Ethics for things
Adam, Alison 2008, 'Ethics for things' , Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3) , pp. 149-154.
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This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.
|Themes:||Media, Digital Technology and the Creative Economy|
|Schools:||Colleges and Schools > College of Health & Social Care > School of Nursing, Midwifery, Social Work & Social Sciences > Centre for Social Research|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Ethics and Information Technology|
|Depositing User:||AE Adam|
|Date Deposited:||04 Nov 2011 16:59|
|Last Modified:||20 Aug 2013 17:17|
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