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Ethics for things

Adam, Alison 2008, 'Ethics for things' , Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3) , pp. 149-154.

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    Abstract

    This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.

    Item Type: Article
    Themes: Media, Digital Technology and the Creative Economy
    Schools: Colleges and Schools > College of Health & Social Care > School of Nursing, Midwifery, Social Work & Social Sciences > Centre for Social Research
    Journal or Publication Title: Ethics and Information Technology
    Publisher: Kluwer
    Refereed: Yes
    ISSN: 1388-1957
    Depositing User: AE Adam
    Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2011 16:59
    Last Modified: 20 Aug 2013 18:17
    URI: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/18862

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