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Ideology and Total War:
Military Intellectuals and the Analysis of the
Spanish Civil War in Britain, 1936-1943

ALARIC SEARLE

Within the context of interwar military debates, innovation and reform, the Spanish Civil War is generally associated with two armed forces, those of Germany and the Soviet Union. The broad consensus among military historians has been that the Germans learned the key lessons from the conflict, which thus contributed to their ‘Blitzkrieg victories’ in the period 1939-41, whereas the Soviet armed forces failed to draw the right conclusions and, as a result, were brought to the brink of disaster in the summer of 1941. While there are still gaps in the military history of the civil war, there has been considerable recent interest in the contemporary analysis of the war on the part of all the major European powers. It can be argued, though, that the role of the Spanish Civil War in European military debates has been over-simplified: specifically, there has been a tendency to view the assessments as simply revolving around the learning of tactical and technological lessons, even if there has been the occasional attempt to make links between ‘lessons learned’ and the concept of total war.

Most problematic is that this ‘lessons learned’ approach has often led to the unspoken assumption that the analyses of the military events of the war took place in a form of a sober, apolitical environment. Indeed, it is not only military historians who have viewed the military
history of the war within a traditional framework. It is interesting to note here that the leading
German historian of the Spanish Civil War, Walther L. Bernecker, laid out in a study
published in 2005 six areas in which research on the war required renewed efforts: 1.) the pre-
history of the war; 2.) its military history; 3.) the international dimension; 4.) its political
history; 5.) socio-economic aspects; and, 6.) ideology and culture. While his assessment of the
‘desiderate’ for future research was necessarily weighted towards the specifically Spanish
dimensions, and rightly identified a number of military topics which would benefit from
better exploitation of the Spanish archives, he gave no indication that the international
military aspects of the war could also be interwoven with its ideological elements. Although
the non-Spanish military dimensions of the war often fall necessarily within the ‘category’ of
the overall international background to the conflict, even those who have argued that a ‘new
military history’ of the war is needed seem to proceed from a rather narrow,
compartmentalised view of military history.

Given, then, the apparent failure by historians to consider the possible interaction of
the ideological and military dimensions of the civil war, the question needs to be asked: to
what extent did ideology impinge upon the European military debates over Spain? To take the
question one stage further, did ideology merely colour analysis of the conflict, or was the
military analysis itself instrumentalised in support of ideological positions? And, does any
sign of ideological impact on the assessments strengthen the claim that the Spanish Civil War
had at least elements of a ‘total war’? This article will seek to provide tentative answers to
these questions by considering the military debate conducted in Britain during – and in the
wake of – the conflict. This will involve a discussion of: first, the international and political
context of the British debate on the war’s military dimensions; second, the analyses carried
out by British military attachés and intelligence officers; third, the contours of the British
‘defence establishment’ debate over the civil war, with reference especially to the views of
Basil Liddell Hart; and, fourth, the views of three other ‘military intellectuals’ who experienced the war first-hand – J.F.C. Fuller, the retired British Army Major-General who visited Spain as a war correspondent, Tom Wintringham, the ardent Communist and officer in the British international brigade, and a Czech officer who served in staff positions in the Republican Army, and then fled to Britain in 1940, Ferdinand Otto Miksche.

I. The International and Political Context of the British Military Debate

The first consideration in reflecting on the British debate on the Spanish Civil War is that it can be seen that the war appeared to introduce in many minds a division between the armed forces of the democracies and the dictatorships. While the armed forces of the United States, France and Britain carried out analyses of the military lessons of the conflict ‘from a distance’, Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia had military personnel and equipment deployed in Spain and, thus, were all in a position to glean lessons first hand. As a result, not only Britain, but also France and the United States, felt at various stages during the war that they were deficient in adequate intelligence. Hence, there was a clear division between the major ‘totalitarian participants’ and the principal ‘democratic observers’, a point not lost on some commentators in Britain who were well aware of the increasing divergence in concepts of war between totalitarian and democratic states.

A division of the six major powers into democratic and totalitarian is significant for the European military debate because in the totalitarian states, at least in those circles where the civil war was discussed, there was a tendency to focus more on the purely military aspects of the conflict. This could not be clearer in the case of Germany. With few exceptions, the weekly army newspaper, Militär-Wochenblatt, restricted its coverage to reporting on the operational outline of the war, while the journal Wissen und Wehr, which was aimed at higher ranking officers and civil servants, concerned itself principally with its military lessons.
Needless to say, a further contrast between the democratic and totalitarian states in the debate can be seen in the differences in its participants. One can also detect differences in the democracies, too, particularly when one considers the term ‘military intellectual’.

Although it is hard to define precisely, a ‘military intellectual’ suggests a writer who may be either a serving or retired officer, or a civilian with military interests and connections. The idea of a ‘military intellectual’ is peculiarly British, at least for the interwar period, since it suggests a radical streak and some deviation from the official military or government line. While France and Germany had enjoyed a tradition of military commentators even before the First World War, such individuals tended to be very closely associated with their own armed forces. The British concept of a ‘military intellectual’, on the other hand, partly emerged from the national perception that its armed services were lacking in intellectual traditions, but was also a product of the country’s volunteer and ‘amateur’ military culture. So, in Britain, military debates can be taken to refer to discussions either within the military and state bureaucracy, or in a broader, public context, including the contributions of journalists, publicists, politicians and military intellectuals. In other words, the British debate may well have been characterised by some unique features, not found in the Soviet Union, Italy, Germany or France.

The debate in Britain on tactics, technology and the strategic implications of the civil war was not only one which took place against the backdrop of intense ideological conflict, it was just as concerned with the strategic threat posed by ideologies. Essentially, it was the co-existence and combination of professional discussions on the use of armour, aircraft and new technology, and its significance for future war, estimates of the likely duration of the civil war, the strategic implications of its outcome, and the choice of ideological enemy by the respective commentators, which lent the Spanish Civil War its true significance in political discourse in Britain. While it is essential that any analysis of the military debates over the
civil war pay close attention to the crucial role of political ideologies, in the case of Britain the debate must likewise be seen against the backdrop of three prisms through which the war was viewed at the time by large sections of the public.

While the bitter divisions which the war created in British society certainly had some domestic-political causes, the activities of the British volunteers for the international brigades galvanised the left and the British labour movement as a whole. The right clearly disliked the positive emotional effects which the international brigades had on the various campaigns to provide aid to Republican Spain since this was seen as support for Communism. The second area of dispute centred round the official government policy of non-intervention, which came under increasing criticism as the war progressed. On the one hand, Britain had strong strategic reasons for not wanting a Nationalist victory, especially the threat which this could pose to Gibraltar; on the other hand, Conservative opinion either sympathised with the Nationalists (some supported Franco publicly through the association ‘Friends of National Spain’), or it was hoped that Fascism and Communism would savage each other on the battlefield, thus making intervention unnecessary. The third prism through which the war was viewed was military, most prominently (though not exclusively) in terms of what the conflict appeared to communicate as to future threats to the British Isles from National Socialist Germany. The outrage over the bombing of the civilian population by the Nationalist air force, generally equated with the Condor Legion, not only strengthened the moral case for intervention, it also highlighted the need for Britain to overhaul its air defence measures.

In attempting to re-assess British reactions to military developments and the overall strategic significance of the Spanish Civil War, all against the backdrop of ideological conflict, the four military intellectuals who have been selected can be seen as particularly suitable for the task since they symbolise the four principal political ideologies in Europe in the 1930s: the ‘unofficial’ but still highly influential views of Basil Liddell Hart are closely
related to the *Liberalism* of the period, Fuller can be associated with *Fascism*, Wintringham with *Communism*, whereas Miksche represents the political emigré who fled to Britain where he adopted a particular brand of central European *Nationalism*. However, before turning to their views, the contours and nature of the debate over the military dimensions to the Spanish Civil War in Britain cannot be understood without paying some attention to the role of intelligence assessments. Not only do the intelligence reports provide context to the interpretations of the ‘military intellectuals’, they also offer evidence of the ideological dimension to the official analyses.

**II. Whitehall and Intelligence Assessments**

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War caught British intelligence unprepared for the challenge of gathering information. Although after the start of hostilities a series of intelligence summaries began to be issued every three or four days, Report No. 4 of early August 1936 noted that ‘The conflicting reports in the Press, our chief source of information, make it impossible to arrive at any accurate forecast of results.’ An accompanying minute sheet prepared by M.I.3.a. gave some indication of the general attitude in Whitehall: ‘As our Ambassador reported yesterday, [the civil war] seems to be resolving itself into one of Rebel v. Rabble.’ By January 1937, the quality of intelligence had not improved appreciably as made plain by a War Office assessment of the situation on the Madrid front. Referring to the numbers, armament and morale of both sides, it was pointed out that ‘these factors are largely a question of guesswork owing to lack of definite information’.

In March 1937, Sir Maurice Hankey wrote to Major-General R.H. Haining, head of the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office, to ask whether he had received ‘any information containing a little more atmosphere and sidelights’. Haining replied that while ‘a lot of information’ was arriving from Spain, it had arrived ‘a bit late’
since the Foreign Office were opposed to a military representative being posted to Franco’s forces, while the Assistant Military Attaché at Valencia had recently been ‘cold-shouldered’ by the Spanish government. This correspondence led to a minute by M.I.3.b. to the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence on the problem of obtaining accurate intelligence from Spain. It began with the observation that ‘information from Spain of military value is not coming in as fast as I had hoped’. Not only were the press reports ‘not of great value from a technical military point of view’, but interviews with individuals who had recently returned from Spain were on the whole disappointing. Since the Assistant Military Attaché in Republican Spain had sent ‘little information of military value’, it was recommended that a trained military observer be posted to Franco’s forces.15

Some insight into British military intelligence can be gained from a close study of a number of military attaché reports filed from various cities in Spain. The deficits in British military intelligence-gathering are plain from one report completed after a year of hostilities, written by the secretary to the military attaché. This report, which was obviously based on official Nationalist and Republican press releases, sought to provide estimates of the manpower available to the two sides and simply quoted Nationalist claims on the quantity of equipment they had captured. It ended with the common belief at this time, that ‘The possibility of the war being settled by a complete military victory in the near future on one side or the other grows daily less, and if, as seems likely, it is to be a war of exhaustion, Spain will probably be bled white on both sides before the end.’16 The fact that the following year British embassy officials were still relying on journalists for information on the overall condition of both Nationalist and Republican forces, gives an indication of the dearth of reliable intelligence.17

Later reports compiled by assistant military attachés were, however, rather more detailed. Revealing is a report of April 1938 by Major C.A. de Linde, which shows some of
the typical reactions of British military personnel when faced with the conditions in the Spanish Civil War. In addition to reporting his impressions of a visit to Nationalist forces, he emphasized the absence of the feeling that this was a real war. He noted that ‘battles only flare up intermittently, and then only on small portions of the front’, at the same time that little effort was made to harass the opponent as he moved supplies within full-range of the artillery. Yet despite the apparent superiority of the Nationalists in weapons, ammunition, training, transport and foreign aid, Major de Linde concluded that ‘the Government is not yet beaten.’ Still, it should be borne in mind that one of the difficulties facing de Linde was that he was assistant military attaché in Paris at the time and seems only to have had the opportunity of visiting the Nationalist front for around two weeks.

Another military attaché who made observations on the situation in Nationalist Spain was Major Edward Mahoney of the Irish Guards. He had previously served as the ADC to the British commander at Gibraltar, was a Roman Catholic and had a Spanish wife. It may well have been that this background had some influence on his positive portrayal in November 1937 of the ‘normal and well ordered’ life of Nationalist Spain, as well as the ‘present impression of efficiency, completeness of turnout and cheerfulness of all ranks’ in Franco’s army. His conclusion that not only was the morale of the Nationalist troops high, but that the ‘Government forces lack leadership and are poor in the offensive’, was not unreasonable, although it lacked differentiation. Still, he thought that a collapse through internal dissension was possible on either side. Despite the likely bias which Mahoney’s personal background suggested, a Colonel in the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence recommended that Mahoney be paid £10 ‘for his trouble’.

Another report by Mahoney of November 1938 displays further examples of the thinking which infused British military attitudes towards the war in Spain. The Spanish soldier was regarded as inferior to the northern European combatant: ‘The Spanish soldier is
seen to greatest advantage in defence. This role spares him the trouble of having to think, or having to keep his eye on all the time his leader, a very marked characteristic, due probably to a very low standard of education.’ There was a general attitude of contempt towards the effectiveness of the combatants on both sides. At this late stage in the war, Mahoney saw little prospect of a Nationalist victory on the battlefield, since ‘the Republic can probably resist indefinitely with the resources or manpower available within their territory, provided their supply of war material is not reduced.’ He concluded by predicting that the war would only end as a result of a collapse of one side due to ‘internal political disunity or through starvation’. Nonetheless, even the much better placed German ambassador in San Sebastian could observe on 19 October 1938 that ‘A military decision is unlikely in the foreseeable future’, adding that he thought ‘only substantial foreign supplies to one side could swing the balance in the immediate future.’

What is interesting about many of the attaché reports is their general nature: in other words, while the Germans were conducting tactical experiments under combat conditions, the British were reduced to trying to build up a broad picture of developments by conducting brief, supervised visits to battle zones. It seems significant that in only one of the principal attaché reports before the Nationalist victory did an assistant military attaché emphasize the constant numerical superiority of the Nationalist air force, noting at the same time the qualitative inferiority of the Republicans in cadres. In this report, of December 1938, the attaché noted that the Nationalists had on some occasions underestimated the fighting capacity of their opponents in the battles for Madrid from November 1936 to March 1937. Nonetheless, throughout the report there were frequent references to ‘national character’ as an explanation for military inefficiency: ‘Partly as a result of the climate in which he lives the Spaniard is liable to violent extremes of feeling and opinion, oscillating rapidly from despair to over-confidence.’
The difficulties under which the attachés laboured in the first half of the conflict led military intelligence to make use of various visitors, mainly to Nationalist Spain, who reported their impressions. This information was coloured by many of the weaknesses of the military attaché reports. Thus, in an interview with the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, an M.P., Wing-Commander A. James, noted the lack of artillery fire and that he had never seen a wounded man. Moreover, one of the main obstacles for Franco’s forces was ‘the Spanish national temperament’, which apparently caused them to ‘keep on making the same mistakes in military art’. In addition to frequent remarks on ‘the Spanish temperament’, there were turns of phrase in some reports which hinted at how the war was perceived by the author, such as the following example from a report by an army officer of May 1938: ‘The Spaniards appreciate the kind assistance of the Italians in the war against Bolshevism [emphasis added] and consider it well meant.’ It was only rarely that correctives to the information being culled from visits to Franco’s Spain were provided by informed visitors to Republican territory who had access to high-ranking military personnel.

Nonetheless, as the war progressed, the Sub-Committee on Air Warfare in Spain began to produce detailed reports for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on subjects such as ‘Low flying attack on Land Forces’ and ‘Air Attack on Ships’. However, even as late as July 1938 General Sir Hugh Elles could complain to a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in London that there was ‘prima facie a gap in our intelligence’. Elles, who was Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Bombing and Anti-Aircraft Gunfire Experiments, was clearly frustrated at the lack of useable technical data which had been obtained from the civil war for his work on anti-aircraft guns. Obviously, the intelligence emerging from Spain was not contributing to a range of sensitive fields affecting Britain’s defence, hence Elles’ sense of frustration. But, by the final phase of the war, the Sub-Committee on Air Warfare in Spain had begun to produce highly detailed,
technical studies, printed for internal circulation, which combined information gathered from Spain and China on subjects such as air attack on sea communications, air cooperation with land forces, air attack on industry and air defence. At least in the field of air warfare, by the end of the war British intelligence had managed to obtain quality tactical and technical data.

Part of the problem in studying the military attaché and other reports, however, is it is hard to discover exactly who learned which lessons. In Whitehall, there was inter-agency rivalry between the Air Ministry Intelligence Directorate (DDI3), the War Office Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (MI3), and the various diplomatic personnel in France and Spain, who were all competing to interpret the war in a way which supported their own contentions and policy preferences. The fact that the Foreign Office initially resisted the sending of observers to Franco’s forces resulted in private individuals and officers inexperienced in intelligence-gathering being used by the War Office as sources of information, individuals whose assessments were often coloured by their anti-Communist outlook. And, in addition, it was not that easy to decide which lessons were genuinely relevant for a war in Europe. All in all, the results of intelligence-gathering generated some useful insights, but at the same time the tendency to dismiss the Spanish as militarily inferior led to important lessons being ignored.

III. Liddell Hart and the ‘Defence Establishment’ Debate

While there are examples of officers who had provided intelligence assessments for Whitehall participating in the political debate over Spain, others may have been more reticent to make statements in public, whether in order to avoid revealing classified information or the fact that there were gaps in Britain’s intelligence. Nevertheless, there was a ‘defence establishment’ debate on the civil war among leading military experts, politicians, journalists and officers. In this regard, articles and editorials in the leading journal of the British Army, the Army
Quarterly, are revealing, not least of all due to its ‘semi-official’ status. In keeping with the ambivalent attitude towards Germany and Italy in the editorials (the Italian attack on Abyssinia had been criticised only half-heartedly), every argument was brought into play which could be used to defend the British policy of non-intervention in Spain. So, while the civil war was discussed in a rather more detached fashion than developments in the dictatorships, there was an obvious tendency to view the conflict as a clash between ‘Bolshevism’ and Fascism, with apparently more distaste for the former than the latter.

When it came to Spain, two main tendencies can be seen in various comments to be found in the editorials. First, the editor, Sir Cuthbert Headlam, a former General Staff officer and recently ousted Conservative M.P. for the Barnard Castle constituency in County Durham, lent his support to the official British policy of non-intervention and, second, he let no opportunity pass to attack the position of the Labour Party and other left-wing groups. In October 1936, for example, ‘so-called progressive politicians’ were criticised because they were opponents of non-intervention. In April 1938, the latest air attacks during the civil war were used not to condemn the assaults against Republican cities from the air, but instead the point was driven home that ‘every effort should be made so to organize our defensive measures in order that the catastrophe of panic among the population should be rendered as harmless as possible.’ The close of the hostilities in Spain provoked the comment in the April 1939 edition that it was very difficult to understand why the opposition in the House of Commons continued to support the Republican movement.

In fact, both the British army and navy maintained a number of basic ideological premises when it came to the war in Spain. Certainly, it appears to be the case that naval officers, despite an attempt to enforce the blockade in an even-handed fashion, and while not taking sides in public, had more sympathies with the Nationalists given the fate of Spanish naval officers at the hands of the ordinary ranks at the start of the conflict. Without saying
as much openly, the army had shown few objections to the Italian intervention in Abyssinia, just as long as it did not present any threat to Britain’s position in the Mediterranean. When Basil Liddell Hart conducted a talk in June 1937 with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Cyril Deverell, the latter stated he found it ‘unfortunate’ that articles by The Times Spanish Correspondent had annoyed the Italians. He also expressed the view that the Italians had intervened in Spain to prevent it becoming Communist, he thought that the Republicans were ‘certain to lose’ and seemed generally uninformed about the extent of foreign intervention.

Behind these partisan views on Spain lay a deep mistrust of the League of Nations, common to all three armed services. Furthermore, throughout the civil war there was a light, but seldom openly expressed, preference for the Nationalist forces under Franco, not only on the part of officers but also among Foreign Office officials. This was particularly obvious when it came to the apparent tendency of serving officers to want to visit Nationalist rather than Republican territory in an effort to glean lessons from the war. There was clearly a pro-Franco bias to some of the – at times unsolicited – reports which were produced, such as one by the commander of the Northamptonshire Armoured Car Company, Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.G. Renton, who thought that ‘Franco’s strategy and tactics are influenced by his determination not only to avoid casualties on his own side, but also to inflict a minimum of casualties on his opponents.

Some reporting also showed a tendency to attribute any examples of Nationalist efficiency to the efforts of German technical advisers and officers and to be correspondingly dismissive of the Italians, as can be seen from information passed to military intelligence by Wing-Commander A. James, M.P., on 1 April 1938, after returning from a visit to the Nationalist sector on the Aragon front. What is particularly interesting is that three days later, responding to Arthur Greenwood’s views on foreign intervention in the House of
Commons, he made a ‘a few observations’ on his trip during which he did everything he could to play down the significance of foreign aid. He made great play of his first-hand experience, subjecting his fellow M.P.s to a torrent of technical military information in a speech lasting three-quarters of an hour. The apparent ‘authenticity’ of his observations was used to conceal politically loaded statements: ‘I can assert from observation that a very large part of the numerical superiority in aircraft and artillery which the Nationalists enjoy to-day is Spanish manned.’ James rejected the view that the conflict was a war between Fascism and Communism as ‘an appalling over-simplification’. The underlying message was clear support for non-intervention, since this would favour the Nationalists, but this was camouflaged by statements like: ‘I believe that when history comes to be written it will be shown that if the policy of non-intervention favoured either side, it favoured the Republic’.43

However, the political discourse did not only involve civil servants and military officers, since civilian commentators with good official connections played their part as well. One influential contributor to the debate on the military dimensions of the civil war was the writer and military correspondent of The Times, Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970).44 Despite the fact that most of his information was based on second-hand accounts, he reached a number of conclusions which were then disseminated through several books, journal articles and newspaper pieces.45 Most significant were his contentions that, by 1938, the Spanish Civil War had begun to prove that the defensive was the strongest form of warfare, that to prefer offensive forms of combat would undermine the morale of the attacker, that air bombardment had not led to the dramatic results which many had anticipated and, finally, that a multiplicity of defensive measures could seriously reduce the impact of air attack. He was worried by the prospect of a Franco victory, mainly because he thought this would threaten Britain’s strategic position in the Mediterranean.46 It seems clear that in his assessment of the conflict he was
more or less in line with Liberal opinion in Britain and France which viewed Spain mainly through the prism of the German strategic, military – but also ideological – threat.\textsuperscript{47}

Nonetheless, despite the fact he did not visit Spain himself, as Britain’s leading military commentator he was able to meet with a range of foreign and domestic civilian and military officials, as well as journalists, who had visited both Nationalist and Republican forces.\textsuperscript{48} What is particularly interesting is that by 1937 he was clearly of the opinion that Britain ought to side with the Republicans, telling the First Lord of the Admiralty Duff Cooper in November of that year that he could not agree with him that Britain could not afford to take the risk of trying to stop Italy and Germany in Spain.\textsuperscript{49} At the same time, he reached the conclusion that the majority of atrocities had been committed by the Nationalists and turned against those right-wingers who had come out in support of Franco. In June 1937 he rebuffed an invitation by the editor of the conservative \textit{English Review}, Douglas Jerrold, to dine with a member of Franco’s staff at the Athenaeum.\textsuperscript{50} In February 1938 he reflected in a note: ‘As a result of steadily collecting and weighing the evidence from Spain for many months I have now reached the conclusion that those who in this country desire the victory of Franco are traitors to England and all that England stands for.’\textsuperscript{51}

His interpretation of the significance of the military developments in Spain was treated as an important contribution to the debate at this time and he appears to have influenced the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain through his book, \textit{Europe in Arms} (1937). Yet Liddell Hart largely used his interpretation of events to bolster a position he had already begun to champion before the civil war: the need for Britain to avoid a ‘continental commitment’.\textsuperscript{52} His private reflections on the civil war also reveal that he was in many ways afraid of the power of modern technology, noting in mid-1937: ‘The most virile and united of people would not be able to withstand another... inferior to it in all natural qualities if the latter had some decisively superior technical appliance.’\textsuperscript{53} It was not that there were no other writers
providing thought-provoking interpretations of the conflict. The prolific military writer, Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, for example, showed a clear grasp of the significance of the tactics and technology on land, at sea and in the air in a book published in 1938.54 The problem was that more people were prepared to listen to Liddell Hart, who was adept at passing on his ideas to politicians in private correspondence, successfully packaging them as based on confidential military information.

When it came to the strategic implications of the civil war, though, Liddell Hart’s arguments did carry a certain logic. Considering the situation in early 1938, he thought that the German Anschluß with Austria was not as important as the outcome of the war in Spain. In fact, he still thought it possible that allowing the sale of arms to the Republic would force the Germans and Italians into a military competition in which they would be unable to compete with France and Britain. He was sceptical of the argument that Franco would ditch his allies once he had won, pointing out that both the church and the army in Spain had been pro-German during the First World War.55 When it came to the importance of the Iberian peninsula for Britain’s supplies, he emphasized strongly the potential disaster which a Franco victory could spell for Gibraltar, not least of all since air and naval bases could be made available to Germany or Italy, who could then threaten British ships either leaving or entering the Mediterranean.56

The problem with Liddell Hart’s thinking on Spain was not simply that he had not been able to witness the conflict first-hand. Out of step with Conservative military opinion in his political sympathies and strategic assessments, he also tended to ascribe Nationalist success almost exclusively to German-Italian military aid. Revealing is a note describing a talk with Republican generals, in particular General Menendez who had commanded the Levante Army, in which he uncritically accepted their opinion that ‘in modern warfare the artillery conquers and the infantry merely reconnoitre and occupy’. The record of the
conversation, which had taken place only two months after the end of the war, contained nothing in relation to other tactics, or for that matter to airpower. Given Liddell Hart’s claims about the increasing power of the defensive, into which his views on the tactical lessons of the fighting in the civil war were conveniently slotted, it is important to compare his views with those ‘military intellectuals’ and commentators who actually witnessed the conditions in Spain for themselves. This brings us to three very different individuals – Fuller, Wintringham and Miksche – whose ideas differed in many important respects from the ‘official’ and ‘semi-official’ debate in Britain.

IV. Military Intellectuals and the Analysis of the Civil War

Major-General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966), who visited Spain on three occasions as a war correspondent, is a good example of the pro-Franco tendencies of the British armed forces. The use of language in his newspaper reports, such as in the dramatic, anti-Republican articles he wrote for the Sunday Dispatch, provides further evidence of the anti-Communist attitudes prevalent in wide circles of British officers. He also wrote contributions for the British Union of Fascists’ paper, Action, as well as the party’s journal, the British Union Quarterly, not least of all as he had become a member of the BUF in 1934. But regardless of the publication, the message was invariably the same: Franco had united his forces behind him, while the ‘Reds’ were gripped by chaos and a lack of discipline. Fuller argued frequently that the war would be a fight to the finish and that in all probability Franco was likely to win; and, this victory would be important in containing Communism.

In keeping with the thrust of his journalistic pieces, Fuller also engaged in pro-Nationalist propaganda, publishing a pamphlet in a series which contained contributions from several British supporters of Franco, as well as a string of articles in the journal, Spain, which was published by the Nationalist Press Service. It was this open support for Franco which
provoked a strong dispute with his close friend from the early 1920s, Basil Liddell Hart. Fuller first attacked Liddell Hart’s views on the employment of tanks in Spain in a letter to the *Times* in April 1937. The ensuing correspondence led to Liddell Hart criticising Fuller’s Fascist views in a letter to him the following month, bringing up at the same the parliamentary and press discussion of the raid on Guernica and heaping scorn on Nationalist denials of involvement. This letter saw the breakdown of a seventeen-year friendship.62

There was, however, another dimension to Fuller’s visits to Nationalist Spain: the writing of intelligence reports for the War Office. Given the sympathies of many high-ranking army officers, it is not that surprising that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote to Fuller, pointing out that Britain had no official attaché seconded to the Nationalist forces. Requesting his assistance in the collation of intelligence, he remarked, ‘There are many points upon which we want all the information we can get.’63 In his reports, Fuller sought to provide, based on the Francoist view of the situation which he had received, an analysis of military developments. His first report of March 1937 emphasized that the war was a ‘city war’ and that German anti-aircraft guns had been highly effective. The Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office was positive in his assessment: ‘It has the merit of being less partisan than the majority of the reports which we have received; consequently it is obviously of great value.’64 In a report he produced on his visit in October 1937, he commented on the discipline of troops, Republican tanks at the Battle of Brunete, desertions, air bombardment, air defence and future operations. A military intelligence assessment of the information took issue with some of his comments on air attack and defence, but it noted that his ‘general remarks… confirm the impressions previously gained.’65 However, the reaction to his final report of April 1938 was rather more muted.66 So, was there anything useful in his military analyses?
The first point which needs to be made is that there was often disagreement among military observers over the emerging tactical lessons of the war. On the question of tanks at least, Fuller did not allow himself to be distracted from the big picture, concluding that due to the combatants, the types of tanks employed, and the terrain typically encountered, there were no clear lessons to be drawn for a future European war.  

He also succeeded, despite his pro-Franco rhetoric, in distilling some of the essential truths of the war without descending into the clichéd views of Britain’s military attachés. In an article published in the *Army Quarterly*, he pointed out that the civil war could only be understood if one considered the extremely mountainous nature of the terrain in the country and the poor state of all subsidiary roads. He was convinced that Franco was a sound strategist, who was determined to pacify the areas he had conquered before undertaking major operations, but that he was constrained by the wishes of Mussolini upon whom he was highly dependent in the opening year of the conflict. He also pointed to the lack of military discipline among the Republican forces, arguing that action for them was a form of propaganda.

While he often used ideological vocabulary, and made frequent comparisons with the Russian Civil War, he was also fond of identifying similarities with the American Civil War, in 1938 referring to Madrid as the ‘Richmond of this war’. When the military officer stepped forward and the propagandist disappeared, the parallels with the American Civil War took over. He saw the Battle of Aragon as ‘the Vicksburg of the war’, while he observed in April 1938 that ‘Franco has succeeded in cutting Red Spain in two, just as, in 1863, Ulyssess S. Grant cut the confederacy in half when he gained control of the Mississippi.’ He also thought that even with discipline and spirit ‘the Reds’ would not win if they did not have a preponderance in armaments – ‘This caused the ruin of the Confederates in 1862-1865’. In actual fact, the parallels between the Republican side and the Confederates, in his view both seemingly destined to lose, seem extremely poignant.
Surprisingly, there was a form of intellectual link between Fuller and a major military thinker on the left in Britain, Tom Wintringham (1898-1949), who was an active member of the British Communist Party in the interwar period. Prior to the civil war he had been a journalist who had already displayed some interest in military affairs while writing for the *Workers’ Weekly* and *Daily Worker*. Before leaving for Spain he had produced two general military studies and, in the first, he had quoted copiously from Fuller’s 1932 book, *The Dragon’s Teeth*, remarking that Fuller seemed to agree with Friedrich Engels on the social impact of the introduction of gunpowder. In the second, on mutinies in history, he argued that the Nationalist mutiny in Spain was atypical and that it had increased the danger of a general war.

Having joined the British international brigade in 1936, he was wounded twice, returning to England in November 1937. The following year he was expelled from the Communist Party of Great Britain on account of an affair with an American journalist which he refused to break off. Although he maintained his political views, unshackled from the constraints of party discipline he was able to write with greater freedom. The first product of his experience in Spain was a memoir, *English Captain* (1939), which contained noteworthy portrayals of individuals and the fighting he had observed. Wintringham dismissed the idea that the Spanish were poor soldiers, but they were lacking in training and the basic skills of soldiering. He was impressed with the effects of air action on mechanized columns, especially at Guadalajara, concluding that while infantry could advance in daylight with difficulty, it would be suicidal if mechanised columns attempted daylight movement on roads without anti-aircraft cover.

Towards the end of the book, and quoting an article by Fuller, he drew fairly negative conclusions as to the utility of tanks. He argued that they were not the solutions to problems of the attack, noting the heavy casualties sustained by the Republican Tank Corps at the Battle
of Brunete. His experience was that even a lack of anti-tank guns was not an insurmountable problem for a defender: field artillery could be easily pressed into service in an anti-armour role. He also dismissed the argument that Spain was unsuitable tank country, and likewise the argument that the German and Italian tanks were simply too primitive, citing cases where allegedly German medium tanks had been destroyed. According to Wintringham, efforts to make the tank conform to ‘the theories of Fuller and other advocates of complete mechanization were bad failures’. Tanks would simply not replace infantry in modern war. Despite some qualifications, he reached a generally negative verdict on the tank in Spain.76

It is worth mentioning that before sending *English Captain* to the publishers, Wintringham had contacted Basil Liddell Hart in September 1938 with the request that he read some of the chapters. He also noted slightly obsequiously: ‘A passing reference to yourself in connection with modern theories of war may need some modification, as you are less easy to classify than some others.’77 Liddell Hart had no time to deal with Wintringham’s requests and also side-stepped an approach by Wilfried Roberts, a Liberal M.P., requesting that Liddell Hart write an introduction to Wintringham’s book.78 Clearly Wintringham was after two things: on the one hand, he was anxious to secure Liddell Hart’s endorsement as, presumably, a means of improving sales; on the other hand, it seems he was uncertain about his own theories on modern warfare and wanted Liddell Hart to provide comments.

Although he had already been expelled from the Communist Party of Great Britain the previous year, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939 must have come as a deep shock to Wintringham. In all probability it sealed his commitment to throwing his weight behind Britain’s efforts to fight the National Socialist state, the more so after the outbreak of war. The first year of war saw him secure a job on *Picture Post* and an increase in his journalistic activity.79 Much of this work was designed to boost morale on the home front, but some of his writings reveal more on his views of the lessons of the Spanish Civil War. In
a manuscript which appears to have been written for Military Intelligence, dated 28 September 1939, he sought to downplay the significance of German armour successes in Poland, arguing that ‘Anti-tank guns have not yet been tested in large-scale warfare’. He concluded that ‘the German tanks, that have proved so useful in Poland... will not be nearly so valuable to the German High Command when sent against enemies better prepared and equipped.’ In a piece written the following month, and titled ‘German Tanks’, he predicted that a German armoured breakthrough in the West could be brought to a halt by ‘determined infantry’, as he anticipated that the German tanks would begin to suffer from mechanical breakdowns.  

Other books, including a practical manual on guerrilla warfare, followed his memoir on the civil war. His call for a reform of the army was based on the belief that Conservative forces in Britain would hinder military reform: ‘A Conservative ruling class is incapable of fighting modern war effectively because war is changing very rapidly. Conservatives do not admit change.’ Still, despite the military instinct which was on display in English Captain, there was still an underlying ideological approach to much of what he wrote. Ultimately, although he sought to draw political and military lessons from the civil war, a process which led to his own ideas on ‘people’s war’ being adapted for the struggle against Germany, he seems to have subordinated his military theories to ideological considerations. Thus he concluded in English Captain: ‘Only a democratic force, knowing not only what it is fighting for but all that it can know about how and why and where each detail of the fighting works, can exert the spontaneous yet controlled, rapid but co-ordinated pressure that is decisive.’

The fourth individual, Ferdinand Otto Miksche (1904-1992), presents the final biographical case study in this consideration of the role of military intellectuals in the assessment of the civil war. Although he was born in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and joined the Hungarian Military Academy ‘Ludikova’ in 1923, Miksche was a Czechoslovak
citizen and was called up for military service in 1927. After the civil war and the rapid German victory over France in the summer of 1940, he succeeded in fleeing to Britain; it was then that his career as a military writer began in earnest. During the Second World War he authored three accomplished military books, as well as numerous newspaper articles. What made his such an authoritative voice was – at least in part – his extensive experience as a Republican staff officer on all the major fronts during the Spanish Civil War.

The reason why Miksche ended up in Spain might be considered as testimony to his lack of interest in the ideological background to the conflict. In the autumn of 1936 an official request was sent out by the Czechoslovak War Ministry requesting officers to come forward for service in Republican Spain so they could test optical devices for Skoda artillery pieces. Miksche, at this time still only a second-lieutenant, was anxious to get out of the claustrophobic atmosphere of the Czechoslovak Army and volunteered. In the spring of 1937, by this time an officer in the Republican Army, he was transferred to the commander of coastal defence, shortly afterwards he was sent as an adviser to the staff of a corps at Brunete; then, at the end of 1937, he was transferred to an independent artillery staff. In April 1938 he successfully executed the freeing of an encircled Republican brigade; in the second half of 1938 and until the end of the Republic, and by this time promoted to Major, Miksche served as part of the staff of a Corps Commander. On 15 March 1939, he managed to escape over the Pyrenees to France. His explanation for the defeat of the Republican forces was quite simple – their lack of discipline.

On arriving in Britain on 7 July 1940, he joined the Free Czechoslovak Forces, and, based on his fresh experiences from the civil war, attracted the attention of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at an exercise. Shortly afterwards he was put in touch with Tom Wintringham, who assisted him in preparing his first book, *Blitzkrieg* (1941), for which Wintringham provided an introduction. What is most interesting about *Blitzkrieg* are two of
the central contentions of the book: first, that the French were decisively defeated in 1940 because they thought there was little to be learned from the Spanish experience; second, the argument that Spain pointed the way towards the tactics used in the first two years of the Second World War. As regards the latter point, he argued that islands of resistance had been crucial in the fighting in Spain and, further, that there were numerous examples of successful tank attacks. In two works published in 1943, he emphasized on several occasions the importance of the civil war for the evolution of the concept of airborne operations. He also noted the experience the Germans gained in Spain and their significance for the development of the Luftwaffe.

What is most striking in Miksche’s assessment is that he had understood something about the civil war which has confused generations of historians – its rapidly changing character. He wrote in Blitzkrieg in 1941:

We take the Spanish War, therefore, as the laboratory in which modern warfare was first tested out. It went through every phase of development from the most primitive to the most modern. It blazed up on barricades that recalled 1848. Its first twelve months had much of the character of the first World War. Towards the end of 1937 that character was changing; in 1938 and 1939 it was a war of infiltration, of concentrated attacks pressed deeply at considerable speed, of islands of resistance – of new methods.

Important to note here is that he had recognised that new forms of warfare, although they had not been unqualified successes in Spain, were pointers to future methods which were likely to succeed once they had been perfected. He first witnessed the mass employment of tanks at the Battle of Brunete in July 1937 while serving as an adviser to a Corps staff, when 120 Russian T-26 tanks were used against the Nationalists, supported by 59,000 men and 150 aircraft. The experience seems to have made a lasting impression on him and convinced him that a future war would involve the mass use of tanks, supported by aircraft.
The fact that Miksche came to very different conclusions from many other military observers is, in itself, extremely interesting. Even though he seems to have had an abrasive character, falling out with his collaborator on *Blitzkrieg*,\(^95\) this book clearly had some impact on Wintringham.\(^96\) Yet what is intriguing is the way in which Miksche’s ideological perceptions changed over time. In the preface to *Blitzkrieg* he wrote, ‘I dedicate this book to the memory of men too soon forgotten, the heroes of the International Brigades who sacrificed their lives for the freedom of the Spanish people between 1936 and 1939, in the first battles of the present war.’\(^97\) Tom Wintringham described him in 1942 as ‘above all a refugee, a disappointed man and he is also a mixture of some undigested Marxist ideas with a good deal of “very regular” contempt for all civilians and particularly journalists.’\(^98\) However, in later, unpublished biographical accounts of his life, Miksche was very anxious to emphasize that he had never been a member of ‘the so-called International Brigades’.\(^99\)

The reasons for Miksche’s change in attitude are not difficult to identify. After taking up the post of the military attaché of the Czechoslovak Republic for France and Belgium in Paris on 1 January 1946, in the summer of 1947 he was summoned home.\(^100\) When he arrived in Prague in August, he was closely watched and was forbidden from publishing military works by the Ministry of National Defence; in mid-November 1947 he returned to Paris.\(^101\) Needless to say, his political ‘transformation’ was reflected in his post-1945 works. The book which marks him out as having put himself firmly on the side of the anti-Communist movement in Europe is *Unconditional Surrender*, published in 1952. Here he argued that strategic logic had to take precedence over politics, speaking out strongly in favour of West German rearmament and for the inclusion of Spain in the Atlantic Pact.\(^102\) Miksche had undergone an ideological metamorphosis, moving from possessing ‘some undigested Marxist ideas’ during the Spanish Civil War, to a strong, anti-Communist stance after 1945.
V. Conclusion

Having considered Liddell Hart, Fuller, Wintringham and Miksche together, it has emerged that there were intellectual and personal connections between all four writers, suggesting there was a ‘military intellectual culture’ in Britain of a type not to be found in other European countries. What made their views distinct from the intelligence and, to a certain extent, the semi-official, public debate over the war in Spain, was that none of the four attempted to base explanations on negative perceptions of the ‘national character’ of the Spanish soldier. Nonetheless, Wintringham, the only one of the three without any form of staff training or experience, misinterpreted the war in some crucial respects. While he saw it as a “‘little war’ in which things have been happening slowly, on a small scale, as in a clumsy laboratory experiment’, it was in his interpretation of the tactical and operational lessons that he was most inaccurate. He was as well one of numerous writers who did not foresee the sudden collapse of the government forces, writing before the end of the conflict: ‘Franco’s failure to destroy the Republic... is partly due to his attempt to make tanks do what they cannot do.’

But it was Fuller – at the opposite end of the ideological scale to Wintringham – who identified an important analytical approach to understanding the war: the comparative perspective. What is interesting is that in his propagandistic commentaries his comparisons were more often with the Russian Civil War, and he talked frequently of ‘White Spain’. Yet, despite the ideological intent behind the comparison, there were still stimulating questions which he pursued, not least of all, why did the Whites in Russia (with foreign support) lose, while the ‘Whites’ in Spain won? Is he correct that it was because the Whites in Russia advanced too quickly, leaving large regions still occupied by the enemy, and that Franco did not make this mistake? Moreover, in drawing a comparison between Grant and Franco, Fuller seems to have grasped that the Spanish Civil War held many complications for the commanders on both sides, so that swift victories were always going to be hard to achieve in
the first two years of the conflict. Still, just like Fuller, the process of analysing the civil war tended to confirm the basic ideological dispositions of the other three writers. However, while ideology coloured all four writers’ interpretations of the Spanish Civil War, it did so less detrimentally than many of the studies produced by British officers.

But if we are to place the military and political views of all four ‘military intellectuals’ within a wider context, it is important to ponder more generally whether or not ideology itself could be influenced by military considerations. If we consider for a moment a definition of political ideologies offered by Michael Freeden, it may be easier to reflect more closely on the relationship between military thought, strategy and ideology:

A political ideology is a set of beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community.106

For our purposes, the third and fourth parts of this definition are the most significant, since military debates are usually nothing more than a competition over the direction and control of plans for policy, while the military itself is a crucial factor in the social and governmental arrangements of a political community. So, if we assume that military establishments have basic ideological tendencies and preferences, influenced by the desire for the maintenance of their technical, political or social role, then military analyses of broad strategic developments will involve conflict within the institution, among bureaucratic elites and within society more generally. In a sense, the analysis in Britain by military intellectuals and officers of the civil war in Spain indicates that there was a debate over the prevailing ‘military ideology’, which involved: (a) assessments of the lessons of the war; (b) debates over the strategic implications of the conflict for Britain; and (c) broader political attitudes towards the belligerents and their domestic and foreign supporters. Since at least part of this debate took place within the public
sphere, it contributed to the intense ideological battle between – and over perceptions of – Fascism, Communism and Liberalism within British society.  

Moreover, to a greater or lesser extent, all four writers, not to mention many of the British officers who produced intelligence reports, were prone to instrumentalising their interpretation of the military lessons of the war for ideological purposes. This is clearly significant for the proposition that the Spanish Civil War had some of the characteristics of a ‘total war’. If we view the conflict as a whole, rather than making comparisons between the scale of the fighting on the ground in Spain and in the First World War, and consider its progress and dynamics within a broader international context, then it begins to look a lot more like a total war. As the case study of Britain presented here suggests, it was the growing intensity of ideological conflict and its interaction with the issue of foreign intervention, the on-going analysis of the lessons of the war, the worsening strategic position of the democracies, and public perceptions of improving military technology, which gradually transformed the civil war into a European conflict with many of the features of total war.

When, at the close of hostilities in Spain, Basil Liddell Hart noted that in an immediate crisis ‘our prospects would benefit from the incomplete and unconditional state of Franco’s conquest of Spain’, he nonetheless suspected that Germany was unlikely to wait to consolidate her strategic gains, especially as British rearmament was gathering pace. The problem was that in the ‘national defence establishment’ the war appeared to have led to a ‘choice’ between Communism and Fascism as the major threat to Britain, with many senior officers more worried about the strategic threat of Communism than of Fascism. Thus, even after the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939, military planning in Britain remained firmly in the shadow of the ideological conflict unleashed by the civil war in Spain, with service chiefs continuing to prepare for major hostilities with the Soviet Union.
What ultimately strengthens the case for viewing the Spanish Civil War as the final rung on the ladder leading to total war in Europe is the awareness it created of ideologies posing strategic threats – either as political ideologies in themselves, or as ideologies in combination with military power.\textsuperscript{111} Quite evidently, the civil war in Spain helped forge a strong bond between military analysis and ideology, contributing to a ladder of escalation which led to the emergence of a new and more virulent strain of total war.

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**Notes:**


5 This is not, however, the impression generated if one simply analyses the contents of military journals. See here, Stig Förster (ed.), An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft 1919-1939 (Paderborn, 2002). However, it is interesting that, in a 1937 book, Basil Liddell Hart referred to Germany, Russia and Italy in one chapter entitled, ‘The Totalitarian Powers’ B.H. Liddell Hart, Europe in Arms (London, 1937), pp. 21-39.

6 See here, J.F.C. Fuller, ‘The Development of Totalitarian Warfare’, Journal of the Royal Artillery, 63 (January 1937), pp. 441-52, which shows a clear awareness of the emerging German concept of warfare and which Fuller contrasts with the approach of the democracies.

7 In the case of Militär-Wochenblatt, one of the few exceptions to the ‘war commentaries’ of Oberst a.D. Rudolf von Xylander was his article, ‘Vom spanischen Bürgerkrieg. XXVIII: Erfahrungen mit neuzeitlichen Waffen’, Militär-Wochenblatt, No. 47, 1937, col. 3134-7 & No. 49, 1937, col. 3205-8. In Wissen und Wehr, there were only two articles which went beyond analyses of lessons learned and the role of new technology: Anon., ‘Militärische Rundschau (1.7. bis 7.9.1936)’, Wissen und Wehr, 17 (1936), pp. 640-4; Hermann Gackenholz, ‘Spaniens wehrpolitische Lage’, Wissen und Wehr, 19 (1938), pp. 601-12.


9 It would be inappropriate to enter here into a discourse on the nature of political ideologies, nor is it the place for semantic discussions on, for example, the differences between ‘ideology’ and ‘ideologies’. For a general overview of terminology, see Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Basingstoke, 1992), esp. pp. 1-24.


The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter, TNA), WO 106/1576, SECRET. No. 4. The Spanish Civil War. Summary of Information received 8th – 10th August, 1936, pp. 1-2.


23 Doc. 145, W 16269/29/41, ‘Report by Major E.C. Richards, Assistant Military Attaché, Barcelona, on Offensive Strategy in the Spanish Civil War’, received in Foreign Office, 9 Dec. 1938, in BDFA, Vol. 27, pp. 230-41. Needless to say, stereotypes of Spanish national character, traditions and customs were not restricted to military officers and were widespread in British commentaries on the civil war, on both left and right, especially in the first half of the war. On this, Tom Buchanan, “‘A Far Away Country of Which We Know Nothing’? Perceptions of Spain and its Civil War in Britain, 1931-1939’, Twentieth Century British History, 4/1 (1993), pp. 1-24, esp. 4-7, 19-20.


26 For a rare example, see TNA, AIR 2/3261, Republican Spain – February, 1938. Visit of Air Staff Officers – General Report by Wing Commander R.V. Goddard, Air Ministry, 11 Mar. 1938.

28 TNA, CAB 56/1, Committee of Imperial Defence, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Minutes of 18th meeting, held on Friday, 8 July, 1938, at 2 Whitehall Gardens, SW1, at 10.30 am, pp. 1-2.

29 TNA, CAB 56/6, fol. 50-79, 80-103, 104-141A, 143-165, for reports 1, 2, 3 and 5 by the Sub-Committee on Air Warfare, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Committee of Imperial Defence, all with highly detailed tables, maps and illustrations, produced in 1938 and 1939.

30 The Sub-Committee on Air Warfare was officially dissolved on 1 April 1939. TNA, CAB 56/6, fol. 167, Note by Secretary, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, [signed] L.C. Hollis.


32 See the following editorials in Army Quarterly: 24 (April 1932), pp. 2-3; 31 (January 1936), pp. 196-7; and, 32 (July 1936), pp. 193-7.


41 TNA, WO 106/1583, Lt.-Col. A.F.G. Renton, Some Impressions of the Nationalist Army in Spain, May 1938, p. 1. Reports of this type seem on occasions to have been the product of ‘battlefield tourism’ and the Nationalists soon realized the propaganda opportunities which this presented. See here Sandie Holguin, ‘“National Spain Invites You”: Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish Civil War’, *American Historical Review*, 110 (December 2005), pp. 1399-1426.

42 TNA, WO 106/1587, Note on information given by Wing Commander A. James, M.P., after a visit to the Nationalist Aragon Front, 1 Apr. 1938.


49 LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/1937/85, Talk with Duff Cooper at Bucks Club, 4 Nov. 1937.


59 In late February and early March 1937 he spent two weeks in Spain, another two weeks in October 1937, and two weeks in April 1938. LHCMA, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller Papers, IV/4/32, Appointments’ Diary 1937, IV/4/33, Appointments’ Diary 1938.


63 University Archives & Special Collections, Rutgers University, NJ (hereafter, UA&SC Rutgers), Major-General J.F.C. Fuller Papers, box 2, file 16, C. J. Deverell to Fuller, 22 Feb. 1937.

64 TNA, WO 106/1578, Fuller to Deverell, 31 Mar. 1937, Report by Major-General Fuller on visit to General Franco’s Army in Spain, March 1937 (DMO & I to CIGS), 2 Apr. 1937.


66 TNA, WO 106/1585, Report by Major-General Fuller on his visit to Spain, April 1938, with accompanying minute sheets of M.I.3 notes, May 1938.


Ibid., pp. 304-7.

LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/758/2, Wintringham to Liddell Hart, 3 Sept. 1938, and LH 1/758/1, Wintringham to the editor of *The Times*, 23 Aug. 1938, asking for a letter to be forwarded to Liddell Hart.

Purcell, *Last English Revolutionary*, pp. 167-88, for this phase of Wintringham’s life.


*Armies of Freemen* (London, 1940); *Deadlock War* (London, 1940); *New Ways of War* (Harmondsworth, 1940); *The Politics of Victory* (London, 1941); *People’s War* (Harmondsworth, 1942); *Weapons and Tactics* (London, 1943).

Tom Wintringham, *Freedom is Our Weapon: A Policy for Army Reform* (London, 1941), p. 11, and for similar arguments, see also idem, *How to Reform the Army* (London, April 1939).

Writing to Liddell Hart in December 1938, he referred to ‘an essay... on the British army; the basic idea being that an army, to be efficient in modern war, must be “democratic”.’ LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/758/10, Wintringham to Liddell Hart, 19 Dec. 1938.


There is, unfortunately, as yet no biography of Miksche. Biographical details can be found in LHCMA, Lt.-Col. Ferdinand Otto Miksche Papers, box 2, file 7, ‘Ferdinand Otto Miksche’ [3-page summary of career], n.d. [approx. 1952]. See also the obituary by Adalbert Weinstein, ‘Der Militärschriftsteller und strategische Denker Ferdinand Otto Miksche ist tot’, *Deutsche Tagespost*, 12 Jan. 1993.

Nachlaß Walter Bauer (privately held by Prof. D. Schössler), untitled biographical notes on F.O. Miksche, 2 Feb. 1989, attached to letter, Bauer to Miksche, 2 Feb. 1989. The author is grateful to Prof. Schössler for granting access to these papers.

*Blitzkrieg* (London, 1941); *Is Bombing Decisive? A Study in the Organisational and Tactical Employment of Modern Air Fleets* (London, 1943); *Paratroops: The History, Organization and
Tactical Use of Airborne Formations (London, 1943). In 1943 and 1944 he published articles on the course of the war in Tribune and the Manchester Guardian.


90 LHCMA, Miksche Papers, box 2, file 7, Wintringham to Miksche, 2 Apr. [1941], ending with the words ‘Salut y vitoria’, and Wintringham to Miksche, 6 Nov. [1941], in which revisions for a second edition are discussed.

91 Miksche, Blitzkrieg, pp. 23-42.


93 Miksche, Blitzkrieg, p. 42.


96 LHCMA, Wintringham Papers, 6/9/54, Tom Wintringham, untitled typescript, marked ‘For Volunteer for Liberty’, 12 Oct. [1941/2?], which picks up on a number of Miksche’s arguments in Blitzkrieg.

97 Miksche, Blitzkrieg, p. 8.

98 LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/758/12, Wintringham to Liddell Hart, 18 Aug. [1942].


Wintringham, *English Captain*, pp. 306-7, 333. When it came to tanks, there were several contemporary commentators who disagreed with negative verdicts. A German émigré writer stated in March 1939: ‘The suggestion that modern weapons of offence, the tank and the aeroplane, have proved a failure in Spain is not correct…. they proved of decisive strategical importance.’ Max Werner (pseud.), *The Military Strength of the Powers* (London, 1939), p. 29.


Fuller had a particular fascination with Grant, after all he had written one biography of him, as well as a comparison of Grant and Lee. See J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant* (London, 1929), and idem, *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship* (London, 1933).


Within this context, it is easy to agree with Michael Freeden when he writes: ‘The nature of society and its structures, supposedly reflected in ideologies, are themselves partly the product of those ideologies, operating as a way of organizing social reality’ [emphasis in original]. Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford, 1996), p. 4.

See here Roger Chickering, ‘The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War’, in Baumeister & Schüler-Springorum (eds.), “If You Tolerate This...”, pp. 28-43.

LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1939/26, Appreciation of the Strategic Situation, 17 Mar. 1939. This was by no means a new insight. A study by M.I.3. in April 1938 argued that Germany would use
a Nationalist victory to do anything it could to damage British interests. TNA, WO 106/1586, M.I.3.a., The Possible Effects of a Military Victory by the Nationalists in Spain, 1 Apr. 1938, p. 3.
