Corporate governance and the financial crisis: did the theories stand the test?
Wen, S and Zhao, J 2010, 'Corporate governance and the financial crisis: did the theories stand the test?' , Butterworths Journal of International Banking & Financial Law, 25 (10) .
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Three key theories - the agency theory, stewardship theory and path dependence theory have served to explain the relationship between directors and shareholders in the field of cor-porate governance. However, none of the theories alone have stood the test of the global fi-nancial crisis. · Given the multiplicity and complexity of directors' interests, directors in organisations are likely to have agency relationships with some managers and stewardship relationships with others. · Path dependence theory indicates the prevalence of voluntary codes rather than man-datory instruments in the post-crisis context. · In the authors' opinion, a combination of voluntary codes and mandatory instruments would be desirable.
|Themes:||Subjects / Themes > H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
Subjects / Themes > K Law > K Law (General) > K3840 Regulation of industry, trade, and commerce. Occupational law > K3941 Trade and commerce
Subjects outside of the University Themes
|Schools:||Colleges and Schools > College of Business & Law > Salford Law School > Salford Centre of Legal Research|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Butterworths Journal of International Banking & Financial Law|
|Depositing User:||Users 47901 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||06 May 2011 11:11|
|Last Modified:||17 Dec 2012 10:40|
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