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Parentheticals and Point of View in Free Indirect Style

1. Introduction

In linguistics, parentheticals have been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. However, not all analyses focus on the same range of phenomena. Thus those linguists who study language as a form of social interaction have tended to treat parentheticals as examples of the sort of disfluency which characterizes unplanned discourse. Their examples include hesitations, revisions and self corrections, incidental comments about what is being said in the host utterance, self-addressed questions and reminders, responses to something external to the conversation, and questions designed to elicit feedback or to check attention, for example:

- (1) Uh around the end of the century – it was 1899 wasn't it – Elgar came along with the Enigma Variations (ICE-GB S1b 032 044: cited in Wichmann 2001)
- (2) That's a little bit of uh – how shall I put it – uh uhm uh arrogance that has still got to be eliminated uh in my life. (ICE-GB S1b 041: cited in Wichmann 2001).

Such disfluencies, claims Wichmann (2001:189) are 'evidence that speakers have trouble planning their utterances, but are constrained by interactional principles to keep talking'.

In contrast, syntacticians, who are, after all, interested only in syntactically licensed structures, exclude examples such as (1) and (2), and focus on what Wichmann (2001) calls 'syntactically anchored' parentheticals such as the non-restrictive relative clause in (3), the nominal appositions in (4), and the parenthetical adverbial clause in (5):

- (3) Penn, who last week received an Oscar for his role in Clint Eastwood's *Mystic River*, may also have thought of Eastwood's previous picture, *Bloodwork*... (*Observer* 7 March 2004)
- (4) Paul, an ailing mathematics teacher with a few months to live, receives the architect's heart in a successful transplant and hires a seedy private detective to discover the identity of his donor. (Film review *Observer* 7 March 2004).
- (5) My idea, if you really want to know, was to treat the phenomenon as a conventional implicature.

For them, the question is whether such structures can be accommodated within a grammar in which notions of immediate dominance and linear precedence play a central role.¹

Somewhere in between these two approaches, pragmatic analyses have treated parenthetical utterances as examples of the way in which speakers may form their utterances in order to encourage the recovery of a particular interpretation. Thus my (2005, 2006, 2007) analyses have excluded the sort of disfluencies illustrated in (1) and (2). At the same time, however, they are not restricted to the syntactically licensed examples in (3) – (5), but also include examples such as those in (6) – (8), where the intervening material is pragmatically integrated with the host even though it is not syntactically related.²

- (6) It's been a mixture of extreme pleasure – I've had hundreds of letters from all sorts of people who have enjoyed the book – and considerable irritation because of being constantly interviewed. (ICE-GB S1b 032 046: cited in Wichmann 2001, my underlining)
- (7) The driver of Al-Kindi's only remaining ambulance – the other three have been stolen or looted – had disappeared. So the dangerously ill Mr Khassem was bundled into a clapped-out rust-bitten Moskavich 408. (*The Independent* 16/5/03, my underlining).
- (8) What is obvious – and we have eye-witness reports – is that they were killed. (from a discussion of the causes of the extinction of the population of Easter Island, BBC, Radio 4, 26 August 2005, my underlining).

In this paper, my interest lies in the use of parenthetical structures by writers of fiction, and in particular, by writers of free indirect style or thought (FIS). It seems that interest in the role of parentheticals in free indirect style is largely restricted to those parentheticals which explicitly indicate the source of the represented thought and its mode of representation (See Banfield 1982: 76- 88; Ehrlich 1990: 11- 14; Fludernik 1993: 165, 240-1, 285- 297). (9) and (10) are Ehrlich's (1990) examples from *To the Lighthouse*, while (11) and (12) are my own examples taken from Lowry's *Under the Volcano* (underlining is my own in each case):

- (9) Her shoes were excellent, he observed. (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 22)
- (10) Human relations were all like that, she thought, and the worst (if it had not

been for Mr Bankes) were between men and women. (Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 107)

(11) Yvonne knew where she was now, but the two alternatives, the two paths, stretched out before her on either side like the arms – the oddly dislocated thought struck her – of a man being crucified. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 319)

(12) So the ‘other’ had come again. And now gone, he thought: but no, not quite, for there was still something there, in some way connected with it, or here, at his elbow, or behind his back, in front of him now (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 96)

The significance of these parentheticals lies in the way they affect the interpretation of their hosts. As Reinhart (1983) has argued, sentences of FIS which contain such parentheticals are subject oriented in the sense that the content of their hosts must be interpreted as being represented from the subject’s perspective. In contrast, in an indirect thought or speech report the attributed thought is being represented from the speaker’s (narrator’s) perspective. Compare the free indirect thought (*de dicto*) report in (13), which exhibits the characteristic forward pronominalization together with obligatory tense agreement, with the indirect thought (*de re*) report in (14):

(13) He_i was drunk, thought John_i.

(14) John_i thought that he_i was drunk.

Whereas (13) will be true if and only if John actually had a thought identical to or at least closely resembling the thought in the host, (14) does not require that John had such a thought – the speaker may have simply inferred (14) on the basis of his observation of John's behaviour (his decision not to drive home, for example).

As Ehrlich (1990) shows, this contrast is nicely illustrated by the difference between (15), which is acceptable, and (16), which is semantically anomalous:

(15) Oedipus_i believed that his_i mother wasn't his_i mother.

(16) His_i mother wasn't his_i mother, Oedipus_i believed.

In (15) the attributed assumption is being represented from the point of view of the speaker, who in contrast with Oedipus, knows that Jocasta is Oedipus' mother. Accordingly, Oedipus is not being attributed with a contradictory belief. However, in (16), which exhibits the characteristic forward pronominalization and obligatory tense agreement of sentences of FIS, this speaker oriented interpretation is not possible, and the speaker will be understood to be attributing a contradictory belief to Oedipus.

However, parentheticals in FIS are not restricted to clauses which explicitly indicate the source of a represented thought. One can find the same sorts of parenthetical phenomena as one finds in impersonal descriptive discourse in which events and states of affairs are reported from an objective perspective or in planned personal discourse in which events and states of affairs are reported from the writers/speaker's point of view. And because a writer uses FIS to represent the thoughts of a character who is not himself/herself engaged in a (deliberate) act of communication or spoken discourse

which is not planned, one can also find the sort of parenthetical disfluencies which characterize unplanned personal discourse. In other words, we have the same range of parentheticals which I have illustrated above in (1) – (8).

Thus for example, the extract in (17), which is a representation of M. Laruelle's thoughts, contains a straightforward example of a syntactically anchored appositive relative clause, while the extract in (18) contains both a syntactically anchored parenthetical and a parenthetical which, although it is not syntactically licensed, is related to the host at a level of pragmatic interpretation in the sense that it makes a meta-linguistic comment on a word used to refer to the Consul:

- (17) But there was a slight hitch apparently. For whereas the submarine's crew became prisoners of war when the Samaritan (which was only one of the ship's names, albeit that the Consul liked best) reached the port, mysteriously none of her officer's was among them. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 38, my underlining)
- (18) Had his discovery of the Consul here in Quauhauac really been so extraordinary, the discovery that his old English playmate – he could scarcely call him 'schoolmate' – whom he hadn't seen for nearly a quarter of a century was actually living in his street, and had been, without his knowledge, for nearly six weeks. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 22, my underlining)

In (19) the first parenthetical is syntactically unlicensed – it is a sort of repetition – but nevertheless can be said to play a particular role in the pragmatic interpretation of its host and hence cannot be said to be a disfluency. However, the second is the sort of digression which is said to characterize unplanned spoken discourse.

- (19) Perhaps there was no time either, in this stone retreat, perhaps this was the eternity that he'd been making so much fuss about, eternity already, of the Svidrigaliov variety, only instead of a bath-house in the country full of spiders, here it turned out to be a stone monastic cell wherein he sat – strange! – who but himself? (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 296, my underlining)

Similarly, in (20) we have a self-addressed question analogous to the ones which are classified as digressions in interactive approaches to parentheticals:

- (20) But just at that moment steps sounded, and, looking in the mirror, she saw George bowing in the doorway. How queerly he smiled! It was the mirror, of course. She turned round quickly. His lips curled back in a sort of grin, and - wasn't he unshaved? – he looked almost green in the face. (Mansfield, 'Revelations', *The Collected Short Stories*, 194, my underlining)

The aim of this paper is to examine the way in which such parentheticals function in FIS, which, as we have seen, represents the characters' memories and thoughts about events and states of affairs from their perspectives rather than from the perspective of the narrator. If sentences of FIS are subject oriented in the way that Reinhart and Ehrlich have argued, then one might expect that parentheticals of the kind illustrated in (17) – (20) are themselves subject-oriented, and that they must therefore be interpreted as part of the content which is being attributed to a character. In other words, one might expect that in FIS a parenthetical will be interpreted as being part of the thought it represents and utterances in exactly the same way as the exclamatives, expressives, repetitions and appositional pseudo-repetitions in (21):³

- (21) That was the way to live – carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes into the firm, wrinkled sand. To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow of life, but to give way to it – that was what was needed. To live – to live! (Katherine Mansfield, 'At the Bay', *The Collected Short Stories*, 209, my underlining)

If this does turn out to be the case, then this would be another respect in which utterances of FIS contrast with utterances which provide indirect thought or speech reports. For as Potts (2006: 38-9, 213) has shown, parentheticals are among a class of phenomena which are 'speaker oriented' in the sense that they do not fall within the scope of indirect thought and speech reports. Thus even though the parenthetical

underlined in (22) interrupts the sentence which is attributed to Bill, it will not itself be interpreted as part of what Bill said. It will be interpreted as a *speaker* commitment rather than an assumption which Bill is represented as being committed to, and one cannot accuse the speaker of speaking falsely if Bill had never said or thought that the fact that Ben is a committed functionalist is common knowledge:

- (22) Bill said that Ben, who, as everyone knows, is a committed functionalist,
was reading *The Minimalist Program*.

Similarly, a speaker who reported the journalist's utterance in (7) (above) cannot be construed as reporting that the parenthetical was part of what the journalist had said. It would have to be attributed to the *speaker* of the indirect speech report:

- (23) He said that the driver of Al-Kindi's only ambulance – the others have all been stolen or looted – had disappeared.

However, in this paper I shall argue that the contrast between FIS parentheticals and indirect discourse parentheticals is not quite so straightforward. We have already seen that a represented thought may be interrupted by a parenthetical in which the narrator attributes the source of the represented thought. However, as we shall see, there are also other types of pragmatically integrated parentheticals which interrupt a passage of represented thought but which seem to reflect the narrator's consciousness rather than

that of the character whose thoughts are being represented. There are also parentheticals which are part of a represented thought but which interrupt a passage of description in the narrator's own voice. And there are parentheticals which interrupt a passage of represented thought but which seem to reflect the consciousness of another character. In other words, parentheticals in FIS seem to play an important role in creating what Auerbach (1968, cited by Ehrlich 1990:7) has described as 'a multi-personal representation of consciousness'.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section, I discuss how we might approach the way in which thought is represented in FIS from a relevance theoretic perspective, focusing on first, the idea that FIS represents 'internal speech' (Dillon & Kirchhoff 1976); and, second, the question of how we should see the role of the narrator in FIS. In section 3, I return to parentheticals and show, first, how they function in FIS extracts which are interpreted from the perspective of a single subject of consciousness, and finally, how parentheticals in FIS can be used to contribute towards a 'multi-personal representation of consciousness'.

2. Free indirect style and the representation of thought

2.1 *FIS as a representation of 'internal speech'*

Free indirect style is sometimes compared to a narrative style in Japanese – *non-reportive style* (cf Kuroda 1973) - in which the narrator identifies with the characters involved in the described events so that we view or witness events from their perspective. The author who adopts this style is sometimes said to 'reveal' or show the thoughts or 'inner speech'

of his/her characters (cf Chatman 1978, Ehrlich 1990) rather than tell the reader what those characters thought and did. In fact, one cannot reveal or show a character's thoughts in the same way, say, one shows someone the contents of a cupboard by opening it. No-one, authors included, has a direct line to another person's thoughts. All we are given are the utterances produced by the author, and even if these were viewed as the utterances that would be made by the author's character (but see below), one cannot *identify* these public acts with that character's essentially private thoughts. As Sperber & Wilson (1995) have emphasized, public utterances are not themselves 'inner speech', but are evidence from which we can derive meta-representations of someone's thoughts, and, perhaps, more generally, his state of mind. That is, even if we were to assume that the author's utterances are to be interpreted as utterances that would be made by one of his characters, they cannot be identified with the thoughts they are intended to represent. The reader is intended to use them as linguistic clues for the derivation of meta-representations of that character's thoughts or state of mind.

Of course, the utterances that we read are *not* made by a fictional character, but by the author who is *representing* that character's consciousness. As Sperber & Wilson (1995) have shown, no utterance which is used to represent another person's utterance or thought should be assumed to be a literal reproduction of the original. One can only assume that it resembles it in respects which are relevant in a given context. In fact, as Fludernik (1993: 408) argues, in FIS the linguistic evidence which the author provides for a character's thought cannot be seen as a quasi-verbatim representation of actual utterances or speech or even of actual thought. In many cases, these representations are schematic and even clichéd, consisting of language which is not obviously attributable to

either the author or his character. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, Dillon & Kirchoff (1976) and Fludernik (1993) have shown that the clichéd and schematic nature of the language of FIS can be exploited for ironic purposes.

The idea that the material that appears in FIS is to be understood as ‘a representation of a character’s expressions or thoughts *as he would express them*’ (Dillon & Kirchoff 1976:431, my emphasis) is an illusion - an illusion derived at least in part by the use of a variety of linguistic forms and constructions which are said to characterize direct speech. Thus the literature on FIS draws attention to the use of what Potts (2006) describes as SPEAKER ORIENTED expressions and constructions such as expressive adjectives, expressive epithets, and, as we shall see in Section 3.1, parentheticals. These expressions are speaker oriented in the sense that whatever they communicate must be attributed to the speaker even when they are used in an utterance which (explicitly or tacitly) attributes a thought to another person. Consider, for example, the expressive in (24):⁴

(24) [B has been reading a letter]

A: Well?

B: The bastards are refusing to reimburse me.

While A will understand B to be attributing the thought that the referent of *the bastards* are refusing to reimburse him to the author of the letter, he is unlikely to understand him to be attributing the author of the letter with the assumption that his company merits the

expressive epithet *the bastards*. Whatever is communicated by this epithet will be attributed to B himself.

Similarly, whatever is communicated by the repetition in (25) must be attributed to the speaker even though it is part of an utterance which attributes an assumption to another speaker:

(25) [B has been reading a letter]

A: Well?

B: They are very sorry and they're going to give me ten pounds, ten pounds.

In contrast, the expressive in (26) and the repetition in (27) will be attributed not to the author, but to the character whose thoughts are being represented (Peter Walsh in (26) and the child Sun in (27)):

(26) He would go to Clarissa's party, because he wanted to ask Richard what they were doing in India – the conservative duffers. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 142, my underlining)

(27) The lovely food that the man had trimmed was all thrown about, and there were bones and bits of fruit peel and shells everywhere. There was even a bottle lying down with stuff coming out of it on to the cloth and nobody stood it up again.

And the little pink house with the snow roof and the green windows was broken – broken – half melted away in the centre of the table. (Mansfield, Sun and Moon, *The Collected Short Stories*, 160, my underlining)

Since these constructions are speaker oriented in the sense just explained, their use would suggest that the reader is expected to identify the author's character as the 'speaker' in each case.

However, this cannot be a speaker in the sense of someone who literally speaks or even in the sense of someone who is communicating. As we have seen, this 'speaker' is not necessarily engaged in a communicative act: he may simply be engaged in an act of thinking. And where a character is engaged in a communicative act, this is not presented as one in which the reader is involved as audience. It is simply one which we 'over-hear' – much in the same way, as we over-hear conversation a recording of conversation on a tape or CD which we happen to find.

But this would seem to raise the question of what justifies any effort which the reader invests in processing the text which represents these thoughts or utterances. For a reader must invest the same sort of effort in processing FIS utterances that he would invest in the recovery of information from any act of communication. Thus he must use contextual assumptions to develop the linguistic clue given into a fully propositional representation and to understand its relevance in the text. For example, in the following extract, the reader must use contextual assumptions about Buckingham Palace (e.g. it is

the official London residence of British sovereigns) in order to achieve a full understanding of Richard Dalloway's thoughts:

- (28) As for Buckingham Palace (like an old prima donna facing the audience all in white) you can't deny it a certain dignity, he considered, nor despise what it does, after all, stand to millions of people (a little crowd was waiting at the gate to see the King drive out) for a symbol, absurd though it is; ... (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 104)

Moreover, FIS includes expressions and constructions which do not correspond to conceptual constituents of thoughts but which simply serve as a means of triggering a process which yields an impression of a character's state of mind. For example, according to Potts (2007:165), the use of expressive adjectives (*damn*), epithets (*the bastard*) and exclamations (*God almighty!*) such expressions not encode concepts, but rather 'reveal ... the perspective from which the utterance is made' and thus 'have a dramatic impact on how current and future utterances are perceived'. Thus the (repeated and embellished) expressive in (29) reveals the perspective from which we should understand the utterance *he might have known all the time*:

- (29) On the day bed Hugh wrestled with his cigar. God almighty. Good God all blistering mighty. He might have known all the time. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 176)

In other words, while the reader's interpretation is constrained by the expressive, he still has to engage in a certain amount of inferential work.

Similarly, according to Sperber & Wilson's (1995) analysis, the interpretation of (27) would be accounted for by assuming that the repetition is an encouragement to expand the context which has been made accessible by the repeated word, and in this way derive a range of assumptions about Mansfield's character (the child, Sun) that he would not have recovered otherwise. However, as they point out, the audience is not given any particular information about the way in which the context is to be expanded, or about the extent of the expansion. The form of the utterance simply suggests a line of processing and the responsibility for exploring the context is given to the reader.

According to Sperber & Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory, communicated information comes with a guarantee of OPTIMAL RELEVANCE, so that that any effort an audience invests in its interpretation is rewarded by cognitive effects, or in other words, by an improvement to the MUTUAL COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT of communicator and audience.⁵ In the case of utterances such as (27), where much of the responsibility for interpretation is given to the audience (cases of WEAK COMMUNICATION), utterances do not add entirely new assumptions to the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer, but 'marginally increase the manifestness of a great many weakly manifest assumptions', thus creating common impressions rather than common knowledge' (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 224). In other words, the audience is rewarded by an increased sense of affective mutuality rather than an enlarged mutual cognitive environment.⁶

According to Sperber & Wilson, the principle which provides this guarantee is grounded in a cognitive principle about the way people process information: they aim to

achieve the greatest possible COGNITIVE EFFECTS for the least amount of processing. In cases where information has not been ostensively communicated, there is no guarantee that processing effort will be rewarded. However, when this principle is applied to communicative behaviour where the communicator's intention to communicate is overt, it gives rise to a specific expectation of relevance simply by virtue of the fact that it is an overt demand for attention. The point is that if the narrator is identifying with a character who is not engaged in an act of communication, then it would seem that there can be no guarantee that the effort we invest in processing the evidence provided will yield a relevant interpretation.

Indeed, as Ehrlich (1990: 105) points out, FIS texts are characterized by sudden topic shifts – shifts which would not be made by someone who is aiming for optimal relevance. Lowry's representation of M. Laruelle's unfinished thought in (30) is typical:

(30) Yet in the Earthly Paradise, what had he done? He had made few friends. He had acquired a Mexican mistress with whom he quarrelled, numerous beautiful Mayan idols he would be unable to take out of the country, and he had –

M. Laruelle wondered if it was going to rain: it sometimes, though rarely, did at this time of the year, as last year, for instance when it rained when it should not. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 16)

However, while M. Laruelle's train of thought may not itself be constrained by the search for optimal relevance, Lowry's act of showing us this thought is. As Sperber &

Wilson (1995:52-3) have argued, even where an act of showing provides strong direct evidence for the basic layer of information (as in the case of opening a cupboard to let someone see the contents), there is an intention to draw some attention to the fact that the act was intentional and hence that the audience can assume that by paying attention they will discover relevant information. As we have seen, the evidence provided by an author who uses FIS is indirect in the sense that the reader must infer or work out the character's thoughts from the linguistic properties of the utterances together with contextual assumptions. A reader will only invest the sort of effort that is required for these inferences because he has recognized that there has been a communicative intention, and hence that he will be rewarded by an interpretation which is optimally relevant. The point is that the communicative intention must be attributed to the author who is revealing his character's thoughts. As Ehrlich (1990:10) says, 'there is always an intermediary between the reader and the character's speech and thought' – an intermediary whose presence is indicated by the presence of formal properties of indirect discourse, for example 3rd person (rather than 1st person) pronouns and back-shifted tense.

Nevertheless, the presence of such an intermediary does not mean that the effort invested in the interpretation of an FIS text is rewarded by improvements to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author. The reader of an FIS text is not intended to recover meta-representations of the author's thoughts about his character's thoughts, but is given the impression that he is being given evidence for the character's thoughts or state of mind. In other words, the sense of mutuality which is created by the author is a sense of mutuality between reader and character.

If this is right, then FIS cannot be treated alongside examples such as (24) and (25) and ironic utterances as tacitly attributive uses of language, as Wilson (2006) suggests. The idea underlying this analysis is that while all utterances are interpretive representations of thoughts entertained by the speaker, and hence involve one level of meta-representation, an utterance which is used attributively involves a further level of meta-representation, since the thought it represents is itself being used as an interpretation of another (attributed) thought.⁷ Utterances such as (24) and (25) achieve relevance in virtue of what they communicate about the content of the attributed thought, while ironic utterances are relevant in virtue of what they communicate about the speaker's attitude towards the attributed thought – specifically, the speaker of an ironic utterance will communicate an attitude of dissociation from this thought (see below).⁸ The point is that in either case, it will be assumed that any effort invested in interpreting the utterance will be rewarded by improvements to the mutual cognitive environment of audience and speaker rather than the mutual cognitive environment of audience and the person whose thought or utterance is being represented.

However, it seems that the reward for interpreting an FIS text is not the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author, but a sense of mutuality between the reader and the character whose consciousness is being represented. The notion of interpretive use, and in particular, the extra level of meta-representation it requires does not capture the impression that the evidence that we are given for these characters' thoughts is more direct than in cases such as (24) and (25). As we have seen, this impression is achieved by the use of speaker oriented expressions and constructions

which, in contrast with their use in tacitly attributive uses of language, reflect the perspective of the narrator's characters rather than the narrator himself.

At this point the suggestion seems to be that we should remove the author from the picture completely. This would give us analysis more in line with Banfield's (1973) conception of FIS as 'speakerless' text which exhibits no linguistic evidence of a speech event. However, it seems that it would also leave us with the problem of explaining what provides the reader with the justification for investing effort into processing the text. Moreover, as I have suggested, FIS includes ironic representations of a character's thoughts, a phenomenon which would seem to suggest an authorial presence. And as Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) and Fludernik (1993, chapter 6) show, complex FIS texts may include passages which are authorial in origin.

In fact, there are really two separate questions here, and correspondingly, two different senses in which we may think of the author as being 'present' in an FIS text.⁹ On the one hand, there is the question of why a reader should pay attention to the text at all. The answer to this lies in what Fludernik (1993:65) describes as the 'image of a narrator *qua* producer of the narrative ever hover[ing] on the horizon of the reader's consciousness'. As producer of the narrative, the author is responsible for revealing the consciousness of his character(s), and thus provides us with a guarantee that the effort we invest will be rewarded. In this sense, the author is present simply in the sense that the assumption that it is the author's act of ostension which provides the reader with the expectation that any processing effort will be rewarded.

The other question is frequently presented as a question about 'voice', or sometimes 'perspective', namely, whose voice is the reader 'hearing' in FIS texts, or

from whose perspective should an FIS text be interpreted? I would suggest that this question be re-analysed as a question about the mutual cognitive environment which is affected by the interpretation of the text. On this analysis, an FIS is ‘speakerless’ in the sense that the sense of mutuality that is achieved is not a sense of mutuality between the reader and author (qua producer of the text), but a sense of mutuality between reader and character. In other words, the examples in this section would seem to suggest that there can be a dislocation between author qua source of the guarantee of optimal relevance and ‘voice’ in the sense that that the relevance of the text is not necessarily defined in terms of an improvement to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and author. However, in the following section we shall see that there are FIS texts which do not exhibit this dislocation and the linguistic evidence orients the reader towards the author rather than his character. Indeed, as we shall see, there are a variety of ways in which an author may communicate an ironic attitude towards his character(s) and in this way develop a sense of collusion between himself and his reader(s).

2.2 *Authorial intrusion*

It has been argued (e.g. by Banfield 1973: 29) that not only can there be a one ‘subject of consciousness’ for a single sentence of FIS, but that the identity of this subject of consciousness will remain the same over an entire stretch of coherent text (1973:34).

However, as Dillon & Kirchoff (1976:433) have shown, this sort of model would only work for what they call ‘simple’ works in which all the events and thoughts are presented from the perspective of a particular character. Thus they suggest that it might work for Joyce’s story *Eveline* or Fowle’s *Ebony Tower*. However, it is more questionable, they

argue, whether it would apply to complex works where not only does the point of view change from one sequence to another but also the author interrupts a character's train of thought with a contribution of his own. As I have suggested, parentheticals can be used to interrupt a character's train of thought in this way. However, the examples of passages which are authorial in origin discussed by Dillon & Kirchhoff and, more recently, Fludernik (1993) provide a useful backdrop for the discussion of the parenthetical phenomena in Section 3, and accordingly, we shall look at some of them here.

As we have seen, in FIS the narrator uses deictic expressions which indicate current time or proximate referents even though the fictional world is located in the past and in a distal location. This indicates that utterances should be interpreted as representations of the current thoughts of the character. Consider the use of *now* and *here* in (31) and (32), for example:

- (31) How continually, how startlingly, the landscape changed. Now the fields were full of stones. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 15, my underlining)
- (32) And the echo came back: "Orio." – Why, the mad pictures of the wolves! He had forgotten they were here. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 232, my underlining)

However, as Dillon & Kirchhoff show, the narrator may use a distal demonstrative (*that*) with a character's proximate demonstrative (*this*) in order to intrude on the character's thoughts. Their example is given in (33):

- (33) It was her deep distrust of her husband - this was what darkened the world. That was a sentiment easily indicated, but not so easily explained.
(James, *Portrait of a Lady*, my underlining)

This intrusion does not, however, have to be interpreted as an indication of the narrator's own consciousness. Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976: 435) argue that 'as long as the narrator maintains some marks of the character's point of view, his observations may be taken as something the character might have thought, had he stopped to generalize. The effect is that the generalization is latent in the thought of the character and hence is one that a relatively intelligent character might himself make'.

As we have seen, expressive language and interjections are amongst the formal devices said to be used by readers to identify a passage of FIS as a representation of a character's thoughts. However, as Dillon & Kirchhoff have shown, such language is not always attributable to a character. Consider, for example, the following passage from Mansfield's 'At the Bay', where in the utterance beginning *but no* the narrator moves from the rather critical voice of her character Beryl to a more detached voice which is not that of the servant girl Alice herself (note the inverted comma's around the word which, I assume, is taken from Alice's own vocabulary) but which nevertheless one which is more sympathetic towards her:

- (34) And where did a girl like that go to in a place like this. She supposed Alice

had picked up some horrible common larrikin and they'd go into the bush together, Pity to make herself so conspicuous; they'd have hard work to hide with Alice in that rig-out.

But no, Beryl was unfair. Alice was going to tea with Mrs Stubbs who'd sent her an "invite" by the little boy who called for orders.

(Mansfield, *At the Bay*, *The Collected Short Stories*, 228).

And indeed, it is only a matter of another short paragraph before Mansfield is identifying with Alice completely and we begin to view events from Alice's own perspective.

However, the narrator is not always sympathetic to the character whose thoughts are being represented. As Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976) have shown, the narrator can indicate his dissociation from the thoughts that are being represented. Thus they argue that in the following extract, the utterance introduced by the sentence adverbial *as a matter of fact* indicates a view which contrasts with that of the character whose thoughts are being represented in the preceding segment: Mrs Verloc, who has just killed her husband, is panicking and hysterical, while the narrator is cool, detached, and perhaps ironic:

- (35) She looked up mechanically at the clock. She thought it must have stopped. She could not believe that only two minutes had passed since she had looked at it last. Of course not. It had been stopped all the time. As a matter of fact, only three minutes had elapsed from the moment she had drawn the first deep, easy breath after the blow, to this moment when Mrs

Verloc formed the resolution to drown herself in the Thames. (Conrad,
The Secret Agent)

As we have seen in the last section, Sperber & Wilson (1995) treat irony as a variety of tacit attributive use of language in which the speaker is communicating an attitude of dissociation from the attributed thought represented. Thus the utterance in (36) is on the analysis outlined an interpretation of a thought which is being used as an interpretation (or echo) of an attributed thought from which the speaker is understood to be dissociating himself:

(36) How generous. After all that inconvenience they are going to reimburse me the princely sum of ten pounds.

By indicating that he is dissociating himself from the thought echoed, the speaker is not simply rejecting the thought echoed: he is also ridiculing it. However, the responsibility for deciding just how ridiculous it is to give someone £10 in the context in which (36) is uttered is given to the hearer. In this way, the utterance achieves relevance in virtue of a range of weakly communicated implicatures which communicate the speaker's attitude towards the thought echoed.

However, the point here is that this range of implicatures is recovered only if it is possible to recognize that the speaker is dissociating himself from the thought echoed. It might be thought that since such dissociation would be impossible in a 'speaker-less' text in which the speaker's own voice is suppressed, we should not expect to find irony in a

text in which the only voices are those of the characters whose thoughts are being represented. The fact is that we do. In some cases, the required dissociation is achieved by the author by reminding the reader of his presence. Thus not only do we have the 3rd person pronouns of indirect speech and thought, but we also find other more ironic forms of reference (for example, Conrad's use of *Widow Verloc* to refer to a character who has just murdered her husband). Or the author may use vocabulary which would not be used by the character whose thoughts are being represented or which provides only a clichéd representation of those thoughts (cf Fludernik 1993). Or, as we will see in 3.2.1, the author may even provide a commentary (in a parenthetical, for example) so that the thoughts that are represented are placed in a ludicrous light.

In other cases, however, characters are simply allowed to speak for themselves in contexts which revealed not just through the narrator's descriptive commentary but also through the represented thought of other characters, and as we all know, some speakers are able to make themselves look ridiculous simply by opening their mouths.

This suggests that there is not, after all, a single subject of consciousness in an FIS text and that the sense of mutuality it communicates may be either a sense of mutuality with the character whose thoughts are being represented or a sense of mutuality with the author who is representing that character's thoughts. A parenthetical and its host may represent the consciousness of a single subject and contribute to the sense of mutuality between reader and character. However, we should not be surprised to find parentheticals which communicate a thought from one perspective but which interrupt a thought presented from the perspective of another. In particular, we should not be

surprised to find parentheticals which are authorial in origin but which provide a context for the character's thought represented in the host.

3. Parentheticals in FIS

3.1 Parentheticals and affective mutuality

Self-interruptions, digressions, and revisions are characteristic of spontaneous, unplanned discourse. Thus a speaker may be prompted to interrupt his own utterance because of an event or state of affairs in the environment which is perceived by the speaker as requiring an immediate response. Consider, for example, the utterance of the 'Fire!' mid-utterance during a lecture, or 'Pass me a pen' uttered mid-sentence by someone taking a message on the telephone.¹⁰ Alternatively, a revision may reflect the difficulties that the speaker is having finding the most appropriate means of representing a concept or thought.

It is not surprising that an author whose aim is to represent thoughts which themselves are unplanned should produce utterances containing similar kinds of interruptions and revisions. Consider, for example, (37), where Mansfield's character (Monica) is distracted by something she has noticed suddenly, and (38), where the revision is intended to reflect Miss Brill's difficulty in identifying the emotion she is experiencing:¹¹

- (37) But just at that moment steps sounded, and, looking in the mirror, she saw George bowing in the doorway. How queerly he smiled! It was the mirror, of course. She turned round quickly. His lips curled back in a sort of grin,

and - wasn't he unshaved? – he looked almost green in the face.

(Mansfield, 'Revelations', *The Collected Short Stories*, 194, my underlining) (= (20) above).

- (38) And when she breathed, something light and sad – no, not sad exactly – something gentle seemed to move in her bosom. (Mansfield, 'Miss Brill', *The Collected Short Stories*, 331, my underlining)

In some examples, a parenthetical interruption simply reflects the haphazard order in which a character is identifying and responding to the elements of a complex situation which he comes upon. Thus Lowry's use of parentheticals in his representation of Yvonne's thoughts as she enters the bar at the Bella Vista contributes to a complex structure which reflects the complexity of the memories and emotions which are being evoked. Since it is not possible to quote this passage in full, I simply extract the following here:

- (39) The bar was empty however.

Or rather it contained one figure. Still in his dress clothes, which weren't particularly dishevelled, the Consul, a lock of fair hair falling over his eyes and one hand clasped in his short pointed beard, was sitting sideways with one foot on the rail [.....] talking apparently to himself, for the barman, a sleek dark lad of about eighteen, stood at a little distance against a glass partition that divided the room (from yet another bar, she now remembered now, giving on a side street), and didn't have the air of

listening. [...] She saw she was mistaken about the barman: he was listening after all. That is, while he mightn't understand what Geoffrey (who was, she noticed, wearing no socks) was talking about, he was waiting (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 50, my underlining).

Similarly, the use of parentheticals on the opening page of *Mrs Dalloway* reflects the disordered and, perhaps, unexpected, nature of Clarissa's memories of Peter Walsh – for example:

(40) It was his sayings one remembered; his eyes, his pocket-knife, his smile, his grumpiness and, when millions of things had utterly vanished – how strange it was! – a few sayings like this about cabbages. (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 5, my underlining)

Now, I have argued elsewhere (Blakemore 2005, 2006) that even in spontaneous discourse the processing effort entailed by a parenthetical interruption may be justified in terms of the speaker's aim of optimizing relevance. In spontaneous discourse, stylistic decisions are made 'on the trot' and are affected by the audience's own contributions and reactions to the discourse. Within these parameters, it may be relevant to modify or revise a stylistic decision mid-utterance if it allows the hearer to construct the right hypothesis about his informative intention without investing unnecessary processing.¹²

However, as we have seen, the fictional characters whose thoughts are being represented in FIS are not themselves engaged in ostensive communication and cannot be

said to be constrained by the communicative principle of optimal relevance. This suggests that if we attribute the disruptions in the examples above to the character whose thoughts are being represented (rather than the narrator), then it would seem that we cannot say they are justified by the aim of optimizing relevance. In other words, it seems that there can be no sense in which an interruption to the structure of an utterance which we attribute to an author's character can be made with an audience in mind.

There is no doubt that in spite of the formal features indicating the presence of a narrator, we *are* intended to attribute these structures to the author's character in each of the examples in (37) – (40). In this respect, they contrast with parentheticals in tacitly or explicitly attributive utterances, where they cannot be interpreted as being part of what is being attributed. For example, in contrast with the revision in the FIS example in (38), the revisions in the constructed examples in (41) and (42) must be attributed to the narrator rather than the subject.

(41) Apparently, when she breathed something light and sad – no, not sad,
gentle – moved in her bosom.

(42) She said that when she breathed something light and sad - no, not sad,
gentle –moved in her bosom.

But this does not mean that the effort which must be invested in the interpretation of the forms that result from the use of parentheticals such as the ones in (37) – (40) is unjustified. As we have seen, it is the *narrator's* communicative act of revealing their characters' thoughts which justifies the effort which we invest in the interpretation of an

FIS text, and this includes the effort which is invested in the interpretation of these parentheticals. That is, while we are intended to attribute these parentheticals to a non-communicating (fictional) character who does not have an audience in mind, we are also intended to attribute the decision to make these parentheticals publicly available to an author who does.

However, in the cases considered in this section, the reward for this effort does not lie in a meta-representation of the *author's* thoughts and an improvement to the mutual cognitive environment of reader and *author*. The reader is rewarded by a heightened impression (or illusion) that he has the sort of direct line to a character's private thought/s which in reality he cannot have. Thus it could be said that these disruptions allow the author to capture the difficulties a character is presumed to have when he experiences a feeling which he does not recognize or which surprises him; to capture the intensity of a feeling or thought which a character is feeling; and to capture the way that the train of a character's thoughts may be interrupted, perhaps because it reminds him of another or perhaps simply because he has just noticed something in the environment. In this way, they allow the reader to gain an impression that he is recovering a more accurate meta-representation of a character's thoughts and thought processes – or in Sperber & Wilson's (1995) terms, an impression of affective mutuality between himself and a fictional character.

3.2 Parentheticals and the multi-personal representation of consciousness

As we have seen, authors of FIS texts do not always leave their characters to speak for themselves. Their characters are left to speak in a context which is sometimes made

accessible by the representation of the consciousness of other characters, and sometimes provided by the author's own descriptive commentary. By contextualizing the representation of a character's thoughts in this way, the author may, in some cases, establish the sort of dissociation which is required for irony. In other cases, the context simply plays a role in enhancing reader's own meta-representation of the consciousness represented by the author thereby contributing to the impression of affective mutuality just discussed. In this section, we will examine the role that parentheticals play in contextualizing the author's representation of a character's consciousness. The parentheticals discussed in 3.2.1 provide a context for enhancing the reader's impression of affective mutuality between himself and a fictional character, while those discussed in 3.2.2 contribute to the impression of ironic distance.

3.2.1 Contextualizing parentheticals

As I have shown elsewhere (Blakemore 2005, 2006), in some cases a parenthetical is pragmatically integrated with its host in the sense that the assumptions they communicate alter the context for its interpretation. For example, in (8) (repeated as (43) below), the parenthetical plays a role in the interpretation of the evidential status of the proposition that the Easter Islanders were killed, or the hearer's understanding of the sense in which the proposition can be said to be obvious:

(43) What is obvious – and we have eye-witness reports – is that they were

killed. (from a discussion of the causes of the extinction of the population of Easter Island, BBC, Radio 4, 26 August 2005).

And in (44) (from Blakemore 2005), the *and*-parenthetical refines the audience's search for the contextual assumptions which enable him to interpret the repetition in the host. Thus while the repetition (which was given emphatic stress in this reading) encourages the audience to re-visit the contextual assumptions made accessible by his concept of a helicopter for the derivation of implicatures which capture the excitement of traveling in a helicopter, the parenthetical ensures that he will imagine the prospect of traveling in a helicopter for someone who has never flown in any kind of plane at all:

- (44) A helicopter, a helicopter – and here was me who'd never even flown in an ordinary plane – would come and pick me up at (from reading of *Stargazing: memoirs of a young lighthouse keeper*, by Peter Hill, abridged by Laurence Waring, read for Radio 4 by David Tenant)

A similar phenomenon is found in FIS. For example, in (45) the parenthetical is a descriptive commentary provided by the author that allows the reader to recover the reference for *this very theatre* in the representation of M. Laruelle's thought in the host.

- (45) Strangely, that particular film had been scarcely better than the present version, a feeble Hollywood product he'd seen some years before in Mexico City or perhaps – M. Laruelle looked around him – perhaps at this

very theatre. It was not impossible. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 30, my underlining)

It seems that by providing this commentary, the author not only allows the reader to recover a meta-representation of M. Laruelle's thought but also a meta-representation of the processes involved in having it, thus increasing the sense of immediacy or affective mutuality between reader and character .

Similarly, in (46) the parenthetical is a commentary provided by the author, while the host is a representation of a thought which must be attributed to his character, Hugh. In this case, the commentary in the parenthetical ensures that the reader not only recovers a meta-representation of Hugh's thought, but also a meta-representation of Hugh's emotions as he has this thought:

- (46) At all events, he thought, his guitar had probably been the least fake thing about him. And fake or not one had certainly been behind most of the major decisions of his life. For it was due to a guitar he'd become a journalist, it was due to a guitar he had become a song-writer, it was largely owing to a guitar even – and Hugh felt himself suffused by a slow burning flush of shame – that he first gone to sea. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 159, my underlining).

In some cases, it seems, the author's parenthetical commentary contributes to the reader's interpretation of the surrounding text simply providing the reader with a

representation of the physical context in which the character whose thoughts are being represented is engaged in thought. For example, Woolf's representation of Peter Walsh's consciousness as he returns to his hotel and dresses for dinner is interrupted by a number of parentheticals which create a picture of Walsh as he thinks. The following extract has been abridged for convenience:

- (47) He became absorbed; [...] now surly, now gay, dependent on women, absent minded, moody, less and less able (so he thought as he shaved) to understand why Clarissa couldn't simply find them a lodging [...]. And then he could just – just do what? just haunt and hover (he was at the moment actually engaged in sorting out various keys, papers), swoop and taste [...]; and yet nobody of course was more dependent on others (he buttoned his waistcoat). He could not keep out of smoking-rooms [...], liked bridge, and above all women's society, and the fineness of their companionship, and their faithfulness and audacity and greatness in loving which, though it had its drawbacks, seemed to him (and the dark, adorably pretty face was on top of the envelopes) so wholly admirable, so splendid a flower to grow on the crest of human life, and yet he could not come up to the scratch, being always apt to see round things (Clarissa had sapped something in him permanently), and to tire very easily of mute devotion and to want variety in love ... (Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 140-1, my underlining)

Thus the first four parentheticals in this extract enable us to imagine Walsh as he shaves, buttons his waistcoat, shuffles his papers, and becomes distracted by the picture of Daisy. And this picture encourages us to imagine other thoughts which Walsh might have, but which are not actually represented in the text thus contributing to our sense of immediacy.

The final parenthetical in the extract is rather different, since it is related to the host in the sense that it provides an explanation for the thought it represents, and its attribution is less obvious. It could be Walsh's answer to his own question (raised by his own thought) and thus part of his own thought processes. Or it could be the author's answer to a question which might be raised in the mind of the reader, in which case it is another example of the sort of phenomenon illustrated in (45) and (46).

Parentheticals may also play a role in shifting the focus from one perspective to another. In some cases, the parenthetical simply establishes a contrast between two different points of view. For example, Lowry's representation of Senor Bustamente's thoughts about the Consul is interrupted by a number of parentheticals representing utterances made by M. Laruelle's:

- (48) Actually Sr Bustamente seemed half convinced that M. Laruelle had been taken in, that Senor Firmin had really been a sort of spy, or as he put it, spider. [...] Sr Bustamente was prepared to be sorry for the Consul even as a spider, sorry in his heart for the poor lonely dispossessed trembling soul that had sat drinking here night after night (though she came back, M. Laruelle almost cried aloud, that was the extraordinary thing, she came

back!) and possibly, remembering the socks, even by his country ...

(Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 36, my underlining).¹³

In other cases, however, the parenthetical establishes a distance or dissociation between two subjects of consciousness so that one places the other in a ludicrous light. We turn to such cases in the following section.

3.2.2 Parentheticals and ironic distance

The extract in (49), is taken from Mansfield's story, *Prelude*. Although Mansfield seems to move back and forth from the perspective of Linda Burnell to that of her husband, Stanley, in this part of the story, it seems that we are intended to empathize with Linda, who is described as being 'worlds away' and watching him 'as if from the clouds'. In other words, we are intended to share her feeling of distance and, indeed, her amusement. The representations of Burnell – his delight in 'firm, obedient body', his annoyance at the 'idiot' who had fastened the neckband of his shirt, and indeed the parenthetical in (49) are all gently ironic:

- (49) He began parting his bushy ginger hair, his blue eyes fixed and round in the glass, his knees bent, because the dressing table was always – confound it – a bit too low from him. (Mansfield, 'Prelude', *The Collected Short Stories*, 25, my underlining)

In *Under the Volcano*, Lowry's representation of the Consul's consciousness is not only divided between different voices (the voice of temptation and the voice of resistance), but is also viewed from different perspectives (for example, the (often deluded) perspective of the Consul himself and the (more objective) perspective of other characters). The distance between these voices allows Lowry to create an ironic representation of the Consul without providing any commentary of his own. Thus in (50) both parenthetical and host might be said to be in the Consul's voice. However, the parenthetical undermines the Consul's triumph over the voice of temptation - his 'pleasant and impertinent familiar, perhaps horned, prodigal of disguise, a specialist in casuistry' – represented in the host:

(50) 'I don't believe you believe in the strychnine somehow,' the Consul said, with quiet triumph (there was an immense comfort however in the mere presence of the whisky bottle) pouring himself from the sinister bottle a half-tumblerful of his mixture. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 74, my underlining)

Similarly, in the following the voice of the disillusioned, defensive drunk in the parenthetical is interpreted against the background of the more objective description in the host, and in this way placed in a ludicrous light:

(51) The drink situation was now this, was this: there had been one drink

waiting for him and this drink of beer he had not quite drunk. On the other hand, there had been until recently several drinks of mescal (why not? - the word did not intimidate him, eh?) waiting for him outside in a lemonade bottle and all these he had and had not drunk: had drunk in fact, had not drunk as far as the others were concerned. (Lowry, *Under the Volcano*, 304, my underlining)

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that FIS contains features which enable the author to establish the illusion of a direct line between the reader and the character whose consciousness he is representing, or, in other words, a sense of affective mutuality between reader and character which is unmediated by the presence of the author. Thus one can say that in many cases the effort which is invested in the interpretation of an FIS text is rewarded by an increased sense of intimacy between reader and character, even though the guarantee that this effort will be rewarded derives from the author's act of ostensive communication.

At the same time, I have argued, there are features of FIS which lead to an increased sense of mutuality between reader and author, and a corresponding impression of distance between reader and character. In such cases one might say that the reader is rewarded by a sense of absurdity and even a sense of collusion with the author. These features are not restricted to the use of third person pronouns or of back shifted tense, but include the sort of devices discussed by Dillon & Kirchoff (1976) – for example, ironic forms of address, the use of vocabulary which is more characteristic of the narrator than

of the character whose thoughts are being represented – as well as the schematic forms of representation discussed by Fludernik (1993).

As we have seen, parentheticals in FIS play both types of role. Thus the interruptions, revisions and digressions discussed in 3.1 contribute to the sense of affective mutuality between reader and character. Similarly, parentheticals which describe the context in which a character is having the thoughts represented can encourage the reader to create meta-representations of thoughts not actually revealed by the narrator, thereby increasing the sense of intimacy between reader and character.

On the other hand, parentheticals can also be used to place a character's thoughts in a ludicrous light thereby contributing to a sense of ironic distance between reader and this character. In such cases, the reader may feel that in recognizing this impression of absurdity he is in collusion with the author – even though he does not make any explicit judgment about his characters. Since irony must be implicit in order to be truly effective, this is not unexpected.

Either way, it seems that the role played by parentheticals in FIS extends beyond that of attributing the source of the thoughts represented, and that they play an important role in enabling the narrator to represent thoughts from a variety of perspectives – including his own.

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comments on the original version. Of course, I remain responsible for all any errors it may contain.

Notes

1. See Emonds (1979), Safir (1986), Taglicht (1988), Espinal (1991), Potts (2005, 2007b) for examples of various solutions to this problem. However, note that not all syntacticians would agree that parentheticals such as these should be accommodated in the grammar. For example, Haegeman (1988) and Burton-Roberts (1998, 2005) have argued that parentheticals are not generated by the grammar as constituents of any structure, but as ‘orphans’ integrated into the host utterance at the level of pragmatic interpretation. However, see de Vries (2002) for criticisms of this approach. I shall remain agnostic on this issue in this paper. However, see Blakemore (2006) for further discussion.
2. Examples are from Blakemore (2005, 2006, 2007). Of course, if Haegeman (1988) and Burton-Roberts (1998) are right and there is no syntactic integration in the examples in (3) – (5), then integration at the level of pragmatic interpretation is all you have in any of these examples.
3. For further discussion of the phenomenon I have labeled ‘appositional pseudo-repetition’ (*carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself*) see Blakemore (2008).
4. See Potts (2002, 2007a) for further discussion of expressives. As Potts (2007a) has shown, it is not impossible to have a context in which an expressive used in an indirect thought or speech report is attributed to the subject rather than the speaker. Thus he cites Angelica Kratzer’s example:

My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster.

The point is that whereas in FIS contexts an expressive is *never* attributed to the speaker, in indirect speech reports and tacitly attributive utterances an expressive is attributed to the subject only in very specific contexts.

5. (i) Sperber & Wilson (1995) define the COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT of an individual as the set of assumptions which are MANIFEST to an individual at a given time, where MANIFESTNESS is defined in terms of the degree to which an individual is capable of representing an assumption and holding it as true or probably true at a given time. A MUTUAL COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT is a cognitive environment which is shared by a number of individuals and in which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other.

(ii) OPTIMAL RELEVANCE is defined by Sperber & Wilson (1995) in the following way:

An utterance is optimally relevant iff:

- (a) it is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it;
- (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

The relevance of an utterance increases with the number of the cognitive effects it yields in a given context, and decreases with the amount of processing effort required for the derivation of those effects. For introductions to relevance theory, see Blakemore (1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004).

6. For further discussion, see Pilkington (2000) and Blakemore (2008).

7. One representation is an interpretive representation of another to the extent that it resembles it in content – i.e. to the extent that it shares logical and contextual implications with it. For further discussion of interpretive representation, see Sperber & Wilson (1995).
8. For further discussion, see Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Wilson (2006).
9. As Fludernik (1993:64) says, the question of whether a speaker ‘exists’ in an FIS text is misleading: ‘if there is a speaker function, a speaker figure is projected from the text’. She continues ‘Texts without a personalized narrator therefore do not ‘have’ a narrator in the strict sense of the term even if readers continually project a vague narrator or implied author figure as the source of the text and its inconsistencies’.
10. For further discussion of interruptions, see Sperber & Wilson (1995), Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002: 164-9).
11. See Blakemore (2008) for the discussion of the role that appositional structures play in communicating a similar sort of impression.
12. For further discussion, see Blakemore (2005).
13. The significance of the socks (‘remembering the socks’) can be found in the passage cited in (39).

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