In Defence of the *Alter*factual in Historical Analysis

In recent years a small number of so-called ‘counterfactual’ or ‘what-if’ historical books, which ask us to imagine what would have happened if events in the past had turned out differently than they did, have been published. They have stimulated an important, albeit not entirely new, methodological debate about issues and questions which are (or should be) of central relevance to the work of socialist historians, and which such historians need to engage with and contribute towards. This brief discussion article attempts to do this by presenting one particular Marxist viewpoint, with the hope and expectation others (hopefully supportive but possibly critical of the argument presented here) will follow. In the process, it examines the past use (and abuse) of the counterfactual within historical analysis, presents an argument for the validity of a refined and renamed ‘*alter*factual’ approach, and examines the use of such an *alter*factual approach to the British miners’ strike of 1984-5.

In the past a variety of different well-known historians, including Edward Gibbon, Isaiah Berlin, and G. M. Trevelyan, have ventured to address (or at least to pose) counterfactual questions. But one of the most important recent publications within the ‘what-if’ genre is a book edited by right-wing Oxford University historian Niall Ferguson entitled *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*, originally published in 1997 and republished in paperback in 2003. The book contains a series of contributions from different leading historians (many of whom are also right-wing) exploring what might have happened if nine momentous events (mostly twentieth-century turning points) had turned out differently. What if Charles I had avoided the Civil War? What if there had been no American Revolution? What if Home Rule had been enacted in 1912? What if Britain had ‘stood aside’ in August 1914? What if Germany had invaded Britain in May 1940? What if Nazi Germany had defeated the Soviet Union? What if the Cold War had been avoided? What if J. F. Kennedy had lived? What if Communism had not collapsed? As well as contributing one of these essays (on August 1914), Ferguson provides an overview of some of the debates over the last three hundred and fifty years related to the practice of what he terms ‘virtual history’.

Similar counterfactual books have also appeared recently. In the book *What Might Have Been* (2004), Andrew Roberts from Cambridge University, brings together a collection of twelve short essays written by leading (again mainly right-wing) historians (such as John Adamson, Norman Stone, Antonio Fraser and Simon Heffer) to pose other ‘what-ifs’ of history. Examples include: What if the Spanish Armada landed in England? What if the Gunpowder Plot succeeded? What if Great Britain won the American War of Independence? What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand survived Sarajevo? What if Lenin was assassinated at the Finland Station? What if Stalin fled Moscow in 1941? What if the Brighton bomb killed Margaret Thatcher? In addition, David Frum, a former speechwriter and special assistant to President George W. Bush, wonders what if Al Gore had won the 2000 American presidential election (I thought he did).

Meanwhile, the military historian Robert Cowley has also edited three counterfactual books, with the most recent, *What If? America* (2005), also bringing together a collection
of essays written by ‘eminent historians’, this time concerned with potential alternative events in American history. On the basis that there is no such thing as historical inevitability, most contributors attempt to remind us of the role of chance and accident in human affairs, ironically in which illness and weather seem to dominate proceedings. For example: What if the storm-force winds had not blown the Mayflower north to Cape Cod? What if George Washington’s army had not escaped from Brooklyn Heights behind a convenient layer of fog? If the sensible Pitt the Elder had not fallen ill, might he have negotiated for America to remain within a reformed British empire? In addition, the distinguished war historian Antony Beevor wonders whether Eisenhower’s troops might have seized Berlin before Stalin, thereby severely delaying the Soviet atomic programme.

Such alternative histories have not only been penned by academics. One of the towering novels of 2004, *The Plot Against America* by Phillip Roth, imagines a what-if fascist America, where aviator and Hitler-admirer Charles Lindbergh beats Roosevelt to the White House in 1940.

Not surprisingly, although such counterfactual history has been very well received by right-wing historians, as well as by newspapers such as the *Daily Mail*, in a short comment piece in *The Guardian* the leftish historian Tristram Hunt castigated this kind of work, in which:

…there is as much a sense of ‘if only’ as ‘what if’. This is history as wishful thinking, providing little insight into the decision-making processes of the past, but pointing up preferable alternatives and lamenting their failure to come to pass.4

Hunt highlights the way in which many ‘what-if’ authors, such as Niall Ferguson, pursue a conservative political agenda that explicitly rejects Marxist history (mistakenly perceived as being completely determinist) with the ultimate aim of elevating certain powerful individuals (usually generals and politicians) to the heart of their histories. In the process, there is often a relative neglect of the structures, processes and limitations that social context can place on the historical role of the individual.

Significantly, this critique of the counterfactual in historical research has long been common among many historians. For example, E. H. Carr dismissed such exercises as a mere ‘parlour game’, a ‘red herring’.5 From Carr’s point of view there are literally no two ways about it, and questions beginning ‘What If?’ are simply not worth asking. ‘History is…a record of what people did, and not what they failed to do…The historian is concerned with those who…achieved something’.6 Characteristically E. P. Thompson went one stage further, dismissing ‘counterfactual fictions’ as ‘unhistorical shit’.7 Both pointed to the futility of pondering multiple variables in the past and the logical problem of assuming all other conditions remained constant.

However arguably, none of the criticisms which have been hitherto leveled at the counterfactual approach necessarily invalidate a methodological form of inquiry that recognizes the way in which every historical situation contains potential ‘what ifs’. It
does not undermine the value of conceiving of ways in which the actual course of past events might have unfolded rather differently if various actors had acted and organized themselves differently, armed with a different set of capacities and ideas, even if their exact effect cannot be predicted. This is something which is particularly the case not only at times of war (in relation to questions of military strategy) but also during great labour conflict and social revolution. In terms of its general value Hugh Trevor-Roper has commented:

At any given moment there are real alternatives…How can we explain what happened and why if we only look at what happened and never consider the alternatives…It is only if we place ourselves before the alternatives of the past…only if we live for a moment, as the men of the time lived, in its still fluid context and among its still unresolved problems, if we see those problems coming upon us…that we can draw useful lessons from history.8

But even if examination of what did not happen historically is of value, there are, of course, very real problems with much of the counterfactual history that has been produced in the past, particularly in recent years. At this point it is useful to look at the three main limitations of the counterfactual technique in order to posit the possibility of a rather more grounded and methodologically valid approach.

The most frequently raised objection to the counterfactual approach is that it depends on ‘facts which never existed’. It is, critics argue, a technique based on mere fantasy or what Simon Schama calls ‘fairy stories’. Such speculation, it is suggested, is mere entertainment; it is mind games lacking in intellectual rigour or seriousness. Hence, we simply lack the empirical evidence, the knowledge, to answer counterfactual questions.

Undoubtedly this is a charge which is often justified (despite suggestions made otherwise by Niall Ferguson and others) about much of the recent material we have considered. Indeed, the claim that ‘what-if’ history writing is acceptable so long as it is as ‘believable as possible’ does not really hold up when the only constraint most writers appear to impose is merely that potential scenarios are viewed as being ‘plausible’.9 On this very loosely framed basis, while it would clearly be impermissible for Lenin say, to have a nuclear bomb, it is nonetheless viewed as acceptable for speculation about what might have happened if the bombs had fused at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In practice, for many practioneers of the counterfactual approach almost anything (including events that have no connection with conscious human intervention whatsoever) can be included in the ‘virtual history’ that is conjured up. In the process, most tend to discredit themselves by posing, what are in reality, implausible questions or by providing implausible answers. And those historians who favour a postmodern world of contingency for whom one narrative is as valid as another, inevitably end up with the complete blurring of factual, counter-factual and fiction.

However, this lack of empirical evidence need not always be so. One of the better recent attempts to consider an alternative course of events to that which occurred has been provided in the book 1943: The Victory That Never Was by John Grigg, a (by no means left-wing) freelance journalist.10 The thesis of the book is that the Western Allies could and should have invaded France in 1943, rather than in 1944, which would probably have
shortened the Second World War, certainly spared many lives and possibly have altered the course of the subsequent Cold War. Grigg brings a forensic judgment to bear on events and decisions so often regarded as almost inevitable. He convincingly does so not just by criticizing the actions of Roosevelt and Churchill and the brutality of Harris’s bombing policy, but also by dismissing the main counter-arguments to the view that the cross-Channel invasion should have been a year earlier. But what stands out about this account is the way that Grigg utilizes the empirical information and factual arguments that were available (and in part considered) at the time, rather than lapsing into mere wishful speculation or fantasy. Moreover, the analysis of what could have happened helps to provide a more thorough contextual explanation of what did happen.

A second objection to counterfactual history is that, in speculating about potential alternative decisions made by great military and political leaders such as, for example, Napoleon or Churchill, it rips individual human actors from the limitations of their social context and thereby makes the exercise even more pointless and unbelievable. Again, there is evidence to suggest much recent work commits precisely this error. As Marx argued: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’. In these counterfactual scenarios, by contrast, we are often led to believe that powerful individuals, ‘great men’ in history, are free of almost all historical constraints, able to make decisions purely on their own volition.

Yet this emphasis on agency, to the subordination of structure, while common to most counterfactual work hitherto produced (and is not uncommon in more orthodox historical accounts), is also not necessarily an integral part of any attempt to inquire into potential alternative historical events. It is, or should be, possible for the researcher to integrate the interaction between individual choices and historical context; recognizing that while human action itself constitutes and in some circumstances transforms social structures, social structures contain and condition what can be achieved through individual or collective human action. Certainly, Grigg’s work, mentioned above, succeeds admirably in achieving this interface.

A third objection to counterfactual history is that, as Ferguson has suggested, far from being a harmless intellectual pursuit, it pushes a dangerous historical and right-wing political agenda. Once again, such a critique appears well founded both in terms of the political vantage point of most (albeit not all) recent writers and the potential alternative events on which they (or most) speculate. Certainly, it is no coincidence that the most recurring counterfactual is the indulgent dream of: What if Charles I had won, or avoided, the Civil War? And not surprisingly for those preoccupied with military strategy and tactics, no conflict has been more heavily subjected to counterfactual analysis than the Second World War. One publisher, Greenhill Books, even has a special section of its lists devoted to various different outcomes of that war. In the process, it is not difficult to discern the straying from ‘what-if’ to the judgmental ‘if-only’ by armchair ‘would-be’ generals.
Moreover, the way in which Ferguson has (elsewhere) posed the counterfactual question: ‘Would British colonies have achieved more peace and prosperity in the absence of British rule?’ effectively justify the benign effect of British empire, built on genocide and slavery, has also not exactly encouraged a sympathetic approach to the historical method.\(^13\) The same could be said for R.W. Fogel, who in asking whether the United States’ economy could have thrived in the nineteenth century without railways, has gone on to argue that slavery would have survived as a perfectly viable economic system if it had not been eradicated by the Civil War.\(^14\)

Nonetheless, such an explicit right-wing political agenda is not always apparent in counterfactual history, and anyway is by no means an integral part of any attempt to inquire into potential alternative courses of events to those that occurred in historical analysis.

Of course, there is a danger of historians, with the benefit of historical hindsight, superimposing their own, often politically-informed, preferred alternative options on past events. Roger Seifert and Tom Sibley have insisted in the (2005) book *United They Stood: The Story of the UK Firefighters’ Dispute 2002-2004*:

> The point of writing history is to make sure that the actions and views of those involved are reported as they were at the time of the decisions and not re-invented afterwards. Pointless speculation – counterfactual history – about the what-ifs of life serve no purpose other than to undermine the decision capabilities of those involved.\(^15\)

But ironically even such left-wing authors as Seifert and Sibley (who are supporters of the Communist Party of Britain/Morning Star) are not immune from the dangers of advancing a political agenda, even by omission.\(^16\) Significantly, their book received the official endorsement of the Fire Brigades Union general secretary (at the time) Andy Gilchrist and the union’s national executive, presenting what is effectively a semi-official ‘authorised’ history from above viewed through the eyes of national union officers. In the process, it defensively seeks to justify the ‘flexible strategy’ of discontinuous strike action adopted, with its repeated suspension and cancellation of strike days, as the most appropriate means of obtaining a negotiated settlement in difficult circumstances, and claims it succeeded in achieving a tactical, though limited, victory. The authors vigorously seek to denigrate so-called ‘ultra-left’ groups (which became the focus for a growing internal union opposition to the leadership during the dispute and afterwards by calling into question the strategy employed, campaigning for the escalation of action, and bitterly criticising the final agreement) for allegedly being completely unrepresentative of the mass of members.

But readers are not provided with the available alternative arguments or evidence that might contradict the author’s claims, which at the very least would have helped too contextualise and explain the growing disenchantment about the direction and outcome of the dispute that became evident at grassroots level. Such dissent was most spectacularly demonstrated by the overwhelming rejection of the executive council’s recommendation to accept an employers’ offer at the March 2003 recall national delegate conference and the historically momentous decision taken at the June 2004 annual conference to reject
executive council advice and disaffiliate from the Labour Party (both of which are relegated to less than half a page by Seifert and Sibley). Even if a more adversarial union campaign may not necessarily have led to a more favourable outcome, many activists clearly thought otherwise, and the potential effect of an alternative more militant approach was something which would have been important to for historians to consider.

Perhaps the most important point here is that whatever the political partisanship of the historian there should always be an attempt to write in as objective a way as possible (the two are not necessarily antagonistic to each other, although there are admittedly real tensions between them). It is undoubtedly of real significance when reading historical accounts and interpretations to be aware of an author’s political vantage point of analysis (something that should ideally be made explicit). But an equally important methodological issue is that there is no undue skewing of the ‘facts’ to suit the perspective of the author. And if this should be a guiding principle for historians in general then it should also apply to any consideration of potential alternative courses of events to those that actually occurred, not least given its inevitably broader ramifications for our understanding of what did take place.

In other words then, what is being argued is that even if much of the counterfactual history practiced in the past has serious methodological limitations, this is not necessarily to suggest that any type of ‘what-if” historical approach is equally bound to be flawed.

At this point I want to propose a more appropriate term to illustrate the point, namely an ‘alterfactual’ approach. As we have seen, the problem with the way the ‘counterfactual’ has often been used is that it suggests an essentially speculative and even anti-factual interest in the indeterminacy of the future - for example ‘What if Hitler had not come to power?’ By contrast, an alterfactual historical approach is one which is (or at least should be) based on the potential for alternative courses of action taken by actors which genuinely seemed possible at the time; it suggests an historical approach that frames its inquiry through the prism of a context that was shaped by the determinacy of events that actually happened - for example ‘Could Hitler have been stopped?’.

On the basis of the above considerations I would suggest, from a Marxist point of view, that the posing of alterfactual courses of action in historical analysis is perfectly legitimate so long as the following methodological preconditions are applied:

• only those alternative courses of action are considered which were theoretically or practically considered at the time by actors and for which there is some historical empirical evidence are valid

• there is appropriate recognition of the complex dynamic interplay between (subjective) individual choices and (objective) historical material conditions

• the political vantage point of the researcher is made explicit and the reader is invited to judge for themselves if there is any evidence of undue skewing of the available facts to suit the author’s perspective
• any historical inquiry into what might have happened can be shown to be directly related to providing a more comprehensive understanding and explanation of what actually happened.

Whatever the term we use - Alan Fox has referred to ‘suppressed historical opportunities’17 - if these four conditions are applied, I would suggest the posing of alterfactuals about what might have happened if alternative choices had been made and events had turned out differently can potentially enrich our understanding of the past.

In fact, labour and socialist historians frequently discuss alternative courses of action available to historical actors; although they go on to explain why one course of action was chosen rather than another. In this way they often do not merely examine choices and events that happened and ask ‘why?’ - they also look at alternative choices and events that did not happen and ask ‘why not?’ One example of this can be briefly explored, namely the 1984-5 British miners’ strike.

It is noticeable that in relation to this epic labour struggle some historians have adopted a limited alterfactual approach (although, of course, such a term is not used) in examining the impact of the decision made by the National Union of Miners (NUM) executive not to organize a national ballot from the outset of the dispute. While some commentators have assumed that a ballot would almost certainly have been unsuccessful, others18 have argued that if such a ballot had been organized, accompanied by a broad political campaign to explain the reasons behind a coalfield strike, a majority vote in favour could have been won; this could have won the support of most Nottinghamshire miners and given the strike the greater political legitimacy that in turn could have led to a more successful outcome. Even though this is an alterfactual (rather than counterfactual) interpretation that can be challenged - as it was at the time – (see below) it is nonetheless an undoubtedly valid alternative course of action for historians to consider.

Similar questions could be posed about other tactical decisions made in the 1984-5 miners’ strike.19 For example, it is possible to consider a potential alternative course of action to that which occurred in the first days of the strike. During this period the Yorkshire flying pickets that converged on the Nottingham coalfield were criticized by the Notts area NUM officials (with left-wing Notts area secretary Henry Richardson refusing to publicly dispute miners’ ‘right to work’ despite his appeals not to cross picket lines) and Yorkshire Area NUM officials ordered the withdrawal of the unofficial pickets to allow a Notts area ballot to take place. It is possible that if, from the onset of the strike and before the huge subsequent police operation that was mounted, striking miners had been provided the opportunity to explain their case face-to-face to working miners with the aim of trying to bring the pits out, the division that developed between Nottingham and the rest of the coalfields would not have been so fatal.

Certainly, this tactic operated successfully in South Wales where the sanctity of the picket line proved crucial in overcoming the result of individual pithead ballots that had initially recorded opposition to strike action at eighteen of the area’s twenty-eight NUM lodges.20 And there is evidence to suggest that many rank-and-file striking Yorkshire
miners saw such a strategy as both crucial and potentially achievable. For example, one
faceworker from Maltby colliery claimed that during the first week of the strike, the
Yorkshire pickets received ‘95 per cent support’ from miners at Pye Hill colliery, while
at Annesley, ‘we had them out’. By the third day of the strike, production in North
Notts had been halted at eight collieries and reduced at the other six. About 8,000 out of
30,000 Notts miners were brought out through picketing that appealed for united action
and it seems possible many more could have been if the argument that Notts miners had a
direct interest in fighting to prevent future job losses had become more firmly implanted.
However, initial successes proved short-lived in the face of official union opposition and
the subsequently rapidly growing police presence. By the time a Notts miners’ delegate
conference had finally declared the strike action engaged in by those in the area to be
official, it was too late and the majority continued to work.

Notwithstanding the assumption that the NUM’s failure to organize a national ballot was
a ‘tactical mistake’ that inevitably undermined miners’ unity, and that a vote could
actually have been won (a viewpoint held even by left-wing commentators such as Huw
Beynon), there is much evidence to suggest that had a ballot been implemented it
would merely have invited a ‘no’ vote and derailed the entire momentum of the strike
movement. It should be noted that there were a number of crucial arguments advanced at
the time against holding one - the failure to obtain a majority for action in earlier ballots
in 1982 and 1983; the considerable initial success which pickets across the country had in
spreading the strike suggested that their objectives could be achieved without recourse to
a ballot; supporters of a ballot were generally opposed to the strike and knew the media
would mount an unprecedented ‘No’ campaign; there was no guarantee that Notts miners
would join the strike, even if a national ballot had been held and a majority attained
overall; no person should have the power to vote another out of a job. Although a
ballot is unlikely to have secured a favourable majority in Nottingham, it does seem
reasonable to suggest that an active picketing strategy backed up with a propaganda
offensive from the outset of the strike might have won a much larger network of support
in the area, thereby considerably diminishing the damage to the strike that transpired.

Another example of a potential alternative course of action relates to Orgreave, where
- notwithstanding Scargill’s determined personal efforts to encourage a repeat of the 1972
victory at Saltley Gates - NUM area officials (above all Jack Taylor, Yorkshire NUM
president) and the union’s national executive refused to mount mass picketing aimed at
turning ‘Orgreave into Saltley’. Although thousands of rank-and-file miners did take the
initiative from below to converge onto the coking plant (which supplied the Scunthorpe
steel plant), area union officials refused to call mass pickets for more than two
consecutive days and rejected the attempt to build a consistent and prolonged
mobilization of mass pickets, or to appeal for solidarity strike action or picket line
support from the large concentrations of engineering and steelworkers based in nearby
Sheffield and Rotherham, as was advocated by at least a small core of militant activists in
the Yorkshire area.

Again, it is possible that the adoption of such alternative tactics might have galvanized
sufficient numbers (of hitherto more passive strikers as well as sympathetic local trade-
unionists) to overcome the determination of the state to defeat mass picketing to successfully shut the plant down, which could have marked a symbolic political and psychological (albeit not necessarily industrial) turning point in the strike in a similar fashion to Saltley. This in turn could have boosted the impetus to spread picketing out to other vulnerable areas. Instead, the uneven series of mass pickets that were held were unable to prevent the thousands of police officers equipped with riot helmets, shields, truncheons and horses at their flanks, inflicting some of the greatest violence seen in an industrial dispute since before the First World War.

Of course, there were enormous potential objective constraints (such as the difficult economic environment, the extent of the state’s offensive, and the decline in the level of confidence generally inside the trade union movement) to the implementation of such alternative tactical initiatives that need to taken into consideration. But these constraints by no means rendered such potential initiatives inoperable. Certainly, any historical inquiry about them is not to be compared to the traditional counterfactual historical approach based on pure wishful thinking, on speculation about decisions made by individual leading figures that run against the overall material context in a completely implausible fashion. On the contrary, these were potential initiatives that at least a minority of actors argued in favour of at the time and might have succeeded in implementing, despite the obstacles (from the employer, government, police, and other union members) they confronted. However, even if such initiatives had been taken, it is probably unlikely that the eventual outcome of the strike would have been a miners’ victory, although impossible to know. But it is a justifiable question to pose, not least because the lack of such tactical initiatives may, along with other factors, have actually contributed to the miners’ defeat.

No doubt some people will dispute the validity of the alterfactual methodological approach adopted here as a pointless exercise; what happened in the past happened and no amount of alternative contemplation will change that or is worthwhile. But arguably the re-evaluation of any major historical event, and in particularly those that have involved workers’ battles against employers and governments, is a valuable exercise, not least because inquiring into what might have happened helps to provide a more comprehensive explanation of what actually happened. Beyond this, an alterfactual approach can also make a significant contribution to what might be regarded, by some at least, as another central purpose of history, namely to learn lessons for the future. In terms of the example we have examined this can either be specific (for instance, the efficacy of ballots and/or picketing in industrial disputes) or more general (for instance, the problematic nature of a divided union). If we accept such a purpose for studying history, then examining alternative course of action can be seen not as an attempt to rewrite history but an effort to either emulate or not to repeat it. At the very least, whatever the limitations of the counterfactual approach as practiced in the past, this does not mean we have to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’.

6 Ibid., p. 105.
9 Roberts, op. cit, p. 7.
11 See book review by Roger Darlington at http://www.rogerdarlington.co.uk/history.html
21 Ibid, p. 102.
27 For a full evaluation of these see Darlington, ‘There is No Alternative’, op. cit.