The police response to crime

O’Neill, ME

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Nostalgia is a fun thing. When one thinks of the past, especially a past too far away to have experienced first-hand, all mistakes of the time are forgotten, details neatly smoothed over and all the answers to modern predicaments lay apparent. So this seems to be the case when politicians and policy-makers think of 1829, Sir Robert Peel and his Bobbies. ‘Policing by consent’, it was. Friendly constables, never distracted by squawking radios, never speeding by in police cars, would wander amiably around their patch. They would get to know everyone in their area, have access to all pertinent ‘intelligence’ (in modern terms) and could probably see off a good deal of trouble before it began. They were trusted, respected and a perfect model of community engagement.

Then lo, the bad times came in the form of the 20th century. The police were a reactionary, distant and forceful institution. Police constables changed their ‘patch’ as frequently as their radio batteries. The public was an unknown entity to police and of which to be wary. Patrolling was done from the safety of the squad car and ‘community engagement’ largely involved getting information out of paid informants, themselves dubious characters. Corruption scandals erupted on both sides of the Atlantic; encouraging performance targets and accountability measures, which deepened the bureaucratisation of the institution. While this became a new management age in policing, the poor, ignored, marginalized and discarded
communities lamented the loss of the their Bobbies; the blue sentinels that had stood firm and had signified to them (if not in words then in their being) that it was 6 o’clock and all was well.

Obviously, the above is an exaggeration of both scenarios. The political reasons for the origin of the Bobbies and their initial remits are of continuing debate (Brogden 1987, Styles 1987). But what is certainly clear is that all members of the ‘community’ did not openly embrace them (Rawlings 2001). In addition, Peel never intended for his police constables to engage with the community as partners in crime control (Tilley 2003). The constables were to patrol, checking doors and windows, and by their mere presence would deter thieves and other criminals (Emsley 2003). Thus this model is really a rather passive and reactive one (Manning 1997), which focused police attention on street crime and on the poorer sections of society for the origin of that crime. However, one could be forgiven for overlooking these points, considering the way politicians and policy makers seem to view this period in history as being policing in its ‘purest’ and ideal form.

While the description above of the 20th century may also be an exaggeration, there was indeed a ‘crisis’ of confidence in policing in the latter half (Wright 2002). The police in England and Wales moved from the old foot patrol beat system to a motorised patrol system in the 1960s. This enabled the officers to patrol larger geographical areas and provide a fast response to calls coming over their new personal radios. It was argued that this would improve police-community relations, but in fact the opposite happened (Newburn 2003). In addition to mobility and speed, the police acquired other new technologies in the subsequent years: computer assisted
dispatching, the centralised emergency telephone numbers (999 in the UK, 911 in the US) and other developments which, when combined with motorised patrol, resulted in a policing system which prioritised action and fast response to community engagement and service (Manning 1992, Newburn 2003). Despite the new technological advances, the police were still not able to exert much of an influence on the crime rate and were felt to be too distant from the people they served. Minority ethnic people in particular can have very problematic relationships with the police, as they frequently come under the police gaze as objects of suspicion rather than of protection. Something needed to change, and Peel, his Bobbies and nostalgia combined to provide a Golden Age of policing; long lost, but perhaps not irretrievable (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). The fact that the ‘community as partner’ was not a factor in Peel’s vision is quietly neglected here.

Thus we now find ourselves in the age of Community Orientated Policing. This, along with Neighbourhood Policing (in the UK), Intelligence-Led Policing, Zero Tolerance Policing and Problem Orientated Policing, make up a large proportion of the current police response to crime problems. Some of these are more prevalent in the UK or in North America, but all will be discussed here to examine how they are supposed to be a better way to address crime than what went on before. The basic idea is to get away from ‘reactionary’ crime control methods that deal with all incidents in isolation from each other (Tilley 2003, Wright 2002, although this is less so with Zero Tolerance Policing). Each has a different way of going about this, but none, as yet, seem to be an ideal answer to the question of how best to do policing in the 21st century. This chapter will be largely written from the UK perspective,
although there is considerable overlap with policing developments happening in other
countries as well, most notably in the US and Canada.ii

THE TRADITIONAL AND THE MANAGERIAL

Before we can examine the more recent developments in policing, we should first
have a brief look at policing in the ‘traditional’ sense and then in the age of New
Public Management. These set the stage for what was to come, as many police
reformers felt that the traditional model had essentially failed and the new
management practices kept the police too distant from those who were policed. The
term ‘traditional’ in this sense refers to the post-war era of policing when the police
worked in beats in motorised patrols, rather than the Peelian approach described
earlier.

A traditional approach to policing prioritises a ‘crime-fighting’ mentality in which
crimes are usually handled independently of each other, and in a reactive (rather than
proactive or preventative) way. Police officers mainly patrol in cars and minor
infractions are seen as crimes to be pursued rather than as signs of larger social
problems that need to be addressed (Manning 1997). Technology is highly prized as
being essential to investigation to the extent that members of the public are often
contacted electronically rather than in person. Investigation generally is seen as the
epitome of police work while community activities have the lowest status. This
enforcement approach to policing can have a limited impact on the crime rate and
simply doing more of it (in terms of increased police budgets) does not improve this
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005, Tilley 2003). Police culture tends to be viewed as
orientating itself around this vision of policing (O’Neill and Singh 2007), which was seen as unproblematic until the 1970s and 1980s. Communities were becoming increasingly socially and ethnically diverse, and the crimes that affected them had varying characteristics that the police were struggling to address. Crime rates continued to rise, as did the cost of policing (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In addition to this now largely ineffective approach to policing, police officers themselves were coming under scrutiny for their behaviour (planting evidence, abuse of suspects, taking bribes, etc). Several corruption scandals have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic in the mid to late 20th century, leading to various attempts at reform, which usually met with limited success. Police morale was falling, as was the confidence of the public in them (Wright 2002).

In the 1980s and 1990s came the move towards ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ in the police service. This is the dawn of the New Public Management (NPM) era in the UK (and similarly with COMPSTATiii in the US), which sought to reconceptualise the police in terms of being a service (rather than a force) that was accountable to its customers (rather than to clients or the ‘public’). Public services were increasingly managed in ways similar to that of the private sector (O’Malley 1997) where performance was to be measured against pre-set targets to ensure best ‘value for money’. These locally set targets for policing were designed to meet nationally set objectives (Fielding and Innes 2006). This has had many implications for policing practice, some of which will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. While the move towards this kind of managerialism was intended to ensure that the police service performed more effectively, the types of police work that are most easily measured, evidenced and quantified are those that rely on traditional policing methods
(enforcement leading to better arrest rates, clear-up rates, etc.). Certain types of crime satisfy these targets better than others, known as the ‘volume crimes’ such as burglary or assault, and thus these tend to be prioritised. Police methods themselves remained largely unchanged in this management style, while their use is now more carefully held to account. The public’s role as consumers of a service who deserve to be satisfied that their needs are being met is essential. However, as policing objectives are set at a national level, there is only a certain amount of scope for how much the ‘community’ can influence policing in this model (Long 2003, Maguire and John 2006). So while the New Public Management was meant to be a great change in the police organisation (and in certain respects it is), it has left some of the key problems with policing unaddressed: enforcement-orientated methods into which the public has little real input are still valued. Manning (1999) has argued that not only is it not possible for the police to be ‘efficient and effective’, but that it is actually not desirable. For example, a public service that needs to be able to respond at a moment’s notice to any event must have extra resources and time at the ready to spend on it – something that is neither efficient nor effective in terms of officers’ overtime and public spending.

COMMUNITY ORIENTATED POLICING

Community Orientated Policing (COP, also known just as ‘community policing’) is meant to take the involvement of the public in their police service to a new and deeper level than that afforded in the new management styles (although it can help to meet some of the NPM accountability requirements), and to encourage non-traditional policing practice. As Skogan and Hartnett (1998) discuss, there was a coalescence of
factors that made community policing possible in the US from the 1970s onwards, but particularly in the 1990s. Much of this was mentioned above in relation to the problems of the traditional approach to policing. Minority ethnic groups had developed a history of conflict with the police, sometimes culminating in urban riots. Enterprising and aspiring senior officers who were willing to embark on new approaches to these communities found their career prospects enhanced. Top police officers now often had university degrees in subjects that encouraged a receptiveness to change. Police managers, policy makers, researchers and consultants had developed a robust network to communicate new ideas and share good practice across the country. The general move towards a more effective, efficient and accountable police service was also present here along with new technologies to improve communication with a local public. This ability to target police resources more directly towards community needs, as well as a growing willingness of police managers to do so, made a ripe situation from which community policing could emerge.

Unfortunately for the purposes of this chapter, it is very difficult to find a clear definition of community policing. Part of the reason for this is the nature of this type of policing, in that the needs of the local area are prioritised and thus any activities done in its name will be unique to that situation and its people. Thus the exact way in which community policing is done will vary not only between police forces but also within them.

Brogden and Nijhar (2005) offer the following as guidelines for identifying community policing:
• Neighbourhoods or small communities serve as primary foci of police organizations and operations.
• Communities have unique and distinctive policing problems that conventional police organizations and responses have not traditionally addressed.
• Community consensus and structures should guide police response to the community’s crime and security problems.
• Policing should be both locally accountable and transparent.
• Police discretion is a fact and should be used positively to maximise community confidence in the police.

(Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 23-24)

The general idea then is to take policing down to a rather microscopic level of engagement, to be led by these local actors in whichever way they see fit and to be held accountable to them. Thus it goes against much of the methods the police used to do their work before or, more importantly, goes against the kind of working practice the police value most highly: internally-driven, crime-fighting approaches where offenders are pursued and captured and the community is there mainly to give the police any information needed to do the job (Brogden and Nijhar 2005, Skogan 2006, O’Neill and Singh 2007). While the police have always to some extent been involved in ‘social work’ types of activities, these were not regarded very highly as being ‘true’ police work. The emphasis in community policing is to reverse that tendency, to see the ‘community’ as the main priority.
Perhaps more important than a definition of community policing here is a definition of ‘community’. As this concept forms the basis of all further police action, we must consider how exactly it is identified. Now while that is probably a task best left to a different volume of academic research entirely (and has been), a few thoughts will be considered here. There are different ways that the police can go about identifying and engaging a ‘community’, such as by using pre-existing networks or forums, approaching a specific geographical area to illicit its input or linking in with identity groupings (such as a specific religion or sexual orientation-based groups). All of these ‘communities’ come with their own inherent problems, such as finding suitable ‘leaders’, having internal fissures and competing demands, as well as difficulty in remaining stable for a reasonable length of time to allow work with the police to be successful. Community police officers may find themselves faced with different accounts and demands from the same group (Hughes and Rowe 2007). With pressure from above to engage with and reassure these nebulous entities, community officers have to do the best they can. It may be that ‘community is not so much a descriptive term as a process whereby key actors (police officers, community safety managers and such like) construct and mobilize selectively discourses of community and aim to make them conducive to the aims of government’ (Hughes and Rowe 2007: 338). The result is that those areas that probably need more positive engagement with the police are least likely to do it. These would tend to be the more deprived areas, accustomed to seeing the police as oppressive law enforcers, rather than as partners in local area development. At the same time, those who are willing to work with the police are precisely those who least need it: well-organised community collations with comparatively less crime problems (Tilley 2003, Skogan 2006). It would appear in effect that a high level of social capital (strong social networks in a community that
bring about collective action and maintain social control) certainly helps make community policing easier, but areas with high social capital have less need of engaging with the police more than they already are.

While it may be difficult to find and motivate a ‘community’ into action that does not mean that it cannot be done. Many community policing initiatives have happened worldwide since its earliest inception in the 1970s. While ‘Community Orientated Policing’ was initially and American concept, it has been exported around the globe (Brogden and Nijhar 2005) and it even informs efforts at democratic policing in developing and failed nations through its concepts of community accountability and engagement (see Pino and Wiatrowski 2006iv). Judging the success of COP, however, is another matter. As mentioned before, activities that fall under the ‘community policing’ label are many and varied, so each would need to be assessed independently. As Tilly (2003) points out, however, this can be difficult to do as much of community policing is supposed to be based on police officer creativity and non-standardised outcomes. Supervising this kind of work, as well as monitoring it and judging its success can be a murky task. A further complication is that the officers doing the work with communities may focus their efforts on things that can be easily quantified and measured (under the guise of ‘community policing’), rather than on the actual problem-solving itself. Brogden and Nijhar (2005) report that many police forces in the US are no longer even trying to maintain a pretence of community policing, either changing it to ‘community problem solving’ or simply reverting back to traditional, crime-lead policing. This is especially so in areas of great deprivation, where the police may make gestures towards community
engagement, but then continue to police in a more traditional way as it is far easier to do so (see Skogan et al 1999).

Until recently in the UK, community policing was largely left out of a very powerful measurement of police success, Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) (Herrington and Millie 2006). These are a product of the move towards New Public Management in the police, as discussed earlier. What is important for this section is the contrast between the types of policing activities measured by the BVPIs (response times, arrests, clear-up rates, etc) and those types of activities that are valued and ultimately more successful in a community-orientated approach (meeting with local residents, moving children away from crime hotspots, etc). These two approaches to policing ‘value’ exist in parallel to each other and ultimately are in competition with each other for resources (although the current incarnation of BVPIs make slightly more of an attempt at including community elements, to be discussed later). While success in a community policing approach may not actually be felt for several years as the changes take root and are not easily quantified, immediate and measurable outcomes can be gained from the more traditional policing methods (Herrington and Millie 2006). And it is by success in these latter activities that police services are measured and ultimately praised for their ‘effectiveness’, thus inadvertently encouraging more orientation towards them and less towards the vague, immeasurable and long-term solutions afforded by community policing (Fielding and Innes 2006). The central UK government is in effect encouraging two competing policing ideologies, but reserving most of its praise (in terms of judging the ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ of a police force) for the one that relies upon traditional, reactionary policing methods.
Police officers themselves are aware of this tension and of the pressure upon the police force to adhere to both ideologies (while community policing might be being dropped in some forces in the US, it is still a national priority in the UK, more on this later). The above points to an inherent problem of community policing mentioned before: it largely works in conflict with traditional policing methods, culture and ethos. But after more than 20 years of COP, in one form or another in the US and UK, can some changes be detected in the overall institution to address this? Surely some efforts are being made to sell the idea to new recruits?

Chappell (2007) discusses police training in the US and reports that while training in the academy has started to incorporate community policing elements, these are largely missing from new recruits’ experiences in field training. The former is largely classroom based training while the latter involves the new officer out in public with a field training officer, a logical place to build upon the techniques learned at the academy. However, as Chappell argues, the field training method used in most police forces (San Jose model) has been largely unchanged since its inception in the 1970s, despite being designed to adapt to the local priorities of the agency using it. This is attributed to difficulties in changing the structure and priorities of bureaucratic police institutions, field training officers focusing on ‘the basics’, and cultural resistance to community policing. Peace (2006) analyses the initial induction period by evaluating how well andragogy is employed in training probationary officers in England and Wales and if this is successfully applied to furthering community policing skills. Andragogy theory stipulates that adults learn differently than children and has been adopted by the police service as a guiding principle for its trainers. It can also fit very
well with developing skills that support a community-orientated policing approach, as it is student-lead. This mirrors the emphasis on police officer creativity and experimentation inherent in community policing. However, Peace found that despite a recent overhaul of probationer training in England and Wales to encourage community engagement, the (at the time) proposed new methods still prioritised traditional policing techniques largely based around law enforcement and that andragogy was not largely apparent in the training approach. Time will tell if the new decentralised training regime in England and Wales can meet expectations for a more community-savvy police service (see next section on Neighbourhood Policing). As it was only implemented nationally in April 2006, it is still too early yet to assess its effectiveness (Rogers and Lewis 2007)

If training does not yet show strong signs of changing to meet the new community policing ethos, what about individual performance evaluations? This would be another area where the institution could adapt to the ideological goals of community policing, by formally assessing how well police officers demonstrate the necessary skills or perform relevant tasks. Lilley and Hinduja (2006) argue that many police forces in the US are indeed modifying their appraisal processes to take community policing into account. Traditional appraisal schemes usually measure the more easily quantifiable side of policing (arrest rates, number of crimes solved, number of complaints lodged by the public, etc.). In this way, supervision and appraisal can be done at a distance, though indirect indicators, which are less resource-intensive. This can mean that police officers tend to avoid certain actions that may look bad on an appraisal, but this is not the same as engaging in high-quality policing. Appraisal schemes which do take community policing methods into account will look for ways
in which officers employ a problem-solving approach and who do work in quality of
life issues, rather than just use law enforcement methods. They would also emphasise
independent thought as well as good teamwork. Lilley and Hinduja (2006) conducted
a survey of over 400 police organisations in the US to ascertain if the above was
indeed happening in officer evaluations. The results paint a mixed picture: while
police agencies that embrace a community policing ethos do indeed show a greater
appreciation for innovation in their officers (such as through public speaking,
leadership or creativity), all organisations surveyed rated this as less important than
the more traditional factors such as avoiding trouble and following agency norms. In
addition, community policing agencies have not reduced their use of law
enforcements statistics in measuring officer performance, but merely added more
qualitative measures to the assessment process. This would suggest that even in those
police agencies that embrace community policing, the traditional policing methods
and ethos have not diminished to the extent that they are devalued in the appraisal
process.

Lilley and Hinduja (2006) are unsure if the above is due to organisational resistance,
or more to a lack of motivation on the part of administrative officers to significantly
alter the appraisal system. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argue that, for whatever
reason, few police organisations in the US have truly embraced the overall
organisational change that community policing invites and not much other than the
status quo is a result. This may mean that any significant changes to the police
institutions to bring it more in line with the community policing ideology (such as in
training and appraisal) will be difficult to achieve. Pino and Wiatrowski feel that this
is happening in spite of dramatic organisational changes in other segments of the
public and private sector. Even if individual officers can overcome the usual cultural resistance to community policing (Chappell 2007) (such as seeing it as social work, middle managers fearing losing authority, conflicts with established expectations of police work) the organisation itself does not always change in ways to fully support officers in their community work (such as by providing adequate resources for it or valuing it in performance assessments). To truly embrace the ethos of community orientated policing, the entire institution needs to change to one orientated around the community it serves, and so far this does not seem to be happening in the US (Skogan 2006, Pino and Wiatrowski 2006, see also Manning 2007). Thus a picture emerges where community policing is either sitting alongside the traditional model of policing (and is often in conflict with it), or is merely providing window-dressing for the continued status quo.

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING

As mentioned above, community orientated policing has been in practice in the UK for a number of years. However, since The Police Reform Act of 2002 the central government has given it a new impetus, a new theoretical underpinning, as well as a new name. Could this be enough to end the mere lip service often paid to COP (as seems to be the case in some areas of the US) to make it truly an integral part of policing, the ‘golden thread’ that runs throughout what the police do (Herrington and Millie 2006)? This next section will explore some of the literature produced so far on this development.
Since the mid-1990s, overall levels of recorded crime have been falling in England and Wales. It was also just before and during this time that the police adopted their New Public Management approach to policing that put ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ to the fore. The result was that volume crimes (such as burglary and theft) were prioritised, as they would produce the more easily measured and quantifiable results, thus meeting the government’s demands for a reduction in crime and an increase in accountability. While this seems to have been a success in terms of the crime rate, it has also meant that relationships with community members were not high on the police priority list. Since that time when crime rates began to fall, a new factor was on the increase: fear of crime. The disparity between actual recorded crime levels and the perception the public had of crime is called the ‘Reassurance Gap’ (Herrington and Millie 2006). This propelled the government into action and it launched the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England and Wales in April 2003. It ran for two years and its main objectives were to improve public confidence in the police while reducing the fear of crime (Fielding and Innes 2006). Integral to the reassurance project was a focus on ‘signal crimes’, a perspective developed by Martin Innes and colleagues at the University of Surrey (see Innes and Fielding 2002). Signal crimes can be anything that causes a person to feel alarmed or fearful of harm or disorder, such as graffiti, drug dealing or fly-tipping. The events or objects that become signals to a person do not necessarily bring about further or worse crimes (as is the premise of the ‘Broken Windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling 1982, see later section on zero-tolerance policing), but can bring about changes in the person’s behaviour to avoid harm. Signal crimes do not necessarily signal the same kind of danger or disorder to all people, and thus the importance here is how events are interpreted and acted upon, rather than on their ability to further increase the crime
rate in an area. This leads to the importance of consulting with local areas to ascertain which events or objects are signals for them.

Reassurance policing as it was developed for the NRPP had reassurance as a core process in police work, rather than an outcome in itself. Reassurance was to be the style of policing that officers adopted, by helping local areas to address their signal crimes so that they felt more secure in their surroundings, more cohesive (collective efficacy) and had greater confidence in the police. In this approach, overall security is the master concept. This is in contrast to how a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary described reassurance (Herrington and Millie 2006). In Povey’s paper (2001), reassurance is a goal in itself, and by achieving it the public could be encouraged to engage with the police more fully, and potentially provide more intelligence and other assistance in reducing crime. By being ‘visible, accessible and familiar’, the police would begin a virtuous circle, whereby the more reassured the public felt, the more they would assist the police, the more the crime rate would reduce and the more the public would feel reassured (Povey 2001, cited in Herrington and Millie 2006). There is thus a subtle difference in these two types of approaches to reassurance (in the former it is a process, in the latter it is an outcome), but only one could win out in the end.

Towards the end of the NRPP, its five core elements were modified slightly from their original text to include a specific mention of tackling anti-social behaviour and a suggestion that tackling disorder is additional work. These suggest a narrowing of the scope of reassurance policing so that it is no longer purely based on the signal crimes identified in local areas, and that is not a ‘golden thread’ running throughout all
policing work, but needs specific allocation of resources of its own. It seems as though national priorities were having an influence on how reassurance policing was to be done. Researchers who assessed the success of the NRPP reported that the police officers involved did not show an awareness of the concept of reassurance as a policing style, instead of being a policing goal. Their respondents often spoke of achieving reassurance with the public, rather than embarking on overall neighbourhood security (Herrington and Millie 2006). Thus the philosophical underpinnings of reassurance and signal crimes were perhaps being lost to a more general focus on community policing as had been exercised in the past.

When the NRPP came to an end, it was deemed to be a success (Tuffin et al 2006), but was not implemented across England and Wales in exactly the same format as it was in the trail programme. What is now in place is a programme of ‘neighbourhood policing’. The signal crimes perspective is still named as an integral part of the approach, but the core principles have changed from those identified in Herrington and Millie’s (2006) work to the following:

Neighbourhood Policing:

1. Is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime and disorder, improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security

2. Is managed within mainstream policing activity, integrated with other policing services

3. Requires evidence based deployment of neighbourhood teams against identified need
4. Establishes dedicated identifiable, accessible and responsive
eighbourhood policing teams which provide all citizens with a named point of access

5. Reflects local conditions and is flexible and adaptive

6. Allows the Police Service to work directly with local people to identify problems that are most important to them, thereby giving people direct influence over local policing priorities

7. Establishes a regime for engaging other agencies and the public in problem solving mechanisms

8. Uses the National Intelligence Model (NIM) as the basis for deployment.

9. Requires an effective engagement, communication and feedback strategy, and a clear explanation of where accountability lies

10. Should be subject to rigorous performance management including clear performance monitoring against a local plan and commitments made to neighbourhoods

(Neighbourhood Policing Programme websitevi)

While there is indeed a continued emphasis on consulting local people and reflecting local conditions, there is also repeated mention of joint working with other partner agencies and working in teams. Emphasis on evidence-based police deployment is clear, as is a commitment at the end to performance management and monitoring. So we can see here a mixture of the original reassurance philosophy of engaging the public and being flexible and adaptable to their needs, but also the New Public Management of policing with evidence-based deployment, working with partner agencies to spread the load and performance management. This ideological duality
also reflected in the way neighbourhood policing is presented in point two as being part of mainstream policing activity, but in point four requires dedicated policing teams. This echoes a finding in Herrington and Millie’s (2006) work in that while reassurance was to be the work of all police officers; it was in practice usually left to those with a ‘community’ role. Nowhere in the above list is there a mention of ‘reassurance’ in the principles of neighbourhood policing. While the focus of reassurance policing was largely around an improved sense of security for communities and reducing the ‘Reassurance Gap’, neighbourhood policing mentions crime and disorder in point one as a key principle, before mentioning feelings of security. It would appear that Herrington and Millie’s (2006) observation of a narrowing of the focus of reassurance policing towards national goals instead of a purely open-ended approach lead by local communities continued into the Neighbourhood Policing Programme. We can also note the continued struggle to make community-type policing activities fit within or at least alongside the traditional policing model, as evidenced in the US. Thus what is listed above needs to be seen as more of a ‘wish list’ than the reality of policing practice, as traditional policing methods do remain. There does not seem to be here a suggestion of altering the entire police institution to one focused on the community first and foremost.

What is perhaps unique to the Neighbourhood Policing Programme in England and Wales and is so far largely absent from other community policing initiatives is an attempt to integrate its goals into police service performance monitoring methods. As mentioned above, Best Value Performance Indicators were introduced and used in the late 80s and early 90s to assess if the police service was achieving ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ as determined by nationally-set organisational goals. A BVPI related to
‘public reassurance and quality of life’ was proposed in 2003 (Herrington and Millie 2006), but until then, the entire performance assessment programme was geared towards traditional policing goals and methods. All the BVPIs were condensed and renamed ‘Statutory Performance Indicators’ in 2004 in a new Policing Performance and Assessment Framework (PPAF) (Flanagan 2008). Included in the new SPIs are a measure of ‘public confidence’ (SPI 2) and three ‘quality of life’ measures (SPI 10a-c). While it is interesting to see a new recognition of reassurance-type measures, all of these indicators are assessed using specific elements of the British Crime Survey (Home Office 2006). This is an annual national survey of the public’s experiences of crime, and while it is largely regarded as a very valuable tool in measuring crime rates, it does not quite address the more qualitative aspects of reassurance, confidence and fear. Fielding and Innes (2006) have argued for the importance of qualitative measures of police performance, especially those which capture the opinions of key informants. These are people with a detailed knowledge of life in their community, especially as it has changed over time. Fielding and Innes (2006) feel that response reliability is greatly improved if the people targeted are in a position to know about performance under neighbourhood policing. These approaches can actually be more reliable than a random survey, if done well.

As mentioned above, the core principles of neighbourhood policing include ‘evidence-based’ deployment and employing the National Intelligence Model (NIM). These point to the relevance of another type of policing strategy within neighbourhood policing, specifically, that of ‘intelligence-led policing’. It is to this that we now turn, to discuss what it is and how it can co-exist with community-orientated approaches.
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

In the early 1990s, the police in the UK were under increasing pressure to do their work more ‘efficiently and effectively’, as has been discussed above. Part of the response to this call came in the form of ‘intelligence-led policing’. This is designed to be a more proactive approach to policing than what had taken place before. Up until the 1990s, much police work was reactionary, taking each incident in isolation and responding to the particular crime in question. In intelligence-led policing, it is the criminal who matters first, as crimes do not always happen in isolation from each other and criminals can work in networks. It was theorised that by taking a more systematic approach, where certain people are investigated for their criminal activity, not only could more crimes be detected and cleared up, but also future crimes could be prevented. A small number of offenders account for a large number of crimes, so this would be a far more efficient way to address crime. The idea is to look at offending patterns and so assemble as much ‘intelligence’ as possible about certain offenders before police action is taken. That way it can be targeted far more ‘effectively and efficiently’ (Tilley 2003). As with other police innovations, this is the intention behind this method. As we shall see later it may not be the reality.

In order to ensure that there is consistency in the approach to intelligence-led policing across the UK, the National Criminal Intelligence Service developed the National Intelligence Model (NIM) on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers. It has been rolled out to all police forces in England and Wales since April 2004 and is also being introduced in Scotland. It is primarily a tool of law-enforcement, with a
focus on criminals and their crimes and disrupting criminal networks (Tilley 2003, Maguire and John 2006). There are three main levels at which the NIM works:

- Level 1, covering local issues, including the while range of categories and levels of crime, notably volume crime
- Level 2, covering cross-border issues, where crime issues cross jurisdictional borders and where intelligence needs to be shared, and
- Level 3, covering serious and organised crime operating on a national or international scale

(Tilley 2003: 322)

Thus all types of crime are included in the model – it is not just intended for ‘volume’ crime or just for organised crime. At each level is a Tasking and Coordinating Group (TCG), which, using advice from intelligence units and data from analysts, allocates appropriate resources. It is here that the main police ‘business’ takes place, and the TCG is also responsible for achieving the necessary ‘outcomes’. The NIM is a rather complicated model and rather than go into great detail on how it works, I shall quote a helpful summary:

[T]he Model splits policing into the two overarching fields of core policing ‘business’ and its required ‘outcomes’. The link between them is the Tasking and Coordinating Process. Tasking and Coordinating operates in two mutually dependent modes, strategic and tactical, and is informed by four key ‘intelligence products’. These, in turn, are based upon nine ‘analytical products’ (or techniques). The key resulting driver is the control strategy,
which is addressed through the tactical menu (or set of operational responses).

This general structure is replicated at three distinct Levels of policing: Level 1 (local), Level 2 (cross border) and Level 3 (national/international). Mutual dependence is [...] apparent, with priorities set at each level ultimately influencing those at the others. (Maguire and John 2006: 73).

Much of the NIM is orientated around traditional, enforcement-type policing methods. For example, the tactical menu includes managing specific hotspots, targeting specific offenders or investigating a series of crimes. It also includes, however, using preventative measures such as community action programmes (Tilley 2003). Community intelligence is acknowledged to be one type of intelligence that can be fed into the model, and this is obtained from the general public when they report what they know to the police (Maguire and John 2006). As Hughes and Rowe (2007) have pointed out, community policing and intelligence-led policing used to be at odds with each other, in that the former was seen as a distraction from ‘real’ policing and the latter was seen as a more efficient and sophisticated policing method. However, since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the local and the global are increasingly viewed as linked. Local information can have an important relevance for national and international events. Thus the police are careful to ensure that all three Levels in the NIM influence the others, and that gains in community intelligence made through improved community relations with the police are fed into the NIM, wherever relevant (Hughes and Rowe 2007).

As intelligence-led policing is closely concerned with ‘efficient’ use of police resources and deployment, it was easy to develop it into a management tool as well, to
be used across the entire police organisation. Intelligence-led policing was intended to be applicable to all police officers and all areas of police work – not just to specialist units. This means that the police work which stems from intelligence-lead policing does not necessarily have to be enforcement orientated, or geared towards the traditional policing methods. Indeed, if intelligence generated about an area identifies a problem that needs to be solved, community action or partnership approaches may be better suited to the task. This shows that while intelligence-lead policing was designed to be proactive in nature, does not have to be and in some cases should not be. Thus one cannot assume the proactive police work and intelligence-led policing are the same thing (Maguire and John 2006).

However, this distinction seems to have been lost on some officers involved in intelligence-led policing. The NIM is associated with intelligence-led policing and therefore, by association, to proactive investigation methods, which are the preserve of specialist investigation units. Instead of becoming a tool by which the entire organisation could do its business more effectively, it is seen as an additional method and an imposition. During the time when the NIM was first introduced, reassurance policing had begun and it appears as though these methods initially were seen to conflict. As discussed above, however, reassurance policing’s heir, neighbourhood policing, should be based on intelligence gathered from the community. It can also provide intelligence to be fed into the NIM, so the two methods are not intended at all to be competitive (Maguire and John 2006).

As discussed earlier, a second development in policing in the early 1990s was the move towards New Public Management, directed by performance indicators and
focused on volume crimes (low-level crimes usually, such as burglary). There is an important difference in philosophy between this and intelligence-led policing. Volume crime encourages the police to work on crimes that are likely to produce a good ‘result’ and clear up as many cases as possible with as few resources as possible. Thus prolific offenders who are more difficult to catch would not be pursued, as they might be in intelligence-led policing. This suggests that volume crime is more concerned with quantity (and meeting performance targets) than quality in intelligence terms. It also brings a return to reactive policing methods, where (volume) crimes are investigated independently of each other. Efforts are being made, however, to link volume crime approaches to the NIM. For example, by using intelligence to identify ‘crime series’, offenders can be charged with as many crimes as possible, as can their co-conspirators. However, nationally set performance indicators do still hold a strong influence over senior police officers and research suggests these may at times influence how the TCG sets its priorities. Some actions taken under the NIM would not show up on performance indictors and there is thus a risk that politics rather than intelligence could dictate policing at times (Maguire and John 2006).

Other problems have been identified with intelligence-led policing, besides (perceived) conflicts with community and volume crime methods and performance indicators. Generating intelligence itself can be problematic, in addition to keeping that flow of information coming. Police officers are still involved in reactive policing, as they must respond to crimes as they are reported. This does not always leave a lot of time for ‘proactive’ work. In addition, some of the roles and activities that stem from intelligence-led work may be less attractive than other, more reactive,
ones. It is still too early to know if the NIM has been successful, but it does have a number of inherent barriers to overcome. (Tilley 2003). However, Tilley argues that intelligence-led policing may come to sit better with the more traditionally-minded police officers than initiatives like neighbourhood policing. In its most narrow interpretation, intelligence-led policing is primarily concerned with enforcement, arrest and incarceration of offenders. More fuzzy concepts such as economic deprivation or low social capital do not come into play, and the offender is cited as the main root of the problem. The police as ‘intelligence-led’ can paint a flattering picture of their work, one that the public is likely to embrace. The police are hard on criminals, but especially the worst and most prolific criminals. However, as Tilley (2003) reminds us, this does not mean that it is necessarily a better way of dealing with crime. Enforcement alone is not always the best solution (Bittner 1967), and there is also the ethical issue that some covert methods employed to gather intelligence might disproportionately impact on privacy.

The NIM was designed to avoid the narrow interpretation of being intelligence-led. It is in fact a business model for the entire police organisation and can include community input as well as that from partner agencies, and focus resources on longer-term projects to solve community issues. There are efforts underway in some areas to join up the work of Community Safety Partnerships (of which the police are one of many members) with that of the NIM. Thus strategic planning could reflect the fears of communities, which are often focused on very low-level and isolated incidents. At the moment, however, this is more of an ideal picture than the reality of police work. There is no guarantee that the NIM will be used to its full potential and the above
mentioned problems and prejudices towards the NIM within the police do still exist (Maguire and John 2006).

ZERO TOLERANCE POLICING

The theme of being hard on criminals continues in the next policing method to be considered. While there has been some attempt at implementing it in the UK, the US has shown far greater interest in zero tolerance policing. The primary and oft-cited example of this comes from New York City and its dramatic fall in recorded crime, especially that of homicide, in the 1990s. The mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, and the chief of police for the NYPD, William Bratton, had enthusiastically embraced the ‘Broken Windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982). This theory stipulates that small acts of disorder, such as a broken window, can invite further acts of disorder if they remain uncorrected (more broken windows). Increasing numbers of small acts of disorder will eventually lead to greater acts of disorder (graffiti, vandalism) and then to serious crime (drug dealing, car theft), resulting in the demise of a neighbourhood or other area in terms of its social control and security. As the public grows increasingly fearful from the small acts of disorder, this leads them to use public areas less, which invites further acts of disorder and crime because informal social control is disappearing. The New York policing method developed in line with this theory was not labelled ‘zero tolerance’ as such. The original idea was for ‘quality of life policing’, but it has inextricably become known not only as zero-tolerance policing, but also as the epitome of this method (even though Bratton never used this term himself) (Newburn and Jones 2007). Some of the main elements in the New York method are:
Vigorous law-enforcement responses to minor crime and disorder

The use of civil remedies against those perceived to be involved in criminal activities

Enhanced accountability, using Compstat \textsuperscript{viii}, of local police managers for crime and disorder in their areas

Public target setting in relation to crime reduction

Conspicuous use of the media as a public relations tool on behalf of the police and policing strategies; and

Aggressive enforcement action against street crimes

(\text{Newburn and Jones 2007: 226})

What lead to the label ‘zero tolerance’ being applied here was the first point – aggressive policing of minor incivilities such as begging, public urination or fare dodging. The police ‘cracked down’ on this kind of behaviour in a way that reflected ‘zero tolerance’ for it, in the hopes that it would prevent worse disorder or crimes from happening (\text{Newburn and Jones 2007}). This, combined with the other methods listed above, is credited with cutting the felony rate by half and dropping the homicide rate from 2245 in 1990 to 767 seven years later (\text{Dixon 1999}). It would appear on the surface that zero tolerance was a success, and widely heralded as such in the media at the time (\text{Manning 2001}).

\text{Dixon (1999) warns against reading too much into this, however. First of all, there were significant crime rate drops in other cities in the US at the same time, which did not use zero tolerance policing methods. 17 of the 25 largest US cities reported a fall}
in their crime rates, as did 12 of the 17 countries in advanced industrial development. While it is not certain why these falls happened, what is clear is that zero tolerance policing was not the main cause. Secondly, as the list of elements making up ‘quality of life’ policing indicates above, the police in New York were not just using new zero tolerance methods. Many other techniques had been implemented. Officers in the NVPD were suffering from an uncertainty in the extent to which they should use their powers for minor offences prior to Bratton’s arrival as chief of police due to fears of corruption allegations, breaches of freedom of speech and inadequate supervision. It can be argued that all these changes in policing contributed to an improvement in morale and to an overall reform in terms of laziness, corruption and incompetence in some areas. This newfound motivation for police officers to do their job may also play a part in the dramatic change in crime in New York (Dixon 1999).

Besides the above reasons for not attributing too much credit to the New York interpretation of zero tolerance policing, there is another important drawback to the method. ‘Crack down’ policing methods have been used before, and are not always received well by the community in question. The UK experienced widespread disorder in 1980-81, which was sparked by an intensive programme of stop and search by the Metropolitan Police in a predominately black area of London. The US experienced similar problems in the 1960s after a period of intensive policing. Even if disorder does not arise, intensive policing methods can have a very detrimental effect on relationships between the police and the communities they serve if these methods are unwelcome (Dixon 1999). This runs counter to the ethos of both community policing and intelligence-led policing where the public is a partner and key informant for the police (Taylor 2006).
It is to a fuller examination of the relationship between zero tolerance policing and community policing that we will now turn. The ‘Broken Windows’ theory was pitched as a type of community policing. By targeting nuisances and disorder that disrupt the ‘quality of life’ of residents, the police could help improve community life, social order and the local environment. This would enable crime control and social problem resolution to be achieved through the same policing method (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). However, zero tolerance is ultimately a law-enforcement approach to policing that usually takes an inflexible view of low-level disorder and incivilities. It is an aggressive policing method done in the name, but not in the spirit of, community policing. If we look at the New York experience in particular, it primarily involved new policing tactics, strategy and technology and not a great deal of community consolation or partnership working (Dixon 1999). If we also consider the negative repercussions zero tolerance policing can have on police-community relations, it is hard to see how this could ever be interpreted as a type of community policing.

Despite these problems with zero tolerance policing, it can be an attractive concept for police managers. It can be a method for meeting some performance targets and indicators in a very dramatic and direct way. As we have seen in earlier discussions, demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness is an ongoing pressure for police managers, and one they are highly motivated to meet. It may come as a surprise then that there have been very few attempts to implement zero tolerance policing in the UK. One attempt took place in the King’s Cross area in London in 1996 where the police took a harsh approach to both minor and major infractions of the law and incivilities for a six week period. The idea was to ‘clean up’ the area. A second
attempt at zero tolerance policing occurred in Hartlepool at around the same time. Detective Superintendent Ray Mallon wanted to protect the ‘decent’ and ‘respectable’ citizens, and so advocated an aggressive response to any low-level nuisances (Newburn and Jones 2007: 227). Other than these, zero tolerance policing has not been seriously implemented in any UK police force. The lure of the ‘New York miracle’ can be strong, but it is important to remember that New York is not indicative of the rest of the world. First of all, when zero tolerance was implemented in New York the population was not only highly criminalized, it was also highly armed. Therefore, taking police action against a person for a minor infraction had a good chance of revealing some more major ones (such as an illegal firearm). This will not be the case in all countries. New York also had a staggering homicide rate, which is also not the case elsewhere. As was mentioned above, the police in New York prior to the introduction of zero tolerance felt impeded by laws regarding personal freedoms and civil liberties. Police officers in other countries have more power to stop and search members of the public than this, and so do not feel restricted in their street policing in quite the same way (Dixon 1999). Thus zero tolerance policing has to be understood in the context in which it developed – the US, and New York in particular – and therefore it cannot be viewed as a magic fix for all policing problems.

What has proven to be a useful aspect of the ‘zero tolerance’ era is the language it uses. While the zero tolerance policing policies themselves did not transfer well to the UK, the terminology and the symbolism they employ did. Prior to their election in 1997, the Labour Party made use of ‘zero tolerance’ in reference to their approach towards failing educational standards and performance. Zero tolerance also surfaced
in a general way to paint New Labour as ‘tough on crime’, especially when discussing their policies on anti-social behaviour in the 1997 manifesto. It has also been used in reference to handling abuse of public sector workers and discipline in schools. The fact that it can be used in so many policy arenas shows the flexibility of the concept, as well as its simplicity and vagueness. It is appealing because it touches on contemporary concerns with disorder and lawlessness. But as any police officer could attest, ‘zero tolerance’ in its truest form is impossible. There is no practical way to police every single infraction that occurs in an area or institution. Nor is this desirable. Therefore, the terminology appeals more to politicians than to police officers and is very significant for its symbolic value. It conveys a ‘mood’, or policy narrative, rather than a realistic operational plan. It is more a form of expressive crime control, rather than effective crime control. Its power is in the image it conveys, rather than any actual police action (Newburn and Jones 2007).

PROBLEM ORIENTATED POLICING

One final policing method will be discussed, and this also touches on the issues of police effectiveness and efficiency. Like many of the others discussed so far in this chapter, it was an outcome of the call for an end to reactive policing that treated all incidents in isolation from each other. Problem orientated policing (POP) is often assumed to be the same as community orientated policing, but they are different in significant ways.

The main underlying principle in problem orientated policing is to look for the root cause of problems in an area that result in multiple calls to the police. If the source of
the problems was addressed, then there would be an overall reduction or end to calls for police services. These calls can seem unrelated to each other, but may all stem from the same basic issue. For example, if an apartment complex is experiencing physical and social deterioration, multiple incidents may result such as burglary, vandalism, anti-social behaviour of residents, maybe even drug dealing. If the police stop reacting to each incident in turn and instead work with local residents and the building’s owner/manager to improve the conditions, then all the seemingly unrelated incidents might end. This makes for a more efficient use of police time and resources (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). There has been an increasing sense in recent years that the demands on the police far exceed their resources, and problem orientated policing is seen as one way to address this (Tilley 2003).

The key difference here between problem orientated policing and community policing is that the former focuses on the \textit{problem} to be solved, while the latter focuses on the \textit{means}. POP takes each situation in isolation and uses a range of options for solving the identified problems. Community policing is instead a force-wide agenda that (in theory) is the preserve of all officers and often employs the same kinds of approaches to all situations (such as public meetings). The community must be consulted and the police are to be lead by their concerns. Thus the process by which problems in an area are identified and solved through community policing is vital as it can improve police community relations and give residents a greater sense of security. This is as much the goal of community policing as addressing the specific community concerns is. In POP, the police may or may not consult or involve local residents in the problem identification and resolution (Brogden and Nijhar 2005).
Herman Goldstein was the main architect of problem orientated policing in the US, who felt that the traditional model of policing had serious shortcomings. He stressed the need for police officers to use their discretion and imagination, as well as community resources and data analysis to arrive at more effective ways of engaging police resources. Goldstein argued that the police had become more concerned with procedure and had lost sight of what policing was meant to be about. He describes the purposes of policing as being:

1. Prevent and control conduct threatening life and property
2. Aid crime victims and protect people in danger of physical harm
3. Protect constitutional guarantees
4. Facilitate the movement of people and vehicles
5. Assist those who cannot care for themselves
6. Resolve conflict between individuals, between groups of between citizen and their government
7. Identify problems that may become more serious for individuals, the police of the government; and
8. Create and maintain a feeling of security in the community

(Tilley 2003: 318)

Goldstein argues for a systematic approach to policing to achieve these aims whereby relevant problems in a community are researched and understood and responses targeted according to this analysis. Enforcement is only one method that can be chosen, and often does not prove effective in the long-term as a way of solving community problems. Of course, identifying a ‘problem’ is a key part of the process,
and Goldstein felt that these would have patterns to them, which can vary widely. They can involve repeat offenders, repeat victims, repeat locations, high-demand products or even have a particular seasonality (which can be anything from time of day to time of year when problems are more likely to occur) (Tilley 2003). Each problem needs to be understood on its own merits and solutions chosen that are the most appropriate to each one.

Policing ‘tools’ have been developed to make the various stages in the problem orientated policing approach more systematic and accessible. The main ones are the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the SARA process, which stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. PAT is used to identify a problem, and SARA covers the entire problem orientated process. In PAT, the ‘crime triangle’ is comprised of an offender, a victim and a location (or related variations such as a class of victim or source of complaint). These three features of a problem are analysed to detect where a change might be made in one of them so as to solve the problem. In SARA, ‘scanning’ identifies a problem; ‘analysis’ brings about a deeper understanding of the problem (which may involve the use of PAT), which informs the subsequent ‘response’. The whole process is then ‘assessed’ for its effectiveness. The steps in SARA are not always as clear-cut as this, but it provides the police a general framework in which to work (Tilley 2003).

While problem orientated policing has been embraced in both the US and the UK, there have been some difficulties in its implementation. It shares with community orientated policing the perception that it is not ‘real’ policing, as enforcement is not a preferred method in POP. Because of the cultural value placed on traditional,
enforcement type methods, the data police gather about crime incidents tend to have this in mind and are not geared towards an analysis of longer-term crime trends (Tilley 2003, Cordner and Perkins Biebel 2005). Thus the data itself can be problematic. This then makes the subsequent analysis difficult, which is an important part of the SARA process. Like the other policing methods above, problem orientated policing suffers from external pressures to meet performance targets, which often work against the philosophy of POP. For example, as enforcement is not always an ideal way to address an identified problem, there will be no subsequent arrest or crime ‘cleared up’. This leaves vital performance targets unmet. Police also report having little time to do problem-orientated work as they are still an emergency service and have to respond to calls when they come in (but this of course was one of the reasons for developing POP in the first place). A final obstacle to implementing problem orientated policing is the fact that it requires a serious change to the way the police operate, a change that takes commitment and resources which cannot happen overnight. If there is no concerted effort within a force to bring in a problem-orientated approach, it will not achieve significant results (Tilley 2003). Cordner and Perkins Biebel (2005) found in their research in San Diego that police officers tended towards small-scale ‘problem solving’ (favouring enforcement methods) instead of towards the intended comprehensive ‘problem orientated policing’, as the distinction had not been made entirely clear to them (see also Braga and Weisburd 2006).

While problem orientated policing does experience many barriers within the police service, the competing policing philosophies described in this chapter are not necessarily one of them. As Lancashire Constabulary has demonstrated, the POP process they had been promoting could be successfully linked into the National
Intelligence Model. Both stress the importance of gathering data about an issue or problem (over a comparatively long term) to better understand it and locate the best solution (Maguire and John 2006). As was mentioned above, problem orientated policing is often confused with community orientated policing as they can involve similar methods (but do not always do so). Zero tolerance policing, however, will not sit well next to POP as the former is heavily focused on short-term, enforcement methods.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered some of the recent innovations in policing methods in the UK and the US, most of which are designed to direct the police away from traditional, enforcement orientated approaches. The most established and influential is community orientated policing (COP). It has been employed in various forms, not only in these two countries, but across the globe (Brogden and Nijhar 2005) since its first inception in the 1970s. The other policing methods examined here all bear some relation to COP. Neighbourhood policing is currently the driving force of policing in England and Wales, and represents a very systematic and heavily resourced approach to police reform (in contrast to the patchy and sometimes under-resourced COP in the US). This method not only involves police officers, but also the new breed of Community Support Officers (CSOs) hired and trained specifically to work alongside the police in the community. CSOs are a response to the eternal call for more ‘Bobbies on the beat’, albeit with less power and authority than a fully trained police officer (and considerably cheaper). Police officers, CSOs, and other actors from local authority agencies all form part of a Neighbourhood Policing Team, which as of 2008
should be present in every ‘neighbourhood’ of every police force in England and Wales. Time will tell of the significance and effectiveness of this endeavour.

Intelligence led policing, while still being rather enforcement-orientated, can support community policing methods in providing ‘evidence’ on which action can be taken. ‘Community intelligence’, in turn, is one of many kinds of information on which this method relies for combating other kinds of crime. Problem orientated policing also relies on effective data gathering, and is usually community-focused and sees enforcement as only one option among many. However, direct engagement with a community experiencing a ‘problem’ is only initiated if it is deemed relevant to solving that problem. Thus these two methods can be complementary to community and neighbourhood policing, but this is not always the case. Zero tolerance policing was initially viewed as a type of community policing, in that addressing small signs of disorder or crime in a neighbourhood would ultimately lead to a better quality of life for the local residents. In practice, this method has tended to be heavily reactionary and enforcement driven, and actually risks doing damage to police relations with a community, rather than improving them.

While police officers themselves have, or are encouraged to have, a great deal of discretion in how they undertake these policing methods, the biggest influence on the manner in which these methods are enacted and ultimately on their success would seem to be performance indicators and management systems (New Public Management in the UK). At every turn we have seen how the philosophies and theories behind these policing systems have been undermined (or at best influenced by) centrally set performance targets. In some cases this is not necessarily
problematic – zero tolerance policing is only marginally a community orientated approach and acts very much in the short-term (although not exclusively). But for other systems, orientating one’s work towards nationally set priorities is in direct conflict with the underlying ethos of the policing method. Several authors mentioned in this chapter have questioned the wisdom of trying to fit these types of systems within a policing service so heavily monitored by targets. Measures are currently being taken in England and Wales to modify the targets so that some of them cover community methods, but it seems these will still to be in the minority. Traditional policing methods offer the best way to meet the majority of performance indicators.

There is another inherent contradiction in this situation. While, as mentioned above, police officer discretion and creativity is central to many of these policing methods, the methods themselves were imposed from above and usually with very little consultation with the staff who would be enacting them. Many new approaches to policing have been introduced in a rather short time frame, and it is not surprising that there has been resistance to them from police officers. Research has shown that the police as a whole and as individuals fare better if they have been involved in some way in the decision-making process for the organisation (Sklansky 2007). Not only do they seem to be happier workers, but the force has increased productivity and less citizen complaints. Wood and Marks (2007) have conducted research into ‘bottom up’ reform in the police and show very positive and promising results.

While the intention behind many of these new policing methods was admirable (moving towards proactive and/or citizen-led policing), it would seem that their implementation has some serious problems: multiple and overlapping methods,
imposed form above and in conflict with powerful performance targets. While no one method has emerged as the best way forward (nor can any of them claim to have been successfully implemented as yet), it would seem that most of them can work together if the effort is made to do so. It would also seem that engaging police officers directly in the strategic decision-making would support and encourage them in their operational decision-making as well. All of this requires a comprehensive and dramatic commitment to change from the police organisation and central government, which as yet does not seem to be the case.

REFERENCES


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¹ I would like to express my sincere thanks to Peter Manning and Anne-Marie Singh for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this chapter.
² This is not meant to encourage the assumption that policing experiences in North America and the UK are largely same, nor that these systems are always appropriate for adoption by other cultures. Please see Brogden and Nijhar (2005) and Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) for more on the perils of ethnocentrism in police studies.
³ COMPSTAT is a police administrative software package in use in the US. It is linked to the success of zero tolerance policing in New York in the 1990s. See later section in this chapter on zero tolerance and Moore (2003) for more.
⁴ Democratic Policing, however, goes beyond the concepts of community policing to place issues of Human Rights and equity to the fore.
⁵ Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own separate policing arrangements and as yet no centrally organised community-type policing programmes as those to be described for England and Wales.
⁷ The PPAF system is soon to be replaced with the Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS). This will measure the performance of all the public sector agencies involved in community safety under one system and is hoped to include more qualitative measures, a lack of which is a criticism of the PPAF (Flanagan 2008).
⁸ COMPSTAT is a computerised system in the US that gathers data on calls for police service and levels of police activity. This can be taken down to the precinct level and can be made available within about a week of the data being collected. It is used as a management tool as well to determine where the police are and perhaps should be focusing their resources (Moore 2003).