The Past becomes the Present.
German National Identity and Memory since Reunification

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<tr>
<td>ANS/NA</td>
<td>National Socialist and National Activist Front (Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten/Nationale Aktivisten)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td>Working Group of the Public Broadcasting Institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Comradeship South (Kameradschaft Süd – Aktionsburo Süddeutschland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AuslG</td>
<td>Foreigner Law (Ausländergesetz)</td>
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<td>BAFL</td>
<td>Federal Office for Refugees (Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDM</td>
<td>National Socialist League of German Maidens (Bund Deutscher Mädels)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BdV</td>
<td>The Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVfV</td>
<td>Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHF</td>
<td>The Women's Homeland Association (Bund Heimattreuer Frauen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BITKOM</td>
<td>The Federal Association of Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft Telekommunikation und neue Medien e. V.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMGS</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Health and Social Security (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMI</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNO</td>
<td>New Order Movement (Bewegung Neue Ordnung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Alliance of the Right (Bündnis Rechts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVA</td>
<td>Federal Administration Office (Bundesverwaltungsamt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVFG</td>
<td>Federal Expellees’ and Refugees’ Act (Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>Group of the CDU/CSU in the Federal Parliament (Fraktion von CDU/CSU im Bundestag)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (<em>Christlich-Soziale Union, Bayern</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>German Alternative (<em>Deutsche Alternative</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHF</td>
<td>German Heathen Front (<em>Deutsche Heidnische Front</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLF</td>
<td>German Radio (<em>Deutschland Funk</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>German Liberal Party (<em>Deutsche Partei. Die Freiheitlichen</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>German People's Union (<em>Deutsche Volksunion</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMNID</td>
<td>A News Service of Opinion in Germany (<em>Ein Informationsdienst zum Meinungsbild in Deutschland</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAF</td>
<td>Frankish Action Front (<em>Fränkische Aktionsfront</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Free German Workers Party (<em>Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party - The Liberals (<em>Freie Demokratische Partei</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMB</td>
<td>League of Free Maidens (<em>Freier Mädelsbund</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSA</td>
<td>Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis (<em>Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analysen mbH</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>FUL</td>
<td>Citizens Movement (<em>Bürgerbewegung Für unser Land</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDF</td>
<td>Community of German Women (<em>Gemeinschaft Deutscher Frauen</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLA</td>
<td>Hamburg List to Stop Foreigners (<em>Hamburger Liste für Ausländerstopp</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA-NRW</td>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalian Information and Documentation Centre Against Violence, Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia (<em>Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum gegen Gewalt, Rechtsextremismus und Ausländerfeindlichkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDGR</td>
<td>Information Service Against Right-Wing Extremism (<em>Informationsdienst gegen Rechtsextremismus</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfZ</td>
<td>Munich Institute of Contemporary History (<em>Institut für Zeitgeschichte</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>Military Information Centre (<em>Informationsstelle Militarisierung</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JN</td>
<td>Young National Democrats (<em>Junge Nationaldemokraten</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFN</td>
<td>Criminal Research Institute of Lower-Saxony (<em>Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen</em>)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGM</td>
<td>Museum of Cultural History (Kulturgeschichtliches Museum Osnabrück)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MABB</td>
<td>Berlin-Brandenburg Regional Supervisory Authority for Private Broadcasting (Medienanstalt Berlin-Brandenburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGFA</td>
<td>Military History Research Office (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHS</td>
<td>Defence of the Mark Brandenburg (Märkischer Heimatschutz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRT</td>
<td>Thuringian Ring of Maidens (Mädelring Thüringen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Germany’s Band of Maidens (Mädelschar Deutschland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDR</td>
<td>North German Broadcasting (Norddeutscher Rundfunk)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>Nationalist Front (Nationalistische Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>National List (Nationale Liste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLPB</td>
<td>Lower Saxon Regional Centre for Political Education (Niedersächsische Landeszentrals für politische Bildung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMBW</td>
<td>Weimar Band of Maidens (Nationaler Mädelbund Weimar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>National Offensive (Nationale offensive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Northern Ring (Nordischer Ring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>German National and Weekly Newspaper (National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKB</td>
<td>Berlin’s Open Public Broadcasting Channel (Offener Kanal Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialists (Partei Demokratischer Sozialisten)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>The Republicans (Die Republikaner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuStAG</td>
<td>Imperial Nationality Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Nazi Storm Troopers (Sturmabteilungen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>East German Communist Party/Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFD</td>
<td>Skingirl-Circle of Friends (Skingirl-Freundeskreis Deutschland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJD</td>
<td>Socialist Youth of Germany (Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Protection Squad (Schutzstaffel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVN-BdA</td>
<td>Association of those Persecuted by the Nazi Regime and Union of Antifascists (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes/Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten e.V.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>West German Broadcasting Corporation (Westdeutscher Rundfunk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>German Channel II (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen)</td>
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History and national consciousness are central to the creation and sustaining of national identity. Although much has been written on German national identity, there has been little examination of how the 60th anniversary of the Allied air campaign or expulsion of ethnic Germans are remembered from the perspective of the Germans as victims. Reflecting the changing status of the National Socialist past as it continues to affect the present, this thesis argues there were significant disparities between official and popular perceptions of national identity and memory.

Presenting a focussed examination of current developments in German society and politics from a German perspective, this thesis examines why many in Germany have rejected a national identity based on a constitutional patriotism and collective atonement. Debates conducted by prominent intellectuals, journalists and academics in leading newspapers and magazines have been compared to statements from Ministers and official reports in order to ascertain the extent to which elite conceptions of national identity find resonance within Germany. Providing fresh evidence from periodicals, archive publications, eyewitness testimonies and books, this informative and arguably compelling thesis makes a significant and original contribution on how German history and identity are now being perceived and represented in Germany.

Competing perceptions of the past and present warrant urgent recognition because so long as a disparate national identity and culture of remembrance continues there can be no effective reconciliation with either the German elite or with others. A greater understanding and recognition of the themes addressed however could not only encourage greater toleration, but also perhaps dispel the increasing sense of bitterness concerning recent aspects of the country’s past.
Introduction

1. Post-reunification national identity and memory.

Although various academics have addressed German national identity, xenophobia and memory in journals such as *Debatte, German Politics* and *The Historical Journal*, there has been little examination of neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* (comradeships), heathen female right-wing groups, the suffering of ethnic Germans during their flight and expulsion from East and Central Europe, or the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air Campaign.1 Writing in 1992 and 1995, for example, British historians Jose Harris, Jeremy Noakes and the German author Winfried Georg Sebald claimed that so far, there has not been a comprehensive examination of the impact of the Allied bombing on German civilians during the Second World War.2 Along similar lines, the editor of the periodical *Schlesien Heute*, Alfred Theisen, contended in 1995 that teachers, academics, politicians and journalists in Germany all failed to convey the extent of the crimes against and suffering of millions of ethnic Germans at the end of the Second World War.3 According to the Director of the Silesian Museum at Görlitz, Martin Bauer, for example, schoolchildren have never discovered the truth about the expulsions of Germans from Silesia.4 Until 2002, the need for atonement for National Socialist crimes took precedence over examinations and commemorations of the Germans as national, collective victims.

Since reunification, sub-cultural right-wing groups have become more prevalent, but, at the same time, largely ignored within academic studies. Addressing the gaps within three interrelated and relatively new themes of contemporary and continuing significance, this thesis suggests there were key dissonances between official and popular understandings of national identity and memory since reunification.

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4 See: Burger, R. Görlitzer Schlüsselerlebnisse. Im Schlesischen Museum wird sehr behutsam an die Vertreibung erinnert. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 03.09.03 (204), p. 3.
2. Setting the scene.

Before reunification in October 1990, questions of national identity appeared to have settled down into an awkward, but mutual recognition of the status quo. One state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was compelled to look east and adopt the mantle of the 'innocent state of workers and peasants'. Such inferences were evident from academic contributions in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* and from Mary Fulbrook when assessing German identity and the causes of xenophobia within the former GDR. 5 Dispensing with Prussian militarism, the other, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), adopted western values and institutions whose most obvious expressions of national consciousness were a 'Westbindung', or bond to the west, the 'Bonn Republic' and a Verfassungspatriotismus or constitutional patriotism. 6

However, with the fall of the Iron Curtain and an increase of ethnic German re-settlers, non-ethnic German immigrants and asylum seekers re-opened questions of nationhood, underlining and exacerbating tensions between exclusive and inclusive definitions of national identity. Due to the unresolved issues of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, the question of how Germans and non-Germans relate to each other has gained increasingly in significance since reunification. In a 1993 edition of *Debatte*, for instance, it was evident that a regressive nationalism and an ethnically orientated identity, apparently in the ascendance, were not the answers to an alleged allusive national unity, but rather a broader and more inclusive German national identity. 7

Before reunification, Germany was the only major European country that adhered to and defended an exclusive *jus sanguinis* (law of descent) as the main principle in defining citizenship. Indicative of this phenomenon was the virtually inviolable right of thousands of ethnic Germans to enter Germany and claim citizenship. 8 Yet, since the 1990s there have been moves away from former official self-definitions, indicating ethnicity no longer constitutes such an important part of German identity.

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Developments, such as the opening up of boundaries in East and Central Europe, prompted restrictions on the migration of ethnic Germans whose former right to automatic citizenship have been increasingly curtailed. Advocates of change, such as liberal intellectuals, social and political reformers, along with members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens, contended, for example, that this right was rather outdated and no longer justified, arguing instead for a less selective approach to citizenship.9

Another related key theme of self-definition during the early 1990s and beyond was how the ruling national political elites and some of the public dealt with and responded to immigration. In response to the large flows of immigrants as a consequence of the collapse of Communism, during the 1990s protracted and often very emotional debates surrounding the question of whether or not Germany was a land of immigration, such as the United States and Canada, polarised the country.10 Since the 1998-2005 SPD/Alliance 90/The Greens government (hereafter referred to as SPD/The Greens) and their supporters promoted continued immigration whilst the media and elements of the public sought to end it, another source of conflict was the ongoing issue of multiculturalism. Reflected in debates within the Bundestag, a greater public acceptance of multiculturalism became a key demand from supporters of ethnic plurality in their quest for a more positive attitude to immigration and foreigners.11 From the opposite pole of the political spectrum, there were claims of a revived Überfremdungsängste (fear of being inundated with foreigners) and search for a non-rational, emotional and ethno-nationalist concept of national identity.12

Posing the question of German identity in new and different ways, the integration of the East not only exposed disputed identities, but also competing and contradictory values. Whilst some intellectuals and parts of the media claimed that German identity was an

unresolved issue, key representatives of the Bundestag political elite and left-liberals continued to seek consensus, promoting a Verfassungspatriotismus as a suitable model for German identity based explicitly on the Grundgesetz (Basic Law).  

Since the Catholic and Protestant churches first introduced the term ‘multiculturalism’ to the FRG in 1980, there have also been ongoing debates about the extent to which Germany represents a multicultural society. On the one hand, there have been claims that Germany has moved way from an allegedly ethnically homogenous nation to a multicultural society. On the other, some in Germany have contended that multiculturalism is a belated and rather unwelcome concept in the former GDR and even within some areas of the FRG. Aside from claims that the GDR had only a small number of foreign contract workers with whom the locals had little or no contact, official doctrine proclaimed that what ethnic identities and attendant tensions there were had effectively disappeared. Hence, until reunification, multiculturalism was never an issue for the GDR.

Closely linked to issues of societal tolerance and self-understanding, reunification and the compulsory re-distribution of asylum-seekers within the new Länder (states) has forced Germans to rethink who they are. On the insistence of officials from various West German Länder, the unification treaty stipulated that the new Länder must take at least 20% of all asylum seekers. Whilst not exclusively German, since reunification anti-foreigner violence has also been a major social issue. Although prompting candlelight demonstrations in Munich, Hamburg, and other major cities against right-wing violence, in response to unprecedented levels of asylum seekers between 1991 and 1992, racist attacks against foreigners and asylum centres reached an all-time high.

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16 See: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., pp. 201, 213.

Following restrictions to the asylum law in May 1993, racist attacks fell in comparison to the two previous years by one third, but xenophobic incidents have continued to attract media and official attention – particularly since the former SPD/Green ruling coalition introduced the Green Card for foreign workers in 2000. Yet, as various political scientists pointed out, the vast majority of Germans have generally distanced themselves from xenophobia, ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. Nevertheless, the central question of what constituted German identity remained. Raising divisive questions about who could and who could not be classed as German, the controversies surrounding German identity were played out in the political and public debates about citizenship, immigration and xenophobia.

Not only were there widespread anxiety and resentment towards immigration and asylum, but also an increasing impatience from some with the historical shame and singularity of the Holocaust. Dismissing open assertions of national identity and relegating national consciousness, the prevailing historical paradigm in the FRG increasingly became one of a collective remembrance of atonement after 1945. Up to 1989 and beyond, what some historians, such as Rainer Zitelmann and Lutz Niethammer, described as 'a negative interrogation of the past' remained central to German identity – both in the FRG and, to a lesser extent, the GDR. Although by no means exclusive to the Bundestag political elite, demands for an ongoing and critical engagement with the National Socialist past also became part of the basic political consensus amongst the major political parties in the FRG. For various representatives of the Bundestag, collective guilt in the form of an Erinnerungsarbeit, or labour of remembrance, was a key component of German historical consciousness and identity.

However, there are often discrepancies between reported and actual attitudes. Challenging official portrayals of the National-Socialist era and German guilt, the Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate) provoked Germany’s first real comprehensive
public self-interrogation about national consciousness and collective guilt. On one side of the debate, conservative historians attempted to minimise the significance of the Holocaust by advocating that National Socialist transgressions ought to be qualified with other genocides. Conversely, liberals and those from the left demanded that the Holocaust ought to be remembered for what it was; namely, an indispensable part of German collective memory. Intervention by the then FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker and common sense ensured that recognition of historical responsibility prevailed.

As well as prompting a reassessment of post-national identities, reunification also seemed to have rekindled a re-examination from some quarters of the historical basis of a collective identity based around Auschwitz. Raised again by the conservative historian Ernst Nolte and others following reunification, doubts were expressed once more about the whole concept of German collective guilt, contesting official and liberal representations of the past and collective memory.

Following on from the Historikerstreit of the 1980s, a second controversy surrounded the 1998 Frankfurt am Main Paulskirche speech by the German novelist Martin Walser. Provoking considerable criticism, Walser condemned all those he claimed had exploited the Holocaust for political purposes and insisted that Auschwitz was not a public, but a private affair of recollection. Although not initially a question of collective guilt, Martin Walser’s acceptance speech for the 1998 Peace Prize for Literature certainly developed into one. It was in this re-configured context that Walser’s 1998 speech broke a former taboo, openly challenging the Bundestag political elite’s insistence on collective atonement.

A more serious and constructive debate was that initiated by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research to the alleged popular myth that the Wehrmacht was a principled and

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honourable military institution. Breaking years of silence, the exhibit provided an opportunity for the descendants of former combatants to acknowledge, question or deny the past actions of loved ones on the Eastern Front. Since the opening of the first anti-

Wehrmacht exhibition in Hamburg in 1995, hundreds of academic articles and newspaper reports have been published on the behaviour of the German army on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. Central to the claims of the exhibition was the extent of the crimes of the Wehrmacht committed by individual soldiers. Historian Christian Hartmann asked in the academic quarterly the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, for example, ‘Was it few or was it many?’ Perceived by many in Germany as having a direct bearing on questions of German identity and memory, the reverberations of a Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or a coming to terms with the National Socialist past, showed no signs of abating at the time of writing. There have been various claims that public and intellectual discourse concerning German suffering has changed.

Although challenged, indicative of a re-writing of the recent past was the depiction and remembrance of the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air Campaign and German suffering during and following the Second World War. On the one hand, FRG portrayals of the past were alleged to have ignored or downplayed the suffering of the survivors of the Allied Bombing Campaign between 1943 and 1945. As German author Winfried Georg Sebald and Fulda historian Günter Sagan contended, the theme was effectively sidelined within the official Erinnerungskultur or culture of remembrance. On the other, the conduct of the Red Army in 1945 along with the fates of thousands of ethnic Germans were also claimed to have been ignored, misrepresented or classified as taboo by the GDR authorities. In short, there were various allusions to what author Volker Hage described as a ‘Darstellungsverbot’ (representational prohibition) in the FRG

concerning the Air War and in the GDR in respect of the so-called ‘re-settlement’ of ethnic Germans (Umsiedler).  

Understandably, perhaps, as far as past and current members of the German ruling political elite were concerned, German grief and suffering was a logical consequence of the explicit or tacit support for National Socialism. During a speech by the former FRG President Roman Herzog, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the destruction of Dresden, it was apparent that Germans were the guilty perpetrators, whose grief both during and after the war was ‘their just punishment’. Evidently, Germans were held collectively responsible for the crimes of the National Socialists. What claims there were for national victim status of the Germans were usually confined to expellee organisations or neo-Nazis. Most Germans, or so it was claimed, did not want to know. In sum, German suffering was considered as secondary to the suffering of the victims of National Socialism.

However, it is now becoming unreasonable to reject claims of national victim status on the grounds of past German crimes or fears of the theme precipitating charges of equal culpability. Indicative of this phenomenon was the growing tendency of local historians and some of the media to want to evaluate the Air War and expulsions from an analytical concept, highlighting oppression and injustice as a means of interpreting and dealing with the past. That is, from a so-called Geschichte von unten or a history from below. This was particularly evident within publications concerning the Air War in Darmstadt and Osnabrück. Catalysts for this alleged new Zeitgeist were Günter Grass’s Crabwalk (Im Krebsgang) and military historian Jörg Friedrich’s Der Brand (The Fire).

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On the 57th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared that nations are communities of consent, not descent. Although the German ethno-national state has effectively disappeared from official rhetoric, there have been claims of a revived national socialist ‘Blut und Boden’, or ‘blood and soil’, mentality amongst neo-Nazi Kameradschaften and female heathen groups. Promoting the preservation of the Germanic race, new social identity protest groups have become associated with disaffected German youth, ethnic identity and xenophobia - in both the west and the former GDR. There has also been a revival of interest in Germany’s ethnic past and origins concerning the confirmation of an ancient battle site known as the Varus-Schlacht (Varus Battle).

Whilst critics of conventional interpretations of national identity, such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich August Winkler, held nationalism and its assertions as responsible for numerous conflicts both past and present, for many, national identity remains one, if not the most important and enduring symbol of self-identification. Enabling mankind to comprehend itself and reality, without national identities we know neither who we are nor where we are going.

Although not the only politically relevant identity at the time of writing, the impact of national identity is unquestionably beyond doubt. Having the capacity to inspire exalted acts of bravery and instil incredible crimes of brutality, millions have willingly given their lives in its defence - however misguided. It has also given rise to some of the most creative pieces of music, literature and art in the world, as well as some of the most destructive ideologies. Without the aforementioned, the history of mankind would not be the story of mankind as we know it, just merely, perhaps, a tale of elevated if commendable ideals that nearly always fall short of man’s expectations. Whatever the merits or otherwise of national identity, nations and national identities remain essential

40 See: Schulz, M. Che Guevara im Nebelland. Archäologie. Der Spiegel, 08.03.04 (11), pp. 152-158.
41 See: Zimmer, M. op. cit., p. 22 and: Wilds, K. op. cit., pp. 84-89. For defenders of national identity, such as Dieter Stein and Andreas Staab, see: Staab, A. op. cit., pp. 31-46 and: Springate, C. Germany: this land is our land. New Statesman & Society, 19.05.95, pp. 24-25.
to self-understanding. Nevertheless, one might well ask, whose interpretation of the
town and identity? Arguably, national identity only becomes a social reality if
sufficient people choose to believe in some or other constructed collective identity.

Whilst most Germans accept the legitimacy of political authority, at the same time,
public contentment with the Federal Republic has not been so widespread as in the past.\textsuperscript{42} Summarising national identity, Professor of Political Science Walker Connor
argued: ‘National consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon. Seldom have the
generalities been applicable to the masses; very often the elites’ conception of the nation
does not extend to them.’\textsuperscript{43} As with all generalisations, much is oversimplified.
However, with all generalisations, there is also some element of truth.

It is often claimed that political elites possess distinctive idioms or ways of talking and
thinking about nationhood - one of whose main tasks is to represent the nation. This is
usually affected by what academics Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson called the
‘invention of tradition’ or ‘imagining communities’ that form an elite’s basis for their
claim as self-appointed representatives of national identity.\textsuperscript{44} Yet, popular idioms or
ways of discussing and expressing nationhood and identity formation may differ
considerably from those of the political elite. Along with the official idioms of what
Professor Lewis J. Edinger called the ‘top-level participants of the ruling policymaking
German national elite’, there are also those of the popular classes of the masses, such as
gender, ethnicity, and public discourses of the past or collective memory.\textsuperscript{45} So, what
were the prevailing idioms of German nationhood between 1990 and 2005, and were
they what the Bundestag elite claimed? How did popular cultural idioms of nationhood
differ from those of the Bundestag political elite and to what extent did an officially
endorsed Verfassungspatriotismus find resonance with what academics Klaus von
Beyme, Mary Fulbrook and Rheinhold Kruppa have defined as ‘the masses’?\textsuperscript{46} In sum,

\textsuperscript{42} For these claims see: Dahrendorf, R. Germans lack the key to their identity. \textit{In}: James, H. and Stone,
\textsuperscript{43} Cited from: Connor, W. \textit{Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding}. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994, p. 223. See also: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and
\textsuperscript{44} Cited from: Anderson, B. \textit{Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.}
pp. 76-83. See also: Brubaker, R. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1-16, 163, 184.
\textsuperscript{46} For comparisons to the masses in the context of a Verfassungspatriotismus or national identity, see:
Beyme, K. von, Deutschland zwischen Verfassungspatriotismus und Neo-Nationalismus. Forum:
to what extent were there key dissonances between official and popular conceptions of national identity and collective memory?

3. The elite group under consideration.

Whilst not exhaustive, the term ‘elite’ could be defined as those literate members of society holding dominant positions in various institutions, expressing and formulating opinions. Holding public or private power, elites often possess wealth, are usually educated to a high standard, accept certain values and usually strive to uphold the established social order. Seeking to maintain and limit social control, they also attempt to a greater or lesser degree to restrict the impact of competing value systems of a given society.

Although this thesis revolves around Germany’s political elite, attention should also be paid to the often acrimonious, personal, generational, professional and ideological rivalries between elites. On the one hand, there are the national political elites in Germany. Drawing on Edinger, this thesis identifies the national political elite as those political leaders from both the ruling and opposition parties of the Federal Parliament, who derive their authority from Article 21 of the Basic Law. On the other, there are also social cultural elites, comprising academics and the opinion-making media. Both seek to or affect considerable influence on public attitudes. Although all elites may be determined by status, wealth and education, political elites do not necessarily represent the interests or opinions of social elites or the masses. Based on that premise, this thesis contends that some of Germany’s social elites have become the self-appointed representatives of the masses over key issues in Germany, exposing major dissonances between official and popular conceptions of identity and memory.

As far as shaping public opinion goes, the influence of Bundestag elites and the mass media is often apparent within established dailies and weeklies, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Reacting to implied and explicit political messages, the Bundestag elite, social elites and the masses

often adapt their outlook on the basis of information supplied to and from the media - particularly from television and newspaper interviews. Attracting media attention, public opinion may also be determined by political campaigning or going on walkabout from political elites to win the hearts and minds of prospective voters.

Indicative of the influence of regional political elites on public opinion is the role of leaders and representatives from the 16 state parliaments (Landtag) from across the political spectrum. In January 1999, for example, the former Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Prime Minister of Hesse, Roland Koch, personally collected signatures in Wiesbaden against dual citizenship for foreigners.49 Along with their 1999 campaign against dual nationality, public sympathy was also garnered for suitable remembrances of the expulsions and the Air War by CSU (Christian Social Union)/CDU regional elites, such as CSU Chairman Edmund Stoiber and CDU Mayor of Frankfurt am Main Petra Roth, by way of their ‘Sunday speeches’ and interviews in the media.50 Pressure groups associated with the Federation of Expellees (BdV), such as the Landsmannschaft Münster and the Berliner Landesverband, have also recently sought or obtained media coverage in order to attract maximum public attention and support.51

Representing a break from ‘traditional politics’ and German national identity, so-called left-libertarian ‘citizens’ initiative groups’, such as the one launched by German television celebrity Lea Rosh for a Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, have also attracted public sympathy.52 Another example was the successful campaign in 1988 by political opposition parties, churches, the media and various interest groups against the draft of a new Foreigner Law, effectively restricting immigration. Proposed by the former CSU Federal Minister of the Interior, Friedrich Zimmermann, the draft had to be withdrawn.53 Determining the political relationship between people and the state, political leaders of

49 For a photograph depicting Koch collecting signatures in Wiesbaden during 1999, see: Deupmann, U., Hildebrandt, T. and Mestmacher, C. Kulturkampf ums Vaterland. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 27.
50 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 186. See also: Darnstädt, T., Enke, C. and Mascolo, G. Der Kampf um die Pässe. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 22-32 and: Graw, A. Stoiber streichelt die Seele der Vertriebenen. Die Welt, 03.09.01, p. 4. See also: Roth eröffnet „März 1944“ Ausstellung zum Bombenkrieg. Frankfurter Rundschau, 24.03.04, p. 34.
organisations and other notables - both national and regional - seek to influence public opinion via the mass media.

Although often critical in their appraisals of certain controversial themes, the role and stance of the media in Germany is not always oppositional to official policies. On the one hand, social elites, such as journalists, justify the policy-makers’ actions to the public or support official interpretations of controversial events. On the other, they may also act as powerful partisan opponents of official policy. Adopting the self-appointed role of interpreters of the news for the public, Germans interested in public affairs usually rely on information provided by reputable journalists and academics. Local historians, art historians, museum experts, memorial educators, along with publicists and journalists play a major role in discussions of public memory.54

Prominent intellectuals, such as Karl Jaspers, Jürgen Habermas, Hans Mommsen and Jörg Friedrich, also play influential and competing roles as they interpret and criticise the ongoing policies and historical issues for the public.55 Often perceived as the ‘moral voice of the nation’, they are usually highly respected in German society.56 Along with political scientists and historians, key participants and arguably major influences on national identity, memory and coming to terms with the past have also been leading left-liberal writers, such as Marion Gräfin Donhoff, Heinrich Böll, Christa Wolf and Günter Grass. Grass and Habermas, for instance, have participated in almost every major debate since reunification, touching on the political self-understanding of Germany and questions of national identity.57

4. Key Terminology.
So, what exactly is national identity and can it be defined and refined? National identity can mean many things to many people. In contrast to neo-conservatives, nationalists, and the extreme right, many left-liberals reject an ethnic construction of identity, seeking instead to construct post-national forms of identification, such as a Verfassungspatriotismus. National identity based on a Verfassungspatriotismus is

55 Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Angelika Krüger-Leißner (SPD) admitted Jörg Friedrich was instrumental in precipitating a new debate on German suffering. See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Berlin, 05.06.03, pp. 4103-4106.
57 For these claims see: Müller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 8-9 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 90, 125-127, 159-171, 187-188, 222. See also: Ardagh, J. op. cit., pp. 193, 298-301, 483.
usually understood to mean a political culture and identity founded on the constitutional principles of the Grundgesetz, such as liberal democracy and equal rights for all irrespective of ethnic, social or cultural origins.\textsuperscript{58} However, as far as the remits of this thesis are concerned, based on theories outlined by academics Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook, national identity is defined as a collective sense of belonging based around a common ethnicity, fate, historical consciousness and memory, shared by significant numbers of people.

Given that three chapters focus on key aspects of the Second World War and its legacy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung constitutes a major feature of this thesis. Drawing on local historians Matthias Rickling (Osnabrück), Karen Meyer-Rebentisch (Lübeck) and Bonn journalist Elena Berhausen, a Geschichte von unten is taken to mean the history of the alleged under-mentioned in Germany in the context of the Air War and expulsions.\textsuperscript{59} It has often been claimed, for example, that many former expellees – particularly German women – were still coping with the events of 1945 and the following months.

In chapters one and six, ethnic Germans are classified into four groups: Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler and Flüchtlinge. Following the provisions of the Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), Vertriebene are German nationals and ethnic Germans who have lost their former domiciles in recognised areas in connection with the Second World War because of expulsion. Yet, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Vertreibungsmaßnahmen ended in 1949.\textsuperscript{60} It is in this connection that a distinction is often made between Aussiedler and Vertriebene. Aussiedler were ethnic German re-settlers from Central and Eastern Europe that have voluntarily relocated to Germany between 1950 and 1987.\textsuperscript{61} In chapter one, there are also numerous references to the term Spätaussiedler (late re-settlers). Mostly originating from territories within the former Republics of the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Spätaussiedler are ethnic Germans that have migrated to Germany since

Based on a definition by the Lower Saxon Regional Centre for Political Education (NLPB), Flüchtlinge (refugees) are classified as those ethnic Germans who either elected, or were compelled, to abandon their former homes during or at the end of the Second World War. Unless otherwise stated, the term 'minister' refers to a member of the Bundestag holding a specific post, appointed and dismissed by the German president on the suggestion of the German chancellor.

5. Methodology and parameters of the study.

Drawing on theories of collective memory and national identity, as defined by Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook, this thesis assumes there were significant discrepancies between official and popular perceptions of national identity and memory. In order to address the validity of this claim, a determinedly interdisciplinary approach has been adopted using content analysis to investigate six selected themes of national identity.

Content analysis can be used to analyse a wide range of material from newspaper reports, television programmes, radio broadcasts, films, government reports and official speeches. Employed as a technique for analysing the actual content of communications, content analysis is particularly useful for demonstrating how contemporary issues are taken up by the media in a positive or negative way and how, in turn, this affects their acceptance or dismissal by the ruling political elites.

How six topical themes of identity and memory were appraised in the media in comparison to the official line have been examined in order to ascertain the extent to which official conceptions of identity and memory were reflected at a popular level. Although this thesis has drawn on numerous sources of contemporary evidence, it is primarily based on what Edinger termed ‘supra-regional dailies and weeklies’, publications from local archives and local newspapers, Bundestag minutes, press

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65 'Whenever somebody reads, or listens to, the content of a body of communication and then summarises and interprets what is there, then content analysis can be said to have taken place', noted Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones. See: Burnham, P. et al. Research methods in politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 236-237.
releases and speeches. Eyewitness testimonies in local newspaper and archive publications have been examined in order to convey a sense of how the Air War and expulsion themes were experienced from a grass roots level or a Geschichte von unten.

Responding to numerous claims that German national identity and memory have become problematic since reunification, this thesis evaluates the impact of citizenship, immigration, xenophobia, the Holocaust, the Air War and the expulsions. Presenting a focused examination of significant developments in German society and politics since the beginning of the 1990s to 2005, a key aim of the thesis is to examine the legacy of the past as it continues to affect the present. This study does not provide an exhaustive account of the themes addressed, but it does go some way in providing a greater understanding of one of the most important states in Europe.


This thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the origins of jus sanguinis and official motives for its retention, examining how citizenship policy has adjusted since reunification in relation to ethnic and non-ethnic Germans. This chapter also reviews the degree to which a Verfassungspatriotismus and German intellectual Johann Gottfried von Herder’s interpretation of the Volk continues to enjoy contemporary relevance in both popular and official discourses of identity. Contrasting official stances on immigration with developments since reunification, chapter two looks at populist reactions to the former SPD/Green government’s promotion of immigration in the face of continuing unemployment. It also considers the related issues of the preservation of German identity and the integration of foreigners that have arisen since reunification.

Responding to official claims that xenophobia is generally the preserve of the former GDR, chapter three considers the extent of racially motivated violence within both parts of Germany. Identifying key challenges to a Verfassungspatriotismus, the first three chapters of the thesis assess official and populist reactions to three subjects intricately connected to national identity. Another central theme of this study is to examine how

the past is being re-interpreted and presented in Germany. Beginning with how German guilt is being re-assessed from some quarters, chapter four examines the extent to which Auschwitz continues to inform to German national understanding. With the notable exceptions of Hamburg and Dresden, W. G. Sebald and others contended that the Allied Air War remained largely unarticulated at national level. Assessing the impact of the 60th anniversary of the Air War, chapter five examines how the Allied Bombing Campaign between 1943 and 1945 is being remembered in popular and official discourses of the past.

Given popular pressure for a national Centre against Expulsion, chapter six asks to what extent the New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) fulfils its alleged official function as the central site of collective national remembrance and mourning. Is there a sense of an inadequate Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany, as has been suggested by various German historians? Raising further questions over collective memory, reactions to the removal of official plaques honouring former war ‘hero’ Group Captain Werner Mölders are also considered. There have also been official and other concerns about a growing heathen subculture influenced by right-wing extremist ideology that is increasingly being embraced by female groups. Evaluating claims of a revival of interest in Germany’s ethnic origins, ancient Germanic symbols and their misappropriation by various identity protest groups, chapter six examines how the ethnic past continues to determine German national self-understanding at a popular level. Focussing on key debates in the Bundestag about citizenship, immigration, xenophobia, and commemoration, this thesis examines the extent an official Verfassungspatriotismus and Erinnerungskultur reflected private and collective remembrance.

7. Justification of themes, source material and its challenges.
Primary sources were selected from leads found within print searches of various areas of secondary evidence, such as footnotes, bibliographies and textual references within books and articles. Official and other key sources of evidence were located from online searches using German search engines, online catalogues from higher educational institutions, official websites and British national bibliographic databases, based on their contemporary relevance and quality.
Forming the essence of numerous press releases and debates in the Bundestag since reunification in October 1990, three themes in particular have constantly re-appeared in slightly varying combinations and intensity concerning self-definition. These were citizenship, immigration and xenophobia. Conferring not only political but also social and economic rights, citizenship and membership of the nation are inextricable from nationhood and national identity. Although the integration of millions of ethnic Germans in the post-war years was officially hailed as a great success, since reunification the admission, integration and ultimately questions of national belonging of the Russlanddeutsche, or ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, have become topical issues of official and public concern. Questions have been raised not only over their numbers, but also concerning the integration of more recent arrivals into German society and their privileged access to citizenship based on ethnicity or alleged discrimination suffered within their host states.

Over the centuries, citizenship has gradually endowed individuals with civil, political and social rights. Although citizenship is inclusive, it has often been exclusive, excluding foreigners based on their nationality. Perhaps debates on citizenship should primarily focus not on who we are, but what we are. Nevertheless, although some may contend an ethnic basis of citizenship is somewhat outdated, it is plausible to claim that what we are is who we are. Examining amendments to citizenship entitlement for ethnic Germans and public reactions to dual nationality for non-ethnic Germans, which conception of national identity underlay official and popular self-understanding can, to some degree, be established.

Throughout chapter one and subsequent chapters, opinion polls have been utilised to measure public response to Spätaussiedler, non-ethnic German immigration and dual nationality. Whilst public opinion surveys provide a useful medium for sounding out the mood at the time, opportunities for the articulation of mass concerns can be rather limited. Firstly, they only permit people to express their views in response to restrictive

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questions. Secondly, they may not shed much light on the individual's motives or reasons for expressing something. Clearly, survey data has its limits.

National consciousness and identity can also be analysed by examining emotive issues triggering public responses, such as immigration. Immigration in Germany has provoked from some quarters an alleged Überfremdungsängste and concomitant fears of a loss of German identity. What may seem as a justifiable or essential concern to preserve one's own identity for some, for others, national identity may appear as exclusionary, selfish, unacceptable or even dangerous. Though German television stations and newspapers can offer a rich and variegated source of political information, at the same time, they also raise ethical and political problems. During the early 1990s and beyond, elements of the German media, such as Der Spiegel and Bild Zeitung, have stood accused of presenting negative images of asylum and fostering racist attitudes.

Although insensitive reporting about immigration can sometimes prompt attacks on asylum hostels, open discussion of immigration can also have positive effects, such as the campaigns for voting rights for foreigners in local elections and peaceful protests against racist violence in Germany. Without a clear understanding of what actually lies behind xenophobia or the ideological changes said to have occurred since the fall of Communism, racist violence in Germany will perhaps never be effectively tackled or fully comprehended.

National identities tend to be created in contrast to other external identities, such as a perceived enemy. By examining some of the reasons for xenophobia as perceived from within, what being German means can be established to some degree from without by analysing what it is not. Addressing the overarching question of the thesis, the theme of immigration underlined the official inclusive and populist exclusive definitions of nationhood being contested at the time of writing.

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71 For some of these debates see: Kuechler, M. op. cit., pp. 47-74 and: Zimmer, M. op. cit., pp. 34-35.
74 For these claims see: Ekman, J. National identity in divided and unified Germany: continuity and change. Orebro: Orebro University, 2001, pp. 74, 80-81 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17.
Comparisons between statements on controversial themes from political elites and texts within the media go some way in demonstrating emergent disparities between official and popular discourses of collective memory. Revived attempts from some quarters to avoid historical responsibility concerning the Holocaust warrants urgent attention, because a prescribed memory serves no viable function per se if it does not reflect all those it is supposed to represent. Evidently, several political journals, weeklies and books have adopted a selective interpretation of how some of the German public perceived their country’s past. Attracting condemnation in the left-liberal weekly Die Zeit, however, such depictions of alleged social reality were contested. According to academic Karl Wilds and Hungarian novelist Gyorgy Konrad, for instance, Walser’s allegations that Auschwitz was being used as a ‘moral club’ brought ‘a moral cosh crashing down on his head’. Thus, texts from the media addressed to certain audiences whose political message, whether implied or explicit, often signifies different things to different readers.

Along with immigration, xenophobia, and a re-appraisal of the National Socialist past, how the 60th anniversary of the Air War was remembered represented another major quest for a consensual national memory in Germany at the time of writing. Since commemorations tend to construct national images of the past by presenting participants and observers with selected visions of history, their depiction constitutes an important element of German national identity.

In the 2002 book Der Brand (The Fire), Germany’s first comprehensive analysis of the Air War against German towns and cities between 1940 and 1945, Jörg Friedrich questioned the ethics and official justification for the deaths of thousands of civilians by pre-empted and scientifically calculated firestorms. Although firestorms were undoubtedly a hideous weapon of war, perhaps their effects ought to be put into perspective. Anyone caught in the draught of a firestorm had little chance of survival, but as Friedrich and various city archive publications failed to point out, more Germans actually survived the firestorms than perished. Despite the dropping of eighty million incendiaries, for example, only 0.7% of Germany’s entire population were killed by

firestorms between 1943 and 1945. Although Grass and Friedrich raised important issues, they and many other authors often overlooked the fact that German suffering would not have occurred if Germans had rejected Hitler and National Socialism.

Expressing reservations about the impact of *The Fire*, various members of the *Bundestag* accused Friedrich and his supporters of fostering a nationalist *Erinnerungskultur*. Although studies dedicated to collective memory, such as *The Fire* and the Frankfurt Historical Institute’s *Frankfurt am Main in the Bombing War* (2004), perhaps lapsed into a populist culture of emotionalism, these sources were fitting and very useful for comprehending Germany’s new *Erinnerungskultur*. Both publications and others like them included numerous eyewitness testimonies on the Allied Air Campaign.

Memory is a useful medium for understanding the past and people whose stories have to be recorded in order to ensure their survival. There was a widespread perception amongst the media and local historians that the generation who experienced the Air War and expulsions are dying out, along with a concomitant sense of urgency to record their testimonies before they die. In short, eyewitness accounts have become progressively important in Germany – particularly in Darmstadt, Magdeburg and East Friesland.

Whilst oral history can sometimes convey a sense of the categories in which people think, it may also involve the bias of the observer, the exponent and comprise small samples from which it is difficult to generalise. Informants, for example, may have consciously or otherwise omitted or revised their recollections of the past. Nevertheless, oral history can make a vivid and significant contribution to historical analysis, provided it is dealt with critically and tested as to how relevant and representative it is. In relation to the contemporary relevance of the selection of numerous local articles and publications by newspapers on the Air War within the remit of the thesis, German

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77 See: Honold, K. *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
81 Hamelin historian Bernhard Gelderblom raised these points. See: Gelderblom, B. and Truchseß, W. F. *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
history can perhaps best be understood in conjunction with local history. Although the
effect of information obviously varies with different media, audience and location,
evidence to-date suggests that local memory of the impact of the Air War was
considerable throughout Germany.

Particularly striking was the manner in which the Air War was engaged by both local
newspapers and ‘supra-regional dailies’ and weeklies in Germany. Many seemed to
have adopted the mantle of representative of this new culture of remembrance –
especially in the form of what both German and foreign observers have described as an
extensive Opferkult (victim cult).

Although the media sometimes functions ideologically, what perhaps should be
remembered is that they neither represent nor express a single ideology. That said,
newspapers and their publications can offer a unique approach to the study of the past
since they are time-specific and are not usually written for posterity. Written for
contemporary audiences, newspaper material often reveals a great deal about a certain
period or topic. Unfortunately, however, the reliability, accuracy and actual reporting of
newspaper material cannot always be assured. As a corrective for the deficits and
problems that inevitably arise from the use of newspapers, parliamentary minutes can
provide a greater balance and insight to the theme under review. It is sometimes
possible, in parliamentary minutes, to find the views of members of the Bundestag not
necessarily always made open to the public. Reflecting on the merits of official sources
of evidence, Professor of Contemporary History Rodney Lowe noted: ‘The great
advantage of government records is that they reveal the range of influences to which
government was subjected at any given time.’

Prompted by Grass’s 2002 publication Crabwalk, another important influence on the
then German government was the popular demand for a national symbol and Centre

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83 For allusions to a new victim discourse see: Sontheimer, M. Schillerndes Ungeheuer. Der Spiegel,
84 See: Larsen, P. Media contents. Textual analysis of fictional media content. In: Jensen, K. B. and
86 Cited from: Burnham, P. op. cit., p. 177.
against Expulsion for the thousands of ethnic Germans who died during their flight or expulsion from East and Central Europe during and after 1945. Places of collective remembrance and mourning can offer useful insights into understanding national identity.

Beginning around 1150, the colonisation of the Slav lands east of the river Elbe by Germans proved to have significant repercussions for Germany.\(^87\) Becoming a central interpretive factor of history and identity for some in Germany, any comprehensive engagement with German politics, history, identity and memory needs to be understood against the background of ethnic Germans in East and Central Europe. Providing the backdrop for Crabwalk, the former West Prussian port of Danzig (now the Polish city of Gdansk) was, after all, the ‘trigger’ for the most destructive war in history.\(^88\) Described by some in Germany as ‘one of the biggest expulsions of recent history’, by 1950, \textit{Vertriebene} constituted 16.5\% (one-sixth) of the total population of the FRG.\(^89\) In the former GDR, meanwhile, one in every four of its inhabitants was a \textit{Vertriebene} or descended from such a family.\(^90\) In other words, they are a part of German identity. Together with the Second World War, the legacy of the so-called ‘re-settlement’ of ethnic Germans, along with their ethno-cultural and historical dimensions of national identity, continues to be felt in Germany at the time of writing.\(^91\)

‘Although Pomeranian, Silesian and East Prussian \textit{Vertriebene} did not leave a perceptible cultural imprint on their new \textit{Heimat} of East Friesland, what remains are their stories’, claimed local authors Petra Herterich and Dr. Heiner Schneider.\(^92\) Moreover, from such stories history and identities are made.

As with the relatively recently published accounts from the Air War, previously unheard testimonies of the \textit{Vertriebene} have been enthusiastically aired, printed and discussed

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by local historians, radio stations, local newspapers and regional journals. Focussing on sensational themes likely to enhance their circulation, illustrated weeklies and monthlies also featured interviews with well-know writers, such as Günter Grass. As far as some public attitudes went, however, it seemed the media had a good sense of what was going on within sections of the population in the wake of Crabwalk (2000). Take, for instance, the response to the publication Crabwalk. With more than 300,000 copies sold within a few months of publication, it seemed that Crabwalk met a popular demand for this particular aspect of the past.93

As with all sources, the sincerity and motivation of the author ought to be considered. Perhaps Grass may have written an exaggerated account with the view of ensuring wider public acceptance and fostering the impression of the current Zeitgeist. Although Crabwalk may have shaped rather than reflected popular discourses of the past, that in itself did not necessarily make it any less relevant as a useful source. Perhaps Crabwalk and other articles on the expulsions helped bring closure for some with their past trauma and personal Vergangenheitsbewältigung.

Although sometimes charged with dismissing or ignoring alternative views, at the same time, journalists bring a much-needed awareness to issues and events bypassed or even, sometimes, officially repressed. There have been claims that the flight and expulsions of ethnic Germans have not been adequately addressed in Wittenberg and Berlin.94 In addition to the subjective conditions under which sources are written, there is also the ideological manipulation of topical themes for political advancement to be considered. Established in 1991 and 2000, dissident organisations, such as the radical breakaway youth section of the Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen, the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen (JLO), and Die Preußische Treuhand, were particularly noteworthy in this connection.95


Remembering the past from a selective perspective also carries the danger that the expulsions could be taken out of their historical context, damaging relations and inhibiting a genuine reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours. However, if a comprehensive *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is to be properly affected and the past finally laid to rest, those who have suffered because of the errors of the past have to be remembered collectively. Moreover, remembering collectively is not an obstacle to, but a condition of reconciliation. Given the concerns expressed within the *Bundestag* regarding the public’s reception of *Crabwalk* and *The Fire*, the Air War and expulsion themes were evidently key parameters of an official national identity and memory.

Evaluating key political and social developments in Germany since reunification, the theme of this project was decided given an alleged renaissance of an ethno-nationalist doctrine and a changing *Erinnerungskultur* concerning how German suffering was depicted and remembered in the wake of *Crabwalk* and *The Fire*. In sum, the reporting of attitudes and explanatory factors are far from consensual, which ought be kept in mind when assessing the limitations and merits of the influence of the media and academics in determining public opinion. Evaluating events since reunification, the informational cut-off point of the thesis and source material is November 2005.

8. Recent research and deficits in the literature.

According to key members of the *Bundestag* ruling political elite, any collective remembrance of German suffering must be expressed in a European context. As well as the merits of this stance, such as harmonious diplomatic relations and tolerance for others, there were also a number of problems. Firstly, since each respective state presented itself as the antithesis of the other, the demise of the GDR was, arguably, problematic for establishing a collective past. Berlin historian Annette Leo noted in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* that there was no historical consensus concerning appraisals of the GDR or its classification within either a national or a European context. 96 Secondly, along with multiculturalism and the GDR’s euphemistic depictions of the expulsions, the history of the Air War also required integrating with official representations of the past. 97

On the one hand, the GDR authorities were far from silent about the Allied air raids. Referring to the Allied bombers as *Luftgangster*, the GDR authorities apparently rarely missed an opportunity to question the moral and strategic legitimacy of the air raids. According to Rolf-Dieter Müller and Joachim Bölche, for instance, the former East German Communist Party (SED) held a regular remembrance ceremony during which they exploited the firestorm of Dresden for anti-western propaganda purposes.98 On the other, criticism and questions about the mass rape and abduction of women and young girls to labour camps by the Red Army were strictly taboo in the GDR.99

Whilst there were no official taboos in the FRG concerning events in eastern and central Europe, there have been numerous allegations of official taboos against portraying the Germans as innocent collective victims of the Allied firestorms. Because of real or imagined official pressure and fears of being labelled a neo-Nazi, representing the Air War from the perspective of the victim remained suppressed or simply ignored within mainstream German literature. Instead, previous debates about German history and memory usually focussed on the identity, behaviour and motives of the perpetrators and on the appropriate commemoration for the victims of National Socialism.100

Existing German literature tended to focus on the Air War at local level. In 1955 and 1984, for example, former chief of the Brunswick fire brigade Rudolf Prescher and local historian Armin Schmid published accounts of the firestorms in Brunswick and Frankfurt am Main.101 Although Friedrich’s *The Fire* addressed the strategic and physical aspects of the Allied Air Campaign on towns and cities throughout Germany, what became apparent was a deficit in this and other literature concerning the psychological and emotional effects of the air raids against German civilians – particularly amongst those who were children at the time.102

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99 These claims issued from Alfred Theisen, Arno Surminski and Annette Leo. See: Theisen, A. *op. cit.*, pp. 20-22 and: Surminski, A. *op. cit.*, pp. 112-114. See also: Leo, A. *op. cit.*, p. 31.
In studies, such as Wido Spratte's *Approaching Osnabrück: The Air Raids Between 1940-1945* (1985) and even within the second edition of Dieter Wolf's *Events of the Air War in Mannheim 1939-1945* (2003), there was little use of eyewitness material. Instead, these historians focussed on the immediate aftermath and statistics of the heaviest raids based on local and Allied sources.\(^{103}\) Whilst Dr. Mark Connelly provided statistics of Germans lost during the Air War in the 2001 publication *Reaching for the Stars. A New History of Bomber Command in World World War II*, the British historian concentrated on justifying RAF raids against cities such as Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Mainz.\(^{104}\) Moreover, although authors Winfried Georg Sebald and Alexander Kluge raised moral questions over the bombing, there was no comprehensive critical appraisal of the legitimacy of the air raids themselves.\(^{105}\) Evidently, the social and contemporary historical aspects of the Allied Bombing Campaign were clearly under-researched both in German and in English literature.

Another area of memory in which there were remaining gaps in English contemporary literature was how the flight, expulsions and abductions of ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe were remembered post-\textit{Crabwalk}. In his best seller *Crabwalk*, Günter Grass claimed that discussing the sinking of the refugee ship the \textit{Wilhelm Gustloff} and the fates of its passengers and others that had fled East Prussia and Pomerania, were forbidden in the GDR. Neither did the events surrounding the \textit{Gustloff} make any waves in the West because of German guilt and a lack of public interest, alleged Grass.\(^{106}\) Nevertheless, other German authors have addressed former events in East Prussia and Pomerania.

In 1997, the German political scientist Christian von Krockow described the exertions and fates of German women during their flight from Pomerania in the publication *The Hour of Women. Report from Pomerania 1944-1947*. A year later, German historian Ulla Lachauer addressed the trials and tribulations of 13 ethnic German families from the former East Prussia during and at the end of the Second World War in the book *East*  

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\(^{106}\) See: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 29, 50, 94-95, 103-105, 119, 162-166, 174-175.
Prussian Lives. 107 Although official censorship disappeared with reunification, for many years eyewitnesses from the former GDR, who suffered at the hands of the Red Army and in Soviet labour camps, remained silent about past events. 108 Whilst Grass and others have brought back into public attention the events surrounding the Wilhelm Gustloff, there has been no appraisal in English of how the flight and expulsions of Germans from Eastern Europe were remembered since Crabwalk or the debates surrounding the requests for a national Centre against Expulsion.

Neither has there been a comprehensive engagement with the phenomenon of female xenophobia. Although academics Gertrud Siller and Birgit Meyer addressed female membership of neo-Nazi groups and their attitudes to foreigners, female support of, or capacity for, right-wing orientated violence and participation in other identity protest groups constitute areas of research that are still rather limited. It was evident within a review of contributions by Siller and Meyer for the 1993 volume Radical Right-Wing Violence in Unified Germany by Hans-Uwe Otto and Roland Merten, that female support for extreme right-wing parties and xenophobic behaviour were often ‘neglected topics’. 109

9. German national identity and contribution to the wider body of knowledge.

One of the main aims of the thesis is to raise an awareness of why there is a necessity in Germany for a comprehensive collective identity and memory and suggests that to learn from history means to learn in contrast to history. On the one hand, the respect of individual testimonies, national identity and the need to place them in the appropriate historical context leaves future German generations with an unenviable and difficult legacy of grief and responsibility. On the other, such developments are positive for facilitating a greater understanding of the past and ultimately for helping to foster a more constructive Vergangenheitsbewältigung.

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According to academic Rudi Koshar, 'Many scholars have emphasised the continuities and discontinuities of German history. But few have done little to analyse an Erinnerungslandschaft or landscape of memory in all its forms.'\textsuperscript{110} Aside from the previously unheard interpretation of events from the perspective of Germans as victims in Hanover, Darmstadt and Dusseldorf, other new details have also emerged about events elsewhere in Germany. These included the firestorm of Leipzig in December 1943 and the real objective of the RAF raid on Koblenz in November 1944.

By providing fresh evidence in the form of previously unpublished eyewitness testimonies and historical reports from newspaper publications, local historians and city archives, post-reunification reflections of a Geschichte von unten offer a more informed debate about a Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the internal dimensions of German memory. This study, therefore, provides a synthesis of six highly topical and comparatively new debates of national identity in one of the most important states in Europe. Enhanced by eyewitness testimonies and other reports from journalists and historians in cities such as Hanover, Mannheim and Magdeburg, future studies could perhaps benefit from this thesis since many survivors have hitherto remained silent over past events. Given these considerations and the inter-disciplinary nature of the study, this thesis could make an original and credible contribution to the field of contemporary German history.

Chapter 1.

German Citizenship – the Legacy of Blood

One method of establishing which conception of the nation determines national self-understanding is, arguably, the legal entitlement of the residents of a nation to citizenship. Along with former legal adviser to the 1982-1998 CDU/CSU-FDP (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party) ruling coalition on citizenship, Kay Hailbronner, Rogers Brubaker in his *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* claimed:

The distinctive and deeply rooted ethno-cultural and differentialist understanding of nationhood has remained surprisingly robust. Nowhere is this more striking than in the contrast between the policies and politics of citizenship vis-à-vis ethnic Germans and non-German immigrants. 1

Before 2000, non-German immigrants and their children were unlikely to be granted automatic German nationality or dual nationality. This selective policy was based on the official assumption that ethnic German re-settlers relocating from East and Central Europe after 1950 (*Aussiedler*) would be easily absorbed and accepted within the community. 2 As the former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner Issues Marieluise Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) stated: 'Following the Second World War many ethnic Germans were absorbed and subsequently integrated whose immigration to Germany was both politically and socially accepted.' 3

In the light of more recent evidence, however, Hailbronner and Beck’s conclusions were questionable - both from an official capacity and increasingly in a more extreme sense, a public one. Assessing the significance of a *Staatsnation* (civic-territorial nation), *Kulturnation* (ethno-cultural nation) and the principle of citizenship based on *jus*

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sanguinis or descent for German identity, this chapter suggests there has been a significant revision in official self-perceptions.\(^4\)

On the one hand, Spätaussiedler (German re-settlers post-1987) can no longer claim automatic citizenship in Germany, and on the other, dual nationality has now become more accessible to the children born of foreign parents in Germany. Both, arguably, represented significant breaks from a citizenship based almost exclusively on blood descent. On the other, Germanness was still defined and understood in terms of common descent, language and culture from some public quarters, in contrast to liberal conceptions of self-understanding, such as the 1998-2005 Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green ruling coalition’s more civic and inclusive re-orientation of citizenship.\(^5\)

Despite the SPD/Green ruling coalition’s attempts to foster a more inclusive citizenship, this chapter suggests that significant sections of the public still adhered to an exclusive *jus sanguinis* principle of blood descent. It is against these developments that the claims of Hailbronner, Brubaker, Beck and various members of the Bundestag, or lower house of the German Parliament, are reassessed. Although Brubaker suggested the gulf between popular and official idioms, or the ways of talking and thinking about national identity, were particularly pronounced in the French case, at the same time, no such claim was made for the German one. Embodying an ethno-cultural national self-understanding, Brubaker argued that elite German definitions of citizenship continued to be based on *jus sanguinis*.\(^6\)

Before demonstrating the disparities between official and popular idioms of citizenship and, therefore, national identity, it is useful to comprehend past events that led to *jus sanguinis* as one of the key, but not only, determinants of German citizenship.

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The Origins of *jus sanguinis*

For most of its history, Germany has been politically fragmented. Highlighting this political division of Germany, Francis Robin Housemayne du Boulay described late medieval Germany as a 'sea of political fragments in which some of the large pieces floated'. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this political fragmentation led intellectuals, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder, to console themselves, and others like them, by the idea that Germans should think of their nation as a cultural, linguistic and ethnic unit. Echoed by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Ernst Moritz Arndt, a philosophical and military call to arms against the French during the Napoleonic Wars inspired an ethnic and later ultimately exclusive definition of German identity.

In contrast to political nations born out of political revolution, such as France, or founded on immigration, such as America, the cultural nation assumes that primarily ethno-cultural and ancestral ties should constitute the basis of its identity. In his *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808), the philosopher Fichte stated: "[...] even if our political independence were lost, we would nonetheless keep our language and literature and would always remain a nation..."

From the late eighteenth to the nineteenth century, ‘Germany’ had been a psychological and cultural reality rather than a political one - its language being the most tangible aspect of that reality. What was lacking in Germany was the idea of territorial sovereignty that was characteristic of most Western European nation-states. Helmuth Plessner in his *The Belated Nation* referred to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s Germany as an Empire without the idea of the state, without any cohesive political force that by contrast had, perhaps, already been rooted for some time in political nations,

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such as Britain and France. Instead, German national consciousness centred on the ethnic community based on a shared language, tradition, destiny and ancestry from and among the many different German states – a *Kulturnation* or ethno-cultural nation. Sociologist and authority on national identity, A. D. Smith employed the term *ethnie* (ethnic community) to describe and analyse such formations that in his view make up the cores of all modern nations. According to Smith:

Locating such ethnic cores tells us a good deal about the subsequent shape and character of nations. It helps us to answer in large part the question: who is the nation? A state’s ethnic core often shapes the character and boundaries of the nation; for it is very often on the basis of such a core that states coalesce to form nations.

German national identity developed, therefore, outside and against the territorial framework of existing German states due to the disparity in scale between supranational Empire, the sub-national patchwork profusion of sovereign and semi-sovereign political entities. In this sense, German nationhood was an ethno-cultural not a political fact.

Although unified in 1871 under Prussian hegemony, ‘the relatively high degree of fragmentation and regional disparities […] and the federalist structure of the Reich made equalising national citizenship an arduous task’. According to Christiane Lemke and Mary Fulbrook, these rival ethno-national and state-national ideologies prevented a coherent national citizenship from being implemented until 1913 – particularly from states such as Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria.

These competing ideologies between the *Staatsnation* (an active self-determining political nation) and *Kulturnation* (or cultural nation) were first formulated by the

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13 See: Hogwood, P. *op. cit.*, pp. 125-144.
16 For these claims see: Craig, G. A. *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17 and: Brubaker, R. *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. op. cit., pp. 51-52. See also: Hogwood, P. *op. cit.*, p. 127.
By Staatsnation (political nation), Meinecke referred to the nation that centres on the idea of individual and collective self-determination based on the concepts of individual free will and subjective commitment to the nation, noted Alter. By contrast, the cultural nation is founded on criteria such as common heritage and language, religion, customs and history. It does not need a state to mediate a consciousness of unity since the sense of national belonging can develop independently of the state.

Alongside the state nationalism of Germany’s first national Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Johann Gottfried von Herder’s interpretation of the Volksgeist, or spirit of the people, effectively became distorted by various pedagogues promoting a violently inflated anti-Semitic ethnic nationalism. Embodying the new Romantic Movement of the nineteenth century, these intellectuals included Julius Langbehn, Paul Bötticher, Wilhelm Marr, Eugen Dühring and others.

Published in more than 39 editions, Julius Langbehn’s 1890 Rembrandt the Educator advocated an investigation into people’s ancestry as a condition for German citizenship. Although voicing no objection to orthodox Jews, to Langbehn, modern Jews could ‘no more become German than a plum could turn into an apple’. Allegedly, this was because they were democratically inclined and ‘a nation within a nation’. Reflecting a more extreme perspective, alias Paul de Lagarde, Göttingen University Professor Bötticher declared: ‘any alien body within a living organism creates ill feeling, disease, even festering sores and death. The Jews as Jews are aliens [...] and as such nothing but

carriers of putrefaction.\textsuperscript{24} So for these academics, political and state systems were the expression rather than the determinant of characteristic cultural and historical entities. As Brubaker stated: ‘The Romantic understanding of nationhood was fundamentally ethno-cultural with the \textit{Volksgeist} constitutive, the state merely expressive of, German nationhood.’\textsuperscript{25}

Within Imperial Germany, a new state-centred nationalism did not displace an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood. In fact, the two co-existed rather uneasily, reflected in the terms ‘German’ and ‘national’ that sometimes referred to the state and citizenry as a whole, sometimes to an ethno-cultural Germandom alone. Nevertheless, on 22 July 1913 a national citizenship was finally codified in the \textit{Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz} (Imperial Nationality Law (RuStAG)) that defined Germany on ethno-cultural lines, thereby reflecting a \textit{Kulturnation}.\textsuperscript{26} This law primarily defined citizenry as a community of descent - thus confirming an ethno-cultural rather than a political territorial definition of citizenship. One of the most important features of this law was the definition of German citizenship primarily based on the principle of blood and descent (\textit{jus sanguinis}), rather than on the French territorial principle of \textit{jus soli} that defined citizenry as a territorial community.\textsuperscript{27}

Following the defeat of Germany in 1918 and concomitant territorial divisions of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, both the reduced German state and the concept of citizenship became even more homogeneously ethnic in character. In order to make state-membership more consistent with \textit{Volk}-membership and Nazi racial policy, during the 1930s the Nazi government proposed to exclude all Jews and other \textit{Volksfremde}, or ‘foreigners of the people’, from state-membership as outlined in the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24} Cited from: Carsten, F. L. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 25-27. See also: Craig, G. A. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 138, 204–208.
\textsuperscript{25} Cited from: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit.}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{27} Introduced in 1889 to give citizenship to second-generation immigrants or those born in the country of immigration, the concept of French nationality was primarily based on the nationality of one’s country of birth or \textit{jus soli}. See: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit.}, pp. 85-137, 207. For full details of the 1913 German Citizenship Law see: \textit{Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, op. cit.}, pp. 1-9.
After 1945 the principle of ethnic descent was again strengthened. Germany was divided amongst the Allies into four Zones of Occupation, with the United States, Britain and France occupying the west of Germany, and with the Soviet Union controlling the rest of Germany east of the river Elbe. When it became clear that ideological differences between the western Allies and the Soviet Union were increasing, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded in May 1949 with its attendant Basic Law (Grundgesetz). In October that year, the Soviets responded by establishing the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Although the racial laws were abolished in the post-war Federal Republic, final defeat in 1945 did not result in a clean break with past nationality legislation. Whilst racism was banned from the construction of the new national identity of the Germans, jus sanguinis (blood descent) still remained an important part of citizenship. Although the National Socialists racialised the concept of jus sanguinis by enacting the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, the liberal founders of the German post-war constitution, the Basic Law, did not abolish the ancestral principle of citizenship in favour of jus soli.

Within the Basic Law, the framers recognised a certain class of rights that adhered to the quality of being German - irrespective of formal state affiliation. Although an ethno-national understanding of membership ‘had definite exclusionary implications’, the framers of the Basic Law stipulated in Article 116 (2) that: ‘Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial or religious grounds, and their descendents, shall on application have their citizenship restored.’ These were the only group of would-be migrants who were considered to be culturally and ethnically German, and thus automatically entitled to become German citizens. ‘This emphasis on German descent was extended still further in the 1953 Federal Expellees’ and Refugees’ Act (BVFG) to include the millions of

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29 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 918.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Volkszugehörige or ethnic Germans still living behind the Iron Curtain’, noted Simon Green.\footnote{35}

Citizens of the GDR and ethnic Germans remaining in Eastern Europe as a result of German loss of territory after 1945, for example, were to be included into the citizenry of the FRG - officially regarded as German citizens, ‘jure sanguinis’.\footnote{36} It was this common citizenship that paved the way for the re-establishment of a common statehood and meant that the Wilhelmine law of 1913, with its emphasis on \textit{jus sanguinis}, remained in force and became the law of the FRG. Supplemented by Article 116 of the Basic Law, what should also be noted is that the RuStAG granted citizenship to the children of German citizens, irrespective of their ethnic identity. Although modified since 1913, elements of the RuStAG were still valid at the time of writing.\footnote{37}

Nevertheless, official and other evidence suggested that \textit{jus sanguinis} took priority over \textit{jus soli} in post-war Germany as the key determinant of citizenship.\footnote{38} So why did citizenship initially continue to be based primarily on descent? Hermann Kurthen and Mathias Bös suggested the following reasons:

1. The referral to common ethno-cultural bonds promised to guarantee national stability and identity when Germany was still recovering from the ravages of war; the post-war policy of the Allied victors themselves stipulated a collective and ethnic definition of Germanness. Germans were to be isolated and contained within the four occupation zones until 1949.

2. Additionally, the West German government tried to avoid an official recognition of the Cold War division of Germany. East German citizenship was ignored and any \textit{Übersiedler} or former GDR citizens fleeing the Soviets were automatically granted citizenship.


\footnote{36} Cited from: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 169. See also: pp. 163-178 and: Kurthen, H. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 929-930. For territorial settlement of the German border between the Allies see: Fulbrook, M. \textit{A concise history of Germany}. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 204-206.


\footnote{38} For appeals by the SPD and Greens for a change in citizenship legislation, see: Antrag der Fraktion SPD. Erleichterung der Einburgerung unter Hinnahme der doppelten Staatsangehörigkeit \textit{In}: Deutscher Bundestag, \textit{Drucksache 13/259}. Bonn, 19.01.95, pp. 1-4 and: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts (StG) \textit{In}: Deutscher Bundestag, \textit{Drucksache 13/423}. Bonn, 08.02.95, pp. 1-7.
3. Finally West Germany wanted to be a refuge for Germans from either expulsion or ethnic cleansing (in the Soviet Union and East European countries).³⁹

In sum, ethnic definitions of citizenship consequently provided a more flexible and more acceptable solution than a shift to *jus soli*. Any other form of German citizenship at the time would have deprived Germans in the former eastern parts of Federal German citizenship, or implied the tacit acceptance of the GDR.⁴⁰

So what had been primarily a community of descent in Imperial Germany became even more ethnic in conception owing to the particular circumstances of the early post-war period, effectively reinforcing the ethno-cultural focus of citizenship in the FRG. Instead of discrediting the ethno-cultural nation, the division of Germany during the post-war period and expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, ironically perhaps, reinforced and powerfully re-legitimated former official self-understanding. Indicative of a significant change in official self-perceptions was the former unquestioned right of automatic citizenship and other privileges for the millions of ethnic Germans living in the former Eastern bloc, who have allegedly long been eager to settle in Germany.⁴¹

During the 1990s, the Red Cross estimated there were approximately 3.2 million ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe, with 1.9 million in the CIS or Commonwealth of Independent States.⁴² In spite of the fact that the former Soviet Union had a large German minority within its borders, only 110,000 of them (8% of all *Aussiedler*) were allowed to emigrate between 1950 and 1987, noted Münz and Ulrich.⁴³ Since the lifting of administrative restrictions on travel in the late 1980s, however, the migration of ethnic Germans continued more or less unabated, with official statistics suggesting they

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⁴⁰ For this claim see: Kurthen, H. *op. cit.*, p. 930.


⁴² The former CIS states included the eleven former Soviet Republics of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. See: Münz, R. and Ulrich, R. *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴³ The majority of ethnic Germans relocated from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. For figures of ethnic Germans still abroad and claims by the Red Cross, see: Münz, R. and Ulrich, R. *op. cit.*, pp. 25-28.


Representing three inter-related legacies of the \textit{Staatsnation}, populist \textit{Kulturnation} and the latter’s most extreme variant, the \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} (an organic national community), the alleged anomalous status of \textit{Spätaussiedler} epitomised the distinction between state and ethno-cultural ideologies. In a sense, they arguably signified key disparities between official and popular national understanding.


As a legacy of German occupation of Central and parts of Eastern Europe during the Second World War, by 1950 about 12 million ethnic Germans fled west, or had been expelled from the lost eastern territories known as the \textit{Ostgebiete} in western Poland and the Russian district of Kalingrad, along with other districts of ethnic German settlement in Eastern Europe.\footnote{See: Kurthen, H. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 919, 937 and: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany}. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 168.} Consequently, the occupying powers of Britain, France and the US were compelled to redistribute the second biggest enforced migration of people in
history.\textsuperscript{50} By the end of 1946, the occupying powers had re-settled over six million ethnic Germans.\textsuperscript{51}

Since the early 1950s, complete integration rights, inclusion in the welfare state and access to all segments of the labour market were the requisite right of all Aussiedler.\textsuperscript{52} Their desire to move to the FRG was officially regarded as an act of patriotism and adherence to the concept of Germanhood.\textsuperscript{53} Although their bond to Germany was largely ethno-cultural, ethnic Germans outside the borders of West Germany continued to be eligible for West German citizenship. Even if they were unable to speak German, \textit{jus sanguinis} allowed Germans of ethnic origin from Central and Eastern Europe the constitutional right to work and settle in Germany.\textsuperscript{54} Summarised by John Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, the terms ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘ethnic origin’ refer to the ‘individual’s level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity - the sense on the part of the individual that she or he belongs to a particular cultural community’.\textsuperscript{55} In the German case: ‘It is the organic or ethnic interpretation of nationalism that sees human beings simply as specimens of their national group’, noted Smith. In other words, ethnic identity lies at the core of German identity.\textsuperscript{56} Provided that they could prove their German descent:

Article 116 (1) of the 1949 Basic Law granted the right of repatriation to any person who had been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of December 31, 1937, as a refugee \textit{[Flüchtling]} or expellee \textit{[Vertriebener]} of German ethnic origin \textit{[Volkszugehörigkeit]} as the spouse or descendent of such person.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{50} For these claims see: Brubaker, R. \textit{Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany}. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{51} See: Münz, R. and Ulrich, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{55} Cited from: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5.
Article 116 (2) of the 1949 Basic Law based on *jus sanguinis* (law of descent) also guaranteed automatic citizenship to the *Volksdeutsche*, or ethnic Germans abroad, and their descendants.  

Although German citizenship was defined expansively towards ethnic Germans, it was distinctly restrictive towards non-German immigrants. Whilst ethnic Germans had an automatic right to citizenship, on the other hand, non-German immigrants already resident in Germany were unlikely to be granted citizenship - even in the case of second or third generations.

According to Rainer Münnz and Ralf Ulrich, some 20,000 to 25,000 Poles successfully reclaim German citizenship because they themselves, or at least one of their parents, held German citizenship during the German occupation of Poland. Indicative of the former official preferential treatment accorded to *Aussiedler* and impact of *jus sanguinis* was the case of the Silesian ethnic Germans in Poland. As well as holding a Polish passport, the *Bonner General-Anzeiger* estimated more than 200,000 ethnic Germans also held a German one without ever setting foot in the Fatherland. Until 1990, ethnic Germans in the former Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were also entitled to a German passport on application within their host states. By the end of 1999, the German government expected 100,000 citizenship applications from *Russlanddeutsche* or ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union.

Formerly, German citizenship law effectively distinguished three categories of people: citizens, foreigners and ethnic or ‘status’ Germans. Foreigners under 18 who were born in Germany or who had resided in Germany over many years by comparison did not have a right to naturalisation. And in contrast to other migrants, the immigration of ethnic Germans from East and Central Europe, as well as *Übersiedler*, or migrants from

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the former GDR, were not subject to any restrictions from the FRG during the 1970s and 1980s. The following statistics give an indication of the scale of this exodus. According to Münz and Ulrich, between 1953 and 1987 an average of 37,000 Aussiedler per year arrived in Germany from Eastern Europe; between 1957 and 1989 East Germany alone lost over two million Übersiedler to West Germany. Conversely, during the same years 230,000 West Germans left for East Germany and East Berlin.

With liberalisation under way in the Soviet Union during the mid 1980s, and fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the last migration barriers for ethnic Germans vanished via East Germany. In 1988, '203,000 ethnic Germans came to the FRG - almost three times the number in the previous year', noted Münz and Ulrich. In the aftermath of reunification, Mary Fulbrook reported the stream of East Germans flowed at a rate of 1,000 to 2,000 a day. In 1990, however, the immigration of ethnic Germans reached its peak: 397,073 Spätaussiedler had moved to Germany, reported the former Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues. In total, by 2003, 4,387,267 Aussiedler had settled in Germany since 1950 from the former Soviet Union, Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia and other areas of ethnic German settlement, reported the Federal Administration Office (BVA). Their right of entry was not only officially regarded as an act of loyalty to the homeland, but as an alternative to the inclusion of ethno-culturally more distant and allegedly less easy or willing to integrate immigrants. Summing up the situation, Christhard Hoffman noted:

Thus, on the one hand the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government gave temporary immigrant foreign workers money to return to their countries of origin from the mid-1980s whilst on the other it was simultaneously paying for

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69 See: Fulbrook, M. *A concise history of Germany. op. cit.*, p. 245.

70 In 1991, figures had fallen to 221,995. Cited from: *Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2003).* op. cit., p. 31.


ethnic Germans to immigrate to Germany and then generously assisting them once they arrived.\textsuperscript{73}

Yet, modification of citizenship entitlement for ethnic Germans and immigration legislation since reunification, suggested blood descent (and, arguably therefore, an exclusive ethno-cultural identity) no longer constituted such an essential element for official self-perception.

Under the former CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition, on 1 July 1990, the Ethnic Germans Admissions Act \textit{(Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz)} came into force. This required applicants to remain in their former state whilst their application for admission was processed and a waiting period for a reception permit at German consulates or German embassies abroad.\textsuperscript{74} After 2010, ethnic Germans born after December 1992 will no longer be entitled to ask independently for admission to Germany and they must also prove discrimination from their host state – thus reducing official significance attached to descent. Former automatic citizenship entitlement is no longer the requisite right of all ethnic Germans – from 1996 German ethnic origin must be proved with language \textit{and} cultural tests.\textsuperscript{75}

The official representative for \textit{Spätaussiedler}, Jochen Welt (SPD), explained that anyone who wants to come and settle in Germany has to prove a basic level of competence in German in his or her host country. Welt went on to say that current legislation planned to introduce a language test for all ethnic Germans and for \textit{Russlanddeutsche}, in particular from January 2003 - not just for the main claimant of the family group, as was previously the case.\textsuperscript{76}

Welt explained that Paragraph 85 of the \textit{Ausländergesetz} (Foreigner Law (AusIG)) required any applicant for German nationality to undergo a language test. When


\textsuperscript{75} For details of restrictions on the admission of \textit{Aussiedler}, see: Münz, R. and Ulrich, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29 and: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 9-10.

questioned on whether or not mere blood descent should be sufficient enough for settlement, Welt replied that until recently that was officially the case – ‘however, anyone who now fails the test should remain in the country of origin’. A year later and Welt’s wish appeared to have been granted. In 2002, the then Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (SPD) confirmed that: ‘In future, dependents of German origin will only be included in a decision of acceptance if they can already demonstrate adequate German language skills in the country of origin.’

For Spätaussiedler, though, these new requirements made no sense. They saw little relevance in language tests or any other questionnaires in order to determine whether they were German. In other words, though many might not be able to articulate the thought, they were still wedded to the literal *jus sanguinus* definition of nationality. It was this literal interpretation of *jus sanguinis* that was further indicative of the disparity between official and collective national self-consciousness reflected in the anomalous and poignant status of the Russlanddeutsche.

Whilst politicians of all parties invoked the alleged ‘limited absorptive capacity’ (*Aufnahmefähigkeit*) with respect to foreigners, it remained politically unacceptable to make the same argument about ethnic Germans, as they were expected to be easily absorbed into German society. Referring to the millions of ethnic German refugees that were returned to Germany, CDU Chairman Alfred Dregger maintained in 1982 that: ‘After the Second World War we [the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union CDU/CSU governing coalition] affected one of the world’s most successful programmes of integration.’ Similar comments were made in 2003 by the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Security (BMGS), which claimed that during the post-war years: ‘Millions of German expellees [*Vertriebene*] and refugees [*Flüchtlinge*]...”

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79 For these claims see: Richter, A. *op. cit.*, pp. 91-98 and: Dahlkamp, J. et al. *op. cit.*, p. 42.


81 Cited from *Bundestag* speech by Alfred Dregger in: *Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. Stenographischer Bericht* 83 Sitzung. Bonn, 04.02.82, p. 4894.
were successfully integrated.  

Implying that Spätaussiedler (late re-settlers post-1987) were also first and foremost Germans (and hence, arguably, their loyalty to Germany was unquestionable) to support liberal proposals for a future modification of German nationality, liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) member of the Bundestag, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, cited the officially endorsed retention of dual citizenship by ethnic Germans. According to the former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, Marieluise Beck, public acceptance of ethnic Germans was never in question.

Thus, one may be tempted to infer that Spätaussiedler integration was assumed and were accepted as if they were Germans returning to their Homeland. But a closer reading of both past and more recent developments painted a different picture to the official one. Evidence suggested that German officials, from both the left and right of the political spectrum, who based their former policies of integration on the basic assumption that the Russlanddeutsche were 'Just like us', was unreciprocated within the German public. Three regions that seemed to personify the problem were North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Brandenburg.

Although millions of ethnic Germans were expelled from East, Central and South East Europe, many remained within their traditional areas of settlement in Eastern Europe, such as Upper Silesia (Poland), Transylvania (Romania), Banat (Hungary), the Ukraine and Volga districts (Russia). Jochen Welt estimated in 2002 that up to 950,000 ethnic Germans still remained in Russia and Kazakhstan. As part of the Allied re-settlement agreement for the redistribution of German refugees (Flüchtlinge), during 1946 2.7 million ethnic Germans were relocated back to the Soviet zone of occupation. At least a million of them were used as forced labour in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet

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83 For discussions by Schmalz-Jacobsen, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. Stenographischer Bericht 18 Sitzung. Bonn, 09.02.95, pp. 1228, 1234.
86 For interview with Jochen Welt see: „Sprache ist der Schlüssel zur Integration.” op. cit.
Union after 1945. In areas east of the rivers Oder and Neisse, for instance, the Red Cross reported there were 1,200 labour camps for Germans. 88

Whilst they became official citizens of their host states, such as Poland, Romania and the former Soviet Union, the status of ethnic Germans both in their former and new homeland remains contentious. Although officially Polish or Russian in their host states, they were often treated with disdain as Germans on account of the past. Whenever recognised as ethnic Germans in the former Soviet Union, they frequently experienced hostility, such as being ostracised as ‘fascists’ and ‘Nazis’, as well as social disadvantage. 89 German political circles tended to interpret their migration as a response to political and social discrimination. 90 For example, youths of German extraction were forbidden to speak or learn German at school. 91 National identities fulfil intimate, internal functions for individuals in communities, claimed A. D. Smith. One of the most obvious of these is the socialisation of the members as nationals and citizens. 92 But just how integrated were the Spätaussiedler?

Most ethnic Germans abroad have no ties with Germany and cannot speak German. According to the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel, a large section of Spätaussiedler could not even understand the simple ‘Wie heißen Sie?’ or ‘what’s your name?’ 93 Difficulties resulting from an inadequate command of German and social isolation of the Russlanddeutsche prevented integration where, on the streets, Russian was often more spoken than German. 94 As a consequence of this lack of competence in German, according to the Criminal Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN), contacts with the indigenous population were subsequently complicated, strained and hindered the quick integration of young Spätaussiedler. 95

92 See: Smith, A. D. National identity. op. cit., p. 16.
93 Cited from: Dahlkamp, J. et al. op. cit., p. 42.
94 See: Schmid, B. op. cit., p. 43.
95 See: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. op. cit., p. 35 and Dahlkamp, J. et al. op. cit., p. 40.
In contrast to the 1980s, Russlanddeutsche can no longer expect social or economic privileges and must, for that reason, wait longer for their ambitions to be realised. As a result ‘youths, especially young males, lose patience in this frustrating situation and take what they cannot acquire legally illegally’, noted the KFN. In areas with particularly high Spätaussiedler immigration, such as Osnabrück, Cloppenburg and Gifhorn, according to investigations by the KFN, young Russlanddeutsche came into increasing conflict with the authorities at a rate above the average. Given the alleged poor prospects for integration, they remain predominantly on the social periphery. Consequently, Jochen Welt wanted all Spätaussiedler after 2001 to be compelled to participate in an Integrationsvereinbarung (integration agreement) for the swift acquisition of the German language, cultural awareness and employment programmes and for German host communities to support them.

Yet, according to Der Spiegel, there was increasing resentment among many communities and states in Germany against the former SPD/Green government’s ‘burdening of local authorities with their integration programmes’. In the North Rhine-Westphalian town of Waldbröl, for example, where every one in six of the population was of German extraction from the former Soviet Union, unemployment and integration were considerable problems, exacerbated by a lack of German skills - and alleged local resentment. Social workers in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony reported that there were increasing problems in finding individuals and Patenfamilien (step-families) for the voluntary care and accommodation of new arrivals. In addition, charity associations appeared very reluctant to become involved in assisting with the integration of ethnic Germans, claimed the KFN. There was particular antipathy towards the continued, albeit now limited, immigration of Russlanddeutsche in Brandenburg, reported the local Ministry of the Interior and Holger Stark. In June 2000, Forsa (Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis) found that 68% of the 1,006 Germans surveyed spoke in favour of a reduction of Spätaussiedler, with only 24% not

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in favour of such measures.101 12 years earlier, the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research asked whether the immigration of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, Romania and Poland was a good thing. 22% of 1,000 West Germans surveyed believed it was; 61% had serious doubts that it was.102

Prejudice against ethnic German minorities in their former host countries was also evident within their new one. Particularly sad was the situation in which Spätaussiedler found themselves. Their anomalous status in their former homelands reported by Diana Forsythe, the Lower Saxon Regional Centre for Political Education (NLPB) and Der Spiegel, also extended to their official status as Spätaussiedler.103

Despite Marieluise Beck's claim to the contrary, on arrival in Germany they experienced much the same reaction from the local populace - though this time not as Germans, but as Russians.104 Youth centre worker Christel Kirsch claimed: 'Aussiedler were abused in Russia as Germans and experience much the same in Germany as Russians.'105 Evidence suggested that it was the latter - whether Spätaussiedler constituted being accepted as true Germans - that epitomised the distinction between state and ethno-national self-understandings.

'A 16-year-old ethnic German born in Russia, whose family has re-settled in Germany, is on average seen as a Russian', concluded the Youth 2000: Shell Study on Young People in Germany.106 Whenever Spätaussiedler were treated as foreigners by their new

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101 Carried out on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, from 29.06.00-30.06.00. See: Es sind der Meinung, dass die Aufnahme von Ausländern beschränkt werden sollte. Aufnahmembeschränkung für Aussiedler? 4. Meinungen zur Aufnahme von Aussiedlern. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung und zum Asyl. Forsa Bericht P020326/8229 Sb/Sc, 03.07.00, p. 4.


105 Cited from: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 43-44.

hosts, they tended to associate in their own groups and distance themselves from the local population. ‘Consequently, young Aussiedler become isolated’, noted Christian Pfeiffer, Katrin Brettfeld and Ingo Delzer.¹⁰⁷

Spätaussiedler Edurad was one of those surveyed by Shell, whose family originated from the former autonomous Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans dissolved by Stalin in 1941. During and shortly after World War Two, ethnic Germans in the former Soviet Union were re-settled, mostly in Siberia with the note ‘German citizenship’ remaining in their passports.¹⁰⁸ Edurad and his family claimed they were German. Yet, although they tried to mix, ‘Most of the local Germans do not want anything to do with us’, explained Edurad.¹⁰⁹ During an interview with the NLPB on behalf of Spätaussiedler in Lower Saxony, ‘Waldemar H.’ from the former Siberian village of Reichenfeld declared: ‘We are foreigners here.’¹¹⁰ Another survey appeared to corroborate the findings of the Shell study, Der Spiegel and the NLPB. December 1989 revealed 64% of the 1,000 Germans surveyed in West Germany expected that further Spätaussiedler immigration would result in tensions between them and the local population, according to the 1984-1992 Allensbach Report of public opinion research surveys. 25% expressed the opposite view. Only 28% expected it would lead to enrichment for German culture as a result of more German re-settlers – 51% remained sceptical it would.¹¹¹

Tensions first became apparent between ethnic Germans and the local population in 1946. Reception of the ‘strangers’ from the former eastern German territories was anything but cordial. According to Der Spiegel, resentment was evident even before the conclusion of the Second World War. German refugees (Flüchtlinge) from the former Ostgebiete were derided as ‘riff-raff, Poles and seen as an additional burden of a lost

¹⁰⁹ Cited from: Thomas, V. op. cit., pp. 15-16.
war', noted Christian Habbe. Ethnic German refugees were considered as unwelcome competition for the scarce resources of food and perceived as aliens with a different mentality. Expelled from the former West Prussia, President of Germany’s Federation of Expellees (BdV), Erika Steinbach, recalled that: ‘We were compelled to accept dwellings little better than pigsties. There was no milk - not even half a litre for the infants.’ East Prussian Protestants quartered in predominantly Catholic areas, such as Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, also sometimes resulted in denominational conflicts: a Lower Saxon pastor allegedly described the refugees as a ‘plague of colorado beetles’.

Although by 1970 the FRG had received and integrated almost ten million Aussiedler, initially the GDR had to cope with a relatively bigger wave of immigration, claimed Habbe. During the post-war years almost 4.5 million ethnic Germans from the former territories of West Prussia, Pomerania or Silesia were halted on the borders of what was later to become the GDR during their flight westwards. In 2002, East German dramatist Heiner Müller recalled that Aussiedler in the former GDR were allegedly as unwelcome as non-ethnic German asylum-seekers were in West Germany. Although officially Germans by passport, evidence suggested Spätaussiedler have not been accepted as equal compatriots in the eastern part of the country either. In some areas of the former GDR they were treated with considerable contempt. In the Wittstock Gymnasium within the state of Brandenburg, for example, Der Spiegel reported that local schoolchildren refused to let the ‘stinking Russians’ use their toilets.

Alleged public hostility to the integration programmes of the former SPD/Green government, along with rejection from some quarters of the Spätaussiedler’s literal interpretation of jus sanguinis, not only suggested continued ethno-national attitudes,

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114 Cited from: Habbe, C. op. cit., p. 64.
115 See: Ibid., p. 63.
but also the persistence of a National Socialist-inspired *Volksgemeinschaft* mentality.\(^{118}\)

In 2002, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the former eastern state of Thuringia reported that local neo-Nazis followed the 1920 25 Point Party-Programme of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), based on Adolf Hitler’s book *Mein Kampf*. National Socialist and current neo-Nazi philosophy maintains that the German people should be protected from an infiltration of foreign blood (*Volksvermischung*).\(^{119}\)

Similar reports of neo-Nazi appeals to preserve a racial *Volksgemeinschaft* were also made by the Saxon and Brandenburg regional authorities.\(^{120}\) One of the victims of this concept in practice was the 24-year-old *Russlanddeutscher* Kajrat Batesov, from Wittstok in Brandenburg, who later died of his injuries.\(^{121}\) This was not an isolated incident, however. Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union became the targets of xenophobia – particularly in Brandenburg. Brandenburg’s Secretary of the Interior Eike Lancelle (CDU) admitted in 2001 that every weekend special police units had to patrol the area in order to protect the *Russlanddeutsche* from right-wing violence. In August 2001, five *Spätaussiedler* were attacked on Freyenstein’s market place in Brandenburg and a week later there was a similar assault on a housing settlement centre in Wittstock, where over half of all the occupants were *Russlanddeutsche*.\(^{122}\)

Three regional authorities in the old Länder (states) also reported right-wing extremist preoccupation with the *Volksgemeinschaft* and preservation of the German race. Organisations, such as the *Bewegung Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft* (Movement for a National Ethnic Community), were active in North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate.\(^{123}\)

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118 Although the exclusion of Jews and other *fremdvölkisch* (alien elements) had deep roots in German history, it was the National Socialists who first racialised German citizenship in the Nuremberg Laws. See: Brubaker, R. *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, op. cit., pp. 166-167.


Often applied to describe the states to the west of the river Elbe not in the former GDR, the old Ländere include the eight states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. Reinstated by the East German regime between 1988 and 1989, the five new Ländere include the states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Interestingly, the former Federal Director of the Policy Analysis and Speech-Writing Unit, Michael Mertes, claimed they are ‘new’ because ‘West Germans perceive them as such’.\textsuperscript{124} Despite official claims to the contrary, evidence suggested this was not a concern merely of the extreme right. Concerns about maintaining the purity of race were not only the primary concerns of neo-Nazis, whose racist agenda clearly found resonance in other quarters.

In March and April 1992, the Research Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig undertook a study of East German youth in order to ascertain the extent to which 4,300 participants agreed with certain extreme right-wing statements. One of the aforementioned included: ‘We should take care to keep das Deutsche [Germanness] pure and prevent the Völkervermischung [mixing of our race].’\textsuperscript{125} According to the survey, 39% of schoolchildren from class grades 8-10, 65% from grades 11-12, along with 33% of college trainees from the states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt agreed with the above declaration.\textsuperscript{126} In early 1989, ‘24% of the population in the FRG agreed with the aforementioned statement’, noted Professor Hans-Georg Betz.\textsuperscript{127}

Münz, Ulrich, Anthony Richter and, to some extent, Allensbach, implied that one of the reasons for the rejection of the Russlanddeutsche was the frequent mixed marriages of the latter - ethnic Germans from Russia and Central Asia who apparently ‘bring along non-German spouses and children’.\textsuperscript{128} This phenomenon was actually suggested by Russlanddeutsche themselves, such as Helene Weimer, Katharina Suhowa and

\textsuperscript{125} The question was put by the Research Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig (Forschungsstelle Sozialanalysen Leipzig e.V.), whose conclusions were analysed in the political journal \textit{Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte}. The study was based on a random sample survey of 4,300 trainees and young people aged from 14-25 in Saxony and Saxon-Anhalt: See: Tabelle 1: Rechtsextreme Orientierungen ostdeutscher Jugendlicher 1992 (Angaben in Prozent). \textit{In: Müller, H. and Schubarth, W. Rechtsextremismus und aktuelle Befindlichkeiten von Jugendlichen in den neuen Bundesländern. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte}, 1992 (B38), pp. 16-28.
\textsuperscript{128} Cited from: Münz, R. and Ulrich, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30. See also: Richter, A. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 30, 91-98.
Waldemar ‘H.’, who believed that the multi-racial mix of Russlanddeutsche families accounted for the prejudice and rejection from the local population. Suhowa explained to Der Spiegel that she no longer wanted her current name. She wished to revert to the name Warkentin of her ancestors who were brought to Russia two centuries ago by Catherine the Great of Russia – herself a German.\textsuperscript{129} Apparent rejection by some in Germany of ethnic Germans on account of their Mischehen, or mixed marriages, must be taken into account when assessing the disparities between official and popular self-understanding. Acceptance of Spätaussiedler subject to German racial purity suggested, for instance, the continuing legacy of a National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft mentality and challenged Marieluise Beck’s and Jochen Welt’s appeals for a less exclusive citizenship based on blood descent and, hence, national identity.\textsuperscript{130}

Indicative, perhaps, of the significance attached to race as a condition of social acceptance from some sections of the population of the Russlanddeutsche, were the following conclusions from Allensbach. According to Allensbach, in 1989 31% of the 1,000 Germans surveyed in the old Länder did not consider ethnic Germans from East Europe as ‘richtige Deutsche’, or real Germans, and 29% did not consider them German at all.\textsuperscript{131} Three years later, Allensbach found that 44% of the 1,000 Germans surveyed within the old Länder considered that German descent should play an important role in determining whether Spätaussiedler should be admitted into Germany; within the former GDR it was 42%.\textsuperscript{132} Further indicative of the apparent disputes about which sense of self should animate Germany was some of the public’s reaction to the former SPD/Green ruling coalition’s proposals to allow long-term foreign residents dual nationality.


\textsuperscript{130} For official claims of the continued adherence to a National Socialist-inspired Volksgemeinschaft in Hamburg, Saxony and Baden-Württemberg, see: Rechtsextremismus in Stichworten. Ideologien Organisationen - Aktivitäten. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.


Karen Schönwälder, *Der Spiegel* and *Statewatch* claimed that many Germans reject the introduction of the territorial principle of *jus soli* since it would effectively allow dual citizenship for non-German immigrants. On the other hand, federal ministers of the then SPD/Green ruling coalition government, such as Minister of the Interior Otto Schily, Commissioner for Foreigner Issues Marieluise Beck and Commissioner for the Armed Forces Willfried Penner, all actively promoted and encouraged the extension of dual nationality to children born of long-term foreign residents in Germany.

Amendments in citizenship legislation for immigrants and foreign residents in Germany were of particular interest for two reasons. Firstly, France and Germany were often regarded as the leading motors of European integration within the European Union (EU). In an era when de-emphasising the national cultural implications of citizenship has become important at the European level, reunification revived the urgency of affecting a collective national identity. Secondly, a French civic-based citizenship based on *jus soli* appeared to represent a threat to the traditional concept of citizenship for some Germans, who continue to assert the importance of ethno-linguistic and cultural communities. Given that Germany’s ruling political elite and its western neighbours arguably promote a multiethnic setting for Europe, the adherence to and defence of an ethno-cultural conception of citizenship from sections of the German public presented considerable challenges for an extended EU.

Since its first inception in 1913, national citizenship law in Germany has primarily followed the model of *jus sanguinis*. In principle, Germany has always been opposed to dual nationality and, along with several other countries, was a signatory to the Council
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and Dr. Marianne Takle provided a lucid explanation of this civic interpretation of the nation. In contrast to the ethnic model that interpreted citizenship from a cultural and racially determined perspective, the civic stance of democratic citizenship does not necessarily have to be rooted within the national identity of a people. There are no core values to defend, such as a common heritage, ethnicity, language, religion or customs; cultural values are common for all members. So whilst the ethnic pattern ensures it remains difficult to include people in the political community, the civic model makes it problematic to exclude people and extends citizenship status to members of the polity regardless of class, race or gender. A corresponding attachment to jus soli, or the territorial concept of the nation-state, is the guiding principle of citizenship status. Thus, the French nation is usually perceived as one where people choose to belong – la conception élitiste – as opposed to the former German determinist or organic ethno-cultural membership of association.

With continued immigration and settling of immigrants in Germany from the 1960s onwards, official relegation of jus soli to the principle of descent became legally and politically problematic. During the early 1980s, for instance, debates in the Bundestag...
reflected official concerns with the social and political marginalisation of thousands of long-term immigrants. Arguing that citizenship legislation was ambiguous, contradictory and could lead to a future identity crisis for the 4.6 million foreigners in Germany, SPD representative Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak asked in the Bundestag during 1982: 'Is the national identity of foreigners to be respected or rejected?' Questioning the CDU policy of rotation of foreign workers and proposed programme of repatriation, in the same Bundestag debate, Dietmar Hölscher of Germany’s liberal FDP party maintained that ‘immigrants do not know what to do for the best - stay, go or wait and see’ - a situation described in the Bundestag by Reinhard Bühling (SPD) as a 'post-card naturalisation'.

Since more and more children were being born to foreigners in Germany, by 1995 the question of naturalisation had again become acute for the German government. As far back as 1982, for example, an FDP representative of the Bundestag pointed out that the foreign population had an increasingly higher rate of births than the German one. During the early 1990s, Germany attracted more immigrants than any other European country, claimed Jost Halfmann and Hermann Kurthen; between 1989 and 1992 about one million people migrated annually to Germany. According to official figures, between 1991 and 2002 almost 12.2 million people migrated to Germany. At the same time, immigrants neither applied for citizenship nor, aside from a few exceptions within the former CDU/CSU/FDP ruling coalition, along with most members of the SPD/Green opposition (1982-1998), were actively encouraged to do so by a German government. ‘The Federal Republic of Germany does not strive to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation’, ran the former SPD/FDP government’s 1978 guidelines on naturalisation.

145 See Bundestag speeches by Hirsch and Dregger in: Ibid., pp. 4893, 4916.
147 See: Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2003). op. cit., p. 5.
149 The guidelines on naturalisation Einbürgerungsrichtlinien (EinhRilli) were agreed by the SPD/FDP ruling coalition in 1977. See: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 12.01.78 Z 3191 A. Ausgabe A. 29. Jahrgang (2), p. 16.
During the early 1990s, though, efforts were made to address the problem. Former CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl began considering naturalisation for foreigners already resident in the country at the apparent expense of those outside the territorial boundaries, whose claim was based on ethnic links. Governing the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners in Germany, the Foreigner Laws (AuslG) were formally introduced in 1991 to simplify the naturalisation process for foreigners.\(^{150}\)

However, naturalisation remained conditional on the applicant relinquishing his or her former citizenship between the ages of 16 and 23.\(^{151}\) Despite modification of earlier naturalisation legislation in 1994, according to the then SPD-led opposition and others, the former CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition had still failed to address one of the central problems of the AuslG. For Manfred Steger, F. Peter Wagner and others, for example, the problem still remained that thousands of foreign children born in Germany were, in the words of Simon Green, ‘effectively restricted from becoming German citizens until their formative years were over’.\(^{152}\) It was a point not lost on Green representative Kerstin Müller and the former Federal Government’s Commissioner for Foreigner Issues. ‘ Compared to most of Germany’s neighbours, in 1995 the FRG had the lowest rate of naturalisation - less than 1%’, claimed Müller of the Alliance 90/The Greens.\(^{153}\) According to the then Federal Government’s Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, in 1996 only one in two of Spaniards, former Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians and Turks - ‘expressed an interest in naturalising’.\(^{154}\) And whilst the naturalisation rate among Turks rose from 1.57% in 1995 to 2.26% in 1996, it fell again to 1.86% in 1997. Overall, in comparison to 1996, this represented an average decrease of 5.3% in naturalisation rates of foreigners in 1997.\(^{155}\) Those not intending to naturalise were asked the reasons for this. By far the most common answer was that the respondent wanted to remain a citizen of his country of origin. In 1995, when Turks were asked by the Federal Ministry

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154 Two thirds of foreigners were surveyed from the age of 15. Cited from: 2. Einbürgerungen. *In: Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Bonn: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, Dez 1997, p. 22.

155 See: 4.0 Einbürgerungsquoten. *In: Beck, M.* *op. cit.*, p. 20.
for Work and Social Order if they intended to naturalise, only one in four responded positively, whilst fewer than half (46.7%) unequivocally rejected the idea.\textsuperscript{156}

Along with Bundestag politicians Kerstin Müller and Joschka Fischer (Alliance 90/The Greens), Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen (FDP) and Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin (SPD) also criticised the principle of blood descent taking precedence over \textit{jus soli} and demanded that naturalisation procedures for foreigners should be eased.\textsuperscript{157} Despite the introduction of the so-called \textit{Kinderstaatszugehörigkeit} (children's citizenship) in 1997, proposing a guarantee of naturalisation to children born to foreign parents in Germany between the ages of 18 and 27, as a result of intense opposition within the CDU/CSU, dual nationality and hence, arguably, \textit{jus soli} were rejected.\textsuperscript{158}

As a result, naturalisation still remained conditional on applicants abandoning their former nationality. So why were the CDU/CSU so inveterate against dual nationality during the 1990s? Effectively, between 1982 and 1998, most members of the CDU/CSU believed that an applicant for German citizenship must actively elect for German citizenship - not have it imposed, regardless of his or her inclinations. Naturalisation had to remain essentially an individual process - not a collective one as in France. In France, for instance, assimilation and naturalisation are usually expected, whereas past German governments usually viewed naturalisation as the exception. Indicative, perhaps, of the French citizenship ideology were the comments by the then French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1987: "It is a joy for France to receive supplementary children [naturalised citizens]."\textsuperscript{159}

In the past, former conservative German ministers defended their stance with the argument that naturalisations should only occur at the end of a successful integration process - and then only if the applicant elected to adopt German citizenship. During


\textsuperscript{157}For speeches in the Bundestag by Kerstin Müller, Joschka Fischer, Schmalz-Jacobsen and Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1224-1225, 1230-1232.

\textsuperscript{158}This revised version of the earlier 1995 \textit{Kinderstaatszugehörigkeit} granted "foreign children born in Germany a guarantee of naturalisation between the ages of 18 and 27", conditional on "good conduct" and the relinquishment of former nationality. Cited from: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. \textit{In:} Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, p. 42.

various political debates, for example, CSU politicians made this point abundantly clear. Dual nationality was perceived by the sister party of the CDU, the CSU, as working against integration and keeping alive, in the words of the former Bavarian state secretary Hermann Regensburger: ‘An undesirable insurance mentality.’\(^{160}\) From the viewpoint of conservatives, the assumption was that anyone with dual nationality had divided loyalties. As the former CSU Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Dr. Günther Beckstein, stated: ‘No-one can dance at two weddings.’\(^{161}\) Former CDU Minister of the Interior, Manfred Kanther, also stated in the Bundestag that dual nationality created a conflict of interests, and similar comments were made earlier by the then CDU Chairman Alfred Dregger.\(^{162}\) Even those committed in Germany to granting full political rights to immigrants hesitated in attributing unilaterally German citizenship to immigrants. This was evident from politicians both left and right of the mainstream by their use of the expressions Zwangsgermanisierung and Eindeutschung (enforced Germanisation) to dispel any possible indictments of compulsive naturalisation.\(^{163}\)

In a Bundestag debate about extending dual nationality to the children of long-term resident foreign parents during 1997, summarising her contribution, Dr. Cornelie Sonntag-Wolgast (SPD) stated: ‘No-one should be forced to become German. We do not want to force double nationality upon anyone - for better or for worse. It is necessary, however, to amend the principle of descent with the territorial one.’\(^{164}\) Earlier in 1982, CSU politician Carl-Dieter Spranger claimed in the Bundestag that: ‘It should not be overlooked that there are large groups in Germany that have no wish to be Germanised.’\(^{165}\) In 2004, the term was still being officially employed. During debates about the ethics of foreigner integration in Germany, Bavaria’s former CSU Minister for Education and the Arts Monika Hohlmeier and the then Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber criticised the inconsistencies of SPD policy. For example, Hohlmeier and Stoiber highlighted that in contrast to the past party line that rejected compulsive

\(^{160}\) Cited from: Hogwood, P. op. cit., p. 137.

\(^{161}\) For interview with Dr. Beckstein see: Jach, M. and Krumrey, H. op. cit., pp. 34-37.


\(^{164}\) See Bundestag speeches by Dr. Sonntag-Wolgast and Hesse’s Staatsminister Gerhard Bökeli in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/200. Stenographischer Bericht 200 Sitzung. Bonn, 30.10.97, pp. 18080-18081, 18088-18089.

language competence as a Zwangsgermanisierung, former Minister of the Interior Otto Schily now demanded it as a requisite for integration and naturalisation for foreign nationals. During an interview with the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag in 2002, for instance, Schily declared: ‘Anyone who wishes to settle here permanently must learn German.’

With a change of government in 1998, though, the first real signs of a re-orientation regarding the conceding of dual nationality to immigrants at official level appeared. Attempting to break with what Meinrad Belle of the CDU described in the Bundestag as a ‘centuries-old tradition that defined German naturalisation according to bloodlines’, a new coalition of Social Democrats and Greens entered office in September 1998 determined to modernise Germany’s citizenship law. Announcing their proposal to comprehensively modify Germany’s citizenship legislation, Dr. Michael Bürsch of the SPD proclaimed in the Bundestag: ‘We Social Democrats have been fighting and waiting 86 long years for the extension of the principle of jus soli.’ Responsible for the reform of the law on nationality, Otto Schily himself stated that Germany’s new citizenship law represented a ‘historical break from past traditions’.

In autumn 1998, Schily presented the German parliament with a draft bill intended to provide a ‘litmus test’ for the state of German society and its resolve to admit ethnic non-Germans as Germans via dual nationality. Central to the provision of the SPD-Green proposal was that foreigners could keep their original citizenship when they became naturalised Germans. This was expected to encourage Turks to apply for citizenship because they could still retain the inheritance and property rights previously withheld by the Turkish authorities to Turks living in Germany. Formerly, Turks and other foreigners in Germany had to be released from their previous nationality before being naturalised as German. Provided certain prerequisites are fulfilled, the 2000 Law Reforming the Right of Citizenship now recognises children born in Germany to

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171 See: Martin, P. German Green Cards: solution, stopgap or symbol? Migration News [Online]. 18.02.01 [Accessed 02.08.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/cmpr/feb01/martin_feb01.html>
foreign parents as German from birth. But between the ages of 18 and 23 years, children must decide whether they want to retain German nationality or the nationality of their parents.\textsuperscript{172}

Although dual nationality was still avoided in principle, in contrast to past legislation, previous nationality can be retained under certain conditions. Foreigners who have lived in Germany for more than 30 years are now able to naturalise and keep the passport issued by their country of origin. This last point applies to elderly persons and victims of political persecution. If release from the foreign nationality is legally impossible or would be politically, socially or economically detrimental, foreigners may retain their previous nationality.\textsuperscript{173} Serving to highlight the distinction between popular and official national self-understanding, it was this last principle – that of the retention by foreigners of their former nationality - which provoked the most opposition.

Along with some of the public’s rejection of the *Spätaussiedler*, since reunification, those seeking to defend the ethno-cultural tradition of citizenship have become increasingly apparent. Further evidence of the contemporary relevance of Herder’s notion of the *Volk*, or people, was the reaction from some quarters to SPD/Green proposals for extending dual nationality to long-term foreign residents based on a *Verfassungspatriotismus* or constitutional patriotism. Posing ideologically charged questions of what it means to belong to the nation-state, the fundamental ideological division between the *Kulturnation* and what Patricia Hogwood termed a *Verfassungsnation* underlined the competing idioms of German national identity.\textsuperscript{174}

Entering political discourse in the late 1970s, the term *Verfassungspatriotismus* was first employed by Dolf Sternberger and became central to the theme of national identity during the 1980s. During the 1970s, for example, West German left-liberal thinkers


\textsuperscript{173} This applied if release from the foreign nationality would bring economic disadvantages such as high release fees, degrading methods of release or problems with assets and property. Cited from: Reform of the Law on Nationality. \textit{op. cit.} See also: Germany: option model approved. Migration News [Online]. Jun 1999: 6(6) [Accessed 12.07.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/jun_1999-11mn.html>

\textsuperscript{174} See: Hogwood, P. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 125, 136-142.
began advocating a German patriotism based explicitly on German liberal democratic traditions. Summarised by Habermas, national identity based on a *Verfassungspatriotismus* refers to a political culture in which liberal constitutional principles are able to take root - without requiring all citizens to share the same language, ethnic and cultural origins.\(^ {175} \) For the promoters of the *Verfassungsnation* stance upheld by the majority of the representatives of the left-wing parties, such as the SPD and the Greens, citizenship policy should contain the following criteria:

1. Immigrant and citizenship status ought to be re-defined in accordance with a more modern legislation.\(^ {176} \)

2. *Jus soli* should take precedence over *jus sanguinis*.\(^ {177} \)

3. Dual nationality should be extended to children born to foreigners in Germany and permitted to long-term foreign residents under certain conditions.\(^ {178} \)

By contrast, an ethno-cultural self-understanding does not favour the naturalisation of millions of foreigners. Mario Rainer Lepsius and Douglas Klusmeyer, for instance, contrasted the differences between nations based on a *Verfassungspatriotismus* and an ethno-cultural community with respect to their bonds of allegiance, social composition and political development. According to Lepsius, ethnic unity provides the basis of legitimacy of statehood that becomes the fundamental criterion of membership in the state. Summarising Lepsius, Klusmeyer explained:

> Ties of common ethnicity bind members of such a state more than their devotion to shared political principles. Indeed *Volk* [ethnic nations] can be indifferent to

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\(^ {176} \) See: Hogwood, P. *op. cit.*, pp. 136-142. For demands for a naturalisation process more in line with Germany’s western neighbours, see speeches by Kerstin Müller (Alliance 90/The Greens), Diebeler-Gmelin (SPD) and Schily (SPD) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. *op. cit.*, pp. 1224, 1231-1232, 1237-1238.

\(^ {177} \) From 1995-1999 there were increasing calls by some members of the *Bundestag* for *jus soli* to replace the ‘*Abstammungsprinzip*’ (principle of blood descent) as a requirement for naturalisation. See comments by Joschka Fischer (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. *op. cit.*, p. 1226. See also *Bundestag* speeches by SPD politicians Dr. Sonntag-Wolgast and Sebastian Edathy in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/200. *op. cit.*, pp. 18080-18082 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. *op. cit.*, pp. 2297-2300.

\(^ {178} \) For general support of dual nationality from the left, see speeches by Dr. Bürsch (SPD), Jelpke (PDS), Christine Lambrecht (SPD) and Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. *op. cit.*, pp. 2281-2283, 2295-2297, 2305-2309.
the form of political constitution the state assumes and place their collective ethnic interests over and above respect for individual rights.\textsuperscript{179}

One of the fundamental features of national identity is the idea of a patria or a community of laws. Concurrent with the sense of legal and political community is a sense of legal equality among the members of that community. Its full expression is in the various kinds of ‘citizenship’ that implies a minimum of reciprocal rights and obligations among members.\textsuperscript{180} If citizenship is based on the Verfassungsnation construction, access to basic rights is available for all those who commit themselves to a particular cultural project.\textsuperscript{181}

In contrast to the Bundestag political elite, for the proponents of the Kulturnation position, the Verfassungspatriotismus idea of co-existing ethnic and cultural minorities and equal rights to naturalisation within a German society was unacceptable. This became particularly evident from the three main German extreme right-wing parties the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the Republicans (REP) and German People’s Union (DVU).\textsuperscript{182} A REP Hessian bulletin of locally elected representatives noted:

So far jus sanguinis has ensured the character and identity of our people have been preserved - at least to some extent. By abandoning this principle, however, the federal government lays the foundation for the destruction of our country and people.\textsuperscript{183}

In sum, the more extreme variant of the ethno-cultural position as defined by the DVU, NPD and the REP parties can be summarised as follows:

1. Jus sanguinis should be preserved as the defining principle of German citizenship.\textsuperscript{184}

2. Foreigners are seen as a threat to the idea of the German Volk (nation) and, therefore, German identity.\textsuperscript{185}


\textsuperscript{180} See: Smith, A. D. National identity. op. cit., pp. 10, 14.

\textsuperscript{181} See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125, 135-142.

\textsuperscript{182} Headed by Dr. Rolf Schlierer the Republikaner are known in Germany as Die Reps. See: Roberts, I. op. cit., p. 149.


3. Naturalisation should be restricted and dual nationality is unacceptable for foreigners.\textsuperscript{186}

It was the last principle outlined above that provoked the most vocal opposition by the DVU, NPD and the REP. Calling dual nationality 'an electoral betrayal', the REP initiated a nationwide signature campaign against Otto Schily's nationality reform.\textsuperscript{187} Along with the REP, the DVU and NPD were also actively engaged between 1999 and 2000 in encouraging resistance to Schily's proposed extension of dual nationality. Under the slogan: 'No German passport for foreigners', the NPD held demonstrations in Magdeburg, Berlin-Mahrzahn and Cologne.\textsuperscript{188} Responding to a DVU demonstration against dual nationality, SPD member of the Bundestag Christine Lambrecht maintained that the DVU's signature action campaign was tantamount to the incitement of racial hatred.\textsuperscript{189}

Whilst, perhaps, not sharing all the ideology of the REP, DVU or NPD, nevertheless, evidence indicated that the last principle of their agenda outlined above enjoyed considerable widespread public support. At the beginning of 1998 a petition was launched that, according to the former Prime Minister of Hesse, Hans Eichel (SPD), 'mobilised opposition against the extension of dual nationality'.\textsuperscript{190} Between January and April of 1999, Statewatch reported 4.5 million signatures were collected from Germans opposed to dual nationality – Der Spiegel reported ten million.\textsuperscript{191} Indicative of the gulf between official and popular national identity at the time, some exit polls also revealed a vigorous opposition to the SPD/Green government's dual nationality proposal second only to worries about unemployment, which in 1999 was 10.7%, leaving 4.1 million jobless.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{186} During their campaign against dual nationality in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD stated in the Deutsche Stimme (German Voice): 'Racial mixture is against nature and is Völkermord [genocide].' See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Düsseldorf: Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 28.02.01, pp. 47-48.
\textsuperscript{187} See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. op. cit., pp. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{189} See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2307-2308.
\textsuperscript{192} See: Germany: dual nationality change. op. cit.
According to a survey carried out for Der Spiegel by the official representative of GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid, 53% of the 1,000 Germans of voting age polled in January 1999 stated that they were against the introduction of dual citizenship. 71% of CDU voters were against it compared with 44% of SPD voters. In a separate telephone poll in 1999 by Politbarometer for Germany’s second public service television station, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), of 1,287 Germans questioned, 67% of FDP voters and 82% of CDU/CSU voters rejected dual nationality. Overall, 68% of voters from the main parties - the SPD, CDU/CSU, The Greens, the FDP and PDS – all objected to the possibility of dual nationality, with 27% in favour of it. In the same year Forsa reported, on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, illustrated weekly Stern and television station RTL, that every second citizen (49%) of the 1,002 Germans surveyed opposed dual nationality. On the other hand, only 39% supported it. Ignoring alleged popular resistance at the time, however, the ruling parties of the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens pushed through legislation in May 1999 de-emphasising the traditional principle of citizenship by descent with those of birth.

To summarise, the post-war circumstances of a divided Germany and expulsions of ethnic Germans seemed to legitimate rather than disgrace the ethno-cultural nuance of self-understanding and citizenship in the FRG. According to some German commentators, such as Silke Delfs and Volker Ronge, the German public and political elite often tended to interpret the decisions of ethnic Germans to emigrate as a response to political and social discrimination, and to the adherence to German nationhood. This was evident in the former special status granted to ethnic Germans, who were not officially regarded as immigrants, but as nationals returning to their ethnos (ethnic group), whereas labour migrants and asylum-seekers were perceived as temporary

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193 The survey was undertaken from 05.01.99-06.01.99. See: „Sind Sie für oder gegen die Einführung der doppelten Staatsbürgerschaft?“ Mißtrauen gegen Unbekannt. TNS Emnid. In: Darnstädt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. op. cit., p. 23.
196 See: Germany: dual nationality change. op. cit. and: Germany: option model approved. op. cit.
Indicative of an end to former official positive Spätaussiedler discrimination was the more rigorous citizenship application for ethnic Germans, which suggested jus sanguinis no longer constituted such an indispensable element of national self-understanding – at least at official level. Responding to questions from the Bonner General-Anzeiger during 2001 on the more stringent conditions of entry and naturalisation for Spätaussiedler by way of language tests, official representative for Spätaussiedler, Jochen Welt, asked: ‘Why should it be different for family members of the Spätaussiedler?’

Although the Bundestag political elite have dispensed with ethno-cultural inflections of national identity, both Spätaussiedler and some sections of the public still seemed committed to jus sanguinis - either in its literal or its more radical form. This was evident from Spätaussiedler claims to German citizenship based on either an inherited jus sanguinis, or through an apparent endorsement from a minority of a more racially determined variant of German nationality. Surveys by Allensbach, the Research Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig and various articles suggested that for some, Germanness and naturalisation were conditional on being of German descent.

Further to this distinction between the Bundestag political elite and collective national self-understandings, were the anomalous status and an apparent rejection of the Russlanddeutsche within some areas of Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. Although government policy was no longer so conducive towards ethnic Germans abroad, at the same time, their integration was still actively being officially promoted at the time of writing, and they continue to arrive in significant, albeit reduced, numbers. Despite an annual immigration quota of 100,000 ethnic Germans since 2000, scheduled to fall to 50,000 from 2002, the SPD and Greens were still determined to foster their integration. For instance, from 1998-2002 the SPD/Green

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199 For questions put by Holger Möhle of the Bonner General-Anziger to Spätaussiedler representative Jochen Welt, see: „Sprache ist der Schlüssel zur Integration.” op. cit.
government spent in excess of 26.907 million Euros on 1,300 social integration programmes for Spätaussiedler.201

In the past, the official line was that ethnic Germans would be ‘easily absorbed into German society’.202 Closer inspection of more recent developments and past evidence suggested otherwise. Official promotion of the integration of the Russlanddeutsche into the host society was neither welcome nor wanted from some in Germany. Prejudice encountered in their former homelands also extended to their new one. Representing an ambiguous and unhappy position regarding their identity, as long as they remained outside Germany, Spätaussiedler were regarded as Germans. Yet, because they were perceived as German, or occasionally as fascists rather than Poles or Russians, they suffered discrimination in their host states. As soon as they arrived in Germany, their identity again became contentious. Although Spätaussiedler still had a legal, albeit more restricted, entitlement to citizenship, once again they were widely held as foreigners – this time as ‘Russians’.203 In sum, they were Germans who were not German.

Discrepancies over national self-understanding were also apparent over the extension of dual nationality to non-German immigrants. In the past, Germany did not officially seek to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation.204 In the larger German cities, only one in four inhabitants had a German passport, and in 1996 Germany granted citizenship to just over 4% of its foreign population.205 And, according to Kurthen, in 1995 the annual naturalisation ratio was about 3% of the 7 million ‘resident aliens’ in Germany. This was in comparison with 6% in the United States and 8% in the Netherlands.206 Yet, since 1998 developments suggested it would become easier for those foreigners living on German territory to acquire citizenship, while ethnic German immigration and citizenship applications have become progressively restricted.

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203 Cited from: Stark, H. op. cit., p. 43. See also: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 43-44.
204 ‘The Federal Republic of Germany does not strive to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation.’ Cited from: 2. Allgemeine Grundsätze für die Einbürgerung. 2. 3. Einbürgerungsrnichtlinien. In: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. op. cit., p. 16.
206 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 93.
Conversely, ethnic Germans can no longer claim automatic citizenship in their host states and on the other, dual nationality is now extended to the children of non-German immigrants who may, subject to certain conditions, retain their previous nationality. Both, arguably, represented significant breaks from a citizenship based almost exclusively on blood descent. In other words, a völkisch, or ethno-nationalist concept of citizenship, has lost ground to a civic-territorial one, mainly supported by liberal intellectuals, ecologists, social reformers, Social Democrats and the Greens. SPD and Green representatives of the Bundestag Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin (SPD), Michael Bürsch (SPD), Kerstin Müller, Joschka Fischer and Marieluise Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) campaigned for years for the extension of full citizenship rights for Germany’s long-term foreign residents.207

For prominent Greens and liberals, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, only the concept of a civil society can be the foundation of a successful and harmonious society. Claiming that jus soli had a civil advantage over German citizenship determined by bloodlines (jus sanguinis), political scientists Cohn-Bendit and Schmid argued: ‘Civil society does not seek the deliberate eradication of differences and conflict via homogenisation or exclusion, but outlines exactly what is permissible without disrupting social cohesion.’208

For other Germans, citizenship based on a Verfassungspatriotismus remained a problematic and emotive issue, as the opposition generated in response to the former SPD/Green ruling coalition’s attempts to modernise and normalise German citizenship law in accordance with the more Western civic-territorial concept testified. Although jus sanguinis has lost ground to jus soli, continued adherence from some to the racial and xenophobic legacy of jus sanguinis from extremist elements threatened internal discord and a progressive conception of national identity.

Looking at the broader picture, evidence to-date indicated that the 2000 Law Reforming the Right of Citizenship, designed to promote a more inclusive national identity, was

unpopular with some elements of the population. Hostility to left-liberal moves away from *jus sanguinis* towards a more inclusive citizenship via dual nationality, not only reflected the unresolved question of a collective national identity, but also the struggle to preserve an ethno-cultural inflection of national self-understanding. Arguably, the two particular competing idioms of national identity of an exclusive populist *Kulturnation* on the one hand, and the SPD/Greens’ conception of the *Verfassungsnation* that championed an inclusive identity on the other, polarised citizenship and, consequently, national identity.209

In conclusion, whilst the Law Reforming the Right of Citizenship heralded a significant change in direction under the former SPD/Green ruling coalition, at the same time, evidence suggested some were reluctant to dispense with exclusive definitions of nationhood. Although it would be misleading to conclude attitudes have not changed since 1945, despite the political ruptures in German history and official amendments, the ethno-cultural inflection of citizenship in Germany revealed a remarkable continuity.210

To some in Germany, bestowing dual nationality represented a breach of the *völkisch*, or ethno-national, principle whereby a German citizen was born, not made. This type of attitude reflected a kind of folk-genetics or primordialism, according to which Germanness was seen as something that could neither be acquired nor lost. In other words, nationality could not be a conscious choice of the non-ethnic German citizen.211

There are, of course, other aspects of German identity, such as the continuing literary legacy of, arguably, some of the greatest representatives of the German variant of the *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment); Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, Friedrich Schiller and Wolfgang von Goethe. Rejecting all forms of intolerance and barriers to the intellectual development of mankind, Lessing dismissed patriotism since it could lead to forgetting

209 See: Hogwood, P. *op. cit.*, pp. 125-144.
210 'Surviving three political ruptures, the Wilhelmine era, the post-war democratic reconstruction of the FRG and German reunification were prominent in this development', noted Lemke. See: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in Germany. *In*: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 86.
that one must be a citizen of the world. Schiller agreed: ‘Serving no prince, I write as a citizen of the world having lost my fatherland to the whole world at an early age.’

Although not advocating the relinquishing of national identity, others, such as the Berlin historian Heinrich August Winkler, welcomed the extension of dual nationality as a step in the right direction for non-ethnic German residents.

Nevertheless, evidence suggested that Herder’s definition of the *Volk* and national identity as an exclusive cultural, linguistic and ethnic unit lived on, reflected within some public attitudes to citizenship - despite official and other appeals for the contrary. Advocates of change, such as Green politician Marieluise Beck, admitted in the *Bundestag* that ‘dual citizenship needed making more palatable to the population’.

Former chairman of the CDU opposition Wolfgang Schäuble also conceded that: ‘In an era of closer European co-operation and globalisation, an exclusive *Schicksalgemeinschaft* [citizen community of common fate] is now no longer tenable.’

Although liberal and postnational conceptions of citizenship have become more widely supported than they were in the past, conceding dual nationality to aliens still remained a Pandora’s box for some in Germany. Since debates about citizenship reflect what it means to belong to the nation-state, membership of the nation-state is, arguably, primarily about national identity. Exacerbated since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, apparent hostility to the *Spätaussiedler*, along with some of the public’s rejection of dual nationality for long-term immigrants, suggested there were clear disparities between popular and official conceptions of citizenship and, arguably, therefore, national identity.

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212 For résumé of the positive impact of the *Aufklärung*, see: Craig, G. A. *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.


214 For comments by Beck and support of dual nationality by Sebastian Edathy (SPD), Christine Lambrecht (SPD) and Otto Schily, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. *op. cit.*, pp. 2297-2300, 2305-2309 and: Darnstäd, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 27.


Chapter 2

Immigration

'Germany is not a land of immigration.'

According to German Professor of Sociology Christian Joppke: 'Germany is the only country that has not become tired of repeating it is not an immigration land, elevating the no-immigration maxim to a first principle of public policy and national self-definition.' In 1978, the Joint Commission of the Federal Government and States outlined the principles of (West) German policy towards immigrants and non-Germans. Some of the first of these guidelines included the statement: 'The Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country.' In fact, with a few exceptions, such as the former liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) deputy Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union politicians of the 1982-1998 CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition, including the then FDP Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum, continued to reiterate this claim. For example, CSU member of the Bundestag, Carl-Dieter Spranger, maintained in 1982 that whilst Germany may be a land of immigration, it was not something that ought to be encouraged. At the time of writing, however, the Bundestag political elite from both left and right maintained that Germany was an open and friendly land of immigration.

Drawing on comparisons between official former and current stances on immigration, this chapter analyses how the Bundestag political elite defined themselves. Evidence suggested there were two different conceptions of national identity being contested. On the one hand, mainstream party leaders either promoted or claimed that Germany was an open land of immigration. France, the Netherlands and the United States in particular

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were held up in the Bundestag as suitable models to justify continued immigration and integration. For example, in 2000 the then Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (Social Democratic Party (SPD)), stated: ‘Why shouldn’t we have a close look at the U. S. system of green cards and whether it meets our needs?’ On the other hand, a populist stance resisted further immigration and perceived official efforts to encourage a more economically competitive and cosmopolitan society as a threat to German identity. This chapter suggests there have been revived fears of what Baum and others referred to as an Überfremdungsängste (fear of being inundated with foreigners) and concomitant need for Germans to protect their identity. Both conceptions exposed unresolved tensions between official and populist perceptions of national self-understanding, raising further questions as to whether Germany had a comprehensive collective national identity. Examining some of the public and media’s responses to the country’s first comprehensive national immigration law, Green Cards and attendant Leitkultur (leading culture) disputes, this chapter highlights other disparities between official and popular conceptions of identity.

From Dual Nationality to Green Cards

In 2001, the 1998-2005 SPD/Green coalition government dispensed with former official claims that Germany was not an immigration country. This former stance bore little relation to reality, however. Germany continued to accept, in varying degrees, foreigners under the terms of labour migrants, family reunion, ethnic Germans, asylum-seekers and refugees. Consistent with former official self-definitions, Germany had no formally defined national immigration policy. Yet in 2000, Germany’s then Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (SPD), appointed a 21-member Immigration Commission to make recommendations on the shape of Germany’s ‘first regulated immigration law’.

6 An Überfremdungsängste, or fears of an excess of foreigners, has been employed both past and present by Bundestag politicians such as Baum (FDP) and the former Chairman of the CDU Party Wolfgang Schäuble. See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4908-4909 and: Schäuble, W. Der Platz in der Mitte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.07.94, p. 29.
7 See: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. op. cit., p. 16.
9 Cited from: Schäffer, A. Schily unveils new immigration legislation. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [Online]. 03.08.01 [Accessed 19.05.03]. <http://www.faz-archiv.de>
One of the Commission’s proposals was that Germany dispensed with its tradition of refusing to acknowledge that the country was a land of immigration, by admitting 20,000 new permanent residents annually.\(^{10}\) Divided into three main sections of labour migration, protection of refugees and integration, six doors for the entry of labour market immigrants were recommended that included three doors for foreigners seeking admission based on their qualifications. One of the main goals of the new German immigration policy, the Commission concluded, was to attract highly qualified foreigners to Germany and to cushion the impact of alleged demographic changes in the country.\(^{11}\) Four doors were also recommended for immigration - each to have a quota for asylum-seekers, humanitarian immigration, ethnic Germans and economic immigration.\(^{12}\)

Official assurances to overhaul immigration policy provoked neo-Nazis to march down Berlin’s main boulevard, the Unter den Linden, shouting: ‘No sell-out of Germany’ and ‘Germany for the Germans’.\(^{13}\) According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), in response to the announcement of the Commission’s recommendations of allowing 20,000 new foreigners, headlines appeared in the right-wing publication of the German People’s Union (DVU), the National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ), claiming that: ‘German academics demand stop to immigration.”\(^{14}\) Press releases from the right-wing party of the Republicans (REP) also demanded a halt to immigration, one of which declared that Otto Schily’s new immigration law threatened the internal security of the land by encouraging thousands of ‘unwanted guests’.\(^{15}\) According to the Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior, at a National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) ‘Party Day’, Chairman Udo Voigt described the immigration law as: ‘One of the biggest mistakes and crimes of the German government.”\(^{16}\) Yet, was it only right-wing extremists who opposed the bill as implied by the authorities?

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\(^{13}\) Cited from: Boyes, R. German Right plays xenophobia card. The Times, 06.11.00, p. 14.


\(^{15}\) Cited from: Republikaner: Schilys Zuwanderungsgesetzentwurf gefahrdet die innere Sicherheit in Deutschland. Pressemitteilungen. Die Republikaner [Online]. 06.11.01 (47) [Accessed 31.08.05]. <http://www.rep.de/index.aspx?ArticleID=0afdddfb-850f-4d02-a932-8318bd4c78a2>

In spite of the efforts of the former SPD/Green ruling coalition to permanently dispense with Germany’s cultural nationalism of the past, there were some in Germany who clearly opposed this stance, rejecting immigration. Indicative of this apparent identity crisis were the comments by SPD politician Gunter Weißgerber, German diplomat Hans von Stackelberg and various opinion polls. Speaking in the Bundestag, Weißgerber stated: ‘It remains to be hoped the Commission for Immigration’s Report will pave the way for a solution that will find accord within the population.’17 ‘What is becoming clear today is that our identity is still insecure’, stated von Stackelberg.18 Surveys by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in 2002, for example, revealed some Germans opposed the immigration bill, doubting not only its quality, but also the manner in which it was passed. Between 25 May and 6 June 2002, when Allensbach asked 2,087 Germans aged 16 onwards their impression of the course of events, only 16% expressed the conviction that the decision was inaugurated in accordance with federal regulations. But 39% maintained the law was not passed in accordance with official regulations.19

Article 52 of the German constitution, or Basic Law, requires Germany’s 16 Länder, or states, to cast a majority vote on important legislation.20 Germany’s Bundestag narrowly accepted the proposed SPD/Greens’ immigration law, sending it to the second chamber of German politics responsible for the approval of laws passed by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat (upper house of the German Parliament), for a 35-34 vote on 22 March 2002. In fact, the new immigration law was only approved with the signature of the former Federal President Johannes Rau in June 2002.21 17% of the 2,087 Germans surveyed in 2002 were convinced that the new immigration law was a good one, whereas around

every second person (49%) expressed doubts about its quality.\textsuperscript{22} 50% of the 2,087 Germans surveyed later that year were generally against immigration, with 22% in support of it.\textsuperscript{23} Others were also convinced that the majority of Germans were also opposed to immigration. 84% of the 2,087 respondents, for example, believed that the rest of Germany in general was totally against immigration, with 4% expressing the opposite view.\textsuperscript{24} There were also reports from German newspapers of a general public hostility to immigration.\textsuperscript{25}

Indicative of the Bundestag political elite’s attempts to change the country’s image as a non-immigration land were, arguably, the comments by CDU member of the Bundestag Rita Süssmuth. Within the Preface of the 2001 Report for Immigration heralding the introduction of the Green Card Programme, Süssmuth, Chairperson of the Independent Immigration Commission, drew attention to the benefits that more immigrants would bring into the country.\textsuperscript{26} In order to alleviate alleged labour shortages due partly to Germany’s falling birth-rates, the then German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, responded by proposing what he referred to as the Green Card Programme, allowing non-European Union (EU) foreigners to work in Germany for five years.\textsuperscript{27} Since Germany was allegedly expecting 20% fewer skilled workers by 2010, in May 2000 the German government agreed to offer what Schröder and other officials referred to as ‘Green Cards’ to 20,000 non-EU foreign computer specialists.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{26} See: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1, 36-41, 63-64.


Schröder, Otto Schily and the former President of the Federation of German Employees, Dieter Hundt, argued that Germany needed additional immigrants simply to maintain its labour force. Immigration and the recruitment of foreign workers were officially justified because allegedly not enough children were being born in Germany and there were significant skill shortages in the workplace - especially within the IT industry.29 Former Chairman of the CSU party, Edmund Stoiber, for instance, described Germany’s falling birth-rate as a ‘ticking time bomb for the social security system and our whole economy’ - a view echoed by Bavaria’s then Minister of the Interior Günther Beckstein (CSU).30 There were also concerns that this ‘demographic time-bomb’ could mean Germany’s generous welfare state and high pensions may no longer be sustainable. ‘An aging and shrinking population needs goods and services and somebody has to provide them’, argued Rainer Münz of the Immigration Commission.31

According to the Report by the Independent Commission, Germany’s birth-rate had been dropping steadily in Germany for the last 30 years. If women continued having the current number of children at the time of writing, without further immigration the population in Germany is expected to decline from 82 million to less than 60 million by 2050. This would result in the number of employed persons falling from 41 million in 2000 to 26 million, which will probably have undesirable effects on economic development, innovativeness and the labour market, predicted the Commission.32

According to Migration News, German women averaged 1.35 children in 2001 - the lowest fertility rate in northern Europe.33 In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) the situation was even more pronounced. Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich reported that since 1990, eastern Germany experienced fundamental demographic change, with births and marriages falling by 65% in 1994.34 As with the immigration bill, the Green Card proposal had many detractors – exposing, therefore, another key dissonance
between popular and official idioms of national identity. Evidence suggested that some sections of the German media along with the public in general had difficulty agreeing with the commission’s proposals.

Some, such as the unions, *Der Spiegel* and Edmund Stoiber, maintained the German government must do more to retrain German workers to fill vacant jobs rather than turn to immigration. Speaking in 2002, for example, the then CSU Chairman Edmund Stoiber claimed that in view of the 4.3 million unemployed in Germany, the majority of the German population had no sympathy for a law that would facilitate the immigration of qualified employees. Public concerns about unemployment cast one of the biggest shadows over the SPD/Green government’s proposal to bring in foreign workers. ‘Most opinion polls found that 55 to 65% of Germans opposed the Green Card Programme’, because ‘Germany should not increase immigration at a time of high unemployment’, noted *Migration News.* At the end of 2002, for instance, the unemployment rate in the former East stood at 18% - about twice the rate in the west (9%).

In a survey undertaken on behalf of the German government’s Press and Information Office by Forsa (The Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis), the majority of those surveyed were against any further immigration because there were too many unemployed in Germany. Of the 1,007 citizens surveyed in 2001, 60% expressed the view that Germany was already over-stretched with current immigration. 59% thought that further immigration should be halted because there were too many unemployed.

Opponents of the proposal even included the former SPD Minister for Labour, Walter Riester, who stated: ‘We cannot allow a general international opening of the job market. We have over four million unemployed people - amongst whom are very qualified people in the IT field.’ Although giving no indication as to why some Germans rejected the Green Card, official representative of GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid,

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35 See: Burgdorff, S. et al. „Wettbewerb um Köpfe.” Einwanderung. *Der Spiegel*, 12.06.00 (24), p. 23
found 50% of 1,000 Germans surveyed in June 2000 opposed the initiative; 45%, on the other hand, approved of the scheme.\footnote{TNS Emnid surveyed 1,000 Germans by means of a CATI or computer-assisted telephone poll interview. See: Mehrheit für Einwanderungsgesetz – Green Card für IT-Experten bleibt umstritten. Die aktuelle politische Stimmung in Deutschland. TNS Infratest Trendsetter. (Ein Informationsdienst zum Meinungsbild in Deutschland) [Online]. Jun 2000 [Accessed 12.09.05]. <http://www.tns-infratest.com/03_presse/Trendsetters/2000_06.asp>}

In contrast to official efforts for a more open Germany, another concern were fears of cosmopolitanism and resentment of the outsider whose origins can be traced back to the Wars of Liberation against France. Irritated by an alleged indifference to a lack of collective German national identity and excessive foreign, (notably French) values, Johann Gottfried von Herder emphasised the significance of a cultural community (Volk). In the late 1700s, von Herder pleaded for Germans to defend their values against foreign corruption, exemplified by statements such as: ‘Awake German nation! Do not let them ravish your palladium! Germans, speak German!’\footnote{Cited from: Craig, G. A. The Germans. New York: Meridian, Penguin Group, 1991, p. 32.} Along the same lines, the political writer Ernst Moritz Arndt wrote in his dissertation entitled *On the Hatred of Other Nations and the Use of Foreign Tongues* (1813):

> It will come as no great loss to us if the gaggle of French language tutors, dance-masters, Abbés, valets, cooks and quacks, together with their maids and governesses, who infest our daughter’s chambers and brothels, prefer to shun in future these coarse Alemanic lands, rendered so dreadful and unbearable to them.\footnote{Cited from: Schroder, K. Essay 1: Languages. Translated by D. Cannell. In: Shelley, M. and Winck, M. (eds). *What is Europe? Aspects of European cultural diversity.* London/New York: Routledge/Open University, 1995, p. 48.}

Herder also suggested that each culture must be regarded as an organic whole in its own terms, which was to lead to a rejection of the Enlightenment, fostering in turn the intellectual, political and literal movement known as Romanticism.\footnote{See: Craig, G. A. *op. cit.*, pp. 30-34, 190-212 and: Fulbrook, M. *A concise history of Germany.* Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 94-95, 108-109.} In Germany, as arguably nowhere else, romantic poets and thinkers influenced political and social thought.\footnote{See: Kohn, H. *The mind of Germany: the education of a nation.* London: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 49-50.} According to Hermann Kurthen and Hans Kohn, the ethno-cultural understanding of German nationhood was formed in the shadow of French occupation by the Romantic Movement, which supplied patterns of thought that helped consolidate the nation.\footnote{See: Kohn, H. *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77 and: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the challenges of immigration. *International Migration Review*, 1995: 29(4), p. 929.} German romanticism began, but did not end in poetry: ‘It was an
interpretation of life, nature, and history and this inward-looking philosophical character distinguished it from romanticism in other lands’, explained Kohn. German Writer Friedrich Schlegel wrote in 1798: ‘Alone is infinite.’

This Innerlichkeit (inwardness) fostered a general anxiety to the outsider and change, or Angst, that later developed into what Jan-Werner Müller and Michael Mertes described as a ‘cultural pessimism’ - and ultimately into xenophobia. Aside from left-liberal promoters of cosmopolitanism and difference in Germany, such as the publicist Norbert Bolz and the SPD Mayor of Bremen Henning Scherf, indicative of a Romanticist Angst towards change was some public cynicism towards globalisation, manifest in speeches by the then Chancellor Schröder. In the 2000 annual general meeting of the Association of German Newspaper Publishers in Berlin, Schröder emphasised that any form of isolation was wrong:

Former debates about immigration have traditionally provoked defensive responses. Immigration in Germany has to come to be understood as something that Germans put up with out of moral grounds and as is the case with the current opinion, not necessary. This attitude in view of globalisation is a mistake.

Schröder also announced that despite the prevalent deep reservations concerning immigration in Germany, he wanted to go further with the process facilitated by the Green Card initiative, claiming that Germany needed immigration for the country to compete with America, Britain and France. The then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s justification of the Green Card initiative and declarations from Otto Schily, such as ‘We are an immigration land, and that is irreversible’, appeared to find little public resonance, except, perhaps, with the opposition. Schily was keen to highlight

47 For comments by Hans Kohn and Friedrich Schlegel see: Kohn, H. op. cit., p. 49.
51 See: Chancellor advocates expansion of Green Card system. German Federal Government Press and Information Office [Online]. 02.02.01 [Accessed 10.06.03]. <http://www.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Artikel/1x_30911.htm>
52 Cited from: Arbeitsmarkt soll Zuwanderung regulieren. Rhein Zeitung [Online]. 03.08.01 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://rhein-zeitung.de/on/01/08/03/topnews/zuwa.html> See also: Address by Joschka
that most CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag had finally acknowledged that Germany was an immigration land. ‘For years immigration was described by them as a terrible wave rolling towards us. Now immigration is seen as something positive by the opposition’, noted the former Minister of the Interior in 2001. Along with Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Schröder, the then leaders of the CDU opposition Angela Merkel and Friedrich Merz also claimed that: ‘Germany needs more not less immigration.’ Reflecting the goals of the SPD/Green coalition, head of the CDU/CSU faction and, from November 2005, Germany’s first Bundeskanzlerin, Angela Merkel, stated: ‘We are competing for the best minds in the world.’

In contrast to previous declarations, there were also admissions from other conservative leaders that Germany was an immigration land. Former CSU party chairman Edmund Stoiber also admitted in an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper, that Germany was ‘an open immigration country’, along with the CDU Hesse Prime Minister Roland Koch. Defending his Green Card initiative, Chancellor Schröder also maintained people were beginning to understand that it was in their economic interest to have this type of internationalisation. Joschka Fischer was more vociferous, declaring right-wing extremists resisting an, ‘immigrant culture are still living in the nineteenth century, because the fact is we have to open up for economic reasons’.

Yet, there was some public and media scepticism concerning official claims of a general acceptance of the promotion of internationalisation. In spite of warnings from economic experts of deficits in areas of the workforce, Dr. Renate Köcher of the Allensbach Institute claimed that the majority of Germans were convinced that an immigration law should not only control, but also reduce future numbers of immigrants. According to

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53 Cited from: Schily, O. „Es gibt noch Stolpersteine.” Interview mit Der Spiegel, 02.06.01. Bundesministerium des Innern [Online]. 02.06.01 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Rede/1x_43199.htm>
54 Cited from: Merz, F. Einwanderung und Identität. Die Welt, 25.10.00, p. 3.
56 For these admissions see: Käppner, J. and Rubner, J. op. cit. and: Deupmann, U., Hildebrandt, T. and Mestmacher, C. Kulturkampf ums Vaterland. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 27.
an Allensbach poll taken in June 2001, 68% of 2,054 German respondents from the age of 16 believed the limits of immigration had been reached, with only 17% believing Germany could accept any more. When asked whether an immigration law should reduce, expand or retain the current level of immigration, 53% of 2,054 Germans polled in 2001 believed that it should be reduced. Only 9% thought it should be expanded. A separate poll by Forsa revealed about a third (32%) of 1,006 Germans, surveyed between 29 and 30 June 2000, believed that Germany needed more immigrants, whereas a clear majority (63%) were opposed to increasing the numbers. In another poll by Forsa in 2002, 84% of 1,007 Germans agreed with the question: ‘Should immigration to Germany be restricted?’ Only 13% said that it should not.

Earlier surveys seemed to indicate a consistency of opinion. In 1992, for instance, Allensbach reported that every third person (34%) of the 2,205 Germans surveyed was concerned about the number of foreigners in Germany. By 1998, a survey by Forsa indicated this opinion had doubled. Between 19 and 20 November 1998, Forsa, on behalf of Die Woche, carried out a survey about immigration. 1,008 Germans were polled on whether they considered there were too many immigrants in Germany. Only 3% expressed the view that immigration should be unlimited. Overall, 73% thought that the immigration of foreigners – including asylum-seekers – should be reduced. In total, 60% of the 1,008 Germans surveyed thought there were too many foreigners, with 28% voicing the opposite opinion, indicating an increase of anti-immigration sentiment in Germany.

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62 The survey by Forsa was undertaken on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche. See: Es sind der Meinung, dass Deutschland mehr Einwanderung braucht? 1. Meinungen zur Einwanderung. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung und zum Asyl. Forsa Bericht P020326/8229 Sb/Sc, 03.07.00, p. 1.
63 1,007 German citizens aged below 30, from 30-44, 45-59 and 60 and over were surveyed by a telephone poll on behalf of RTL Television from 28.02.02-01.03.02. For survey details see: Sollte die Zuwanderung nach Deutschland begrenzt werden? In: Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. Forsa Bericht P220409/10408 Gü, 02.03.02, p. 1.
64 During 18.01.92 and 29.01.92, 2,205 Germans from the age of 16 were surveyed on their opinions of the numbers of immigrants. Cited from: Multikulturelle Gesellschaft. Jeder zweite weiß nicht, was gemeint ist. Allensbacher Berichte. Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992 (9), pp. 2, 6.
This scepticism also extended to some sections of the media. According to Deutsche Welle and the Berliner Morgenpost, in light of the economic downturn within the German information and telecommunications industry, the need for foreign computer workers fell considerably, raising questions about the justification for the scheme. In 2002, the Berliner Zeitung explained that The Federal Association of Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (BITKOM) reported a growth rate of only 1.7%, with a continued scaling-down of operations in the forthcoming year.

So were there any other salient reasons why the Green Card was not the predicted success? Speaking at the 2000 annual general meeting of the Association of German Newspaper Publishers in Berlin, Chancellor Schröder declared that irrespective of the economic situation, more, not less, international exchanges were needed. Nevertheless, at the same time, Schröder admitted that at the heart of the Green Card debate was a fear of globalisation and with it, exchanges of people who looked different and had different cultures.

According to British historian Eric Hobsbawm: ‘International population movements in combination with economic shifts fuel defensive reactions whether against real or imaginary threats - some of them not unconnected with the rise of local nationalism.’ Summarising, Hobsbawm observed that: ‘Some force, tendency, or enemy must be perceived as potentially or actually eroding, corroding, or endangering one’s movement and what it holds dear.’ Frank Brunssen argued that Angst was a non-rational reaction from those who felt threatened and ‘therefore develops into distrust and suspicion towards the source that generates the threat’. According to Brunssen, Angst ‘may be people, objects, the past, present day events or anticipated future developments.’ One such manifestation was the revival of the nineteenth century fears of an Überfremdung (swamping by foreigners).

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70 Cited from: Brunssen, F. „Angst vor Deutschland” and German self-definition. Debatte, 1994 (1), pp. 53-54.

71 For these claims see: Ibid., pp. 49-63.
By the 1960s, the ghosts of German nationalism in the guise of an Überfremdung appeared to have vanished. According to Peter Alter, 'from 1950 political culture and mentality of the German people emerged purified from the excesses of nationalism'.

Although some, during the 1970s, warned of an ostensible foreign takeover of Germany, according to Christhard Hoffmann: ‘The goal guiding of public discussion was one of social stability - not ethnic homogeneity.’ Hoffmann claimed there was no ‘national debate’ about immigration when the economic downturn of the 1970s resulted in a cessation of guest workers. On the other hand, Hermann Kurthen and Karen Schönwälder argued that by the late 1960s the xenophobic ghosts of the past had not completely disappeared. There was still a crude anti-Semitism and openly racist attacks on migrant workers in response ‘to the health of the German Volk’, noted Schönwälder.

With their distinctive styles of appearance, different religious beliefs as well as their unique and resented economic role, Jews had long been targets for anti-Semitism in Germany. The economic crash of 1873 also stimulated a revival of anti-Semitism. According to Mary Fulbrook and Daniel Goldhagen, for many years there had been a tradition of popular hostility to Jews, and denigration of inferior ‘eastern’ Jews in particular. Big German banks associated with Jews survived the crash of 1873 and German Jews in general were allegedly resented by small enterprises, along with the lower-middle classes that had suffered economically. ‘In addition, anti-Semitism was given intellectual respectability by prominent academics such as the nationalist historian Professor von Treitschke’, noted Fulbrook.

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Arguably, one method of determining which understanding of the nation shapes a country is by evaluating its policy on immigration and by assessing popular reactions to these amendments. Nationalist language and symbolism are, perhaps, broader than an ideological movement. For Anthony D. Smith, nationalist language and symbolism often connect an ideology with the ‘mass sentiments’ of wider segments of the designated population, notably through slogans, ideas, symbols and ceremonies. According to Smith:

Typical events that generate and respond to such nationalist discourse may be perceived threats to a sense of common ethnicity in the guise of an influx of immigrants. A rich inner or ethno-history may help to crystallise and perpetuate therefore ethnic identities and xenophobic reactions.\(^{78}\)

In the 1980s, articles began appearing implying the spectre of an Überfremdung was back and with it marked decreases in tolerance towards immigrants, along with fears of a loss of identity.\(^{79}\) Opening with a psychological stimulus to the apprehensions and resentment ‘of the West German population over the increasing influx of foreigners’, noted Sabine von Dirke; one of the first of these was the Heidelberg Manifesto.\(^{80}\) Initiated, drafted and signed by 15 university professors in 1981, the document highlighted alleged key distinctions between the foreign and indigenous population. Calling for the preservation of the German race, the signatories condemned the infiltration of the German people by full-scale immigration, concluding the latter would eventually lead to an ethnic catastrophe.\(^{81}\)

Another article by political scientist Robert Hepp maintained that western and, in particular, German political elites had become estranged from their national roots. This alleged disjuncture between official and popular ideology suggested another key fracture in German national identity. According to Hepp, official political doctrine contributed to a de-nationalisation of the German people that would eventually lead to ‘the final solution of the German question’ – a theme forming his book of the same name. Hepp predicted an

81 For details of the Heidelberg Manifesto, see: Im Wortlaut: „Facette eines göttlichen Plans.” Frankfurter Rundschau, 04.03.82, p. 10 and: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 518-519.
ethno-morphosis or permeation of the host culture by the immigrant culture, which will 'soon be completed in the collapse of the German hosts under the onslaught of foreign immigrants with higher fertility rates'. Furthermore, claimed Hepp, continued immigration and a cosmopolitan society was not an indication or expression of tolerance, but rather a decadent society's resignation to the fact that the steadily increasing birth deficit of Germans made the immigration of foreigners necessary. Concomitant with Germany's declining fertility rate was the process of modernisation, with its passionate and unrelenting, but shallow, emphasis on the individual pursuit of happiness, argued Hepp. During the 1990s, it was again argued by extremists and some of the German media that hostility to immigration was a legitimate and an understandable self-defence of a people or culture that saw its identity under threat. 'Don't the Germans', Karen Schönwälder and others asked, 'have the right to protect their identity?'

Evidence suggested that new immigration legislation, in the form of the Green Card (2001) and Immigration Act (2002), appeared to have provoked a revival of fears of an Überfremdung. An alleged ethno-morphosis referred to by Hepp was also referred to by the NPD's organ, the Deutsche Stimme:

Established politicians demand, in all seriousness, that foreigners make up for the imbalance in our people's net reproduction rate and they [the politicians] agree to raise immigration quotas. Since, in their view, all people are equal, it makes absolutely no difference whether they attract black Africans, Chinese or Turks to immigrate. In view of our reality-based image of humanity, this attitude is completely absurd.

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‘How many Mohammeds, Mustafas and Alis will be born in Germany this year?’ asked the Hessian journal of the REP.87 In 2004, the party paper of the DVU also asked: ‘Should foreigners replace Germans?’88 There were similar statements from other right-wing extremist organisations, such as the Frankfurt am Main-based Citizens Movement (FUL) and the Hamburg List to Stop Foreigners (HLA).89 Concerns were also voiced about the sharp decline in German birth-rates. ‘The Germans are dying out’, ran a number of headlines, accompanied by predictions that within 20 years the population of Germany would be in near terminal decline.90

Germany’s foreign population rose from four million in 1990 to just over seven million in 2000 - primarily due to family unification and births to foreigners in Germany.91 Based on conclusions from the Federal Commission for Foreigner Issues in 1999, from 1960 to 1998 the share of the foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) rose approximately from 1.2% to 9%.92 In December 1994, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies concluded that the German population then estimated at 81 million - would shrink and that the foreigners’ share of the population (8%) would rise.93 A decrease in return migration, the continued flow of family members from Turkey and a high birth-rate, for instance, has, according to some German commentators, kept the population of Turks in Germany particularly high.94

In an interview with Die Welt, Chairman of the then CDU/CSU opposition, Friedrich Merz, claimed that the relations between Germans and foreigners in many areas were not a problem. However, Merz also admitted that where it was perceived that there were more foreigners than Germans, people had concerns about their identity.95 Some articles

91 Cited from: Germany: asylum, Green Cards. op. cit. and: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
95 See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
in the British press claimed that over half of the German public thought there were too many foreigners in Germany – so much so that the term Überfremdung itself began to reappear in surveys and some of the German media.\textsuperscript{96}

Indicative, to some extent, of this particular Angst and disjuncture between official and popular self-conceptions of national identity were, arguably, the results of the following surveys. Between 30 and 31 October 2000, Emnid surveyed 921 Germans on whether they had fears of being inundated by foreigners (Überfremdung). 43\% of CDU voters, 23\% of SPD voters and 100\% of DVU and NPD supporters agreed with the statement put by Emnid that: ‘I have fears of an Überfremdung.’\textsuperscript{97} In a 2001 Forsa survey on behalf of the Press and Information Office of the German government, the majority of the 1,007 surveyed were also against any further immigration because they believed Germany was already überfordert (overburdened) with immigrants.\textsuperscript{98} A survey and conclusions by co-director of Allensbach, Köcher, also seemed to reflect Hepp’s controversial reasoning. Of the 2,172 Germans asked in 2000, 68\% expressed the view that the limits of immigration had been reached.\textsuperscript{99}

Attempts from the SPD/Green coalition to modernise citizenship and dispense with cultural nationalism provoked a political polarisation of who could and could not be German. Representing a cultural war that went to the very heart of what it meant to be German, another was whether there should be a Leitkultur, or leading culture, for Germans and Germany’s immigrants.

\textsuperscript{96} See: Germany in uproar over foreign workers. \textit{op. cit}. and: Connolly, K. Immigration issue could be key to German election. The Guardian [Online]. 03.05.02 [Accessed 21.06.02]. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,708999,00.html> See also: Schäuble, W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29 and: Mohr, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 344.


\textsuperscript{98} From 10.12.01-13.12.01 Forsa surveyed 1,007 citizens over the age of 14 by means of a random choice computer-assisted telephone poll on their opinions on immigration. 60\% expressed the view that Germany is already over-stretched with current immigration. See: Weil Deutschland bereits mit der Eingliederung der hier lebenden Ausländer überfordert ist. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung (Kontra-Argumente). 4. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. \textit{In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung}. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.


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**A leading culture?**

When Chairman of the former CDU/CSU opposition faction, Friedrich Merz, demanded in the *Bundestag* that immigrants must conform to a *Deutsche Leitkultur* (guiding culture), the term triggered indignation as well as widespread sympathy.\(^{100}\) Presenting different projections of collective identity, this issue of self-definition became an almost daily subject of discussions in mainstream national and regional German newspapers, right-wing radical publications and in the *Bundestag*.\(^{101}\) It set the then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and other members of the *Bundestag*, such as Peter Struck (SPD) and Kerstin Müller (Alliance 90/The Greens), against the CDU politicians Peter Hintze, Friedrich Merz and head of the CDU/CSU faction Angela Merkel.\(^{102}\) In response to conservative pleas for a German *Leitkultur* as a suitable model for German national identity, both Chancellor Schröder and SPD member of the *Bundestag* Peter Struck dismissed it as ‘half-baked’, Schröder adding that Germany needed a more modern approach to its identity.\(^{103}\) On the one hand, Kerstin Müller and Joschka Fischer argued that such a concept was inflammatory and damaging to the concept of Europe.\(^{104}\) On the other, Angela Merkel claimed the governing parties found the theme of the nation insecure and that the SPD and Greens, in particular, quite obviously ‘have a disturbed relationship with the Fatherland’.\(^{105}\)

Perhaps more significant than party squabbles, the *Leitkultur* debate also exposed key differences between the *Bundestag* political elite, sections of the media and public, along with right-wing extremists. Although the political elite differed about the extent to which long-term foreign residents should adapt to a German ‘guiding culture’, key representatives from most of the mainstream German political parties agreed that immigrants could and should be integrated.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{102}\) For these debates see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. *op. cit.*, pp. 13046-13049.

\(^{103}\) For *Bundestag* speeches by Peter Struck and Schröder see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. *Stenographischer Bericht* 136 Sitzung. Berlin, 29.11.00, pp. 13196, 13222-13223.


\(^{106}\) For the promotion of the integration of foreigners by the CDU/CSU, along with key representatives from the SPD/Greens’ Otto Schilly and Marieluise Beck, see: *Arbeitsgrundlage für die*
Evidence suggested that some of the German public and elements of the media were more sceptical. Further to the citizenship debate about the legal definition of foreigners was the one that emerged about their integration. The additional effect of Friedrich Merz's comments stimulated questions not only about what it means to be German a decade after reunification, but also whether or not foreigners, particularly the 2.2 million Turks in Germany, could be integrated.\textsuperscript{107} Merz claimed that as long as there were no clear definitions of a leading culture, neither immigration nor integration would be fully accepted. 'Immigration and integration can only be successful in the long term, if there is wide agreement within the population', noted the CDU opposition leader.\textsuperscript{108}

A résumé of Germany's past encounter with immigration is, arguably, essential in order to fully comprehend the significance of both the proposed immigration law and significance of the \textit{Leitkultur} debate.

During the early history of the FRG, the ethno-cultural grounding of German citizenship was embedded in the tradition of the \textit{jus sanguinis} principle that, according to Jost Halfmann, 'worked well for a nation-state without substantial immigration'.\textsuperscript{109} Due to an otherwise readily accessible labour force drastically reduced by death in war and thousands of German prisoners of war, the immediate early post-war years saw deficits in the workforce.\textsuperscript{110} This deficiency was initially compensated with the \textit{Vertriebene}, or ethnic Germans, fleeing the Red Army at the end of the Second World War from the former \textit{Ostgebiete} or eastern territories. Following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, this important source of labour became severely restricted, however. In response, the FRG increased its recruitment of so-called \textit{Gastarbeiter} (guest-workers) from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia, under the theory that they could be


\textsuperscript{107} For the alleged problems of integrating Turks, see: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. \textit{Der Kampf um die Pässe.} \textit{Der Spiegel}, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 25-32 and: Schönwälder, K. Migration, refugees and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates in (West) Germany. \textit{In:} Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 166-167. See also: Rinaldi, A. No Turks please, we're German. \textit{New Statesman}, 01.01.99, pp. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{108} Cited from: Merz, F. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.


rotated in and out of the labour market as and when needed.\textsuperscript{111} Indispensable for any comprehensible understanding of why sections of the public and the far-right were reluctant to accept the fact that Germany had become an immigration land, was the official reasoning behind the policy of rotation.

Guest workers were recruited primarily to cushion fluctuations in the business cycle, without either having to be added as long-term residents or integrated within the population.\textsuperscript{112} Yet, it was not until the late 1980s that officials began to accept that labour migration would lead to permanent settlement. ‘Governments on both the left and right nurtured for decades the illusion that labour migrants were temporary workers who could be sent home when jobs became scarce’, noted Kurthen. According to Kurthen and Brubaker, foreign workers were supposed to stay for between one and three years and then return home.\textsuperscript{113} A comparison with France is instructive. Whereas in Germany the employment of foreign workers was regarded as only a temporary measure, France planned on permanently integrating at least some of its migrants.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, official admissions that Germany was an immigration land and that foreigners were there to stay would have necessitated an officially endorsed integration programme for its foreign residents. Neither until 1998 was particularly forthcoming.\textsuperscript{115}

Since the Bundestag political elite promoted open immigration, whilst some of the media and public sought to bring it to a halt, the issue of integration raised by the Leitkultur epitomised the fundamental ideological crisis within German national identity.

According to the Verfassungsnation, or understanding of national identity based on a constitutional patriotism, irrespective of ethnic or religious background, as a rule,

\textsuperscript{113} Cited from: Kurthen, H. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 922-923 and: Brubaker, R. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 171-172.
everyone can become integrated into a nation’s culture.\textsuperscript{116} Indicative of this constitutional patriotism in action was, arguably, the Bundestag speech by Kerstin Müller (Alliance 90/The Greens): ‘A Leitkultur is of no use for the integration of foreigners because culture is many-sided and is not that simple. People must be treated as individuals and not on their religion or descent.’\textsuperscript{117} Despite official justifications for continued immigration, evidence suggested the Bundestag political elite seemed to have failed to understand that the irrefutable fact of immigration settlement does not necessarily make the country, in the minds of many Germans, a country of immigration. An apparent anxiety that the former SPD/Green ruling coalition were ignoring popular sentiments that Germany should not be a land of immigration, also extended to differences between how mankind was perceived between the Bundestag elite and some elements of the German public. Evidence suggested there was some doubt as to the limits of assimilability for non-German ethnic groups – especially, but not exclusively Turks.\textsuperscript{118}

Useful sources when probing the nature of national identity are the speeches of nationalists and their pamphlets, programmes and other documents of ethno-nationalist organisations. As far as Reitemeyer Professor of Political Science Walker Connor was concerned, nationalist speeches have been dismissed far too readily as useless propaganda. Nevertheless, according to Connor: ‘Nationalism is a mass phenomenon and the degree to which the leaders are true believers does not affect the impact of its reality.’ So the issue was not the credibility of the propagandist, ‘but the reactions they inculcate and mass instinct to which the propagandist appeals’.\textsuperscript{119}

A. D. Smith argued that: ‘The mingling of homogeneous cultures through immigration and guest workers can provoke strong ethno-nationalist reactions from indigenous peoples and cultures.’\textsuperscript{120} Because it is based upon the belief in a common ethnicity, the


\textsuperscript{117} Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13209.


\textsuperscript{120} Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity. op. cit., p. 176.
ethno-national bond ultimately bifurcates humanity into 'us' and 'them'. Summarising ethnic identity, Smith and John Hutchinson interpreted ethnic identity as: 'The essence of an ethnic group' or 'the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group. It is what you have if you belong to an ethnic group - generally in the context of opposition to other ethnic groups.' Indicative of this exclusive stance in Germany was the Heidelberg Manifesto. Published in several newspapers in 1981, its racist agenda caused particular concern in the Bundestag. 'Based on an alleged objective science including cybernetics, biology/genetics', the 15 signatories of the Heidelberg Manifesto concluded that certain different peoples were incompatible and mutually exclusive on the same territory. According to the Manifesto, large numbers of non-German immigrants of disparate culture, mentality and religion were beyond integration.

Other advocates of what Sabine von Dirke termed the 'biologist-nationalist stance', such as Wolfgang Seeger and Professor Erwin Faul, equated culture with nature by claiming that a people’s culture is part of its genetic material. Or, in other words, culture is biology. According to Seeger, children of interracial marriages inevitably have a disposition for being unprincipled, weak-willed and having unrestrained behaviour. They are, therefore, most likely to show criminal traits because of the incompatibility of the genetic material of their parent, argued Seeger. This example illustrated not only the continuing influence and language of the Third Reich, but also its overtly racist ideology articulated via Seeger and others during the 1980s and beyond. What was particularly significant about the Heidelberg Manifesto was that its recommendations and philosophy not only continued to emerge within far-right publications, but had become manifest within the media and, to a lesser extent, the public.

In 2003, REP Party Chairman Dr. Rolf Schlierer agitated against the admission of Turkey into the EU, claiming Turkey’s entrance would spell the end for any German

121 Cited from: Connor, W. op. cit., p. 207.
123 For official concerns about the detrimental influence of the Heidelberg Manifesto, see comments by Baum (FDP) and Dreßler (SPD) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4908-4909.
guiding culture, guiding or otherwise. As far as the so-called German Liberal Party (DP) was concerned, any foreigners who did not want to adapt to a German Leitkultur had no right to stay in Germany, reported the Brandenburg authorities in their report on far-right German parties. Explaining why the CDU did not represent a viable political alternative to the NPD, in July 2005 the Thuringian party candidate, Dr. Rita Hoffmann, vehemently criticised conservative party leaders Angela Merkel and Friedrich Merz for adopting a conciliatory approach to implementing a German leading culture.

Along with a radical stance to a guiding culture for foreigners, anti-integration positions also appeared in various far-right party papers and speeches. In the Niedersachsen Spiegel, the Lower Saxon authorities reported that local NPD party functionary, Michael Fiedler, justified rejection of the equality of foreigners ‘on an explicit biological racism’. For the Saxon branch of the REP, the belief that it is possible to integrate past and future immigrants was ‘a mistake’. According to the DVU, ‘the integration of any more foreigners is simply not possible – particularly a group so ethnically erratic as the Jews’.

In response to Johannes Rau’s 2000 Berlin Speech, urging Germans to accept that Germany should continue to receive more immigrants, some contested whether a German guiding culture should, could or must exist. For Ronald Mönch, Georg Paul Hefty and Josef Joffe, a leading culture was indispensable for German identity. Along similar lines, Bremen College Principal Mönch stated in the newspaper Die Welt that the acceptance of a leading culture should be self-evident for anyone living in a country. Writing in the weekly Die Zeit, Joffe defined German culture as metaphysics and Volkstum or national traditions – ‘it is Goethe on the shelf and the lime tree above

134 See: Lehmann, K. and Beyer, M. op. cit.
In complete seriousness,' noted Reinhard Mohr and Georg Paul Hefty, "integration without a Leitkultur is like going to bed without a bed." 136

These interpretations of Leitkultur elicited critical responses from some quarters, suggesting such explicit patterns of conformity to certain values were tantamount to an implicit exclusion of others. On 8 May 2002, in a speech commemorating the end of the Second World War, Chancellor Schröder stated that whenever one associated values as emanating from a certain area, the exclusion of others resulted.137 Publicist Norbert Bolz and SPD Mayor of Bremen, Henning Scherf, argued that a guiding culture should be orientated less towards identity and more with the inclusion of others. Bolz believed a guiding culture should not represent identity, but tolerance: 'We have to learn these days to understand culture not as identity but as difference." 138 For Scherf, 'a word that leads people astray into a restrictive definition of Germanness contradicts the goal of Bremen as a city open to the world'.139

Whilst those, such as Bolz, the Mayor of Bremen and the SPD/Green government, did their best to promote the integration of foreigners, at the same time, there seemed little public and media sympathy for ethnic diversity. Since 2000, the Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues reported 3.5 million marks had been set aside for integration projects for foreigners in Germany.140 Although torchlight demonstrations in Munich and Hamburg between 1992 and 1993 protested against violence towards foreigners, they did not lead to the formation of a civil rights movement in support of minority rights.141 Expert in international law, Dieter Blumenwitz, recommended distinguishing between rights to 'native national groups' and those to 'immigrating aliens'.142 Theo Sommer argued against granting formal minority status to Turks that could result in their 'eventual segregation when the task in hand should be their

138 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 344.
integration and adherence to the central values of a German Leitkultur. On the other hand, German political scientist Claus Leggewie demanded that Turks living in Germany should be formally acknowledged as an ethnic minority and granted the same status of cultural autonomy that ethnic Germans in Poland allegedly have. But what did some of the public think?

In 2001, 2,054 Germans were asked by Allensbach to what extent should foreigners give priority to German culture. 61% thought German culture should take precedence over foreign traditions, religion and language. When asked whether they opposed a German Leitkultur in a country where many foreigners lived, only 29% believed there should not be a guiding culture, but only diversity with equal rights. Another poll by Emnid in 2000, found that 31% of 921 Germans surveyed believed that immigrants should be able to live amongst Germans as they would in their own homeland. However, the SPD/Green government, at the time of writing, seemed determined to move away from the traditional ethno-cultural understanding of a guiding culture. In the Bundestag, Chancellor Schröder declared he did not want to rekindle a new Leitkultur debate because ‘enough has already been said on the issue by my colleague Peter Struck.’

As the reactions to the immigration law and Green Cards suggested, the problem for the German government appeared to be public perceptions of a leading culture, which promoted a national heritage and traditions as the sole legitimate points of identity reference. Although Schröder claimed dual nationality law was facilitating the integration of foreigners, past surveys indicated otherwise. Officially classified as ‘confidential’, in a 2001 Allensbach survey undertaken for the German government

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143 Cited from: Sommer, T. Der Kopf zählt, nicht das Tuch. Die Zeit, 16.07.98, p. 3.
entitled *Foreigners in Germany*, respondents were asked the extent to which their opinion mirrored what one most often heard in Germany.149 Responding to the statement that most foreigners wanted to keep themselves to themselves and had as little as possible to do with Germans, 54% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide agreed with this statement, compared to 40% in 1997.150

A 1999 survey undertaken by Allensbach revealed 23% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide believed that dual nationality would contribute to the integration of foreigners, whereas the majority - 64% - were convinced it would not.151 In 2001, 68% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide believed that Islam and its customs hindered the integration of Muslims into German society, reported the 1998-2002 *Allensbach Yearbook of Public Opinion Surveys*.152

Evidence also suggested the general perception in some areas of Germany was that Turks were different in culture and religion and wanted to remain so, 'seeking neighbourhoods of their own', noted Hamburg's former Foreigner Representative Günter Apel.153 Consequently, Turkish ghettos formed and isolated themselves from German society, noted three editors of *Der Spiegel* and Theo Sommer from *Die Zeit*.154 Conversely, according to the 2000 *Shell Study on Young People in Germany*:

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149 See: Scheidges, R. *op. cit.*, p. 4.
153 For comments by Günter Apel, see: Darnstädt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.
‘Germany’s youth have little interest in other cultures and their knowledge of Turks is minimal.’\textsuperscript{155}

‘Social aloofness, racist, ethnic and religious prejudice as well as discrimination by the German population can all obstruct efforts for integration - even in cases where immigrants are highly motivated’, claimed the 2001 Report by the Independent Commission on Migration.\textsuperscript{156} Evidence from the media also implied the major problem seemed to be Germany’s reputation as a country where foreigners were not always welcome.\textsuperscript{157} An example of this discrimination in action was the case brought to \textit{Der Spiegel}’s attention by the IBM manager Erwin Staudt who wished to employ a top, unidentified British IT manager in Germany. \textit{Der Spiegel} reported the latter’s work visa was suspended by the local authorities whilst his case was assessed. Staudt had to inform his prospective employee that his application had been refused on the grounds ‘his wife was a coloured person’.\textsuperscript{158} Indian Frankfurt-based business consultant Rajesh Agarwal confirmed his associates felt there was definitely a racism problem in the city towards foreign employees. ‘There’s is an assumption that even if you have a very good education, it still makes no difference’, explained Agarwal.\textsuperscript{159} During his visit to India in 2000, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer noted that he was asked: ‘How safe is Germany for people with dark skins?’\textsuperscript{160}

For right-wing radicals it seemed what constituted indispensable differences between races also extended to some sections of the public. In contrast to the official line, evidence suggested there were clear distinctions to be made when assessing levels of acceptance (and arguably, therefore, assimilability) for different ethnic groups from a European sphere and those outside it.\textsuperscript{161} In a 2001 Forsa survey undertaken for the Press

\textsuperscript{155} Based on in-depth polls of and interviews with 6,000 young Germans during 1998-1999, the study was compiled by Arthur Fischer head of \textit{Psydata} in Frankfurt am Main. The majority of respondents were between the ages of 15-24, and a total of 4,546 young people were selected, with an additional random sample of 800. See: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study on young people in Germany. \textit{Inter Nationes} [Online]. Mar 2000 [Accessed 06.06.03]. <http://www.internationes.de/d/presse/basis/e/bi18-2000-e-f-html>
\textsuperscript{156} Cited from: \textit{Structuring immigration. Fostering integration. op. cit.,} p. 236.
\textsuperscript{160} Cited from: \textit{Address by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the opening of the Forum on the Future of Cultural Relations Policy. op. cit.,} p. 8.
\textsuperscript{161} For official promotion of equal rights by Alliance 90/The Greens politician Kerstin Müller and Chancellor Schröder see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. \textit{op. cit.,} pp. 13209, 13222-13223.
and Information Office of the German government, 73% of 1,007 German citizens surveyed aged 14 onwards, admitted they had reservations, in particular, about immigration by citizens from Islamic states. By contrast, Germans were more positive regarding the immigration of western EU citizens - 31% professed concerns about their immigration to Germany.\(^{162}\) Karen Schönwalder, Michael Minkenberg and Hermann Kurthen also maintained there were clear distinctions in the acceptance of different nationalities and there were similar reports in the German press.\(^{163}\)

Whilst discussing the European legacy of culture for German identity, former President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse (SPD), maintained the question remained whether or not a Turk with a German passport could actually become German. 'Is it sufficient that immigrants respect the law or conform to a *Leitkultur*?' asked Thierse.\(^{164}\) According to Rüdiger Scheidges, Rainer Münz and Professor Hans-Dieter Schwind, it was not. Münz, Scheidges and Schwind maintained that some of the German public still did not accept Turks, Bosnians and Albanians.\(^{165}\) This was, arguably, another instance of a contemporary version of Herder’s ethnic-orientated cultural community of the *Volk* (people) opposing the idea of co-existing ethnic and cultural minorities and equal rights for minorities.\(^{166}\)

Evidence suggested then, that these attitudes not only deterred high-skilled workers from abroad via the Green Card visa system, but also damaged the country’s chances of attracting foreign investment. Speaking in the Berlin parliament in 2005 about foreign IT-specialists avoiding the capital due to alleged hostile attitudes to foreigners, Berlin Senator from the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), Giyasettin Sayan, declared: 'At the moment, Germany’s image abroad is not a good one.'\(^{167}\) Summarising official concerns about foreigners being accorded equal treatment, SPD politician Peter Struck declared: 'We do not want to damage the respect of Germany in the eyes of the

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166 For Johann Gottfried von Herder’s interpretation of the *Volk* see: Craig, G. A. *op. cit.* , pp. 30-34, 190-212 and: Fulbrook, M. *A concise history of Germany.* *op. cit.* , p. 94.

world.' Publicly, though, Otto Schily was more upbeat about the situation. 'In spite of all the problems of immigration and integration, the past ten years have been largely a success story', noted the then Minister of the Interior.

During a 2003 demonstration in Hanover against immigration, NPD Chairman Udo Voigt criticised the alleged failure of Chancellor Schröder and the former SPD/Green government to admit to their clear incapacity to solve the immigration problem in Germany. Similar demonstrations occurred in Osnabrück, Wilhelmshaven and again in Hanover during 2004. Two surveys also seemed to reflect a lack of confidence in the SPD/Green government’s handling of immigration. In 2001, when 1,007 Germans were asked by Forsa, on behalf of the Federal Press Office of the German government, whether mainstream parties could be trusted to deal with immigration, it emerged that only 25% of those surveyed believed any German mainstream political party was fit to do so. A 2001 Allensbach survey reported similar findings. 22% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide believed none of the mainstream political parties ‘take the trouble to deal with the issue’, with 57% agreeing with the statement that they avoided the issue as much as possible. Capturing the alleged mood at the time, the newspaper Handelsblatt reported:

So the government have it in black and white - the months long disputes about immigration have not only resulted in Germans dissatisfied with the government’s competence in dealing with the issue, but has also revealed the public has become sceptical about the whole credibility of the equal co-existence of different cultures and ability to successfully integrate immigrants.

To summarise, evidence suggested that the notion of a homogenous ethno-cultural Volk based around the ethnus, or ethnic group, along with the presumption that Germany was

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168 For speech by Struck see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., pp. 13194-13196.
171 From 10.12.01-13.12.01, 1,007 Germans over the age of 14 were asked by means of a random choice computer-assisted telephone poll to what the extent they thought the mainstream were competent in dealing with immigration, see: Kompetenz der Parteien bei der Zuwanderung. 9. Meinungen zu Parteien und Politikern bei der Regelung der Zuwanderung. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung. op. cit., p. 22.
173 Cited from: Scheidges, R. op. cit., p. 4.
a country of non-immigration remained official dogma. Yet, since the introduction of Germany's first national regulated immigration legislation, the Bundestag political elite maintained that Germany had become an open land of immigration. Rau claimed in 2000 that: 'Germany is now one of the most open countries in the world. We have become more experienced, more rich in experience and more tolerant.'

Right-wing extremists did not share either Rau's view or the beliefs of many from the Bundestag political elite that Germany was an immigration land. Arguing it was 'absurd' that the German political elite wanted to continue immigration in the face of increasing unemployment, evidence suggested the views of the Republikaner and the NPD on the subject were not so different from those held by some of the public and the media. Otto Schily's and Rita Süssmuth's claims that Germany was 'de facto an immigration land' seemed to contradict the views of some Germans and there was little sign that some had become more receptive to either immigration or the Green Card. Whilst Germany had officially recognised itself as a country of immigration, evidence suggested it has done so against the will of many in Germany. Surveys indicated that as far as some Germans were concerned, the new law had changed nothing regarding the so-called 'problem of immigration' and that in general, most claimed the media were opposed to the whole concept of immigration anyway.

At the time of writing, it seemed that the new legislation allowing 20,000 skilled non-EU workers into the country also found little accord with the population, exposing further dissonances between popular and official idioms of national identity. Responses to the Green Card were generally disappointing, both from prospective applicants and in the attitudes of Germans themselves. In the eastern state of Saxony, for example, the Leipziger Volkszeitung claimed that by 2000 no Green Cards had been accepted by foreign workers.

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174 Cited from: Section IV. In: Rau, J. op. cit.
178 For these claims see: 71 Green Cards in Sachsen. Leipziger Volkszeitung. 08.11.00, p. 1.
Despite appeals from former Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer for more internationalisation in order to justify the immigration law, Green Card Programme and concomitant immigration of foreign workers, their pleas appeared to have been rejected. A deep-seated Angst of change and the external seemed to have returned in the form of an Überfremdung. Legislation introduced in 2000 and 2002 sanctioning continued immigration in the form of the Green Cards and the country’s first comprehensive immigration law provoked an Überfremdungsängste, and concomitant loss of identity within the media and public.\textsuperscript{179}

Notwithstanding clear public opposition, the Bundestag political elite appeared resolved to adapt to global competition, arguing Germany needed immigration for demographic, economic and cultural reasons. Yet, it seemed clear from the Leitkultur debates that some Germans had problems not only accepting the consequences of immigration, such as globalisation, but also parity of different cultures.

Another consequence of the immigration law and Green Card was to raise questions about whether there should be a suitable German cultural model of integration, or Leitkultur, for both Germans and immigrants to adhere to, exposing a vacuum in national identity. Politicians Friedrich Merz (CDU) and Rainer Brüderle (FDP) accused the SPD of indifference to a German Leitkultur in the Bundestag, claiming the people were still seeking guidance on the theme.\textsuperscript{180}

On the one hand, the mainstream German political parties generally accepted integration was necessary for Germany’s foreign population. On the other hand, however, surveys and various articles revealed clear distinctions were made between foreigners from a European sphere and those from outside it, to the point of an apparent scepticism about whether Turks, for instance, could be integrated. Non-Europeans, particularly Indians, accounted for the largest proportion of those issued the Green Card, followed by workers from Russia.\textsuperscript{181} There was, therefore, an apparent rejection by some of an

\textsuperscript{179} Articles were still appearing on the theme in 2005, for example, See: Peter, J. Warnung vor zunehmender Überfremdung. Die Welt, 11.06.05, p. 4 and: Immer mehr reden von “Überfremdung.” Berliner Zeitung, 14.07.05, p. 36. Concerns were also expressed from the Brandenburg branch of the SPD about the use of the term. See: SPD-Landtagsfraktion Brandenburg. Potsdam: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 01.03.05, pp. 12, 20, 33.

\textsuperscript{180} For speeches in the Bundestag by Friedrich Merz and Rainer Brüderle, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., p. 13036 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13204.

\textsuperscript{181} See: Kettmann, S. op. cit. and: Puppe, A. op. cit., p. 18.
identity based on equal rights and cultures for all, indicating further evidence of competing definitions of national identity. Rau’s 2000 speech, arguably, summarised the mood in Germany at the time: ‘Integration [...] needs acceptance on the part of the local population.’ 182

In conclusion, evidence suggested a direct line was being increasingly drawn between national identity and immigrants and that, at times, Germany was becoming a battleground in which two different conceptions of national identity were being fought. Increased immigration in the form of the Green Card exacerbated tensions between exclusive and inclusive notions of nationhood.

Promoting immigration, tolerance and the integration of foreigners into society, the Bundestag political elite along with left-liberals continued to defend a Verfassungspatriotismus. 183 Political scientist Claus Leggewie, for example, noted that many German economists and politicians valued immigrants highly because of their model behaviour in the market economy. Along similar lines, CDU representative Heiner Geißler argued that many immigrants were essentially the ‘cream of the crop’ of their home countries and thus a valuable contribution to German society. 184 Although a low birth-rate was, arguably, potentially damaging for the future of the FRG, in contrast to right-wing political scientists, such as Robert Hepp, perhaps immigration could be the solution for, and not the alleged death of, the German nation. 185

Removing narrow definitions of identity could make it easier for Germany to reap the economic benefits of immigration, instead of wasting intellectual energy in struggling to preserve an ethno-cultural national homogeneity or purity that probably never existed or never will exist. That said, developments suggested immigration remained largely an alien concept with opinion polls demonstrating it did not represent a viable solution in the eyes of many Germans. It was also evident that official efforts to encourage a more economically competitive and cosmopolitan society were perceived as a direct threat to an ethno-cultural definition of German identity. In short, an ethno-cultural

182 Cited from: Section III. In: Rau, J. op. cit.
185 For Hepp’s contentions see: Ibid., pp. 518-521.
understanding of Germanness continued to inform sections of the public and those who questioned the merits of immigration.

So how far was Germany in reality 'an open land of immigration', as claimed by leading figures from the Bundestag elite? Reflecting another key dissonance between an inclusive Verfassungspatriotismus and exclusive ethno-cultural definition of the nation, although Germany was officially represented as an open land of immigration, evidence suggested for some, it remained rather a reluctant one.

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Chapter 3. 
Xenophobia and Right-Wing Violence in Germany

There was, arguably, hardly a subject that aroused more unease outside Germany than the reception of foreigners by some elements of the German public. Commenting in 1998 on xenophobia, spokesperson for the South African Embassy, Alan G. Moore, stated that the situation in Germany was ‘very disturbing’. Earlier, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, criticised the xenophobic outbursts against foreigners.

Aware of these and other concerns, the German government attempted to ban the largest of the three main right-wing extremist parties in Germany, the National Democratic Party (NPD), noted The Observer. Yet, despite claims by the Federal Ministry of the Interior to the contrary, this chapter suggests the real motives behind the attempted prohibition was not only the growing membership of the NPD and other right-wing organisations, but also the increasing sympathy amongst some sections of society for their xenophobic and anti-multicultural agenda.

According to Social Democratic Party (SPD) Minister for Culture and Media, Julian Nida-Rümelin, and other members of the Bundestag, such as Annelie Buntenbach and Kerstin Müller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, Germany has, or should, become more of a multicultural society. As well as advocating cultural diversity, former SPD German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also defended political asylum on the grounds of human dignity, enshrined within Germany’s Basic Law (Constitution). Despite these claims and similar appeals from mainstream party leaders to Germans to resist right-wing

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2 Cited from: „National befreite Zonen.” Der Spiegel, 23.03.98 (13), p. 52.


extremism, evidence suggested attitudes had changed little since the first public participation in right-wing extremist attacks on asylum centres during 1991-1992.

Top SPD officials, such as the former Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily and former President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, maintained the problems of racist violence and xenophobia were centred almost entirely within the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). According to Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook, in order for a strong sense of national identity to develop, there has to be a significant identification and affinity with the values, interests and traditions of state elites. In the light of a sense of official repression, hostile reactions to multiculturalism, asylum and a concomitant perception that the Bundestag political elite’s values were not those of some of the German people, this chapter argues that xenophobia highlighted the continuing disparities between official and popular perceptions of German national identity in both parts of the country.

The Real Essence of the Bans

Although extreme right parties do not play a significant role within German parliamentary party politics, nevertheless, at the time of writing, there were various claims they had a considerable influence on both political discourse and public opinion, whose racist agenda all the mainstream parties attempted to restrain. To-date, for example, mainstream parties have so far consistently rejected any coalition politics with the extreme right. So why were the mainstream parties so determined to curb the influence of the extreme right if, in the words of former Federal President Johannes Rau, ‘Germany is now one of the most colourful and open countries in the world. We have become more relaxed, more rich in experience and more tolerant’? Did violent racist conceptions of German national character find resonance within German society?

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8 For appeals by all the mainstream parties to resist right-wing extremism, see comments by Bundestag members Klaus Heß (FDP) and Michael Luther (CDU) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. Stenographischer Bericht 135 Sitzung. Berlin, 28.11.00, pp. 13109, 13113. See also speeches by Peter Struck (SPD) and Kerstin Müller (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., pp. 13194, 13209. See also: „National befreite Zonen.” op. cit., pp. 52-81 and: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 26, 34-35, 131.
On 30 March 2001, both the Bundestag and Bundesrat filed requests to the Federal Constitutional Court asking it to declare the right-wing extremist NPD as unconstitutional thus outlawing the party.11 Chancellor Schröder himself appealed to the Constitutional Court, asking it to ban the NPD.12 As far as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) was concerned, of the three larger right-wing extremist parties, which included the German People’s Union (DVU) and the Republicans (Republikaner (REP)), the NPD was the most radical, decisively rejecting parliamentary democracy.13

Otto Schily and the authorities were keen to outlaw the NPD on account of its anti-democratic stance, but evidence suggested the main concern of the then SPD/Green government was the party’s increasing influence over disaffected youth and growing membership of the party - despite federal claims to the contrary.14 Evidence from regional security reports and elsewhere indicated the federal authorities had attempted to play-down the significance of the increasing influence of the NPD - particularly the latter’s claim that they were the true guardians of German national identity.15

For the first time since 1996, in 2002 the BMI, or Federal Ministry of the Interior, claimed NPD membership had fallen. At the same time though, the authorities persisted with their attempts to have the party banned.16 In the national elections on 22 September 2001, the NPD gained ‘a mere 0.4% of all votes, thus failing to reach the 0.5% level required by the Political Parties Act to qualify for public funding’, explained the BMI.17 Nevertheless, no other party, except the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), had been so influential in the former GDR as the East German wing of the NPD, claimed Der Spiegel and social psychologist Harald Welzer.18

11 See: German Supreme Court discontinues proceedings on ban of NPD. (Press Release). German Federal Government Press and Information Office [Online]. 19.03.03 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_473207.htm?script=0>
Before the middle of the 1990s, the NPD was relatively insignificant in the East compared to the other far-right parties - the Republicans (REP) and the German People's Union (DVU). But since 1992, the Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringian authorities reported a more or less consistent rise in NPD membership. In 1996, for instance, membership of the NPD had reached 3,500, increasing steadily during the years 1997 to 4,300 to reach 6,500 members by 2000. 19 In fact, the Saxon and Saarland officials feared that the right-wing extremists under the NPD could easily cross the required 5% clause hurdle (Fünf-Prozent Klausel) in local elections. 20 One of the main cities of the former East where the NPD had more than half the numbers of local left-wing SPD members was Leipzig, explained Der Spiegel. 21

Implying the ruling political elite no longer represented the people and, therefore, German national identity, NPD Chairman Udo Voigt claimed: ‘As the spearhead of national opposition, the NPD is to be banned because those in power are afraid that their own people will awake.’ 22 Already represented in Bremerhaven and Brandenburg in 2003, concerns were expressed by the Saxon Ministry of the Interior that the DVU could also acquire the 5% vote level required in local party elections. 23 Who else apart from the NPD made similar claims that the Bundestag elite no longer represented German national identity?

In contrast to other right-wing extremist parties, such as the German Alternative (DA), the National Offensive (NO) and the Free German Workers Party (FAP), according to Der Spiegel: ‘The NPD appeared to have struck the right tone in the East a note of xenophobia and populism.’ 24 In the eastern state of Saxony, the NPD attracted more members in 1998 than the Alliance 90/The Greens, with NPD membership rising from

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350 in 1996 to over 1,000 by 1998. In 2000, the Saxony-Anhalt authorities reported that ‘membership of the NPD had increased six-fold in the area since 1996’. Others indicated the same. Known for his research of the far right, political scientist Richard Stöss argued that election results in the former East could have happened anywhere in Germany and feared there was a real sense that ‘the dam would burst’. Whilst this prediction failed to materialise in the aforementioned manner, nevertheless, the NPD certainly extended their support and influence from the new eastern Länder (states) into the old western Länder.

There were reports, for example, of what journalist Carsten Holm described as ‘a renewed subtle form of racism of the people’ in the western state of Hesse. In 1989, 6.4% voted for the NPD in the Hessian town of Ehringshausen. This had risen to 13.6% in 1993, 22.9% in 1997 and by 2001, almost one in every four were voting NPD in Ehringshausen. In neighbouring Leun and Wölfersheim, the Hessian authorities reported a similar story; the NPD attracted 21.5% of votes in Leun and 22.7% in Wölfersheim during the local Hessian elections of 1997. Three other regional state authorities also reported consistent increases in membership of the NPD from 1998 to 2000. Corroborating the claims of Der Spiegel, representative for Turks in the area, Oktay Divar, stated: ‘There is a general fear amongst Turks of racism and of the NPD in Hesse.’ In fact, the Hessian Ministry of the Interior also reported the NPD were still continuing to attract support in the area during 2002.

When the various annual reports by individual Länder were examined, discrepancies also appeared between BMI claims and those of the local Land offices responsible for the protection of their particular states. Germany’s equivalent of Britain’s MI5, the BfV, reported on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior that ‘the overall membership

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27 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 35.
28 Cited from: Holm, C. Ein Dorf sieht braun. Rechtsextreme. Der Spiegel, 12.03.01 (11), pp. 76-77.
31 Cited from: Holm, C. op. cit., p. 77.
potential of right-wing extremists has decreased since 1995'. Compared to regional estimates of German subcultural right-wing extremist groups, reports from the federal BfV and BMI appeared underestimates of sub-cultural neo-Nazi groups. Evidence suggested that the federal authorities were keen not only to prove that attitudes in Germany were becoming more receptive to immigrants, but also that they were in control of an increasingly deteriorating situation.

In 1998, the BMI reported ‘only 80 neo-Nazi “Kameradschaften” in existence’, with ‘only a few groups making sufficiently successful attempts to achieve public attention through demonstrations’. Again, in 2002, the authorities claimed Kameradschaften, or what the BMI described as ‘neo-Nazi comradeships’, only had a negligible impact. Characterised by an openly aggressive ideology for a National Socialist system, racism and xenophobia, so-called ‘comradeships’ were clandestine groups in which neo-Nazis organised themselves, who, along with the NPD, sought to protect German national identity.

Contradicting the BMI, four regional authorities reported increases in the membership of these comradeships. Since 1993 and 1996, the Mecklenburg-West Pomeranian and Saxony-Anhalt Ministries of the Interior reported increases in these types of neo-Nazi groups. Along with the Hamburg Ministry of the Interior, the Lower Saxon authorities also reported increases in comradeships between 1997 and 1998. Particularly active since 1998, organising various local events in the Bramfeld area of Hamburg, was the ‘Kameradenkreis’, or the neo-Nazi comradeship network, of Thomas Wulff.

Between January 2001 and December 2002, for instance, no fewer than 30 NPD demonstrations took place in the Saxon area alone, with an average attendance of over...
Demonstrations were also organised by Udo Voigt in Hesse and Berlin. Perhaps of greater significance was the good publicity that the NPD demonstrations attracted with their martial appearance. An indication of the NPD’s relentless public activities was, arguably, the following claim by the Bavarian authorities. According to the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, since Udo Voigt took over as Chairman of the party in 1996, the NPD has staged almost 700 nationwide demonstrations and similar actions. Aside from their openly racist activities, many right-wing extremists also displayed ‘well-adjusted behaviour’, noted Jan Herman Brinks. This was one of the reasons why they were often able to count on sympathy from some of the public, while other sub-cultural groups were less able to do so. Evidence also suggested the NPD held attraction for a particular segment of German youth.

Numerous comradeships maintained a close contact with the NPD, as well as its youth organisation, the Young National Democrats (JN). In fact, the NPD was the only right-wing extremist party to have a youth organisation with a significant number of members in 2002. Evidence suggested that the NPD was not only sending out what Der Spiegel described as the ‘right message’ in the former GDR, but also in the older western Länder. It was, arguably, this last factor that the federal authorities feared most. It seemed the most likely reason why the federal authorities were so keen to outlaw the NPD was not so much their alleged falling membership, but the ‘extensive reception’ of their openly xenophobic agenda amongst some German youth in states such as Hesse and Saxony. Challenging the Bundestag political elite’s claims as representatives of German national identity, another was the NPD’s blatant rejection of an officially endorsed multiculturalism.
Multicultural Germany?

'Together we want to build a cosmopolitan, tolerant and just Germany.'

As noted in the previous chapter, reactions from some of the public to the immigration law, Green Card Programme and 'guiding culture' deliberations highlighted the resistance to the Bundestag political elite and, in particular, the SPD/Green attempts to foster a change in attitudes towards foreigners. In a further attempt to dispense with a cultural nationalism of the past, between 1998 and 2005, the then SPD/Green ruling coalition aimed at new horizons of inclusion by extending dual nationality to children born in Germany of foreign parents and long-term foreign residents or victims of persecution. Another was the Bundestag elite’s promotion of a multicultural society.

In a speech observing the tenth anniversary of German reunification on 3 October 2000, Chancellor Schröder stated: 'Together we want to build a cosmopolitan, tolerant and just Germany.' With more than a hint of wishful thinking, perhaps, opposition Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) party leader at the time, Angela Merkel, maintained that German culture was not prescriptive and would probably not change anyway as a result of a growing cosmopolitanism. Yet, the extreme right did not share their optimism or the theme of their multicultural agenda.

Right-wing extremist parties, such as the REP, the DVU and NPD, all maintained that German national identity was threatened by multiculturalism. According to the Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior, NPD Party Chairman Udo Voigt declared: 'We are Germans and proud of it. We unequivocally reject a multicultural society because we want Germany for the Germans.' Critical of the alleged damaging effects of a multicultural state, an NPD press release demanded the preservation of German identity. Holding immigrants responsible in general for Germany's political and social
problems, the 2002 party-programme of the REP argued that the experience to-date of every multicultural society was one of conflict. Outlining the party’s guiding principles, the most important demand of the party was the safeguarding of German identity and opposition to a multicultural state. And, according to the DVU’s party periodical, the National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ): ‘An Umvolkung into a multicultural society cannot happen quickly enough for either the SPD or Greens.’ In fact, similar fears of an Umvolkung, or replacement of the German population by ‘alien’ ethnic groups, were also invoked by the youth wing of the NPD – the JN, and the REP.

Was it only far-right extremists, such as the REP, NPD and DVU, that said ‘no to multi-culti’, as claimed by the BMI? According to researcher of right-wing extremism in Germany, Wesley D. Chapin, the DVU achieved 6.2% of the vote in 1991 in the local state election in Bremen and 6.3% a year later in Schleswig-Holstein. Led by former Waffen SS member Franz Schönhuber, the REP achieved 10.9% in Baden-Württemberg in 1992 and 8.4% in Berlin in the same year. Together they received more than 2.5 million votes.

Aided by an anti-foreigner billboard and letter campaign, the DVU astonished the German political mainstream by taking 12.9% of the vote and 16 seats in the local state elections of Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998. Five seats were also won by the DVU that year in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, representing 5.3% of the local vote. Posing as champions against an alleged ‘Umvolkung’ of the German people, in 2002 the DVU won nine seats in Bremen and Bremerhaven. During a similar election campaign in 2004, the NPD acquired 4% of the vote in the Saarland district of Germany, gaining ten seats in the region and 17,590 votes, reported the Saarland Ministry of the Interior. Again, the party enjoyed similar success with its anti-multicultural mandate – this time
winning 12 seats in Saxony. Thus, evidence suggested that the defence of German national identity against multiculturalism by parties, such as the NPD and DVU, offered clear electoral potential.

NPD party theorist Jürgen Schwab declared: ‘German citizens oppose multicultural propaganda in kindergartens and schools.’ But, just how realistic was this claim compared to statements from mainstream party leaders at the time of writing, such as Chancellor Schröder and Angela Merkel, that Germany was becoming ‘more cosmopolitan’? Whether Germany was, or should become, a multicultural society, arguably, warranted particular attention because the issue transcended party politics into the media and public discussion, questioning the validity of the Bundestag elite’s representations of German national identity.

According to Andreas Staab and others, throughout its history Germany never really experienced a multicultural society and the short period of colonisation prior to World War One had hardly any cultural or social impact on the populace within the Wilhelminian Reich. Although Germans often had experience of foreign cultures through exposure in the workplace to guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s, at the same time, until the inauguration of the SPD/Green coalition government in September 1988, most politicians never demanded that Germans had to accommodate multiculturalism. According to the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, Sabine von Dirke and Christhard Hoffmann, it was only during the 1980s that a comprehensive discussion appeared as a result of public engagement with the theme from the two main German church denominations. It was the Catholic and Protestant churches, for example, that introduced the term ‘multicultural society’ in 1980, during the so-called Tag des ausländischen Mitbürgers (Day of the Foreign Fellow Citizen),
‘whose employment of the term was an attempted broadening of the public’s view of this group’, noted von Dirke.\(^\text{67}\) In a policy statement in 1973, the former SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt maintained that the point at which ‘Germany’s capacity to absorb migrants was exhausted should be given careful consideration’.\(^\text{68}\) Even as late as 1980, the former SPD Prime Minister of Hesse, Holger Börne, stated: ‘There will be no more Turks coming to this state as long as I am in charge.’\(^\text{69}\) Opposition to multiculturalism was also apparent within discussions for proposals for a minority rights clause within the Basic Law. In 1991 and 1994, for example, regional ministers, such as Baden-Württemberg’s Permanent Secretary Dr. Lorenz Menz (CDU), Bavaria’s Assistant Secretary Dr. Friedrich Giehl (CSU) and CDU member of the Bundestag Erika Steinbach, flatly rejected the possibility of a multicultural state-construct.\(^\text{70}\)

Nevertheless, since the replacement of the conservative-dominated 1982-1998 CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition government, various members of the Bundestag have actively promoted multiculturalism. Referring to the political debates about multiculturalism, Alliance 90/Green politician Kerstin Müller stated in 1999 that: ‘The living together of Jews and Germans has deservedly become very topical.’\(^\text{71}\) Annelie Buntenbach, of the Alliance 90/The Greens, argued that it was essential that Germany acknowledged it was a multicultural society.\(^\text{72}\)

Since the recruitment of foreign workers for the Green Card and rise in xenophobia since reunification, official encouragement of multiculturalism in order to stem the former and facilitate the latter made the issue particularly pressing. Evidence suggested that the modest results of the REP, DVU and NPD succeeded in mobilising parts of the population holding extreme-right values. Exposing further gaps between official and popular conceptions of national identity, along with the dual nationality and

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\(^{71}\) Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag. 14/136. op. cit., p. 13210.

\(^{72}\) See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., p. 2325.
immigration debates, two main responses to multiculturalism were also apparent. On the one hand, there was an enthusiastic embrace of cultural diversification by the ruling SPD/Green political elite. For the former President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Commissioner for Foreigner Issues in Germany, Marieluise Beck, multiculturalism was the successful foundation of a tolerant society.

In a 1999 Bundestag debate about tolerance, Beck argued that in the end, multiculturalism brought with it colour and diversity, which were better than a narrow-mindedness.73 In 2001, Wolfgang Thierse praised the leader of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, for his active commitment to the promotion of understanding between different cultures and religions.74 Responding to the detractors of multiculturalism and idealists, at an Alliance 90/Green party conference, Joschka Fischer appealed for members to stand together for human rights and tolerance.75

On the other hand, there was an equally emphatic populist rejection of cultural diversity by sections of the public and media, along with a few academics. As to the acceptance of a multicultural society, a 1992 survey by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research reported 55%, or every second person, of 2,205 Germans surveyed did not even know what multiculturalism was, let alone accepted it.76 According to another survey in 2000, multiculturalism hardly ranked as the norm, and neither did the toleration or understanding for the culture of others. Of the 2,172 Germans questioned, 27% believed that multiculturalism represented German culture.77 Another survey found much the same. Summarising the results of the Youth 2000: Shell Study on Young People in Germany, by Arthur Fischer of Psydata in Frankfurt am Main, Volker Thomas reported almost one-quarter of 5,346 Germans aged between 15 and 24 said

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they had ‘nothing at all’ to do with foreigners with almost half (46.9%) claiming ‘very little’.78

Significant elements of the German media also rejected multiculturalism. On a front cover issue of Der Spiegel entitled, Dangerously foreign. The failure of the multicultural society, young Muslim girls were depicted reading the Koran, while to their right, foreign youths were shown brandishing knives and other weapons.79 Deriding it as ‘absurd’, a 2001 edition of the Sachsen Stimme criticised the Saxon Council for their attempts to promote multiculturalism.80 And, according to Die Welt, it was a particularly Berliner phenomenon that many politicians played down local fears about multicultural schools.81 Further to some of the media’s hostility to the concept were, arguably, the headlines in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Berlin-based Die Tageszeitung that claimed multiculturalism was ‘unreasonable’ and ‘irresponsible’.82

Whilst the SPD/Green government generally embraced the concept of the multicultural society and criticised the alleged ‘boat-is-full mentality’ of some Germans, many it seemed did not.83 Some in Germany, such as Professor Erwin Paul and Karen Schönwälder, associated large-scale immigration of non-Europeans with Lebanonisation and American-style slums and their associated social breakdown and conflicts, dangerous streets and political disintegration in Germany. Faul described ethnic plurality as: ‘An arbitrary disintegrative blend.’84

Many in Germany, according to Der Spiegel and Rüdiger Scheidges, feared that the tensions and conflicts, especially in the larger cities, were getting worse.85 When asked to respond to the claim that high numbers of foreigners in German schools brought

81 See: Peter, J. Warming vor zunehmender Überfremdung. Die Welt, 11.06.05, p. 4.
many social problems, 63% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide by Allensbach in 2001 agreed with the aforementioned statement. Designated by the authorities as ‘confidential’, 49% believed foreigners were involved with crime, with 52% associating them with drug dealing. In 2001, 2,000 Germans nationwide were asked whether they thought it was possible to live together peacefully with those having essentially different convictions and cultural values, or would this always lead to conflict. In response, 29% believed it was - 58% did not.

In contrast to German nationalists, who perceive multiculturalism as a threat to German identity, advocates of multiculturalism legitimised their vision of Germany through a positive historical narrative, citing past successful examples of integration to Germany. ‘No statement in favour of the multicultural society passes up the opportunity to refer to Frederick the Great’s generous immigration policy regarding the French Huguenots or Austrian Protestants’, complained Sabine von Dirke. The supporters of multiculturalism had often cited Polish miners who migrated to the Ruhr Valley and the seasonal workers in Prussia during the late nineteenth century, as successful models for integration of foreigners. Some West German intellectuals, such as Axel Schulte, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Thomas Schmid and CDU politician Heiner Geißler, have also argued, in the words of Hans-Georg Betz, that the ‘majority make an effort to understand and tolerate alien cultures’. Evidence suggested, however, that in contrast to the Bundestag political elite’s generally positive attitude to cultural diversity, along with their belief that culture is not racially determined; multiculturalism was also alien to a populist ethnic nationalism advocating the preservation of the Volk.


89 Ibid.


What exactly is meant by the term ‘ethnic nationalism’ in the above context? Stefan Berger provided an insight into the term:

Ethnic nationalism rests on the assumption that people, like an individual, have certain hereditary characteristics, which separate one nation from another. In this sense ethnicity is indivisible from the concept of the nation: Nations are based on a consciousness of ethnic identity.92

With banners announcing ‘Deportation instead of immigration! German children need the country’, around 300 nationalists protested in the Lower Saxon capital of Hanover against multiculturalism and the ‘gradual and officially sanctioned replacement of the German people’.93 Evidence suggested their radical incitement against foreigners was by no means the preserve of extremists. For example, in the Allensbach Yearbook for Public Opinion Research, a 2001 survey asked 2,000 Germans nationwide whether they believed the continued influx of immigrants would result in a loss of identity. 50% believed it would gradually do so, with 38% expressing the opposite view.94 Of particular concern for the German government were the results of the comprehensive 1998 Forsa (Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis) report on Youth in Germany. Reminiscent of the NPD slogan ‘Deportation instead of immigration’, Forsa reported that 68% of 1,001 14 to 25-year-olds were also of the opinion that immigrants should be deported.95

Whilst the anti-foreigner position saw a multicultural society as a threat to identity, alternatively, an identity based on a constitutional patriotism perceived the Germans’ lack of acceptance of ethnic diversity as the real danger.96 Wolfgang Thierse, in particular, stressed that in a society based on a Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism), ethnicity should be secondary. Otherwise, there was the danger of a return to the calamitous mistakes of the past that the Jews, Germany’s neighbours and

95 From 18.05.98-24.05.98, Forsa conducted the survey for the newspaper Die Woche, see: Einstellungen und Vorurteile. In: Jugend in Deutschland 1998. Einstellungen, Meinungen und Auffälligkeiten für Rechtsradikalismus: eine Trenduntersuchung. Forsa Bericht 2903/5799 Sn/Si, 27.05.98, p. 15.
Germany itself, paid dearly for. Further indicative of the disparity between popular and official perceptions of the nation and its representation, was a sense of the suppression of ethnic nationalism by the German establishment.

Suppression, or a ‘poisoning of the hearts and minds of the people’? In an interim report of the Federal Cabinet on 11 October 2000 about the question of a proposed NPD ban, Chancellor Schröder claimed the available material proved conclusively the party’s links to the former Nazi Party. Obliging the former German Chancellor, the BfV provided the following report for the Ministry of the Interior: ‘The close affinity of the National Socialist racially pure community to which the NPD aspires is clear in the NPD party organ, the Deutsche Stimme.’ Following the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision to discontinue the proposed ban on the far-right NPD, Schröder declared the government, if needs be, would go it alone for a ban. Federal spokesperson for the German government, Uwe-Karsten Heye, noted it was necessary for the Bundestag, Bundesrat and the German government to approve any ban of a party. In justifying Schröder’s proposed ban of the NPD, the Berlin authorities equated the NPD demonstrations during 2000 and 2001 to the former SA and SS marches against the Weimar Republic of the 1920s.

According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnicity and the myths of common descent are fundamental features of national identity, in some cases perceived ‘as extensions of genetic selection and inclusive fitness’. ‘Its adherents and particularly National Socialists excluded other ethnic groups such as the Jews and Gypsies in order to ensure ethnic persistence’, argued Smith and the German authorities. Arguably, neo-Nazi ideology plays an important part in assessing German national identity and xenophobia,

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since its ethnically coloured violence goes hand in hand with National Socialist ideals. Evidence suggested there was a clear resentment that the aforementioned views were being officially repressed, along with an obvious empathy by some for those advocating them.

'Hans Jürgen Syberberg, filmmaker, essayist and consummate cultural critic is the man German politicians love to hate', noted *New Perspectives Quarterly*. One of his suggestions was that far-right attitudes – particularly of the young - were a product of a kind of post-war democratic repression of identity. Some in Germany have given the impression that they were more sympathetic to the perpetrators of violence than the victims. Attempting to explain the motivation behind the spate of right-wing violence against asylum-seekers between 1991 and 1992, Syberberg argued:

> When you look into the face of the 19-year old that threw the firebomb in Mölln you see he's really the victim of a certain situation. My point is that we should not be focusing on what propelled the firebomb but what propelled the man.105

Author Martin Walser and PDS member of the *Bundestag* Gregor Gysi, argued that ‘the rise of extremist right-wing groups was the outcome of all of us having neglected the national question’.106 Gysi pointed out that many East Germans today ‘must be Germans’ because the national question was blocked out in the GDR.107 Accounting or, perhaps, excusing the xenophobic violence in the state of Brandenburg, Director of the Institute for Families, Childhood and Youth Research at the University of Potsdam, Dietmar Sturzbecher, claimed that: ‘The deficits in the background of the typical perpetrators of violence are emotional - they miss acceptance and an open ear for their problems.’108 ‘Do not exclude them,’ implored the author Martin Walser – ‘for they are our protesting children.’109 Following the leader of the NPD Udo Voigt’s appearance on Germany’s Channel II (ZDF) television station, as part of his 1998 election campaign, Hans Jürgen Syberberg explained that ‘official opinion held this man and his views


106 Cited from: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 61. See also: Walser, M. ,,Deutsche Sorgen.“ *Der Spiegel*, 28.06.93 (26), p. 43.

107 Cited from: Brunssen, F. *op. cit.*, p. 61. See also: Walser, M. op. cit., p. 43.


should be silent on the basis that he spoke far too cleverly'. Voigt explained to The Observer's Denis Staunton that:

If there are attacks on foreigners in Germany, that is of course a sorry tale but it is the responsibility of the established parties who continue to allow uncontrolled flows of foreigners who now have the Green Card while they are not in a position to guarantee the right of all Germans to work. They have to reckon with the fact that people will develop a will to resist at some stage. But that is a normal, popular reaction. We don’t need to orchestrate that.

But, what did some of the public think? In September 1994, according to the Allensbach Yearbook for Public Opinion Research, only 1% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide reproached the NPD and DVU as ‘extremist’. Forsa revealed in a survey of 1,100 Germans in 1995 that one in every ten young people (11%) held the view that right-wing extremist groups should be treated in the same manner as other political parties, whereas in 1998 it was every one in four, or 27% (the figure was 29% in the old Länder, whereas in the new Länder, it was 26%). Similar results occurred two years later. In 2000, only 8% of 1,793 Germans surveyed nationwide by Forsa believed right-wing extremist groups and demonstrations should be banned. Voigt and Syberberg also claimed Germany’s political leaders tried to repress opinions with laws and decrees, but if people wanted a Hitler, one could not prevent them from having one. According to Syberberg, Hitler ‘came out of the heart of the German people’. On the other hand, Chancellor Schröder maintained that ‘neo-Nazi propaganda and xenophobia constitute attacks on the central values of our society’.

So was there any evidence indicating that some wanted a new Hitler? In 1981, Martin Greiffenhagen claimed five million Germans wanted to have a Führer (leader) again.

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114 The Forsa survey (5-9/10/00) was undertaken for the German newspaper Die Woche. For results see: Was müsste zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus mehr getan werden? In: Einstellungen und Meinungen zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. Forsa Bericht PO20340/8576 Gü/Mo, 10.10.00, p. 3.
117 See: Schröder, G. Observing the 10th anniversary of German unification on 3rd October 2000. op. cit.
Eleven years later, Forsa reported that 41% of all members of right-wing parties believed the country needed a new type of ‘Fuhrer’, and one in five of the 1,005 Germans surveyed, a strong leader again. In 2000, *The Observer* and Brinks also reported that 26% of Germans believed Germany needed a strong leader again. According to the head of the Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Lutz Irrgang: ‘The apparent inclination of Ehringshausen’s citizens to right-wing extremism has its origins in the recent past.’ In 1933, for instance, almost 80% of the area’s citizens voted for the Nazi Party (NSDAP). Interestingly, by comparison, almost one in every four citizens voted for the NPD in Ehringshausen in 2001.

More disturbing, perhaps, were the dismissive attitudes towards right-wing extremism uncovered by Allensbach. In September 1994, 2,000 Germans were questioned nationwide about what they perceived as particularly extremist characteristics and expressions associated with political parties. Only 4% associated National Socialist ideology and 2% violent incitement against foreigners with right-wing extremist parties. Although another Hitler was evidently not imminent, the banning of groups and repression of the former dictator’s ideology were unwelcome from certain quarters raising questions as to the acceptance of the Bundestag political elite’s national identity.

Some contributors to the theme of German national identity, such as Chancellor Schröder and leaders of the then CDU/CSU opposition faction, Friedrich Merz and Angela Merkel, maintained that an economic dimension was crucial to identity building in Germany. ‘Germans increasingly identify themselves with the market economy’, claimed Merz in an interview with *Die Welt*. Some aged 16 onwards were polled by means of a random sample survey. See: Frage: „Woran erkennt man eigentlich, ob eine Partei extremistisch ist, was würden Sie sagen?” Extreme Parteien. September 1994. Parteien. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993-1997 Band 10*. op. cit., p. 881.

Cited from: Merz, F. *Einwanderung und Identität*. *Die Welt*, 25.10.00, p. 3.
significance to international exchanges and the world economy. Since the *Wirtschaftswunder*, or economic miracle in Germany of the 1950s, capitalism was the major source of identification with the regime before reunification - west of the river Elbe at any rate. Generally considered Germany’s leading playwright and artistic director of the renowned Berliner Ensemble, Heiner Müller claimed, for example, that during the 1990s Germany had no national identity, apart from the former *Deutschmark*.

Yet, there were various claims that what appealed to some German youth had little to do with money. Founded in 1994 as an extension of a Berlin reading group based on the far-right extremist weekly newspaper *Junge Freiheit* (Young Freedom), the *Deutsches Kolleg* (German College) was active in NPD circles, its chief task being training a ‘nationalist intelligentsia’. In November 2002, the *Deutsches Kolleg* published a flyer on its web site appealing for the following:

> Let us build a new order without party rule on the ruins of this corrupt and decaying system! Let us create a *Volksgemeinschaft* [an ethnically homogenous national community] in which the economy serves the people instead of the greed of those who control all the money!

Expressing concerns about a change of values amongst German youth, Hans Jürgen Syberberg claimed: ‘They have concerts that can’t be advertised. They don’t make money and don’t spend any. They just gather, and the gatherings are getting larger and are part of a real underground.’

Although the Nationalist Front (NF), the German Alternative (DA) and the FAP had all been banned by 1995, ‘their prohibitions only produced temporary dislocations and a search for new organisational forms’, noted anti-fascist investigative magazine

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131 Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. *op. cit.*
From the middle of the 1990s, for example, Searchlight and the Lower Saxon authorities reported that former FAP and NF leaders, such as Thomas Heise and Steffen Hupka, were already conducting intensive discussions with the NPD about granting membership to their former members. In northern and western Germany, leading activists of the banned FAP and ANS/NA (National Socialist and National Activist Front) parties, Christian Worch and Thomas Wulff, were quick to set up ‘autonomous comradeships’ as replacement organisations. Indicative of these developments was the re-structuring of Hamburg’s right-wing extremist organisation the National List (NL). Although banned in February 1995, during the following months the NL and their former Chairman, Thomas Wulff, assumed overall control of most autonomous neo-Nazi groups in northern Germany, reported Searchlight and the Schleswig-Holstein Ministry of the Interior.

Instead of well-organised action groups with formal membership and internal hierarchies, loosely organised comradeships appeared in Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony. From the outside, these bodies appeared independent from one another and only organised at a regional level. However, on the inside they were hierarchically organised and linked nationwide, as the aforementioned reports from regional authorities testified. Having no statutes, no tendering of accounts and no formal addresses, ‘comradeships’ avoid detection and prosecution by dispensing with their former self-styled names such as the Kameradschaften Northeim, Oberhavel and Wittenberg. Comradeships not only communicated and transferred collective identities via informal communication outlets, such as the Internet, but also employed it to convey their message to the public.

‘Once a month, every night at 11 p.m. a voice proclaims where the next torchlight neo-

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134 See: Bans are not working. op. cit.


Nazi procession will take place. It was the voice of the head of the comradeship *Beusselkiez Mike Penkert*, noted *Der Spiegel*.\(^{139}\) Despite repeated bans by the MABB (Berlin-Brandenburg Regional Supervisory Authority for Private Broadcasters), *Radio Germania* was continuing to broadcast in 2000 via Berlin’s Open Public Broadcasting Channel (OKB) for an ‘obviously growing audience’, claimed Carolin Emcke.\(^{140}\) Since reunification, Emcke also claimed that the number of right-wing extremists in Berlin alone more than doubled by 2000.\(^{141}\) In fact, the neighbouring Brandenburg authorities also reported increases in neo-Nazi membership from 1998 to 2000. In 1998, for instance, there were 550 militant right-wing extremists in Brandenburg, 580 in 1999 and 600 in 2000.\(^{142}\)

Speaking in the *Bundestag*, Kerstin Müller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, declared:

> Whilst it is disgusting that bellowing right-wing extremists thugs demonstrate outside the Brandenburg Gate [...] at the same time we must deal with the poisoning of hearts and minds of people if we want to effectively combat racism in the long term.\(^{143}\)

Consequently, a scheme offering neo-Nazis money, jobs and even new identities to persuade youths to leave violent far-right movements was set-up by the BfV. Nonetheless, one year after its implementation, the BBC and Leonie Redler of the journal *Socialism Today* branded it ‘a failure’.\(^{144}\) Although the German government pushed through a new ‘solidarity pact’ to improve infrastructure in the east, as in the old *Länder*, money alone was not solving the problem.\(^{145}\) Despite attempts to draw German youth away from neo-Nazi circles in the form of financial incentives and re-training initiatives, by the end of April 2002 the authorities admitted that fewer than 40 of the country’s estimated 33,000 neo-Nazis had signed up for the so-called *Aussteiger* (Exit)

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\(^{141}\) See: Emcke, C. *op. cit.*, p. 70.


\(^{145}\) See: Eastern Germany’s economy and voters in the dumps again. *The Economist*, 16.03.02, p. 49.
programme.\textsuperscript{146} An official press release announced in 2001 that over the course of the next three years, 150 million marks would be allocated for the nationwide XENOS, or Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance - Against Extremism and Violence, programme to fight xenophobia. In 2001, for instance, the equivalent of 80 million marks alone were made available for the purpose.\textsuperscript{147}

Although the German authorities have banned no fewer than 23 right-wing extremist organisations since 1990, evidence suggested the consequence of these bans had been a restructuring of the scene that had simply gone underground, with a concomitant increase in membership.\textsuperscript{148} Even before the Nationalist Front (NF) was outlawed at the end of 1992, 'replacement structures were set up for Germany’s first self-styled “autonomous comradeships” that turned out later to be the foundation for the Free Nationalists’, noted \textit{Searchlight}.\textsuperscript{149} When informed that the authorities were going to continue with their endeavours to get his party banned, NPD Chairman Voigt remained defiant: ‘Besides, new organisations can always be created afterwards.'\textsuperscript{150} Developments seemed to bear Voigt out. According to Leonie Redler, since 1995 over 150 far-right comradeships had been established.\textsuperscript{151} In 2004, the Lower Saxon authorities reported the number of these semi-autonomous groups had increased to 160 nationwide.\textsuperscript{152}

Along with Voigt and Syberberg, Mike Penkert also maintained that the repressive official anti-German authorities forced him to introduce a national message. Greeting fellow neo-Nazis over the air-waves, Penkert announced that \textit{Radio Germania} was the station for the national interest, expressing his bewilderment at bans imposed whenever one spoke the truth about what most Germans thought of certain groups of foreigners.\textsuperscript{153} Arguably, fascists do not stop being fascists because the state bans their organisations. One reason, perhaps, why neo-Nazi organisations reformed so effectively was because it took two years before a ban could take effect.\textsuperscript{154} Evidence appeared to suggest that the

\textsuperscript{146} See: \textit{Bayern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001}, München: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Bayern, März 2002, pp. 19-20. See also: Leidig, M. \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{147} See: XENOS - German government initiates programme to promote understanding and tolerance. \textit{German Federal Government Press and Information Office} [Online]. 23.02.01 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_32339_6073.htm>

\textsuperscript{148} See: Bann are not working. \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{150} Cited from: Staunton, D. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{151} See: Staunton, D. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19 and: Redler, L. \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{153} See: Emcke, C. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{154} See: Redler, L. \textit{op. cit.}
established mainstream parties had failed to represent and address the concerns of some German citizens about multiculturalism, foreigners and the safeguarding of German national identity.

'The Basic Law is an important expression of our values and part of German cultural identity, through which only the internal unity of our society is possible.'

Referring to basic human rights as enshrined in the Basic Law, Chancellor Schröder affirmed in 2000 that there should be no presiding adjectives or distinctions for the term 'mankind'. In the same year, CDU/CSU opposition leader, Friedrich Merz, echoed the German Chancellor: ‘Our culture belongs essentially to the constitutional traditions of the Basic Law, which is built upon the unconditional respect of the dignity of mankind, personal rights of individuals and their protection by the state.' As far as the BMI and BfV were concerned, the opinions espoused by the NPD and others like them violated the principles of human dignity and equality, as laid down in Articles 1 and 3 of the Basic Law. According to the BfV:

Right-wing extremist ideology is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. According to this right-wing extremist thinking, human and civil rights are subordinate to this criterion and right-wing extremists refuse to accept the universal principle of human equality as defined in Article 3 of the Basic Law.

Disparities between the Bundestag elite’s principles of the German Constitution and right-wing radical perceptions of humanity became apparent within the NPD’s Party Profil series. In their position paper, the NPD declared its allegiance to a ‘reality-based image of humanity’ as the basis for an ethnic national community, defined as a community of shared racial characteristics of the German Volk. They also called for an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people – in their view an ethnically homogeneous group – should join together as a single unit within a

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156 See speech by Schröder see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13222.

157 For comments by Merz see: Friedrich Merz: Einwanderung und Identität. op. cit.


159 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 50, 232.
supposedly natural order, in which only a *Volksgenosse*, or ethnic national comrade of German blood, can be accepted as a German citizen.\textsuperscript{160}

Clear ideological distinctions also became evident in the attitudes of the NPD to political asylum. National manager of the NPD, Frank Schwerdt, maintained that: "Every prevented residence for asylum-seekers is a victory for Germans."\textsuperscript{161} Similarly, the Bremen and Bremerhaven branches of the DVU complained there were already millions of illegal asylum-seekers in Germany, whose allegedly non-political basis for asylum was ‘madness’.\textsuperscript{162} Following the dissolving of the far-right *Bündnis Rechts für Lübeck* ( Alliance of the Right for Lübeck) in 1998, later that year a replacement organisation, the *Bündnis Rechts* ( Alliance of the Right), appeared in the north German state of Schleswig-Holstein.\textsuperscript{163} Suspected of orchestrating the firebombing of an asylum centre in the north German port of Lübeck, *Bündnis Rechts* have campaigned vigorously against asylum in Lübeck. In a press release by the Lübeck-based *Bündnis Rechts*, Ingo Stawitz complained that: ‘The maintenance of millions of foreigners, whether they be asylum-seekers, refugees or former Soviet-Jews has cost the country billions of Euros.’\textsuperscript{164} Apart from right-wing extremists, were there any others in Germany who needed to be ‘persuaded’ to accept asylum-seekers?\textsuperscript{165}

Further indicative of the rift between the *Bundestag* political elite and their national roots, was an apparent public scepticism about the liberality of the asylum clause enshrined under Article 16a of the Basic Law. In the opinions of Christiane Lemke, Jan Herman Brinks and Hermann Kurthen, Article 16a, or Right of Asylum, became the most liberal law on asylum in Europe.\textsuperscript{166} According to Brinks: ‘German asylum was a very generous arrangement since whoever asked for it was granted it.’\textsuperscript{167} Article 16a

\textsuperscript{160} *Ibid.*, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{167} Cited from: Brinks, J. H. *op. cit.*, p. 130.
read: ‘Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.’ In September 1991, however, Allensbach found that 69% of 1,000 Germans surveyed within the old Länder wanted a change to the right to claim asylum guaranteed by Article 16a, that would reduce the numbers permitted to enter the country. In the new Länder, the figure was 64% out of 1,000 Germans surveyed. Only 19% said they wanted no change to the law in the old Länder; in the new Länder the figure was 21%. In 1992, a ZDF-Politbarometer survey conducted by the Mannheim Research Institute found 75% of West Germans and 86% of East Germans did not accept claims that asylum-seekers flee their homelands on account of political persecution. In total, 66% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide thought that Article 16 should be amended. Hans-Dieter Schwind and Manfred Kuechler also reported that ‘most Germans’ (two-thirds of West and over 80% of East Germans) did not believe asylum-seekers were fleeing from political persecution.

Coming into force on 24 May 1949, the Basic Law is the very basis of the German Constitution. This was the first time in German history that a ‘democratic’ constitution was to be law. ‘Former parliaments had attempted to create a bill of fundamental laws and rights but these had always been little more than recommendations’, noted Roberts. It is worth noting, in the context of a deficient popular identification with the Bundestag political elite, that the Basic Law of 1949 was, and still has not been, put to the German people by way of a referendum. ‘Since Germany was an occupied country without its own government, there could be no peace treaty’, noted Fulbrook.

According to researchers of politics of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Lewis J. Edinger and Gordon Craig noted:


173 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. op. cit., p. 205.
It was generally understood by the drafters of the Basic Law and was implicit in the governmental structure [...] that ‘strong governmental leadership would need to ensure the smooth operation of the new system and to create political orientations that would give the regime legitimacy among the mass of the population’. 174

Summarising the intentions of the Basic Law, Matthias Zimmer wrote: ‘The Constitution was deliberately drafted to form a “militant democracy”, intended to have the means to defend itself against unconstitutional activities.’ 175 It seemed evident, therefore, that the Allies and those permitted to draw up the Basic Law mistrusted most Germans and were reluctant to give ‘the people’ too much of a voice after the war. But, not only were there allegedly large sections of the German population who did not feel bound to the pledges of asylum protection in the Basic Law, some have also questioned the validity of the Constitution itself. 176

Surveys suggested that the opinions of some of the German population were not being sufficiently represented by the political elite, manifest in the attitudes expressed towards the Basic Law. Questioning whether the Basic Law and constitutional patriotism could continue to serve as a suitable means for collective identification, Stefan Berger and Alexander Gauland have denounced the FRG’s ‘bloodless constitutional patriotism’. 177 Along the same lines, Karlheinz Weißmann and Rainer Zitelmann argued that whilst the German people had retained a national feeling of togetherness, decadent anti-German intellectuals developed ‘artificial ideas’, such as constitutional patriotism and multiculturalism. 178

In 1994, REP national deputy and erstwhile member of the Bundestag, Dr. Rudolf Krause, warned there was considerable public disaffection towards the basis of the German constitution. According to Krause, the German public often perceived

176 According to Kurthen and Minkenberg: ‘Large segments of the population resent the fact that labour migrants and asylum seekers will be the recipients of benefits and subsidies long before they become substantial contributors.’ See: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. op. cit., p. 184.
177 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 209. See also: Gauland, A. Die Demokratie braucht Symbole. Die Welt, 08.08.00, p. 9.
mainstream politicians as self-serving and unresponsive to their concerns and, whilst interested in the electorate’s votes, they remained oblivious to their demands. Quoting Article 146 of the Basic Law, Krause reminded fellow members of the Bundestag that: ‘The Basic Law shall cease to be in force the day on which the German people in free elections adopt a new constitution. Many in Germany want such a referendum.’\(^{179}\) Polls taken in 1991 and 2001 appeared to vindicate his comments. Reminding Germans that ‘the Basic Law originated under the supervision of the Western Powers and which is now over 40 years old’, Allensbach asked 1,000 Germans in November 1991 whether an entirely new Basic Law should be drawn-up. 58% of 500 Germans surveyed in the new Länder thought that Germany should create a new constitution.\(^{180}\) 66% of 500 Germans surveyed in the old Länder believed that they should have more of a say in the drawing-up of new laws; in the new, the figure was 79% of 500 Germans surveyed.\(^{181}\) According to Forsa, in 2001 two-thirds (67%) of 1,003 Germans questioned over the age of 18 said they wanted a national referendum on the Basic Law. 27%, meanwhile, were against such a change. Apparently, those surveyed wanted a more populist approach than that of the SPD/Green ruling coalition.\(^{182}\)

Chancellor Schröder claimed that he could not imagine any German patriotism which did not love freedom and with it, the German constitution.\(^{183}\) Friedrich Merz also claimed that the Basic Law was an important expression of German values and an integral part of German identity.\(^{184}\) Some in Germany had very different views. At an NPD demonstration in Göttingen in 2002 with the slogan ‘Achieving social and national justice’, according to NPD legal representative Horst Mahler:

They are not our politicians they are traitors to our fatherland. This system is not a German system. It is a vassal government [...] Many Germans think we have a constitution meaning the Basic Law but this Basic Law is not a

\(^{179}\) For speech by Krause see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 12/209, op. cit., pp. 18144-18145.


\(^{182}\) From 17.07.01-19.07.01, Forsa surveyed Germans above the age of 18 on behalf of the registered organisation Mehr Demokratie e.V. – Landesverband NRW. See: Meinungen der Deutschen zur Volksgesetzgebung auf Bundesebene. Forsa Bericht P1722/9635 Ap/Na, 30.07.01, p. 1.

\(^{183}\) Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mit Gerhard Schröder. News Archive. op. cit.

\(^{184}\) See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
constitution. It is a basic law dictated by the occupying powers the victors over Germany for the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic is not the German Reich and not Germany.185

Hoping to weaken public trust in the value system anchored in the Basic Law, the REP and DVU have consistently attacked the democratic representatives of the state in ‘a polemic and defamatory manner’, explained the BMI. ‘Stop the corruption tango’ read one 2002 REP headline.186 There was also some public indifference to the Basic Law. In March 1995, when asked by Allensbach to what degree did they think the founding of the Basic Law was an important event in Germany’s history, fewer than half of the 600 Germans polled (30%) considered it as significant.187

According to a report by the Federal Government’s Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, high percentages of migrants neither resulted in social flash points or high rates of criminal offences with a xenophobic motivation.188 Yet, evidence suggested that for many in Germany, the driving forces behind xenophobia were economic and social fears compounded by asylum. Reservations of complete absorption within a borderless Europe have fuelled German fears of an alleged ‘vast influx of immigrants seeking jobs in a country where over 9% of the population was already unemployed in 2000’, noted the New York Times.189 Evidence suggested that, at the time of writing, mass unemployment, fears of socio-economic decline and a general insecurity were undermining the Bundestag political elite’s post-national identity or constitutional patriotism.190

Some, such as Manfred Kuechler, Christhard Hoffmann and Werner Bergmann, argued that xenophobia was a product of resentment towards asylum-seekers based on socio-


economic factors. Increased numbers of asylum-seekers during the 1980s, for example, brought social tensions that culminated in the first overt racist attacks against foreigners, claimed Thomas Ammer, Hoffmann and Bergmann.

Asylum applications, for instance, rose from 51,493 in 1979 to 107,818 in 1980. Data from the Federal Office for Refugees (BAFL) recorded 193,063 applications for asylum in 1990, 256,112 in 1991 and 438,191 in 1992. Of these, 6,518 (4.4%) were approved in 1990 and 11,597 (6.9%) in 1991. According to Panikos Panayi and Eva Kolinsky, during 1991 the high number of racist attacks carried out by extremists increased even further during the following year, from 1,483 in 1991 to 2,584 in 1992 - representing an increase of 74%. In fact, there were almost 400 arson attacks on asylum centres during 1991; the following year the figure had risen to over 700.

So what was behind those incidents? Following reunification, some areas in Germany experienced high unemployment and faced an economic crisis. In February 1991, an Afghan refugee died of his injuries after a fascist raid on a refugee hostel in Leisnig, near Colditz in the former East. Later that year, skinheads in Dresden beat 28-year-old Angolan Jorge Gomondai to death. 50% of the population had lost their jobs by the end of 1992 following reunification in the eastern city of Rostock, noted Panayi. Heiner Müller claimed that the unemployment rate was more than 60% among young men in the city at the time. During the summer of 1992, violence broke out from local and travelling neo-Nazis against the asylum refuge in Rostock. In November 1992, three Turks were murdered in a firebomb attack in Mölln, near Lübeck, within the state of Schleswig-Holstein. Four years later in January 1996, an arson attack on an asylum

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refuge in Lübeck resulted in ten deaths and the serious injury of 35 asylum-seekers, reported local newspaper the *Lübecker Nachrichten*.199

Evaluating the reported economic problems of the city, the *Lübecker Nachrichten* made a clear correlation between xenophobia and unemployment. ‘Since the middle of the 1950s Lübeck has always been a problem area’, noted the head of the city’s employment exchange, Norbert Hahn. Claiming that during the 1950s the area was ‘already overrun with refugees’, the *Lübecker Nachrichten* also reported that by 1996, unemployment in the economically depressed port of Schleswig-Holstein had reached 13.4% - ‘the country’s highest’.200 A similar firebomb attack to those in Mölln and Lübeck occurred in May 1993 on a Turkish house in Solingen, near Cologne, resulting in the deaths of two women and three children.201 Contradicting official claims, Asher Reich and Frank Brunssen stressed that most attacks on asylum-seekers and their hostels occurred between 1991 and 1993: ‘In 1992 Nazis killed more people than at the beginning of the 1930s’, claimed Reich.202

Another development challenging the Commissioner for Foreigner Issues’ claims that high numbers of asylum-seekers did not necessarily culminate in ‘social flash points’ were the claims that some local communities were being excessively overloaded with maintenance expenditure associated with asylum.203 In 1990, the former mayors of Stuttgart and Dortmund predicted animosity and resentment from local residents towards the housing of asylum-seekers. According to Eva Kolinsky, allocating public buildings like sports centres, community centres or school halls as temporary shelter for newcomers ‘could inflict lasting damage on the life of communities and create potentially explosive social resentments’.204 These fears were corroborated by the responses from residents in Hoyerswerda, Leipzig and Hanover.

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200 See: Nesemann, U. Im Schneckentempo durch das Jammertal. *Lübecker Nachrichten*, 20.03.96, p. 3.
204 Cited from: Kolinsky, E. *op. cit.*, p. 213.
By the 1970s, the Saxon town of Hoyerswerda had become economically dependent on a nearby electro power plant and brown coal mines. Following reunification, unemployment in the city rose to 7%, thereby putting strains on social facilities by autumn 1991. ‘After an increase in hostility between residents and 230 asylum-seekers during the summer, a full-scale riot broke out between 17 and 22 September involving hundreds of local residents and skinheads’, noted Panayi.\(^\text{205}\) Along with Dortmund and Stuttgart, resistance from the local population, who were reluctant to accept refugees in their neighbourhood, also had to be taken into account during 1994, when finding asylum-seekers accommodation in the district around economically depressed Leipzig.\(^\text{206}\) ‘Residents even paid skinheads to attack a home for political refugees that had recently been built at the end of their street’, noted right-wing extremist researcher Wilhelm Heitmeyer.\(^\text{207}\) Although Heitmeyer failed to disclose the city where the alleged payment transpired, one source that did was the Lübecker Nachrichten. Suspected of the firebombing of an asylum hostel in Lübeck on 18 January 1996, in a written statement Maik ‘W.’ disclosed that he along with three fellow accomplices each received 5,000 marks from an ‘unknown source in advance for the attack’.\(^\text{208}\) In Munich 1991, a Romanian asylum-seeker died of a broken skull sustained during a neo-Nazi attack, and in Hanover the following year, a refugee was so badly beaten by an extremist that he died from his injuries the following day.\(^\text{209}\) With the reduction of asylum-seekers in Hanover, local newspaper the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung claimed local protests in the city also decreased.\(^\text{210}\)

Various surveys also appeared to support the theory that the xenophobia in Germany was aggravated by economic and social fears. In 1992, the Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig invited pupils between 14 and 15 years of age to give their opinions concerning violence against foreigners. 50% expressed that they felt economically and socially threatened by ‘foreigners’.\(^\text{211}\) Wilhelm Heitmeyer undertook a similar


\(^{209}\) See: Atkinson, G. op. cit.

\(^{210}\) See: Klein, M. Land will Flüchtlinge aus Container holen. Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.08.95 (197), p. 4.

investigation between 1985 and 1990. Directed by Heitmeyer, the *Bielefeld Study of Right-Wing Extremist Behaviour* found a tendency of hostility towards foreigners that had been developing for many years as a result of the following process:

1. A fear of foreigners overshadowed by a competitive stance fuelled by economic considerations linked to a defensiveness expressed partly in political concepts such as ethno-pluralism and racism;

2. Hatred of foreigners is the next stage in which tolerance disappears completely. In its place, hostility arises that aims to introduce clarity by making fundamental distinctions between friends, the ‘natives’ and foreigners.  

As with the Bielefeld Study, the *Youth 2000 Shell Study on Young People* also concluded xenophobia in Germany was fuelled by anxieties about future competition between Germans and foreigners - especially from asylum-seekers - who allegedly ‘rob them of their jobs’.  

However, speaking in the *Bundestag* ex-Chancellor Schröder stated: ‘On account of our self-respect, asylum should remain distinct from immigration.’ Evidence suggested Schröder’s high-mindedness was not shared by some of his compatriots. According to a survey submitted for the German government in 1992, almost two-fifths of 2,000 Germans questioned nationwide said they wanted to participate in a citizens’ action group against a hostel for asylum-seekers scheduled for their community. Only 18% in the West and 14% in the former East declared their support for a counter-initiative to protect asylum hostels. In 1992, a survey from Forsa found 51% of 1,005 Germans were also of the opinion that there were already too many asylum-seekers.

Admittedly, those surveys were all undertaken in the 1990s. So have attitudes changed since 1990? Evidence suggested that xenophobic anti-asylum initiatives were still

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attracting votes from some quarters. In the 2002 local elections, Chairman of the Bavarian NPD and advocate of the Nuremberg-based Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp, or Citizen’s Initiative to Stop Foreigners, Ralf Ollert, won a seat on the Nuremberg City Council with that very type of mandate. Holding the Interior Ministry in the city’s coalition government, in 2002 Hamburg’s populist Law and Order Initiative Party offered money to any African country prepared to accept 2,600 refugees, whose applications for asylum had been rejected.

When asked whether they would participate in initiatives to support places for asylum in November 2000, only 19% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide confirmed they would participate in an anti-xenophobic initiative. In a survey undertaken by the Berlin-based Forsa in 2001 for the Press and Information Office of the German government, 60% of 1,007 German citizens expressed particular reservations about the influx of asylum-seekers and refugees from civil wars. In 2002, the Hamburg authorities reported the number of nationwide right-wing extremist offences rose in comparison to the previous year, from 10,054 to 10,903. Thus, it would appear from developments to-date that, for some Germans, xenophobia arose as a result of asylum-seekers and socio-economic concerns, thus contradicting official claims.

Not all, of course, in Germany shared these views. Rejecting any amendment to the asylum clause Article 16a in the Basic Law, political scientist Jürgen Habermas argued that the existence of a world-society imposed responsibilities on the wealthier nations for the poorer ones. Other proponents of multiculturalism, such as Gunter Hoffman and Werner Perger, also held Germany morally responsible for its resident immigrants. There were candlelight demonstrations, with demands for a peaceful coexistence with

222 For support of ethnic diversity in Germany, see: Habermas, J. Die Festung Europa und das neue Deutschland. Die Zeit, 28.05.93, p. 3 and: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 526-527, 535.
foreigners, in Hamburg and Munich between 1992 and 1993. Nevertheless, in February 1999 an Algerian refugee was chased then pushed through the streets of the eastern town of Guben in Brandenburg by a right-wing youth gang. In order to escape his pursuers, Omar ben Noui jumped through a plate glass door, which caused him to bleed to death. In August 2000, a 39-year-old Mozambican asylum-seeker was kicked to death in Dessau within the former GDR. Later that month, Indian Atiqur Rahman was beaten and had a dog set on him by Leipzig skinheads until managing to find sanctuary in a student hostel. Those incidents allegedly formed ‘part of an endless catalogue of right-wing violence’, whose focal point, argued the federal authorities, was clearly within the former GDR.

The regional focus of violence is clearly eastern Germany.

Right-wing violence against foreigners in Germany increased considerably during 2000, representing a situation that was particularly dangerous for foreigners in the former GDR. That was the conclusion drawn by the then Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily, who declared in a press interview that: ‘The regional focus of this violence is clearly eastern Germany.’ Former President Johannes Rau also maintained that although very few foreigners resided there, xenophobia was widespread in the east. But some in Germany questioned whether this constituted an accurate depiction of the state of affairs, raising further questions about the relevance of a collective national identity. For example, Pfahl-Traughber declared that: ‘In no way is right-wing extremism merely an East German phenomenon.’

Dietmar Henning and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in particular, complained that statements issued by those such as Schily, portrayed a rather damning and unfair
depiction of the situation in the former East. Even the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt’s Minister of the Interior, Dr. Manfred Püchel, claimed that the number of violence prone neo-Nazis had decreased in the state during 2001. Whilst numbers had increased nationwide, the Mecklenburg-West Pomeranian authorities maintained that neo-Nazi membership remained constant in the state during 2000 and 2001. In fact, Der Spiegel claimed the highest number of right-wing acts of violence in 2002 were actually committed in the western state of Lower Saxony.

In order to help verify whether or not this really was an East German phenomenon, or merely a propaganda exercise designed by the federal authorities to de-emphasise the problem of ethnic-nationalism in the west, a differential examination may prove helpful. A report by the BMI, for instance, revealed that the eastern state of Thuringia accounted for the highest number of right-wing motivated extremist offences by the end of 2000. Although the figures given were per inhabitant in each state, arguably, the authorities’ and various officials’ assessment of right-wing violence was misleading (see Graph 1, p. 154). At first sight, the report gave the impression that the former GDR had the highest number of suspected or proven violent crimes overall. In terms of right-wing offences committed overall, however, the state with the highest number of recorded incidents in 2000 was actually the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia (see Graph 2, p. 155).

Since 1997, the federal authorities, along with various other officials, have portrayed the former GDR as the most violent-orientated area. Yet, if the annual reports for the protection of the constitution by the BMI are examined between 1997 and 2000, most right-wing violence took place not in the new Länder of eastern Germany, but in the western Länder. So, with the exceptions of the former eastern states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt in 1998, along with Berlin, the western Land of North Rhine-Westphalia actually accounted for the highest overall total of right-extremist offences between 1997 and 2000.

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236 See: Ibid., p. 35.
237 See: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany. op. cit. See also press release: Bundestagspräsident Wolfgang Thierse dankt für Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
and 2000 (see *Graph 2.* p. 155 and *Graph 3.* p. 156). Therefore, the highest level of xenophobia was, arguably, within the old Länder not the new – since the old Länder had the highest population concentration. In 2002, Germany had a population of 82 million people, with roughly 15 million residing in eastern Germany.

‘Compared to western Germany, right-wing radicalism bears a more brutal visage in the east.’ That was the assessment of the situation in the former GDR by the then SPD President of the Federal Parliament, Wolfgang Thierse, in January 2001. In the 2000 Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Brandenburg’s CDU Minister of the Interior, Jörg Schönbohm, went even further, stating the increase in ‘physical assaults on foreigners had been committed with particular contempt for mankind’. Nonetheless, there was also, arguably, an equally vicious catalogue of right-wing motivated incidents occurring in the western Länder.

In the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, a Turkish mosque was firebombed in July 2000. Later that year, right-wingers in Ludwigshafen in the Rhineland-Palatinate threw Molotov cocktails into a house for refugees. In Wolfenbüttel, near Brunswick, right-wing extremists in three waves of attacks threw 16 Molotov cocktails into the living quarters of a German-Turkish cultural club in November 2002. There was also a host of similar incidents that the federal authorities failed to take into account in their assessment of xenophobia, preferring instead to focus on events in the former GDR.

Speaking in 1996, Brandenburg’s Minister of the Interior, Alwin Ziel, also expressed particular concern about the ‘incredibly blatant nature of right-wing acts of violence’. According to Ziel, for instance, 517 offences were recorded in Brandenburg by the end of 1996, whereas in 1995 the figure was 444. More recently in 2000, the BMI also

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238 For acts of violence with proven or suspected right-wing extremist background since 1997 both per inhabitant and per Land, (corroborating the claim that the western Länder had the highest right-wing offences in absolute terms), see *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998.* Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1998, pp. 21-25 and: *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000.* op. cit., pp. 35-36, 39.


243 See: Redler, L. *op. cit.*


246 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. *op. cit.,* p. 164.
claimed there was a readiness to use violence that was particularly apparent in the former GDR.\textsuperscript{247} For example, at Eberswalde in Brandenburg, near the Polish border, right-wing extremists assaulted two passers-by because they refused to return the Hitler salute.\textsuperscript{248} Evidence suggested, however, that this so-called 'blatant' xenophobia was by no means merely the preserve of the former GDR.\textsuperscript{249}

In the Bavarian town of Kolbermoor in 1999, a 35-year-old Mozambican was killed after a car-parking dispute.\textsuperscript{250} On 18 January 2002, in the residential area of Sülldorf in Hamburg, two young men were seen giving the Hitler salute. When challenged by three pedestrians to refrain from this behaviour, they were immediately set-upon one of them incurring serious head-wounds. On 3 August 2002, a man of Southern European appearance was told to 'get out' of Germany and was beaten to the ground, suffering fractured ribs. A passer-by who attempted to help was kicked away.\textsuperscript{251} It was significant that these incidents occurred in broad daylight within western states - not those of the new Länder.

Along with his allegations that xenophobia was particularly brutal in the east, Wolfgang Thierse maintained the skinhead scene was a reflection of the youth culture in the former GDR.\textsuperscript{252} Following Thierse, the BMI also claimed that the majority of skinheads were found in eastern Germany, with large groups operating in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg.\textsuperscript{253} Indicative, however, of the extent of right-wing skinhead groups throughout Germany, were reports of increases in skinhead membership from 1998 to 2000 in three of the old Länder.\textsuperscript{254} Commenting on the neglected topic of female attitudes towards foreigners, Gertrud Siller argued that during the 1990s, women's opinions of asylum-seekers were marked by a similar degree of contempt and hostility to that expressed by males.\textsuperscript{255}

\textsuperscript{249} Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 164.
\textsuperscript{252} See press release: Bundesratspräsident Wolfgang Thierse dankt für Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
\textsuperscript{255} See: Schönwälder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany. op. cit., p. 454.
of right-wing comradeships was higher than that of skinhead groups in the western state of Lower Saxony.²⁵⁶

Further indicative of the federal authorities' portrayal of xenophobia as a particularly eastern problem were, arguably, the following comments made by the Schily-appointed 21-member Immigration Commission. According to the Immigration Commission, East Germans had a higher tendency towards xenophobia than West Germans.²⁵⁷ Warning against tolerating a climate in which right-extremism could thrive, the authorities of the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia claimed xenophobic acts of violence were becoming increasingly 'socially acceptable' in the region.²⁵⁸

Copycat Offences?²⁵⁹

Reciprocal allegations between the media and Bundestag political elite about the coverage and exposure of xenophobia raised further questions about the relevance of a comprehensive, collective German national identity. Highlighting an apparent mutual animosity between the media and the authorities, newspapers, such as the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Tagesspiegel, the Frankfurter Rundschau, and the news magazine Stern, all accused the German authorities of deliberately keeping silent or playing down right-wing acts of violence and offences.

In 1998, for example, Brandenburg's Ministry of the Interior instructed local police to keep silent about right-wing graffiti in former concentration camps, claimed the Süddeutsche Zeitung. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Potsdam Ministry of the Interior feared such news coverage would only incite copycat offences - a fear that was also shared by the BMI. 'In view of statements advocating the use of violence [...] groups could feel inclined to copycat attacks which meet with a keen response among the media', noted the BMI.²⁶⁰ Instead of the official number of 36 xenophobic murders, as claimed by the federal authorities, according to the Tagesspiegel, there were 93

deaths as a result of right-wing extremist violence since 1990. Other publications, such as the Frankfurter Rundschau and Stern, claimed the figure was more likely to have been between 97 and 99 deaths resulting from racist attacks. Whatever the precise figures, in a BMI press release Schily maintained that the figures were not half so bad as the media had portrayed: ‘Our records show that from 1990 to July 2000 a total of 36 people were killed as a result of acts of violence motivated by right-wing extremism.’

On the other hand, the federal authorities accused the media of exacerbating the situation by over-dramatising it. ‘Nationalist liberated zones’ was a term employed and abused too often by the media, judging by the response from representatives of the Bundestag and head of the employment agency for foreigners in East Germany Anetta Kahane. ‘Nationalist liberated zones’ was an expression used by right-wing extremists to refer to areas in which foreigners and minorities were subject to almost daily attack by neo-Nazis. German police often warned that they could not guarantee the safety of foreigners who strayed into them at night. Long-standing expert of the neo-Nazi scene in the former GDR, Bernd Wagner, noted:

Increasingly small communes are being established. In Brandenburg or Saxony-Anhalt a group of about 30-40 people can completely dominate the local area. Such places include youth clubs, rail stations, petrol stations or market places that can provide a certain perceptible aura of intimidation.

‘Within these zones there is a total hegemony of right-wing groups, where anyone who looks different from Germans are thrown out’, claimed Kahane. Kahane also maintained that East Germans were not interested in West German politics, or what the West German press reported, tending to isolate themselves from both. Conversely, it was different concerning foreigner politics. ‘In this case, everything is absorbed and East Germans respond to this theme as if by remote control’, claimed Kahane. Expressing particular concerns about the possible detrimental impact of Der Spiegel’s cover story:


262 See: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany. op. cit.


The failure of the multicultural society, Kahane complained that such national headlines 'poured oil on the flames of the generally racist mood in the east that could prove disastrous for her work'. For seven years, Kahane and others have allegedly been trying to support the integration and local acceptance of foreigners within the former GDR. Summarising her main concerns, Kahane stated:

Journalists seem painfully unaware of the effects these kinds of comments could have in the east of the country. My main fear is that Bosnians and Vietnamese refugees - the two groups representing the most numbers of foreigners in the east - will be driven out.

Allegations of media complicity in the incitement of right-wing violence were also made by the CDU Prime Minister of Hesse Roland Koch, Jörg-Uwe Hahn of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Cem Özdemir (Alliance 90/The Greens). Koch alleged that the spate of right-wing violence was nothing to do with a general right-wing radicalism in society, but with irresponsible reports from the media. According to Otto Schily, the term 'nationalist liberated zones was the most monstrous expression to be heard in 2000'.

'A passing fancy'?  

In response to the spate of right-wing violence in the former GDR during 1999 and 2000 recorded by the authorities, in 2000 Chancellor Schröder took a ten-day trip through East Germany urging 'civic courage against right-wing extremism'. SPD Prime Minister of Rhineland-Palatinate Kurt Beck, Chairman of the CSU Edmund Stoiber, and leader of the FDP Guido Westerwelle at the time of writing, also appealed for more civil courage from citizens. Summarising these requests, Volker Beck

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268 Cited from: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany. op. cit.
270 Cited from: Germany: Green Cards, violence. op. cit.
271 See: Leersch, H-J. Zeichen setzen. Stoiber legt „Erfurter Memorandum” vor. Die Welt, 04.05.02, p. 3 and: Stoiber-Kritik dominiert politischen Aschermittwoch. German News [Online]. 09.02.05 [Accessed 26.10.05]. <http://www.germnews.de/archive/gn/2005/02/09.html#1> See also: Ambrosius, G. and Esser,
(Alliance 90/The Greens) declared in the Bundestag that: ‘We as a party call upon Germans to resist right-wing extremism.’\(^{272}\) Despite similar appeals for ‘resistance by the decent’ from the Bundestag political elite in 2000 in response to right-wing extremism, in 2003, anti-Semitism researcher Wolfgang Benz maintained that Schröder’s 2000 plea had changed nothing. ‘It was a passing fancy that has since died out again’, lamented Benz.\(^{273}\)

According to Forsa, only 14% of 1,793 Germans surveyed nationwide in 2000 believed that there should be more done in schools to redress the problem of right-wing extremism. Only 5% of those questioned believed more civil courage was needed from citizens against right-wing radicalism.\(^{274}\) On 9 November 2000, a demonstration was scheduled against xenophobia. In a poll conducted by Emnid for Der Spiegel between 31 October and 1 November 2000, out of 1,000 Germans surveyed, 68% said they would be abstaining, with only 5% confirming they would be participating. It is worth noting the following evidence in the context of claims by the former SPD/Green ruling Bundestag political elite that the heart of German xenophobia was located in the former GDR. 67% of Germans from the old Länder said they would not be taking part, whereas in the former East, 70% confirmed they would be joining the protest.\(^{275}\)

Karen Schönewälder, Jan Herman Brinks and Bernd Wagner warned that many citizens thought along the lines that right-wingers simply put into practice. Brandenburg neo-Nazi expert Bernd Wagner claimed that the young right-wing extremist scene personified ‘the will of the people which had the silent majority behind them’.\(^{276}\) But, how credible were these rather ominous claims?

According to Hajo Funke and Panikos Panayi, the violence against the asylum centre in Rostock during the summer of 1992 ‘involved both thousands of local residents and

\(^{272}\) Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., pp. 13125-13126.


\(^{274}\) For Forsa survey from 05.10.00-09.10.00 on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, see: Was müsste zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus mehr getan werden? In: Einstellungen und Meinungen zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. op. cit., p. 3.


neo-Nazis’, who had taken the trip expressly for the purpose.²⁷⁷ Of Germany’s 42,400 far-right extremists registered by the BMI, Heinz Abosch and Frank Brunssen estimated that 200,000 Germans sympathised with their motives.²⁷⁸ Attacks on asylum hostels and their inhabitants in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock (1992) went on for almost a week until, eventually, local police allegedly ‘came to an arrangement with the right-wing assailants’ reported Jochen Arntz of Amnesty International.²⁷⁹ ‘Ordinary east Germans cheered first the attackers and then the police, who finally ended events by removing the asylum-seekers to a different locality’, noted Eva Kolinsky.²⁸⁰ Der Spiegel, Searchlight and Gerd Knischewski also reported that right-wing extremists were sometimes at liberty to terrorise their victims in Eberswalde (Brandenburg) and Magdeburg (Saxony-Anhalt), because citizens and local police just stood by - often with unconcealed support.²⁸¹

Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Manfred Kuechler also maintained that public sympathy for right-wing extreme acts of violence had increased between December 1991 and April 1992 in both parts of Germany, ‘because of the problem with asylum-seekers’.²⁸² Reviewing contributions to the 1993 volume Radical Right-Wing Violence in Unified Germany by Hans-Uwe Otto and Roland Merten, Schönwalder also reported how ‘remarkably similar racist violence and hostility towards foreigners was backed by widespread sympathy amongst the population in both parts of Germany’.²⁸³ In 1992, 500 Germans nationwide were asked whether they thought it was worthwhile protecting asylum hostels from attack. As with the 2000 Emnid survey undertaken for Der Spiegel, there was apparently scant difference in attitudes between respondents from the old and new Länder. In September 1992, only 18% of Germans in the west and 14% in the east said they would support action to protect a hostel from violence against asylum-

Apart from the Bundestag political elite, however, others have also attempted to change attitudes and make a difference. In November 1997, German and Polish students created a chain of lights across the river Oder between the respective town halls of Frankfurt an der Oder to the Polish town of Slubice. Yet, according to foreign student representative Dietmar Martiny from Frankfurt on the Oder’s Europa-University, there was an area in the city known locally as the ‘Bermuda Triangle’, in which foreigners simply vanish.\textsuperscript{285} Admittedly, there have been projects with varying successes to address the problem, such as the African cultural awareness clubs in the towns of Schwedt and Eberswalde near the Polish border. ‘We have to overcome local fears’, noted Holger Zschoge, a teacher who ran an employment centre for foreigners in Angermünde, Brandenburg. ‘Brave words’, wrote Der Spiegel, because local intimidation, such as the throwing of stones against the windows of his residence, forced Zschoge to re-locate to a ‘safer’ location.\textsuperscript{286}

**Have attitudes to asylum and foreigners improved west of the river Oder?**

Whilst there have been events promoting cultural diversity, such as the 1999 Berlin Love Parade and the 2000 Humanity and Tolerance festival, evidence revealed attacks on asylum centres have continued.\textsuperscript{287} Since 1999, there have been repeated attacks on asylum hostels throughout western Germany. In 1999, for instance, an asylum centre was attacked at Kutenholz-Aspe near Stade in north Germany by armed extremists.\textsuperscript{288} In Oberhausen in North Rhine-Westphalia, an asylum centre was firebombed in 2000. At Dinslaken railway station later that year, local skinheads who were encouraged by two accompanying females repeatedly kicked an asylum-seeker.\textsuperscript{289}


Arson attacks also occurred on asylum hostels in the Bavarian towns of Dorfen, Grainet and Roth in 2000.\textsuperscript{290} Attacks continued in the area the following year. In Aystetten, near Augsburg, a refugee centre was firebombed and in Cham three Kossovan-Albanian asylum-seekers were assaulted.\textsuperscript{291} In 2003, the windows of an asylum centre in the Baden-Württemberg city of Marbach-Rielingshausen were smashed and Molotov cocktails thrown inside. ‘Stress with Turkish children at school’ was the justification for the firebombing of a Turkish home in Rottenburg-Bad Niedernau, reported the Baden-Württemberg authorities.\textsuperscript{292} Contradicting federal claims, evidence suggested there was little difference between the old and new \textit{Länder} in attitudes to xenophobia or asylum-seekers.

To summarise, on the one hand, the federal authorities claimed that NPD membership had fallen and, on the other, persisted with their attempts to ban the party on the grounds of their anti-constitutional stance and National Socialist message. There have been numerous warnings from various regional authorities and others of the growing popularity of the party – particularly amongst German youth.\textsuperscript{293} During 2001, for example, almost one in four Germans voted NPD in the Hessian town of Ehringshausen.\textsuperscript{294}

Evidence suggested that the federal authorities were keen not only to demonstrate their representation of German identity was widely accepted, but that they were also in control of an increasingly deteriorating situation. In 1998 and 2002, the federal authorities reported ‘only 80 neo-Nazi comradeships’ in existence, attracting little response.\textsuperscript{295} Nevertheless, a number of regional authorities reported increases of these neo-Nazi groups, whose neo-Nazi message, according to Hans Jürgen Syberberg, \textit{Der Spiegel}, and the \textit{Berliner Zeitung}, was ‘warmly received’.\textsuperscript{296}

\textsuperscript{291} See: \textit{Bayern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001}. op. cit., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{294} See: Holm, C. op. cit., pp. 76-77.
It was, arguably, the challenge from NPD cells within comradeships to the *Bundestag* elite’s role as representatives of German identity, and widespread response to the NPD’s anti-multicultural agenda, that formed the real motivation behind the authorities’ attempted prohibitions of the party. Promoting multiculturalism, however, formed part of the then ruling SPD/Green coalition’s political agenda in Germany. Not surprisingly, the extreme right did not share their ideals.

Exposing further dissonances between official and popular perceptions of national identity, evidence also suggested that NPD and DVU claims that multiculturalism was a menace to German national identity also found accord within some sections of the media and population. Surveys and electoral gains by the NPD and DVU indicated that statements, such as ‘Germany has or should become more of a multicultural society’, from members of the *Bundestag* elite, were not particularly welcome from either some of the media or the public.

On the other hand, in response to criticism from opponents of multiculturalism, Claus Leggewie, Jürgen Habermas, Gunter Hoffman and Werner Perger, for example, have developed counterarguments in favour of multiculturalism. Promoting functionalist and ethical arguments, advocates of multiculturalism maintained that not only have immigrants contributed to the economic wealth of the country, but that the country had a certain moral responsibility for foreigners and refugees, owing to the Holocaust and the economic inequality in Europe. Since the West German government actively recruited the *Gastarbeiter* as cheap labour during the *Wirtschaftswunder* (Economic Miracle), and that they contributed to the economic wealth of the FRG, Jürgen Habermas, Gunter Hoffman and Werner A. Perger held West Germany morally responsible for both its foreign residents and asylum-seekers.\(^{297}\) Moreover, perhaps the issue should not be whether Germany is or is not multicultural, but how a more positive view of multiculturalism and harmonious coexistence be affectively promoted.

In contrast to the SPD/Green government’s generally positive attitude to multiculturalism, evidence suggested that Germany was only a multicultural society in the very narrowest sense of the term. Some even expressed concerns of the merits and

alleged dangers of a multicultural society. Clearly, it was not just far-right extremists who rejected multiculturalism and perceived that German identity was threatened.

Further indicative of the disparity between popular and official perceptions of the nation, was a sense of repression of an ethnic nationalism by the German establishment. One survey found, for instance, that right-wing extremist parties should not be banned, and another, that some young Germans in particular were not so ready to condemn National Socialism. Despite numerous bans of right-wing extremist organisations since 1992, 160 replacement informal networks of like-minded individuals had been created throughout Germany by 2004.

Symptomatic of the inconsistencies between official and popular perceptions of national identity, was an apparent scepticism from both right-wing extremists and sections of the public to asylum. Speaking in the Bundestag, ex-Chancellor Schröder maintained the right to political asylum should be upheld on account of German self-respect. Friedrich Merz, for example, claimed the Basic Law reflected German values and was an indispensable part of German identity. Yet, clear discrepancies became particularly apparent between Schröder’s defence of asylum and some public opposition to Article 16a of the Basic Law, which granted political asylum based on persecution.

Not only did evidence suggest that some Germans opposed Article 16a, but in the context of identification with the Bundestag political elite, some commentators, along with some of the public, did not accept other elements of the Basic Law. Questioning the legitimacy of the German Constitution, during the NPD’s 2002 national party convention in Lower Saxony, party Chairman Udo Voigt declared that the Federal Republic had been founded on ‘Allied bayonets’.  

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301 See Bundestag speech by Schröder in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13222.

302 See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.

Various German academic contributors to the theme of national identity have also raised questions about whether a constitutional patriotism and, arguably, the Basic Law, were suitable means of collective identification.\textsuperscript{304} Some surveys even revealed approval for an actual referendum on the Constitution. Perhaps the words of Brandenburg's former SPD Minister of the Interior, Alwin Ziel, explained why there has been no referendum on the Constitution in Germany: 'Just as citizens have to put their trust in the state, then so too must the state in turn trust its citizens.'\textsuperscript{305}

According to a report by the former Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, high numbers of asylum-seekers do not provoke ethnically motivated violence.\textsuperscript{306} For some in Germany, however, asylum was the catalyst in racist attacks on asylum centres and on refugees themselves. Surveys indicated that xenophobia within elements of the public was provoked by high numbers of asylum-seekers.

Suggestive of the increasing gulf between popular and elite self-understanding, were the reciprocal antagonistic recriminations between the media and elite of how xenophobia was reported. Some in Germany disputed or resented the SPD/Green political elite's claim that xenophobia was a hallmark of the former GDR. Reports from the media and local authorities indicated right-wing extremists terrorised foreigners with equal brutality in the old Länder.\textsuperscript{307} Various newspapers also challenged official statistics, accusing the authorities of a deliberate reticence about the actual numbers of foreigners murdered by right-wing extremists. For their part, some Hessian politicians and the former Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, reproached the media for aggravating the situation by exaggerating it.

Whatever significance the national media had in determining public opinion, despite claims to the contrary from the Bundestag elite, their concerns about the publicising of these incidents suggested racist attitudes were very much the same in both parts of Germany. Some political scientists even claimed that extremist violence particularly

\textsuperscript{304} Some of these contributors included Stefan Berger, Alexander Gauland, Karlheinz Weißmann and Rainer Zitelmann. See: Berger, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 209, 214 and: Gauland, A. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.


\textsuperscript{306} See: Räumliche Verteilung. \textit{In: Daten und Fakten zur Ausländer situation. op. cit.}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{307} Areas where this was seemed particularly evident were Schleswig-Holstein, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Bavaria. See: Latzel, S. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16 and: \textit{Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit.}, pp. 87-88. See also: \textit{Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. op. cit.}, pp. 80-81.
that directed against asylum-seekers - enjoyed public backing.\textsuperscript{308} Public hostility to multiculturalism and asylum, sympathy to racially motivated violence and even National Socialist ideals were not merely a phenomenon characterised by right-wing extremists in the former GDR.

In the context of official and popular identity and values, such as racial tolerance and what being German should actually mean, there were sometimes clear discrepancies. Friedrich Merz, Wolfgang Thierse, Chancellor Schröder and other members of the Bundestag all promoted tolerance and understanding as being central to German identity. Despite official calls for civil courage from the leaders of the mainstream German political parties against right-wing extremists, public indifference and the continuing rise of right-wing motivated violence – particularly against asylum-seekers – suggested nothing much had changed since 2000. Since 2000, for example, some of the media and three regional authorities continued to report attacks on asylum centres.\textsuperscript{309}

To conclude, although not everyone in Germany is xenophobic, evidence suggested reactions from the Bundestag political elite to extremist right-wing criminal actions have been considerably more positive than in the media or amongst certain sections of the population. Although the majority of Germans have not directly indulged in attacks themselves, at the same time, some in Germany did not condemn racially motivated attacks on foreigners either.

Reflecting more of an enlightened identity based on the land of Dichter und Denker (land of poets and thinkers), the candlelight demonstrations in Hamburg, Munich, and Frankfurt an der Oder could be interpreted as support for multiculturalism and cosmopolitan values.\textsuperscript{310} Yet, when the increase of clandestine right-wing extremist groups and the need for tolerance initiatives, along with some public sympathy to

\textsuperscript{308} For these claims see: Heitmeyer, W. Hostility and violence in Germany. Extract from the 1993 Bielefelder Study. \textit{In}: Björgo, T. and Witte, R. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 19-20 and: Brunsse, F. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 56. See also: Schönwälder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 448-449 and: „National befreite Zonen.” \textit{op. cit.}, p. 53. See also: Kuechler, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 53-63.


xenophobic-motivated acts of violence are all taken into account, sadly, the words of a former West German Chancellor seemed particularly appropriate. SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt maintained that Germany brought in far too many foreigners as a result of idealistic thinking that resulted from the experience of the Third Reich. In Schmidt’s opinion:

We have seven million foreigners in Germany today who are not integrated, do not want to be integrated and who are also not helped to integrate. Germans are unable and unwilling to assimilate all seven million because they are to a large extent xenophobic.311

In the light of hostile reactions to foreigners, multiculturalism and asylum, evidence suggested that pockets of xenophobia highlighted the continuing disparities between official and popular perceptions of German national identity in both parts of the country.

Graph 1. Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation Per 100,000 inhabitants, 1999 and 2000

See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., p. 36.
Graph 2. Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation by Land, 1999 and 2000

North Rhine-Westphalia 153
Lower Saxony 129
Baden-Wuerttemberg 100
Thuringia 92
Brandenburg 76
Saxony-Anhalt 81
Saxony 86
Bavaria 58
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 51
Hesse 43
Hamburg 42
Berlin 39
Rhineland-Palatinate 37
Schleswig-Holstein 35
Saarland 10
Bremen 6

See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000, op. cit., p. 35.

Chapter 4.
Collective Guilt or ‘Atonement’ of Contempt?

In the previous chapter it was argued that reunification raised divisive questions about who may and may not be classed as German, contested both in the political and public arenas around citizenship and immigration. Evidence suggested the perceived failure to implement immigration goals and asylum encouraged xenophobia in both parts of Germany. Developments since reunification also suggested that not only were there widespread anxiety and resentment towards immigration and asylum, but also an increasing irritation with official demands for continued public atonement in respect of the Holocaust.

Immigration, xenophobia and asylum have all, arguably, had a direct impact on the legacy and collective memory of the Third Reich. It was the latter’s nationalist excesses that led directly to the asylum provisions of the Basic Law of West Germany, formulated in May 1949. ²

Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook suggested that some of the most important preconditions for national identity include a sense of collective memory, common history and a shared legacy of the past. ³ Fulbrook, Karen E. Till and James Young also suggested ‘sites of memory’ might differ considerably from those intended by the state. ⁴ Thus, one of the central arguments of this chapter is that what some have called the ‘foundational myth of post-war Germany’ and so-called ‘Holocaust identity’ has been rejected. ⁵

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Although historians ceased to engage in any constructive discussions following initial objections from left-liberal academics, nevertheless, the fallout of the Historians’ Debate was considerable. In the wake of Ernst Nolte’s 1986 essay *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will* (*The Past Which Will Not Disappear*), for example, over 1,000 articles appeared about the Historians’ Debate in Germany. At the time, all the participating historians agreed that Germany’s self-conceptualisation was at stake, noted Jan-Werner Müller. In the words of one of the main contributors to the theme, German philosopher and political commentator Jürgen Habermas stated: ‘It was a debate about Germany’s self-understanding.’

Although those demanding a reappraisal of Germany’s unique guilt were largely discredited and their views considered ‘to some extent taboo’, as maintained by Fulbrook and others, since reunification evidence suggests this aspect of German history is now being understood rather differently. Developments have indicated that a new post-national revisionist paradigm emerged, challenging the post-1945 official constructions of German identity.

Focussing on how German historians have contributed to nation-building both before and since 1990, throughout the chapter the changing role of the National Socialist past is reassessed. Evaluating the reappraised Holocaust, attendant crimes of the *Wehrmacht* and pre-1945 *Sonderweg* (special path) thesis, this chapter suggests both a public and increasingly intellectual disaffection with the *Bundestag* elite’s portrayal of the National Socialist past and concomitant shame.

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7 See: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 60.


The Historians' Debate

Although developments were underway before reunification, new approaches to collective guilt, history and identity from some German historians since the fall of the Berlin Wall have become particularly evident. In the words of historian and political consultant to the former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Michael Stürmer: 'The future is open once again. Nothing will be as was previously.' According to liberal historian Thomas Nipperdey, German historians have become the 'main speakers for the nation'. Have any others laid similar claims in Germany, and if so, what are their implications for German identity?

Often exploiting their position of authority in Germany, 'historians have been defining and promoting national identity for at least the last two centuries', noted Stefan Berger. J-W. Müller even maintained their current role was almost unique:

Only in Germany does one find political scientists regularly publishing popular books on the state of the nation, often with pictures of themselves looking diffident and angst-ridden on the front or inside covers. Only in Germany would a random flicking through TV channels inevitably lead the viewer to one of the numerous 'talk shows' in which a small group of intellectuals earnestly debate political or philosophical topics on an almost daily basis.

Not only was the self-perception of German historians as 'promulgators of the national idea the result of their high social status', it was also due to the strength of historicism, argued Berger. Their commitment to nation building, or what Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger described as the invention of tradition, has had a long tradition in German historiography.

In the alleged absence of a politically united nation-state such as France, following defeat and occupation by the French between 1794 and 1813, tracing a unifying national

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15 Since historicism held that any society could only be understood on the basis of its historical development, this meant historians held the automatic right to interpret the present, given that they supposedly held the key to Germany's past, noted Berger. Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 2-3.
consciousness, or *Volksgeist*, became one of the central tasks of historians. 'Ethnicity and cultural identity constituted the very core of the “national spirit”', noted Berger.\(^{17}\) Early advocates of the national idea, such as Fichte and Herder, drew on the twin forces of culture and history in order to fashion the missing political nation, which has since, arguably, become part of the very essence of German national identity.\(^ {18}\)

Faced with the scattered political map of the German states, German intellectuals promoted the idea that the German nation was created by culture and education based on the ethnic community, in contrast to the political idea of the nation epitomised by France. In the mid-nineteenth century, Theodor Mommsen argued that the idea of the nation was firmly linked not to political traditions, such as the French *état-nation* (nation-state), but to the *Volk* (people) that allegedly embodied a unique identity. According to Stefan Berger, this special emphasis on history, culture and ethnicity characterising the German case was, by comparison to British and French historiography, much weaker.\(^ {19}\) Ludwig Dehio claimed that: ‘Historiography has played a far greater role in the development of the immature nations of central Europe […] than in the nation-building process of Western nations who by the eighteenth century had long reached national maturity.’\(^ {20}\) Summarising the past impact of historians and writers on Germany in the aftermath of the 1986 Historians’ Debate, Lothar Gall at the German Historical Institute’s 1991 Annual Conference stated: ‘One thing seemed quite obvious and was accepted unquestioningly by large sections of the public: The Germans’ view of their history was shaped by historians […] and the nation’s understanding of its history depended crucially on them.’\(^ {21}\)

Although it was not solely university professors who wrote the nation’s historical consciousness, what seemed incontrovertible was their increased presence within the media after the events of 1986. Along with historians, prominent participants in the debates on national identity have also been political scientists – often with a strong interest in contemporary history, such as Hans-Peter Schwarz, Eckhard Jesse, Kurt

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Sontheimer and Konrad Löw. Evidence suggested there was an increasing tendency to recreate the nineteenth century role of history in order to dispense with collective guilt and re-constitute a German national identity.

Ostensibly provoked in June 1986 by historian Ernst Nolte’s essay ‘The Past Which Will Not Disappear’, the so-called Historians’ Debate questioned the singularity and, consequently, German collective guilt of the Holocaust and advocated its ‘relativisation’ through a comparison with other genocides. In the aforementioned article, Nolte asked the central question: ‘Was not the “class murder” of the Bolsheviks logically and factually prior to the race murder of the National Socialists?’ Nolte’s basic contention, argued Karl Wilds, was that ‘the Holocaust was essentially a reaction to the Nazis’ fear that the “Bolsheviks” would perpetrate a similar asiatische Tat [Asiatic action] against them given the opportunity’.

Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber also sought to reappraise certain elements of the National Socialist era. Hillgruber and Hildebrand asked, did Germany initiate as well as carry out genocide, or was it merely imitating Stalin ‘out of fear of Asiatic hordes’? Such contentions did not go unchallenged. Provoking a storm of protest, Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen Kocka, Hans Mommsen and Hans-Ulrich Wehler all reproached Nolte for attempting to equate the mass murder of Jews by the Nazis with Stalin’s Gulag forced-labour camps. Although the debate ended in victory for those who insisted on the continuing relevance of a ‘labour of remembrance’ concerning the singularity of the Holocaust, evidence suggested it satisfied neither some academics nor some elements of the German public.

Underlining key disparities between official and popular perceptions of contemporary German history, at issue were different implications of the past for the present. Whilst

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23 See: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 59.
27 Cited from: Nolan, M. op. cit., p. 115. See also: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., p. 95.
increasing numbers of academics saw the end of the division of Germany as a chance to escape from a so-called 'institutionalised collective guilt', the Bundestag elite maintained Germany should continue to bear historical responsibility.\textsuperscript{30} Former President of Germany Richard von Weizsäcker and members of the Bundestag argued that the Third Reich and attendant Holocaust were 'without historical precedence' and a disgrace representing Germany's collective guilt.\textsuperscript{31} In a Bundestag debate concerning a future memorial to the Holocaust in Berlin, politicians Rita Süßmuth of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party and Eckhardt Barthel of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), claimed nobody disputed the singularity of the Holocaust. Members of the Bundestag Michael Roth (SPD), Anjte Vollmer (Alliance 90/The Greens) and former SPD Minister for Culture and Media, Michael Naumann, later added in the debate that the Holocaust carried a heavy burden of guilt for Germany.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite Nolte having lost the first round of the debate among German academics, and with President Weizsäcker, according to Brinks, coming out clearly in favour of the anti-Nolte camp, Nolte and others continued to refute the singularity of Nazi crimes.\textsuperscript{33} Returning to his initial thesis that National Socialism and Communism were closely related after reunification, in his \textit{Nietzsche und Nietzscheanismus}, Nolte 'interpreted Nietzsche's thoughts on his "party of life" as a kind of philosophical design for Nazi genocide'.\textsuperscript{34} Nolte also claimed the nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche advocated world civil war in order to safeguard 'culture'. Brinks argued that Nietzsche was one of the main ideological contributors to the philosophical justification for the National Socialist programmes of the extermination of certain races.\textsuperscript{35}

Although Nolte accepted the ideological differences between Marx and Nietzsche, both were the 'most important ideologues' of what Brinks termed the 'European Civil War between 1917 and 1945'.\textsuperscript{36} Further indicative of the resentment towards the Bundestag

\textsuperscript{30} For these claims see: Fulbrook, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 36 and: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. \textit{In:} Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 139-148.


\textsuperscript{32} For Bundestag speeches by Rita Süßmuth, Eckhardt Barthel, Michael Roth, Anjte Vollmer and Michael Naumann highlighting Germany's collective guilt, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. \textit{Stenographischer Bericht} 48 Sitzung. Bonn, 25.06.99, pp. 4091-4116.

\textsuperscript{33} See: Brinks, J. H. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 102-103 and: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 113-115.

\textsuperscript{34} Cited from: Brinks, J. H. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 104.


\textsuperscript{36} Cited from: Brinks, J. H. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 104.
elite’s depiction of the National Socialist past, were a number of articles challenging the singularity and damning portrayals of the Hitler regime. Fulbrook argued that: ‘The views given expression by Nolte, Hillgruber and Stürmer had long been prevalent among conservative circles, but had been to some extent taboo as far as public support by professional historians was concerned.’

According to Stefan Berger, since the appearance of Nietzsche und Nietzscheanismus in 1990, other academics have also taken up Ernst Nolte’s ideas. Along with Nolte, right-wing historian Joachim Hoffmann argued that Hitler’s invasion of Russia ‘only just prevented Stalin’s war of annihilation’. In the historian Arnulf Baring’s book What Now, Germany? (1991), German publisher Wolf Jobst Siedler described National Socialism as ‘simply an authoritarian system’ having an ‘incredible criminal energy’.

Dr. Christian Striefler reiterated Nolte’s thesis that National Socialism’s ‘rational centre’ was its anti-Bolshevism. According to Striefler, the real threat to the Weimar Republic was from the Communists - not the Nazis.

There have also been suggestions from some German historians that the Third Reich possessed certain modernising elements. Nolte suggested that the killing methods employed by the Nazis during the Holocaust were ‘humane’ and ostensibly indicative of modernity, noted Stefan Berger and Michael Schneider. Following Nolte, in a best-selling biography German historian and publicist Rainer Zitelmann depicted Hitler as: ‘A conscious modernizer and revolutionary’, concluding that his ideas were ‘coherent and modern’.

Lower Saxon schoolteacher Karlheinz Weißmann also claimed National Socialism brought about its own ‘economic miracle’, such as the development of ‘a strong welfare state’, noted Berger. Bielefeld Lecturer Michael Prinz and political scientist Jürgen W. Falter also contended that the German National Socialist Workers’

37 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 126, 175.
39 Cited from: Ibid., p. 137.
41 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 125, 141.
Party (NSDAP) was one, if not the first, modern 'populist party', going on to develop certain modern favourable social achievements, observed Michael Schneider.\(^{45}\)

Evidence suggested some of the population also rejected the Bundestag elite's understanding and portrayal of Germany's most controversial aspect of its traumatic past. What Allensbach, Der Spiegel and Forsa (Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis) uncovered, arguably, made disturbing reading for the various German governments. Since reunification, it seems some young Germans have become less critical in their assessment of National Socialism. On a scale of one to six, 2,000 Germans nationwide were asked by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in February 1991, to what extent they agreed with certain aspects of Germany's past. Approximately half (3.3 on the scale) agreed with the statement that not everything about National Socialism was bad.\(^{46}\) According to Der Spiegel, in 1995 41% of 1,500 Germans questioned between the ages of 18 and 65 agreed that National Socialism had its 'good and bad sides'.\(^{47}\) Other surveys revealed much the same. 23% of 1,101 Germans surveyed by Forsa in the new Länder during 1998 believed that National Socialism 'was not that bad' compared to 13% in the old.\(^{48}\) Of 1,106 Germans surveyed in 2001 by Forsa, 47% in the former East Germany and 35% of West Germans said they believed that 'National Socialism had its good points', reported the German news weekly Die Woche.\(^{49}\)

Not all, of course, portrayed National Socialism in such a favourable light. Professor Heinrich August Winkler reproached both Nolte and Striefler 'for attributing rationality

\(^{45}\) For arguments by Michael Prinz and Jürgen Falter see: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 28, 31-33.


\(^{49}\) Germans aged 14-25 were surveyed by Forsa for Die Woche. See: Helm, T. Young Germans see ‘good side’ to Nazis. The Daily Telegraph [Online]. 08.02.01 (2085) [Accessed 21.06.02]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/02/08/wnaz08.xml>
and historical legitimacy to Nazism"). Bochum Historian Hans Mommsen interpreted the National Socialist dictatorship as ‘fake modernisation’ concealing backward tendencies, and Hamburg Professor Peter Reichel claimed the regime was ‘inimical to and incapable of modernisation’. Some writers and academics, such as Klaus Rainer Röhl, Friedrich Lenger, Eckhard Jesse and Martin Walser, also adopted Nolte’s thesis - arguably this time though - to exonerate Germans from past guilt.

A ‘Moral club’?

Another manifestation of the Historians’ Debate was an apparent impatience from some quarters with an alleged ‘institutionalised historical guilt’. Heralded by the acceptance speech from the novelist Martin Walser of Germany’s 1998 Peace Prize for Literature, it represented another key disparity between the mainstream German political elite and popular perceptions of the past and national identity.

Along with political scientists, prominent participants in the debates on national identity have also been journalists and writers, such as Martin Walser and Günter Grass, who in the words of J-W. Müller could ‘best be described as Meinungsführer [opinion leaders]’. Emphasising the centrality of their role within historical writing, the media and for national identity, according to J-W. Müller:

These Meinungsführer self-consciously aim at influencing public discourse, staging their public interventions in what are usually called the Intelligenzblätter. They tend to set the terms of debates both in specialised journals such as Merkur and Kursbuch, popular dailies such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt as well as in more influential weeklies such as Der Spiegel, Stern and Focus.

‘There is a peculiar German tradition of Publizistik (intellectual journalism), where public opinion often equalled published opinion in Germany’, noted J-W. Müller – but

52 See: Taberner, S. A manifesto for Germany’s ‘New Right’? Martin Walser, the past, transcendence, aesthetics, and ein Springender Brunnen. German Life and Letters, 01.01.00: 53, pp. 126-128.
54 Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 13.
not it seemed official.\textsuperscript{56} Evidence indicated that there was a fundamental difference between official published opinion and public opinion.\textsuperscript{57}

Indicative of the pattern of discussion first established in the Historians’ Debate by Nolte and Hillgruber, Martin Walser and others not only demanded a re-assessment of the Holocaust’s singularity, but also rejected demands for Germany’s collective penance.\textsuperscript{58} This next round went beyond the Historians’ Debate because not only were previous representations of the Holocaust at issue, but also the role of morality and collective guilt in German memory.\textsuperscript{59} Challenging official recommendations of how the Holocaust should be remembered, in his 1998 \textit{Frankfurt Paulskirche} speech Walser attacked what he perceived as the ‘institutionalisation of Holocaust remembrance as a moral club’ as a means of ‘ensuring perpetual German shame’.\textsuperscript{60}

Furthermore, Walser also claimed that: ‘Auschwitz is not suited to be readily available as a means of intimidation or even moral obligation.’\textsuperscript{61} Or, as J-W. Müller put it, ‘real moral claims could only be negotiated between reader and author’.\textsuperscript{62} Dismissing the role of ethics in contemporary interpretations of the past, along with Ernst Nolte, Manfred Kittel, Friedrich Lenger and others also argued that morality and politics should occupy little, if any, place within historical writing.\textsuperscript{63} Enrico Syring, for instance, argued that some historians in Germany now claim that the one-sided representations of Hitler should cease.\textsuperscript{64}

However, statements from the \textit{Bundestag} elite indicated that the Holocaust should very much remain part of German collective remembrance and national self-understanding. President of the FRG at the time, von Weizsäcker, argued that in view of the magnitude of the crime, any reservations any had about the Holocaust paled into insignificance.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{56} Cited from: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{57} See: Berger, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 178, 192 and: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 244-265. See also: Fulbrook, M. \textit{op. cit.}, 155, 166-167, 175, 203, 235.
\textsuperscript{58} See: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 244-249 and: Kansteiner, W. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 84-85, 96-99. See also: Mohr, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 42 and: Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu verantworten. \textit{Die Welt}, 15.01.04, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{59} See: Berger, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 5-6 and: Brinks, J. H. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{60} Cited from: Taberner, S. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{62} Cited from: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{63} Other German academics adopting this argument were Karlheinz Weißmann, Eckhard Jesse and Rainer Zitelmann, see: Berger, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 125-126, 130-131, 177-179.
\textsuperscript{64} Cited from: Schneider, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{65} Cited from: Mohr, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
Speaking in the Bundestag during 1999 about a prospective Berlin Holocaust memorial, CDU representative Sylvia Bonitz asked rhetorically: ‘Do we not need a memorial to express the shame and sadness within every individual in the country?’ Former President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse and Berlin Senator Annette Fugmann-Heesing of the SPD agreed. ‘A central Holocaust monument ought to reflect a message of our shame for future generations that is an important element of our dignity’, stated Thierse. According to Fugmann-Heesing: ‘No memorial has hitherto sufficiently expressed our shame and dismay. By not accepting a memorial in Berlin would be tantamount to denying future generations a symbol of our grief and shame for the victims of the Holocaust.’

Further to official demands for continued public acceptance of Germany’s collective shame, Michael Roth (SPD) declared: ‘We want to make Germany’s shame clear to future visitors.’ Former SPD Minister of Culture and Media Michael Naumann, politician Antje Vollmer (Alliance 90/The Greens) and other members of the Bundestag also maintained that the theme should constitute a future collective atonement of remembrance.

In addition to recommending that Auschwitz should be the ‘subject of personal conscience not public ritual’, according to Wulf Kansteiner and J-W. Müller, Martin Walser and his supporters also contended that there was ‘no such thing as collective guilt’. Along with the authorities’ claims that those such as Walser attempted to foster ‘intellectual respectability’ to views allegedly only held by right-wing extremists, former head of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, criticised Walser as an ‘intellectual arsonist’. Others, such as the novelist and essayist Monika Maron, maintained that the writer had not committed any crime and Günter Grass spoke out against any Holocaust museum.

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67 Ibid., p. 4087. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 65.
69 See speech by Michael Roth see: Ibid., pp. 4097-4099.
70 For claims that the Holocaust should serve as an indispensable part of collective remembrance, see speeches by Michael Naumann and members of the Bundestag Antje Vollmer, Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig (Free Democratic Party (FDP)) in: Ibid., pp. 4090-4091, 4094-4095, 4100-4101, 4111-4112.
72 Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 247.
Consistent recriminations against the views articulated by Martin Walser also followed from the authorities. For example, in 1999 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of the Interior labelled the journal Nation und Europa ‘right-wing extremist’ for re-printing an interview with Walser questioning German collective guilt in the news magazine Focus. In 2003, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) reported that a member of the right-wing extremist Republican (REP) party’s national executive appealed to Germans to ‘resist their feelings of inherited guilt’. National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) legal representative, Horst Mahler, wrote: ‘The German people have been subjugated long enough to an atonement complex via an Auschwitzkeule [Auschwitz club].’

Indicative of a deeper disaffection with the Bundestag elite’s portrayal of the National Socialist past than officially acknowledged, there was evidence that Walser’s controversial appeals found accord not only amongst right-wing extremists, but also with a few academics and some of the public. Evidence suggested there was not only a growing resentment towards an alleged ‘institutionalisation of collective guilt’, but also to a so-called ‘Gedächtnisarbeit’, or labour of remembrance, raising further questions concerning the validity of a comprehensive national history and, therefore, identity.

A ‘Labour of Remembrance’, or ‘is guilt out-of-date’?

According to Gerd Knischewski, Lutz Niethammer and Reinhard Mohr, after 1945 the prevailing paradigm was a Gedächtnisarbeit (labour of remembrance) for the victims of Germany’s genocide that rejected German nationalism. Konrad Jarausch, Hinrich Seeba and Daniel Conradt, for example, claimed: ‘The post-war period functioned as a postscript, a historical space of prolonged penitence for previous transgressions.’ For

76 See: Ibid., p. 87.
Peter Alter and Mary Nolan, this marked the beginning of a change of national consciousness that laid the foundations for a post-national identity.\(^{81}\) To what extent did an ‘Erinnerungsarbeit’, as Wolfgang Thierse and other members of the Bundestag, such as Michael Roth (SPD) and Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens), described as ‘a labour of remembrance’, remain a prevailing paradigm, given the allegations by Ignatz Bubis and the authorities?\(^{82}\)

Shortly after official reunification in November 1990, the historian Karl Heinz Janßen attacked what he perceived as efforts to absolve Germans of their historical guilt.\(^{83}\) Kurt Sontheimer and Nicolas Berg also criticised ‘the current tendency in historiography on National Socialism to revitalise and sanitise twentieth century German history’.\(^{84}\) Indicative of this anti-penitential paradigm change were a number of articles challenging what political scientists Eckhard Jesse and Stefan Berger termed an ‘enforced and excessive atavistic notion of atonement in Germany as a substitute for a missing identity’.\(^{85}\)

In 1994, Klaus Rainer Röhl, Rainer Zitelmann and Karlheinz Weißmann argued that as a result of the excessive attempts in dealing with National Socialism, an inherited guilt complex arose that ought to be dispelled.\(^{86}\) Symptomatic of what Hans Jürgen Syberberg and Martin Walser derided as ‘institutionalised collective guilt’, were allegations that Auschwitz had been deliberately abused in order to permanently dishonour the German people.\(^{87}\) Süddeutsche Zeitung journalist Dirk Rumberg asked, ‘how much longer will Auschwitz be used to blackmail us?’\(^{88}\) Along the same lines, historian Hellmut Diwald complained that: ‘Auschwitz was being abused with deliberately misleading and exaggerated statements in order to discredit a whole people.’\(^{89}\)

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These views provoked understandable admonitions from supporters of the Bundestag elite, who insisted on a continued penitence for the Holocaust. Professor Ulrich Raulff claimed that whilst suffering demonstrated that both Jews and Germans had a common memory, ‘German shame ensured a perpetual distinction.’ Questioning whether the significance of Martin Walser in the disputes about German guilt was merited, Professor Michael Wolffsohn described the author as an example of an ‘extreme and overrated literary figure’. Despite vilification by the authorities, at the time evidence indicated that Walser’s views gained increasing respectability. Since Walser’s 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, evidence suggested demands have been growing that after almost 60 years Germans have borne the mantle of shame long enough. Indicative of these attitudes were a number of articles questioning German identity based around Auschwitz. Christian Jennerich, for instance, argued that a ‘negative German identity based on a contrite recognition of the crimes of the Nazis is perverse’. Social psychologist Harald Welzer also dismissed official notions that a national identity derived from German guilt and a criminal past can be successfully promoted and sustained amongst the people. One of Germany’s most influential intellectuals, Karl Heinz Bohrer, also maintained that ‘taking Auschwitz as a foundational basis of post-war German identity made a coherent national history and memory impossible’.

For many years, Auschwitz served not only as an inescapable and unique symbol of the epitome of crime against humanity, but also as part of the history and very identity of Germany. Based on the ‘genocide of the Jews’, what some described as a ‘Holocaust identity’ was particularly encouraged and fostered by Germany’s ruling political elites, alleged Jennerich, Josef Joffe and others. Justifying the location of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin, member of the Bundestag Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) declared: ‘We have to show that it is not only a question of collective responsibility, but

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90 Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 248.
91 Cited from: Augstein, R. „Wir sind alle verletzbar.” Der Spiegel, 30.11.98 (49), pp. 32-33.
94 See: Welzer, H. Was bleibt im Gedächtnis. Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.01.05, p. 23. See also: Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.
95 Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 252.
97 Cited from: Deutschland ist nicht mehr das Reich des Bösen. op. cit., p. 11. For allegations that the Bundestag political elite encouraged a ‘Holocaust identity’ see: Jennerich, C. op. cit., pp. 61, 67, 69 and: Müller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 246, 248. See also: Staab, A. op. cit., p. 40.
also our national identity.'98 'Preventing a repetition of the past is Germany's mission. Auschwitz must, therefore, remain part of German identity', stated Bundestag representative Christian Simmert of the Greens.99 'German history between 1933 and 1945 is an indispensable part of German identity. That is why we need a Holocaust memorial in Berlin', argued CDU politicians Ruprecht Polenz and Eckhart von Klaeden in the Bundestag.100 'By creating a monument in Berlin for the victims of the Holocaust', its official advocates would in effect be 'commemorating the millions of victims and also itself as a lasting symbol for a better Germany', argued Josef Joffe.101

Following the then CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s visit to Israel in 1984, his spokesperson, Peter Boenisch, stated: ‘Germany must never be permitted to forget Auschwitz.'102 More recently, CDU member of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert declared in 2002 that Germany bore a particular responsibility in remembering the Holocaust.103 During his 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, Walser complained that a Berlin Holocaust memorial would be ‘tantamount to creating an immense concrete nightmare’.104 Maintaining there must be no public renunciation of collective remembrance, responding to Walser’s 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, President of the FRG at the time, Roman Herzog, insisted that ‘without Auschwitz no ethics are possible’.105

Summarising the aftermath and implications of Walser’s 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech for German collective memory, Thomas Assheuer appears to have exposed another key dissonance between official and popular perceptions of the Holocaust. According to Assheuer, official and academic reactions to Walser’s Paulskirche speech clearly demonstrated that national identity was being played out between a ‘bundesrepublikanische Schuldkultur’ (official culture of shame) and discursive remembrance.106 Or, in other words, collective memory and identity were being

100 Cited from: Ibid., p. 4146.
103 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/245. Stenographischer Bericht 245 Sitzung. Berlin, 27.06.02, p. 24760.
contested between an official identity of atonement and revisionist anti-penitential identity.

With the gates of Auschwitz in the foreground, forming the basis of a series of articles, the 1998 front cover issue of the German news weekly *Der Spiegel* asked: ‘Is Germany’s guilt over?’ There have also been allegations of a growing ‘Zerknirschungsmentalität’, or a ‘mentality of remorseful rumination’, from what some political commentators described as ‘the silent majority’. Implying a former public reticence and acceptance of collective atonement, according to Michael Geyer: ‘When Martin Walser expressed his unease about a culture of German contrition he publicly expressed a popular German sentiment that had only previously been heard privately.’

It was in this context that Rudolf Augstein, Reinhard Mohr and *Die Welt* claimed that Walser’s 1998 *Frankfurt Paulskirche* speech broke a former taboo, openly challenging official demands for German collective atonement. In the aftermath of Walser’s speech, the first real signs of open public hostility to official demands of collective responsibility and atonement became apparent.

Augstein, for example, interpreted Walser’s reference to an earlier silent disregard of the persecution of the Jews as indicative of a blatant indifference ‘now increasingly prevalent in Germany’. According to J-W. Müller: ‘While everybody present at Walser’s speech offered a rapturous standing ovation, Ignatz Bubis and his wife alone had remained seated and silent.’ During his  *Frankfurt Paulskirche* speech, Martin Walser also condemned those who had allegedly ‘instrumentalised’ the Holocaust in order to advance ‘arbitrary political positions’.

There were others who also shared this view. ‘It is correct’, complained Reinhard Mohr in *Der Spiegel*, ‘that Auschwitz has always been instrumentalised in order to justify every kind of moralistic nonsense such

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107 See: Ist die Schuld verjährt? Der neue Umgang mit der nazi-Vergangenheit. *op. cit.*
108 For claims of a Zerknirschungsmentalität, see: Berger, S. *op. cit.*, pp. 179, 192 and: Schneider, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 43. See also: Mohr, R. *op. cit.*, p. 42 and: Fulbrook, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 235.
111 For demands for Germany’s continued responsibility for the Holocaust, see speeches by Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens), Rita Sussmuth (CDU), Christian Simmert (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Elke Leonhard (SPD), in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. *op. cit.*, pp. 4100-4110.
as the separation of Germany as a just punishment."\[115\] Whilst refraining from such inflammatory language, Matthais Zimmer also contended that the division of Germany was a punishment for the Holocaust.\[116\] Along with Mohr, however, historian Konrad Jarausch and journalists Ulrike Ackermann and Cora Stephan also criticised the endless polemic debates about the division of Germany serving as a ‘punishment for Nazi crimes’.\[117\] Although Klaus von Dohanyi agreed with Walser that the Holocaust had been instrumentalised for political purposes, nevertheless, the former SPD Mayor of Hamburg ‘reaffirmed a German “Holocaust identity” defined by [...] “this shameful time”’.\[118\] According to von Dohanyi: ‘Nothing defines both at home and abroad German identity so profoundly as the legacy of the Holocaust.’\[119\] Speaking shortly afterwards in the Bundestag about a permanent memorial to the Holocaust in Berlin, Free Democratic Party (FDP) representative Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig insisted that any future memorial to the victims of National Socialist genocide should ‘keep alive a Holocaust conscience’.\[120\] Contributions by other members of the Bundestag in the debate certainly indicated a consensus of opinion for the centrality of the Holocaust for collective ‘self understanding’. Former President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse, stated: ‘We are not building a Holocaust memorial for Jews – whether German or otherwise – but for our own self-understanding that accepts a perpetual reminder and admonitions of the unspeakable atrocities against humanity engraved within our conscience.’\[121\]

Yet, according to Mary Fulbrook, ‘many young Germans are simply fed up with having the Holocaust rammed down their throats. They simply want to be allowed to be normal, unburdened by the immense legacies of the national past.’\[122\] Surveys by Allensbach appeared to support the claims of Fulbrook, J-W. Müller, Christian Jennerich and Martin Walser. Allensbach reported in 1991 that just over half of the 2,000 Germans surveyed believed they should no longer be burdened with the National

\[115\] Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42.
\[118\] Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 248.
\[121\] For speech by Thierse and similar comments by members of the Bundestag Elke Leonhard (SPD), Anjte Vollmer and Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) see: Ibid., pp. 4086-4110.
Socialist past. In the same survey, Germans were also asked to what extent they agreed with certain statements concerning Germany's past. Over half believed that Germany's alleged war guilt has been exploited as a means of exerting pressure in order to obtain 'atonement and compensation'. During a speech on Germany's equivalent to Britain's Remembrance Day, the CDU Prime Minister of the Saarland and Bundestag member, Peter Müller, raised concerns about what he perceived as a marked indifference from both former and current generations when requested to acknowledge responsibility for past crimes. Peter Müller claimed that whilst discussing the Holocaust with both young and old, he heard statements such as: 'What has it [the Holocaust] got to do with me? I am not guilty. Those events had already happened by the time I was born.'

According to Jan Herman Brinks and others, Hellmut Diwald's publications, such as Germany: United Fatherland, 'met a popular need to finally draw a line under the Third Reich'. Commenting on the impact of Diwald on German national identity amongst the public, Mary Fulbrook maintained the historian's other major work, The History of the Germans, became a 'prominent blockbuster of German history'. In the History of the Germans, Diwald argued that 'only 7,000 people had perished in the concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen of malnutrition and disease'. Expressing concerns about young Germans who wanted a 'Schlufistrich', or line drawn under the past, according to the periodical Konkret, 55% of Germans no longer wanted to hear about National Socialist crimes.

Mainstream politicians, nonetheless, rejected any kind of Schlufistrich, or permanent confining of Germany's shame and guilt to the past, and have continued to maintain that

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coming to terms with the past was an ongoing process. Representing a central theme in the Reichstag, or home of the German parliament, in 2003 the former President Johannes Rau held a service in which CDU Saarland Prime Minister Peter Müller gave a memorial speech. During the speech, Müller referred to the Holocaust as the ‘most terrible chapter of German history in which there can be no space for any Schlussstriche’. In an earlier Bundestag debate, former SPD President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse claimed unanimity of opinion on the theme. Speaking about the centrality of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin for collective remembrance, Thierse stated: ‘There are those who would gladly draw a line under this the most dismal part of our history. I believe, however, we all refuse to do so with sincerity and urgency.’

Some surveys appeared to corroborate the fears of Thierse. In February 1986, Allensbach surveyed 1,000 Germans from the old Länder on whether a line should finally be drawn under the National Socialist past. 66% of those surveyed thought it was time to do so; only 24% thought differently. Other surveys also suggested Germany’s past guilt should be forgotten. According to a 1992 survey by the official representative of GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid, 62% of those surveyed thought that less attention should be given to the persecution of the Jews. In a 2000 survey on nationalism and right-wing attitudes in Germany, Forsa claimed that 65% of 508 Germans surveyed in the former GDR and 46% of 502 in the new Länder believed that it was time to draw a line under National Socialism.

Since the Historians’ Debate, evidence suggested public attitudes from some quarters and the media appeared to bear little relation to the mainstream political elite’s agenda of a collective atonement. Official pressure from the Bundestag for Germans to

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134 Brinks, however, did not provide details of how many Germans were actually surveyed. See: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 98.
135 From 25.05.00-31.05.00, citizens of voting-age were surveyed by Forsa on behalf of the newspaper Die Woche. See: Einstellungen der Befragten, die rechtsradikalem Gedankengut nahestehen. In: M. Güllner, Nationalismus, Distanz zu Ausländern und rechtsradikale Einstellungen in Deutschland. Forsa Bericht PO 203.21b/8120, 02.06.00, pp. 8, 1.
acknowledge their collective guilt, on the one hand, and an apparent reluctance from them to do so, on the other, arguably served to highlight key dissonances between official and popular identity. This apparent reluctance invoked condemnation from the BMI and from other official representatives who have consistently sought to place it in the context of revisionism.

"Many have little but few have much to answer for."\(^{136}\)

Along with the highly publicised series of exchanges among scholars and publicists, fallout from the Historians’ Debate also, perhaps, helps elucidate the acceptance of revisionist themes and, arguably, public and extremist defiance to official portrayals of national memory and identity.\(^{137}\) Appraising revisionism, the BMI stated:

Revisionism is among the most important subjects of extreme right-wing agitation, whose aim is to morally exculpate the Hitler regime or even to defend it. This approach is taken not only by neo-Nazis but also by other right-wing extremists since they feel that the negative public image of the Third Reich brings their own basic political views into discredit.\(^{138}\)

One of the themes falling under the rubric of revisionism was the opposition to the travelling photo exhibitions entitled *War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944*. Indicative of a rethinking of the past and the politics of memory in Germany, along with the *Historikerstreit*, another controversy was the first *Wehrmacht* exhibition. Whereas the Historians’ Debate of the late 1980s was primarily conducted and supported by the so-called ‘*Flakhelfergeneration*’, or those born between 1927 and 1930, the first anti-*Wehrmacht* exhibition controversy mainly involved the 1968ers, along with younger critics (and supporters) of their parents and grandparents.\(^{139}\)

Arguably, one reason why American historian Daniel Goldhagen’s 1996 publication *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* became a bestseller in Germany was some of the silences

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\(^{136}\) Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. *op. cit.*, p. 27.


and evasions it addressed, not only those of the Hitler generation, but also those of the 1968 generation. In short, Goldhagen put the collective responsibility of the National Socialist past back on the public and intellectual agenda.\textsuperscript{140}

Although Goldhagen highlighted the alleged wide range of willing participants in the Holocaust, at the same time, he seemed to almost vindicate those who claimed that most Germans had made a clean break with the National Socialist past.\textsuperscript{141} Focussing on an 'intentionalism' that blamed Hitler and a small group of high-ranking Nazi officials for the Holocaust, arguably, Goldhagen enabled the 1968 and 1989 generations to distance themselves from the past by hinting that anti-Semitism had died in 1945.\textsuperscript{142} Whilst the main leaders of Nazism and capitalism were singled out as the main perpetrators of the Holocaust, for example, at the same time, some members of the 1968 generation were, according to Mary Nolan, 'reluctant to confront the actions of their parents during the Hitler regime'.\textsuperscript{143} For all the allegations and reprimands against those who had actively or passively facilitated the Holocaust, Goldhagen seemed to imply that the criminal actions of the SS and police battalions did not extend to the ordinary members of the \textit{Wehrmacht}.\textsuperscript{144}

One particular '68er who was not prepared to accept the alleged widely held perception of the clean reputation of the \textit{Wehrmacht}, was the former head of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS), Hannes Heer.\textsuperscript{145} Documenting the questionable ways in which the German army conducted warfare in the Ukraine, Bellorussia and Serbia, it was in this refigured intellectual context that the first \textit{anti-Wehrmacht} exhibition by Hannes Heer, Bernd Boll and Walter Manoscheck was produced.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{140} For this claim see: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118. For similar claim that the 1950s generation failed to address the National Socialist past, see: Zimmer, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{143} Cited from: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{144} For this line of argument see: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 117-118.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 121-122. For official claims of the alleged popular perception of the clean reputation of the \textit{Wehrmacht}, see: speeches by Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens), Otto Schily (SPD) and Otto Graf Lambsdorf (FDP) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/163. \textit{Stenographischer Bericht} 163 Sitzung. Bonn, 13.03.97, pp. 14712, 14716, 14726.
Opening in Hamburg on 5 March 1995, the widely travelled exhibition began touring all the major cities in western Germany, as well as many smaller ones from 1996. By the end of 1999, the exhibition had visited 33 German cities. Since 1996, the federal authorities have also accused the Wehrmacht of war crimes and labelled any attempts to defend the conduct of the German Army as 'revisionist'. According to the BMI:

The NPD uses revisionist arguments in attempting to shift historical responsibility of the National Socialist period. The aim is to deny Hitler's regime responsibility for atrocities committed by the German armed forces of the Third Reich during the Second World War.

'Political agitation from the German People's Union (DVU) party press organ, the National-Zeitung [NZ], against the travelling exhibition concerning the Wehrmacht's involvement in war crimes should also be viewed in the context of revisionism', argued the BMI.

Indicative of the opposition to the exhibition were the numerous nationwide right-wing extremist demonstrations. As soon as the exhibition from the HIS began touring Germany in 1996 there was opposition to its allegations. Some of the first protest actions took place during June 1996 in the regional capital of Thuringia, Erfurt. Along with Bonn, Hanover and Dresden in 1998, protests were also held during 1999 in Kiel, Hamburg and Osnabrück. For instance, during a demonstration against the travelling exposition held in Osnabrück on 9 October 1999 by 250 members of the youth wing of the NPD, the Young National Democrats (JN), 'three cheers were given for the Waffen SS', reported the Hamburg authorities.

Although between 800 and 1,000 people participated in a counter-demonstration in Osnabrück on the same date as the JN demonstration, most of the protestors were not...

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locals, but left-wing extremists from North Rhine-Westphalia. Further indicative of support for the HIS exhibition were the following reports. On 22 May 1999, for example, there was a counter-demonstration in Cologne by about 2,000 anti-fascists – ‘250 of whom were members of various autonomous groups’, noted the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of the Interior.154 Provoking strong condemnation from the Head of the Tübingen Military Information Centre (IMI), Tobias Pflüger, however, one of the exhibits was firebombed in Saarbrücken on 9 March 1999.155 So why did the display incite such vehement protests by right-wing extremists?

Along with the Holocaust, extreme right-wing circles maintain the history of the Second World War has been misrepresented to the public. Describing the protests against the Wehrmacht exhibition as clear indications of the national will, the NPD claimed: ‘Our grandfathers were no criminals and we are proud of them.’156 During a protest rally in Kassel in 1998, Chairman of the Baden-Württemberg branch of the REP, Christian Käss, criticised the travelling exhibition for its alleged ‘distortion of reality and lies’.157 According to the BMI, the DVU also exploited the controversy of the travelling exhibition with numerous articles that ‘abounded with false representations of the Wehrmacht’s conduct’.158

Interestingly, questions about the historical accuracy and legitimacy of the display also arose from other quarters. ‘No political-historical discussion provoked such a strong reaction than that over the role of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War’, claimed Die Welt.159 At issue were the questions of an ‘institutional and individual guilt within the Wehrmacht on the one hand, and the collective responsibility of the current generation’s recognition of it on the other’, noted Mary Nolan. This was particularly difficult to cope with, argued Nolan and historians Norbert Frei and Rolf-Dieter Müller, because ‘the myth of the Wehrmacht’s innocence’ was generally accepted amongst

159 Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. op. cit., p. 27.
some of the so-called ‘Wehrmacht generation’ that had rebuilt Germany.\textsuperscript{160} Indicative of a collective selectivity of memory and hence, arguably, renunciation of guilt, according to J-W. Müller the ‘Third Reich was consciously separated from the Holocaust as was the Wehrmacht from the SS’.\textsuperscript{161}

Others were also not so accommodating to the views of the BMI or the HIS concerning the history and reputation of the Wehrmacht. At the end of 1999, accusations began to appear claiming that some photos had been misidentified, prompted by evidence uncovered by the historians Bogdan Musial and Krisztian Ungváry from recently opened Polish and Ukrainian archives.\textsuperscript{162} Historian R-D. Müller, of the Potsdam-based Military History Research Office (MGFA), explained that the Polish historian Musial had claimed that some photos of alleged victims of the Wehrmacht in Tarnapol and Zloczow in the Ukraine were not Jewish, but actually Ukrainian and Russian victims of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).\textsuperscript{163} Head of the Munich Institute of Contemporary History (IfZ), Horst Möller, noted that Musial had proved that at least nine photographs depicted crimes committed by the Soviets and another two-dozen of suspected Russian involvement.\textsuperscript{164} Hungarian historian Ungváry even maintained that of the approximately 1,000 photos, only 10% actually depicted the Wehrmacht committing crimes, complained the historian Volker Ullrich.\textsuperscript{165}

According to the head of the exhibition, Hannes Heer, 60-80% of German soldiers serving on the Eastern Front were guilty of war crimes.\textsuperscript{166} But R-D. Müller contested this particular portrayal of the past. When asked by \textit{Der Spiegel} how many German soldiers were actively involved in war crimes, according to Müller, there was no definitive answer. Although Müller cited Italian sources that estimated from five to 100 German soldiers were implicated in atrocities in Italy, at the same time, Müller claimed

\textsuperscript{161} Cited from: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33. For similar claims by military historian Rolf-Dieter Müller and Mary Nolan, see: Spörl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 62 and: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 121-122.
\textsuperscript{162} See: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 123. See also interview with Jan Philipp Reemtsma in: Am Abgrund der Erinnerung. \textit{Die Zeit}, 27.05.99 (22), p. 54.
\textsuperscript{163} See: Nolan, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 123 and: Seewald, B. Können Opfer auch Täter sein? \textit{Die Welt}, 18.08.00, p. 30. See also: Spörl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{166} See: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generälen. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 84.
‘the percentage of alleged crimes by the Wehrmacht was even less on the Eastern Front’. 167

R-D. Müller also had particular problems with the assumptions of instigators of the Wehrmacht exhibition that the younger generation that had served in the Wehrmacht should bear collective responsibility. This was because ‘the average age of those serving in the Wehrmacht was 20 or below by the end of hostilities’, noted Müller. 168 There were also recriminations from other German academics. Historian Dieter Schmidt-Neuhaus, for instance, not only disputed the authenticity of photographs from the exhibition, but also a document purporting to boast of recriminations by the Wehrmacht on Russian and Jewish partisans. 169 Berlin historian Jörg Friedrich accused exhibition organisers of ‘over-emotionalising and bungling of the facts’, claiming what advances of the subject there had been over the last four years had, during the last ten days, become an apology for historical research on the theme. 170 ‘An exhibition depicting events in such an implausible manner must be closed indefinitely’, reasoned Frankfurt am Main historian Lothar Gall. 171

Nevertheless, Hannes Heer contested allegations that the exhibition had collected material based on preconceived opinions. Heer ‘vehemently defended’ the selection of photos and texts ‘on the basis of the latest documentary evidence’, noted Volker Ullrich. 172 Disputing Schmidt-Neuhaus, Walter Manoschek of the HIS argued that about 80% of the photographs had never before been released and on those grounds alone reproaches against their presentation were ‘nonsense’. 173 Against the run of opinion, claimed the Saarbrücker Zeitung, director of the Library for Contemporary History in Stuttgart, Gerhard Hirschfeld, defended the exhibition, arguing that ‘such huge criticism was unwarranted’. 174 Representatives from the Tübingen Military Information Centre (IMI) also defended the claims of the HIS exhibition. 175

168 See: Ibid., p. 62.
169 Known as the Franzl-Brief, the authenticity of a letter sent home from a German soldier is questionable since its contents cannot be differentiated from an NSDAP propaganda file, noted Schmidt-Neuhaus. See: Schmidt-Neuhaus, D. “Die Dokumente sind nicht stichhaltig.” Die Welt, 26.10.99, p. 35.
171 See: „Wehrmachtausstellung: Kritiker fordern entgültige Schließung.“ Der Spiegel [Online]. 06.11.99 (44) [Accessed 05.07.02]. <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,51278,00.html>
172 Cited from: Ullrich, V. op. cit.
173 See: Am Abgrund der Erinnerung. op. cit., p. 54.
175 See: Solga, E. op. cit.
Serving to underline the continuing divisions between official and popular history of the *Wehrmacht*, all three of the mainstream political factions, along with the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), expressed particular support for the exhibition. An earlier statement in Munich by former CDU Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, along with concerns about right-wing extremist incitement amongst some of the public against the exhibition, formed the basis of a debate by the CDU, SPD and the Alliance 90/The Greens in the *Bundestag*.\(^{176}\) ‘As one of the leading organisations of the Third Reich, the *Wehrmacht* and parts of its soldiers were inextricably involved in war crimes’, argued Rühe.\(^{178}\) ‘By participating in the *Wehrmacht,*’ reasoned Freimut Duve of the SPD, ‘every soldier was effectively sworn-in as a criminal.’\(^{179}\) Elaborating on his statement, Duve went on to argue that by taking a formal oath of allegiance to Hitler, this effectively made soldiers criminals.

Supporting the conclusions of the exhibition, Gerald Häfner (Alliance 90/The Greens) declared that the *Wehrmacht* undertook a war of annihilation and, as such, was responsible for the murder of millions of civilians. ‘Whoever wants to suppress those facts is guilty of historical misrepresentation’, contended Häfner.\(^{180}\) ‘It is disturbing’, agreed Otto Schily of the SPD, ‘that there are those who attempt to expel the truth about the role of the *Wehrmacht* in historical consciousness.’\(^{181}\)

Whilst the CDU welcomed any historical reappraisal of the history of the Second World War, at the same time, some members of the CDU refused to accept the *Wehrmacht* was a criminal organisation per se.\(^{182}\) Daughter of a *Wehrmacht* officer and CDU member of the *Bundestag*, Erika Steinbach, reprimanded the exhibition for being ‘one-sided, blinkered and offensive to those who are not able to defend themselves’.\(^{183}\) Although some German soldiers were undoubtedly responsible for war crimes, speaking in the

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\(^{179}\) Ibid., p. 14708.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., p. 14713.


Alfred Dregger (CDU) said he would challenge anyone who attempted to depict the Wehrmacht as a criminal establishment.\(^{184}\) It should be noted in the context of the thesis that the sister party of the CSU (Christian Social Union, Bavaria), the CDU, not only participated at the exhibition’s official unveiling in Hamburg in 1995, but also condemned any form of ‘right-wing excesses in connection with the exhibition’.\(^{185}\) Nevertheless, an official CDU/CSU circular did acknowledge that the Wehrmacht ‘actively participated in war crimes’.\(^{186}\)

Following street protests in Munich on 1 March 1997 against the HIS exhibition, R-D. Müller complained representatives of the Bundestag ‘sanctified the exhibition’.\(^{187}\) Defending the exhibition, Heiner Geißler (CDU), for example, maintained that the organisers had successfully demonstrated that ‘false perceptions of humanity based on race lead to crimes against humanity. War crimes are war crimes. They were perfectly justified in highlighting this phenomenon.’\(^{188}\)

In the wake of a ‘wave of criticism’ from historians and journalists, noted West German Radio (WDR), the exhibition was forced to close because according to Mary Nolan, the BMI and others: ‘Confidence in its accuracy and intentions had been notably undermined.’\(^{189}\) Horst Möller, for instance, accused head of the exhibition Hannes Heer of a ‘one-sided interpretation and political agitation’.\(^{190}\) Owing to ‘inaccuracies in the texts and photographic documentation, the organisers closed the exhibition in November 1999’, reported the BMI.\(^{191}\) Chairman of the HIS, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, complained: ‘Never before in the Federal Republic of Germany has an exhibition been subject to such critical scrutiny as this one.’\(^{192}\)

Summarising the alleged mood in some of the German press at the time, Mary Nolan declared: ‘Tendentiousness, sloppiness and a naïve reading of photographic evidence

\(^{184}\) For speech by Alfred Dregger see: Ibid., pp. 14711-14712.
\(^{186}\) For CDU admissions see: Ibid.
\(^{188}\) Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/163. op. cit., pp. 14725-14726.
\(^{190}\) Cited from: Harms, K. B. op. cit., p. 3.
\(^{192}\) Cited from: Ullrich, V. op. cit.
had produced an exhibit so hopelessly compromised that it was beyond repair." 193 Despite continuing criticism and hostility to the exposition and reservations about historical correctness, the exhibit re-opened in 2001. Commenting in 1999 on the closure of the first exhibition, SPD Minister of Culture and Media, Michael Naumann, claimed that the exhibition was not a complete failure, lamenting that it merely demonstrated the old adage that history is always a process of reappraisal. 194

Since re-opening in 2001, the Wehrmacht exposition once again became the focal point of right-wing demonstrations throughout Germany. 195 Following the re-opening of the Wehrmacht exhibition in Berlin on 27 November 2001, the NPD held a demonstration on 1 December in the capital under the slogan: ‘The conscience of the Wehrmacht was and remains clean!’ 196 Another took place shortly afterwards in the eastern city of Nordhausen, Thuringia, on 8 December. 197 Similar demonstrations followed throughout 2002 and 2003. Right-wing extremist protests were held in Bielefeld, Leipzig and Peenemünde, for example, under the slogans: ‘Our grandfathers were no criminals’, and calling on Germans to: ‘Protect the honour of the Wehrmacht.’ 198

Conversely, there were also attempts to prevent these demonstrations. Attempting to stop 600 right-wing extremists from demonstrating on 2 March 2002, counter-demonstrations were held in Bielefeld by about 400 left-wing extremists. On 21 June 2003, around 100 masked left-wing extremists also attacked 180 members of the NPD and its youth wing, the Young Nationalist Democrats (JN), with bottles and fireworks in Schwäbisch Hall. 199

However, official reports indicated that numbers of right-wing extremist demonstrators were hardly down between 2002 and 2003, compared to those of 1998 and 1999.

During 2002 and 2003, for instance, the average number of right-wing extremists demonstrating against the HIS *Wehrmacht* exhibition in Bielefeld, Leipzig and Halle was one thousand - equalling or exceeding earlier protests in Bonn, Magdeburg and Hamburg.\(^{200}\)

Perhaps not surprisingly, representatives from the three main right-wing extremist groups unanimously condemned the re-opening of the exhibition in 2001. Chairman of the NPD, Udo Voigt, attacked the exhibition for being ‘rabidly anti-German and a transformation of lies created by obvious communists’, adding it was ‘shameful that German soldiers should be portrayed in such light who supposedly contravened international law’.\(^{201}\) In another show of defiance to official representations of the *Wehrmacht*, party-periodical of the DVU, the *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ) stated: ‘It is highly questionable that figures like Reemtsma drag the German *Wehrmacht*, which made such an enormous sacrifice, through the mud, whilst the unatoned atrocities by the Allies are covered over or even glorified.’\(^{202}\)

As far as the authorities were concerned, anyone in Germany sharing such opinions were ‘extremist’ and to be condemned. Summarising right-wing opposition to the re-opening of the exhibition, a press release by the REP demanded an end to the ‘defamation of the German army’.\(^{203}\) Of course, such views could simply be dismissed out of hand as overstated right-wing propaganda, or perhaps as pure nonsense, were it not for the fact that those ideas exerted a certain social influence. Commenting on the first anti-*Wehrmacht* exhibition, for example, the Thuringian authorities in 1999 claimed that ‘local right-wing extremists exploited the mood at the time in order to advance their revisionist theories’.\(^{204}\) Hannes Heer himself also admitted in 2004 that although doubts about the singularity of the Holocaust and the idea that the Jews were


the perpetrators rather than the victims, were largely discredited after the first Historians' Debate, ‘those opinions are now becoming more prevalent’.205

In 2000, Berthold Seewald asked in Die Welt: ‘Can victims also become perpetrators?’206 There have been claims the catalyst for the ensuing spiral of violence on the Eastern Front was the Jews. Counter-Revolutionary Elements are to be Shot. The Brutalisation of the German-Soviet War of Summer 1941 was the title of Bogdan Musial’s book reappraising correlations between the Soviet and Nazi crimes in Eastern Europe. Reviewing the historian’s book, Seewald explained Musial researched areas of eastern Poland vacated by the Soviets in 1941 where they were alleged to have murdered between 20-30,000 people during their retreat from the advancing German army. According to Musial, Soviet atrocities enabled National Socialist propaganda to generate sympathy and understanding amongst German troops of all ranks for the war of annihilation in the East. Musial argued that German crimes were not ‘infrequently a direct reaction to Soviet measures’.207

Serving as the alleged catalyst for the ensuing spiral of violence on the Eastern Front were the Jews. Depicted by both Imperial Russia and the National Socialists as residing in excessive communes, this kind of propaganda further encouraged an already deep-seated traditional anti-Semitism amongst Poles and Ukrainians, argued Musial. The image of the Jews as an unwanted race had previously led to numerous Pogroms in the East that was exploited by the German occupying forces as an excuse for representing them as ‘collaborators of the enemy’, noted Berthold Seewald.208 In other words, ‘the Jews had been instrumental during the Russian Revolution and following persecutions of anti-Communists’, noted J. Güntner.209 In his 2000 publication, Musial also referred to the reports by the Wehrmacht recording complaints and a sense of outrage by the inhabitants of Lemberg to Soviet atrocities allegedly ‘aided and abetted by the Jewish population’.210 Despite criticising this reappraisal of atrocities on the Eastern Front by

the *Wehrmacht*, at the same time, Seewald claimed the author’s thesis was ‘in step with current opinion’. 211

Symptomatic of an approval of this kind of revisionism and estrangement with official memory, there have been insinuations of participation in demonstrations against the *Wehrmacht* exhibition from other sections of German society. Mary Fulbrook, exhibition organiser the HIS and the Schleswig-Holstein authorities implied that the ‘massive demonstrations in Munich’ were not merely attended by neo-Nazis.212 Whilst the BMI reported that the 1999 street protests against the *Wehrmacht* presentations in Kiel and Hamburg were ‘organised and undertaken *predominantly* by right-wing extremists’, this and similar contentions indicated others apart from neo-Nazis clearly took issue with the claims of the *Wehrmacht* exhibition.213

On the other hand, historian Eve Rosenhaft and the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior reported there were also violent counter-demonstrations in support of the anti-*Wehrmacht* exhibition during 1997 and 2002. Attended by significant numbers of left-wing extremist elements, in Munich on 12 October 2002, about 3,000 people counter-demonstrated against 1,000 right-wing extremists protesting against the second anti-*Wehrmacht* exhibition in the city. In order for the NPD protest to continue, the local police were obliged to remove a blockade set up by counter-demonstrators.214

Yet, evidence suggested that the right-wing slogan: ‘Our grandfathers were no murderers’ became common practice.215 Incitement from other quarters to defend the honour of the *Wehrmacht* was also a cause for concern aired by *Bundestag* politicians Gerald Hafner (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Walter Kolbow (SPD). Speaking in the *Bundestag* about the ‘inflammatory headlines’ in the CSU’s newspaper, the *Bayernkurier*, Hafner declared:

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With its title page describing the exhibition as part of an orchestrated moralistic campaign of defamation against the German people, attempts by those such as the Bayernkurier to discredit Reemtsma rather than the killings of the Second World War are worse than any right-wing propaganda.\(^{216}\)

Kolbow also expressed fears about the threat posed to the alleged ‘political consensus’ over the theme. According to Kolbow:

> We cannot ignore the Bayernkurier and others like them who threaten the basic fundamental political consensus about the theme. […] It is no longer about the Wehrmacht ausstellung, but the attacks on those who refuse to evade the darkest chapter of our history.\(^{217}\)

During an interview with Die Zeit in 1999, defending the exhibition, Hannes Heer stated that from the very start the intention was to make clear the criminality of the Wehrmacht as an institution. Heer went on to explain the exhibition also wanted to portray the complicity of individual members by means of a graphic interpretation of the mentality and motives behind the taking of the photographs. Although a few photographs revealed that some German soldiers did appear to distance themselves from the executions, according to the organisers, these were the exception. ‘Most revealed a disturbing kind of glorification, pleasure and even pride in the mass graves indicative within the inscriptions and smiles on the pictures’, claimed Heer and Reemtsma.\(^{218}\) Historian R-D. Müller dismissed the ‘handful of field letters or pictures of smirking German soldiers as inconclusive evidence for justifying claims that the majority of the Wehrmacht were implicated in war crimes or were of a general barbaric mentality’.\(^{219}\) According to German journalists Sven Kellerhoff and Klaus B. Harms, Heer and Reemtsma had completely underestimated the extent of public hostility to the photos.\(^{220}\) There was ‘widespread sympathy […] with the experiences of German soldiers on the Eastern Front’, argued Fulbrook, Nolan and others.\(^{221}\)

\(^{216}\) For speech by Häfner see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/163. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 14708-14709.

\(^{217}\) Cited from: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 14724.

\(^{218}\) Cited from: Am Abgrund der Erinnerung. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 54.

\(^{219}\) Interestingly Müller reasoned that the presence of German soldiers at such incidents could be compared to the mentality of civilian curiosity accompanying the scene of a heavy motorway accident. See: Spörl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 60. For the same analogy by Berlin historian Jörg Friedrich, see: Friedrich, J. \textit{Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945}. 12th ed. München: Propyläen, 2003, p. 258.

\(^{220}\) Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. “Das Heer der Täter – desinfiziert.” \textit{op. cit.} See also: Harms, K. B. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3. For similar claims by Der Spiegel, see: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generälen. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 84.

Further to this refusal to accept the Bundestag political elite’s claims of past transgressions of the German army and official interpretations of the National Socialists, were academic and other reactions prior to, and following the re-opening of the second anti-Wehrmacht exhibition in November 2001.²²² Claiming it was still ‘defamatory towards the Wehrmacht’, political scientist and Chairman of the NPD, Udo Voigt, derided the exhibition for showing ‘wide displays of unproductive unhistorical waffle’.²²³ German historical revisionist Walter Post maintained that only 1.5% of all German soldiers were guilty of atrocities on the Eastern Front.²²⁴ Apart from such apologists on the edge of the political spectrum, for many years the undisputed consensus amongst academics was the recognition of the Wehrmacht’s responsibility as a criminal institution, noted Kellerhoff.²²⁵ According to R-D. Müller and Gerhard Hirschfeld, when the first exhibition was shown, there were fears that fierce criticism would embolden the extreme right.²²⁶ Nevertheless, evidence suggested a critical reappraisal of the second anti-Wehrmacht exhibition also extended beyond right-wing extremists.

Although the emphasis switched from visual to written evidence, West German Radio noted the organisers of the HIS continued to maintain the Wehrmacht played a decisive role in every aspect of crimes against Jews and Russian prisoners of war.²²⁷ Along with its introduction, a section within the modified 2001 exhibition claimed: ‘As an institution, the Wehrmacht was extensively implicated in an unprecedented racial war of annihilation.’²²⁸ Director of the Berlin Research Centre for Military History Karl-Heinz Schmick, historian Stefan Scheil and others disputed such sweeping generalisations as ‘unreasonable and wrong’.²²⁹ Responding to the re-opening of the exhibition in 2001, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung released an article entitled: ‘The German army were no murderers.’²³⁰ According to Sven Kellerhoff: ‘19 million private soldiers continue to

²²³ Cited from: NPD-Parteivorsitzender Udo Voigt zur Eröffnung der Schandausstellung. op. cit.
²²⁴ See: Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu verantworten. op. cit., p. 27.
²²⁵ Ibid.
²²⁷ For the analysis by West German Radio see: Reinhardt, N. op. cit.
profess their innocence from both a criminal and moral capacity.'231 So too did some of the public, maintained Allensbach, Bielefeld Professor of History Ute Frevert and the Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior. In January 2001, the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research asked 1,000 Germans nationwide if they believed that many German soldiers had committed war crimes. In response, 27% believed they had, with just over half (52%) declaring they had not.232 Similarly in 2000, only 18% of 1,000 Germans polled thought that National Socialist crimes and the attempted annihilation of the Jews ‘distinguished German history from that of other countries’.233

Running from November 2001 to March 2004, the second Wehrmacht exhibition was shown in 13 German towns and cities. Although there were reports suggesting Germans accepted the essence of the second re-worked Wehrmacht exhibition, there were still claims of public opposition to it.234 Three cities where there was still public opposition to the re-appraised Wehrmacht exhibition were Bielefeld, Dortmund and Hamburg. ‘Confronting its visitors with crimes that many did not and do not accept’, according to Frevert, the exposition continued to invoke criticism and hostility.235 In 2003, for example, the anti-Wehrmacht exhibition was attacked by butyric acid in Dortmund, reported the local police.236

Not all, of course, were so dismissive of the reappraised exhibition. Journalists Johannes Klotz and Klaus Wiegrefe maintained that the new exhibition ‘irrevocably destroyed the public myth of the clean Wehrmacht’.237 Further indicative of public defiance to the contentions of the second exhibition was the following report by the Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior. During the final week of the anti-Wehrmacht exhibition in Hamburg, according to the Lower Saxon authorities: ‘On 31 January and 27 March

237 See: Klotz, J. op. cit. See also: Wiegreffe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generälen. op. cit., p. 84.
2004, 1,200 people demonstrated against the second *Wehrmacht* exhibition in Hamburg - 400 of whom were neo-Nazis.\(^{238}\)

In contrast to what the general public thought, admitted the exhibition organisers, before the opening of the first in 1995 the consensus amongst the academic community was that the *Wehrmacht* did not distance itself from the war of annihilation.\(^{239}\) Yet, some German historians, such as Christian Hartmann, maintained, at the time of writing, that the disputes about the numbers of individual German soldiers implicated in war crimes assumed ‘paradigmatic proportions’.\(^{240}\) Indicative, perhaps, of the change in some academic attitudes and contested collective memory was what could be termed a differentiated categorisation of violence in Germany. According to *Die Welt*, Germany’s only Chair expressly devoted to military history, Bernhard Kroener, demanded future research should focus on the correlation between the violence of the twentieth century and the Second World War.\(^{241}\)

Although the actions on the Eastern Front were undoubtedly questionable by the moral standards of today, at the same time, Kellerhoff asked was it really appropriate to evaluate them by contemporary value judgements? ‘ Compared to the moral standards of today, during the excessively violent German society of the 1930s and 1940s people could have perceived violence and crimes against humanity rather differently’, suggested the journalist.\(^{242}\)

A further problem, contended Kellerhoff and the German historian Ulrich Herbert, was the actual motivation for the crimes on the Eastern Front. Analysing the extent to which events were determined or constrained by ideological or actual circumstances, Herbert emphasised the so-called ‘*putativ-defensive Situation*’.\(^{243}\) According to Herbert, since it

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\(^{241}\) The Chair was in Potsdam. See: Kellerhoff, S. F. *Unklare Vorstellungen*. *Die Welt*, 19.03.04, p. 27.


\(^{243}\) Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. *Unklare Vorstellungen*. *op. cit.*, p. 27.
was evident that *Blitzkrieg* tactics had failed against the Red Army, many *Wehrmacht* officers believed the only recourse left open to them was now unrestricted warfare.\(^{244}\)

Chairman of the HIS, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, continued to maintain that much of what the *Wehrmacht* did was ‘legalised barbarity’.\(^{245}\) Conversely, R-D. Müller expressed ‘serious objections’ to the exhibition for failing to put the partisan war on the Eastern Front in context. In the opinion of Müller, the exhibition should have differentiated between victims of the Holocaust and those of the partisan war. ‘Over three quarters of the photos were of victims of a partisan war and therefore not victims of war crimes in the strictest sense of the term’, argued the Potsdam historian.\(^{246}\) ‘Reprisals by the *Wehrmacht* against civilian unrest were therefore within the boundaries of warfare’, reasoned R-D. Müller.\(^{247}\) Citing the examples of the Algerian War and Vietnam, according to R-D. Müller, the taking and even killing of hostages in order to suppress local resistance in occupied territories was nothing new or exceptional.\(^{248}\)

Yet, spokesperson and co-ordinator of the exhibition, Dr. Ulrike Jureit, argued that even if one were to make allowances by differentiating between the crimes, the essence of either exhibition changed nothing concerning the responsibility of those involved.\(^{249}\) Representatives of the *Bundestag*, Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) and Heiner Geißler (CDU), agreed. ‘Whatever their organisation,’ argued Lambsdorff, ‘many personnel did not shirk from their responsibility in carrying out the orders of the Nazi regime.’\(^{250}\) Geißler also made a similar statement, announcing that: ‘War crimes are war crimes, whether committed by the German soldiers, the SS or anyone else.’\(^{251}\)

Along with some elements of the public, Dieter Schmidt-Neuhaus and R-D. Müller deemed it necessary to differentiate between the *Wehrmacht* proper and the armed units of the SS. Referring to the Nuremberg Trials of 1948 absolving the *Wehrmacht* of collective guilt, Schmidt-Neuhaus and Müller emphasised that executed Poles, depicted in three of the four photos taken in Tarnopol, were actually murdered by the NKVD -

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\(^{244}\) For claims by Herbert see: *Ibid.*

\(^{245}\) Cited from: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generälen. *op. cit.*, p. 84.

\(^{246}\) Cited from: Spörl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. *op. cit.*, p. 60.

\(^{247}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{248}\) On the one hand, R-D. Müller conceded that partisans had the right to defend their homeland. On the other, the *Wehrmacht* had the right to defend itself – even though it was an occupying force, argued Müller. See: *Ibid.*


not the *Wehrmacht*.\(^{252}\) Even if elements of the *Wehrmacht* had played a decisive role in war crimes, argued historian Christian Hartmann, that, in itself, did not necessarily implicate every one of its former millions of members. ‘It is certainly difficult to quantify the actual numbers involved’, agreed Sven Kellerhoff. ‘Furthermore, Hartmann presented a plausible defence of the *Wehrmacht*, based on statistics of those that actually could have been present in the areas in question when the alleged crimes took place’, argued Kellerhoff.\(^{253}\)

On the other hand, allegations have also been made that in some cases officers and individuals alike had the opportunity to extricate themselves from active involvement. Ulrike Jureit and West German Radio, for instance, warned against accepting the ‘general inference’ that it was not possible to question or refuse orders.\(^{254}\) By way of example, the 2001 exhibition cited the reactions by three German officers and two non-commissioned officers to the orders to shoot the Jewish inhabitants of the area west of Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk in Belorussia (White Russia). According to the 2001 exhibition, lieutenant Hermann Kuhls obeyed without hesitation. Following initial reservations discussed with his sergeant Emil Zimber, captain Friedrich Nöll commanded Zimber to undertake the executions, later explaining in court that: ‘An order is an order.’ In spite of pressure from a superior at the time, captain Josef Sibille refused. Sibille was not punished at the time for his insubordination and neither was corporal Wilhelm Magel for ‘deliberately missing his target’. Whilst Magel was pardoned in May 1954, the Darmstadt State Court found Nöll and Zimber guilty of manslaughter and sentenced them to four and three years in prison respectively. Kuhls did not survive the war.\(^{255}\)


\(^{253}\) Responding to the claims of the HIS that 60-80% of the *Wehrmacht* were implicated in war crimes, Hartmann claimed that the majority of soldiers on the Eastern Front were front-line troops, not reservists. ‘This was significant because […] crimes had to have been undertaken predominantly by reservists - not front line troops.’ Concluding, Hartmann maintained the responsibility lay with Generals and Staff Officers – not the mass of private soldiers or front line officers that made up the *Wehrmacht*. See: Hartmann, C. *op. cit.*, pp. 1-35 and: Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu verantworten. *op. cit.*, p. 27.

\(^{254}\) See: Wiegrefe, K. *Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generälen. op. cit.*, p. 89 and: Reinhardt, N. *op. cit.*

Exposing further divisions between official and popular perceptions of the *Wehrmacht* was the dispute between the authorities and citizens of the north German town of Buxtehude, situated west of Hamburg, concerning a commemorative plaque. Celebrating the surrender of the town and its barracks to the British in April 1945, in May 2003 a commemorative stone was set honouring the German officers whose actions prevented the bloodshed of German soldiers and civilians. Survivors of the Second World War Hans-Georg Freudenthal, Richert Rischkau, Jürgen Schwarz, Hans-Peter Berger and Bodo Klages had been waiting many years for a monument to the salvation of their ‘fairy-tale town’ of Buxtehude. According to the Stade branch of the Union of Anti-Fascists (VVN-BdA) and local newspaper the *Buxtehuder Tageblatt*, the initial inscription on the memorial stone read:

On the 22 April 1945 the barracks and town of Buxtehude were handed over peacefully to British troops. With great risk to their lives, rear admiral Siegfried Engel, captains Alexander Magnus, Hans Haverkamp and lieutenant Karl Halaski successfully prevented civilian casualties and the destruction of the town.

Following Internet allegations from the Independent Perspective Communication website (PUK) and Stade VVN-BdA that the officers were guilty of war crimes, however, two weeks after the official unveiling, the plaque was removed.

During his capacity as Second Admiral of the North Sea between 1943 and 1945, rear admiral Siegfried Engel was alleged to have sentenced 54 German naval deserters to death. Another, sea captain Alexander Magnus, was accused of having procured transport for the deportation of Jews from Corfu and having been involved in the execution of ten hostages in Greece during 1944. ‘It was on those grounds that investigations were renewed’, noted the Stade branch of the VVN-BdA. ‘Should research reveal sufficient evidence for the allegations, then the stone must be removed’.

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258 See: Ein gewaltiger Findling für den Friedensplatz. *op. cit.*
announced the Head of the local SPD faction, Hans-Uwe Hansen. When the allegations of misconduct against the officers were first investigated in 2000, head of the town archives, Bernd Utermöhlen, reported there was nothing against the four officers in question. Apparently upholding the reputation of the officers, Utermöhlen stated: ‘The town cannot act merely on the claims of a few newspaper articles.’

Under pressure from the local authorities, however, Utermöhlen reluctantly resumed research on whether there was actually anything to incriminate the officers. Along with Buxtehude archives, Hans-Peter Berger also opposed calls for a critical reappraisal of the Wehrmacht. ‘This commemoration is about former events in Buxtehude and not about a reappraisal of the Second World War. That belongs to other places’, stated the head of Buxtehude’s regional development agency.

As far as the federal archives and the local mainstream parties in Buxtehude were concerned, this apparent acceptance of past events and commemoration of those involved was unacceptable. Commenting on developments in May 2003, local SPD representative Hans-Uwe Hansen declared: ‘What I find particularly disturbing is that a memorial plaque bears the name of suspected war criminals.’ According to the Buxtehuder Tageblatt and the Stade VVN-BdA, local Chairman of the Alliance 90/The Greens, Joachim Buttler, was also ‘on the same wavelength as Hansen’. Critical of any memorial to former combatants, Buttler argued that: ‘Having a memorial stone for war criminals serves no purpose, irrespective of whether the officers were on the right side in the end or not.’ Head of the CDU Party Uwe Hampe was more cautious in passing judgement on the conduct of the officers: ‘We only form our opinions in the context of a political party’, stated Hampe. Disputing the initial findings of Buxtehude archives,

264 Cited from: Gedenkstein wird politisches Thema. op. cit.
265 Cited from: Ibid. See also: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. op. cit.
266 Cited from: Gedenkstein wird politisches Thema. op. cit. See also: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. op. cit.
'further examination had revealed that two of the four officers in question were guilty of war crimes', announced the Mayor of Buxtehude Jürgen Badur.267

In 2000, a branch of the federal archives was set up in Ludwigsburg for the express purpose of the elucidation, ease of access and permanent preservation of documents of the Landesjustizverwaltungen or Federal Central Administration Offices. Established in 1958 under chief National Socialist prosecutor of the SS death squads, or Einsatzgruppen, Erwin Schule, the Zentralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen Ludwigsburg was responsible for the co-ordination of reports documenting allegations of National Socialist crimes from across Germany.268

Concerning the allegations of involvement in war crimes against the Buxtehude officers, documents from the Landesjustizverwaltungen (Federal Central Administrative Offices) confirmed that sea commandant for West Greece, Alexander Magnus, had actively participated in the deportation of the Jewish population of Corfu in 1944.269 On receipt of this information, Mayor Jürgen Badur ordered the removal of all names from the plaque.270 According to the Buxtehuder Tageblatt and the Stade VVN-BdA, even before the allegations were confirmed, chief representatives from three of the main local parties were demanding the removal of the plaque. Along with Hansen (SPD) and Buttler (Alliance 90/The Greens), on account of the questionable conduct of the officers, Chairman of the Buxtehude FDP, Rudolf Fischer, also insisted on the removal of the plaque ‘as soon as possible’.271 Although the town council agreed in essence to the retention of a memorial stone, ‘A future plaque cannot bear the names of the officers involved in the capitulation of the town’, noted Jürgen Badur. ‘Drawing a line under the past’, according to the Buxtehuder Tageblatt, the citizens of Buxtehude had refused to pay for any stone without an inscription.272

270 See: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. op. cit. and: Wisser, K. op. cit.
271 Cited from: Der Stein soll weg. Tageblatt Online (StaderBuxtehuderAltländer) [Online]. 15.05.03 [Accessed 19.04.06]. <http://www.tageblatt.de/db/Druckvorschau.cfm?DID=65251>
272 See: Buxtehuder Politik zieht Schlussstrich. op. cit. and: Wisser, K. op. cit.
Along with others in Germany, evidence suggested many in Buxtehude also rejected official allegations of the collective misconduct of the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{273} Evidence during 2003 and 2004 indicated some in the town still wanted to honour those responsible for its peaceful capitulation. There were reports, for example, that Buxtehude was ‘A haven for the extreme right’, noted the Information Service Against Right-Wing Extremism (IDGR).\textsuperscript{274} In 1999, 2001 and 2004, the Lower Saxon and Hamburg authorities also identified the town of Buxtehude as a centre for right-wing extremists.\textsuperscript{275} According to the Lower Saxon authorities, for example, along with Verden in 1999, Buxtehude was a main focal point for the activities of the youth wing of the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the Young National Democrats (JN).\textsuperscript{276} Owing to disruption from both Hamburg and local neo-Nazis, in January 2004 the panel discussion: \textit{Neo-fascism – a danger for society} had to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{277} Local resident Heiko Tornow stated: ‘It is repulsive that people here want to honour those who have condemned people to death or been involved in the murder of hostages.’\textsuperscript{278}

Despite allegations of criminal behaviour by the Stade VVN-BdA, Mayor of Buxtehude and local politicians against Engel, Magnus, Haverkamp and Halaski, according to the VVN-BdA, Uwe Ruprecht and the \textit{Buxtehuder Tageblatt}, the citizens of Buxtehude ‘hold the officers as heroes and want to remember them as such’.\textsuperscript{279} There was still no proof of Engel’s responsibility for the passing of the 54 death sentences or the involvement of the officers Haverkamp and Halaski in war crimes, maintained Buxtehude City Archives and two local newspapers.\textsuperscript{280} Summarising the evidence to-date, Bernd Utermöhlen contended that neither Engel nor Magnus could be charged with war crimes in the strictest sense of the word, since both operated ‘within the code of established military practice’.\textsuperscript{281}

\textsuperscript{273} For official allegations of the collective guilt of the Wehrmacht, see speeches by Gerald Häfner (Alliance 90/The Greens), Otto Schily (SPD), Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP), and Heiner Geißler (CDU) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/163. op. cit., pp. 14708-14726.


\textsuperscript{276} See: \textit{Niedersachsen Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999}. op. cit., p. 54.


\textsuperscript{278} Cited from: Friedensplatz: Streit um den Gedenkstein. \textit{Tageblatt Online} (Stader Buxtehuder Alltänder) [Online]. 10.05.03 [Accessed 29.11.05]. <http://www.tageblatt.de/db/Druckvorschau.cfm?DID=64963>


\textsuperscript{280} For defence of Engel, Haverkamp and Halaski by Head of Buxtehude Archives Bernd Utermöhlen, the \textit{Hamburger Abendblatt} and \textit{Wochenblatt Neue Buxtehuder}, see: Keine Ruhe auf dem Friedensplatz. op. cit. and: Zweif geehrte Offiziere an Verbrechen beteiligt. op. cit. See also: Wisser, K. op. cit.

\textsuperscript{281} Cited from: Utermöhlen, B. Personal communication, 26.01.05.
To-date, evidence suggested that whilst popular opinion saw the end of the division of Germany as a chance to escape from historical responsibility, the Bundestag political elite continued to demand public penitence for the past. A reappraised Holocaust as a legitimate response to communism and growing academic indignation to reproaches against the Wehrmacht have been identified as two distinct moves away from official representations of the past. Another was the challenge to an alleged officially endorsed German self-hatred and attendant issue of what Die Welt termed a ‘Deutungshoheit’ or sovereignty of interpretation. Underlining the discord between official and popular perceptions of history was the appearance of an anti-post-national Sonderweg or special consciousness. This highly self-conscious project of overcoming collective guilt and German ‘self-flagellation’ was not only ‘highly instructive about the nature of the intellectual field in Germany’, noted J-W. Müller and Jeffrey Olick, but also more broadly about German collective identity. According to Mary Nolan, Stefan Berger and others, it also reflected the growing visibility of right-wing intellectuals and nationalist historiography of some of the younger generation.

After 1945, most intellectuals and political elites in Germany rejected the old anti-Western and nationalist German Sonderweg concerning past German culture, politics and nationalism. During the 1960s, what Karl Wilds described as the critical historical school developed a post-1945 Sonderweg theory that interpreted Germany’s special path to a capitalist nation state, per revolution from above, as a deviation from the French democratic model of 1789. Germany’s rapid economic development was shadowed by its Prussian anti-democratic, pre-industrial elites holding a monopoly of political power. Whereas economic modernisation was accompanied by social and political progress in Britain and France, argued Peter Monteath and Reinhard Alter, in Germany the dominant Prussian landed aristocracy blocked any fundamental

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282 See: Das Tabu der Deutschen. op. cit., p. 3.
283 Ibid.
democratic political change.\textsuperscript{288} Helmuth Plessner, for instance, contrasted the healthy democratic developments of the states of Western Europe with the 'pathological course of German history'.\textsuperscript{289} Summarised by Reinhard Kühnl, Peter Monteath and Reinhard Alter, the pre-1945 \textit{Sonderweg} could thus be described as the 'uniquely German path' to political and economic modernisation compared to the standard western development taken by Britain and France.\textsuperscript{290} Fearing a future united Germany would follow its \textit{Sonderweg} again, the first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, ensured the FRG remained firmly entrenched within the European Community.\textsuperscript{291}

'Germany's desperate efforts to catch up for deficiencies in state building and national consciousness' had contributed to it being led down a special path culminating in the Third Reich, argued J-W. Müller.\textsuperscript{292} 'A new, left-liberal version of the post-1945 \textit{Sonderweg} advocated that Germans had uniquely to be ashamed of their nation', noted Fulbrook.\textsuperscript{293} According to Ernst Nolte: 'For four and a half decades historians have been writing a history of self-humiliation in the interest of the victors in the Second World War.'\textsuperscript{294} Along the same lines, Verena Ringler claimed that the former SPD/Green government was often accused of shaping national identity 'in the tradition of the critical literary and political left-wing movements of the 1960s around their hatred for Germany'.\textsuperscript{295} SPD party official Tilman Fichter admitted that 'by nurturing a post-national identity, during the 1970s, 1980s and reunification, SPD politicians developed a type of anti-nationalism that made the nation state the source of all evil in German history'.\textsuperscript{296}

Since reunification, however, increasing numbers of academics have not only criticised the negative fixation of collective guilt, but were also asking: 'Is it not time to put an end to the German self-hatred encouraged in the aftermath of 1945?'\textsuperscript{297} Rather than

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{289} Cited from: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{292} Cited from: Müller, J-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{293} See: Fulbrook, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 234-235.
  \item \textsuperscript{294} See: Berger, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 136, 215, 227.
  \item \textsuperscript{297} Cited from: Kischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. \textit{In:} Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). \textit{op. cit.}, p. 147. For similar comments see: Schneider, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 42-43.
\end{itemize}
dismissing the pre-1945 Sonderweg as an irrational part of German consciousness, or even as a precondition of fascism, Karl Heinz Bohrer interpreted the Sonderweg as a ‘quintessentially modern and acceptable part of German identity’. Highlighting the continuing tensions between official and popular self-understanding, indicative of what could be described as a revisionist, anti-post-national 1990 Sonderweg consciousness, were various appeals for an officially endorsed national ‘self-flagellation’ to cease.

‘Whenever there are signs of the slightest public hostility to self-flagellation, there is a rush for places in the choir stalls of repentance by the political elite desirous to express their and everybody else’s guilt’, complained Gerhard Köpf. Lienhard Schmidt argued that the continual search for Gutmensch, or ‘model Germans’, resulted in a long silence about past German suffering that became a perennial requisite of German self-flagellation. And, according to the self-styled largest online community for the preservation of Germanic culture, race and spirituality, Skadi net: ‘The self-flagellation and self-hatred depicted within the Wehrmacht exhibition was inculcated by the Left – aided and abetted by Gerhard Schröder.’

Some academics have described the FRG as ‘aberrant, superimposed post-national Sonderweg’, noted Knischewski. Professor Imanuel Geiss claimed the pre-1945 Sonderweg provided a ‘dogma of a new orthodoxy’ for the FRG which ‘served the sole purpose of “morally stigmatising” German history’ that has since ‘been nothing but “an instrument of subtle self-accusation”’. Dismissing historical responsibility for the Second World War, historian Hellmut Diwald declared: ‘Consciousness of guilt for the war is an example of a quite simply incomprehensible desire for self-recrimination. It is truly without equal in human history.’ ‘Abandoning the post-national Sonderweg and associated mentality would give future generations of Germans a consciously national education and thereby overcome the present German self-hatred’, argued political

298 Cited from: Müller, J. Karl Heinz Bohrer on German national identity: recovering Romanticism and aestheticizing the state. German Studies Review, 01.05.00: 23(2), pp. 297-316.
299 For reproaches by Köpf see: Köpf, G. In den Schuhen Fischers. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.10.98, p. 3.
300 See: Schmidt, L. “Denk ich an Deutschland.” Das Ostpreußenblatt/Preußische Allgemeine Zeitung/Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen e.V. [Online]. 18.01.03 [Accessed 01.02.06]. <http://www.webarchiv-server.de/pin/archiv03/0303ob43.htm>
scientist Konrad Löw.\textsuperscript{305} Michael Prinz, for instance, insisted on a mission dispensing with what Karlheinz Weißmann derided as a ‘metaphysics of German guilt’, in order to liberate the country from the alleged ‘stranglehold of educational motives’.\textsuperscript{306} Manfred Kittel, Rainer Zitelmann and Klaus Rainer Rölhl also identified the roots of German self-hatred and ‘national masochism’, not only as a result of ‘the brainwashing effect of German re-education policies’, but also in the ‘anti-fascist tradition of the left’.\textsuperscript{307}

Rejecting an alleged ‘superimposed post-national Sonderweg’, other German intellectuals have also identified German self-hatred as a consequence of left-wing politics.\textsuperscript{308} Calling for an end to German self-hatred, Dr. Christa Hoffmann claimed left-liberal historians ‘deliberately instrumentalised the Nazi past in an almost masochist way in order to stigmatise and ultimately silence their political enemies’.\textsuperscript{309} On the other hand, Thomas Assheuer expressed concerns about attempts to dispense with Auschwitz as an alleged ‘culture of guilt’ and rejection of collective atonement. Referring to the ‘sweeping away of the ashes of the past’, Assheuer reproached Walser for ‘encouraging amongst German youth the phenomenon of national masochism’.\textsuperscript{310}

As well as contending the ‘genocide of the Jews was exploited to justify every kind of moralistic nonsense’, Reinhard Mohr also maintained the Holocaust was used to ‘vindicate self-hatred fostered by a left-wing racism, absorbing itself in anything foreign’.\textsuperscript{311} Reflecting this sense of growing hostility to demands for continued self-flagellation, blaming the Left for an alleged German self-hatred, Hans Magnus Enzensberger complained: ‘That a self-selected minority of the just should desire for themselves another people may well express their educational arrogance.’\textsuperscript{312}

Further indicative of this concept were the comments by Professor Michal Bodemann. Bodemann claimed that instead of the crimes of the past that ought to be fostering a

\textsuperscript{305} Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality. op. cit., p. 179
\textsuperscript{307} For allegations by Kittel, Zitelmann and Rölhl see: Berger, S. The search for normality. op. cit., pp. 177-179, 189-190, 200 and: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
\textsuperscript{309} Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality. op. cit., pp. 179, 192.
\textsuperscript{310} Cited from: Assheuer, T. op. cit.
\textsuperscript{311} Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{312} Cited from: Jennerich, C. op. cit., p. 61.
sense of historical responsibility and guilt, it was the Jewish minority in Germany that were being held responsible for an unwanted self-flagellation.\(^{313}\) There have even been calls for an end to ‘German self-mutilation’, claimed Konrad Jarausch, Hinrich Seeba and Daniel Conradt.\(^{314}\) Filmmaker, essayist and consummate cultural critic, Hans Jürgen Syberberg appeared to sum up this sense of frustration and hostility to German self-recrimination: ‘Germany’s self-flagellation just becomes a sordid form of big business. The German artist who touches Hitler in the appropriately chaste way immediately finds open doors. There is something sickening about this […] that we have all had enough of.’\(^{315}\)

To summarise, after 1945, various political commentators claimed the prevailing academic paradigm was a ‘labour of remembrance’.\(^{316}\) Since reunification, however, new approaches to collective guilt, history and, arguably, identity have become increasingly evident. Symptomatic of this transformation in attitudes to the past was a sympathetic economic and psychoanalysis of the Third Reich - no longer portrayed as quite so uniquely evil.\(^{317}\) Following Ernst Nolte, other German academics have also challenged the singularity of the Holocaust, comparing it to the murder of political prisoners in the Soviet labour camps or Gulags.

Whilst most mainstream historians generally rejected revisionist accounts of the past, since 1990 attempts to reinterpret National Socialism have been warmly received amongst some conservative academics.\(^{318}\) For some in Germany, National Socialism and the genocide of the Jews were no longer the inevitable results of a Hitler or a pre-mediated Auschwitz, as was allegedly the case before the 1980s.\(^{319}\) Academics and writers, such as Armin Mohler, Hagen Schulze and Karlheinz Weißmann, contended that the origins of the failure of the Weimar Republic lay, primarily, in connection with


\(^{315}\) Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.


\(^{317}\) See: DeutschJand ist nicht mehr das Reich des Bösen. op. cit., p. 11.


\(^{319}\) For these claims see: Deutschland ist nicht mehr das Reich des Bösen. op. cit., p. 11 and: Berger, S. The search for normality op. cit., pp. 111-116. See also: Layton, G. op. cit., pp. 208-209.
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that gave rise to Hitler, Auschwitz and the Second World War. 320

Challenging official portrayals of the origins of the Second World War, Armin Mohler argued: ‘The Third Reich was not the product of a “German character” - it was clearly the child of the Treaty of Versailles.’ 321 Yet, statements from the Bundestag political elite were clear about who was responsible for the commencement of hostilities. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder spoke in the Bundestag of the ‘historical responsibility of the land that brought genocide and two world wars to the continent’. 322 ‘We must not forget’, declared the former President of the FRG Roman Herzog, ‘that a German government initiated the last war.’ 323

There were also reports of growing academic resentment towards what Mary Fulbrook and Stuart Taberner referred to as an alleged ‘institutionalised historical shame’. 324 Whilst some journalists, authors and historians adopted Nolte’s thesis in order to exonerate Germans from past guilt, numerous Bundestag politicians and left-liberal academics continued to insist on a ‘labour of remembrance’ and collective responsibility. 325

Nonetheless, there was increasing resentment from some of the media that the memory of Auschwitz was being deliberately abused by the Bundestag elite and others for political purposes. Challenging the role of morality within official prescriptions of collective memory, Martin Walser and his supporters attacked those who ‘wanted to use Auschwitz as a moral club’. 326 Summing up various attitudes perceiving that the National Socialist past was being exploited by the Bundestag elite to ensure a sense of collective guilt, Enzensberger declared: ‘A change of heart cannot be achieved via moral blackmail.’ 327

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326 See: Taberner, S. op. cit. and: Das Tabu der Deutschen. op. cit., p. 3.
327 Cited from: Jennerich, C. op. cit., p. 61.
A number of articles have also challenged what some German politicians referred to as a ‘Holocaust identity’. Numerous members of the Bundestag insisted, perhaps not unreasonably, that Auschwitz should continue to remain an indispensable part of German collective remembrance and national self-understanding.

Underlining a key disparity between official and popular perceptions of national self-understanding, evidence suggested there was not only a growing academic resentment towards an alleged ‘institutionalisation of collective guilt’, but also a public one.\(^{328}\) Denying the existence of collective guilt from some quarters was also indicative of attempts to ‘normalise’ the past.\(^{329}\)

With the growing distance from Hitler’s war and the addition to the population of 15 million East Germans (formerly officially encouraged to believe that responsibility for National Socialism did not extend to them), public acceptance of demands by the Bundestag elite for continued public recognition of collective guilt have become less compelling.\(^{330}\) When Martin Walser called for an end to collective guilt, for example, he claimed to represent the ‘people’. Walser and his followers seemed to echo a popular chord when he declared that there was ‘no such thing as collective guilt’.\(^{331}\)

Irrespective of whether writers, such as Walser, can legitimately claim any representation of the German people, indications from some of the public and the media suggested representatives of the Bundestag political elite clearly did not speak for everyone in Germany. Although contested by many in Germany, a re-writing of the past was evidently seen by some as a welcome opportunity to reconstitute German identity and dispense with collective guilt.

To conclude, what did these themes conducted by intellectuals, journalists and leading newspapers suggest about public perceptions of the National Socialist era, collective guilt and national identity? Developments indicated that a reinvigorated nationalist

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\(^{328}\) Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 36, 235.


paradigm has emerged from some academics, challenging the post-1945 official constructions of German memory. Disputing collective historical responsibility for the Holocaust, there is a danger that such revisionist interpretations of the past imperil the reputation of the current generation of Germans and disguise or, perhaps, even lends credibility to more right-wing representations of the past. Efforts to reappraise disturbing and important issues of the Second World War have not just arisen from a few revisionists, such as Ernst Nolte, Rainer Zitelmann, Klaus Rainer Rohl or Martin Walser, however. Although by no means reflective of German society as a whole, there was evidence of a growing impatience from some elements of the public with the historical shame and singularity of the Holocaust, perceived to have been fostered by the Bundestag elite. Opposing attempts to confine the Holocaust to the past, a left-liberal discourse, demanding a continuing critical engagement with the National Socialist past based upon a ‘labour of remembrance’, was also very much in evidence.\(^{332}\)

Nevertheless, opposition to an official identity of atonement centred on, but not confined to, Auschwitz was no longer unquestionably accepted at the time of writing. Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook suggested that some of the most important preconditions for national identity include a sense of collective memory, common history and a shared legacy of the past.\(^{333}\) Whilst not indicative of the majority of Germans, at the time of writing evidence indicated that, unfortunately, some in Germany would rather forget the Holocaust and official demands for collective responsibility for the past.


Chapter 5.
Contested Memory - the 60th Anniversary of the Air War

According to Mary Fulbrook, Anthony D. Smith and Marita Sturken, collective memory is an accumulation of individual recollections forming perceptions of the past that 'resonates with significant sections of the population and official historical narratives'.\(^1\)

Indicative of a new historical paradigm change concerning how the Allied Air Campaign between 1943 and 1945 was remembered and represented, this chapter highlights another key dissonance between popular and official collective memory and, arguably, therefore, national identity.\(^2\) Despite its dimension in local memory, in contrast to official statements, there have been numerous contentions that the horrors of the Air War remained largely unarticulated particularly at national level. Consequently, there have also been various claims of an attendant loss of history and identity. Reflecting key distinctions between an official and public culture of remembrance, or Erinnerungskultur, this chapter suggests there are increasing ambiguities about how the Air War is remembered, presented and interpreted.

'Images of the past are tied up with contemporary politics. This has been a perennial theme both of social memory studies generally and of discussions of the German situation', noted Jeffrey Olick.\(^3\) 'A strong interest in German history has resurfaced in close connection with the question of national identity', claimed Sabine von Dirke and others.\(^4\) This was particularly evident within numerous academic and newspaper articles appearing since 2002, criticising and commemorating the 1940-1945 Air War, or Bombenkrieg, against German towns and cities as it was frequently referred to in Germany.\(^5\) Although the RAF (Royal Air Force) commenced the bombing of civilian residential districts in places such as Osnabrück and Mannheim in 1940, it was not until

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January 1943 that the first American bombers appeared over Germany in support of the British.⁶

One of the main arguments running throughout this chapter is that a culture of remembrance has changed in significant ways since Berlin historian Jörg Friedrich's 2002 publication, *The Fire (Der Brand)*, suggesting there were clear dissonances between popular and the *Bundestag* elite's conceptions of remembrance.⁷ A central theme of this chapter is that the image of Germany as a nation of perpetrators had been superseded by one of victims. There were increasing calls, amongst the media and local historians, for the survivors of the Allied Air Campaign to be officially accepted as equal and collective victims of war. This development was further evidence not only of a contested memory, but was also another example of a popular rejection of German identity based on a constitutional patriotism and collective guilt. Thus, it suggests that the 'post-national paradigm' referred to by Bernd Weisbrod in 1996 has, since *The Fire*, become a discourse of victims concerning how the bombing of Germany's cities was collectively remembered.⁸

According to Rudy Kosbar and Mary Fulbrook, Germans often speak of a 'memory landscape' or an *Erinnerungslandschaft*. 'This may be physical or psychological, steeped in memories and images that may be intensely personal but also highly public in the sense that large numbers of individuals accept the collective meaning of certain buildings and spaces', noted Koshar.⁹ In contrast to the official line, however, numerous articles and publications maintained the suffering of those killed in the Allied Air Campaign was largely ignored or dismissed from the standpoint of the victims in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

This chapter suggests that German popular collective memory, in relation to the *Bundestag* political elite's, had, in the words of Rudy Koshar and David Carr, 'gone astray' - thus raising further questions as to whether the *Bundestag* political elite

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represented a consistent national memory in Germany. \(^{10}\) Since the appearance of Friedrich’s *The Fire*, the Bundestag political elite’s refusal to acknowledge the civilians lost during the Air War as *national* collective victims of war has been increasingly contested. As a result of the popular acclaim accorded to *The Fire*, there were increasing demands that Germany’s victims of the Allied Air Campaign should constitute part of the nation’s *Erinnerungskultur*. Emergent in popular scholarship and the media, were also ethical challenges to the German official line that the destruction of Germany’s cities was justified on the grounds it successfully served to liberate the country from National Socialism. In some cases, these extended to demands for greater recognition of Allied accountability for the unleashing of firestorms against, primarily, innocent civilians.

Evaluating the central themes of a perceived loss of history, an alleged forbidden collective mourning and official justification for the Air War, this chapter highlights key disparities between public and official memory and hence, collective identity.

**A loss of history?**

1.4 million tons of bombs fell on more than 1,000 German towns and cities between 1940 and 1945. \(^{11}\) Three and a half million homes were destroyed and, by the end of the war, seven and a half million people were homeless. ‘Burnt to death, buried alive or suffocated’, noted relatively recent publications from Solingen and Fulda Archives; the bombings claimed the lives of at least 500,000 civilians, along with the irretrievable loss of medieval architecture. \(^{12}\) Journalists Oliver Reinhard and Jochen Wittmann noted that only during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the expulsions from the former German eastern territories were more lives lost. \(^{13}\) Yet, according to German author Winfried Georg Sebald: ‘It never really crossed the threshold of German national consciousness or played any appreciable part in the discussion of the internal

\(^{10}\) Cited from: Koshar, R. *op. cit.*, p. 9.


\(^{13}\) One in three of the population were killed in some areas in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War. See: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. *Wer Wind sat, erntet Feuersturm*. *Sächsische Zeitung*, 26.11.02, p. 7.
constitution of West Germany."\(^4\) Whilst the fates of Hamburg and Dresden, for instance, are deeply embedded in national memory, the dimension and effects of the Air War on the other 160 bombarded cities remained largely unknown throughout the rest of the country.\(^5\)

Although local books have been written about the Air War, the few authors who did address the theme in the FRG, such as Heinrich Böll and Hans Erich Nossack, were so preoccupied with their own particular experiences that they scarcely noticed the horrors pervading elsewhere. Written at the end of the 1940s, Böll’s *The Angel Was Silent* describing events in Cologne was not published until 1992. According to Sebald: ‘Compilations such as Hans Brunswig’s *Firestorm over Hamburg* [1978] seemed curiously untouched by the subject of their research, making no attempt to portray the self-anaesthesia emerging from the war of annihilation.’\(^6\) Along with Jörg Friedrich, commentators outside Germany have also made similar observations.

Citing Jeremy Noakes, in 2000 Neil Gregor wrote: ‘There is still no major study of the effects of the Allied air raids on the German population.’\(^7\) There have been claims from British military historians Adrian Gregory, Mark Connelly and *Daily Telegraph* journalist Hannah Cleaver, for example, that British authors did not address the effects of the air raids on the German civilian population.\(^8\) ‘Former editor of the *Daily Telegraph* Max Hastings, who did address the theme in his book, did not go into detail about what happened in Darmstadt, Paderborn or Pforzheim whose old town centres disappeared in firestorms’, noted Jörg Friedrich.\(^9\)

Editors of the *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung* (HAZ) Thorsten Fuchs and Stefan Wittke lamented that ‘it is a pity this discussion has only really just begun in Hanover

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\(^4\) Cited from: Sebald, W. G. *op. cit.*, pp. 3-32.
\(^9\) Cited from: Cleaver, H. *op. cit.* See also: Reinhart, O. and Wittmann, J. *op. cit.*, p. 7.
60 years later'. In short, there were various claims that the bombings played no role in a national articulation of collective recollections. But what was the official line?

On the 57th anniversary of the German surrender of 8 May 1945, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder invited the author Martin Walser to a discussion about the theme of *Nation, Patriotism and Democratic Culture* in the Willy Brandt House, Berlin. Whilst elaborating on the theme of the nation, Walser emphasised the importance of a 'Geschichtsgefühl', or sense of national belonging and history, which, according to the author, had both previously been found wanting. But Schröder cautioned against such sentiment, referring to what Germany's excesses for this had led to in the past. Martin Walser maintained that for many years, Germany had been 'without history'. Nonetheless, in a *Bundestag* debate about whether or not the Air War should be officially incorporated within national memory, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician Günter Baumann, along with Angelika Krüger-LeiBner (Social Democratic Party (SPD)), maintained that there had been no loss of history. Evidence from various newspapers and city archives appeared to suggest otherwise. Walser's view and those of others like him are being increasingly echoed throughout Germany at the time of writing.

In 2003, editor of the *Lehmstedt Verlag* Publishing Company, Mark Lehmstedt, discovered a remarkable find in the Leipzig Museum for History. 'Literally stumbling over a chest of unpublished documents', Lehmstedt claimed that many private letters, diaries and accounts revealed a different aspect of the air raid of 4 December 1943, which hitherto, had remained remarkably 'underexposed'. Another hitherto unknown aspect of the raid was the claim of Leipzig's General Inspector of the Fire Service. According to Lehmstedt, the Inspector reported that the intensity of the firestorm

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kindled by 12,550 phosphorous bombs and 281,035 incendiaries exceeded that of the Hamburg firestorm in July 1943. Other places where anxiety over the loss of material and consequently history became particularly apparent were Raunheim, Darmstadt and Freiburg.

Disputing the claims of Baumann and Krüger-Leißner, the Rüsselheimer Echo reported, for example, that the events of the Second World War had only just been appraised in Raunheim. With a special exhibition, the local historical association graphically depicted the events of 1944 for the first time in 2003. Chairman of Raunheim’s local town association, Heinz Schneider, and associates arranged displays and pictures showing the results of the heaviest raid that occurred on 5 November 1944. Photographs depicted bombed-out houses in the town centre that to-date had never been seen in public. Particularly noteworthy were photographs taken from Allied aircraft recording the damage after the attack. It was previously believed in the town that Raunheim had been the secondary target of Allied bombers, forced to abandon their intended targets of neighbouring cities, such as Frankfurt am Main, because of heavy anti-aircraft fire.27

‘Admittedly, there are thousands of photographs available of the scene after Freiburg’s worst air attack in November 1944 but almost no moving ones’, maintained local filmmakers Dirk Michael Adam and Hans-Peter Hagmann. Requesting previously unseen material, Adam and Hagmann hoped that their 2004 film Bombs on Freiburg would ‘fill in the missing gaps’, reported the city’s press and public relations department.28

Along with the Bundestag political elite, there were others who were also not prepared to accept allegations of a lost past. Journalist Volker Ullrich, for instance, referred to the fresco by film-director and author Alexander Kluge and Walter Kempowski’s collage of the destruction of Halberstadt and Dresden.29 Along with Freiburg, there were also appeals in Darmstadt during 2004 for photographs of the evening of 11 September 1944

29 See: Ullrich, V. op. cit., p. 47.
on account of ‘the lack of visual material’, noted the editor of the Darmstädt Echo Klaus Honold.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, perhaps most thought-provoking of all, Head of Bochum City Archives, Ingrid Wölk, maintained that the ‘true extent of the pain and sorrow of the survivors of Bochum has and perhaps never can be documented - graphically or otherwise’.\textsuperscript{31}

CDU member of the Bundestag, Günter Baumann, dismissed allegations that those lost in the Air War had been forgotten from an official capacity. Speaking in the Bundestag, Bauman declared: ‘Our own people have never been forgotten in our national memory. Whenever Germans look back on this particular time, the question always arises of how many of us remain.’\textsuperscript{32}

But the media and some historical institutes did not share Baumann’s apparent indifference towards the significance attached to past testimonies concerning the Air War. Under the direction of publicist and television journalist Guido Knopp, the Eyes of History was a series of films to ensure memories of the twentieth century do not fade away and remain preserved for future generations. ‘Those who experienced the highs and lows of the twentieth century are now over eighty years old. There is, therefore, precious little time remaining to ensure their recollections do not disappear’, reflected Knopp.\textsuperscript{33} ‘This anniversary will be the last chance for us to discuss what happened with those who experienced the Air War first-hand’, noted Düsseldorf eyewitness and author Dieter Forte.\textsuperscript{34} There have also been numerous appeals from German newspapers as well as municipal archives for eyewitness testimonies.

At the end of May 1942, an unprecedented 1,000-bomber fleet was deployed against Cologne. To commemorate its 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, local paper the Kölner Stadt Anzeiger asked for eyewitness accounts and photographs for a series of articles for May 2002.\textsuperscript{35}

In 2003, Hanover newspapers Neue Presse and Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung

\textsuperscript{30} According to Klaus Honold, ‘only one photograph has emerged of the raid of the 11.09.44 on Darmstadt.’ Cited from: Honold, K. Von Mutti blieb ein Schlüsselbund. Darmstädt Echo, 06.04.04, p. 11. See also: Welsch, A. Noch heute Albträume. Darmstädt Echo, 15.09.04, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{32} Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4108.


\textsuperscript{34} Cited from: Gleich bist du tot. op. cit., pp. 1-2.

(HAZ) asked witnesses to recount events and impressions for their book on the Air War between 26 July and 9 October 1943. Although reports already exist recounting the raid of 22 October 1943 on Kassel, the Hessian/Lower Saxon Daily (HNA) appealed for more testimonies in 2003 - all of which were donated later that year by the HNA to Kassel City Archives. In response to appeals during 2004 for an exhibition on the theme, Dessau Archives received photographs and contributions from those who witnessed events. ‘Many citizens from Dessau contributed reports and photographs which, otherwise, would never have found their way to us’, explained head of Dessau City Archives, Dr. Frank Kreißler. According to Kreißler, more eyewitnesses from Dessau needed to come forward, since much remained unknown about the air raids on Dessau.

Further evidence of a sense of a national loss of memory and, arguably, national identity, were various suggestions that many survivors repressed their experiences of events. Dietrich Janßen of Emden’s Bunker Museum claimed that the victims of East Friesa’s regional capital neither talked about the 181 raids on the city amongst themselves, nor conveyed to future generations what they had experienced. Editors of the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ) René Schleucher and Marc Herriger, maintained that although the Air War had ‘burned itself deeply within the memory of those who underwent it, at the same time, it was repressed for many years in Düsseldorf’.

Head of Magdeburg’s Museum of Historical Culture, Dr. Matthias Puhle, also reflected this sense of former suppression from survivors. Whilst Magdeburg was no stranger to air raids during the war, on the evening of 16 January 1945 its citizens were surprised by a second raid on the city by the RAF (Royal Air Force), following an earlier one that morning. Local eyewitness Helene Grenzendorfer, for example, recorded that there were 645 air raid alarms in the city. At 11.00 p.m. the United States 8th Air Force

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37 See: Augenzeugenberichte der Luftangriffe auf Kassel. In: Frau Krenz (Kassel City Archives). Personal communication, 09.09.04 and: Klaube, F. R. (Kassel City Archives). Personal communication, 22.09.04.
attacked the industrial area to the north of the city. Although the second air attack lasted only 36 minutes, it was the worst to-date, leaving almost 95% of the city centre destroyed and 4,000 dead. Among with Dresden and Cologne, Magdeburg was amongst the most devastated of German cities. According to Puhle: ‘Although this image of the horror of what happened that evening has formed itself strongly within the memory of the survivors, seldom do eyewitnesses mention the destruction of the evening of 16 January 1945.’

Testimonies that have appeared since Friedrich’s *The Fire* from Darmstadt, Düsseldorf, Hanover and elsewhere also appeared to corroborate earlier claims of the husband-and-wife writing team, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, and Winfried Georg Sebald that there was a collective ‘inability to mourn’ and an inadequate *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* concerning the suffering of the Germans.

According to Fulbrook, for example, there was a fairly widespread phenomenon in Germany that could be termed *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* or a coping with the past. One aspect of it centred on seeking absolution from the crimes of the past. Another involved dealing with the suffering of the German civilian population, in what Karen E. Till and the Mayor of Minden, Michael Buhre, described as ‘a working through and confrontation with Germany’s National Socialist past.’

Referring to this coping with the past, Germany’s second public service television station, *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen* (ZDF), depicted photographs of disfigured corpses as a consequence of Dresden’s most destructive air raid in February 1945. Breslau refugee Annemarie Reitzenstein, however, discovered new hope in a surviving flower she found amongst the devastation of the city, reported ZDF.

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45 See: Fulbrook, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 147, 167.
46 Cited from: Till, K. E. *op. cit.*, p. 265. See also: Langenkämper, J. *Jedes Opfer stand vor seinem Scherbenhaufen. Mindener Tageblatt*, 07.05.05 (105), p. 4.
47 See: “Wir haben überlebt.” Erinnerungen an Dresden 1945. *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen* [Online]. 06.02.05 [Accessed 23.03.06]. <http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/5/0,1872,2258565,00.html> See also: „Vortrag im Historischen Zentrum zum Thema Luftkrieg.” Presse-und Informationsamt Rathaus, 1,
Nevertheless, others evidently found their Vergangenheitsbewältigung more difficult. Ursula Hoppe explained in 2004: ‘For many years I suppressed my experiences of 16 January 1945 in Magdeburg and even today, I have still not fully come to terms with what happened.’ Arguably, neither did other eyewitnesses from Magdeburg and Darmstadt. ‘For years, Annemarie Burchardt could not bear the smell of burning’, noted Dr. Maren Ballerstedt and Konstanze Buchholz. Survivor from Darmstadt’s heaviest attack on 11 September 1944, Edlind Grobe, stated in Honold’s publication *Darmstadt in a Firestorm* (2004): ‘Whenever I remember the past I am speechless in my grief, weep but then restrain myself once more.’

Statements since 2002 from the media, writers and amongst the population also suggested a loss of history not only arose from the results of trauma and repression, but also from something that is becoming increasingly articulated in Germany. Various articles have appeared in Germany suggesting that a suppression of mourning arose as a consequence of a widespread sense of collective guilt - promoted and fostered by past governments in West Germany. During November 1994, on the 50th anniversary of the firebombing of Heilbronn, local CDU politician Manfred Weinmann stated: ‘An outpouring of local emotions concerning the anniversary of 4 December 1944 is not appropriate with either the occasion or for reconciliation.’ These claims were particularly significant because they suggested a rejection of an officially endorsed Verfassungspatriotismus, or constitutional identity, and further evidence of clear disparities between official and popular collective memory.

According to historians Peter Steinbach, Stefan Berger and Jan-Werner Müller, a Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or a coming to terms with the past, ‘became part of the basic political consensus amongst the major parties in the FRG’. Yet, some have pointed to the alleged excesses of an officially endorsed Vergangenheitsbewältigung as being responsible for the construction of ‘artificial’ concepts, such as ‘post-nationalism’.
and ‘constitutional patriotism’, noted Stefan Berger and Jan-Werner Müller. Jeffrey Olick maintained, for instance, that for some, coping with the past represented ‘a national self-flagellation deriving from the Left’s critique of the Nazi past one that constrained Germany’s ability to claim a proud identity’. There have also been claims it prevented Germany from mourning the dead of the Air War.

**Forbidden mourning?**

Former lecturer and novelist Winfried Georg Sebald argued that not only did the internal and external destruction leave historical deficits in literature, but it also left a kind of taboo in its wake. This taboo was manifest in official requirements for silence on the theme, so as not to embarrass the occupying authorities (western Allies) or jeopardise funds needed for rebuilding Germany’s shattered cities. ‘There was a tacit agreement, equally binding on everyone, that the true state of material and moral ruin in which the country found itself was not to be described’, noted Sebald.

Indicative of this perception of a taboo against an open collective grieving were, arguably, the following comments by Konrad Jarausch, Mary Fulbrook and Dietrich Janßen. According to Emden historian Janßen: ‘The true extent of the moral, material and physical destruction was hushed up within an entire generation under a kind of taboo which often went unrecognised, even by witnesses themselves.’ ‘An emotional vacuum followed, leading to a mass withdrawal to the primary sphere, or privatisation’, as Jarausch and others described it. ‘There did not seem any way of framing mourning in an acceptable way in the past’, noted Fulbrook. According to Fulbrook and others, German private memories, grief and mourning for German victims ‘could not easily be integrated into the official story of ritual guilt since German grief and testimonies were considered inappropriate in the light of collective guilt.’ As there did not seem to be any way of constructing post-World War Two German society which could include the

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54 Cited from: Olick, J. K. op. cit., p. 549. According to Jan-Werner Müller, liberal intellectuals engaged in a kind of ‘intellectual Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ through writing a critical history that sought to explain the initial success of National Socialism. Cited from: Müller, J-W. op. cit., p. 36.
56 Cited from: Janßen, D. op. cit., p. 4.
lost,' argued historian Elizabeth Domansky, 'the dead - forever tainted by the stain of National Socialism - had to be forgotten.' Summarising the situation after 1945, former SPD Minister of Defence and member of the Bundestag, Hans Apel, recalled the prevailing attitude was that 'mistakes had been made and that these had to be paid for'.

One book in particular appears to have changed everything in Germany - Friedrich's 2002 publication Der Brand (The Fire). This publication seems to have had the most impact in Germany on the theme and was, according to the Mayor of Paderborn, 'the most comprehensive national portrayal of the Air War to-date'. 'For the first time in Germany, the Air War is now being comprehensively addressed by a German', declared the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR).

Until the appearance of The Fire, the Air War was taboo, claimed numerous other newspapers and periodicals. According to the Hagen Historical Centre and Malte Thießen, since 2002 Friedrich was widely hailed as a 'taboo breaker' by many publishing houses and the media. Broadcasting station the Hessischer Rundfunk and Geo magazine maintained that The Fire had broken the 'seal of silence' over a certain chapter in German history. Writing for Die Welt, Berthold Seewald claimed that now it may be possible to mourn in Germany for a memory that was repressed 'because the moralistic Basic Law of Germany wanted to promote a sense of shame and guilt'. Markus Schwering of the Kölner Stadt Anzeiger expressed concerns that 2003 could be the last chance for witnesses to present their terrible experiences to the present and forthcoming generations - without censorship. Mariam Lau, Jochen Bölsche and others were more outspoken in their attacks. As far as Lau was concerned: 'The tabooing of

60 Cited from: Bölsche, J. *op. cit.*, p. 42. See also: Sebald, W. G. *op. cit.*, pp. vii-x, 7-14.  
62 Cited from: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. *Neue Westfälische Zeitung*, 11.01.05, p. 3.  
66 Cited from: Seewald, B. *op. cit.*, p. 27.
this subject was an injustice that, in respect of the [SPD/Green] government’s avowal of democracy, it can no longer maintain.”

In 2003, Bölsche asked: ‘Will the nationwide chain of events surrounding the 60th anniversary finally remove one of the last remaining taboos of the past?’ Uwe Bahnsen, Klaus Rainer Röhl and Jörg Huber all seemed to think so. Commenting on those lost in firestorms during the worst air raids on Hamburg in 1943, Bahnsen maintained that this terrible theme was no longer taboo ‘throughout the rest of Germany’. Reuters and Hessian Broadcasting correspondent, Huber, also welcomed the alleged breaking of the taboo in Kassel that precluded the war-time generation from being accepted as collective victims and, arguably, the title of Röhl’s 2002 book, *The Forbidden Mourning: The End of German Taboos* was self-explanatory.

The belief that a taboo had been broken also extended to some historical institutions. ‘For many years the Air War was taboo in Frankfurt. Our new book marking the 60th anniversary of the air raid in March 1944, however, seeks to redress this unbalance’, declared Frankfurt am Main’s Institute for History. So too did Osnabrück’s Museum of Cultural History (KGM) and the *Braunschweiger Zeitung*. In 2004, the KGM released its publication called: *The Day Osnabruck Went Down 13 September 1944*. Local historian Matthias Rickling noted that until ‘very recently’, portraying the grief of the German population was generally perceived as ‘ein unausgesprochenes Verbot’. In a special edition commemorating the most destructive raid on Brunswick on 14 October 1944, discussing the sorrow of the local population, similarly the chief editor of the *Braunschweiger Zeitung*, Paul-Josef Raue, maintained that ‘the question of whether the destruction of the city was justified was taboo for almost 60 years’. Discussing past perceptions of the Air War with *Geo* historical magazine, sociologist and researcher of

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68 Cited from: Bölsche, J. *op. cit.*, p. 41.
71 Cited from: Michels, C. „Alle Häuser, ohne Ausnahme, brennen.” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 03.03.04, p. 37. See also: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.
72 Cited from: Rickling, M. *op. cit.*, p. 3.
violence, Professor Wolfgang Sofsky, also claimed that there had been a clear ‘proviso of terms’ of how the Allied Air Campaign was to be described - if at all.74

Responding to these and similar allegations in the Bundestag, politicians Angelika Krüger-Leiβner (SPD), Silke Stokar von Neuform (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Günter Baumann (CDU) denied that any kind of taboo had been imposed concerning remembering the Germans as victims.75 Along with Krüger-Leiβner and Baumann, others have also denied there was any kind of taboo regarding German collective memory. Reviewing the historical impact of Friedrich’s 2002 publication The Fire, Malte Thießen and Volker Ullrich doubted whether there has been any prohibition of the theme because of a number of articles dealing with the destruction of Hamburg and Dresden. In fact, Thießen claimed Operation Gomorrah, or the series of air raids on Hamburg in 1943, has always been part of the city’s identity.76

Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frank Teske of Mainz City Archives and newspaper editor Klaus Honold, also shared reservations of whether there had been a taboo. At the same time, however, Wehler and Teske maintained it was not until many years later that those involved were able or believed it appropriate to talk about it.77 This was because there was simply no opportunity for Germans to claim that they were victims, argued military historian Dr. Sönke Neitzel, Klaus Honold and journalist Alexandra Welsch.78 Along with Mary Fulbrook, Elizabeth Domansky and SPD representative of the Bundestag, Hans Apel, there have been similar claims that adopting the mantle of victim that, arguably, follows the emotional necessity of those affected by such events, was simply not possible at the time. For one thing, most of the victims had supported the Nazi regime, noted journalists and authors Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann, Jörg Huber and Dieter Forte.79

79 Collective mourning was not possible because mourning for the victims of National Socialism took precedence over a collective one, noted Huber and Düsseldorf eyewitness and author Dieter Forte. See: Huber, J. A. op. cit., pp. 3-4 and: Gleich bist du tot. op. cit., pp. 1-2. See also: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7.
Whatever the truth, official responses to these allegations appeared to highlight the ongoing reappraisal of National Socialist history, where evidence suggested popular memory contrasted sharply with an official one. Commenting on the public reactions to *The Fire* in the *Bundestag*, CDU representative Günter Baumann stated: ‘What has become increasingly amplified is the call amongst the German population for the survivors of the Allied Air War to be accepted as equal victims of war.’ Nevertheless, evidence suggested federal mainstream politicians have so far dismissed mitigating appeals for equal victim status by declaring that Germans, as collective victims of war, should be prevented from becoming a permanent part of a national policy of recollections. Maintaining that it was not appropriate for Germans to be mourned in a national context, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued:

German suffering has to be placed in a European context of suffering. It cannot be a national project. Otherwise, I suspect the real intention is the re-writing of history that reverses the roles of victim and perpetrator. In this sense we cannot talk about the Germans as victims.

There was a similar response from SPD member of the *Bundestag* Krüger-Leiβner. Responding in the *Bundestag* to Friedrich’s *The Fire* and the media’s appeals for parity of status for the bombing victims, Krüger-Leiβner (SPD) declared:

It is particularly dangerous whenever attempts are made in historical discussions to reappraise National Socialism. This is because the question of national self-understanding of the Germans always arises, which carries with it the danger of a new nationalism and exploitation of the past by apologists. We must not, therefore, permit any form of comparison of victims or their reappraisal.

Developments suggested that the official stance was not in accordance with the media, some historical institutions or elements of the public. Corroborated by CDU member of the *Bundestag* Martin Hohmann, Ute Frevert and others, Friedrich has now, in the words of military historian Sönke Neitzel, ‘burst the dam, fuelling a counter-discourse on Germans as victims’. Speaking in the *Bundestag*, Hohmann admitted that for the
first time Friedrich brought into central focus the Air War from the perspective of the 600,000 German civilians as victims. Not only were there increasing numbers of German articles and publications appearing on the role of Germans as victims, emboldened by the appearance of *The Fire*, many eyewitnesses have also spoken out for the first time.

Funded by Darmstadt City Council, local film producers Christian and Jutta Gropper received 25,000 Euros for their documentary film about the destruction of Darmstadt 60 years ago on 11 September 1944. Released in 2004, *Brandmale [Brands of Fire]* is also about the search for the rest of Darmstadt’s history, explained the producers. Challenging the claims of Bundestag politicians Baumann and Krüger-Leißner, according to the Groppers, the film clearly revealed ‘what could only be really understood by following generations after intensive reflection: the loss of the town’.

Including previously unheard eyewitness accounts, Christian Gropper stated: ‘As a consequence of Friedrich’s book, this theme will now be more openly and honestly addressed.’ Following the *Darmstädtener Echo*’s appeal for testimonies for the film, over 80 witnesses volunteered for the production. There was a similar response for the 2004 publication *Darmstadt in a Firestorm* by the editor of the *Darmstädtener Echo*, Klaus Honold. Over 100 testimonies were received by the *Darmstädtener Echo* for the book - many of whom had never before spoken or written about their experiences. Amongst those that did were Ema Reitz-Spielmann, Ruth Gaulrapp and Hilde Carpentier.

In response to an appeal for eyewitness testimonies for Honold’s publication *Darmstadt in a Firestorm*, Reitz-Spielmann described the search for her missing parents shortly after the firestorm in Darmstadt on 11 September 1944: ‘One of the bodies in the Hügelstraße lay burnt beyond recognition which could only be identified by the bunch

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85 For these claims see: Thießen, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2 and: Janßen, D. *op. cit.*, p. 4. See also: Baczyk, D. „Damit die Welt wieder gerade gerückt werde.” *Darmstädtener Echo*, 18.09.04, p. 13.
87 Cited from: Gruner, P-H. *op. cit.*, p. 11.

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of keys. Then I realised - they were those of my mother. There was no trace of my father.90

Further indicative of the breaking of a former repression and ongoing Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Darmstadt were the following statements by other survivors of 11 September 1944. ‘Forty years ago I read an appeal for the publication Brandnacht [Night of Fire]. It was not possible at the time to write or talk about that evening. But I am glad I have now done so’, wrote Ruth Gaulrapp. ‘One heard the cries of the trapped and burning that could no longer be rescued. Those kind of memories remain with one for a lifetime’, noted Hilde Carpentier.91

During 2003, over 100 testimonies were also sent to Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (HAZ) and the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ) newspapers in response to their post-2002 publications on the Air War. Editor of HAZ, Thorsten Fuchs, claimed that the newspaper received almost 250 accounts. ‘Many of these were children at the time and owing to social and professional pressure had until recently repressed their experiences’, noted Fuchs.92

In 2003, WZ interviewed one of the ‘very few who have addressed events in Düsseldorf’.93 According to local survivor and author Dieter Forte, what actually happened in Düsseldorf remained largely unarticulated either historically or publicly. Those who had read his book, The Boy with the Bloody Shoes (1995), actually thought it was science fiction, noted Forte and WZ.94 When WZ began its 2003 series of articles commemorating the Air War, WZ editors René Schleucher and Marc Herriger reported that over 100 people had submitted contributions for their new publication on the theme. ‘Many in Düsseldorf had not previously spoken about their terrible experiences

as victims’, noted Schleucher and Herriger.\(^{95}\) So how did, in the words of Fulbrook, the ‘kaleidoscope of personal memories’ and private stories intersect and interact with official representations of the past?\(^{96}\)

Rudy Koshar maintained that memory sometimes relies on stories told and retold, adapted and shaped in response to specific moments of opportunity or crisis.\(^{97}\) What for some is significant is not so for others, and either view may have been deliberately erased, omitted or manifested in quite different forms. This is, of course, the unreliable side of remembrance. On the other hand, it is an important source of evidence.\(^{98}\) As Fulbrook argued, only those who lived through the experience in question will have authentic personal memories.\(^{99}\) Making allowances for experiences being relative to the individual concerned, and taking into account the difficulties of generalising from small samples, it is possible to glean certain insights as to how the raids were being perceived in Germany at the time.

Undergoing 125 raids, no other city was so visibly transformed during the Air War than Hanover, claimed Jörg Friedrich.\(^{100}\) During July and August 2003, HAZ printed testimonies submitted on what life was like during the nights of bombing in Hanover during 1943.\(^{101}\) Describing the evening of Hanover’s worst attack on 9 October 1943, schoolboy Lothar Redlin recalled that due to smoke coming into the shelter from the firestorm the door had to be opened: ‘We saw phosphorous flowing over the asphalt and a woman on fire running screaming through the street.’\(^{102}\) Eight-year-old Helga Reinhardt corroborated Redlin’s account. On emerging from a cellar in Hanover after the same raid, Reinhardt claimed that neighbours and acquaintances rushed past her with burning phosphorous on the soles their shoes.\(^{103}\)

1,300 people were killed and 300,000 wounded in Düsseldorf on 12 June 1943. Recovering in a local hospital, Margot Schmidt described what she saw following the air raid:

\(^{95}\) See: Die Opfer waren damals so alt wie ihr. \textit{op. cit.} For the Westdeutsche Zeitung 2003 publication on the theme see: Steinacker, O. \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{96}\) Cited from: Fulbrook, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 155.

\(^{97}\) See: Koshar, R. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.

\(^{98}\) For these claims see: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.

\(^{99}\) See: Fulbrook, M. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 145-146.

\(^{100}\) See: Friedrich, J. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 228-229.

\(^{101}\) For appeals by HAZ see: Sommer 1943. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Erinnern Sie sich? \textit{op. cit.}, p. 15.

\(^{102}\) Cited from: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 73-74.

\(^{103}\) For testimony by Reinhardt, see: \textit{Ibid.}
A young girl was brought in. She sat by the only means of running water available in order to have her head dressed. In her hand held closely under her chin was one of her eyes. Until now I have been unable to recount the horror of what I saw that evening.  

Recalling the evening of 12 June 1943, during which he not only suffered serious injuries but also the loss of his mother, Heinz Lang reported that he wept on his first attempt to write down his remembrances. Of all the numerous testimonies that have appeared since The Fire, perhaps that by Kassel eyewitness Otto Pfützenreuter best summarised the ending of the former silence from survivors of the Air War: ‘What never ceased to amaze me was that people accepted this misery and distress without complaining.’

At odds then with official representations of the past, were the intense memories of the Air War from women and children as ‘forbidden victims’, noted Matthias Rickling, Dietrich Janßen, Jörg Huber and ‘many in the media’. Highlighting the growing disparities between official and public cultures of remembrance, evidence suggested that Friedrich was also a key factor in affecting the breaking of the past silence of many Air War survivors. ‘At last,’ declared Mariam Lau, ‘the German civilian population will have their sufferings acknowledged as a result of the appearance of Friedrich’s publication.’ ‘It would appear that the generation that experienced wartime suffering at first hand is now to be paid its deserved respects’, reflected Bernd Ulrich. Not, however, from the ruling Bundestag political elite.

‘Your memory and ours.’

According to the Federal Administration Office: ‘Commemorations serve to emphasise key events or profound experiences in the collective past that are significant for the
present and worthy of remembrance." Official reactions to appeals for a National Day of Remembrance for those lost in the Air War suggested they were unworthy of commemoration. This reluctance to grant national victim status for those lost in the Allied Air War reflected another disparity between official and popular national self-understanding.

Summer 2003 marked the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air War against Germany. Until April 2005, no fewer than 161 German towns and cities planned to remember it, claimed Der Spiegel. In Kassel’s town hall, for instance, a commemorative hour was held in October 2003. The people of the city, the local media and Jörg Friedrich attended. Outside the remains of Hamburg’s main church, the St. Nicolai-Kirche, a bronze statue by Edith Breckwoldt was set up, marking the 60th anniversary of Operation Gomorrah on the city, ‘in remembrance of those lost in the unimaginable inferno’, noted the CDU Mayor Ole von Beust. In September 2004, Darmstadt’s Mayor Peter Benz unveiled a three metre high pillar, commemorating the casualties of the raid in September 1944. Remembering the 17,000 killed on the evening of February 1945, a new stele was also established in Pforzheim on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Air War. In fact, along with Pforzheim, three other German cities hold annual commemorative events attended by local dignitaries to remember the heaviest raids and loss of life. In 1995, the Mayor of Magdeburg, Dr. Willi Polte, confirmed that: ‘Every 16 January we honour the victims of the inferno with commemorations.’ There are also annual remembrance initiatives in Heilbronn and Dresden to which several notables and foreign guests are usually invited.

Evidently, new monuments have been erected and numerous commemorative events held both past and present – but not at a national level. Responding to growing requests

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114 Cited from: Die Narben der Vergangenheit. Die Welt, 21.07.03, p. 34.
for a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims, in the Bundestag, Silke Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens) emphasised that the international element was of greater significance than national for remembering the dead of the Air War. Referring to the many events across the country, echoing Stokar von Neuforn, SPD member of the Bundestag Krüger-Leißner argued that: ‘An official National Day of Remembrance is therefore not necessary.’ Along with Krüger-Leißner, Free Democratic Party (FDP) representative of the Bundestag, Hans-Joachim Otto, also stated that Germany did not need any more memory initiatives, since it was not the duty of the German government to inaugurate a national memorial for Germany’s dead. But some historians and the German media thought otherwise. Despite increasing calls in the media ‘to permit those lost in the Air War justice, empathy, comprehensive recollection and recognition’, noted Ute Frevert and others, evidence suggested the Bundestag political elite has so far proved unwilling to accede.

In 2003, on the 60th anniversary of the largest air raid on Kassel, HNA’s chief editor and local author, Thomas Siemon, asked Jörg Friedrich what the relevance was of a national commemoration 60 years after the event. ‘Dispensing with all pretences of a self-appointed prophet of the nation’, noted Siemon, Friedrich claimed that: ‘Germany’s dead still do not have a name - or collective voice. What are they? Those lost in a total war or victims of a war crime?’ According to Friedrich, Kassel was amongst only six other German cities that lost more than 10,000 civilians in one air raid – the others being Hamburg, Darmstadt, Dresden, Pforzheim and Swinemünde. ‘Although the exact figure was never conclusively verified’, noted Kassel City Archives, they estimated at least 10,000 deaths as a result of the air attack on 22 October 1943.

Evidence from other sources also suggested there was a growing need for a collective voice for the bombing victims in Germany. Head of Heilbronn’s Municipal Archives,
Christhard Schrenk, stated in 1994: ‘After 50 years it is time to lay the facts on the table, because Heilbronn’s deliberate annihilation, along with the deaths of thousands of innocent people, have never been officially acknowledged.’ During 1998 and 1999, local historian Margarete Dörr interviewed numerous female survivors from the raid on Heilbronn on 4 December 1944 for Heilbronn Municipal Archives and for her publication on women’s wartime experiences. Dörr’s three-volume work included the testimonies of over 500 German women surveyed between 1988 and 1996. According to Dörr: ‘The worst part of the testimonies from the women of the town remains to be told.’ Referring to the 7,000 killed or missing in a single raid on Heilbronn on 4 December 1944, along with Jörg Friedrich, Dörr stated in 1999 that: ‘The dead have no voice.’

Since Heilbronn’s main cemetery proved inadequate to hold all those killed as a result of the Air Raid of 4 December 1944, mass graves were dug, noted Heilbronn Archives. This was a familiar pattern repeated in Hamburg, Magdeburg and Pforzheim. Between 24 July and 3 August 1943, Operation Gomorrah claimed over 40,000 lives. In its aftermath, corpses were thrown into mass graves adjacent to the main cemetery at Ohlsdorf, noted Egbert Hoffmann and Jochen Böltsche. Dr. Maren Ballerstedt and Konstanze Buchholz of Magdeburg City Archives explained how horses and carts brought the 2,000-2,500 bodies to the cemeteries after the 16 January air attack. ‘As these proved too small, mass graves had to be dug’, explained Ballerstedt and Buchholz. In 2004, the Pforzheimer Zeitung published a letter from a young woman writing to her husband at the front, describing the scene after the air attack on Pforzheim on 23 February 1945. According to the Pforzheimer Zeitung: ‘The dead had to be buried in a mass grave and everyone brought their dead or helped his or her neighbour up to the pit. We had forgotten what grieving really was.’

What Friedrich and others appeared to be suggesting, was that there was no appropriate form of mourning, culture of remembrance and, ultimately, identity for those lost in the Air War. Some Bundestag politicians have criticised this phenomenon as a misguided ‘Erinnerungskultur’ or culture of remembrance. Highlighting the apparent dilemma of German commemoration, member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), Peter Gauweiler, asked in the Bundestag: ‘How are we to integrate our nation with this Erinnerungskultur?’ Gauweiler then went on to cite an extract from the Süddeutsche Zeitung that ran: ‘There is no reason why the victims of the Allied bombing terror should not be remembered.'

This new Erinnerungskultur phenomenon also became particularly apparent in publications and statements from historical institutions in Paderborn, Solingen and Fulda. Along with Heilbronn in 1992, the city of Paderborn wanted to dedicate a book of remembrance to its dead in 2005. According to the head of Paderborn City Archives, Rolf-Dietrich Müller: ‘Some of the dead of the city remain faceless and anonymous and we believe that should change.’ Following the November raids in 1944, the dead of Solingen were taken to the so-called ‘body collection points’ at the cemeteries of Gräfrath, Höhscheid and Ohligs. ‘In many cases, identification or normal burial was therefore not always possible’, noted the head of Solingen Archives, Ralf Rogge, and local historian Armin Schulte. Although plans were laid in Frankfurt am Main during 1946 for a memorial to those killed in the 1944 air raids, it was not until 1978 that a commemorative plaque was finally realised in the city. ‘This proved inadequate, however, owing to its poor location’, complained the self-styled ‘memory of Frankfurt’ or the Frankfurt Institute of History.

According to a 2004 publication by Fulda Archives, both an official and public culture of remembrance of the Air War was ‘swept under the carpet, along with the pain and sorrow of those who survived it. 60 years on there is now, however, an opportunity to

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135 Cited from: Ibid. Bundestag politicians Baumann (CDU), Krüger-Leißner (SPD) and Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens) all noted (with clear reservations) that Friedrich’s The Fire encouraged the widespread perception that there should be no reason why those lost in the Air War should not be remembered as collective victims. See: Ibid., pp. 4103-4108.
137 Cited from: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. op. cit., p. 3.
remember those lost."140 Wolfgang Sofsky also maintained that the Air War was always an unpopular term, due to official assumptions that it was open to abuse.141 In 2003, members of the Bundestag Angelika Krüger-Leißner (SPD), Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP) and Günter Baumann (CDU) rejected such appeals for a specific National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims. ‘One must remember the Bombenkrieg has always been part of a memory culture’, stated Krüger-Leißner. Baumann maintained that Germans ‘always have been a part of our collective remembrance’.142 When appeals for eyewitness testimonies, statements from various leaders of municipal archives and eyewitnesses themselves are considered, the claims of Baumann and other members of the Bundestag that fears over a loss of the past were unwarranted, appear rather questionable.

Although a collective silence has now been broken, evidence suggested there was not only a widespread perception of a broken history, but also an attendant desire to recover and convey past suffering particularly to the younger generation. Janßen claimed, for example, that his 2004 publication would be of ‘particular interest to the young in Emden since schools never addressed the theme in the past’.143 Referring to the 1945 raid on Magdeburg, for instance, city tour-guide and survivor Christel Hörning wrote that ‘this terrible part of German history should never be forgotten or suppressed, either for German youth or for visitors to Germany’.144 These concerns also extended to the North Rhine-Westphalian Minister for Schools Ute Schäfer, Würzburg bookshop Schöningh and the Mayors of Paderborn and Pforzheim.

Promoting the past in Düsseldorf, local company Henkel, together with local newspaper the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ), arranged for ten free copies of their 2003 publication Air War over Düsseldorf to be issued to every secondary school in the city. WZ editors René Schleucher and Marc Herriger noted that Schäfer welcomed the project: ‘Concern about the past is not merely an end in itself. We have to convey this subject to our children in order that they can have a relationship with the reality of what happened’,

141 See: Sofsky, W. op. cit.
142 For official dismissals of a National Day of Remembrance for German civilians lost in the Air War, see Bundestag speeches by Krüger-Leißner (SPD), Baumann (CDU) and Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4108.
143 Cited from: Janßen, D. op. cit., pp. 3-4.
144 Cited from: Hörning, C. Personal communication, 14.04.04. Although not claiming to address any historical gaps in Magdeburg, Ballerstedt and Buchholz maintained that their 2003 publication served as a present and future remainder against forgetting 16 January 1945. See: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. op. cit., p. 3.
stated Schäfer.\textsuperscript{145} Henkel spokesperson Michael-Rolf Fischer also noted: ‘It is our duty to enable the young to discover this aspect of the past.’\textsuperscript{146} A similar initiative was sponsored in Würzburg. ‘Every school in Würzburg is to receive free copies of the 2005 booklet \textit{Chronicle of Würzburg 1945}, information folder and plan of the destruction of the city from the local bookshop \textit{Schöningh’}, reported the \textit{Main Post}.\textsuperscript{147} Events commemorating the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the heaviest air raids in 1945 on Paderborn were also addressed to the young of the city.\textsuperscript{148} Introducing a 40-page commemorative booklet in 2005 on the destruction of Paderborn, Mayor Heinz Paus stated:

\begin{quote}
We must remember the grief of those who endured and suffered the near total destruction of our old city. We owe that to the memory of our lost citizens and as a legacy to forthcoming generations of the perversion of war.\textsuperscript{149}
\end{quote}

Mayor of Pforzheim Christel Augenstein expressed similar views.\textsuperscript{150}

Freiburg historian Horst Boog was particularly vociferous in his demands for bringing past testimonies alive to the young. Although critical of some of the technical aspects addressed by Friedrich, such as radar equipment, nevertheless, reviewing \textit{The Fire}, Boog wrote: ‘The terrible portrayal of the Allied bombing war against German cities should be hammered into the next generation.’\textsuperscript{151} Magdeburg tour guide Christel Hörning also maintained that ‘a more realistic portrayal of the past must be undertaken in order to fully comprehend the political facts and to find their identity in the land of their birth’.\textsuperscript{152}

Further indications of an apparent need for a more comprehensive engagement with the past were allegations of a lost identity as a result of the immense destruction. Commemorating the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Air War in Frankfurt am Main, the

\textsuperscript{145} For statement by Schäfer and details of the publication by the WZ, see: Die Opfer waren damals so alt wie ihr. \textit{op. cit.} and: Steinacker, O. \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{146} Cited from: \textit{Die Opfer waren damals so alt wie ihr. op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{148} See: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{150} See: \textit{Ausführungen von Christel Augenstein, Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Pforzheim, anlässlich der Gedenkfeier 23.02.2005, 16 Uhr, auf dem Hauptfriedhof}. Stadt Pforzheim, Hauptamt Pressereferent, pp. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{152} Cited from: Hörning, C. Personal communication, 14.04.04.
Frankfurt Institute for History released a publication supplemented by an exhibition in 2004. Referring to the exhibition, Head of Frankfurt’s Department of Culture, Bernhard Nordhoff, declared: ‘Not only do we want to hold a memorial ceremony, but also ensure people know what happened.’\textsuperscript{153} According to the Head of the Frankfurt Institute for History, Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff, this was because ‘events have only just become realistically portrayed’.\textsuperscript{154} Lamenting the loss of Frankfurt’s identity, introducing their 2004 publication, editors Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff and Tobias Picard noted: ‘Birthplace of Goethe and the intellectual domain of Schopenhauer, the destruction of the city in March 1944 robbed Frankfurt of its original identity.’\textsuperscript{155} ‘On account of war-damage sustained many beautiful old buildings in Krefeld had to be demolished. Many Krefelders still mourn for this loss of architecture’, noted Elisabeth Kremers of Krefeld City Archives.\textsuperscript{156}

But not all had such regrets, or were so keen to remember past generations in Germany. During the 60\textsuperscript{th} commemoration in Leipzig, demonstrators ran into the main function room of the town hall crying ‘never again Germany’, throwing out flyers with the headlines: ‘German perpetrators are no victims.’\textsuperscript{157} In front of the British Embassy in Berlin, anti-fascists invited locals to a party under the caption: ‘Thanks England. Whether New York, London or Paris, everyone loves Bomber Harris.’\textsuperscript{158}

Many others, however, clearly mourned the loss of their city’s respective history, architecture and identity. Dismissing reproaches of attempting to adopt a cult of victim, Dr. Antje Telgenbücher argued: ‘The dead of Paderborn have their place in the private history of every family, but, at the same time, their fate is also Paderborn’s and thus part of the city’s identity.’\textsuperscript{159} Proudly noting that even Berliners used to travel to Hamburg whenever they wanted fashionable or luxury goods, grieving the loss of its thousand-

\textsuperscript{153} Cited from: Michels, C. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37. This exhibition was held in the \textit{Karmeliterkloster} and ran from 04.03.04-02.05.04. See: Hock, S. \textit{Vor 60. Jahren: Die Altstadt im Feuersturm. Die Presse-und Informationsamt der Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 09.03.04 (9), pp. 1-2. For the Frankfurt Institute for History’s 2004 publication see: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{154} Cited from: Michels, C. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{155} Cited from: Michels, C. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{156} Cited from: Michels, C. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 3-4.


\textsuperscript{158} Cited from: Rosendahl, I. \textit{04.12.43 Leipzig gedachte gestern der Toten. Leipziger Volkszeitung, 05.12.03, p. 19.}

\textsuperscript{159} Cited from: Rosendahl, I. \textit{04.12.43 Leipzig gedachte gestern der Toten. Leipziger Volkszeitung, 05.12.03, p. 19.}


\textsuperscript{159} Cited from: Steinmetz, J. \textit{Kein fragwürdiger Opferkult. Stadt Paderborn. Neue Westfälische, Paderborner Kreiszeitung, 24.03.05 (70), p. 3.}
year-old history, chief editor of the *Hamburger Abendblatt* newspaper, Egbert Hoffmann, wrote: ‘The recording of the appalling disaster of the Hamburg firestorms is still outstanding both for posterity and the world.’

‘Following the November raids in 1944, the distinct and uniqueness of Solingen’s medieval past was irretrievably lost’, noted Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. Referring to the former city’s once magnificent baroque town hall as the ‘pride of Emden’, Dietrich Janßen expressed clear frustration, sorrow and bewilderment over its substitute and the time taken for the ‘grave events and destruction of the city to be appraised’.

Summarising official reactions to appeals for a National Day of Remembrance for victims of the Air War, Krüger-Leißner stated: ‘Our collective memory must not become a national politics of remembrance.’ Reluctance from the Bundestag elite to acknowledge the suffering of the war generation at national level not only seemed at odds with significant sections of the media and historical archives, but also with a general current ‘Zeitgeist’ or spirit of the times. This raised further questions as to whether there is a consistent collective memory and, thereby, coherent national identity in Germany today.

Arguably, one way of ascertaining the mood at the time was by public reactions to eyewitness testimonies themselves. According to Fulbrook, ‘our memories are not simply un-refracted reflections of the past, but are in part products of the present - prompted and limited by surviving evidence, records, the memories of others and current conversations’. Recollections of eyewitnesses of events were not only indicative, to some extent, of a past phenomenon, but also reflective, perhaps, of a more recent one. How painful events are privately recalled, publicly discussed and politically memorialised, arguably, form integral elements in a sense of collective identity, noted Fulbrook. That is what makes them both significant and a barometer of the spirit of the times. ‘Literature, non-fiction works, films and local television, have all taken up

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162 Cited from: Janßen, D. *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4, 6, 72-78.
164 According to the Baden-Württemberg authorities, there was a deep, but marginal, belief that a taboo had been broken by a new and extensive paradigm change reflected in a political-cultural Zeitgeist. This was particularly evident in the discussions about the Allied air raids on German cities during World War Two. See: *Verfassungsschutzbericht Baden-Württemberg* 2002. Stuttgart: Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg, Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, Mai 2003, p. 15.
these new histories of victims and perpetrators which the German public have responded to with the high sales and audience figures’, claimed Ute Frevert. 167

Since its publication in 2002, Friedrich’s The Fire has consistently been a ‘best seller’. Within a month of its publication, The Fire had sold more than 100,000 copies ‘with a theme hitherto confined to local history publishing houses or railway-station bookstalls’, noted Berthold Seewald. 168 At the end of 2002, for example, Heimo Schwilk claimed 50,000 copies had been sold, with a further 30,000 printed to meet the expected demand. 169 Nevertheless, it was not just The Fire that became a best seller. Along with the Braunschweiger Zeitung’s 2004 special publication on the Air War, Pforzheim survivor and former lawyer Hannelore Schöttgen’s 2003 book was also a best seller. 170 According to the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, advertisements to its 2004 publication on the Air War prompted continual enquiries from the newspaper’s readership as to when the book would be available, stirring considerable local interest when finally released. 171

As far as films, radio and television broadcasts on the theme went, in April 2003, ZDF presented a 90-minute documentary. Not only was Jörg Friedrich’s ‘portrayal of the horror’ of the Anglo-American air raids on major cities, such as Berlin and Cologne, depicted, but also the effects of the raids on smaller cities, such as Aachen, Mainz and Würzburg. 172 In 2003, Spiegel TV author Michael Kloft interviewed Friedrich and the British historian Richard Overy in a television documentary about the 1944 raid on Brunswick. 173

There have also been a number of films and broadcasts at local level. Radio broadcasts on the theme included transmissions in Bremen and Hildesheim. 174 In Hildesheim, for instance, the local station DLF Nachrichten held a radio discussion called...

168 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 27.
169 For these claims see: Schwikl, H. op. cit., p. 9 and: „Der Brand“ · Trauma und Tabu. op. cit.
172 Cited from: Bomben auf Deutschland. Berliner Morgenpost, 04.02.03, p. 10.
Remembrances on the 23 March 1945 and Hildesheimer Identity.\textsuperscript{175} New films and documentaries on Mannheim and Kassel also appeared in 2003, documenting the destruction of the respective cities. Radio and television presenter Eberhard Reu\ss of Southwest German Broadcasting (SWR), for example, produced a 45-minute documentary video entitled The Injured City, based on the recollections of female survivors in Mannheim and comments of local military historian Dieter Wolf.\textsuperscript{176} Thus, evidence suggested that Friedrich was a major catalyst in affecting a more sympathetic approach towards the suffering of the Air War generation.

Not all, however, were so ready to accept the war generation as equal victims in collective remembrance, or welcomed this new spirit of the times. Reviewing Volker Keller’s Mannheim in the Bombing War, Jörg Arnold criticised the local historian for not sufficiently underlining that the suffering of the survivors was a direct consequence of Nazi racial policies. Instead, Keller focussed on the ongoing physical and psychological trauma of the survivors.\textsuperscript{177} Although Mannheim only lost 2,171 of its residents during the entire war, owing to its relatively good system of air raid protection, the material destruction was extensive. Enduring many air raids, 31 of which were described by the Mannheim City Archives as ‘heavy’, in total, 49\% of buildings in the city were lost.\textsuperscript{178} Eyewitness testimonies suggested the physical and psychological damage was also considerable and ongoing. Eyewitnesses, such as Dorothea Fath, claimed that men wept when they realised nothing could be done to help those buried in the rubble. Werner A. Wurm recalled that he and others threw themselves onto the floor with their mouths wide open, in order to prevent their lungs from bursting from the impact of a ‘Luftmine’ or ‘blast bomb’.\textsuperscript{179} Summarising these and other statements from Mannheim, Doris Perlstein maintained that the pain from the scars of those days has not ceased.\textsuperscript{180}


\textsuperscript{176} The film in Kassel was Robert Schumann’s Bomben über Kassel 60 Jahre nach dem Inferno. See: Rede von Oberbürgermeister Georg Lewandowski zum 60. Jahrestag der Bombennacht. op. cit. See also: Reu\ss, E. Die verwundete Stadt. Erinnerungen an die Bombennächte. Südwestrundfunk, 2003. Videocassette.

\textsuperscript{177} See: Arnold, J. Sammelrez. Bombenkrieg. Humanities, Sozial-und Kulturgeschichte, 28.06.04, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{179} Cited from: Keller, V. op. cit., pp. 39. For the testimony of Dorothea Fath, see Ibid., p. 36. For details of ‘blast bombs’, see: Connelly, M. op. cit., p. 89.

Along with Jörg Arnold, Ralf Blank of the Hagen Historical Centre also expressed concerns about those adopting the same line of reasoning as Keller and Jörg Friedrich, dismissing claims that Friedrich was a credible model for research and future historians. Following Friedrich’s critical interpretation of events, however, a number of historians and historical archives in Germany released numerous publications on the Air War, arguably, indicating the growing extent of Friedrich’s influence. It seemed self-evident, therefore, that since the publication of Friedrich’s book *The Fire* in 2002, there was a new interest if not distinct empathy with those bombed out of their homes.

‘Liberation’?

As we saw in the last chapter, a minority of Germans are beginning to question Hitler’s sole responsibility for instigating genocide during the Second World War. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air Campaign against Germany’s cities, evidence suggested that many in Germany had reservations as to whether the bombings really did contribute to liberation. According to Matthias Rickling, Oliver Volmerich and Hans-Willi Hermans, the Allied Air Campaign was always justified in Germany because it led to liberation from the Hitler regime. During the 40th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the former West German President, Richard von Weizsäcker, referred to 8 May as a ‘Day of Liberation’ for everyone from National Socialism. More recently, Silke Stokar von Neuform of the Greens argued that the destruction of the last war was ‘without question morally justified because it led to a liberation from Fascism’.

Responses to these claims indicated a very different interpretation of the bombing. Contradicting official claims, evidence suggested there was an increasing sense of doubt with official moral and strategic justification for the Allied Bombing Campaign. This

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questioning of the former generally accepted Allied strategy to dispense with the Hitler regime, suggested a further distancing from an official Verfassungspatriotismus identity, based largely on collective atonement. More significantly, it represented another indication of a key dissonance between official and popular perceptions of collective memory and consequently, identity.

According to the editor of Dortmund’s largest daily newspaper, the Ruhr Nachrichten: ‘Whenever it is claimed the air raids liberated Germany from National Socialism, there is now a growing distance to the previous justifications of the destruction as an unavoidable consequence of the Air War.’ On the other hand, Volmerich refrained from questioning the moral or strategic issues of the bombing of civilians throughout his publication. Conversely, in May 2003, local historians Hermann Glaser and Ingmar Reither gave a historical lecture in Nuremberg’s Karl-Bröger Centre - attended by both young and old. During the lecture, Jörg Friedrich claimed that the Allies ‘carried out some of the raids in order to celebrate destruction for its own sake’. For Matthias Rickling of the Osnabrück Museum of Cultural History (KGM), Osnabrück’s past represented only too well this phenomenon of wanton destruction. ‘One of the most devastated cities of the Air War’, by 1945, 6,018 buildings had been totally destroyed, 1,434 people killed and 87,780 made homeless, noted Friedrich and Rickling. Rickling also claimed that by the time of the final raid on 25 March 1945, there was: ‘Nothing left to defend, nothing more to fight against.’ According to Rickling, ‘by 1945 there was scarcely any movement on the railway, which was the Allied justification for the raid and scarcely anything left of the oil or cable factories’. Not one of the city’s historical monuments was left unscathed. On the other hand, local historian Wido Spratte maintained that the city was a legitimate target, since it constituted an important rail junction for the movement of troops between Hanover, Münster, Bremen and the Netherlands.

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187 Cited from: Volmerich, O. op. cit., p. 3.
188 See: Ibid.
190 For these claims see: Friedrich, J. op. cit., p. 204 and: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 3, 50.
192 According to Friedrich, 94% of the city’s Altstadt, or old quarter, was completely destroyed. See: Friedrich, J. op. cit., p. 204. See also: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 34-41, 44-48.
193 See: Wie zertretenes Kinderspielzug. Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 01.03.05, p. 15.
Questioning the real motives of the raids after September 1944 on Fulda, Günter Sagan, Thomas Heiler and Beate Kann protested: ‘On 11 September 1944 the Air War reached its most appalling point, bringing in its wake death and destruction. Yet that was not enough – more attacks followed right up until March 1945.’ Throughout the war, the regional capital of Rhineland-Palatinate, Mainz, suffered 33 air raids - the first of which was in 1942 and the most devastating on 27 February 1945. ‘Admittedly, the air raids in 1942 were the only real effective counter-weapon to the successes of the German army’, argued military historian Sönke Neitzel. Nonetheless, the significant difference between the earlier raids and that of 27 February 1945 was that by the beginning of 1945 it was obvious the outcome of the war was in no doubt, argued Neitzel. A month after the February raid, Mainz was occupied by the Allies and so in that respect, argued Nietzel, military justification played no role. ‘In 1945 the raid was not a contribution to victory but more a spiteful action on an historical city with a significant cathedral’, contended Nietzel.

In February 1942, Britain resolved on breaking the morale of the civilian population by area bombing, ‘yet by winter 1944 it was evident that this objective was not working’, noted Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. In spite of the 1,000 raids on Germany, neither the German population nor war production ‘broke’, argued Matthias Rickling, Thorsten Fuchs and Stefan Wittke. Whilst some accepted the inevitable defeat, others, according to Rogge and Schulte, developed a fanatical resistance. ‘Right up until the end, there was a clear will to resist the intended objective of the raids’, noted Rogge and Schulte historians Rainer F. Schmidt and Hans Mommsen argued that area bombing of civilian districts - which should have brought the Nazi dictatorship down was completely futile in this respect, and actually brought civilians inadvertently closer to the regime. ‘In spite of occasional protests and minor civil disobedience, a popular civilian uprising against the National Socialist authorities envisaged by the Allies never

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199 Cited from: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., p. 3.
materialised’, reflected Rogge and Schulte. In fact, right up until the final days of the war, local journalist Karl Kühling and historian Matthias Rickling claimed the position of the NSDAP (National Socialist and German Workers’ Party) remained virtually inviolable in Osnabrück. Former Head of Minden Archives, Dr. Hans Nordsiek, was more sceptical about the adverse effects of the Allied bombing. Indicating that National Socialist exploitation of the raids had its limits as an effective means of propaganda, Nordsiek and Hans-Jürgen Amtage explained that the Nazi authorities forbade newspaper reports about the air attack on 26 October 1944 on Minden.

For Hans Mommsen, Rainer F. Schmidt and Matthias Rickling, however, area bombing only served to play into the hands of National Socialist propaganda. Frequent references by the Third Reich’s Minister for Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, to the air raids as ‘terror attacks’ was not without its effect, argued Mommsen, since they encouraged a ‘lynch mob justice’ mentality within the civilian population towards captured Allied pilots. There were reports, for example, of attempted and actual assaults on downed aircrews in Solingen and Osnabrück.

Along with Jörg Friedrich, according to Frank Stenglein, Jochen Bölsche and others, it was less the endeavours to shorten the war or rescue the innocent than a pure lust for destruction that was the real motivation behind area bombing. Summarising the fates of Bremen and Koblenz, journalist Georg Schmidt and historian Helmut Schnatz argued: ‘Carpet-bombing neither shortened the war nor had any direct influence over its final outcome.’ ‘Only for the opponents of Hitler’s regime and forced labourers did the raids really signify liberation’, reflected Mannheim historian Dieter Wolf and Hamelin journalist Wolfhard Truchseß. ‘We were delighted whenever the bombers came, because we believed their bombs brought the end of war nearer’, explained

201 See: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., p. 3.
202 For these claims see: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17, 42.
former Sachsenhausen concentration camp inmate Harry Dubinksy. German-born Jewish journalist and survivor of Operation Gomorrah, Ralph Giordano, stated: ‘In spite of all that happened, the British bombers were my liberators. As far as my family and I were concerned, the bombers were our second threat – the first being the Gestapo.’

Evidence indicated that reactions to the claims of Richard von Weizsäcker, Stokar von Neuforn and Gerhard Schröder not only underlined the disparate interpretations of the Air War as an act of liberation, but also reflected another instance of where alternative memories confronted one another. During an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, Joschka Fischer reiterated the essence of von Weizsäcker’s speech, claiming that the collapse of National Socialism brought liberation especially for Germany. Apart from an obvious sense of relief to an end of the bombing, evidence indicated that other more pressing factors overshadowed any feelings of liberation. Testimonies from Cologne, Fulda, Magdeburg and Osnabrück suggested that some remembered 1945 not as liberation, but as hunger, privation, horror and the loss of loved ones as a result of bombing.

One of the main privations for the German population in Cologne, Düsseldorf and Osnabrück at the end of the Second World War was the lack of food and health care. As a consequence of the bombing, for instance, hospital beds in Cologne had been reduced from 7,264 in 1939 to 1,627 by 1945. Indicative of the situation in Cologne during October 1945 was the birth of Kläre Schumacher’s son in a cellar of the ruins of a convent.

As well as experiencing hunger, Alfons Klüber claimed that he witnessed dogs digging up the remains of the dead for food in Fulda in April 1945 and accounts from the same year in Magdeburg and Osnabrück could, arguably, be interpreted as equally appalling. Anneliese Schultze described the scene two days after the raid on Magdeburg on 16 January 1945: ‘Soldiers fetched steaming black bundles out of the

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210 See: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.
211 For these claims see: Hermans, H-W. op. cit., p. 51 and: Steinacker, O. op. cit., pp. 42, 46. See also: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 47-51.
213 Cited from: Ibid.
rubble the size of large loaves of bread with long poles and laid them out in rows. I asked one of them what they were. “People”, replied one of the soldiers. 215 An unidentified woman described the aftermath of the final and most destructive raid on Osnabrück on 25 March 1945 to the city’s Museum of Cultural History (KGM):

When I came around after an explosion near the tunnel […] I found myself several metres away from where I had originally taken shelter. I felt warm and soft bodies under me - the dead and dying. Tatters of flesh hung on my clothing and I heard the groans of the injured. 216

It was also evident that searching for the missing and dealing with the dead in the aftermath of war featured more prominently for some than liberation. By 1 October 1947, for example, local historian Hermann Poppe-Marquard reported that 2,242 former combatants from the city of Osnabrück were still missing. 217 Frank Teske and Hans-Jörg Kühne reported in 2005 that for weeks following the raids on Mainz and Paderborn in February and March 1945, the local inhabitants were pre-occupied with burying the dead. 218 Mainz author Heinz Leiwig, along with eyewitness accounts from those cities corroborated their claims. 219 Thus, according to Mary Fulbrook, it seemed evident that: ‘The most searing private memories of war for women, children and serving soldiers were lost relatives and comrades.’ 220

Nevertheless, according to the federal German authorities: ‘Through collective remembrance of specific historic experiences, the fundamental values upon which the system of government and constitutional order are based come alive.’ 221 In his speech on the occasion of the 57th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, former Chancellor Schröder referred to the ‘gratitude to the former Allies in giving Germans the opportunity to embrace democracy’. 222 Polls and other evidence indicated that there was a distinct unease with official claims that the bombing served to liberate the

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216 Cited from: Rickling, M. *op. cit.*, p. 46. For other eyewitness accounts of the raid by Günter Heinemann and Anneliese Volpert, see: Löpke, K. and Jansing, H. Flugzeuge kreisten die Stadt förmlich ein. *Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung*, 24.03.05, p. 20.
country. In March 1995, 600 Germans were surveyed by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research and asked what particular events they considered represented a deep significance for German society since 8 May 1945. Only 7% believed that 8 May 1945 was important for Germany.\(^{223}\) In May 1995, Allensbach asked 2,000 Germans nationwide whether they had personally participated in any of the celebrations marking the end of the Second World War. Apparently contradicting Schröder, only 3% of those surveyed claimed they had done so.\(^{224}\)

Yet, perhaps the most significant survey questioning official claims was the following. In March 1995, 1,000 respondents nationwide were asked whenever they reflected over the past, what particular time of history represented in their opinion the happiest for Germany. Only 4% held that ‘liberation from the Nazis and the end of the war’ could be included as among the most joyful.\(^{225}\)

In addition, various regional historical institutions and a number of Wartberg Verlag publications reflected the growing challenges to the official justification that the Allied Air Campaign, and attendant devastation of German cities, facilitated the liberation of the country.\(^{226}\) At the time of writing, there were also increasing calls for official acknowledgement that ‘suffering should be weighed against suffering and guilt against guilt’, noted Frevert and others.\(^{227}\) Or as Matthais Rickling, Egbert Hoffmann, Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte indicated, there should be less emphasis on German accountability and more on Allied responsibility.\(^{228}\)


\(^{227}\) See: Frevert, U. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 11-12 and: Stephan, C. Wie man eine Stadt anzündet. \textit{Die Welt}, 23.11.02, p. 3. See also: Raue, P-J. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.

Speaking at the 50th anniversary of the destruction of Dresden, in 1995 the then President Roman Herzog claimed a reappraisal of the theme was not productive and did not correspond to the thinking of Germans. Perhaps, but as we have seen with so many other aspects of this theme, opinions about the Air War have changed considerably since 1995. Along with victim status and destruction, questions were not raised over the ethics of the bombing of civilians in public because, according to the journalists Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann and Cora Stephan, political correctness forbade it.

Whether the Allied Air Campaign against Germany could be morally justified or not was never the subject of open public debate in Germany after 1945, contended Winfried Georg Sebald and Paul-Josef Raue. ‘A defeated country that had murdered millions of Jews could hardly call on the victorious powers to answer for the destruction of German cities’, reflected Sebald. Or, as Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann and Dieter Forte noted: ‘Eclipsing all other considerations were the criminal dimensions of the Third Reich.’ Konrad Jarausch and David Conradt’s analysis of the situation serves to illustrate the atmosphere after 1945: ‘The post-war period functioned largely as an ahistorical space of prolonged penitence for previous transgressions.’ In sum, the prevailing feeling in postwar Germany and well into the 1980s was one of guilt that obstructed a serious historical reappraisal, noted Ingrid Wölk, Sönke Neitzel and Winfried Georg Sebald.

Since the appearance of Friedrich’s *The Fire*, various publications and discussions have intensified concerning the credibility of the Air War against ‘defenceless civilians’, noted the Mayor of Frankfurt am Main Petra Roth and others. Prior to Friedrich, the

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229 The term was used by *Der Spiegel* to describe the air attacks of 1945. See: Böltsche, J. *op. cit.*, p. 46.
231 For these claims see: Stephan, C. *op. cit.*, p. 3. See also: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. *op. cit.*, p. 7.
233 See: Huber, J. A. *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.
236 See: Roth eröffnet „März 1944“ Ausstellung zum Bombenkrieg. Frankfurter Rundschau, 24.03.04, p. 34.
'generally accepted justification for the Bombing Terror' was that without it, the war would have continued and claimed more lives, noted Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann and Hans Mommsen. In any case, argued Frank Stenglein and Dieter Forte, the Allied bombardment of Germany was considered as judgement for the support given by the German people for Hitler and National Socialist excesses. Whenever the sufferings of Germans themselves were raised, it was in the words of Fulbrook: ‘Difficult for them to be respected as genuine without the retort that Germans had, after all, brought it upon themselves.’ Speaking in Dresden on the 50th anniversary of the city’s destruction, President of the FRG at the time, Roman Herzog, declared: ‘Those who were jubilant at the outbreak of war finished up in tears because they had not done enough to prevent the National Socialists from seizing power in 1933.’

Yet, evidence suggested that along with Jörg Friedrich, many others no longer accepted those historical representations. What has increasingly emerged, at the time of writing, from both historians and the media, was that the closer the end of the War came, the more questionable the strategic necessity and legitimacy of the Allied air attacks. Aside from the questionable destruction and doubts over it facilitating liberation, Jochen Bölische, Friedrich and others suggested the Allied raids served at the end of the war as something, perhaps, rather more sinister - ‘Strafaktionen’ or punishment raids. This was, arguably, another indication of where a rewriting of the past has also been a matter of redefining German national identity.

Many used to believe in Germany, reflected Cora Stephan and Hamburg journalist Christoph Kucklick, that the Allied Bombing Campaign was merely directed towards military and industrial targets of Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, many in Germany have also since questioned this standpoint. For historians, such as Matthias Rickling, Helmut Schnatz and Frank Kreißler, the characteristic feature of area bombing was not the alleged industrial, communication or transportation, but the residential areas of towns.

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238 See: Mommsen, H. op. cit., p. 16. For claims by Reinhard and Wittmann, see: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7.
241 Cited from: Ansprache von Bundespräsident Roman Herzog in Dresden. op. cit.
243 See: Stephan, C. op. cit., p. 3 and: Kucklick, C. op. cit.
and cities. Frank Kreißler of Dessau City Archives also raised questions over the alleged restriction of American strategy to ‘purely industrial and communication objectives’. In the preface of his 2004 publication Dessau in Ruins, Kreißler claimed that of the 1.4 million sorties by the Allies, few differentiated between civilians, workers, military or industrial targets. Questioning the merits and intention of the RAF’s strategy, Dr. Helmut Schnatz claimed the ratio of incendiaries deposited on Koblenz on 6 November 1944 far outweighed conventional explosives: 153,848 incendiaries to 143 high explosives. This ratio and the actual location of the target, according to Schnatz, betrayed the real intention of the attack, namely ‘the incineration of residential quarters’. Schnatz provided an aerial photograph from Flight Lieutenant Young taken from his Lancaster bomber, clearly indicating the area illuminated by flares dropped marking the target area was the inner city – not the alleged railway lines spanning the Pfaffendorfer bridge. Along the same lines, Dietrich Janßen of the Bunker Museum emphasised that the explosives used to destroy Emden on 6 September 1944 comprised predominantly of incendiaries ‘dropped on the densely built-up areas of the old town’.

Although the attacks on Fulda were directed on militarily significant targets, at the same time, ‘their effect on civilian areas was certainly taken into consideration’, noted Sagan, Heiler and Kann. In neighbouring Frankfurt am Main: ‘1,001 men, women and children lost their lives on the evening of 22 March 1944 in the city. This corresponded to 18% of Frankfurt’s total casualty rate during the entire war’, explained the Frankfurt Historical Institute.

On the other hand, Göttingen historian Martin Heinzelmann argued that without the Allied Air Campaign, even more lives would almost certainly have been lost. Yet, according to journalists Christoph Kucklick, Hans-Willi Hermans and others, what has

244 Matthias Rickling argued that although the 8th American Air Force allegedly specialised in precision bombing against industrial and transportation targets, a large number of German civilians were killed, which at the time was passed off as ‘unavoidable collateral damage of war.’ Cited from: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17, 20.
246 Cited from: Schnatz, H. op. cit., pp. 21, 23.
247 Ibid., pp. 9-23.
become increasingly apparent in Germany was the question of whether the bombardment of German cities, resulting in thousands of deaths, was really necessary in order to remove Hitler. In contrast to official interpretations of the purpose of Allied air raids (which was to liberate Germany), ‘from January to May 1945 Allied bombers with pure punishment actions killed on average more than 1,000 civilians per raid’, noted Jochen Bölsche. Although there was nothing more to defend by 1945, the intention of the final raid of 25 March 1945 was to ‘strategically purify Osnabrück’, contended Matthias Rickling. Others have also sought to draw attention to the legitimacy of the casualties in the latter stages of the war.

Between January to the final capitulation in May 1945, Jörg Friedrich, MDR, Oliver Reinhard and Jochen Wittmann estimated that at least 130,000 died as a result of such air raids. According to Jörg Friedrich and Hans-Willi Hermans, the average casualty rate was 1,023. ‘From February to March 1945, long after the outcome of the war was self-evident, a whole row of German towns and cities were left in soot and ashes’, noted Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. Almost three quarters of the entire bomb load of the War fell during this time. There have also been various claims that ‘militarily insignificant and defenceless towns and cities’, such as Mainz, Pforzheim and Würzburg, were targeted in order to inflict the greatest possible terror and destruction.

Questioning the real motive for the heaviest attack on Mainz, Frank Teske of the local archives reported that about 1,200 people died in this the final raid of the war on the city. According to Teske, the raid did not achieve its alleged military objective of destroying the local transport infrastructure. In February 2005, Wolf Günthner reported that Pforzheim was almost entirely obliterated in 17 minutes following the air raid on 23 February 1945, claiming ‘at least 20,000 lives’. Nevertheless, according to

254 Cited from: Rickling, M. op. cit., p. 44.
257 Cited from: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., p. 3.
259 See: Teske, F. op. cit.
Pforzheim historian Ursula Moessner-Heckner, by February 1945 Pforzheim no longer constituted any military or economic significance.\textsuperscript{261} ‘It died needlessly and was destroyed simply because it had not yet been destroyed’, noted Moessner-Heckner.\textsuperscript{262}

Apart from the Third Reich’s broadcasting service and press releases, before Friedrich only a few, such as GDR representative on the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, Olaf Groehler, and neo-Nazis openly challenged the conduct of the Air War.\textsuperscript{263} Following Hildesheim’s heaviest raid of the war on 23 March 1945 by the RAF, the headline of the local National Socialist newspaper, the \emph{Hildesheimer Zeitung}, referred to the perpetrators of the destruction as: ‘Sadistic barbarians whose hour of reckoning would soon be upon them.’\textsuperscript{264} Official organ of the Nazi Party for the Gau Hessen-Nassau area, the \emph{Rhein-Mainische Zeitung’s} front-page headline after a particularly destructive air raid in March 1944 ran: ‘Renewed Bombing Terror Tries to Break our Resistance.’\textsuperscript{265}

Neo-Nazis have also commemorated the Allied Bombing Campaign in the aforementioned manner, which, since 1996 the authorities have consistently condemned.\textsuperscript{266} As for how right-wing extremists have described the Allied raids, along with the Saxon authorities two other local authorities recorded protests within their annual security reports.\textsuperscript{267} Saxony-Anhalt’s Minister of the Interior, Manfred Püchel, reported in 2000 that right-wing extremists from across the region laid wreaths at Magdeburg’s main cemetery bearing the dedication: ‘The NPD-KV Magdeburg remembers the Allied war crimes’ and ‘murder of the German people on 16 January 1945’.\textsuperscript{268} Marking the 60th anniversary of \emph{Operation Gomorrah} in July 1943, the Hamburg authorities complained that local right-wing extremists and the National

\textsuperscript{261} Cited from: Top Secret: Churchill gesteht britische Terrorangriffe ein 23. Februar 1945. \emph{Pforzheimer Zeitung}, 23.02.05 (44), pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{262} Cited from: Güntner, W. \textit{op. cit.} See also: Top Secret: Churchill gesteht britische Terrorangriffe ein 23. Februar 1945. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{263} For these claims see: Bölche, J. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 42 and: Sebald, W. G. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{265} Cited from: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 37-38, 40. The raid occurred on 18.03.44.
\textsuperscript{266} See: \textit{Verfassungsschutzbericht 1996.} Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Mai 1997, p. 156.
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) held a commemorative march through Hamburg’s city centre in July 2003 under the tenor: ‘60th anniversary of the Bombing terror.’

In an interview with the German television station Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), Potsdam historian Julius Schoeps claimed that in the past, the Air War was inseparable from Hitler’s regime and its atrocities. CSU representative Peter Gauweiler stated in a Bundestag debate on a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims: ‘German collective guilt is inextricably and extensively embedded within German historical consciousness.’ Fear of being labelled a revisionist meant the conduct of the Air War generally went unchallenged, argued Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittman and Hans-Jörg Kühne.

But since 2002, questions and demands for Allied accountability - particularly within the German media - are becoming increasingly independent from Nazi atrocities and the extreme right, noted Julius Schoeps, Berthold Seewald, Hans-Jörg Kühne and others. According to Kühne, critics of the theme attempted to expose paradoxes and inconsistencies concerning the claims that German suffering has not been sufficiently addressed in the past. At the time of writing, however, evidence suggested there has been a perceptible turn of the tide in attitudes towards the examination of German suffering. Holger Dohmen of the Hamburger Abendblatt and Paderborn historian Dr. Antje Telgenbücher maintained that describing or remembering the horrors of the Air War had nothing to do with either forgetting the crimes of the National Socialists or right-wing revisionism. ‘It is simply the issue of human sorrow’, noted Sven Kellerhoff. Although Thorsten Fuchs and Stefan Wittke maintained that German suffering should not take precedence over German crimes, nevertheless, they did...
suggest that, perhaps, it would have been more productive if an ‘alternative narrative’ concerning the Air War had been fostered. 277

During an interview with The Daily Telegraph, Jörg Friedrich contended that the Allied war leaders ‘should be judged using the same moral standards as those that they had vanquished’. 278 According to Die Welt, Rudolf Walther and Achim Reinhardt, many in Germany agreed. 279 Cora Stephan writing in Die Welt, for example, argued: ‘Whoever preaches the indivisibility of human rights must also record past misdemeanours on both sides.’ 280 Rudolf Walther described the Air War as a ‘barbaric strategy’ that for Hamburg journalist Uwe Bahnsen and many others has led to ‘irrefutable moral questions being thrown open over the Allies’ excessive employment of firestorms’. 281

Klaus Honold described the dropping of 80 million incendiaries on German towns and cities as a ‘perfidious military logic that served no strategic use whatsoever’. 282 As a result of thousands of incendiaries being dropped on Hamburg, Magdeburg and Frankfurt am Main, according to Jörg Friedrich and Dr. Sabine Hock, huge firestorms were unleashed. 283 Rushing through the streets at 15 metres per second, those who did not reach the cellars and air raid shelters in time were pulled into the firestorm, noted Maren Ballerstedt, Konstanze Buchholz and the Head of the Frankfurt Institute for History, Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff. 284

Speaking in the Bundestag, SPD politician Angelika Krüger-Leiβner maintained that the destruction of Dresden and Hamburg would never have occurred without Rotterdam or Coventry and, therefore, German suffering should be secondary to the sorrow of others. 285 Yet, for Berthold Seewald, this division into ‘good and bad victims’ was ‘absurd’ because innocent Germans suffered during the Air War irrespective of whether Hitler attacked Coventry in November 1940 or not. 286 Sven Kellerhoff claimed

277 See: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 3-4, 34, 55.
278 Cited from: Cleaver, H. op. cit.
279 See: Reinhardt, A. op. cit., p. 15.
280 Cited from: Stephan, C. op. cit., p. 3.
286 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 27.
that scarcely anyone in Germany today would hold all Germans as collectively guilty – especially women and children.287

Prior to the Queen's visit to Germany in 2004, according to The Times and The Daily Telegraph there was a 'pent-up demand for British repentance in the country'.288 Further indicative of the demands for Allied accountability were the numerous articles and publications betraying a sense of anguish and injustice from those who had lived through the bombardments.289 Journalists Reinhard Kalb, Holger Heith and Wolfhard Truchseß noted that some survivors gave vent to their anguish over their personal loss in Bochum, Hamelin and Nuremberg - in some cases even accusing the Allied bombers of being 'murderers'.290 This also became evident in the tone of a number of national and regional articles.

Commemorating 16 March 1945, Würzburg council official Wolfgang Jung declared: ‘About 5,000 people - 3,000 of whom were women and children - suffocated, burned to death or were killed by falling masonry.’291 Area bombing claimed more than 600,000 civilians - almost 80,000 of them children, noted Der Spiegel and Die Welt.292 In fact, as the Lübecker Nachrichten, the Kölnische Rundschau, The Fire and other publications and articles on the 60th anniversary seemed particularly keen to emphasise, it was mainly women and children who were the main recipients of the bombing.293

Before the advent of The Fire, most mainstream German historians went out of their way not to attract official allegations of revisionism, by avoiding suggestions that the Allies should be held just as accountable for their actions as the National Socialists.294 Along with the media, during and since the 60th anniversary of the Air War, the suffering of the innocent was also raised by a number of historical institutions. This

287 See: Kellerhoff, S. F. op. cit., p. 27.
288 Cited from: Boyes, R. Should the Queen say sorry to Germany for bombings? The Times, 29.10.04, pp. 48-49 and: Cleaver, H. op. cit.
289 This was particularly apparent from survivors in Brunswick and Cologne. See: Raue, P-J. op. cit., pp. 3-103 and: Hermans, H-W. op. cit., pp. 15-22, 26-32, 35-39.
292 See: Bolsche, J. op. cit., p. 38 and: Kellerhoff, S. F. op. cit., p. 27.
294 For these claims see: Bolsche, J. op. cit., p. 42 and: Kühne, H-J. op. cit., p. 7. See also: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7 and: Klugermann, G. op. cit., p. 3.
development suggested not only another paradigm change in German collective memory, but also a further challenge to official conceptions of national identity.

'Apart from the theme being generally officially ignored, the fact that the victims of the Air War were primarily women, children and the elderly is all the more reason that it should be heightened within public conscience', noted Sagan, Heiler and Kann of Fulda Archives.\(^{295}\) Claiming that the victims of the raids on Solingen in November 1944 were predominantly women, according to Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte: ‘Mothers wandered around helplessly with their infants as the first bombs fell at midday.'\(^{296}\) Matthias Rickling of the Osnabrück Museum of Cultural History and Dr. Andreas Fahl of Hanover’s Historical Museum, both criticised the ‘indiscriminate manner’ in which women and children were killed in raids on Osnabrück and Hanover.\(^{297}\)

‘Planquadrat Gustav Ulrich 5’ was the German air-defence codename for impending attacks on Hanover during the war. Often listened to by Hanoverians, its messages could be detected by good transmitters broadcasted by the early-warning radio station code-named ‘Primadonna’.\(^{298}\) Commemorating the 60th anniversary of the raids on Hanover, the city’s Historical Museum called their ‘special 2003 exhibition’ after it, reported local newspaper the *Neue Presse*.\(^{299}\) During the evenings of 8-9 October 1943, the Allies dropped 3,000 conventional explosives and 258,000 incendiaries. As a result, 1,245 Hanoverians died in the following firestorm.\(^{300}\) ‘Those who could, threw themselves into the local lake’, noted a 15-year-old former anti-aircraft gunner.\(^{301}\)

Questioning the moral aspects of the strategy, exhibition curator Dr. Andreas Fahl stated: ‘The terror of the raids did not differentiate between Nazis, opponents of Hitler, women or children.’\(^{302}\) In fact, Matthias Rickling, Frank Kreißler and Wolfgang Sofsky actually went as far as to suggest that the Allies could also be held accountable as


\(^{296}\) Rogge and Schulte highlighted that 20 female first-aid workers died in the flames of the second consecutive attack on Solingen following the first on 04.11.44. See: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 24-25.

\(^{297}\) See: Rickling, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 37, 46.

\(^{298}\) See: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. *op. cit.*, p. 47.


\(^{302}\) See: *Ausstellung Planquadrat Gustav Ulrich 5. op. cit.*, p. 2.
murderers and criminals'. Other German historians, however, such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Ralf Blank, claimed that Jörg Friedrich and others in his wake overstated their case. Wehler challenged the terms Friedrich employed to describe the Air War - in particular his analogies to a war of annihilation against civilians. Wehler also maintained in an interview with Der Spiegel that the question should not be over Allied guilt, but what was actually strategically feasible at the time. Ralf Blank, meanwhile, argued Friedrich 'places too much graphical emphasis in his publications'.

Hans Mommsen, Lothar Kettenacker and Sönke Neitzel, on the other hand, were more sympathetic to Friedrich's depictions of German suffering, along with the historian's insinuations of Allied accountability. Deputy Head of the German Historical Institute, Lothar Kettenacker, claimed the Allied Bombing Campaign on civilian targets was neither militarily necessary nor morally legitimate. ‘Although Hitler initiated the brutalisation of warfare, equally the British also developed weapons specifically to be directed against civilians’, stressed Hans Mommsen. Whilst also referring to the Allied casualties, at the same time, Mommsen claimed that by way of comparison the figures almost ‘fade into total insignificance when compared to German casualties – most of whom were women and children’.

For Sönke Neitzel, the last raid on Mainz in February 1945 was an indefensible atrocity that nothing could justify. In contrast to the official line, with the exception of Elizabeth Kremers of Krefeld City Archives, none of the other six Wartberg Verlag publications by various archives or historians on the theme attempted to justify the aerial bombing of civilians. Numerous publications encouraged by The Fire suggested a radical change in this particular perception of the National Socialist past.

307 ‘55,000 Allied bomber pilots were lost in comparison to 570,000 German civilians’, noted Mommsen. See: Mommsen, H. op. cit., p. 16.
308 See: Reinhardt, A. op. cit., p. 15. For similar contentions see also: Leiwig, H. op. cit., p. 3.
Despite increasing reappraisals of the Air War and how its 60th anniversary was remembered, mainstream politicians shared neither the media’s nor numerous historical institutions’ appeals for official recognition of Allied culpability. Discussing public reactions to The Fire in the Bundestag, SPD representative Angelika Krüger-Leifner argued, for instance, that public remembrance of the Air War must not lead to a re-orientation of Germans as victims or reversed charges of culpability.310 ‘Germans should bring neither accusations of guilt nor offset sorrow against sorrow, since it has to be made clear who the actual perpetrators and victims of the Air War were’, argued members of the Bundestag Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP).311 ‘Germans are in no position to make allegations of external responsibility anyway’, declared Silke Stokar von Neuform of the Alliance 90/The Greens. Others have also stated there must be no reversals of indictment. Journalist Ralph Bollmann and Professor Ute Frevert accused Friedrich and those who took up his arguments of ‘l lapsing into historical relativism’.312 Ulrich Rauff even reproached Friedrich for ‘over-emotionalising the facts’.313

But for some, Friedrich had not gone far enough. Although Friedrich had addressed the long overdue theme and broken the silence, Klaus Honold noted that the Berlin historian had not given adequate expression to the emotional effects of the bombing in Darmstadt. Commenting on Friedrich’s The Fire, Honold noted: ‘The sorrow and pain clearly remaining in the city is not visible in the material.’314 Achim Podak of the television station Das Erste Online maintained that: ‘After almost 60 years, it is high time to bring out into the open the pain and private memories hitherto repressed.’315

There were even claims that the true extent of the horror remained largely unarticulated. In 2003, Anja Greulich and Jörg Müllner from ZDF television produced a film using previously un-released footage censored at the time by the authorities. Josef Goebbels, the Third Reich’s Minister for Propaganda, prohibited the taking of any photographs of

311 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 4104, 4106-4107.
315 Cited from: Podak, A. op. cit.
German victims by the German press.\textsuperscript{316} According to the \textit{Berliner Morgenpost}, their photographs revealed entire city centres ablaze, people wandering around after losing their homes or broken bodies lying in the streets. ‘These are bad enough,’ explained Greulich, ‘but we still have not dealt with the worst yet.’\textsuperscript{317} Indicative of this stance, newspaper editors, Egbert Hoffmann and Hans-Willi Hermans, declared in their publications on Hamburg (2003) and Cologne (2004) that the actual numbers of those lost and the misery of the survivors remains ‘far too understated’.\textsuperscript{318}

There were also similar observations elsewhere in Germany. As part of the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary commemorations, Friedrich was invited to give lectures on the Air War in Nuremberg, Bochum and Paderborn.\textsuperscript{319} According to Friedrich, during these lectures and discussions it became evident many had never read or been instructed about the Air War from their teachers. ‘Whilst every 16-17-year-old knew all about Auschwitz, many were astounded on hearing what happened to the German civilian population.’\textsuperscript{320} Similar claims were made in Minden and Würzburg. Referring to the 2005 photographic exhibition in Minden’s museum documenting the city’s destruction, Robert Kauffeld claimed that the younger generation scarcely believed what they saw.\textsuperscript{321} According to Wolf Rottenbauer, one of the many questions put by Würzburg schoolchildren to local eyewitness Jutta Nüdling was: ‘Why were the dead stacked-up in the cathedral?’\textsuperscript{322}

In conjunction with a public memorial service and reception in the city’s main function chamber, the \textit{Kaisersaal}, on 23 March 2004 the Mayor of Frankfurt am Main, Petra Roth, opened the Frankfurt Historical Institute’s exhibition \textit{March 1944 – Frankfurt during the Air-War}.\textsuperscript{323} Assessing the mood in the city and, arguably, other places at the time, during the memorial service Roth stated: ‘I have the impression from both young


\textsuperscript{317} Cited from: Bomben auf Deutschland. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{318} Cited from: Hermans, H-W. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3 and reverse cover. See also: Hoffmann, E. A. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{319} See: Kalb, R. \textit{op. cit.} and: Heith, H. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4. See also: Sirt, Gedenken an die Bombennacht. Stadt Paderborn. \textit{Neue Westfälische, Paderborner Kreiszeitung}, 24.03.05 (70), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{320} Cited from: Aufenanger, P. \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{321} The exhibition ran from 01.05.05-22.05.05. See: Kauffeld, R. 1945: Trümmerberge in der Bäckerstraße. \textit{Mindenere Tageblatt}, 02.05.05 (101), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{322} Cited from: Rottenbauer, W. Als die Toten im Dom gestapelpt wurden. \textit{Main Post, Stadt Würzburg}, 18.03.05 (64), p. 5.

\textsuperscript{323} The exhibition was held in Frankfurt’s \textit{Karmeliterkloster} and ran from 04.03.04-02.05.04. For details see: Hock, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1-2 and: Roth eröffnet „März 1944“. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.

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and old alike that many questions remain unanswered. That is why the theme has to continue.\footnote{Cited from: Roth eröffnet „März 1944”. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.}

To summarise, for five years Germany’s cities were under perpetual bombardment. In contrast to official claims, Winfried Georg Sebald, Dieter Forte, Jörg Friedrich along with many others have argued that the true extent of the destruction remained unarticulated at national level. Although German contributors to the theme, such as Hans Erich Nossack, Hans Brunswig, Heinrich Boll and Dieter Forte, depicted their experiences at a local level, until \textit{The Fire}, there have been numerous claims that there was no comprehensive national account of the Air War in Germany. Responding to these allegations and public reactions to Friedrich’s \textit{The Fire}, members of the Bundestag Günter Baumann (CDU) and Angelica Krüger-Leißner (SPD) maintained that there was no ‘\textit{Gedächtnisverlust}’ or loss of history.\footnote{For responses by Bundestag representatives Baumann and Krüger-Leißner, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 4104-4106, 4108-4109.} Evidence suggested that not only was there a sense of a loss of history and identity, but also that the trauma of the Air War was never properly dealt with in the national consciousness of Germany.\footnote{Cities where this seemed particularly apparent were Darmstadt, Freiburg, Hanover and Frankfurt am Main. See: Gruner, P-H. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11 and: Filmemacher suchen Zeugen zum 27. November 1944. \textit{op. cit.} See also: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 3-4 and: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 3-4.}

Numerous articles have also suggested that a loss of history not only arose from the results of trauma and shock, but from real or perceived official repression. Various journalists and local historians claimed, for example, that a general silence arose as a consequence of an officially endorsed collective guilt, resulting in a public suppression of what was actually thought and felt about the Air Campaign. In short, there was a widespread perception that an official ‘taboo’ prevented Germany from mourning its dead, coming to terms with its past and from claiming equal collective victim status for those lost during the Air War.

This sense of an insufficient ‘\textit{Vergangenheitsbewältigung}’, or coming to the terms with this aspect of the past, also extended to demands for a National Day of Remembrance for the victims of the Air War.\footnote{For public demands for a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 4105-4108.} There have been claims that the dead in Germany have ‘no voice’ and, arguably, identity. Referring to the thousands lost in the air raid on Darmstadt on 11 September 1944, for instance, editor of the \textit{Darmstädter Echo}, Klaus...
Honold, declared in 2004 that: '10,000 dead cannot speak.'

Appeals for a collective voice and national place of mourning for the bombing victims have been, in the words of Ute Frevert: 'Justified by the argument that the suffering of the German civilian population has so far been neglected or completely ignored in how the consequences of National Socialism are remembered.'

Indicative of this sense of neglect were claims from Jörg Friedrich, local historians and the media, that current and future generations should be more aware of what happened. Introducing Frankfurt am Main's 2004 exhibition on the Air War, arguably reflecting the fears of many in Germany, Head of the City Archives Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff stated: 'A state loses its identity if it is unaware of its past.'

Reluctance from the Bundestag political elite to introduce a National Day of Remembrance and thus grant collective victim status to those lost during the Air War represented another instance where alternative memories confronted one another. This became particularly apparent in the widespread public interest in various non-fiction works, films and broadcasts in which the Air War generation were increasingly portrayed as victims - not perpetrators - of war. Malte Thießen even claimed that in the current culture of remembrance, Polish and British victims of German bombing were sometimes almost completely overlooked.

Because there were widespread concerns that witnesses are dying out, evidence suggested their testimonies and new books on the theme were increasingly being requested and digested by many of the present generation. Yet, for some in Germany, such as Bundestag politicians Angelika Krüger-Leifner, Silke Stokar von Neuform and Die Zeit journalist Bernd Ulrich, publications such as The Fire appeared to be 'selling rather too well'.

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332 Cited from: Ulrich, B. op. cit., p. 46.
Concerns expressed in the Bundestag about the apparent change in public attitudes suggested not only another paradigm change in German collective memory, but also a further challenge to official conceptions of national identity. ‘It seems the past will not go away because what for a long time was never talked about is now being talked about’, reflected Heimo Schwilk. So much so that Jörg Friedrich has been acclaimed by many as a ‘taboo-breaker’. Evidence suggested, therefore, that Friedrich has been instrumental in affecting a new paradigm change concerning how those lost in the Air War are remembered.

Contradicting claims from the Bundestag political elite, evidence also suggested a change in a culture of remembrance extended to whether the Air War could be strategically or morally justified. This questioning of the official stance on the Air War and justification for the Allied strategy in ridding Germany of Hitler indicated a further rejection of German identity based on an alleged penitential ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’. Increasingly questioned by German historians and the media, was the official line that the bombing raids contributed to or signified liberation from Nazi tyranny. In fact, evidence suggested that most survivors remembered 1945 as bereavement, burying the dead or just concerns with sheer survival. Summarising numerous archive and other publications on the Air War, Lothar Kettenacker concluded: ‘No serious German historian would attempt to justify area bombing of civilians either strategically or morally.’ Or in the words of Jörg Friedrich: ‘It was excessive, wrong and never once achieved the alleged and hoped-for effect.’

Yet, despite growing pressure from many in the media and some historians, there was no official accord with charges of Allied culpability. Bundestag representatives from the mainstream political parties maintained that German suffering must not be equated with the suffering of Germany’s victims. ‘Germans are in no position to make allegations of external responsibility’, declared Silke Stokar von Neuforn of the Alliance 90/The Greens. Although contending that the Allies should not be absolved from their share of responsibility for past events, at the same time, Klaus Honold repudiated Friedrich’s

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333 Cited from: Schwilk, H. op. cit., p. 9. See also: Rickling, M. op. cit., p. 3.
334 According to Stefan Berger, Berthold Seewald and Jörg Huber, an officially endorsed and excessively penitent ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ prevented Germany from mourning its dead or coming to terms with the past. See: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 254 and: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 27. See also: Huber, J. A. op. cit., pp. 3-4. For similar claims see: Röhl, K. R. op. cit., pp. 76, 219.
335 Cited from: Kettenacker, L. op. cit. See also: Mommsen, H. op. cit., p. 16.
argument that the raids in the latter stages of the war served as actions of retribution. ‘The question of whether or not the raid of 11 September was a war crime is pointless’, contended Honold.338

To conclude, in spite of Bundestag politicians’ claims to the contrary, for some in Germany the Air War still has not found adequate expression and neither have its psychological effects diminished. Not only did evidence suggest that many were still coming to terms with the past, but despite numerous allegations of a breaking of past taboos, a historical void still needed to be filled in Berlin, Darmstadt and Frankfurt am Main, for example.

On the one hand, a loss of history and official prohibitions against remembering German civilians lost in the Air War could be disputed. In 1978, 1983 and 1995, for instance, local authors Hans Brunswig, Thomas Grabe and Dieter Forte provided accounts of the firestorms in Hamburg, Hanover, and Düsseldorf.339 Although the theme was evidently addressed before the appearance of The Fire in the aforementioned cities, the essence of more recent publications and articles from these and other cities indicated that past events had not adequately been dealt with from the perspective of the Germans as victims.340

On the other hand, perhaps, the standpoint of the Germans as victims should not be the only perspective of the Air War. Together with the hundreds of civilians killed in the bombing of Rotterdam and Coventry in 1940, many forced foreign labourers also died during air raids in Bochum, Hamelin and Göttingen. According to the Head of Bochum City Archives Ingrid Wolk and Hamelin historian Bernhard Gelderblom, for example, foreign slave labourers were forbidden from using public air raid shelters.341

340 For books and articles indicative of this phenomenon in Hamburg, Hanover and Düsseldorf, see: Hoffmann, E. A. op. cit., pp. 9-44 and: „Das Thema war überfällig.” Bombenkrieg über Düsseldorf. op. cit. See also: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 3-78 and: Valentin, G. Findling erinnert an Tragödie. Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.11.05, p. 3.
Along with demands for a national memorial to the victims of the Air War, there was an overriding sense of urgency from some survivors, the media and local historians to continue to convey the pain of a neglected past – especially to the young. For the moment though, the Bundestag political elite continued to show a marked reluctance to collectively remember this particular aspect of the past.

Responding to the question put by The Times on how far collective grief should be permitted to shape a new German patriotism, former manager of an East German factory, Ernst Rietze, declared: ‘We would just like the same right that other countries have to express our identity. Is that so bad?’ So how far should German suffering determine German memory and identity?

On the one hand, some may claim that digging up the past serves no positive purpose and alienates those who suffered at the hands of Adolf Hitler. Although, perhaps, no-one would dispute that the employment of firestorms was hideous, on the other, some may contend they needed to be, in order to rid Germany of a cruel dictator. Some may even argue that history is not a private living room of remembrance. But why try to hide the past? As the 60th anniversary of the Air War clearly indicated, it often re-appears in any case – especially when branded by horror, trauma and a sense of injustice. It was this combination, along with an overriding need to remember the Air War from the perspective of the Germans as victims, which distinguished a popular Erinnerungskultur and identity from that of the Bundestag political elite.

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342 For these concerns by Minden and Hamlin historians Monika Schulte and Bernhard Gelderblom, see: Gelderblom, B. and Truchseß, W. F. op. cit., pp. 13-17 and: Zeitzeugen sollen Erinnerungen niederschreiben. Mindener Tageblatt, 14.05.05 (111), p. 9.

343 Cited from: Boyes, R. op. cit., pp. 48-49. 'A cross section of Germans were questioned by The Times at the Brandenburg Gate', noted Roger Boyes. See: Ibid.
Chapter 6.

Contested Sites of Memory - Symbols for and against Expulsion.

Sites of memory selected by post-reunification elites as alleged 'icons of historical memory' can offer useful insights into understanding German historical memory and identity. Serving as King Frederick-William III of Prussia's palace guard quarters between 1816 and 1818, the New Guardhouse in Berlin became the official national memorial to the fallen during the Weimar Republic and again during the Nazi regime. Established in what Karen E. Till described as the 'symbolic centre of the city', the New Guardhouse was also the descendant to the former East German monument to the Unknown Soldier from the Second World War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a redesigned New Guardhouse was ceremoniously unveiled in November 1993. During the observance, the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech and laid a wreath at the New Guardhouse, which, according to officials, has since served as the new national memorial to Germany's fallen.

Arguably, cultural practices and rituals, such as the laying of wreaths at national memorials or festive parades that take place along a prescribed route, 'naturalise a collective identity', noted Robert Foster. For example, Till claimed that citizens physically enact what is 'normal, appropriate or possible for a group at a particular setting'. Sites of memory might differ considerably from those intended by political elites, however. Challenging the alleged collective function of the New Guardhouse, proposals for a central memorial and National Day of Remembrance commemorating the flight and expulsions of ethnic Germans were compelling examples of where alternative 'landscapes of national memory' have been created.

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4 Cited from: Till, K. E. op. cit., p. 254.
5 Ibid.
Although former German governments have not refused to acknowledge the suffering of ethnic Germans who fled or were expelled from East and Central Europe at the end of the Second World War, this chapter contends that key members of Germany’s former Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green ruling political elite had rejected them as national and collective victims of war.

Another apparent inconsistency in commemorating Germany’s dead, along with acceptable collective images of the past, was how former Group Captain Werner Mölders was remembered. Other alternative landscapes of memory were the Hermannsdenkmal (monument to Hermann) and the Varus-Schlacht (Varus Battle), celebrating the preclusion of foreign influence from Germany, along with the misappropriation of ancient Germanic symbols by right-wing extremist heathen groups. Analysing the legacy of the Hermann monument and the battle it commemorates for German national identity, this chapter also suggests an official distancing from Germany’s ethnic origins and ancient symbols, highlighting further contradictions between popular and official national self-understanding.

Reflecting on the way the past has become an integral part of a symbolic politics of the present, issues of representation have also assumed a new importance in the politics of memory and identity. This chapter suggests, therefore, that the alleged roles of the New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) and Day of National Mourning as central symbols of collective memory and mourning are increasingly being brought into question.

A Centre against Expulsion. ‘The expellees that were not expellees.’

In 2003, the Federation of Expellees (BdV) wanted to establish a permanent exhibition and memorial as a suitable place of remembrance for millions of ethnic Germans who fled or were expelled from East and Central Europe at the end of the Second World

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War. As part of the post-war settlement of Europe between 1945 and 1947, almost 12 million German refugees (Flüchtlinge) and expellees (Vertriebene) were ‘re-settled’ amongst four zones of occupation. Forced to leave East and West Prussia, Hungary, Poland and the Sudetenland, their former homelands have since become part of the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and the Baltic states.

At the 1945 Potsdam Conference between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the main Allied Powers convened to clarify and implement agreements reached at Yalta in February that year. It was agreed that Germany would be denazified and divided into four occupation zones, administered by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Germany’s institutions, economy, borders and populations were also to be reorganised.

To mark their plight, the BdV planned a £69 million Centre against Expulsion containing a permanent exhibition, library artefacts and a possible statue. Along with the bombing victims, according to the Sächsische Zeitung and Jörg Friedrich, the expulsions of ethnic Germans from the former German territories in the east was Germany’s biggest catastrophe since the Thirty Years’ War of 1618-1648. Since the generation which experienced the expulsions as victims is dwindling, not only were their fears that their past would pass away undocumented, but there have also been allegations of official indifference and even malevolence from some quarters. ‘One of the biggest tragedies of the twentieth century could fall into oblivion’, declared East Friesian authors Dr. Heiner Schröder, Petra Herterich and Lübeck historian Karen Meyer-Rebentisch.

Along with representatives of the two million-strong BdV, some sections of the German media, for example, claimed that the suffering of Germans driven out of former German
territory in Poland, the former Czechoslovakia and East Prussia by the Red Army has so far generally been ignored.18 Therefore, the day of our founding (5 August) should constitute a National Day of Remembrance for the victims of the Expulsions’, declared the President of the BdV Erika Steinbach.19 There were also demands for a National Day of Commemoration from the East Prussian and Silesian Welfare and Cultural Associations for ethnic Germans.20 Concerning the fate of her members, speaking on the Day of Homeland in September 2001, Steinbach and others claimed that the eviction of millions of ethnic Germans from Central, East and Southeast Europe ‘left almost no trace in official consciousness’.

Responding to public appeals for official recognition of victim status, SPD representative Angelika Krüger-Leißner declared in the Bundestag that: ‘Germany has always remembered the German expellees in our collective memory.’23 Interestingly, comments by the former SPD Minister of the Interior Otto Schily appeared to contradict Krüger-Leißner. During her speech on the Day of Homeland in 2001, Erika Steinbach thanked Schily for his past support for the BdV. Speaking in the Berliner Dom on 29 May 1999, for instance, Schily claimed: ‘For years, the political left in Germany virtually ignored the crimes against the expellees.’

Other evidence suggested responses from SPD/Green politicians, concerning how the expulsions were remembered, also appeared to have exposed key dissonances within German collective memory. Referring to the number of representatives from France, Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary and the Slovak Republic at the Day of Homeland, Steinbach highlighted that their presence indicated the significance attached to the issue
in which the fate of millions remained hidden under an alleged ‘veil of silence’.\textsuperscript{25} Implying current generations of Germans have not been adequately informed over Germany’s past trauma, spokesperson for the Federation of Expellees, Walter Stratmann, declared: ‘We want to show that the German people - especially women and children - also suffered terribly as a result of being expelled.’\textsuperscript{26}

‘Shot, hung, raped, frozen or starved to death’ - almost two million Germans died during the expulsions, noted Petra Herterich, Dr. Heiner Schröder, Karen Meyer-Rebentisch and others.\textsuperscript{27} Underlining an apparent ‘need to bring the theme closer to the young’, noted Hessian expellee representative Rudolf Friedrich, Meyer-Rebentisch and Kristina Stau maintained they were no longer prepared to accept the neglect and suppression of this particular aspect of Germany’s past.\textsuperscript{28} Wittenberg historian Christel Panzig and journalist Helga Hirsch also declared that there must finally be an end to a repression of German history.\textsuperscript{29} Suggesting further evidence of a divided memory and national self-understanding were the numerous allegations of official taboos concerning the theme.

Reporting about the former ‘shame and embarrassed silence of around a million women abused and expelled from former German territories’, the fate of German expellees was ‘until very recently taboo’, maintained the women’s branch of the BdV, Meyer-Rebentisch and Berlin historian Ute Schmidt.\textsuperscript{30} There were various claims, for example, of official taboos in former East Germany (GDR) about the questioning or the open discussion of the suffering of German women as a result of the behaviour of the alleged Soviet ‘liberators’.\textsuperscript{31} Interestingly, Christian Social Union (CSU) politician Peter

\textsuperscript{25} Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung ächten.” op. cit.
\textsuperscript{26} For statement by Stratmann, see: Paterson, T. op. cit.
Gauweiler noted in the *Bundestag* that Günter Grass’s 2002 publication *Im Krebsgang* (*Crabwalk*), focussing on the Pokriefke family of West Prussian refugees aboard the *Wilhelm Gustloff*, was widely held by the German public as a ‘taboo-breaker’.32

On 30 January 1945, hospital ship the *Wilhelm Gustloff* embarked from the port of Gotenhafen (now Gydnia in Poland) near Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland), carrying around 1,000 wounded German soldiers and at least 5,000 refugees – mostly women and children - noted Günter Grass.33 Sunk by a Soviet submarine, according to Grass only 1,230 people were saved. This event constituted the deadliest maritime disaster of all time and was ‘taboo’ in the former GDR, noted *Die Welt* and the publishers of *Crabwalk*, Faber and Faber.34

Although Hans-Ulrich Wehler disputed that the theme of expulsion was a ‘taboo’, nevertheless, the Bielefeld historian conceded there were certainly deep inhibitions about discussing what happened in 1944 and 1945.35 Consequently, ‘thousands of Germans still live as homeland expellees with a broken biography and missing identity’, claimed Erika Steinbach.36 There were similar contentions from Hamburg *Geo* magazine investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke, along with academics Manfred Wille and Karen Meyer-Rebentisch. Indicative of their broken story is the outstanding fate of 600,000 ethnic Germans from the ‘Vertreibungsgebiete’. To this day, photographs of the missing still hang on the walls of the homes of expellee families, noted Jaenecke and Meyer-Rebentisch.37

As a result of missing, psychologically or physically impaired fathers and mothers traumatised by rape, many war generation children also have an identity crisis, noted psychiatrists Hartmut Radebold and Elmar Brähler.38 Areas whose female inhabitants in particular endured mass rape, for example, were Demmin, Saxony and Berlin. ‘There

34 See: Grass, G. *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 50, 135-142, 161-162, rear cover.
35 See: „Die Debatte wirkt befreiend.” *Der Spiegel*, 25.03.02 (13), p. 61.
36 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten.” *op. cit.*
were between 300,000 and 400,000 cases in Berlin alone during 1945', claimed Bielefeld historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler. During and following the advance of the Red Army, German historians Wehler and Hubertus Knabe estimated almost two million women and girls were raped by soldiers of the Red Army – thousands of whom were later deported to and died in Soviet forced labour camps.  

For instance, between 15,000 and 30,000 Germans died from hunger, disease, cold or abuse between 1945 and 1950 in Sachsenhausen, the former Nazi concentration camp. Their treatment and subsequent deaths in other so-called 'Speziallager', or special camps, such as Ketschendorf (Speziallager Nr. 5) in the former GDR, were, until reunification, ‘taboo’, claimed Berlin author Regina Scheer and former Ketschendorf detainee, Alfred Jank. As a result of their experiences, many have remained ‘permanently disturbed’, noted Greifswald psychiatrist Philipp Kuwert and Berlin historian Ute Schmidt. Accounts by survivors from the former Siberian labour camp Schadrinsk, along with the reports from abused females now resident in East Friesland and former East Berlin, confirmed the aforementioned claims of permanent psychological and physical distress. For many years, Erika Eden, Eva-Maria Stege and Hildegard Rauschenbach suffered severe back pains or depression as a result of their experiences in former East Prussia and East Brandenburg during 1945 and later within Schadrinsk.  

Citing from Günter Grass’s Crabwalk, CSU politician Peter Gauweiler admitted in the Bundestag that whilst the suffering of Germans remained largely forgotten, it was very much alive within the history of every German family. However, Erika Steinbach lamented:

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39 Cited from: Ibid. See also: Zimmer, G. „Forum.” „Kriegsende in Demmin.” Erinnerung für die Zukunft. Norddeutscher Rundfunk 1 Radio MV, Broadcast 03.05.05 20:15 – 21:00. Cd-Rom.  
40 For these claims see: „Kriegskinder.” Trauma von Bomben und Tod quält noch heute viele Menschen. op. cit., p. 28 and: Hoppe, B. Die Verbrechen der Roten Armee. Berliner Zeitung, 09.05.05, p. 26.  
Nowhere in Germany is there a roof for an overall view of this tragedy, and nowhere for interested citizens to see for themselves the history and fate of these people. Knowledge of our own past is important for Germany’s future. That will only be realised, however, if school lessons in every facet of the twentieth century are objectively reappraised. With this, of course, belongs the fate of the German expellees.  

Reflecting this sense of inadequate commemoration and articulation of past trauma was a survey carried out in November 2004 by the Hamburg magazine Geo. Asked whether the theme had been sufficiently dealt with in German schools and universities, of the 1,471 Germans surveyed, 145 (10%) replied in the affirmative. 989 (68.3%) thought otherwise. ‘After decades of silence, many women are only just coming to terms with what happened to them’, maintained Berlin historian Ute Schmidt, Munich Professor Michael Eermann and Greifswald University psychiatrist Philipp Kuwert. Further indicative, therefore, of the ongoing dissonances between officials, the media and historians over the alleged role of memorials, was whether German suffering should be placed within a national or European context.

**Here, there, but nowhere yet...**

Although Jürgen Kocka suggested a bilateral rather than a national project, at the same time the Berlin historian favoured a German location for the centre. ‘What speaks against Berlin? Nothing!’ declared Munich historian Michael Wolffsohn. Wolffsohn went on to argue: ‘Every decent human being has to approve of such a centre.’ Frankfurt historian Lothar Gall reasoned that since the expulsions constituted a part of German history, such a project should be located in the political centre of the country. On the other hand, historians Fritz Klein (Berlin) was against Berlin and Karl Dietrich Bracher (Bonn) rejected any kind of centre at all.

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46 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung ächten.” *op. cit.*
47 The survey included the following age groups: 151 (10.7%) younger than 20 years; 436 (30.9%) between 20-30; 373 (26.5%) between 31-40 and 449 (31.9%) over 40. See: Finden Sie, dass das Thema „Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen“ an Schulen und Universitäten ausreichend behandelt wird? In: Umfrage: Flucht und Vertreibung. *Geo Magazin* [Online]. 02.11.04 [Accessed 21.06.05]. <http://www.geo.de/umfrage-vertreibung>
As far as federal officials were concerned, any German memorial against expulsion had to be in a European context. In the words of Germany’s former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: ‘It cannot be a national project.’\footnote{Cited from: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” – Interview mit Bundesaussenminister Fischer über ein Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen und über das Geschichtsbild der Deutschen, Wochenschrift „Die Zeit“ 28.08.2003. Auswärtiges Amt [Online]. 28.08.03 [Accessed 02.02.04]. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4793>}

Along with Fischer and the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, according to the Berliner Morgenpost most SPD/Green politicians, at the time of writing, supported the ‘Europeanisation’ of the project. ‘Any Centre against Expulsion must not be explicitly connected to the German expellees’, declared Schröder.\footnote{Cited from: Facius, G. Schroder lehnt Zentrum fur Vertriebene in Berlin. Die Welt, 14.08.03, p. 4. For claims of the rejection of a national project by most SPD/Green politicians, see: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, Berliner Morgenpost, 16.07.03, p. 3.}

Not only was there opposition from members of the 1998-2005 SPD/Green government against a national theme for a centre, but also to its proposed central location. During a summit with the then Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, Schröder declared: ‘A centre should not be constructed in Berlin.’\footnote{Cited from: Boyes, R. Poles enraged by memorial to expelled Germans. The Times, 24.09.03, p. 14.}

In an interview with journalists from Die Zeit, Joschka Fischer also spoke out against a centre for the German expellees in Berlin. ‘Such a project could only be conceivable in a European context’, argued the former Foreign Minister.\footnote{Cited from interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.}

Opposition to Berlin also came from SPD representatives Lorenz Postler and Markus Meckel. SPD Deputy Mayor of Berlin’s Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district, Lorenz Postler, stated he would vote against Berlin - in spite of the considerable financial gain the project could bring to the city. ‘So long as the debate has not been settled for a European location, I regard the national initiative as wrong’, contended Postler.\footnote{Cited from: Falkner, M. op. cit., p. 4.}

SPD member of the Bundestag Markus Meckel meanwhile suggested Wroclaw in Poland, whilst former SPD Minister of Culture Christina Weiss appealed for a European solution to the planned exhibition, Flight and Expulsion, to be set up in Bonn.\footnote{See: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin. op. cit., p. 3. For Weiss’s comments see: Streit um Vertriebenen-Zentrum – Schily will mit allen sprechen. Bundesministerium des Innern [Online]. 16.07.03 [Accessed 18.11.03]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_92625.htm>}

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Along with Meckel, former presidents of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) and Rita Süssmuth (Christian Democratic Union (CDU)), also expressed concerns that a
national project would arouse the mistrust of Poland and the Czech Republic. Former Polish Foreign Ministers Władysław Bartoszewski and Bronisław Geremek, for instance, signed a joint appeal stating: ‘Setting-up such a centre as a national German project creates mistrust among neighbours and cannot be in the interests of our countries.’ In Berlin, Poland’s Ambassador Andrzej Byrt raised concerns expressed by the Polish media against the centre. Czech officials also protested to Joschka Fischer, who was visiting Prague to discuss the Czech Republic’s forthcoming European Union (EU) membership. According to The Daily Telegraph, ‘hostile Czech journalists asked an embarrassed Fischer whether a memorial centre was intended as Germany’s welcome to the EU new member states’. But, Erika Steinbach dismissed her critics, arguing that Germany should be allowed to mourn the plight of its people. Steinbach also stressed the importance of a central location, because that would be the best method of representation, ‘allowing Germans to mourn all those killed and dispossessed’. Other representatives of the expellees also opposed a European dimension of the theme. Implying the official stance compromised not only national memory, but also national sovereignty and, arguably, therefore identity, Vice-Chairman of the BdV Peter Glotz argued: ‘If one accepts the official line, it would be tantamount to admitting that the government in Berlin is not really a German government at all.’ Complaining external factors were taking precedence over domestic, Glotz suggested the SPD/Green government obviously thought avoiding external irritation was more important than commemorating Germany’s expellees.

Along with Erika Steinbach, the Organisation for a Centre against Expulsion also maintained that the problem of expulsion should not be reduced to German-Polish or German-Czech relations. According to the organisation: ‘A centre’s first responsibility

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58 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit. See also: Burger, R. Görliitzer Schlüsselfeinkniffe. Im Schlesischen Museum wird sehr behutsam an die Vertreibung erinnert. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03.09.03 (204), p. 3.
60 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit.
63 Cited from: Ibid.
is with the internal affairs and sympathy for the expellees.” Claiming popular support, Erika Steinbach declared: ‘I feel it is a compliment that our work has inculcated such interest.’ ‘Levying a five Euro cent tax on each person to fund it, the centre had the backing of three Germans states and 400 towns and cities’, noted The Daily Telegraph. Although the BdV attracted financial donations from seven regions in the country, it has yet, at the time of writing, to receive any official funding.

Nevertheless, Erika Steinbach attracted broad support from the public, senior CDU politicians and prominent writers, reported The Times. In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the former CDU Chairperson, Angela Merkel, claimed that most German states supported Steinbach. Further indicative of popular support for a centre was, arguably, the following claim by the Berliner Morgenpost and survey by Geo magazine. According to the Berliner Morgenpost, establishing a centre somewhere on the outskirts of the country would be suitable for nobody in the prevailing climate of opinion. In a 2004 survey undertaken by Geo, for example, of 1,471 Germans surveyed, 19.9% (228) were against a memorial in the capital, whereas 64.6% (936) supported the proposal. In an open show of defiance against the SPD/Green government, the BdV argued that Chancellor Schröder had no authority to try to stop it. An insistence on a national role of a memorial for Germany’s expellee victims seemed indicative of an emergent popular historicism, challenging the SPD/Greens’ understanding of nationhood and their ‘landscapes of memory’.

Children of guilt?

According to the Berliner Morgenpost, one of the reasons why most mainstream politicians rejected a national centre to the expellees were fears that a national focus

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65 Cited from: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin. op. cit., p. 3.
67 See: Bruckner, M. op. cit.
68 See: Boyes, R. op. cit., p. 14 and: Hall, A. Germans agonise over war memorial. The Times, 30.08.03, p. 18. See also: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3.
70 Cited from: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin. op. cit., p. 3.
72 See: Paterson, T. op. cit.
73 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. op. cit., pp. 16-47, 155-156.
would threaten, in the words of Chancellor Schröder, ‘a blurring of the actual historical causes of the expulsions’.

Joschka Fischer argued:

Whenever we are discussing the expellees, what must not be omitted is what occurred previously. By doing so, one equates historical guilt that results in a disastrous confrontation of a distorted perception of history that does not reflect reality. This reality being, that Germany’s responsibility for beginning a war that resulted in the expulsions of its minorities.

Although the then CDU Chairperson Angela Merkel supported a national Centre against Expulsion, at the same time, she also maintained along with other mainstream politicians that: ‘We must recognise our guilt and responsibility concerning their causes.’

Whilst Joschka Fischer stated he understood the pain of the expellees, at the same time, he argued the expulsions must be put in the context of ‘what we have done to ourselves and not about what others have done to us’.

Nonetheless, Erika Steinbach contended that: ‘Millions of those expelled were children. How can they be held responsible for National Socialism?’ Further indicative of this emergent popular historicism were the demands from expellee representatives for an acknowledgement from the Polish and Czech governments of their states’ respective responsibility for past injustices perpetrated against ethnic Germans. Speaking at the BdV’s 2001 Day of Homeland, Erika Steinbach declared: ‘It is also an appeal to our neighbours to acknowledge their responsibility for their countries’ past actions.’

Challenging the ruling political elite’s ‘landscapes of memory’, there were similar demands from other quarters. Following reunification, the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared the New Guardhouse as the new unified German national memorial for ‘victims of war and oppression’.

74 See: Facius, G. Schröder lehnt Zentrum für Vertriebene in Berlin. op. cit., p. 4.
75 See interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer in: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.
77 Cited from interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.
78 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit. ‘In reflection, it was amazing the extent of violence perpetrated against German civilians - most of whom were innocent women and children’, noted Monika Franz. See: Franz, M. 60 Jahre nach Kriegsende: Flucht und Vertreibung als Gegenstand der Erinnerung in Deutschland. Bayerische Zeitschrift für Politik und Geschichte. [Online]. 2005 (2) [Accessed 21.06.06]. <http://www.km.bayern.de/blz/eup/02_05/2.asp> For a similar line of argument see: Surminski, A. op. cit., pp. 112-114 and: Bunge, I. op. cit., p. 4.
79 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung ächten.” op. cit.
by Käthe Kollwitz and an inscription to all the victims of the Third Reich’, noted Jeffrey Olick.\(^81\) Situated on a bronze plaque to the right of the entrance of the New Guardhouse, the inscription reads:

The New Guardhouse is the place of memory and remembrance of the victims of war and tyranny. We remember the innocent who lost their lives in war and as a result of war in their homeland, in captivity or through expulsion.\(^82\)

Responding to the question put by Die Zeit of how the current official stance differs from that of Erika Steinbach’s, Joschka Fischer maintained the current issue should not be about the expulsions, but about the process of German self-destruction. ‘Past actions by Germans therefore rules out any claims that the Germans were victims’, argued Fischer.\(^83\)

Exposing further contradictions about how the German expellees were perceived in official and collective memory, BdV spokesperson Walter Stratmann stated: ‘For decades displaced Germans have been brought up to think of themselves merely as perpetrators - not the victims - of Nazi war crimes.’\(^84\) They were what historical investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke referred to as: ‘The generation of perpetrators.’\(^85\) Similar observations followed from Monika Köpcke, some historians and three female survivors of former Soviet labour camps. According to Former East Prussian survivor of the Siberian camp Schadrinsk, Hildegard Rauschenbach, for example: ‘No-body was interested in what had happened. Past injustices were simply belittled or ignored.’\(^86\) 1999 Nobel Prize Winner for Literature Günter Grass, along with historians Hubertus Knabe and Michael Kroner, were also concerned that the ‘expulsion crimes’ against German civilians had taken second place in German history.\(^87\)

A survey by Hamburg’s Geo magazine and other evidence also reflected this reasoning. When asked to respond to the statement: ‘Too little has been made of past injustices

\(^81\) Cited from: Olick, J. K. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 561.
\(^83\) Cited from: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?” \textit{op. cit.}
\(^84\) Cited from: Paterson, T. \textit{op. cit.}
\(^85\) See: Jaenecke, H. \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 133-134.
\(^86\) Cited from: Köpcke, M. \textit{op. cit.} For similar views by Eva-Maria Stege and Christel Wolf, see: \textit{Ibid.}
such as the Air War and Expulsions", 822 of 1,471 Germans surveyed agreed.\textsuperscript{88} Attempting to answer the questions ‘who am I and where am I from?’ by German expellees, Helga Hirsch maintained that as long as the ‘enforced repatriation of the expellees remains swept under the carpet, a reappraisal of past events cannot be concluded’.\textsuperscript{89}

Although there is an official record of the crimes committed against the German expellees in the Federal Archives, they were not published until 1989 – and then only by the German Expellee Cultural Organisation, noted Hans Lemberg. According to Lemberg, ‘the SPD government actively prevented the publication of the expulsion crimes against German civilians’.\textsuperscript{90} In the words of the Academic Director of the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen memorial to the victims of the Stasi (East German Secret Police), Hubertus Knabe: ‘Communist atrocities against German civilians have so far been played-down in comparison to the crimes of National Socialism.’\textsuperscript{91} Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler and political scientist Michael Klundt, however, dismissed a ‘like by like’ comparison of crimes and the fates of German and Polish expellees.\textsuperscript{92}

Nevertheless, there have been other allegations of atrocities against ethnic Germans. So where exactly did the alleged war crimes take place? According to historian K. Erik Franzen, writer Günter Grass and the sole remaining survivor of Nemmersdorf, Gerda Mezzulat, atrocities occurred in the former East Prussian and Pomeranian towns and villages of Nemmersdorf, Großwaltersdorf, and Damerkow during 1944-1945, the first two having since become Russian and the last Polish.\textsuperscript{93}

Along with the supporters of the bombing victims, according to Hermann Kurthen:

\textsuperscript{88} Cited from: Es wird zu wenig iiber das Unrecht geredet, das Deutschen wahrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs widerfahren ist, zum Beispiel bei Bombardierung und Vertreibung. In: Umfrage: Flucht und Vertreibung. \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{90} See: Lemberg, H. Deutschland, die Nachbarlander und die Vertriebenen: Geschichte und Geschichtspolitik seit 1949. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Archiv für Sozialgeschichte \textit{[Online].} 2004: 44 [Accessed 24.06.05]. <http://library.fes.de/netzquelle/zwangsmigration/44hist.html>}

\textsuperscript{91} Cited from: Oberschelp, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{92} See: Oberschelp, M. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30 and: „Die Debatte wirkt befreiend.” \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 61-64.

Sympathisers of the expellees now maintain that the country cannot continue to accept historical and moral responsibilities for victims of Nazi aggression on the one hand, whilst ignoring the plight of ethnic Germans who suffered as tokens of revenge against Nazi aggression on the other.94

What the representatives and sympathisers of the expellees appeared to highlight were double standards concerning the ethical duties advocated by the then Bundestag ruling elite. Or, as Radio Berlin Brandenburg, Karsten Deventer, Eva Schmitz-Gümbel and some expellees have indicated, the general official stance seemed to be that the legacy of Germany's past demanded an apparent selectivity of who warranted official sympathy, restitution and attentions.95

In September 2001, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the then German Chancellor Schröder laid flowers in Berlin’s Tiergarten to the memorial of ‘Soviet-Liberators’ killed in 1945 during the battle for Berlin.96 What was significant about this was that ‘until today no top official of a united Germany has ever laid wreaths of flowers to the memorial of Soviet soldiers in the German capital’, noted Russian news agency Pravda. According to Pravda, the sculpture ensemble in the Tiergarten was the first Soviet monument established in post-war Berlin.97 As far as the right-wing organisation the Preußische Treuhand (Prussian Claims Trust) and a Baden-Württemberg branch of the BdV were concerned, this kind of ‘selectivity of remembrance’ by Schröder was tantamount to a ‘betrayal’.98 Although not expressing their resentment in such radical tones, the tone of various articles highlighting the need to remember the alleged ‘neglected abuse of German women’ and their enforced deportation, arguably, implied as much.99

97 Ibid.
Exposing further inconsistencies between the ruling Bundestag political elite and popular national memory, the then Federal Minister of the Interior’s rejection of a National Day of Commemoration for the German expellees provoked further resentment to official ‘landscapes of memory’.

Ignoring appeals for a National Day of Remembrance, on the 2005 Day of Homeland, Otto Schily suggested that a future Centre against Expulsion should be established in Breslau (now Wroclaw) in Poland.

Schily’s proposal was met with ‘whistles of derision from members of the BdV’, reported various German regional newspapers. ‘Instead of concentrating on the perception of Germans as victims,’ Joschka Fischer argued, ‘Steinbach should not forget the actual historical context of events or taking into consideration the fears and apprehensions of Germany’s neighbours.’ Rather than a German memorial for expulsion, the then Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla also spoke out for a European centre focussing on the origins and consequences of the expulsions. Yet, Steinbach claimed that the history of Czechoslovakia and Poland from 1918 was just as evil as National Socialism, as the ‘huge discrimination experienced by Germans in those countries testified’. ‘Following 1945, many women, children and elderly men were also victims of deportation, forced labour and expulsion – simply because they were German’, noted Erika Steinbach.

Contradicting the general official line, at the time of writing, Vice-Chairman of the BdV Peter Glotz maintained that the centre would neither exclude the sorrows of others, nor place events out of their historical context. Those few who did speak out on behalf of the expellees were labelled ‘revisionists’, noted Erika Steinbach, Christel Panzig, Regina Scheer and others. Statements from the then ruling Bundestag political elite, at the time of writing, suggested they continued to be so.

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102 For interview with Fischer see: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.

103 See: Merkél für Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen in Berlin. op. cit., p. 4.


105 See: Brückner, M. op. cit.

Whilst right-wing extremist parties, such as the German People's Union (DVU) and the Republicans (REP), ‘do not formally deny the crimes of the National Socialist regime, nevertheless, they do dispute their uniqueness’, noted the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). According to the DVU:

At the end of World War Two, roughly 20 million Germans were expelled from their centuries-old homeland by the victors and those that saw themselves as such. It was the largest mass expulsion in the history of the world and the greatest crime against the German people.

For the Chairman of the REP Rolf Schlierer, there were enough memorial sites in Germany to recall and commemorate the victims of Nazi crimes – but there was no central memorial for the millions of victims of expulsion. Furthermore, anyone who emphasised the guilt of one’s own people and, at the same time, ‘swept the crimes committed against the German people under the carpet, produced the very opposite of reconciliation’, argued Schlierer. Along with the federal authorities, Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Schröder continued to maintain the expulsion theme was the preserve of right-wing extremists and revisionists. Although undoubtedly exploited by the extreme right, developments in 2004 and 2005 suggested that this was no longer the case, as the response from some of the media and historians to the theme testified. Nonetheless, according to Fischer, the debate about the role of the Germans as victims hid the danger of historical revisionism. Schröder also expressed similar concerns: ‘No-one can deny that the theme is connected to fascism.’

Yet, evidence suggested that there was, in the words of the Bundestag representatives Martin Hohmann (CDU) and Peter Gauweiler (CSU), 'a new public perception of the expellees'. For many years, claimed Erika Steinbach, Christel Panzig and Günter Grass, neither the expellees nor the German public showed any interest in their history or their suffering. Various publications and former expellees reported that German refugees (Flüchtlinge) from the Sudetenland, Silesia and East Prussia were certainly not

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109 Ibid.
113 For these claims see: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung ächten.” op. cit. and: Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5, 17-26, 101.
very welcome in the aftermath of the Second World War. ‘This was especially the case in Schleswig-Holstein, where almost one third of the entire local population constituted expellees from East Prussia’, noted Günter Grass. However, along with the Air War victims, evidence indicated that considerable public interest has also arisen about the personal experiences of the expellees. ‘More and more people - particularly the young - now want to know about the expulsions’, declared CDU politician Martin Hohmann in the Bundestag. Even Joschka Fischer admitted: ‘The whole network of journalists is full of it every day.’ So what exhibitions and publications have appeared and what exactly was their essence?

In 2004, Wittenberg historian Christel Panzig’s temporary exhibition and accompanying publication Flight, Expulsion and Integration appeared. Over 100 eyewitness accounts from former East Prussia, Pomerania, the Warthegau and the Neumark, now resident in the Wittenberg and Bitterfeld regions of Saxony-Anhalt, formed the basis of Panzig’s exhibition and accompanying publication. Many of the eyewitnesses had never publicly expressed their experiences. Contradicting the claims of Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Schröder, according to journalist Corinna Nitz, expellee (Vertriebene) and refugee (Flüchtlinge) testimonies for the Wittenberg exhibition were not prompted by revenge or political revisionism, but ‘merely deep personal feelings of unjustified suffering and persecution that filled every account’. For example, Frank ‘B.’ testified that an appeal from a former expellee to the local Mayor for compassion for her children was rejected, with the suggestion that they should all be ‘thrown in the River Elbe’. Another witness, Anneliese Stefaniak, claimed she was permanently psychologically traumatised by the terror of the expulsions from the Sudetenland.

Commenting on the 2003 permanent exhibition Expellees in Hesse held in Neu-Anspach, Hesse, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung made similar claims to Panzig and

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116 Cited from: „Was haben wir uns angetan?” op. cit.
Nitz, arguing that expulsion is an injustice – ‘whomever it befalls’.121 Advertising the temporary 2005 special exhibition *Arrived – Refugees and Expellees in Lübeck*, the city’s web site declared: ‘The exhibition offers the people of Lübeck a deeper insight into their origins and family histories.’122

Further symptomatic of this change in public sympathy for Germany’s victims of war was, arguably, the reception of the novel by what some of the German media described as Germany’s ‘praecceptor Germaniae’, or teacher of Germany, Günter Grass.123 Since its first release in February 2002, the semi-fictional *Crabwalk* had already sold more than 300,000 copies, reported *Der Spiegel*, Central German Broadcasting and publishers Steidel Verlag.124 Within a 2002 four-part special series about the expulsion of ethnic Germans, *Der Spiegel* claimed in its introductory headline to the series, along with *Geo* historical magazine, that ‘an innocent generation is finally showing interest in the long forgotten topic’.125 In a 2004 survey carried out by *Geo*, of 1,471 Germans surveyed, 477 (32.6%) stated they were now more interested in the theme than hitherto, with 205 (14.0%) expressing the opposite view.126

This new empathy for the German victims of expulsion also became apparent in the following reviews of three other publications on the theme. During 2005, for instance, a series of articles on the experiences of German expellees near the end of the Second World War appeared in the *Ostfriesen Zeitung*. On account of considerable local interest, the newspaper decided to publish the four-week long series of articles in a 2005 book called *Expelled to Eastfriesland*.127 Sent to the Silesian village of Lübchen, northwest of Breslau (now in Poland), bombed-out Berlin photographer Hanns Tschira also recorded events in early January 1945, whose pictures were brought to the attention of Zweites Deutches Fernsehen (ZDF) employee Lucia Brauburger.128

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121 See: Minister eröffnet Vertriebenen-Ausstellung im Hessenpark. *op. cit.*
Underlining the significance of photographic evidence, the *Berliner Morgenpost* maintained that photographs do not sensationalise reality as eyewitness testimonies can so often do. ‘In that sense the volume *Farewell from Lübchen* will allow “undisguised views” of the hitherto unknown Lower-Silesian expulsions of early 1945’, noted Sven Kellerhoff.129 There was also a Centre against Expulsion in the form of a book, noted the *Berliner Morgenpost*. Reviewing the 2004 publication *Flight and Expulsion* and its significance for German memory, Kellerhoff reflected: ‘*Flight and Expulsion* offers remembrance without endangering reproaches from either side. Although this may help to objectify events, the book is nevertheless no more than the victims of the victims deserve.’130

Referring to the rape and murder of the 24 women and children of Nemmersdorf and other places in Eastern Europe, Jörg Echternkamp, *Der Spiegel* and East Prussian writer Arno Surminski made similar claims that the expulsion theme is now being treated with greater empathy by many in Germany.134 Highlighting once again the dissonances between official and popular perceptions of symbols of memory and nationhood was, arguably, the case of the Director of the East Prussian Regional Museum, Ronny Kabus. In January 2005, for example, there were calls for the resignation of Kabus from former expellees, some of the townspeople of Lüneburg and the East Prussian Welfare and Cultural Association on account of his alleged ‘questionable commitment to the Museum’s cause’.132 Chairman and spokesperson of the Museum, Wilhelm von Gottberg, explained that for a number of years there were tensions between Lüneburg, Kabus, and his colleagues at the Museum on account of the historian’s ‘disloyalty to the work of the organisation’. Historian Kabus also provoked protests from the townspeople for attempting to dispense with the Museum’s ‘image of expulsion’. Conversely, Kabus had the broad support of federal politicians, such as Christina Weiss (SPD) and Martin Hohmann (CDU).133

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133 For comments by von Gottberg, see: *Ibid.*
Together with the claims of a lack of official empathy for the expellees as national and collective victims, particularly from the political left in Germany, on the other hand there was also a discernible hostility towards the victims of past German crimes. Since 1993, victims of war and tyranny are remembered at the New Guardhouse each year on the Day of National Mourning. This is usually observed on the second Sunday before the first Sunday in Advent in a simple ceremony during which the Federal President and representatives of the Federation lay wreaths at the New Guardhouse. In 1957, the New Guardhouse was renovated as a memorial to victims of fascism. At its dedication in Berlin on the Day of National Mourning in November 1993, German Chancellor at the time, Helmut Kohl, delivered the following statement: ‘The New Guardhouse in Berlin will serve as the Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for remembrance and commemoration for the victims of war and dictatorial rule.’

Collective meanings and memories represented by monuments and other physical sites are, according to sociologist Erving Goffmann, products of ‘shared framing strategies and devices’. ‘If deployed successfully,’ noted Rudy Koslar and Goffmann, ‘they are supposed to delimit the number of possible meanings and private interpretations and thus disperse the effect of competing or subversive meanings.’ Yet, evidence suggested that the official ‘framing objectives’ of the New Guardhouse, namely the remembering of millions of Jews murdered because of their origin, were increasingly being rejected at the time of writing.

According to academics Helga Welsh, Andreas Pickel and Dorothy Rosenberg: ‘In spite of official philo-Semitism, most Germans have shown relatively little interest in the principal targets of fascist persecution.’ Historian Nicolas Berg lamented, for instance, that: ‘Throughout the last 20 years the average German has regarded anti-

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139 For references to official framing strategies of remembrance, see: Koslar, R. op. cit., pp. 9-10 and: Till, K. E. op. cit., pp. 251-276. For text of the New Guardhouse see: Neue Wache. op. cit.
Semitism with almost complete indifference." 141 There have been numerous reports, for example, of continuing acts of vandalism on Jewish memorials in both the old and new German Länder (states). More than 100 graves were desecrated at Europe’s largest Jewish cemetery in Berlin during 1999. 142 In 2002, a commemorative work of art known as The Mother was vandalised at the former concentration camp of Wöbbelin, near Schwerin - the regional capital of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. The following year, gravestones in Jewish cemeteries at Löcknitz, Teterow and Ueckermünde were also defaced and overthrown, reported the local authorities. 143 Between 2003 and 2004, two regional Ministries of the Interior also noted defamations of Jewish memorial sites in Brandenburg and the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. 144 Yet, perhaps the most acute resistance to official functions of commemoration was the foiled bomb attack in 2003 planned by the right-wing extremist group Kameradschaft Süd – Aktionsburo Süddeutschland (AS). Their intention was to prevent the laying of a foundation stone in the grounds of the Jewish Cultural Centre at the St. Jakobs-Platz in Munich on 9 November 2003, commemorating the anniversary of the 1938 ‘Reichskristallnacht’. 145 Better known to history as the ‘night of broken glass’, during 9 November 1938 Jewish synagogues, homes and business premises were burned and looted ‘in response to the assassination of Nazi diplomat Ernst von Rath’, noted Günter Grass. 146

According to the German authorities: ‘Official days of remembrance are among the symbols through which a state publicly portrays itself, which say something about the state’s perception of itself.’ 147 Along with the proposed memorial for German expellees and desecration of Jewish cemeteries, how war veterans are remembered also appeared to have exposed another alternative site of memory. This was, arguably, particularly significant for understanding the disparities emergent within German collective memory, because although contested, according to Norbert Frei and Mary Nolan, the

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142 See: Right-wing extremists violate Jewish cemetery. German News [Online]. 07.03.02 [Accessed 11.03.05]. <http://www.germnews.de/archiv/dn/2002/03/07.html/7>
collective innocence of the *Wehrmacht* was generally accepted by many throughout Germany.\(^{148}\)

On 15 November 2003, a funeral march was held to coincide with the Day of National Mourning at Germany’s biggest war grave cemetery situated 40 kilometres southeast of Berlin. At the Waldfriedhof cemetery at Halbe, former German air force pilots Reinhold Leidenfrost and Knight’s Cross holder Otto Riehs remembered their fallen comrades. During the ceremony, they and others criticised the then SPD/Green government’s attempts to prevent such anniversaries taking place.\(^{149}\) On the one hand, the federal body responsible for the maintenance of war cemeteries, The German War Graves Commission, claimed that people from all ages were welcome. Yet on the other, the Commission stated that it was *not an organisation for veterans* who allegedly, ‘only concern themselves with remembrance’.\(^{150}\) Professor Ute Frevert also remarked on this sense of exclusion and the apparent inconsistencies within collective memory. Frevert noted:

> Wishing to block or suppress such recollections politically would not only be pointless, it would be counterproductive. A society whose self-awareness derives from the recognition of historical, current and future responsibility must also remember its own dead – particularly when they have paid with their lives for crimes committed in the name of the German people, the entire people.\(^{151}\)

Besides members of the German army and other military personnel, also caught up in the last major defensive action of the German army, known as the *Halbe Kesselschlacht* of 1945, were Ukrainian slave labourers and German refugees fleeing the advancing Red Army. As well as the 20,000 German soldiers and hundreds of civilian casualties, more than 4,500 German civilians from the former Soviet internment camp of Ketschendorf are also buried at the Waldfriedhof cemetery.\(^{152}\) Almost 12,000 people


were unable to be identified and were buried in mass graves. According to Scheer and Broszinsky, for example, bodies were still being recovered and reburied from an open cast mine in the area at the time of writing. 153

Along with these and other ‘innocent victims of war’, there was also a sense that official framing strategies of remembrance discouraged a fitting remembrance for ‘one of the best German pilots of the Second World War’, noted various German newspapers. 154

No more the hero?

Within their handbook, the German War Graves Commission stated that the New Guardhouse ‘contributes to the identity of our people’. 155 Yet, perhaps one of the most transparent contradictions to-date between official and popular ‘landscapes of memory’ were the emotive reactions inspired as a result of official endeavours to dispense with a certain Second World War fighter ace as an historical role model. Evidence suggested, for instance, that the Bundestag political elite seemed unable to provide an acceptable commemorative link from the past to the present. This applied not only to rear admiral Siegfried Engel, sea captain Alexander Magnus and the Wehrmacht, but also to former fighter pilot group captain Werner Mölders. According to Die Welt and the CSU Mayor of Neuburg, Bernhard Gmehling, it was a debate about tradition, identity and leadership. 156 How Mölders was remembered appeared, therefore, to raise further questions as to whether the Bundestag political elite’s depiction of national symbols and claims by the German War Graves Commission were as comprehensive and extensive as the authorities claimed they were.

Editor of the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, Alexander Gauland, claimed that Germany has reached a degree of abstraction in which it becomes increasingly difficult to find

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156 See: Stürmer, M. Popstar der Nazi-Propaganda. Die Welt, 31.03.05, p. 3 and: Gmehling, B. Statement zur geplanten Namensänderung des Jagdgeschwaders 74 „Mölders.” Presseinformation der Stadt Neuburg an der Donau, 28.01.05, p. 1.
acceptable collective images. For example, former Director of the German Historical Museum, Christoph Stölzl, admitted that: ‘The reunification of the Germans has so far lacked an image replacing all words.’ What was needed was a feeling of community and common identity’, noted Professor Wolf Gruner of Rostock University. Or in the words of Professor Ralf Dahrendorf: ‘Germans lack the key to their national identity.’ Evidence suggested this was particularly apparent concerning the commemoration of ‘war hero’ Werner Mölders.

Under pressure from the left, in January 2005 Germany’s Defence Minister Peter Struck (SPD) extended a law first proposed by the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS) in 1997 to include Werner Mölders. In 1997, various members of the SPD and the Alliance 90/The Greens factions resolved to prevent the honouring of German volunteers who had served in the Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, complained Carl-H. Pierk and the Berliner Kurier. In Bundestag circulars from 1997 and 1998, politicians from the Alliance 90/The Greens and the SPD factions demanded that it should no longer be possible to name federal barracks after former members of the Condor Legion. Notable politicians, for example, included Joschka Fischer and Kerstin Müller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, along with Dr. Peter Struck of the SPD.

Speaking in the Bundestag in 1998 on behalf of several party members, PDS politician Gerhard Zwerenz argued: ‘Any future motion should also include Mölders, since the pilot flew for General Franco during the conflict.’ Despite the SPD/Green government’s earlier exoneration of Mölders’ conduct in 2000, four years later Struck relented to renewed demands from the PDS, noted Carl-H. Pierk and the Berliner

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159 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
161 For claims that Mölders was a popular hero in Germany, see speech by PDS member of the Bundestag Gerhard Zwerenz in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/231. op. cit., p. 21237 and: Boyes, R. German veterans on the warpath over law disowning Nazi pilot ace. The Times, 23.03.05, p. 34.
In accordance with legislation passed in 1998, any federal defence establishments named in honour of Werner Mölders or anyone else who participated in Germany’s Condor Legion will be re-named’, explained the German Ministry of Defence in January 2005.166

Indicative, however, of the perception from some that the Bundestag political elite seemed incapable of providing ‘commemorative continuity and clarity’ were the reactions to the German government’s re-appraisal of their 2000 ruling.167 A number of articles, for instance, expressed bewilderment and, arguably, resentment at the government’s revocation of its former 2000 motion.168 ‘Threatening to impair the 50th anniversary national celebrations in Berlin of the founding of the Federal Armed Forces’, noted Die Welt, opposition to Struck’s defamation of Mölders’ reputation seemed symptomatic of the populist resentment to official ‘framing strategies of commemoration’.169

Along with former Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, one of Germany’s top fighter pilots Werner Mölders was, until 2005, also officially considered a suitable role model for West German soldiers.170 Admirers of Mölders, such as the Berliner Kurier, Young Conservatives and the Chairman of the Mölders Association, Helmut Ruppert, all considered the ‘exceptional talent of the ace’ as a ‘timeless example of one’s fulfilment of duty’.171 As a 2000 Bundestag circular admitted, 30 barracks of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) still bore the names of Wehrmacht officers and there were also establishments named after officers from the First World War. Despite calls from the PDS in 2000 for a reappraisal of their earlier decision, the SPD/Green government rejected a re-naming of any barracks in honour of Mölders. This was due to a ‘lack of evidence implicating the ace with either the bombing of the Basque city of Guernica or

165 See: Pierk, C-H. op. cit., p. 2. See also: Später Streit um Hitlers Teufelspilot. op. cit., p. 3.
169 Cited from: Flieger wollen weiter „Mölders” heißen. Die Welt, 04.03.05, p. 2.
170 See: Boyes, R. German veterans on the warpath over law disowning Nazi pilot ace. op. cit., p. 34. See also speech by Gerhard Zwerenz in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/231. op. cit., p. 21237.
the Nazi regime’, noted a Bundestag circular signed by the German Ministry of Defence.172

Expressing concerns that 74 Squadron had still not dispensed with Mölders’ name for the 60th anniversary of the Second World War in 2004, Norbert Lammert (CDU) and Gesine Lötzsch (PDS) asked fellow members in the Bundestag: ‘Given that an air force Squadron still carries the name of Mölders, will the government ensure that no units of the Bundeswehr continue to bear the name of former Wehrmacht officers involved in war crimes?’173

Lötzsch maintained, for example, that Mölders had been involved in the bombing of the Spanish village of Corbera d’Ebre during the Spanish Civil War.174 According to a report published in April 2004, new evidence uncovered by the magazine Kontraste revealed that Mölders had participated in the air raids on Corbera and in similar actions that had claimed many civilian casualties.175 Accepting the charges, the then President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse, then passed on the report to the German Minister of Defence. Responding to the information, Struck’s Secretary, Hans-Georg Wagner (SPD), declared: ‘It appears there was a greater suggestion of Mölders’ involvement in the attacks on the Spanish population than previously realised.”176 Thus, in accordance with legislation passed in 1998, in January 2005 Mölders’ name was removed from the walls of 74 Squadron in Neuburg (Bavaria) along with a plaque at a German army barracks in Visselhövede (Lower Saxony).177

Nonetheless, according to Die Welt, Kontraste and others, there was considerable opposition to the 2005 resolution and the claims upon which it was based. One of the main allegations by Kontraste was that Mölders delighted in the destruction of war, the


174 For these allegations see: Ibid.


177 See: Umbenennung für Verbände und Liegenschaften der Bundeswehr. op. cit.
campaigns he participated in and that he was a National Socialist. Whilst the national daily *Die Welt* acknowledged there were still unknown facts remaining, according to the Neuburg branch of the CSU, there was still no proof of Mölders' involvement in any questionable activities. Mölders did not even arrive in Spain until after the bombardment of Guernica, noted *Die Welt* and the *Berliner Kurier*.

Although serving in the Condor Legion and later campaigns in the Second World War, Mölders was never a member of the National Socialist Party, maintained Helmut Ruppert and the Mayor of Neuburg Bernhard Gmehling. Accredited with 'more aircraft shot down than the Red Baron Manfred von Richthofen', noted the *Berliner Kurier*, leading authority on Mölders, Kurt Braatz, also pointed out that Mölders received some of Germany's highest military decorations. By 1941, Mölders was the most decorated member of the *Wehrmacht*, reported Braatz.

Seeking then to 'restore the honour of Mölders', noted *The Times*, 218 former and current officers signed an open letter to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*, along with a protest resolution contesting Struck's ruling. Former divisional commander of 74 Squadron, Günter Raulf, described the proposed re-naming as 'totally unjustified' and retired admiral Günter Fromm expressed annoyance over the 'new tradition being prepared for our forces'. 'Although the honourable conduct of most members of the *Wehrmacht* was shamefully exploited by the Nazis, nevertheless, a re-naming would have detrimental effects on the morale of 74 Squadron', argued the head of the administrative district of Neuburg-Schrobenhausen, Richard Keßler. Commenting on his numerous visits to the squadron, according to Keßler a sense of tradition and Mölders' name were 'indispensable elements of the squadron’s and town’s identity'.

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180 For these claims see: Ruppert, H. *op. cit.* and: Gmehling, B. *op. cit.*, p. 1.


182 See: Pierk, C-H. *op. cit.*, p. 2. See also: Stürmer, M. *op. cit.*, p. 3.


Summarising complaints from both former and current officers to Bundeswehr representative Willfried Penner, *Die Welt* remarked: ‘This action by Struck is unprecedented in the last 50 years of the history of the German Armed Forces.’

How Werner Mölders was remembered in 2004 and 2005 by Kontraste and the ruling Bundestag political elite, also provoked anger and resentment from some of the German public, claimed CSU member of the Bundestag Horst Seehofer, Kontraste and others. Following their television documentary on 1 April 2004, Kontraste claimed to have received hundreds of letters from viewers ‘incensed at our interpretation of Mölders as a Nazi’, reported Kontraste editor Caroline Walter. Nonetheless, Kontraste’s representation of Mölders was supported by defence spokespersons for the SPD and Green parties, such as Winfried Nachtwei (Alliance 90/The Greens), Rainer Arnold (SPD) and Wolfgang Thierse (SPD). The Hamburg-based journal SWG (Society for State and Economic Policy) also claimed to have received many letters complaining against Kontraste’s vilification of Mölders’ reputation. Contending to enjoy the ‘full support of the citizens of Neuburg’, Richard Keßler declared: ‘I reject categorically a renaming of 74 Squadron.’ Speaking on behalf of Neuburg, the city’s Mayor, Bernhard Gmehling, also maintained that changing the name of 74 Squadron was: ‘Totally unnecessary and unwarranted.’ Despite these appeals and protests, however, Rainer Kümpel from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that: ‘The government’s decision stands.’

In the light of relatively recent evidence, it seemed reasonable to ask whether the New Guardhouse actually fulfilled official requirements of providing a comprehensive site of collective remembrance. Taken as a whole, evidence suggested official claims that the New Guardhouse served as ‘The Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany’ was rather questionable. It was also debatable when statements from the

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188 Cited from: Walter, C. *op. cit.*
190 See: Ruppert, H. *op. cit.*
191 Cited from: Keßler, R. *op. cit.*
SPD/Green government concerning German national identity were compared with the apparent growing public interest in the ethnic origins of the Germans.

‘Pure and distinct - unlike any other nation.”195
The Varus-Schlacht – location Kalkriese.

Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson suggested that some of the key elements of national identity are myths of common ancestry. Best known for his articles on various aspects of ethnicity and nationalism, Reitemeyer Professor of Political Science, Walker Connor, also argued: ‘A nation is a group of people characterized by a myth of common descent.”196 More than a half-century ago, French Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs noted the centrality of monuments in the formation of collective memory.197 In his alleged popular work The History of German National Literature (1844), theologian August Vilmar also highlighted the origins of ethnic Germans and national development, tracing the Germans’ tribal identity back to Arminius.198 Arminius, or ‘Hermann the hero’ as he is known in the vernacular, was the Germanic chieftain who successfully repulsed and then massacred three Roman legions.199 Hermann, Chief of the Cherusci tribe, was the driving force of the rebellion of three other Teutonic tribes against the Romans. In the year AD 9, these tribes ambushed and annihilated the legions of the Roman governor and military commander Publius Quinctilius Varus.200

Completed in 1875, on 16 August of that year the monument was consecrated with ‘great pomp and national accord celebrating German unification in 1871 in the presence of the emperor Kaiser Wilhelm I’, noted Ralf-Rainer Sass.201 Commemorating the victory of Arminius, with a million visitors every year, the Hermannsdenkmal, or monument to Hermann, south of Detmold in the Teutoburg Forest, is one of the best-known memorials in Germany, claimed the Berliner Zeitung and the Lippe Regional

197 See: Koshar, R. op. cit., pp. 9, 292.
Association. Journalist Kai Schöneberg noted that since 1871 over 20 million people have visited the Hermannsdenkmal. Evidence suggested a revived interest and need to commemorate Germany’s ethnic origins also extended to a museum about the site of the engagement that has important repercussions for German history and hence, arguably, German nationhood. It seemed the battle’s legacy had once again become the focus of national consciousness and memory for some, disputing former Chancellor Schröder’s dismissal of a unique, consanguineous German national identity. On the 57th anniversary of the German surrender on 8 May 1945, discussing the ‘national question’ and patriotism, Schröder declared: ‘Nations are not, as one has long believed in Germany, partly or merely based on blood descent. They are communities of consent not descent.’ On the other hand, Rudy Koshar, Matthias Schulz, Ralf-Rainer Sass and others contended that Hermann became the embodiment of a pure, organic, barbarian identity, symbolising a patriotic defiance and need for protection against foreign intruders.

So what was the catalyst for this revival of interest in the primordial origins of German nationhood? Since the discovery of 162 Roman coins and discarded military equipment at Kalkriese near Osnabrück in 1987, German archaeologists have been trying to determine where exactly the battle took place. Referred to as the Varus-Schlacht (Varus Battle) in Germany, the battle lasted for three days in which 20,000 Romans died. It was previously believed that the Varus-Schlacht occurred in the Teutoburg Forest near Detmold, yet for many years the actual location remained unconfirmed. Although the 53.46 metres high monument was set up on a hilltop in the Teutoburg Forest, the battle is now said to have taken place not near Detmold, but at the foot of Kalkriese hill - just north of Osnabrück.

202 See: Following the Teutons? In: The “Hermannsdenkmal” (Arminius memorial). op. cit. See also: Götz, T. Ein mächtiges Denkmal am falschen Ort. Berliner Zeitung, 11.05.02, p. 10.
With the opening of the new museum in Kalkriese in April 2002 confirming the location of the battle site, national and local interest in events of AD 9 intensified.\(^{209}\) Between the villages of Schwagstorf and Bramsche in northwest Germany, the XVII, XVIII and XIX Roman Legions were annihilated and, according to Die Zeit and Die Welt, the new museum at Kalkriese celebrating these events was a ‘sensation’.\(^{210}\) Attracting the attentions of other national dailies and weeklies, such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Der Spiegel, along with various broadcasting stations, since the opening of the Kalkriese Archaeological Park in 2000, 1,200 publications have appeared on the Varus-Schlacht.\(^{211}\)

At the opening of the Kalkriese Museum in 2002, hundreds of guests were invited - including the German actor and television programme award-winner Matthias Habich, as well as various local archaeologists. There was even free transport provided for the venue.\(^{212}\) Interest in the Varus-Schlacht also extended beyond the opening of the Kalkriese Museum, the archaeological information centre and the local area. Mayors of neighbouring Wallenhorst and Hagen, Ulrich Belde and Dieter Eickholt, for instance, confirmed the success of an information and display stand on the Varus-Schlacht, which was held as part of the 2003 Lower Saxony Day exhibition in Berlin.\(^{213}\) Celebrating the Varus-Schlacht, the travelling exhibition A Legend is Uncovered also proved successful in Dortmund, Wiesbaden and Bad Bentheim.\(^{214}\) Attracting guests from all over Germany, during 2003 150,000 people attended the Varus-Schlacht museum at Kalkriese, noted Der Spiegel.\(^{215}\) Summarising both local and national interest in the Varus-Schlacht, according to Managing Director of the Kalkriese Museum and Varus-Schlacht enterprise, Christian Jaletzke, since 2000 more than 500,000 people have visited the site of the battle.\(^{216}\)


\(^{210}\) See: Herold, A. op. cit. and: Heuer, K. Wo sich Römer blutige Köpfe holten. Die Welt, 17.04.02, p. 44.

\(^{211}\) See: Ein Jahr der Anerkennung für Kalkriese und das Team der Varusschlacht. op. cit.


\(^{214}\) See: Ein Jahr der Anerkennung für Kalkriese und das Team der Varusschlacht. op. cit.


\(^{216}\) See: Ein Jahr der Anerkennung für Kalkriese und das Team der Varusschlacht. op. cit. and: Varusschlacht bringt die Massen in die region. Kalkriese. Bramsche Nachrichten. 13.01.05, p. 15.
Evidence also suggested some areas intended to permanently commemorate the *Varus-Schlacht*. Following their exhibitions on the theme in Werl, near Dortmund, both the Westphalian-Lippe Regional and Osnabrück Regional Varus Battle Associations announced plans for the 2000th anniversary of the *Varus-Schlacht* in 2009.217 *Die Zeit* reported that fireworks and even a ballet celebrated the success of the Kalkriese Museum at Easter 2004.218 In April 2005, the exhibition *Kalkriese – 15 Years of Archaeology* opened with displays of both Roman and ancient German camps, theatre and music performances and gladiatorial combats. ‘Many have already re-registered to participate in archaeological digs’, explained the Head of Archaeology for the *Varus-Schlacht* in the Osnabrück region, Dr. Susanne Wilbers-Rost.219 During the course of 2004 and 2005, a series of successful lectures by German historians and archaeologists were also held about the *Varus-Schlacht* and the significance of the finds.220 Media coverage of the site was particularly enthusiastic. Local newspaper the *Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung*, for example, described the new archaeological finds as a ‘second Troy’ and the *Babelsberger Filmstudio* reconstructed part of the battle site for the Kalkriese Museum, noted *Die Zeit*.221 Along with Radio Bremen, national broadcasting station ARD transmitted live from Kalkriese in 2004 and North German Broadcasting (NDR) devoted 12 programmes to the theme.222

Evidence suggested, therefore, that German national identity manifested itself through reactions to symbols, such as popular heroes and museums. It was also discernible through the historical memories of certain events and their commemoration – ‘shared amongst large numbers of people’, noted Mary Fulbrook and A. D. Smith.223 ‘If nations are to endure, they must be founded upon the belief in the existence of ethnic cores’, stated Smith. ‘They must also have, or find, a living past into which successive generations are able to re-enter those legends and landscapes that locate the nation and

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219 Cited from: Ein Jahr der Anerkennung für Kalkriese und das Team der Varusschlacht. op. cit.
direct its future’, argued Smith. Furthermore, contended Smith, ‘National symbols embody its basic concepts, making them visible and distinct for every member, communicating the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the community.’ Media scientist Siegfried Quandt demanded, for example, that ‘in a multi-media age, historical culture should also include an element of emotional culture’. There were similar contentions from essayist Hans Jürgen Syberberg.

As well as lamenting the loss of a sense of orientation, community and identity, German historians have also participated in discussions about the importance of national symbols for the development of a ‘healthy patriotism’, noted Stefan Berger. Christian Meier and Peter Brandt argued that what was needed was a new patriotism. Meier stated: ‘At stake is the constitution of a broad consensus which cannot be left to politicians alone.’ Yet, despite a revived nationalist self-awareness, the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Minister for Culture, Christina Weiss, rejected anything that would consciously contribute to a re-nationalisation of historical consciousness.

‘We need no legends.’

On 8 May 2002 in Berlin under the slogan ‘Nation, Patriotism and Democratic Culture’, Chancellor Schröder and Martin Walser participated in a discussion about what kind of patriotism was suitable for a future Germany. On the one hand, Walser stressed the importance of the emotional aspects of the nation as a feeling of history that could not be understood in a rational sense. Yet on the other, Schröder claimed: ‘People need no monuments, museums or legends in order to commemorate or account for their

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224 Cited from: Smith, A. D. The ethnic origins of nations. op. cit., p. 207.
225 Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity. op. cit., pp. 77-78.
existence.' At the opening of the temporary 2004 German Historical Museum's exhibition, *Myths of Nations: Area of Memory*, the then SPD Minister of Culture, Christina Weiss, also maintained: 'Nobody in Germany wants any more myths.'

Nonetheless, the Mayor of Jülich Heinrich Stommel, Hans Jürgen Syberberg and others appeared to contest the claims of Schröder and Weiss. On the 60th anniversary of the destruction of the ancient citadel of Jülich by Allied bombers in 1944, Stommel stated: 'Historical myths express the very essence of Mankind. They are comparable to religion in that they help to make sense of the world.'

'It does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. It is primarily the political community - no matter how artificially organised - that inspires the belief in common ethnicity', argued sociologist Max Weber. Or in the words of Walker Connor: 'What ultimately matters is not what is true, but what people believe to be true.'

As academic Peter Calvocoressi remarked: 'Myths can be as powerful as facts, particularly when allied with strong emotions.' According to Stefan Berger, 'The myths of the nineteenth century still touch living roots amongst Germans which are only waiting to be revived.' Further contrary to the stances of the SPD/Green ruling political elite, in 1982 Günter Grass claimed: 'We need a place where every German can look for his origins.'

Along the same lines, Hans Jürgen Syberberg declared:

> I think that there is an urge to retrieve what we have lost [...] our songs, our Teutonic fantasies. We must be allowed to long. We are afraid to sing our grandfather’s songs; we are afraid to appreciate Wagner, even to mourn the theft of our myths and fairy tales from history.

Evidence suggested, however, that the waiting and fears of Christian Meier, Günter Grass and Hans Jürgen Syberberg were over.

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235 Cited from: Connor, W. A nation is a nation, is a State, is an ethnic group, is a... In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 37.


239 Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. *op. cit.*
Popular participation in what A. D. Smith referred to as the ‘myths of ethnic election’ ensured the survival of the belief in ethnic communities across the centuries – ‘despite many changes in their social composition and cultural contents’, argued Smith.\(^{240}\) Even if objective and factual evidence in common ethnicity is found wanting, the desire of belonging to such is a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments.\(^{241}\) For John Hutchinson and Smith, the study of ethnicity owes much to the insights of one of the former founders of sociology, Max Weber.\(^{242}\) Weber reflected that there are certain factors denoting ethnically determined action, determined by the belief in a shared blood relationship. Such concepts may include *Stamm* (tribe) and *Volk* (people). By the very employment of such terms, arguably, the existence of a contemporary political community or memories of one are usually implied, such as those articulated in epic tales and legends. Clifford Geertz also reasoned that although psychological ties stemming from a common linguistic, racial, tribal and regional background are totally separable, at the same time, they often reinforce ‘fundamental identities’.\(^{243}\)

Whenever Social Democrats referred to the nation, according to Berger, ‘they meant a nation of equal citizens, not one of the *Volk* as defined by ethnic origin’.\(^{244}\) Yet, although the ethno-national element has disappeared from official conceptions of national identity, an apparent revived ancient national self-awareness suggested it was still very prominent amongst some of the German media and public. Nowhere was this more evident, at the time of writing, than in the central role accorded to the *Varus-Schlacht* for German national consciousness based on Germany’s ‘barbarian traditions’.\(^{245}\)

Since the opening of a new museum and archaeological park at Kalkriese, evidence suggested an enthusiastic embracing of Teutonic tribal culture and heritage has emerged within the media as well as amongst German youth. The four German tribes, for instance, that participated in the *Varus-Schlacht* were all referred to with gusto by the Kalkriese Museum, the Lippe Regional Museum at Detmold and some of the national


\(^{241}\) See: Ibid., p. 20.


As well as writing with an undisguised verve about the tribes involved in the revolt, more significantly, Matthias Schulz and Helmut Glück referred to the ethnic forefathers of the people of Hesse as the Chatten - described by Tacitus as the Chatti.247

The Modern Valkyries.

German nationalist Max Weber argued cults were the typical concomitant of a tribal or Volk consciousness.248 Over time, arguably, certain images of events, heroes, landscapes and even cults develop into what A. D. Smith termed a ‘distinctive repository of ethnic culture’.249 Evidence suggested that, at the time of writing, the latter were being selectively drawn upon by the current generation. Old Germanic fantasy worlds have become increasingly attractive to German youth, noted Die Zeit and South German Broadcasting.250 Internet sites, such as Wikingerversand, offered the Drink of the Old Teutons for sale, and in Helding’s Nord Rock shop CDs, T-shirts, mobile phones and a perfume for ‘nationalist mothers’ called Wälkure (Valkyrie) - named after the nine mythical maidens in Scandinavian and Germanic mythology were available for purchase.251 At the Kalkriese Museum gift shop there was even a drink named after Hermann and a jam after his wife – Thusnelda’s Best – noted Der Spiegel and the Berliner Zeitung.252

So why were these developments significant for national memory and identity? Although at first sight these reports may appear rather innocuous and insignificant, along with Carsten Holm and Toralf Staud, the Berlin Senate for Youth and Family and cult expert Renate Rennebach also issued admonishments about such apparent trivia. They and the Saxon Minister of the Interior were particularly concerned about the
growing popularity of heathen worship and Teutonic cults amongst the young - allegedly being increasingly infiltrated and exploited by neo-Nazi groups.\textsuperscript{253}

Following a ban of the nationalist magazine \textit{Bravo}, for example, Hessian National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) activists, the Zutt family, now sell literature instead on the Germanic God of war \textit{Wotan} and a scent called \textit{Aroma of the Greater Reich}, noted Holm.\textsuperscript{254} Using neo-Nazi ciphers, such as 14 and 88, representing ideological codes and symbols of mutual identification, according to Christina Schramm, Toralf Staud and the Saxony-Anhalt Ministry of the Interior, right-wing extremists call themselves after the Germanic Gods \textit{Thor}, \textit{Ostara}, \textit{Freya} and \textit{Loki}.\textsuperscript{255} One group in particular has attracted the attentions of the Lower Saxon and North Rhine-Westphalian authorities.

In accordance with the idea of Germanic heathen ancestry and race, headed by Hamburg lawyer Jürgen Rieger, The Society for the Belief in the Essence of Germany (\textit{Artgemeinschaft}) wants to ensure racial purity for the health of future German generations. In 1995, for instance, Rieger established a collective in southern Sweden for members of the ‘northern blond race’. And in 2004, Rieger also bought an estate in north Germany for the ‘research and preservation of the northern race’, noted \textit{Die Welt}.\textsuperscript{256} Revering the ancient sacred tree grove of the northern Germanic tribes, the \textit{Irminsul}, the \textit{Artgemeinschaft} wanted to safeguard the German race by encouraging females to select carefully their partners for future generations, explained the Lower Saxon and North Rhine-Westphalian authorities.\textsuperscript{257}

Their influence within Germany’s biggest female right-wing organisation, at the time of writing, was clear: ‘Only by acting together for the preservation of the German mother will the German way of way of life and continuation of the German people be possible’,

\textsuperscript{254} See: Holm, C. Ein Dorf sieht braun. Rechtsextreme. \textit{Der Spiegel}, 12.03.01 (11), pp. 76-77.
declared the Community of German Women (GDF). Displaying an image of the Hermannsdenkmal, accompanied by comments from Tacitus concerning the tribal status of German women, the ideal of an unsullied Germanic line of descent became patently obvious within the ideology of the GDF. Throughout their web site, the GDF underlined the importance of preserving a consanguineous German identity. In the words of the GDF: ‘In today’s consumer and hedonist world we must continue to emphasise our roles as proud mothers and take our responsibility for the national and ethnic community.’

But was the Artgemeinschaft’s ideology merely confined to the GDF? Not according to Die Zeit, political scientist Renate Bitzan and others. Bitzan claimed that there had been a ‘boom of female right-wing extremist groups’. Some of these included The Ruhr Comradeship of Maidens (Mädelkameradschaft Ruhrgebiet), the Lower Saxon-based League of Free Maidens (FMB) and Cologne’s Women’s Homeland Association (BHF). Die Zeit estimated there were at least 1,500 female members of right-wing extremist groups nationwide in 2002, representing a clear increase in overall membership of the right-wing scene. Other estimates, such as those from the North Rhine-Westphalian Information and Documentation Centre Against Violence, Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia (IDA-NRW) and the Socialist Youth of Germany (SJD), put the share of female membership of right-wing extremist groups at between 20-30%.

Female right-wing extremism promoting a nationalist and racist philosophy also concerned the Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalian and Bavarian authorities. Known as ‘Renees’, the female equivalent of skinheads increased from 15% in 2002 to 19% in 2003 within the state of Baden-Württemberg. Bavaria also saw an increase in

260 Cited from: Staud, T. Mädels, deutsche und rein. op. cit., p. 15.
262 See: Staud, T. Mädels, deutsche und rein. op. cit., p. 15.
Renee activity. Female membership of right-wing extremist groups increased from 10-15% in 2000 to 20% in 2004, reported the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior. Promoting National Socialist ideals of 'women as mothers and centre of the family', the southern neo-Nazi group Frankish Action Front (FAF) appealed to local females to 'preserve the honour of the family', noted the Bavarian authorities. A similar appeal was made by the right-wing publication Der Stiefelträger. Along similar lines, the Bavarian Chairman of the youth wing of the NPD, the Young National Democrats (JN), stated that the 'highest priority that must be constantly conveyed to JN party members' was the preservation of the ethnic community. Their message also appeared to have been accepted by some in North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia.

April 2001, for instance, saw the formation of the female equivalent of the JN in North Rhine-Westphalia – the Young National Democrats' League of Maidens North Rhine-Westphalia. Adopting the same ideological stance, portrayed as an amalgamation of active National Socialists whose duty it was to ensure the preservation of the German race, the Thuringian Ring of Maidens (MRT) was formed in 2004. Another female right-wing group, the Weimar Band of Maidens (NMBW), also appeared that year in the area. According to the Minister of the North Rhine-Westphalian Interior, Fritz Behrens, 'the mere presence of Renees encourages their male colleagues to greater levels of brutality. This was particularly the case when females verbally abuse foreigners.' Of course, Behrens was only referring to one, albeit most densely populated, state of the country. Nonetheless, in 2000 and 2003 the Baden-Württemberg and Bavarian authorities also reported xenophobic motivated acts of violence by females. Although the Baden-Württemberg Office for Criminality maintained that the 792 xenophobic violent incidents were almost exclusively a male

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phenomenon, at the same time, they estimated the female contribution to racially motivated violence in 2000 amounted to 5.7%. This represented an increase from the previous year of 5.1%.\(^{273}\) During the first half of 2004, the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior also recorded racially motivated assaults by females.\(^{274}\)

PDS spokesperson Ulla Jelpke also reported an upsurge of females involved in xenophobically motivated right-wing extremist violence. According to Jelpke, the percentage of females prepared to use violence against foreigners was between 5-20% nationwide.\(^{275}\) Although Jelpke’s estimate was not officially corroborated, the fact that there were any reports at all of female violence directed towards foreigners suggested neo-Nazi ideology amongst females was a cause for concern. In that last respect so was, arguably, the ongoing quest to defend Germany’s Teutonic ethnic origins amongst females, highlighting the increasing gulf between official and popular national self-understanding.

Indicative of an increase in radical right-wing ideas amongst women, were various claims of a rise in female fanzines venerating Germany’s ethnic tribal origins, such as Walküre, Das treue Mädel and Freya-Germanen-Orden. According to various political scientists, female serials Triskele, Das treue Mädel and Das Storchennest, along with their web sites, also promoted the traditional image of mother and child, along with affairs of nature, songs of the Homeland and ancient Germanic traditions.\(^{276}\)

All well and good perhaps, but along with Dr. Andreas Angerstorfer and Annemarie Dengg, the IDA-NRW and the North Rhine-Westphalian Minister of the Interior, Fritz Behrens, also warned that these types of publications and web sites were fostering female Teutonic cults with clear neo-Nazi overtones.\(^{277}\) Focussing on the traditions, culture and ancient history of the German people, fanzines have increased nationwide


\(^{275}\) See: Jelpke, U. Vom Anhängsel zur Aktivistin. *Die Tageszeitung Junge Welt* [Online]. 02.03.05 [Accessed 24.05.05].<http://www.jungewelt.de/beilage/art/730>


from about a dozen in 2003 to 20 in 2004, explained the Bavarian and Brandenburg Ministries of the Interior. According to the anti-fascist journal *Monitor*, the female magazine *Das Treue Mädel* not only had a strong focus on Germanic and National Socialist history, but also spread a clear racist and anti-Semitic message. In its third 2002 February edition, for instance, *Das treue Mädel* protested against the alleged ‘millions flowing into a new synagogue in Dresden’. 279

Writing articles for the party-organ of the NPD, *Deutsche Stimme (The German Voice)*, and Jürgen Rieger’s the *Nordische Zeitung*, the National Socialist and Germanic credo of Birka Vibeke’s web site and publication *Das Storchennest* was also clear. 280 Within an introductory speech by two of its members outlining the organisation’s guiding principles and values, Thoralf and Henrike Berta stated: ‘We believe in *Blut und Boden* [blood and soil] along with the preservation of the ethnic community.’ 281

There were similar articles on the Fatherland and implicit adulation of National Socialism from *Triskele*. In 2001, for example, the Hamburg Ministry of the Interior highlighted the third issue of the women’s magazine *Triskele*, depicting a young female closely resembling a member of the former National Socialist League of German Maidens (BDM). 282 Along with the Hamburg authorities, in 2004 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of the Interior also expressed concerns about the detrimental influence of *Triskele* amongst females. 283 Given the BDM’s past ideology of racial purity and increase in *fanzines* venerating Germany’s Teutonic past, the concerns of the Brandenburg, Hamburg and North Rhine-Westphalian authorities were self-evident.


Indicative of the continued association with an alleged undiluted Germanic heathen ancestry embodying the essence of the ethnic community was, arguably, the re-appropriation of pre-modern ethnic symbols. Runes are the oldest Germanic form of writing and probably the best known amongst these pre-modern symbols of the Germanic era is the double ‘Sig’ (victory) rune. Re-appropriated by the National Socialists, the double victory rune became a symbol of Hitler’s bodyguard - the SS. According to the Berlin authorities, right-wing extremists use various types of runes in order to honour and celebrate the Teutonic, heathen origins of the German people. Amongst these included the Law and Order, Victory and the Life and Death runes utilised as symbols by such groups as The German Heathen Front (DHF), the New Order Movement (BNO) and Defence of the Mark Brandenburg (MHS), noted the Hamburg and Brandenburg authorities. ‘These types of Germanic symbols are also transmitted via the Internet virtually unhindered’, reported the Berlin authorities. Official evidence suggested that Germany’s Teutonic origins were also being used to foster xenophobia. Internet forums, such as Skadi-net, appealed for attacks on Jewish institutions ‘in order to awaken traditional Teutonic anti-Semitism’, noted the BMI. Saxony, in particular, was a problem area. Since 2000, the Saxon authorities noted the use of the Internet as a medium for symbolic and xenophobic agitation had more than doubled in the region from around 30 in 2000 to 70 by 2003. Serving as self-representation and a means of political agitation, overall the BMI estimated 950 right-wing extremist Internet sites were operating nationwide by the end of 2003.

286 See: Ibid., pp. 11-14.
Use of Germanic symbols as a form of self-representation also extended to right-wing female organisations, such as the League of Free Maidens (FMB), the Thuringian Ring of Maidens (MRT) and the Community of German Women (GDF). Some of these symbols were the Wunjo, or Joy, runes and the Black Sun, or Sonnenrad, runes used by the FMB and the MRT. Symbol of the Essen-based publication and web site by and for female right-wing extremists, named after a three-footed Germanic pagan rune, another was the Triskele, noted the North Rhine-Westphalian authorities. Highlighted in a 2001 report by the Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior, originating from the Triskele rune, the Dreierschild rune was also used as a symbol by female right-wing group, the GDF.

Actively participating in right-wing events and demonstrations, the Skingirl-Circle of Friends (SFD) has also assembled to exchange information and work together with like-minded groups - particularly those interested in Germanic traditions and a Teutonicism, reported the North Rhine-Westphalian authorities. Although the SFD disbanded in 2000 to avoid prosecution and an imminent ban, official reports noted that former members of the organisation have since joined other extremist female networks, such as Das Braune Kreuz (The Brown Cross) and the GDF. So how else have the myths and images of the past in the words of A. D. Smith ‘done their work’?

As well as serving as a focal point for German nationhood and nationalism in 1875, according to Konrad Jarausch, Dr. Wolfgang Spickermann and others, the monument to ‘Hermann the German’ in the Teutoburg forest celebrated liberation from foreign oppression. Whilst it would be an exaggeration to claim that German identity derives from the fear of the outsider, nevertheless, evidence suggested that the Varus-Schlacht was a major catalyst of nationalist sentiments, consciousness and myths, at the time of writing, particularly in the north of the country. Taking into account former Chancellor Schröder’s and the CDU’s position on the core values of the Enlightenment, such as an

295 See: Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., p. 36.
297 See: Smith, A. D. The ethnic origins of nations. op. cit., p. 207.
openness to cosmopolitanism, a re-emergence of German nationalist pride in the prevention of a ‘universalising Roman influence’, or western values, suggested another significant alternative ‘landscape of memory’ and perhaps even a revived Sonderweg. 299 It was perhaps this latest manifestation of ethno-nationalist sentiment that could represent a serious threat for current and future public support for European integration.

Along with the celebration of Hermann as a ‘national hero’, evidence suggested that the victory in the Teutoburg Forest appears to have re-manifested itself into the inner life of some Germans. 300 There was, for instance, an ethno-nationalist and defiant pride increasingly being articulated in the current language employed to describe the Varus-Schlacht and its historical legacy. This was particularly evident within both local and national publications since the opening of the Kalkriese Museum celebrating the site where: ‘All Germany now believes Rome’s power was irretrievably halted at Kalkriese’, noted NDR cheerfully. 301 ‘At the foot of the Kalkriese hills, the museum and park now allows the visitor to experience the humiliating defeat of the Romans, where barbarian tribes buried their swords and spears into the Romans’, declared Anja Herold in Die Zeit. 302 Kai Schöneberg referred to the German-Roman scenario as a: ‘David versus Goliath conflict’ that, according to Matthias Schulz, ‘tore a huge hole in Rome’s forces’. 303 Broadcasting stations NDR and ARD, for example, reported that the Teutonic warriors gave their hated oppressors ‘a real thumping’ that ‘shook the Romans to the core’. 304 So much so that never again would a Roman legion be allocated the numbers XVII, XVIII and XIX – the number of the legions lost in the engagement, boasted the Kalkriese Museum and the Berliner Kurier. 305 Even the usually liberal-leaning journal Der Spiegel seemed to take delight in Teutonic defiance and Rome’s defeat. ‘What a


302 Cited from: Herold, A. op. cit.


hiding! A barbarian that had dared to attack the might of Rome at the height of its powers managed to evade capture to the end', noted Matthias Schulz.\[306\]

After the battle in AD 9, all Roman camps to the east of the Rhine were lost.\[307\] Thereafter, the Romans confined themselves to the left bank of the Rhine and Hermann became celebrated as a liberator and national hero, particularly after 1875, noted Spickermann, Anja Herold and the Lippe Regional Museum.\[308\] *Die Tageszeitung, Der Spiegel* and North German Broadcasting (NDR) all referred to Hermann as a German Asterix.\[309\] Inscriptions within the niches of the *Hermannsdenkmal* not only contain references to all the German tribes united by Hermann, but also to the wars of liberation against Napoleon (1813-1815) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), noted Friedrich Hohenschwert.\[310\] From the 1800s, the Germanic chieftain’s heroism came to embody German culture’s defence against the ‘universalising external influences of the arch-enemy France’, argued Rudy Koshar.\[311\] There were similar observations from Ralf-Rainer Sass and the *Berliner Zeitung* about the French as the traditional foe.\[312\]

Not everyone, of course, approved of this nationalism or alleged legacy of the *Varus-Schlacht*. Osnabrück historian Rainer Wiegels derogatively referred to Kalkriese Museum’s new re-constructed watchtower over the battle site as a ‘rust-box’, claiming it represented a ‘miserable symbol of nationalist sentiment’.\[313\] Others have also contested the numerous claims that Hermann is a national symbol and his victory a source of great national pride. Münster archaeologist Stephan Berke and West German Broadcasting (WDR) argued that Hermann did not unite the German tribes and dismissed claims that the Cheruscan prince liberated Germany from Rome.\[314\]

Nonetheless, some in Germany maintained that the battle had wide-reaching consequences for nationhood. Archaeologist Bernhard Ortmann, the *Berliner Kurier*
and the Volkswagen Foundation described Rome’s decision to recall its legions right of the Rhine as a ‘turning point in European history’. One consequence was the lack of Roman influence within northern Germany for a considerable time, noted Osnabrück historian Hermann Poppe-Marquard. Another was the alleged failure to transform Germany into a Roman province along with the rest of Germany’s neighbours, such as Batavia (Holland), Gaul (France) and Switzerland (Helvetia) - thereby preserving Teutonic independence right of the River Rhine.

In response to the eight Roman legions (50,000 men) sent by Emperor Tiberius to subdue the recalcitrant German tribesmen in AD 15, the Germans established communal defences within the Teutoburg Forest and Wiehengebirge hills. However, determined resistance, heavy casualties and the loss of their invasion fleet at the mouth of the Ems in AD 16 obliged Tiberius to relinquish designs on extending Rome’s influence to the River Elbe. Consequently, Germany was never conquered, claimed Matthias Schulz, Ruhr historian Karl-Wilhelm Welwei and the Lippe Regional Museum. ‘How could it have been, when Rome could neither find reliable internal allies for its expansionary quest, nor overcome obdurate high-ranking tribal hostility?’ asked Welwei rhetorically.

Historian Peter Kehne of the University of Hanover suggested, for example, that the Roman campaigns were prompted by reasons of security – not conquest. On the other hand, Frankfurt Archaeologist Gabriele Rasbach argued that Rome’s influence was greater than is usually admitted in Germany. But, at the time of writing, coverage of the battle’s legacy suggested more than a hint of an exultant compliance with the boast by Der Spiegel that: ‘Germanic ferocity was never tamed or Romanised in the land of barbarians.’

320 See: Welwei, K-W. op. cit.
322 Cited from: Schulz, M. op. cit., p. 154. For similar contentions, see: Brettin, M. op. cit., p. 27 and: Herold, A. op. cit. See also: Neuer Streit um die legendäre Varusschlacht. op. cit.
To summarise, despite official recognition of the suffering of many refugees and expellees, for some, the trauma of displaced Germans - particularly women - has still not been adequately dealt with in German national memory.\textsuperscript{323} Implying Germany’s young have not been informed of the suffering of thousands of women during the Red Army’s advance, expellee representatives and some of their more outspoken sympathisers have insisted that Germans should be allowed to see for themselves the fate of these people. Günter Grass, for instance, spoke of the ‘groundless neglect’ of the theme and there have been many other similar contentions.\textsuperscript{324} Evidence suggested that some of the public, parts of the media, a number of historians and the descendants of the expellees themselves still wanted greater official recognition of the history, ‘past injustices’ and identity of those expelled.\textsuperscript{325}

Along with the Air War, it seemed another aspect of repression left yet more ghosts from the past, suggesting further divided national self-conceptions. This became particularly apparent in the official distancing from the media’s and representatives of the expellees’ demands that German suffering should be placed within a national - not European - context. Attempting to avoid antagonising its neighbours, top-ranking officials, such as the former presidents of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) and Rita Süssmuth (CDU), wanted any centre dedicated to the theme of expulsion to include Poland ‘within the list of the dead’.\textsuperscript{326} At the beginning of the Second World War, for example, 800,000 Poles were expelled from German occupied territory and over two million were exploited as slave labourers in Germany.\textsuperscript{327} According to former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and former Chancellor Schröder:

If one wants to dedicate a centre to the German expellees, then it must be in a European context and cannot be a national project. Otherwise it would be

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\item For official acknowledgement of the suffering of ethnic Germans, see interview with the former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and speech by SPD politician Angelika Krüger-Leibner in: Hofmann, G. and Ulrich, B. Was haben wir uns angetan? Die Zeit, 28.08.03 (36), p. 6 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4106.
\item Cited from: Noack, H-J. op. cit., pp. 37-38. See also: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 50, 103-104 and: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort „Im Zentrum - Vertreibung ächten.” op. cit. See also: Jaenecke, H. op. cit., p. 135.
\item For claims from historians Christel Panzig, Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Ute Schmidt that this issue has still not been sufficiently dealt with, see: Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21 and: „Kriegskinder.” Trauma von Bomben und Tod quält noch heute viele Menschen. op. cit., p. 28. See also: Deventer, K. and Schmitz-Gümbel, E. Vergewaltigt und verstummt. Frauen als Kriegsbeute (Teil 2). op. cit. See also: Everwien, A. op. cit.
\item See: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin. op. cit., p. 3.
\item For these claims see: Sokolowski, J. Angst vor den Vertriebenen. Die Welt, 01.09.04, p. 9 and: Krzeminski, A. Die schwierige deutsche-polnische Vergangenheitspolitik. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), pp. 3-5.
\end{enumerate}
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perceived as a re-writing of history and therefore a reversal of the roles of perpetrator and victim, reflected Fischer and Schröder.  

It seemed that international relations took clear preference over issues of internal sovereignty that contrasted to the general mood at the time of writing. Challenging official understandings of nationhood, wide support across the country for a national memorial suggested another alternative to official 'landscapes of memory'. What Martina Rathke, Karen Meyer-Rebentisch and others described as a 'suppression of the past' and 'inability to mourn' has now 'given way to memory'. Nevertheless, there was increasing discord over how collective remembrance of the expulsions ought to be interpreted and represented. Indicative of this sense of an inadequate official representation of collective memory and, arguably, national identity were various articles and publications highlighting the sorrow and sense that the expellees were 'helpless victims'.

In 1993, the New Guardhouse was dedicated as a memorial to 'all victims of war and repression'. Whilst the inscription on a plaque to the right of the entrance of the Guardhouse refers to expulsion in a general sense, judging by the media and public demands for a national centre for the German expellees, this was far from adequate.

Publications and articles indicated evidence of what some journalists called a 'reversal of the perpetrator-victim' image within recent German collective memory and perceptions of the Second World War. Bert Hoppe, Christoph Kleßmann and Jörg Echternkamp criticised, for example, the 2005 publication by historian Hubertus Knabe - Day of Liberation? End of the War in East Germany - in which the author and others like him placed too much emphasis on the Germans as victims. There have been a number of publications, articles and radio programmes where this phenomenon was...
particularly apparent. In many tales of flight and expulsion, at the very least, perpetrators and victims have become virtually indistinguishable.

According to the Federal Office of Administration (BVA), German national symbols, the New Guardhouse and official days of remembrance serve as symbols and national memorials to 'the victims of both world wars and tyranny' whose ‘basic convictions unite the polity’. Numerous reports of continuing anti-Semitic acts of vandalism against Jewish memorials on the one hand, and a sense of an inadequate collective remembrance for the expellees on the other, suggested a commemorative consensus of memory was clearly wanting. Perhaps its most obvious manifestation was the perception from the media, expellee representatives and some academics of the failure of both the former CDU/CSU/FDP and SPD/Green governments to provide a consistent and collective memory. Summarised by Alexander Gauland as a Bilderslosigkeit (lack of collective images), arguably, its latest manifestation were the vociferous protests by both current and former members of the German Air Force against official vilification of 'war-hero' and 'historical role-model' Werner Mölders.

Along with a populist defiance to the official 'framing strategies of remembrance', there has also been a return to ethnic self-exploration via ancient images, such as the Hermannsdenkmal and the battle it commemorates. Evidence suggested the claims of the Roman historian Tacitus continued to have a considerable impact on German identity. Tacitus wrote, for example: 'I accept the view that the peoples of Germany have never been contaminated themselves by intermarriage with foreigners but remain of pure blood, distinct and unlike any other nation.' Although often disputed in Germany, the notion that the Germans should remain a pure race undiluted by foreign blood have in the words of Alfons Soellner, 'proved to be the most persistent of all German ideologies'.


particularly apparent within the philosophy of Jürgen Rieger’s *Artgemeinschaft*, neo-Nazi *fanzines* and some heathen groups at the time of writing.  

Adulation of Germany’s Teutonic past also extended to female right-wing organisations, bands and publications, venerating not only the heathen origins of the German people, but also the National Socialist agenda of preserving the Germanic race. Female bands and singers advocating a clear racist message, for instance, included Annett Möck, *Monique*, Lokis Horden and *Froidenspender*. This phenomenon was manifest either directly or otherwise in racially motivated acts of female violence, reported the Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalian and Bavarian Ministries of the Interior.  

There have also been instances of an aggressive ethno-nationalism, reflected in the claims of the preclusion of Rome’s centralising and cultural influences that have been increasingly articulated outside the usual neo-Nazi circles. Publication *Hermannsruf* (*Hermann’s Appeal*) and the Bredstedt-based heathen organisation the Northern Ring (NR) were both depicted as right-wing extremist by the Lower Saxon and Schleswig-Holstein Ministries of the Interior. At the very least, collective remembrance of Germany’s ethnic origins has become a much more diverse and de-centralised process.  

To conclude, according to a statement from the Federal Administration Office: ‘The historical and political identity of the state and its citizens are concentrated in its symbols.’ Translated into eight languages, passages on a plaque situated within the New Guardhouse, of what the authorities claimed was the central memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, reads:

We honour the memory of peoples who suffered from the war. We remember their citizens who were persecuted and lost their lives. We remember those killed in action in the World Wars. […] We remember the millions of Jews who

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343 Cited from: German national symbols. *op. cit.*
were murdered. We remember all those who were victims of tyranny and met their death, though innocent.344

There were also indications that many in Germany applauded these sentiments and accepted other official symbols, such as the national anthem and the Bundesflagge, whose tricolour dates back to German democratic liberalism of the first half of the nineteenth century. Matthias Zimmer, for example, contended that the former social cleavages of Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany have almost disappeared and there is now a broad acceptance of the Federal Republic, along with its political culture of consensus.345 Demands for the restitution of the honour of Werner Mölders, a national Centre against Expulsion and rejection from some quarters of the victims of fascism, however, suggested very different ‘landscapes of memory’ to those enshrined in the New Guardhouse.

But not all in Germany were so conducive to such discriminatory and unaccommodating approaches to remembrance. German historians, such as Karl Dietrich Bracher, Fritz Klein and Martin Heinzelmann, criticised demands for a national memorial to the Vertriebene and their past political rallies as ‘revisionist’, arguing instead for a European centre commemorating all victims of expulsion.346 Underlining the background causes of the expulsions, key SPD/Green politicians, such as former Chancellor Schröder, Joschka Fischer, and Otto Schily, also rejected such selective and populist appeals for a national centre in the capital and a National Day of Remembrance for the German expellees.

Whilst there were many official answers as to the origins of the German expulsions, at the same time, evidence suggested there were many outstanding questions concerning the identity, fates and histories of Vertriebene families. Perhaps the dead and their descendants should be allowed to rest in peace. There were those who would rather forget the suffering and trauma of the past, as revealed in some responses from former

expellees (*Vertriebene*) and refugees (*Flüchtlinge*) in Lübeck and Leer, when requested for their testimonies concerning former events in Pomerania and East Prussia. It could also be argued that, to some extent, the past and one's origins are unavoidable. Attempting to capture the essence of individuality, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe once wrote, ‘you cannot escape from yourself’. That said, however, perhaps those promoting outdated ethno-national symbols of identity ought to adopt a more liberal, progressive and less confrontational stance.

On the 57th anniversary of the German surrender of 8 May 1945, former Chancellor Schröder also relegated the significance of common descent, promoting instead a *Verfassungspatriotismus* as an essential medium for national identity. Nevertheless, developments suggested that for many in Germany, Hermann and myths of common ancestry still lay at the heart of German national identity. When the revival of an ethno-nationalism celebrating Germany's heathen Teutonic origins are taken into account, a popular identification with alternative sites and symbols clearly exposed further disparities between official and popular perceptions of national identity.

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348 Cited from: Gall, L. *op. cit.*, p. 5.
Conclusion

So what has this thesis suggested about German national identity and memory and does an answer to the question matter?

Although global interdependence, mass migration, multinational production and mass communications erode national boundaries and challenges the ideas of nation as a homogenous ethnic and cultural entity, at the same time, a number of Germans have resorted to defining Germanness by means of national delimitation. It was evident that some Germans still had problems not only accepting immigration, globalisation and a Verfassungspatriotismus, but also any moves away from an identity based on what German academic Lilly Weissbrod described as an ‘ethno/biological understanding of the nation’.¹

Evidence indicated the mainstream Bundestag political elite could also continue to confront problems such as right-wing incitement over whether a multicultural model is desirable, or indeed possible, amongst some of the public. The Hamburg, Lower Saxon and Brandenburg Ministries of the Interior, for example, were still raising concerns over this issue in 2004.²

Despite official claims to the contrary, hostility to foreigners, asylum, sympathy to economically or racially motivated violence and even National Socialist ideals was not merely a phenomena primarily confined to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Evidence suggested the extreme right continued to extend its influence in both parts of the country. Hostility to incoming migrant workers, asylum-seekers and attacks on foreigners by right-wing extremists suggested a genetic determination of citizenship and, therefore, race evidently played a significant factor for some in Germany.


It also seemed the deliberations of Tacitus continued to influence German national self-understanding. A renewed interest in the *Hermannsdenkmal* and battle it commemorates suggested some were rediscovering their Germanic roots as an antidote to insecurity, a missing identity and even a *Verfassungspatriotismus*. There have been various claims, for example, that what was needed in the face of growing economic problems and political disillusionment was a sense of a ‘common identity’. Writing in 2003, Bernd Ulrich claimed that a general confidence in the economy has been ‘shaken to the core and as a result, people are beginning to seek alternative forms of identity such as a greater affinity with the past’. Or, as Rudy Koshar put it: ‘An anxious dissatisfaction with the present has led to an embrace of history.’

There have also been numerous claims that unfavourable structural and economic conditions have fostered right-wing extremist ideologies amongst an increasingly disaffected German youth. Along with high unemployment, Germanic symbols and ancient history were also being exploited in order to promote a racist agenda amongst Germany’s young by the extreme right. In March and August 2005, for instance, there were still reports of the use of Germanic runes as a means of self-representation by various identity protest groups.

Despite or because of continued immigration, fears of a loss of identity and lack of positive direction, the belief in and defence of an ethno-national unsullied Germanic race amongst sub-cultural female groups showed no signs of abating at the time of writing. Groups within the right-wing umbrella organisation of the Working Circle of the German Band of Maidens (*Arbeitskreis Mädelschar*), such as Germany’s Band of Maidens (MSD), and female membership of *Kameradschaften* were still active in Hamburg and Lower Saxony during 2004. By the end of 2004, Dr. Andreas Angerstorfer and Annemarie Dengg of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* estimated that about

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a third of all members of right-wing extremist organisations were females. Evidence suggested, therefore, that ancient German history was being used to justify a nationalist and ethnocentric identity. Summed up by Jan Herman Brinks, for some in Germany, ethno-nationalism was 'socially a la mode again'. In some areas of society, it seemed that the past was competing with the present in Germany, and, at the time of writing, the past seemed to be winning.

Since reunification, a populist culture of remembrance has emerged, apparently rejecting the Bundestag elite’s conceptions of German collective guilt, memory and identity. According to Christian Social Union (CSU) member of the Bundestag Peter Gauweiler: ‘A sense of historical guilt is deeply rooted within the historical memory of the Germans.’ Many other representatives of the Bundestag also contended the criminal past of Germany was and should always remain in the forefront of German national consciousness.

It was evident, however, that German national identity and memory could not simply be dictated by the German political elite - particularly when that identity and memory were based on collective guilt and atonement. As Andreas Staab put it in German Politics, ‘the third post-war generation no longer accepts the collective shame and responsibility so readily as their parents had done’.

Yet, not all in Germany were so reluctant to accept responsibility for the past. Despite opposition in Hanover and Berlin for a national memorial to the Holocaust, German television presenter Lea Rosh attracted considerable public support by way of a ‘citizens’ initiative’ for the project in Bonn, Kassel and elsewhere in Germany. Others, such as the left-liberal intellectuals Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Ulrike Jureit of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS), also insisted that coming to terms with the past should be an ongoing process.

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12 See: Kramer, J. Letter from Germany: the politics of memory. The New Yorker, 14.08.95, pp. 48-65.
Nevertheless, evidence suggested that many Germans remembered who, what and how they wished to and that public commemoration and remembrance had more in common with personal and generational experiences than with the reflections of the Bundestag elite.

What could be described as a competition of remembrance, how German suffering during the latter stages of the Second World War was remembered and collective memory have taken on a new significance. Whilst Hamburg and Dresden have always been, perhaps, symbols of German national memory, evidence indicated the Air War per se has also now become one too. It seemed Germany had a divided memory one focussed on the Holocaust and the other on the Allied Air Campaign. Evidence suggested another was the expulsion theme.

As a consequence of official taboos in the GDR, general public indifference, individual suppression and confrontational stance of some of their leading representatives, many expellees developed their own private, and often stigmatised, Erinnerungskultur or culture of remembrance. Like the two main characters Tulla Pokriefke and her grandson Konrad, the well-received message of Crabwalk was that of anguish, grief and a keen sense of injustice concerning events in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. Consequently, many former German refugees, expellees and their sympathisers became increasingly isolated from the political elites in the former GDR and, to some extent, the 1998-2005 Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green ruling coalition government.14 ‘How much of this has been dammed up all this time?’ asked Günter Grass, referring to the alleged hitherto former public silence and official (GDR) indifference concerning the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff and former events in East Prussia.15 In many individual cases, for instance, the repressed trauma of eyewitnesses

from the Air War and expulsions often culminated in a 'nervous psychological disturbance.'

Although usually associated with individuals, as Crabwalk and many other publications indicated, the trauma of numerous individuals of the war generation, along with a growing populist empathy concerning their past suffering, was also a growing collective phenomenon. On the one hand, some may contend that there is no such thing as collective memory, only individual recollections of contestable and controversial events. Cases in point were the disparities between official and popular perceptions and memories of the Red Army, expulsions and the Air War. On the other, whilst many individuals have, arguably, very private and distinct memories, the fact that they shared similar experiences of the past could be interpreted as collective memory. Making no distinction between an individual and collective populist concept of trauma, publications such as Crabwalk and The Fire have, therefore, become the self-appointed representatives of the hitherto silent children of the war generation as victims.

Emphasising the central role played by history in national identity, Social Scientist Gerhard Schmittchen argued: 'A nation’s sense of self is the result of appropriated experiences and the sum of remembrances of its own political behaviour.' Summarising the roles of National Days of Remembrance and Germany’s Day of National Mourning, for example, the Federal Office of Administration (BVA) claimed the New Guardhouse represented collective memory, grief and identity.

Given the quest from some of the media, a number of historians and sections of the public for a national Centre against Expulsion, in the light of relatively recent evidence this claim seemed rather questionable. Whilst an inscription in the New Guardhouse does refer to expulsion, representatives and children of the German expellees, elements

of the public and the media were still searching for answers to and greater official recognition of their history, identity and fate. In the meantime, Crabwalk and similar publications have become a kind of surrogate memorial to the fate of the expellees.

Although Crabwalk, The Fire and many other similar publications were merely serving what could be described as local markets of remembrance, nevertheless, it was evident that a new culture of remembrance of the Germans as victims was ongoing at the time of writing. Suppression of the past and selective forms of remembrance have evidently played a key role in German memory and identity, serving either GDR and expellee misrepresentations of the past or, more recently, fostering an alternative cult of victim.

Whilst past taboos have now been broken, along with the victims of the Air War, there was a sense that the suffering and history of former displaced Germans - particularly women - still has not been sufficiently addressed. As recently as May and October 2005, for example, there have been claims that the image of the Red Army as heroes went unchallenged in the GDR and German women remained silent for many years about their rape by soldiers of the Red Army and their mistreatment in Soviet labour camps.

Following in the footsteps of Crabwalk, in 2005 several German newspapers along with North German Broadcasting (NDR) reported with considerable empathy about the protection or assistance afforded by the Wehrmacht for German civilians fleeing the Red Army in 1945. This was either in the form of evacuation or by delaying the advance of the Red Army as long as possible in order to win time for German civilians to escape. Shown in 400 German cinemas throughout 2004, films, such as Der Untergang (Downfall) and Napola, were also part of a culture of remembrance in which

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it is gradually becoming acceptable to portray the human and tragic side of the downfall of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{23}

Changing perceptions of the past seemed to be altering Germany's collective memory and, perhaps, even self-understanding. In contrast to the 1998-2005 Bundestag ruling political elite, a cult of victim has evidently gained acceptance within significant sections of the German media, some of the public and a number of local German historians.

Indicative of this shift of a \textit{Zeitgeist} in Germany was not only the enthusiasm accorded to \textit{Crabwalk} and \textit{The Fire}, but also the unrestrained manner in which eyewitnesses expressed their wartime experiences as victims. Since \textit{Crabwalk} and \textit{The Fire}, a new need for remembrance of German suffering has emerged with the history of 'the little people' becoming increasingly more vocal and important.\textsuperscript{24} It seemed as if an empty void needed to be filled for some and the latest recollection campaign, along with outpourings from witnesses, suggested many areas in Germany - including Berlin - were still catching up with their past. The liberal use of eyewitness testimonies in various articles, publications, films and documentaries testified to the increasing significance of a so-called \textit{Geschichte von unten} as a key source of historical evidence in this new culture of remembrance.

With the exceptions of some senior Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politicians, such as Erika Steinbach and Erwin Marschewski, statements from key members of the 1998-2005 SPD/Green ruling political elite indicated they had clear reservations accepting the war-generation Germans as national victims. Although many Germans have received war damages, since 2001 Erwin Marschewski and others have campaigned, albeit unsuccessfully, for greater official recognition and compensation for female citizens of the GDR used as forced labour in Soviet internment camps at the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{25} In sum, there seemed to be a fundamental difference


between how key members of the then ruling Bundestag political elite and sections of the media and public wanted to remember the expulsions and the Air War in the aftermath of Crabwalk and The Fire.

On the one hand, perhaps German suffering should not be the most important factor of collective remembrance. Maybe it is more important that disputes over the past disappear and the present takes precedence over remembrances and depictions of the past. Demands for a national Centre against Expulsion, from the Federation of Expellees (BdV) and their supporters, along with criticism of the Red Army, certainly provoked protests from Poland, Russia and the Czech Republic. In May 2005, for instance, the Russian embassy in Berlin also protested about local demands from representatives of the Berlin Steglitz-Zehlendorf district for Russian acknowledgement of the 'terror and sorrow' wrought by the Red Army in East Prussia and Berlin in 1945.\(^{26}\) Perhaps it is more important to share a common remembrance in which all can participate, rather than fostering calls for the recognition of German suffering and the safeguarding of a historical learning exercise in catching up with the past. Post-reunification German governments have endeavoured to include German expellees in the process of reconciliation with Germany's neighbours. In 2000, for example, the then SPD Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, attended the BdV's Day of Homeland.\(^{27}\)

On the other hand, it could be argued that people can never move on from the past and genuine reconciliation can never be comprehensively affected until the war generation are fully accepted as national, collective victims – both from their eastern neighbours and from many within their own government. A number of articles reported a lack of empathy in Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia for assertions that the Germans were also victims, for example.\(^{28}\)

'As a result of feelings of past guilt, public indifference and official pressure, many expellees have always been harsh on themselves, giving no vent to their feelings',

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\(^{22}\) See also: 22. Hilfen für Spätaussiedler. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, 01.01.03, pp. 727-729.


\(^{27}\) See: Kloth, H. M. Zauberwort Europa. Der Spiegel, 15.04.02 (16), p. 75.

claimed Lübeck historian Karen Meyer-Rebentisch and East Prussian writer Arno Surminski. Consequently, this alleged ‘Unfähigkeit zu trauern’, or an inability to grieve, culminated in indifference and, sometimes, even intolerance towards other immigrants and refugees, noted Meyer-Rebentisch.29

Yet, perhaps greater acceptance of the Vertriebenen and those lost in the Air War as national victims of war from the Bundestag political elite will help to change attitudes not only to other refugees, but also to former enemies. Although public antipathy towards foreigners is rarely expressed in open violence, nevertheless, there were still signs of anti-Semitism along with hostility to asylum-seekers and Poles from some in Germany. Between January and March 2005, for example, there were reports of arson attacks on asylum centres in Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia.30

There have, however, been genuine albeit very slow moves towards reconciliation between ordinary Poles and Germans, noted Polish historian Michal Kaczmarek and German investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke.31 Whilst some may argue comparisons are odious, interestingly, Hans-Ulrich Stoldt maintained that there was more empathy towards German claims for greater recognition of German suffering amongst Poles than in the Czech Republic.32

Nevertheless, mutual recriminations and bitter memories continued to foster fears and inhibit a comprehensive reconciliation, understanding and forgiveness. In April 2005, for example, representative of the Association of German Minorities in Danzig (DFK-Danzig), Gerhard Olter, reported anti-German agitation in Gdansk, which was organised by the Head of the Polish Party for Law and Justice (PiS), Dorota Arciszewska-Mielewczuk. Allegedly encouraged by Arciszewska-Mielewczuk, members of the Polish Claims Conference and the PiS burnt an effigy on 22 February 2005 of Erika Steinbach dressed in SS uniform before the courthouse of Gdansk, complained Gerhard

32 See: Stoldt, H-U. „Schlimmes Trauma.” Der Spiegel, 08.04.02 (15), pp. 70-74.
Olter and CDU representative Erwin Marschewski. Although there was evidence of growing local interest in the German historical and cultural legacy of the Polish city of Wroclaw (formerly Breslau), Claus Christian Malzahn noted that many of the older Polish citizens of Wroclaw keep handcarts at the ready in their cellars ‘just in case the Germans return’. There were similar allegations from the Czech city of Bochov. According to Markéta Ebrlová, for instance, ‘many Czechs fear that their property in the western Bohemian city of Bochov will be returned to the Germans’. Along with many Czechs, some former German refugees and expellees still looked back on the past with considerable bitterness.

Without reciprocal recognition of the Germans as national collective victims and perhaps greater acknowledgement of accountability from former adversaries, future German generations may not be prepared to bear the responsibility for what Peter Brandt referred to as the ‘horrors of the past’. During a school-trip to Auschwitz, for example, German children were allegedly seen and heard running around the camp, ‘hooting and laughing’. Arguably, the statement ‘never again’ by various members of the Bundestag in the context of Auschwitz has a rather pointless function, or perhaps even a self-defeating one, if what is actually thought about remembrance is ignored. As the President of the BdV Erika Steinbach put it: ‘If one cannot grieve over one’s own victims, how can people be expected to grieve over others?’ Depending on one’s point of view, justice and logic suggest that victim status should not apply for some and not for others. A national Centre against Expulsion and a Day of Remembrance could, however, facilitate a coming to terms with the past and alleviate continuing trauma for Germans. An apparent need for victim status indicated that many were still coping with this particular aspect of Germany’s broken past.

38 Cited from: Kramer, J. op. cit., pp. 56, 60.
Catching up with the past could also have a liberating effect, not only for those who have hitherto suffered in silence, but also for those still unaware of the immensity of German suffering. ‘One in five of every German family were displaced yet their history still remains marginal’, claimed the editor of *Geo* Peter-Matthias Gaede, journalist Helga Hirsch and others. So long as the past events of nations and their peoples are not fully addressed or comprehended, bitterness, resentment and misunderstanding may continue. Along with the dead, evidence suggested that many of the living were still not at peace, since they were unable to put the past to rest. An apparent reluctance to leave the past behind was particularly evident in Berlin and Wittenberg, for example. In the quest for a collective consensual national identity, interpretations of the past were arguably crucial.

Discussing the themes of the nation, patriotism and democratic culture in 2002, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared: ‘In order for a nation to be at peace with itself, it has to have the courage to establish a common history.’ But this ‘common history’ was not that of the *Bundestag* political elite. ‘Through collective remembrance of specific historic experiences, the fundamental values upon which the system of government and constitutional order are based come alive’, claimed the federal authorities. However, demands for a National Day of Remembrance for the Air War victims and Centre against Expulsion for the German expellees suggested the dead, rather than the living, symbolised German collective memory at the time of writing.

On the other hand, there are more palatable aspects of the past that continue to have a more positive impact on German identity and memory. Many Germans, for example, associate Germanness with the country’s rich cultural and musical legacy represented by figures such as Beethoven, Goethe and Schiller. Other symbols of German identity include the spirit of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament and the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) in the form of democratic liberalism and the divisive, albeit intellectually

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progressive, ‘Weimar culture’. Writers of the Weimar period, such as Erich Maria Remarque, Bertolt Brecht and Thomas Mann, continue to have considerable and continuing literary and intellectual influence in Germany.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, it was evident that the buried testimonies of the expellees and the Air War have returned to haunt the present and those who seek to deny them collective victim status. In other words, Crabwalk and The Fire have become the memory of the ‘little people’ by proxy at the time of writing.⁴⁶ Taken together, the themes of citizenship, immigration and xenophobia, along with the memory of the expulsions and the Air War, suggested significant disparities between official and popular conceptions of German national memory and identity.

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BAVARIA

Ministry of the Interior


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State Parliament


**BERLIN**

Senate Administration for the Interior


**BRANDENBURG**

Ministry of Science, Research and Culture


Ministry of the Interior


BREMEN

Senator for Interior, Culture and Sport


HAMBURG

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**HESSE**

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Ministry of the Interior and for Sports


SAARLAND

State Ministry of the Interior, Family, Women and Sport

SAXONY

State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Ministry of the Interior)


SAXONY-ANHALT

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