Management and Governance: Inside an HE Institute

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Management and Governance: Inside an HE Institute

ABSTRACT: This research is a case study of a public body - a UK HE institution - to reveal aspects of a cycle of 'change that did not stick' and to reveal the power-base and control aspects of change, organisation and management. This institution set about to change its operation to a democratic, matrix-style of organisation. It then reversed that change and in four years returned to something like its former structure. The people at the top - the 'directorate' - arrived and moved on but the staff remained. Eleven of the staff, all middle managers, talked about the events and their interpretations of this change. Their perspective is from outside senior management, yet closer to those engaged in the day-to-day operations of the institution. The interviewees told what happened - from the inside. Their 'voices' are the 'data' and the most important part of the story. They provide a 'text', which is supported by a background of internal official documents and external documents during the period. The cycle of organisational change, seen through the eyes of the 'affected', is presented as a text, a social document, encasing and enveloping their accounts and stories with the intention of preserving the integrity of the evidence. Various interpretative approaches are followed: Critical Theory, philosophy, culture together with the national Higher Education context and a 'case-study' of another HE institution as corroborative background. The case-study, prompted by the general approach of the respondents, is used as a spring-board for reflections on management and governance.
IMPORTANT NOTE:

All the names and details relating to persons, organisations or places are fictitious.
These details have been changed to protect the individuals and organisations.
This does not apply to national politicians, and other information published in press, print or other means.
The statements of the respondents are in their own words. They have been edited and additions for clarity are shown in [brackets].
The Preface

This thesis is about a UK institution of Higher Education. It is in two volumes. Volume Two is the evidence on cd; it is called The Text. Volume One is a commentary of ideas and interpretations on this evidence arranged in chapters which refer to each other as themes recur, and to The Text, as the source for these ideas.

Interpreting this evidence involved mapping a trail into different perspectives and disciplines. For example, Abecedary Institute is a fictitious name. It is derived from abecedarian: a learner or a teacher of the ABC and it invokes the Institute's teacher-training origins in the introduction of compulsory schooling in the late nineteenth century. It evokes a multiplicity of perspectives from different worlds: language and the key to learning, vocational training, vocation, learners and learned, a national education system, the politics of its origins and the politics of its organisation, and more, extending to a society and culture.

Abecedary Institute's response to the re-ordering of higher education by the Thatcher government's 1992 legislation was to dismantle a hierarchical structure and introduce a flatter management-configuration that passed power and initiative downwards. The public intention was to create a responsive organisation to match a liberalised-market with "student-customers" at the apex.¹

Like many of its staff, my response was to welcome Abecedary Institute's introduction of a democratic organisation. Thus, from the outset, my bias was pro-democratic in spirit, with undefined origins probably harking back to the English Civil War's radical tradition, deeply embedded in Christian culture, and encapsulated in Rainborough's 'ringing' statement on The Agreement of the People in the Putney Debates, 1647, that has endured in democratic thinking: "I think the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he, and therefore truly, sir, I think it is clear that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government"².

This research intended to evaluate the progress of the new democratic management, but when this restructuring was reversed, it turned to monitoring events and attitudes, collating reflections to understand the reasons behind the

¹ Purkiss D. The English Civil War: A People's History London: Harper Perennial 2007. p. 495. Note: Purkis adds: 'Rainborough's final statement is democratic in that it imagined people making decisions who had previously been shut out of all choice'. p. 496.
reversal. The initial change exhibited the management-thinking of Peters' 'excellence-movement' of 'Prescriptions for a world turned upside down: a handbook for a management revolution'. Ironically, 'a world turned upside down' was one contemporary chronicler's description of the aftermath of the English Civil War when republican ideals briefly triumphed over monarchical hierarchy, but this was short-lived because vested interests preferred a world secured for making profits and the theatre of a circumscribed monarchy.

Assembling the evidence, first as recordings, then as extracts and finally as complete transcriptions, resulted in a complexity of evidence and what Bakhtin called a polyphony of voices, providing a more complex account of actuality. Thus, preserving the integrity of the respondents' 'voices' in *The Text* permitted the multiplicity of respondents' views to take precedence over any authorial interpretation.

The adoption of the drama-documentary form allowed the use of drama's strength to 'show', not 'tell', by capturing the uniqueness of each individual thought and emotion, revealing frequency and pattern, and so raising the exhibited individual thought into the dimension of idea and universal. Ultimately, the internal workings of an organisation are its politics: '...one of the reasons for the theatre's possible authority...is its unique suitability to displaying an age in which men's ideals and men's practice bear no relation to each other...showing the gap between what is said and what is seen to be done, and that is why, ragged and gap-toothed as it is, it still has a far healthier potential than some of the other poorer, abandoned arts'.

Inevitably, as the researcher, my hand has always been present from the conception of the research, throughout the interviews, to the final editing of the voices. The researcher's hand is a presence but behind it is a mind, within and beyond which runs a network of connectivity to all that it has ever experienced; the mind is therefore only a conduit, however limited, to a multiplicity of perspectives. The researcher's presence is never the focus. The weave extends in

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one dimension into the evidence and in another into ideas. Every reader adds to the multiplicity of dimensions.

It was necessary to journey through the evidence weaving interconnections that indicated trends and ideas in an approach that borrowed from the methods of textual analysis, verstehen, and ethnography: reference to the text, grounding theory in the evidence, preserving both confirming and contradictory views and drawing out continuities from the particulars of the evidence. The same topography was traversed, never in a straight line, collecting references, going from one to another...and another...tracing continuities. The intention was to understand what had already happened and had already shaped people's lives.

The journey was like Eliot's ending for 'Little Gidding':

'We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time'\(^5\).

And such a journey is never complete; there are always more connections. The interpretative process of the emergence and assemblage of connections beneath the surface of statements and attitudes naturally followed the form of drama, film and music, which express their content in time, one instant, frame or note followed by another, and so on, and the meaning or expression is shown as a complexity of elements and instances but, viewed from a distance, it is clearly an organic pattern. A writer, director or composer can shape these instances into an overarching structure. However, taking a document from life, preserving it so that it is available for others means that the order is organic, random and subterranean. Yet there occur nodal points from which many trails stretch out. If you have ever weeded out nettles, you will know that the life of the plant is in the roots that run in all directions underground from the visible plant, starting new plants where they surface and on and on, in a continuity. Herein lies its strength and power - in the cumulative labyrinth of the connections. It is not like snapping a single stem or uprooting a plant.

To present this labyrinth is the director's task. To draw out an interpretation, a director presents the whole complexity but points and connects the audience toward certain features, moment by moment, adding one to another, so that each is itself a 'becoming' of something else. *The Director's Cut* is my approach to or

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perception of the connections in *The Text*. The cross-referencing binds text and interpretation together. Both are interconnected. My *Director's Cut* does not stand alone. But *The Text* can exist as a separate cultural document.

A parallel take is Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical concept of the *rhizome* which they recognise in literature's capacity to 'move between things, establish a logic of the AND [i.e., conjunction], overthrow ontology...to practice pragmatics*⁶; 'a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle between things' and they acknowledge that this staying in the middle 'between things' is where 'things...pick up speed'. Like its botanical counterpart, a rhizome is a non-hierarchical alliance of horizontal trans-discipline connections and not a single species with a line of progression from root to growing point. It is an assemblage from different disciplines linked to form a multiplicity, a unity that is multiple; therefore the structure of a rhizome is 'the conjunction "...and...and...and..."'. It has force to shake or uproot hierarchical and conventional logic. It is compared to a brick thrown at a window: 'the concept is "...arm+brick+window..."'; it is all of these elements and none of them; it is a direction. The fabric, made up of line and connections, is never ending, is perpetually prolonging itself, and delineates a continuity. The rhizome is therefore an assemblage that connects different regimes and has multi-dimensions: philosophical, political, psychological, organisational and literary. Each is a plateau in the rhizome; each has only a middle with subterranean connecting lines, that are dimensions and 'lines in motion'. The thought that connects them is nomadic. An account of them is like making a map, and the map is constantly referring to the reality that it describes.

My own metaphor for the interpretive approach, in *The Introduction*, was of sliding transparency sheets of different topographies, in different scales, with different features, over the landscape of *The Text* in order to establish points of connection. If management is about the organisation of a human activity, my interpretation's entry point is that its fundamental core is how fellow human beings are regarded and therefore treated and, by extension, how one treats and regards oneself. This regard of one human being for another, for a basic equality, yielded an entry. Others might be happiness, totalising conformity, or collegiality. Each, though different, would eventually lead to the other. If management is a function, then it

⁷ Ibid. p. 27.
is but one aspect of a collective activity. If management is a caste, then it is a hierarchy. If the function is to calculate resources, possibilities and outcomes, then rationality will play its part, but the motivation for judgement will be the passions. If it is a caste, then, by its own criteria, the primary defining quality of the caste’s functioning is or should be its rationality. At a theoretical distance this may seem so, but reference to the reality of evidence, as in The Text, reveals that those respondents, serving under the caste, were aware of and were interpreting individual psychology rather than rationality. Therefore, The Director’s Cut begins with how other persons are regarded. Managers’ claim to rationality is also an argument for the exercise of impersonal authority: a rationalisation that cloaks emotionally led decisions. Managers’ claim to rationality is based on Hobbes, the rational champion of competitive individualism and capitalist egoism that dominated the research’s political context in the shape of the ideology of Thatcherism. Hobbes’ rational, political science of governance and organisation defined people as selfish, isolated individuals, motivated by vicious passions and appetites, who, as equals, would produce a disorderly, anarchic society unless controlled by an absolute sovereign authority. Thus this self-justifying logic asserted that it is in the egotistical individual’s interests to subject herself/himself to absolute authority in order to protect herself/himself from the competing egoism of others. Beneath this rationality is an undercurrent of imagined fears that prompts pre-emptive strikes to secure domination in order to prevent others taking control; it prophesies a democratic society of people with equal rights will descend to anarchy. In Hobbes’ view, authority was a function, and if the sovereign entrusted with it failed, she/he might be replaced. Hobbes’ severe rationality outlawed personal interest, and consequently, security of position, hereditary succession, ladders of preferment, court and courtiers. Vested interests therefore sidelined Hobbes’ theory in preference to Locke’s version which accommodated the “order of egoism’s” appetite for hierarchy, power and money. This mentality is subterranean, and The Prologue offers one account and evaluation of the self-justifying logic that replaces autonomy with domination. The endurance of a public service ethic, of notions of the common good, team-working, collegiality, the ability to debate and decide as a community, are strong themes in The Text. Their existence refutes Hobbes’ psychological assumptions. Hobbes’ contemporaries and, later, Hume, deployed the general existence of these social-psychological virtues to refute Hobbes and Locke. Hume’s evidence-
based psychology/philosophy redefined rationality as the servant of the passions, identified humankind’s sociability and cooperation as the basis of human success and society, and pointed to the fulfilment of the common good through agreed social conventions between equals. In reality, both views persist, with variations, as Mary Douglas describes, as different cultures within society and within organisations.

This provided the entry point from which to refute the rational impersonality of management and organisation and to identify the pre-eminent influence of the character of the person in authority in defining the order of egoism’s hierarchal structures. Courts gather round the characters in these seats of power and adopt their views and perspectives, in preference to that of the common good, as in Castiglione’s debate set in the Renaissance court at Urbino. Tuchman’s historical evidence exposed the failure of monarchical hierarchies and dubbed their egoistic authority: *The March of Folly*. Socio-economic forces may influence actions, but it is impossible to disentangle their influence, like Bourdieu’s *habitus*, from personal traits. From this extended a rhizome that charted a multiplicity of enduring threads – branching in the middle of disciplines – linking Western political and ethical thought in the opposing views of Fallen Man versus God in Man, and imperial versus republican political structures, and social psychological experiments and fieldwork on egoism and co-operation, and organisational effectiveness of cooperative working, and the character of managerialism, and the tendency of enclosed hierarchies to create micro-fascisms of totalitarian organisation... The connections can extend on and on...Each refutes the claim to rational impersonality and effective individualism from different directions.

Time gives the final blow to egoism, like Shelley’s *Ozymandias*. Time loosens the grasp of personal vested interest on power and money. Egoism can be curbed and deliberative democracy established through conventions of rotation and duration that limit the period any may hold authority, before returning individuals to the commonality. Ancient republics put duration of office to the service of their governance. Modern Western elective democracies with similar principles have not degenerated into social disorder. The ancient Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have such levelling principles and conventions of duration and rotation in their governance, viz., *The Background*, though egoism has laid siege to them using the arguments of social disorder, dressed up as efficiency. Subsequent university constitutions have gradually eroded such principles through egoism’s
influence, until, in the 1992 cohort of higher education institutions, like Abecedary Institute, the political intervention of Thatcher’s egoistical ideology established control by self-perpetuating vested interests. Though presented as change, their incorporation was a variation in the constant domination of the egotistical, where, like Heraclitus’ flux, the river’s structure is constant and all that changes is the hue of the passing stream.
The Introduction

*The Director’s Cut*, the commentary on *The Text*, faces the problem defined in an aphorism from Jacques Derrida that 'Meaning is context bound, but context is boundless'\(^1\) which suggests that context contributes to the definition of the meaning of an event, but that no context can be fully known. Meanings continue to endure, are embedded in a context and have boundless dimensions. Locating a meaning or value requires finding the match between evidence and context. It is like sliding one large transparent screen which contains a context of multiple images, all of different scales and showing different aspects of the topography over another screen on which the image that is to be defined is present, until there is a match at some point. The top screen is all that has been thought, written and said and the bottom screen, in this case *The Text*, is the evidence to be defined. What makes it more difficult is that both are incomplete and partial, because neither can be wholly known, and brought fully into focus. The problem is that matching the screens at one point may exclude other matches elsewhere. Meanings or values that are closely associated on one screen may be scattered on another. And to use more screens adds more dimensions, more complexity, till the task is beyond completion, because it is endless.

Finally the level and quality of the interpretation is determined by the human limitations on knowledge and understanding. It is a matter of deciding which match hits home as more or most telling. The likelihood is that what one will reach for is lines of continuity of values or meanings, because endurance and frequency of repetition offer evidence of significance. There is in every present moment something of all ages. As Proust stated his aspiration: 'To describe men first and foremost as occupying a place, a very considerable place compared to the restricted one which is allotted to them in space, a place on the contrary immoderately prolonged – for simultaneously, like giants plunged into the years, they touch epochs that are immensely far apart, separated by the slow accretions of many many days in the dimension of Time'\(^2\). However, absence is also a presence. If a value is absent, one might say that there is a gap or a hole in the screen, or a new pattern exists without that element. Something that was once

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valued is either missing or reduced. There has been loss. Vico\(^3\) in his 'New Science' [1725; third edition 1744] advances an explanation for this sense of loss by suggesting that a new order of things is to be found in the old order, rather than the opposite view that the old are contained in the new. Therefore, there is a sense of loss because the replacement new order has and is less, is diminished, and therefore the new is impoverished by that absence. Vico - who, according to one modern commentator 'bestrides the modern social sciences and humanities like a colossus'\(^4\), partly because of his 'prescience', saw the cultural and social life of societies in terms of religion and the customs and ceremonies of marriages and funerals\(^5\) and the structure of their institutions and governance: monarchies, aristocracies, republican commonwealths. Thus he had the Greek democracies and the Roman Republic in mind when he extolled the 'good laws...passion for justice ...and ideals of virtue' that resulted, and the first stages of civil society.

These became corrupted from within and declined into 'barbarism'. This development is marked by the decline of popular commonwealths into bureaucratic monarchies, and, by the force of unrestrained passions, the return of the 'flattery', deceit and 'calculated malice' that had characterised the earlier societies of gods and heroes\(^6\).

The one 'truth' that 'cannot be doubted' and that guided his account was that 'The civil world is certainly the creation of humankind\(^7\) [Original emphasis] and as such 'can be discovered'. Vico's aim for this vast task was to explain 'a history of the orders and institutions...for although by its creation our world is temporal and particular, the orders which providence establishes in it are universal and eternal\(^8\). Therefore evidence of the 'orders' of the past exists in the present. It is possible therefore to examine the present and so develop an understanding of how it was made. One historian uses Vico's principle of the existence of the past in the present to develop the idea of "presence", that is, 'being in touch with reality' or 'literally or figuratively...[with] the 'people, things, events, and feelings [past and present] that make you the person you are'. He calls Vico's institutions 'the repositories of time, or perhaps even better, the places where history can get hold

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\(^5\) Vico G. Op. cit. p. 120.

\(^6\) Ibid. Sections 1110-1107. p. 487-489.

\(^7\) Ibid Section 331. p. 119.

\(^8\) Ibid Section 342. p. 127.
of you. Places are, in short, storehouses of "presence". It is an idea reminiscent of Raymond Williams' notion of the 'residual', 'emergent', 'dominant' elements as 'structures of feeling' within a culture and his aspiration for a form in which they could be a 'presence' of lived values. His criterion for the validity of his interpretation was grounded on feeling and any other would mean 'abandoning our humanity': 'whatever all of most people feel must be the rule of social life' [Original emphasis]. He founded his method of creating 'a conceptual map of human social institutions' on a set of axioms. For example, culture follows the structure of organizations; what remains of the past's monuments and buildings, i.e., 'great fragments of antiquity...squalid, mutilated and dispersed...once...cleaned restored and set in their proper place ...will shed new light on the past'. Ways of living and thinking also have continuity: 'Native customs, especially natural liberty, do not change all at once, but only gradually and over a long time'; 'popular tradition [of]many centuries...have a public basis in truth'. The complete value, concept or institution might no longer exist in the present but there would be fragments of evidence that would reveal its source and the larger idea behind it. His 'new science' was 'the art of finding in anything all that is in it' and his belief was that his 'New Science' was a process that would transform the view of the present with an awareness of origins, potential and loss, through acknowledging the power of residual elements, traditions and origins. One of Vico's axioms is that the particular circumstances of the origin of an institution define its subsequent nature: 'The nature [original emphasis] of an institution is identical with its nascence [original emphasis] at a certain time and in a certain manner. When these are the same, similar institutions will arise'. This bears a resemblance to the organizational research findings that reforming institutions and organizations will be 'unsuccessful by definition [because] a system cannot reform itself, because it is not able to conceive of itself in different terms'.

12 Ibid. Section 355. p. 131.
14 Ibid. p. 24.
15 Ibid. Section 356. p. 131
Vico advanced the perception of the world as multi-layered: many pasts evident in one present, and the importance of location, artefacts and language. One element that links these layers is 'figures of speech' or 'poetic logic', which he suggests originate from the dawn of philosophies. For example, his first axiom is 'when man is sunk in ignorance, he makes himself the measure of all the universe', and this reveals itself in the metaphors of the human body to describe features, like 'head for top', 'heart for centre'; or metonymy: an aspect for the whole, like 'the ring for boxing'; or synecdoche: a part for the whole, like 'sails for ships'. They juxtapose and combine realities or times in order to create new meanings. These maybe used to explain the present. They also indicate the potential existence of such ideas in the present. They illustrate that people carry with them a past sometimes greater than that of their own lifetime. They may be unregarded, unremarked and accepted as part of custom and tradition without any understanding. Respondents to this research repeated figures of speech as part of their process of trying to explain ideas and found themselves recalling the past, either in particular or in general. They were using them to evoke a general concept, because the junction of bringing two or more layers of time together creates another place, outside of both, an almost objective place, from which to view and understand them. Such junctions were like gateways to another reality or layer of time. For example, 'collegiality' is the abstract expression that respondents to this research and commentators use to indicate a communal feeling. It derives from the Latin 'to gather' which supports such a notion, But 'collegiality' takes the idea back to the Roman Church and the 'sharing by bishops in papal decision-making'; or outside the Roman context, 'the process of making decisions, agreeing on actions, shared by all the bishops of a church'. It harks back to a form of participatory decision-making in the Roman Republic in which the participants had universal franchise, autonomy and responsibility as members of a community. It implies an element of collective deliberation resulting in a collective decision. It does suggest equality of power, equal weighting of participants and their rights, and furthermore the


19 Vico G. Op. cit. Section 120. p. 75. Footnote: Vico here sides with Socrates in his debate with Theodorus, a follower of Protagoras's 'Measure Doctrine', in Plato's Theaetetus, 171a, cited in Blackburn S. Truth London; Alien Lane 2005, in which Socrates using his 'maieutic' method [the method of the midwife] draws out of his adversary who has advanced the view that man is the measure of all things, the admission that, if this is the case, then those who do not believe this view to be true have an equally valid point that proves the original opinion to be false. The relativist doctrine appears to hold equally for all.

implication of decision-making suggests the possibility of agreement and disagreement and all positions between, and therefore debate, argument, discussion, conventions, civility and a common forum. That it has come to mean only a communal sense, indicates loss, as Vico suggests; that respondents note even the loss of that sense of communality demonstrates how absolute the loss had been. Other analogies and comparisons were with ships, monasteries, Tsarist Russia and Nazi Germany.

The telling of history, even very recent history, shares some of the techniques of fictional narrative, so that when history uses metonymy – an aspect to express the whole, for example, 'London's policy'; it alerts readers to what Runia calls 'a presence in absence'; the feature is still present 'below the surface of the text': 'historical reality itself [Original emphasis] is absently present'\(^\text{21}\). What is missing are the people behind the words like 'Great Britain' or London'. Respondents using terms like 'management' and 'Directorate' are referring to a 'presence in absence': the person or persons with individual characters and 'passions' who are performing such tasks and who are the reality of management, and not an impersonal force. Thus, phrases like 'management's right to manage' are presented as a necessary system, but are in fact a person's request for licensed authority which harks back to princely hierarchies and the 'Divine Right' of princes to rule as divine representatives, and therefore reaches further back to the Roman Emperors and the prototype model for the Church and hence for absolute hierarchical organizations. Since this mantra is often deployed as a way of curtailing debate and discussion, however constructive, it has more to do with princely dominance and impatience, and so leads to the person, not the system, and to the character, not the procedure, and to the motive, not the reason.

The Prologue

Home from university, two brothers, students, have been talking about how the world works. Though they have been home from university for three months, they have not talked except briefly. Both have distinctly different views and they are far from agreement. The elder wants to explain to his brother some ideas he has been debating with himself. They are about how people live and relate to each other. He finally chooses to tell his brother a story, because he wants to show that these ideas are not just passing notions but reach into people’s lives, where they run like an underground river, deep and steady.

The younger has his older brother’s respect because he always stands firm. The younger calls the elder brother ‘green’, which the elder accepts but also stands by his passionate belief in life, which would not waver even if he found that everything was ‘a disorderly, damnable, and perhaps devil-ridden chaos’. The younger will never finish his university studies. Instead, voluntarily and free to leave at any time, he has chosen to become a novice to a holy man, in the local monastery, in order to ‘attain perfect freedom... from self’. The younger brother is convinced that this man’s exceptional faith and holiness represents an affirmation that the Kingdom of Christ will eventually come into being. The elder brother wishes to challenge his youthful certainty but also suspects that his young brother wants to know what he believes, or whether he believes at all.

The older brother therefore establishes an agenda for their talk: to settle ‘the eternal questions’. He accepts God but it is a different one from his brother’s. He cannot accept the hand of God in everything, especially in the ordering and organization of the world; that the world is an unchangeable given. He finds no justification for the place of the silently suffering and oppressed in this world. He is searching for what or who is responsible; is it an external influence and authority, like the Devil, or is it the person herself/himself? If it is the person then from where does she/he get her/his power, and in the hierarchy of power where is she/he? Ironically, he throws into the discussion Voltaire’s idea of the human craving for an external authority, so that ‘If God did not exist, he would have to be invented’. He cannot accept that at the world’s end all ‘resentments’ will be comforted, ‘all the crimes of humanity... all the blood they’ve shed’ will be atoned for, that not only forgiveness but justification of ‘all that has happened with men’
will be possible. Consequently he believes that 'If the devil doesn't exist...man has created him [the devil] in his own image and likeness.'

His younger brother finds these long philosophical monologues hard to follow and repeatedly asks what his brother is driving at. The explanation is his research about cruelty, degradations, torture, atrocities and murders based on stories of life reported in newspapers and books, the final focus of which are crimes against children. These, in his view, are 'unanswerable'. His theme is the silent, those that are unrepresented. They exist but they are not heard. There is nothing he can find to say what they think of their plight. Unable to re-present theirs, he offers his voice instead. Much as others have asked 'Where was God at Auschwitz, the Siberian Gulags, Rwanda, Kosovo and others?' he questions how news of child abuse, beatings and killings belong in a view of a world ruled by God. He asks what would the child-victims themselves say. He does accept God, but the price of the world's suffering is too high for the promise of any final Heaven. He can find no reason why any, especially children, should suffer for the calm and harmony that will arrive on Judgement Day when all is forgiven. 'Too high a price is asked for harmony', he declares, '...and so hastens to give up his entrance ticket'. And he traps his believing younger brother into the same opinion 'that if it were essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature - [a] baby, to found that edifice [i.e., heavenly harmony] would you be that architect on those conditions?' The younger replies he would not. But though he could not, he believes that Christ could forgive and that Heaven is built on Christ's suffering. This is the moment when the older brother, Ivan, announces that a year ago while pondering this evidence and the questions it posed about how the world was organized and the place of God within it, he created a story that compressed, condensed and distilled his research, which he now narrates to Alyosha, his younger brother.

Readers will now have recognised that they have been drawn into the middle of Dostoevsky's great novel, 'The Brothers Karamazov', published in 1880, which has drawn intense positive and negative comment from other writers. The story that Ivan is about to tell is the famous episode of 'The Grand Inquisitor'. Sigmund Freud called it 'the most magnificent novel ever written: the episode of the Grand

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Inquisitor, one of the peaks in the literature of the world, can hardly be valued too highly. Before the problem of the creative artist, analysis must, alas, lay down its arms.\textsuperscript{23} He was referring to its psychological insight into the human mind in general, and specifically in the episode of 'The Grand Inquisitor', into the totalitarian mind and its impact on the future organization and governance of Russia.

The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is a story within a story, which like a 'play within a play' provides an episode that 'is generally closely linked up with the action on a primary level\textsuperscript{24}, the elemental nature of the parricide of the head of the Karamazov family, like 'Hamlet' and 'Oedipus'. The structure of 'a story within a story' is based on pairings of speakers and listeners, that could be thought of as the layers or skins on an onion\textsuperscript{25}, like Ibsen's 'Peer Gynt', before Peer's meeting with the Button Moulder, where there is no core, only another layer. The whole is the entirety of the layers. There is a multiplicity\textsuperscript{26} of voices rather than one voice and, like Plato's dialogues, Dostoevsky uses debate between characters to explore ideas about approaches to living amongst which the audience can recognise their own possible responses. At the centre of this story is the legend of the Grand Inquisitor and the silent Christ; at the next layer, Ivan, the narrator and Alyosha, the listener; at the next there is Dostoevsky as the original author-creator and then subsequent layers of the generations of readers and opinions on the novel itself. Permeating the whole is a residue of the centuries-old sources of the original story, that fed into Dostoevsky's world-vision and which also echo in the readers' minds, e.g., the New Testament Gospel according to St. John with its account of the Temptations in the desert, the epigram which Dostoevsky gave the novel\textsuperscript{27}, the medieval 'Carmina Burana', published in 1847, Victor Hugo's character 'Torquemada', or 'The Grand Inquisitor' in Schiller's 'Don Carlos'.\textsuperscript{28} Others were contemporary ideas and movements to which he reacted like the mid-nineteenth century ideologies of Nihilism and Positivism that were the foundation of the social

\textsuperscript{24} Pfister M The Theory and Analysis of Drama Cambridge: CUP 1991 p. 227
\textsuperscript{27} Gospel according to St. John. Chapter 12. Verse 24. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."
\textsuperscript{28} Feemantle A Introduction to 'The Grand Inquisitor' by Fyodor Dostoevsky New York: Continuum 1999 pp. xiv-xv.
sciences, and Bakunin, Belinsky, and Marx\textsuperscript{29} and Nietzsche's assertion that God was dead.

The original conception and presentation of the story is Dostoevsky's. It is his interpretation of the source material that stirred the novel into existence but these materials and his reaction to them cannot be fully known. 'The Grand Inquisitor' is not reality. But it is true to itself and true to its intention. It is complete in itself. Every detail makes its contribution to the totality of the story. Though any reader might wish for some detail not present in the story, its absence indicates its irrelevance to the author's intention and to the totality of the story. The addition of another detail would distort its completeness. Art is true to itself and true within its limits; it offers the potential to be wholly known but any interpretation of that known is limited by the capacities and background of each interpreter. Similarly the representations or research reports based on fieldwork are rooted in reality but cannot wholly encompass nor present the reality. They are like stories within the much larger story of the reality itself. Research reports are filtered through the perception of the field worker/s and finally through one reporter's representational decisions including selection of evidence and choice of language. The fieldwork report is an interpretation, as is a documentary. The interpreter's own intentions, agenda, background and capabilities stand between the reader and the reality.

Ivan sets his story at the time of the Spanish Inquisition. The event is Christ's second-coming to the world. The previous day one hundred heretics had been burned in the presence of the King, court, knights, cardinals, ladies of the court, the population of Seville and the Grand Inquisitor, dressed in the 'gorgeous cardinal's robes', like a Renaissance Bishop-Prince.

The next day, with the smell from the smoke of these fires tainting the air, Christ quietly appeared among the people. The people instinctively recognised him and flocked to him. Accompanied at a distance by 'his gloomy assistants', slaves and the 'holy guard', the Grand Inquisitor, dressed in his old monk's robes, secretly witnessed Christ performing miracles of healing, restoring sight to the blind, and raising a little girl from the dead. The miracles confirmed that it was the Christ. The Inquisitor ordered Christ's arrest. The people who had been cheering were

cowed into submission, and stepped aside to let the guards take Christ into custody.

In the middle of the night, The Grand Inquisitor, lighted candle in hand, comes to the 'close and gloomy cell' to confront Christ. The iron door slams behind him and he is alone with his prisoner. Though without the power of guards and bureaucrats, his assumed personal authority serves to confirm that his power and control is total and that, whatever the outcome of the meeting, the final decision will be his. Though the Grand Inquisitor knows that he is speaking to Christ, he still asks if He is so, and then abruptly silences Christ before he could reply. For the rest of the meeting Christ is silent. Ethics has been silenced.

Christ has become the Grand Inquisitor's prisoner, one of the oppressed like the people of the city. The Grand Inquisitor immediately accuses Him of ignoring their warnings and condemns him to die like one of the hundred other heretics burnt at the stake the day before.

The Grand Inquisitor then proceeds with a recital of charges against Christ based on a re-evaluation of the Devil's temptations in the desert, as in St. John's Gospel, when He had rejected all three of the Devil's propositions. The Grand Inquisitor reviews each of the wrong decisions He made to the temptations. The politics of power and control, the role of the powerful and an interpretation of the psychology of humankind are the three central themes of The Grand Inquisitor's account.

The first temptation was about 'freedom' and autonomy. The Devil promised 'earthly' bread, instead of Christ's giving freedom to humankind and 'the bread of heaven'. The Grand Inquisitor's opinion is that 'nothing has been more insupportable for a man and for human society than freedom'. Humankind does not understand freedom but 'fears' and 'dreads' it. 'Freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never will they be able to share between them....They can never be free, for they are weak, vicious, worthless and rebellious'. If humankind accepted freedom, they would fail to cooperate and organize themselves, not complete the work and would turn to their former rulers to save them. 'No science will give them bread so long as they remain free'. That there are some tens of thousands who have the strength to manage this God-given freedom is irrelevant in the face of the millions who cannot. Humankind is ruled by its belly, its appetites. The suppliers of bread and the satisfiers of appetites will be followed and worshiped by all humankind. The Grand Inquisitor's

judgement is based on the 'fundamental secret of human nature' that, when humankind are free, they are forever craving some certainty or someone to which to enslave themselves and to enslave all others, by force of arms if necessary, in order to create a community of obedience. Those who rule the world, like the Grand Inquisitor, will say that they are doing it in Christ's name, but they will be swindling and lying to humankind, because they will rule in the Devil's name. And humankind will 'marvel' at them because they can endure freedom and exercise autonomy. The Grand Inquisitor and his like will be gods.

It is the Grand Inquisitor's verdict that the rejection of the second temptation revealed Christ's total overestimation of the nature and psychology of humankind. He showed them too much respect and asked too much of them, so that they were 'weighed down with the fearful burden of free choice...laying on them so many cares and unanswerable problems'. Instead of the external authority, he gave them freedom to establish their own rules and conventions. Thus 'in place of rigid ancient law, man must hereafter with free heart decide for himself what is good and what is evil, having only Thy image before him as his guide.' The Grand Inquisitor's psychological analysis of human kind is patronising and contemptuous of their innate inadequacy31: they are 'weaker and baser', 'impotent rebels', 'rebellious', 'rebel, heretic, infidel', 'weak and vile'.

The previous day's one hundred executions are evidence of how such rebellion strikes fear in those in power and is uncompromisingly suppressed, but the Grand Inquisitor politically makes light of their opposition and protest with 'What though he is everywhere rebelling against our power, and proud of his rebellion? It is the pride of a child and a schoolboy. They are little children rioting and barring out the teacher at school'. 32 However the smell of the execution fires of the previous


32 Cf. Colonel Chandler: Kipling. Don't you know it?
"Take up the White Man's burden -
Send forth the best ye breed-
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need.
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild -
Your new-caught, sullen peoples
Half-devil and half-child".

We used to have to learn it by heart at preparatory school.'

Spoken to Major Rolfe who had not been to private - British 'public' - school, in the presence Corporal Turner and an 18 year old Sikh servant, Gurjeet Singh Khera in a British Army Barracks in India in 1947 as the British Army prepares to leave India after the Declaration of Independence in Act 1 scene 1 of David Edgar's play 'Destiny'. Eyre Methuen: London 1976. In this documentary 'factional' [i.e., 'fictional based on
day's execution of rebellious heretics reminds us of the Grand Inquisitor's fear of rebellion and protest and that the same fate even awaits the returned Christ. It echoes the policy of the unknown Roman general for dealing with difficult, independent minded opposition: 'Cut down the tall poppies'. Fundamental to his psychological analysis is that people cannot and do not cooperate with each other.

The Grand Inquisitor's view of the psychology or mentality of humankind envisages three kinds: the most strong, able and independent minded - 'fierce and rebellious' - who will self-destruct; the independent-minded but irresolute - the 'rebellious but weak' - who will destroy one another, and the mediocre - 'the weak and unhappy' - who will fawn on the Grand Inquisitor. These last are those that the Grand Inquisitor preferred.

Consequently, the Grand Inquisitor's view is that humankind has 'no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born ... but only to one who can appease their conscience'. They need a figure that signifies power and control. Christ disqualified himself when he denied humankind the certainty of miracles by not demonstrating his powers and Godliness by jumping from the heights or descending from the cross. Instead the Grand Inquisitor and his like have founded their politics of power and control, their domination, on a total contempt for humankind by using 'miracle, mystery and authority' and consequently human kind has 'rejoiced that they were again led like sheep'. However, the 'mystery' is that the Grand Inquisitor and his like are working with the 'Devil'. They have accepted his external authority for all their actions. Unlike Christ who rejected the temptation of ruling all the kingdoms of the world, the Church of Rome and The Grand Inquisitor, have grasped the role of the authority and power. Like Greek tragic heroes embroiled in overweening pride [hubris] - they had accepted the rule

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factual' research] account of colonial and class ideologies at work in the rise of British fascism in the 1970s, Colonel Chandler, 'became a politician , not to master but to serve'; will find himself 'out [his] of time'. Rolfe will fund a future fascist party; Turner will feel fear and loss of status and become a member of that fascist party and find himself betrayed by big capital ['Money. Power. Opportunity'. Act 3 scene 6.] and Khera, a legal, British citizen, and immigrant fighting against it. The quotation is taken from Rudyard Kipling's 'The White Man's Burden'.

33 Cf. Text p. 466 line 22 – p. 467 line 2: Uncoordinated and un-political protests.

34 Cf. "The disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his lord. It it enough for the disciple that he be as his master, and the servant as his lord". Matthew. Chapter 10. Verses 24-25. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are numbered" Matthew. Chapter 10. Verses 29-30.'

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over the entire world - 'the sword of Caesar'\textsuperscript{35} - eight centuries before. They are embarked on a system to create 'universal unity'\textsuperscript{36}. Though 800 years in the making and still not yet complete, his arrogance speaks through him as if the completion of the system was inevitable. The system will take 'long' to complete, 'ages are yet to come of the confusion of free thought', 'the earth has [yet] much to suffer, but then we shall be like Caesars\textsuperscript{37}, and then we shall plan the universal happiness of man'. Like totalitarian rulers the Grand Inquisitor uses 'we' as though there were a collective leadership\textsuperscript{38}. Their vision will meet humankind's need for community because it will provide 'some means of uniting all in one unanimous ant-heap, for the craving of universal unity is the... last craving anguish of man', because humankind has always 'striven to organize a universal state', but it will be a swindle that produces control. Though aware that all tyrants have failed, the Grand Inquisitor is totally convinced of the rightness of his ideas and approach. He is able to dismiss 'ages ...of confusion of free thought' ...which end in 'cannibalism'. Humankind like a beast will then 'crawl' to them, lick [their] our feet and so will be established a 'reign of peace and happiness - 'and we shall sit upon the beast and raise the cup and on it will be written, "Mystery"'.\textsuperscript{39} The success of the Grand Inquisitor's scheme will be demonstrated by giving 'rest to all'.

As for opposition he estimates Christ will be left with only the paltry few 'elect' who are mighty enough to cope with freedom. Other independent minded 'rebels' will eventually tire of the struggle with freedom, and will accept the Grand Inquisitor's claim that 'they can only become free when they renounce their freedom to us and submit to us'.\textsuperscript{40} In the end it will be their experience of freedom's confusion and misery that will finally convince them that the Grand Inquisitor's lie is the truth. Such is the Grand Inquisitor's 'swindle'. His final apocalyptic vision is of humankind's awareness and complicity in being swindled. They will know they

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. Director's Cut: This echoes with the idea of the military origins of management; military nature of management-language, e.g., 'trouble shooting', 'target', 'strategy'; 'Keep your head down'; 'Don't stick your head over the parapet', 'being fired', and more.


\textsuperscript{37} Cf.: The Background.

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Text p. 170 line 5-14; Text p. 58 line 20 – p 59 .line 16; Text p. 167 line 23-25; Text p. 513 line 22- p 515 line 17; Text p. 514 line 4-7; Text p. 139 line 23- p. 140 line 10; Text p. 299 line 4-11: The formation of 'The Directorate' and their past and present behaviour.


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have been swindled because the bread the Grand Inquisitor will give them will be of their own making, but they will accept the situation because they will have recognised 'the value of complete submission'. The Grand Inquisitor 'will give them the quiet humble happiness of weak creatures such as they are by nature...that they are 'only pitiful children, but that childlike happiness is the sweetest of all'. 'They will huddle close to us in fear, as chicks to a hen. They will marvel at us and will be awe-stricken before us and will be proud of our being so powerful and clever...they will tremble before our wrath, their minds will grow fearful'. Millions of humankind will be happy like little children. He bases his prediction on the superiority of his rationality compared with the weakness of their emotions41. By abandoning freedom, humankind will have surrendered the ability to judge good and evil and to choose between them42, and so humankind will be complicit and equally guilty in the Grand Inquisitor's scheme. And only the Grand Inquisitor and his kind will be unhappy because they 'guard the mystery' that there is no Heaven, and at the final Judgement Day he will defy any condemnation by pointing to the millions of people he and his kind have made like happy children, without guilt and without sin. And with that the Grand Inquisitor pronounced a final death sentence on Christ.

Alyosha, unable to keep silent any longer, butts in rejecting Ivan's creation of the Grand Inquisitor as unreal and unacceptable, but admits its basis in hierarchy and personal action because there might be some for whom 'there's no mystery...It's simple lust of power...of earthly gain, of domination...something like a universal serfdom with them as masters...they don't believe in God'. Ivan thinks that there might be one or even a league of such people as the Grand Inquisitor, who sacrifice themselves and 'accept lying and deception, and lead men to death and destruction [the primrose path to Hell], and yet deceive them all the way, so that they [men] may not notice where they are being led, [so] that the poor blind creatures may at least on the way think themselves happy'.

Alyosha asks about the end. Ivan's plan is that though the Grand Inquisitor expects some reply from Christ, He maintains his silence. His only answer is to kiss the Grand Inquisitor on the lips. Whereupon the Grand Inquisitor sets Christ free,

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41 Cf. Director's Cut
42 Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10; Text p. 558 line 25-p.559 line 8 : Totalitarian practices
This story-within-a-story is one episode in a much longer narrative about the events preceding and following the murder of their father by their half-brother. Before the murder, Ivan will flee from home, father and district to escape from the tangle of deceit, greed, lust, and falsehood and conniving that he intuitively perceives is about to erupt in his family but before he is even a short distance away he is filled with a sense of guilt and complicity in events that will take place in his absence. In a sense he is living the idea that responsibility is not defined by presence; turning away, ignoring, avoiding do not give absolution; complicity exists in even the little things and the actions; and absence is also a presence. The outcome will be the wrongful arrest of their elder brother, and Ivan's eventual collapse in the witness box, as he tries to defend him, and then his descent into madness.

After their father's murder and before the trial, Ivan had been diagnosed as suffering from 'brain-fever' with a tendency to hallucinations. On one evening he returns to his room to find someone sitting on the sofa opposite him, a man 'of gentility on straitened means'. There follows a dialogue that touches on issues in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, even referring to it at one point, especially the relation of any external influence versus personal choice and agency. In the 'final analysis', as the cliché has it, the finishing touch is provided by individual action. The dapper stranger is the Devil. His revelation to Ivan is that he does not exist. Instead of being an external authority and driving force compelling a particular action, he is humankind's 'scapegoat... so life was made possible'. The Devil confesses that 'I [the Devil] ask for annihilation. No, live, I am told, for there'd be nothing without you. If everything in the universe were sensible, nothing would happen. There would be no events without you, and there must be events. So against the grain I do what's irrational because I am commanded to. For all their indisputable intelligence, men take this farce as serious, and that's their tragedy.
They suffer, of course... but then they live, they live a real life, not a fantastic one, for suffering is life. Without suffering what would be the pleasure of it?...But what about me? I suffer, but still, I don't live. I am $x$ in an indeterminate equation. [My emphasis]. I am a sort of phantom in life who has lost all beginning and end, who has even forgotten his own name.  

What happens in the world is of humankind's doing. No one and nothing else is to blame. The Devil is only a scapegoat; the Devil is a cover story for the human mind:

' Je pense, donc je suis'\(^{45}\). I know that for a fact, all the rest, all these worlds, God and even Satan - all that is not proved, to my mind. Does all that exist of itself, or is it only an emanation of myself, a logical development of my ego which alone has existed forever?\(^{46}\)

And the Devil confirms that the punishment for humankind's irrationality is conscience, which may or may not affect the guilty: 'In the old days we had all sorts [of tortures], but now we have taken chiefly to moral punishments - 'the stings of conscience' and all that nonsense. We got that too, from you, from the softening of your manners. And who's the better for it? Only those who have no conscience, for how can they be tortured by conscience when they have none? But decent people who have conscience and a sense of honour suffer for it.'\(^{47}\)

This question of conscience refers to the end of The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor and how to interpret Christ's kiss on the Grand Inquisitor's lips. The question is never cleared up as to whether the kiss is one of compassion for a troubled soul, or Christ's punishment. A recurring theme throughout the narrative is who can forgive and who can punish, man or Christ, and it is virtually settled that only Christ, not man, can forgive. The 'glow' in the Grand Inquisitor's heart is perhaps conscience, but 'the old man adheres to his idea.'\(^{48}\) Sticking to his ideology,

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\(^{45}\) Cf. Descartes. 'I think therefore I am' - the opening and central tenet of rationality.  
\(^{48}\) Cf. Father Zossima, in the long episode of his biography, recollections and thoughts which Alyosha had recorded when friends and fellow monks visited him on the day of his death, gives his pronouncement on judgement and forgiveness: 'you [humankind] cannot be a judge of anyone. For no one can judge a criminal until he recognises that he is just such a criminal as the man standing before him...If you can take upon yourself the crime of the criminal your heart is judging, take it at once, suffer for him yourself, and let him go without reproach. And even if the law makes you his judge, act in the same spirit so far as possible, for he will go away and condemn himself more bitterly than you have done. If, after your kiss, he goes away untouched, mocking at you, do not let that be a stumbling-block to you. It shows that his time has not yet come, but it will in due course. And if it come not, no matter; if not he, then another in his place will
knowing it to be wrong, is even more damning. It leaves no doubt that he is exercising his freedom of choice, regardless of other considerations. Though he claims otherwise, he is not driven by circumstances, events, other people or even the Devil. The world of the Grand Inquisitor is of his and his kind's making by their application of their dominant power and ideology. They have created an 'antheap' for others to live in.

Ivan's narrative is to expose the Grand Inquisitor's purpose, ideology and psychology. Ivan declares that: 'All that matters is that the old man should speak out, should speak openly of what he has thought in silence for ninety years'49.

The episode is like a morality play50 where the audience sit in judgement in the debates between good and evil, embodied in two characters. But because the Christ in this episode is 'silenced', the episode has the conventions of the dramatic monologues: the Grand Inquisitor offers an explanation of his position but at the same time makes a confession of being a 'swindler' and 'liar'. The mindset behind a dominating ideology is laid before a 'silenced' and listening Christ and the eavesdropping readers. The character Ivan is the real narrator and Alyosha is the character to whom the story is told. The reader is implicated51 in the situation, because she/he is positioned by Dostoyevsky to 'stand' behind both Christ's and Alyosha's ethics and compassion. The reader may have residual memories of the Christ's teachings, but the Grand Inquisitor's rejection of them acts as a reminder. All listeners, positioned like judges, do not accept the Grand Inquisitor's view. As a result, The Grand Inquisitor's monologue places Christ and therefore all listeners amongst the free-choice, independent 'rebels' to be executed. As members of the human race, the readers react against his patronising and contemptuous characterisation of humankind as 'weak... pitiful children' and a 'turbulent flock' that has to be subdued and that will eventually fawn on the Grand Inquisitor and his kind52. It is a notion that proposes that human kind can only be saved by rejecting its humanity and assuming the nature of a domesticated animal.53


exactly that same ethical stance of autonomy and freedom of choice. Christ and the readers judge the Grand Inquisitor to have failed. Through his confessional of domination, oppression and his own thoughts, the Grand Inquisitor, ironically, condemns himself and his scheme. The execution fires, guards, cowering crowds, dungeons, secret night-time visit, silencing of free thought and even Christ's opposition, the condemnation of Christ's ethics, the Inquisitor's ideology and admission that they have been engaged on this project for eight centuries, with 'ages yet to pass' before their scheme is accomplished, - all these point to the complete failure of his totalitarian scheme.54

Masked beneath pretence of caring for humankind, The Grand Inquisitor's scheme is a swindle that is really about domination and the exercise of naked power. It is based on his particular view of human nature that to give humankind a free conscience or will to choose between good and evil will turn humankind's freedom to licence that leads to self-gratification and miserable chaos and anarchy, and that having exhausted themselves they will crawl back to the external authority of the Grand Inquisitor's rule to be saved from themselves. They will thus give up their freedom to be subject to another's libido dominandii – the urge to rule and dominate - accepting total submission, like 'chicks', like animals, to an absolute authority, before which they will be 'awe-stricken... and will be proud at our being so powerful and clever, that we have been able to subdue such a turbulent flock of thousands of millions.'55 Humankind will be responsive to every wish and command of this authority and grateful to it for bringing happiness on earth, with no God, no sin, and no morality.

The Grand Inquisitor vision is built on a lie and that is why it is a swindle. It is a lie which he also uses to deceive himself. The lie is that he is doing all this and accepting all the sins of the world onto his shoulders for the good of other people, for love of humankind. Ivan's visiting Devil declares that the 'new man may well become the man-god' in a world in which 'all things are lawful' but 'can't bring himself to swindle without having a moral sanction'.56 Alyosha recognises it for what it is as Ivan almost reaches the end of Ivan's legend: 'there's no sort of mystery or lofty melancholy about it....It's simple lust for power, of filthy earthly gain, of domination, - something like a universal serfdom with them as masters -

56 Ibid. p. 688-689.
that's all they stand for. They don't even believe in God, perhaps. Your suffering inquisitor is a mere fantasy.\textsuperscript{57}

Dostoevsky is implying that the Grand Inquisitor is delusional and echoing Plato's 'state of misapprehension caused by falsehood in the mind'. When defining the education of the Guardians of the state, Plato advocated they should be good and straightforward 'because no one wants to be deceived in the most important part of himself and about the most important things'. Such self-deception is like the 'spoken lie...a copy and subsequent reflection of the mental condition, and no pure lie'.\textsuperscript{58} The Grand Inquisitor's delusional 'confession' is a revelatory piece of self-reflection that exposes the 'self-generated objectivity' of believing that his decisions are external to his control, and the 'objective illusion' that serving their own interests is also ensuring the happiness and well-being of the whole. These 'self-validating' and 'self-justifying' beliefs do not acknowledge the 'libido dominandi' mentality that Alyosha exposes as domination. The Grand Inquisitor's delusion is based on false beliefs but he clings to it because it satisfies a desire\textsuperscript{59}, and the process of reflection exposes its false genesis and origins; it is an 'ideological world-picture' that legitimises, and stabilises domination and hegemony. In the end, Christ's kiss that 'glows' still in his heart reveals that the revelatory process has struck home but the Grand Inquisitor is imprisoned in the web of his own world. To change would require his giving up that status and overturning that hegemony. In effect, rationally understanding the revelation is not enough\textsuperscript{60}; motivation lies in the passions and the desires. He is trapped by his own web of domination and coercion but revelation means that he may understand but lacks the motive to act upon that. The coercion is self-imposed. It is his decision. It is in his power to change. Rational self-revelation proves insufficient to overwhelm other powerful forces and desires that serve, foster and promote the real and perceived interests of the Grand Inquisitor and his like in his world. His decision is that all he can do is let Christ and the truth go free to exist in the world, while he continues to act on, live the lie and control the situation.

At the core of \textit{The Brothers Karamazov} Dostoevsky affirms the worth and freedom of each individual human being, created in the image of God, and the unity of the

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 268.


world. The narrative of 'The Grand Inquisitor' presents a portrayal of the totalitarian mentality through the Grand Inquisitor's explanation - almost a confession - of his project. Instead of being in a public setting - in his 'gorgeous cardinal's robes', surrounded by 'his gloomy assistants, and slaves and 'holy guard' and the members of King's court, the cardinal has come alone to 'a close, gloomy vaulted prison in the ancient palace'. This location deep within the palace suggests the concealed and private thoughts from within himself that the cardinal is going to bring to the light to justify himself before the returned Christ, whom he intends to burn at the stake for heresy in the morning. It's like the classic convention of melodrama when the all-powerful villain reveals his dastardly intentions and plans to the hero whose fate he holds in his power.

In this case the Grand Inquisitor's confession predicts twentieth century totalitarian political practice - the opposite of Dostoevsky's own belief in the worth of each person. Expressing this totalitarian view through a church dignitary highlights the contorted, half-religious zeal that drove the beliefs and actions of such regimes: the certainty of their view, the rallies, the rhetoric, the show trials, the denunciations. The totalitarian view denies religious ethical beliefs and is contemptuous of individual human beings, their inherent qualities and their right to freedom and replaces it with a classic Platonic 'noble lie': the achievement of a so-called universal 'better world' through the subjection of the individual to an all-inclusive, dominating order or culture. Totalitarianism takes over someone's life totally, like being 'a company man', selling one's soul to the firm, the company. In his narrative Dostoevsky destroys this ideology by demonstrating the falseness of the Grand Inquisitor's claims that human kind can only be saved by becoming like an insect or domesticated animals living in happy, mindless subsistence. The people are thought of as 'insects' or 'chickens', who should not question nor seek accountability but should trust. It is a trust that goes just one way from bottom to top, with a large helping of gratitude from below toward the superiors. There is also an implication that these people are an inferior race, lesser lights and talents, and such an attitude echoes Arendt's account of 'The Origins of Totalitarianism'.

It is generally accepted that 'Legend of the Grand Inquisitor' is the nineteenth

62 Cf. Text p. 299 line 4-11: Staff should trust new management.
century's prediction of the totalitarianism of the twentieth century. Dostoevsky was opposing scientific positivism as a means of ruling. He also opposed the idea of sacrificing the present to some future goal; the present time and the people living then were sacrificed and were exhorted to sacrifice their present to an ideal but faraway future. The condition of the totalitarian states of the twentieth century was that they were always states in transition. Isaac Deutscher quotes Trotsky in exile in Siberia in 1901: 'As long as I breathe, I shall fight for the future, that radiant future in which man, strong and beautiful, will become master of the drifting stream of history and will direct toward the boundless horizon of beauty, joy and happiness!' 65 And yet Trotsky, like Lenin and Stalin, would build that future on the Soviet Terror - a callous oppression of executions, exile and hostage-taking - first in a Civil War, after the 1917 Revolution, and then beyond. It operated like a machine of domination created by Lenin and continued by Stalin. The historian, George Kline, defined this sacrifice of the present for the future as 'the fallacy of historically deferred value... a moral monstrosity'. This 'deferred value' is an ethical dimension that was common in twentieth century politics and in civil and industrial management that the end justified the means, however morally unacceptable its nature might be. 66 Yet the Grand Inquisitor claims his ideological view and project is proposed, out of love and respect for humankind and their needs in order to create a better life. But he skirts around the fact that a world based on this ideology would have the effect of maintaining the dominance of the Grand Inquisitor and his cadre or caste, their right to rule and the subjection of all others. 68 This dominance is deeply cloaked in two lies, which he confesses to the silent Christ. The first is that the dominant

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'They constantly try to escape
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that
No one will need to be good.
But the man that is will shadow
The man that pretends to be.'


Caste is deeply committed to the welfare of all humankind, secondly that they have sacrificed their own well-being - even to the point of damning their own souls - to this cause by taking the responsibility for 'lying', for operating/managing the 'lie' in a cause they describe as 'noble'. This is a swindle because the Grand Inquisitor's project is based on destroying the difference that each human being instinctively recognises as distinguishing herself/himself from other humans. The presence of the 'silenced' and marginalised Christ, the ethical focus of the story for the reader, undermines this ideology. His condemnation of the returned Christ forewarns the reader of what fate would await any other independent-minded but 'silenced' heretic. Though the reader's acquaintance with Christ's teachings may be sketchy - from births, marriages and deaths - the reader knows their importance, measures the Grand Inquisitor's project against them, enough to know it as a lie and a swindle. Christ's own teaching on the Mount of Olives castigated the Temple 'Establishment' for laying heavy burdens on men that they themselves would not make an effort to move, for their self-aggrandisement and 'love of chief places' and concluded with 'the greatest among you shall be your servant.' Christ places the 'least' - the 'silenced', the marginalised, the subaltern - at the centre of his ethical teaching. Christ teaches that on Judgement Day he will answer the righteous whom He has saved but who cannot remember when they did any good deed for Christ, with 'in as much as ye did it [acts of kindness and compassion] unto one of my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me.' This teaching is fundamental to Christ's place at the centre of Ivan's myth of the Grand Inquisitor, because the 'least' combine with Christ in judging him. However the choice for Alyosha and the reader is not between two alternatives. What is being played out is the Grand Inquisitor's notion that political power - the exercise of power being the essence of every organization and institution - belongs in a real and commercial world and that spiritual and moral values belong to another world.

There is separation of power politics from ethics: Caesar from God; the corridors of power for politics and the cloister for the spiritual and ethical. To accept these as

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70 Note: It is the opposite of Hamlet's famous humanist definition of a human being: HAMLET: 'What a piece of work is a man? How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving, how express and admirable! In action, how like and angel in apprehension, how like a god! The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals!' Shakespeare Hamlet Act II scene ii.

71 Matthew Ch.23. verses 2-12.

72 Ibid. Ch 25 verses 31-40.
alternatives is to accept the Grand Inquisitor’s swindle: that in order for him and his cadre to create an ordered, happy world it is necessary for him and his kind to ‘sin’ on behalf of all humankind. This falsely rejects the fact that humankind inhabits both worlds simultaneously and ultimately lives concrete political and ethical values as a series of freely taken choices. A role of power does not come with a set of immutable laws providing obligatory behaviour patterns; a role of power may be influenced by political-social-economic factors but they do not wholly determine action; a role may suggest a script but the interpretation is individual. How many organizers/rulers confess to themselves, deep in the dungeon of their personality that ‘I have been put in charge and am going to call the shots and therefore sin, cruelty, domination, lying, swindling, cheating are my necessary lot, and I am obliged to press on with my task. Someone has to do it. And better for me, if it is me that’s doing it.’ That is part of the mentality that the story of the Grand Inquisitor seeks to reveal.

While believers will make a case that religious belief and ethics have an enduring everlasting quality, the power of any political order is finite, bounded by time and space. Any attempt by a state or organization to extend the limits of its temporary power to include every aspect of human life is totalitarianism. A form of government or organization may appear as a rigid structure but it is made and remade by the actions of its participants. This self-replication may offer a pretence of rigidity but the structure of such bodies is temporary and provisional and needs to have the capability to develop organically to meet changes in humankind’s lives and circumstances. And contrary to the Grand Inquisitor’s project, ethics are central to such political order, to which the presence of Christ and the readers stand as silent witnesses. While the Grand Inquisitor, though knowing he is wrong, explains and supplies rational justifications for his actions, they stand in silent judgement on the limits of power and the absent ethical values. Power and ethical values do not exist in separate worlds - court and cloister, management suite and monastery. Separating them splits the vision and purpose of an organization and structure from the operation of power. Raw power - power without vision - can claim that it maintains order and organization, a management. It can claim that it maintains subsistence for others, controls and suppresses conflict, maintains and perpetuates its own existence, and can claim for itself some


74 Cf. Director’s Cut.
legitimacy because it does 'the job', - the swindle of the propagandised false and empty vision - as opposed to one based on the common good, respect and the freedom of humankind.

Power is a part of all organizations as the ultimate means of maintaining order, when socially negotiated conventions of organisation fail. How it is distributed is for each society and organization to choose the form and nature of its consent. The Grand Inquisitor has rejected Christ's values and freedoms as 'too hard', too difficult, too 'other worldly' for ordinary mortals, and therefore they have no place in the real political world - another version of the ethical life being irrelevant except in the cloister. He bases his legitimacy for the possession and exercise of power on the camouflage of 'miracle, mystery and authority' to serve a 'noble lie'. His version of happiness for humankind creates two worlds - an animal subsistence and a ruling caste. His camouflage consist of signs and symbols, titles, status and power that obscure a reality of failure and oppression and a physical separation from others behind guards and slaves. Their dogmas, signs and symbols need to embrace everything. All previous traditions have to be removed as failures to be replaced by a new realism, a new philosophy, which hides the real reason, which is the perpetuation of power, by the dominant group and ideology. Though the Republic of Rome replaced kings, the cycle of kings replaced by tyrants is an old story. In this cycle, power is defined as a personal possession belonging to an individual or a group - and its operation is totalitarian. It flies in the face of devolved power as the method of organization which draws on humankind's political qualities of freedom, compassion, benevolence, negotiation and collective rationality, specialised knowledge, moral judgement and the communicative power of language. But power needs to be regulated and devolved to serve a common good. If power is not informed by the vision of a genuine and accepted common good, it becomes an end in itself to serve an individual craving for domination - libido dominandii and if it becomes the tool of an organization, it becomes a self-perpetuation of tyranny and rule by fear. Power in such circumstances serves only those exercising it and the result is general mediocrity. Power is not the aim of institutional organizations; it is not something that is awarded like a licence to

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75 Cf. Text p. 58 line 20 – p 59 .line 16:Directorate distant
77 Cf. Text 239 line 18 –p. 240 line 5; Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9: Unitisation and attack on traditional values; and formation of an elite group to carry out the task.
78 Cf. Director's Cut
behave like a prince and assume that control has been placed forever in one's grip to 'call the shots'; remember the slave in the chariot behind the general in triumph repeating: 'Remember thou art mortal'. Power needs to be subject to open control and accountability – in which limited duration is the only certain control\(^79\), and constantly monitored to ensure that its forms and substance are kept within bounds that serve the greater good of an institution and a society. Without vision, power is simply a means without aim other than its retention and the exercise of power itself, but any vision proposed needs to be tested for its capacity to 'swindle' humankind and open the way for a proponent of the lust for power.

The twentieth century saw traditional princedoms replaced by tyrannies in Germany, Russia and China\(^80\), each presenting superficially rational programmes to lend legitimacy to their exercise of power. Dostoevsky's prediction of its happening is based on a traditional and fundamental spiritually founded set of beliefs that oppose this exercise of power. The story of 'The Grand Inquisitor' ends with the Cardinal releasing Christ secretly into the night, as though he recognises his own false purpose, errors and guilt, while Christ retains the integrity of his beliefs and ethics. There is no reconciliation of opposites, no compromise, no 'third way', because there are no alternatives that can be reconciled nor compromised to create a third way. Just as it is impossible to be a 'little bit pregnant', it is just as impossible to be a little bit totalitarian, as it is to be a little bit democratic\(^81\). Ethics remain as a 'silenced' witness in Ivan's story of The Grand Inquisitor' and in that form signify the integrity and cooperation of humankind as an unacknowledged and unrealised potential, but still a potential, a promise.

Releasing 'the silenced' Christ and his ethics into the night does not suggest liberation and the promise of action. Communal guilt, the collective character of crime and injustice, is one theme in Dostoevsky's writings. The source for that idea lay in the death of his father, a greedy and corrupt miser, who had refused him a paltry sum of money to ease his time in the army and who was murdered by the serfs from his own estate, but the police arrested no one because in their view the whole village was guilty. This theme is reflected in the Grand Inquisitor's account of Christ's third temptation by the Devil. Humankind has the capacity and

\(^{79}\) Cf: Director's Cut
\(^{81}\) Cf. Director's Cut.
freedom to choose between good and evil. Being ignorant or unaware of actions and consequences is not a valid position. To surrender, like a child, the freedom to choose to some authority figure, like the Grand Inquisitor, who makes the decisions and who sins for you like the Grand Inquisitor, is total complicity and guilt. Those who fall back upon the defence of obeying orders, like Nazi Gestapo persecutors at Nuremburg, raise the question of their own culpability by denying their own freedom of choice between good and evil. The Grand Inquisitor refers to them 'as millions of happy children who know no sin... who have returned Him the ticket'. This is one part of the Grand Inquisitor's swindle. Conversely to recognise one's own sin is the beginning of atonement and forgiveness. The question is whether 'the glow in his [the Grand Inquisitor's] heart' brought on by Christ's departing kiss is a recognition by the Grand Inquisitor of his own guilt and sin, his conscience. If it is interpreted as such, it proposes that character, personal ethic, is the final, crucial, decisive factor in any governing, ruling and organising process. Thus Dostoevsky ended 'The Brothers Karamazov' with an invocation of the nature plus nurture theory.

The schoolboys whom Alyosha has taken to mentoring are returning from the funeral of one of their number whom they had previously bullied, mocked and stoned because he was new and different and for his goodness, kindness, compassion and bravery in standing up for his insulted, alcoholic father. Though they eventually accepted him as one of their number, he had been subjected to vicious 'dares' like harming a dog, and fights and fallings-out. After a long consumptive illness he had died and Alyosha, the Karamazov Brother to whom the Grand Inquisitor story had been told, talking to the other boys after his funeral, invoked the memory of his goodness, and asked them to keep it in their hearts:

'Perhaps we may even grow wicked later on, may be unable to refrain from a bad action, may even laugh at men's tears, and at those people who say, as Kolya [one of their number and protector of the dead boy] did just now, 'I want to suffer for all men', and may even jeer spitefully at such people'. But the memory of how they cared for the dead boy 'may keep them from great evil and he will reflect and say...'No, I do wrong to laugh, for that's not a thing to laugh at.' In the end Alyosha offers a sign of hope in a bleak world through acts of compassion by his caring for these children. 'I say this is in case we become bad... but there's no reason why we should become bad, is there, boys? Let us be,
first and above all, kind, then honest and then never let us forget each other!\textsuperscript{83}

And so the novel ends with Alyosha affirming the virtues of good deeds and faith, because Dostoevsky's vision reflects the fundamental orthodoxy of Christian belief: one of acceptance and belief, not action; of hope and faith, not change.

The end does raise the question of how humankind ought to treat each other. The Grand Inquisitor and the silenced Christ represent two opposed sets of arguments: hierarchy or autonomy/ freedom, hegemony or emancipation and respect, then democracy as a consequence. The basis for both these two arguments is how to treat people and is a constant theme throughout this commentary and text.

Hierarchy is one opinion or one argument on how to regard and treat people. Democracy too is an argument on how to regard and treat people. They are and have been for centuries locked together in combat. That only the Grand Inquisitor speaks confirms the prevailing dominance of the hierarchical point of view. That Christ is silenced suggests the silenced majority who are excluded from participation but whose values and arguments are known to the by-standing readers because they are part of the residual culture and ideology. It is through the lens of these residual perceptions that bystanders and the 'silenced' themselves perceive and judge the hierarchical and totalitarian tendency of management.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. p. 820. Cf. The Director's Cut: Hume's emphasis on the primary importance of character and his list of virtues in which 'benevolence', the primary virtue in Hume's canon, could be taken for 'being kind' and compassionate as Alyosha implies, and honesty is amongst the most valued.
Research Design

Foreword

ALISON: 'You're hurt because everything is changed. Jimmy is hurt because everything is the same. And neither of you can face it. Something's gone wrong somewhere, hasn't it?' [Osborne J. Look Back in Anger, 1956]

TED POTTER: When they tried to get the Faculties going, everyone objected because of the money involved in the Deans' of Faculties salaries and Pat Smith said, "OK, we won't do it then." But she found a different way of going round the side and getting it about a year later. We could all see transparently what she had done, but nothing could be done about it to stop it. I was very incensed at the time but it was a fait accompli. [Abecedary: The Text. 1990s]

Alison is trying to explain her husband's, Jimmy's, angry reaction to an unchanging Britain after the Second World War to her father, the Colonel. He, in his turn, has explained that England for him stopped in the Edwardian era just before the First War and that the day of the Indian Sub-continent's liberation from the British Empire was for him the 'last day the sun shone', when he and the regiment finally departed their barracks and the dirty little train steamed out of that crowded station, and the battalion band played for all it was worth. The Colonel is lamenting the stripping away of a veneer of ceremonies, of etiquette, that make up some of the theatricality that masks the actual location of power. All of them are perplexed, but aware that something is wrong.

The second quotation is the final lines of the Text of this research's respondents' 'voices' that comment on the events that they passed through in the 1990s,

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2 Cf. Text. p. 634.line 23 - p.635. line. 5.
3 Cf. Text p. 597 line. 27.
4 Cf. Director's Cut
nearly half a century later. Anger is present in both. Resignation is present, too. But where the first quotation can ask the question that 'something is wrong somewhere', the second acknowledges powerlessness. Some have the power to act; others do not. Jimmy Porter's anger as he looks back is directed at a post-war loss of opportunity. Osborne's play has been deeply maligned, but the playwright, David Hare, acknowledges its power and John Osborne, its author, as 'our poet laureate of lost opportunity, of missed connections, of what he [Osborne] himself calls the comfortless tragedy of isolated souls'. The second quotation from the Abecedary Text laments a lost opportunity.

It is difficult to decide how one reacts when one has been lied to. Anger is likely to be the reaction on realizing deceit, followed by rejection of the deceiver, even when it may cost the person doing the rejecting. But on hearing the lie for the first time, the first reaction, of course, is belief, perhaps tinged with a little caution, because the purpose of a lie is to tell the listener what she/he wants to hear. The second, as delivery falters in supporting the lie, may be a wary restraint. It is only the final reaction that is anger. Then there is a sense of waste, that may be 'comfortless' for some and 'isolating' for others.

Jimmy is angry because Britain's power and class structure based on wealth had not changed given the reconstruction after the Second World War. Ted Potter was angry because the promise of even a little democracy for him and others in an organization had been quashed, that they had been lied to - or at best fed a delusion - and that hierarchy was being restored, differentiated by wealth, and they would be back where they were, 'comfortless and isolated', because 'something's gone wrong somewhere'.

At the outset, this research was undertaken to monitor and contribute to a process of change toward a democratic, flat organizational structure in an institution of higher education. When a hierarchical structure was re-introduced, the research sought to understand this reversal and its effects on the institution and those respondents to the research. The method of collecting the data was by listening to and recording their reactions and reflections and placing these beside each other as parallel lives. It is a case-study in a unique context, and the respondents, though selected to reflect a significant sector of the organization, are

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5 Hare D. I have a go Lady, I have a Go Lecture, 2002, cited in Billington M. Anger ignited afresh by that old play, The Guardian May 9th 2006, p. 15.
6 Cf. Director's Cut
7 Cf. Text p.418 line. 28-p. 419, line 2, and p. 421 line 6-11.
8 Cf. Director's Cut
not the whole of it; they were drawn originally from one sector of the organization, middle management. Their reactions are determined by what happened to each one over this time. They provide the major source of evidence. There is no evidence from the highest nor the lowliest in the organization, so that this research makes no claim to be the total truth about what took place or to offer a definitive final truth about the circumstances. As for the possibility that the respondents were untruthful, and that their interpretations and my own are without bias, no such claim is made. Each individual's evidence is full of bias. The respondents and the researcher alike worked through the same experiences, though never in the same time and place, and were usually isolated from each other by the daily round, rarely meeting with the researcher except annually when these interviews took place and all the time, over the four years, in complete ignorance, as far as I knew, of each other's involvement in this research. The individual bias is the essence of the research because, while difference is respected, it is when the lines of their responses cross that it is possible to consider a commonality that may be a truth.

The research evidence is presented as a text separate from the commentary to allow the respondents to speak directly to the reader. Among its benefits is immediacy, because the language and thoughts of the respondents, as they interpret people and events is self-evidently authentic, credible and persuasive. The findings are based upon their observations. The respondents' individuality provides empathy for the readers and 'If the reader occasionally sympathizes with certain actors or groups, that is all to the good: we are, after all, discussing political events'. However, the replicability of this research is possible in the sense that the same questions, similar organizations and people with similar positions do exist. However the times and the generations have moved on. Above all the opportunity to record a change and then its reversal may only take place rarely, can hardly be planned for, though possibly predicted. Though this particular fact may seem to undermine any general observation, the events and responses by these particular respondents are not just specific to this particular

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12 Cf. Director's Cut
culture and people, but illustrate that the same political struggle over power is repeated endlessly with local variations. Institutions of a similar kind occupy similar roles and operate within the same national context, and yet the combinations of circumstances, conditions, history, events and, above all, people conspire to make the institution unique. It has been suggested that there is a 'uniqueness paradox' because 'organizational cultures are unique, yet...share similar features'. This perspective is expanded into three views of culture: 'integrating, differentiating and ambiguous', the latter being a compromise of the other two. This is part of a discussion that recognizes that though there is division within institutions, there is also collective understanding about what, at base, is the main task of the institution and how to schedule time, space and people. In this case-study everyone fell back on the academic calendar and what they did last year in order to plan the forthcoming year, so that the operation kept going and there was stability. And the discussion recognizes that the conflicts that play over this basic operation are about the aims, purposes, divisions, power structures, and rewards. But in this case-study given the stability of the operation, the individual motivations for action based on the characters of the people in power occupied the minds of the respondents, with varying interpretations of each. Giddens suggests, in a process that he called 'structuration', that the interaction of people and structure forms the nature of an organization so that organizations are the interrelationships and 'conventions' established between people and so they construct and dismantle structures, react to those structures and reshape the organization daily in a constant process. Divergent views on issues are part of the process and might lead to changing group alignments, and while this adds to the complexity of any description of an organization, it thereby comes somewhat closer to the reality. One suggestion is that these subcultures divide according to 'spatial/functional, generational, and occupational/professional' classifications. The principal area of contention in this case-study was over control and might be considered as a conflict between 'occupational/professional', but centred eventually on the ideology and character

15 Cf. Text, p. 85, line 27-35.
of individuals as they changed the culture or climate of the organization. The situation of the case-study is that a well established set of institutional meanings were targeted for change. And as Parker states: 'organisations are ongoing constructions...some managers are powerful actors, whose claims are backed up by status and resources...Managers can and do, sometimes quite self-consciously, seek to influence the beliefs of their employees as well as their behaviours'. While misunderstandings and opposition can and do arise, sometimes unpredictably, 'the ethical and political problems only begin with such an assertion'.

Organizations are instruments that serve to facilitate a task and require obligations on all who are part of them. Hume's notion of 'convention' is another way of expressing these same patterns of establishing actions and responsibilities. 'Organizational culture is hence the specific set of patterns that are materialized within one institution'. These form the basis of social exchanges and are therefore the foundation of society itself. An absence of such structures and obligations creates not a formal organizational structure but a jungle or a monarchical court and not a civil society. Such patterns become established and reflect the nature of society itself. Institutions of higher education are a reflection of the society and are also one means by which views of society and its operation are transmitted to new generations of citizens.

The overwhelming choice for respondents to this research was to work for a participative democracy. Sadly, however, one analyst calls this 'theoretically interesting', and a 'politically challenging, but hardly likely' scenario, but adds 'for most organizations':

'Working for an organization that was felt to listen to employees' views, that reflected a shared mission, that had means and ends that were widely believed in is a highly utopian, and perhaps, desirable idea. It would, of course, require co-operative and participative forms of organization and could not be solely based on management imposed values. This would be less management culturalism than organizational culturalism in a definitional sense. All groups,

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19 Ibid, p. 229
20 Cf. Director's Cut
22 Text p. 121 lines 17-29.
23 Cf. Text p.505 line 5-14.
24 Cf. Director's Cut
of what ever status, would be encouraged to shape the organization in their collectively negotiated image. Neither capitalism nor 'the ideologies of management' are going to fade away given that they want a compliant workforce and absolute supervisory control. Therefore, crushed by this, one strategy is 'just getting on with the task', accepting the reward structure and having a real life outside work, but this is not something that many workers do. In fact, such an assumption can be not only presumptuous by seeming to indicate that everything is acceptable, but is dead wrong. Many find their whole lives, values and identity expressed in and at work. Thus the ethical line is crossed between being a worker and citizen, when persuasion tends to ease into compulsion and workers regard themselves as being ruled by 'thunderbolts' rather than being 'managed'.

The local circumstances and the suspicion that something more than a local story was being played out provided the motivation for the research. If one was involved one could try to understand what was happening while events played themselves out and in the aftermath. An understanding might not be possible but it was worth the effort because everyone had years of career and life invested in the institution. Moreover the initial phase, though treated with a modicum of caution, offered an openness and autonomy that had not existed before. Therefore, if debate and discussion were a part of the original process, one might do something constructive with what followed in the hope of some outcome. It was after all a theatre director's way of working and a way of working that was committed to discussion aimed at finding a common interpretation of the events of the drama being played out. If taking soundings about the organization was the first phase of the research process, the last two were more about getting people into a huddle to decide what particular 'something had gone wrong somewhere', and if it had.

Research Design

Rather than being devised new-minted, this research evolved over nearly four years. In order to understand this evolution the 'story' of this research is split into

30 Cf. Text, p. 520, line 26-27.
3 parts, or Years One, Two, and Three. These 3 events correspond to the 3 Acts in the Text.

The first part, Year One, is about an announced change from a traditional hierarchy/patriarchal organisation in a Higher Education institution to a more open, flatter, more democratic organisational structure. This followed on the Thatcher government’s legislation that took colleges of higher education and polytechnics from the control of the local education authorities and incorporated them into private corporations that were an extension of the central powers of the Secretary of State. The internal re-structuring and re-organisation was undertaken deliberately as an Organisational Development change [viz French and Bell]. The rapidity of the change, because of the transfer from ‘public service’ to ‘private corporation’, probably qualifies it as one of Tushman’s ‘frame-breaking changes’. The research was conceived at the time the change had only been announced. The intention of the research was to gather evidence about the current state of institutional operations prior to monitoring the effectiveness of this transformation and the reactions of those in the ‘middle-management’ who were to be most involved. The removal of a strata of the hierarchy, a greater democratic involvement in the processes of power and decision-making for Heads of Department and establishing direct communication between both academic and service Heads of Department and the Directorate were features of the change that seemed to progress toward democracy.

The second part, Year Two, is divided between firstly, an evaluation of the operation of this changed ‘democratic’ regime and, secondly, the proposal to reverse that ‘democratic’ change and the reactions to that reversal.

The third and last part, Year Three, [in fact it was two years later], is about living and working under the new hierarchy. In the second and third parts the research changed to assessing the reactions and interpretations of events of the original respondents. Consideration of issues of power and the location and exercise of power would emerge as central themes in the general conduct of the research.

organisation. The research added two extra respondents to make the final data and formulation of any interpretation as complete and full as possible. The research then added as many official documents as could be made available, and the lengthy process of transcribing the data was undertaken. There were 'bubbles from below', some overt 'throttling', and a change in nature and politics of the institution which affected all respondents and which embodied the control that was re-introduced but reflected as much on the characters involved as any set of impersonal rational procedures.

The purpose of the study was to fill a gap in the literature on Higher Education organisations during the changes introduced by Thatcher which has little or nothing that describes first-hand the experiences of those not in 'top positions' and therefore little about the impact of such changes on those working within such institutions. One account of higher education during the period of this research [Weil34] accepts and presents 'top-down' hierarchical notions such as control: 'control is at once the essential problem of management and the implicit focus of much of organisational studies'. However, in its conclusion it reaches for an accommodation with the workforce. Accounts of organisational change report a lack of studies that tell of the work force36, that also extend their study over a span of time and that 'recognise the value of historical continuities, narrative patterns, accumulated knowledge and procedures'. One study states that the emphasis on "management" everywhere 'produces an appearance that the workforce is steadily becoming "unreachable" as a subject of study' and quotes another that states this is particularly true of research on the 'dark side' of organisational behaviour, e.g., 'unethical behaviour, the secret working of organisational cabals'. Deetz is reported as saying that there is too little of this work and that his own studies needed more fieldwork.

34 Weil S Introducing Change from the Top in Higher Education London Kogan Page Ltd., 1994
39 Personal communication between Prof. S Deetz and Prof. R Varey at 3rd International Critical Management Studies Conference, Lancaster University, 7-9 July 2003
Throughout all its phases, the aim of the research was to examine a change in a higher education institution and finally to interpret and understand the events and the reactions of those working in rather than directing institutions and thereby to generate some 'theoretical rather than empirical generalisations' about the meaning of the evidence, in the manner advocated by Deetz and Alvesson. As the story played out, the objectives changed. Initially the objective was to examine the reactions of respondents toward a more open and 'empowering' democratic structure and to provide material that might contribute to an action research exercise [Feedback Survey]. Therefore the initial semi-structured interview was about the culture, operation and management of the whole institution, i.e., an organisational review that requested ideas for improvement. When the process was reversed the aim became to explore events and respondents' reactions in order to build a case-study that could be investigated through the respondents' reflections to identify factors that had influenced the reversal of the initial change and that had redefined the nature of the institution. The second and third interviews, therefore, carried forward aspects of the first questionnaire but added questions that invited respondents' reflections, emotional reactions, explanations and interpretations. Philosophically it has therefore turned its back on the notion of a search of 'logos', the ancient Greek idea for the authority of an external truth based on reason, and 'independent of us, and independent as well of our wishes, emotions, and desires'. This research belongs to a tradition that accepts relativism and the view that, in the end, 'perfectly good explanations can be given by descriptions [Original emphasis] of the world...These [descriptions] are things that explain things. And only what is true explains what happens'. This research has a Critical stance. The philosophical stance of this research is Critical Partial Ethnography, a Critical Theory variant on ethnography. The limitation of ethnographic study is its commitment to methodology, to generating and analysing evidence while rejecting the development of theory. Ethnographic study is based in the interpretive social sciences: Weber's Einzelindividuum, i.e.,

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42 Ibid. p. 184.
43 Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschafstschre p. 415 cited in Gerth H. H. & Wright Mills C. [Trans. & Eds.]. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology London: Routledge 1995 p. 55, i.e., Weber M: 'Interpretive sociology considers the individual [Einzelindividuum] and his action as the basic unit...it is sociology's task to reduce [such] concepts [as 'state', association] to the actions of participating men'.

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'Interpretive sociology considers the individual [Einzelindividuum] and his action as the basic unit...it is sociology's task to reduce[such] concepts [as 'state', association] to the actions of participating men'; Berger and Luckmann's social construction of reality; it focuses on the detailed action of everyday life: 'its awesome indexicality' as Garfinkel has described it\textsuperscript{44}, rather than engaging in structural or organisational analysis. The nature of Critical Partial Ethnography as recommended by Deetz and Alvesson extends the usual method in that any such research should generate some 'theoretical rather than empirical generalisations' about the meaning of the evidence\textsuperscript{45}. They suggest that critical ethnography can be more revealing because the interviews draw on the first-hand experiences of those living through a situation, and are set against a context and background of other material. Given the large scale of ethnographic studies they recommend a partial ethnography, i.e., placing the research at a particular moment or situation where the organisational process is firmly at the centre and where 'actors' and institutional context are both present, and the actors find clear expression. Deetz expresses the rationale for such research not in the quality of telling 'a good tale, but on the ability to participate in a human struggle that is not always vicious or visible but a struggle that is always present. Research should be part of the larger human struggle rooted in the right to participate in the construction of meaning that affects our lives\textsuperscript{46}. The distinctive qualities of Thomas's 'Doing Critical Ethnography'\textsuperscript{47} are defined by Alvesson and Deetz as examining cultural phenomena, choosing a focus in terms of injustices and control, inclining to scepticism, avoiding established ways of thinking, seeing language in terms of power, reflecting on the researcher's involvement with the data and considering the generalisations that may be drawn from the evidence. The advantages of this kind of partial ethnographic study are that it may be possible to achieve 'profound insight into social relations and processes in companies', and a detailed description of naturally occurring events. These may take the research closer to the 'core empirical phenomena' and may tell us more about what actually goes on in management. Alvesson and Deetz finally make two claims for such research:

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.p.201
\textsuperscript{47} Thomas J Doing Critical Ethnography London: Sage 1993
'[This] type of study...has a depth and precision in terms of quality of the empirical material which are radically different from those typical in most other kinds of studies. The democratic value in presenting a description that readers themselves can make their own interpretations of, carefully evaluating the claims of the author, is an advantage compared to work where selective empirical material, normally supporting the author's claims, is included in the text.'

However Alvesson and Deetz identify the disadvantages of this situational approach as the limitation of events, people and individual institutions at a particular moment to embody the whole history of those people and the institution, and the difficulty of achieving far reaching generalisations. Alvesson and Deetz refer to a considerable number of management studies that have used aspects of this approach [i.e., by Alvesson, Forester, Knight and Wilmott, Kunda, Rosen, Smircich]. This research has attempted to take account of these advantages and disadvantages in presenting and analysing the data. [Viz below Presentation of Findings].

The richness of this evidence brought the research to the problem of the incommensurability in Burrell and Morgan's paradigms. The research's approach is interpretive and finds its place in hermeneutics, the interpretive- because of Dilthey's 'textual' 'verstehen', which some call a method and others an 'ontological structural element'. Dilthey's verstehen [understanding] advocates that cultural phenomena, e.g., art, literature, and institutions are understandable 'in relation to the minds that created them and the inner experience that they reflected'. Verstehen provides 'a means of studying human affairs by reliving or re-enacting them'. Dilthey's approach is part of the hermeneutic school, which is the least subjective approach in the interpretive paradigm. As Burrell and Morgan define it, hermeneutics 'adopts an objective idealist view of the socio-cultural environment, seeing it as humanly constructed phenomenon'. People externalise their internal processes and create cultural artefacts, e.g., institutions or literature, which attain an objective character. Verstehen is achieved by re-enactment. 'In order to be comprehended, the subject of study needed to be relived in the

50 Ibid. p. 229-230.
51 Ibid. p 235- 238.
subjective life of the observer'. 'One of the main avenues for verstehen was through the study of empirical life assertions - institutions, historical situations, language, etc., which reflected the inner life of the creators.' Dilthey used 'exegesis [i.e., the critical interpretation of a text] to describe his process of methodological understanding. This required a permanently fixed expression of the evidence being available, so that it may be revisited to aid comprehension. Therefore he advocated the detailed analysis and interpretation of all kinds of social phenomena as texts. 'Textual analysis of meaning and significance was regarded as more appropriate than a scientific search for knowledge of general laws.' Interpretation depended upon the 'hermeneutic circle' - the need for a consideration of the total context and a recognition that 'there were no absolute starting points [for a methodological approach] rather a process of interpreting, revising, revisiting in a circular way toward an understanding of the object of study. It is almost a creative process itself. Gadamer followed in this tradition and advocated entering into a dialogue with the research object and emphasised the importance of the role of language as the 'expression forms of life'. [Gadamer: 'Being is manifest in language'.] 52 Yet the nature of the evidence and the outcomes draw it into other quadrants, such as Weber's "understanding" sociology of interpreting the motives of...men's [sic] conduct in terms of their professed or ascribed intentions 53, or radical humanism, because of the natural inclination of the respondents towards issues of empowerment, political marginalisation, reform and pragmatic solutions. However, this diversity is in the nature of Critical Theory. Alvesson and Willmott confess to Critical Theory's paradigm 'promiscuity' and note that Burrell and Morgan acknowledge the 'interparadigmatic quality' of Critical Theory 54 which reflects the 'diverse and multi-faceted nature of reality which no single approach can grasp' 55.

The research approach is an inductive, interpretive analysis of the diverse perspectives of the respondents' experiences located within a social and historical context, with the intention of advocating reforms that have emerged from the respondents' views. The approach is qualitative in that it elicited the respondents' views and seeks to understand the situation and the events from their perspective;

52 Ibid, p 235-238.
it is a view that at heart is about division, marginalisation, domination and oppression.

Therefore, faced with such rich evidence, this research has taken a 'grounded theory' approach by seeking to understand the meaning of a phenomenon, change, for a particular group of people by drawing out a theory grounded in the views of the participants. The intention was to discover a theory to explain what was happening. In this it followed the guidelines of Glaser and Strauss in wanting to 'ground' any theory in evidence, especially 'the social processes of people' where a theory is a 'plausible relationship between life and sets of concepts'. It has followed the recommended inductive process of setting aside possible theoretical concepts in order to let a substantive theory emerge, which will have 'a phenomenon, causal conditions, context, and consequences'.

The framework of concepts, The Director's Cut, for this research emerged first from its evolution as a project and secondly from its presentation. The research's initial purpose was to be a part of what was intended as the first phase of structural change, identified in management terms as Organisational Development, described by French & Bell as a long term, totally comprehensive change strategy, the impact of which would move the entire organisation to a higher level of functioning, and significantly improve the performance and satisfaction of all staff members by introducing a limited measure of democracy for one strata of the organisation. Informally and independently of the organisation, this research adopted one of the elements associated with such organisational change: the Feedback Process, i.e., gathering respondents' reflections and feeding them back into the development. The change strategy being implemented was typical of a whole industry of Organisational Development [OD] that seemed straight forward: 'An organisation is a social arrangement for achieving controlled performance in pursuit of collective goals'. When this organisational development was abandoned after a year, there was a need to discover an explanation. However, in

56 Instead of 'hypothesis driven' science, this has something in common with 'Baconian Science' or 'ignorance driven' enquiry. 'The seventeenth century philosopher Francis Bacon suggested a system for understanding the the world that began with the accumulation of sets of facts, based on observation.' 'You have a hunch about how the world works, and you do experiments to see if your hunch is right'. This is how John Sulston and Georgina Ferry describe their approach to discovering the human genome in 'The Common Thread London: Bantam Press 2002. p. 44,


59 Ibid. p. 58.


61 Huczinski A and Buchanan D Organisational Behaviour Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall 2001 p.7
his case-study Pettigrew\textsuperscript{62} reviews the extensive OD literature and criticises it for reporting findings that are 'ahistorical, aprocessual, and acontextual' with a tendency to regard change as a discrete event or events which follow rational and linear process models. Taking an approach that echoes Heraclitus's convincing concept of 'flux' and change\textsuperscript{63}, Pettigrew identifies the notions of continuity and change as companion processes and important factors in the change process, such as 'the history of attitudes...relationships between interest groups in and outside the firm, [and] the mobilisation of support for change within the power structure at any point in time'. Pettigrew identifies change not 'as a response of management to improve efficiency' but 'as the legacy of struggles for power emerging through time'.\textsuperscript{64}

The site of such struggles are the inner workings of the organisations. However, a comprehensive account of Organisational Change\textsuperscript{65} creates a division in management thinking and diagrammatically places culture, politics and leadership in an 'informal subsystem' of an organisation, while management, strategy, goals, structure, operations and technology occupy a 'formal' subsystem. The diagram shows a small area of overlap between the two, which are united as one system, receiving 'inputs' and producing 'outputs'. Throughout this account's survey of Organisational Change, this model of separation breaks down and the account repeats that the 'subsystem' can halt, interrupt or disable the change process, for example, politics has to be taken into account [Child\textsuperscript{66}], or planned change - incremental, convergence, discontinuous and emergent - can encounter the resistance of 'comfortable attitudes' [Tushman\textsuperscript{67}, Johnson\textsuperscript{68}]. The 'objectivist' or 'functional' view of politics and culture presents the view that the

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Model of the Inner workings of an Organisation. From Senior B Organisational Change Harlow: Prentice Hall 2002 p. 5.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{63}Cf. Director's Cut.
\textsuperscript{64}Cf. Director's Cut.
\textsuperscript{65}Senior B. Op. cit. p5.
elements in this 'subsystem' are separate behaviourist variables in the organisation and are therefore susceptible to change\(^{69}\). This research follows the view of others and rejects this basic separation and a similar division between rationality and emotion. Morgan\(^{70}\) follows Berger and Luckmann's\(^{71}\) theory of the social construction of reality and the processes of shared meaning, understanding and sense-making in the creation of organisational reality by the interactions of people. Morgan draws parallels between organisations and different political systems in the practice of 'ruling' their members and offers conflict, interest and power as a systematic method of analysis, while admitting that the complexity of organisational politics can be 'mind-boggling'. Finally he places the role and use of power at the centre of organisational analysis and rejects the neutrality and rationality of management as 'myths'. He questions why people surrender their democratic rights on entering the workplace and links political analysis with the 'intrinsic' aspect of organisational domination and management's 'conventional practices\(^{72}\). For Morgan organisations embody, reflect, and are cultures that have been formed by historical processes. While other methods of analysis, e.g., Johnson and Scholes's\(^{73}\) 'cultural web', follow variations of factor analysis, Morgan brings all the factors together as one entity.

The research therefore adopts the concepts and assumptions of Berger and Luckmann's socially constructed reality and seeks to draw together multiple perspectives from individuals who are themselves trying to understand the context in which they are working, and which, perhaps, to a large extent, dominates their lives. The core of the research is the views of its respondents in this particular context who themselves have drawn on social perspectives and history in their responses. The research's intention is to engage in an inductive process to interpret the perspectives of the respondents.

Because these respondents are rarely if ever heard as a group within the wider context, the research seeks to provide a platform for their 'voices', as a natural extension of the research's political perspective. This brings the work into the tradition of advocacy or emancipatory research that includes Habermas and Critical Theory. Part of the agenda of the research is therefore to identify a common 'voice' and to identify relations of power and to suggest reforms in


\(^{71}\) Berger P L and Luckmann T The Social Construction of Reality London: Allen Lane 1967


\(^{73}\) Johnson G and Scholes K Exploring Corporate Strategy, Texts and Cases Hemel Hempstead 1993
practices and constitutions and how emancipation might be achieved from irrational practices. The justification for such claims will be grounded in the practical reality of the 'voices' and the wider context.

The choice of research method was considerably influenced by the researcher's background of a variety of careers in higher education, broadcasting and the arts. He had professional interviewing experience in the media, in extensive academic research using one to one, recorded interviews with hundreds of children, and in teaching by using and promoting small-group discussion teaching techniques. The research was and is funded by the researcher, so there was and is no political aspect associated with funding from a third party. The researcher was and is a private agent. Confidentiality of place and individuals was and is of prime importance. The respondents were all 'warm' contacts and it quickly became apparent that the opportunity to talk about the topics in the research was important to them. This interest did not diminish throughout the period. Many said they were doing it because the researcher was interested in the project and they were 'helping him out', but they also felt a need to express their views. Some said it was the first time they had ever been asked about their work. The respondents' identities were not disclosed to each other during the years when the interviews were conducted.

In Year One, [i.e., the first series of interviews] the researcher's motivation for the original action-research came mostly from a democratic, educational philosophy. More significantly the proposed 'flatter-democratic structure' chimed with the researcher's background as a theatre-director. Though a seemingly creative task, directing and producing plays and television shares much with a business enterprise involving teamwork, strict financial and resource management and pragmatic problem solving. Yet the director needs a vision and to be able to lead others by conveying and by carrying along others with that vision. In the end all those involved will be partners in the enterprise and circumscribed only by the discipline of the task. After re-introduction of a hierarchical structure, after Year Two, the motivation to continue with the project when a hierarchy replaced the flatter democratic structure came from the same personal and professional experience and a wish to understand how and why change did not stick. The researcher's own experience chimed with a story told by Peter Brook about his early career as a director. It was his first big production at Stratford-on-Avon in 1945 and he was fearful of incurring the contempt of the company by not
knowing 'what he wanted'. So he created a cardboard model of the set with forty cardboard models of the actors and practised moving them about to create the opening scene so that he could give the company 'orders, definite and clear'. Armed with a fat volume containing the resulting plan, charts and sets of orders, he came to that first rehearsal. Confidently he numbered the actors, read out the prepared orders and set them loose on the first mass entrance. Some were slow, others fast. They did not behave like the cardboard figures. They kept on coming till they were on top of him, staring him in the face, and there was no way that the next set of orders could either follow on from this situation or work. Brook recognised that a decisive, watershed moment had arrived. It was a moment of panic. The choice was either to drill the actors to conform to his plan, or to accept the pattern that was emerging before him, which was 'rich in energy, full of personal variations, shaped by individual enthusiasms, and laziness, promising such different rhythms, opening so many unexpected possibilities'. He called it a choice where his whole future hung in the balance.

'I stopped, and walked away from my book, in amongst the actors, and I have never looked at a written plan since. I recognised once and for all the presumption and the folly of thinking that an inanimate model can stand for a man'.

As a metaphor it embodies the notion that any enterprise is a creative activity. It offers a rejection of the waste of draconian, positivist, scientific management and an endorsement of the human scale of democratic management and its potential to unlock the positive contributions of human energy and talent in a shared enterprise. Brook does not underestimate the personal qualities involved because a director is thinking, debating, discussing, comparing, brooding, making mistakes, going back, starting again, exposing his uncertainties to the cast but 'in reward he has a medium, [i.e., organisation with a shared vision, purpose, a process or way of working and a product] which evolves as it responds'.

But Brook does not leave it there. He then startlingly asserts the paradox that the director who can be as equally effective as a good director as a 'rotten' one, because faced with an opening night the cast finds strength and unity as though by magic'....Brook describes the processes and the director's role in it as: 'a director is there to help a group evolve towards [this] ideal situation. The director

is there to attack and yield, provoke and withdraw until the indefinable stuff [of theatre] begins to flow....at best a director enables an actor to reveal his own performance, that otherwise he might have clouded for himself.' Brook's account resonates with much of the democratic management school and the theory of task-group and team processes, and the over-riding sense of the need for engagement and the development of human resources toward a common end.

Context and Conduct of the Research.

The nineteenth century origins of Abecedary Institute lay in the backstreets of a nearby city as a specialist teacher-training college which, in the 1930s, moved to a new rural campus. The life style of the nineteenth century institute was domestic and civilised. This had left a culture based on traditions from the days when everyone had been permanently resident on campus. The establishment shared more with a nunnery than a university; in Goffman's terms, it was 'total'. When the first, long-serving Principal retired, the staff assumed that the Deputy who has overseen the internal operation and with whom they had a loyalty and team-relationship would take over, but the Chair of Governors wanted his 'woman' and so an external appointment was made. This story establishes the extent of any autonomy and control the Institute gave to its staff and where the real power lay. It was a monarchical hierarchy dependent upon the vocation and quality of the team working in the operation at the 'chalk-face', but the Principal was dependent upon and interfaced with the real power which was located in the Governors. There was a division between the staff teams' getting on with the job, and the top-management's 'managing'. In the 1970s it had survived the cull of such colleges and had been allowed to diversify to add degrees to its portfolio of pre- and in-service teacher training courses. Central Government decided annual expenditure and recruitment targets and since these were defined by academic subject, it also decided the Institute's nature and place in the national framework of higher education. The management task was to meet these targets, though it had discretion over the nature of delivery and student experience. Opportunities for vision and strategic planning were few. This made the institution a classic textbook example of a not-for-profit

76 Cf. Director's Cut.
organisation. Wortman found these to be managed in a 'short term sense' and Hofer and Schendel found 'no strategy at all...such organisations were motivated more by short-term budget cycles and personal goals'. Together with a neglect of strategic planning, such institutions tended to 'under-utilised planning advantages' in 'the level of [staff. My note] commitment aroused by their purpose and organisational mystique [which] might be exploited effectively in formulating and implementing strategy'. This commitment lay within the teaching staff teams who were dedicated to their subjects, their largely working-class or lower-middle class students and their colleagues. Every external report on the Institute would recognise this as constant. However, the action of the story of the next years would be about the collaboration between management and this staff resource, or the 'conspiracy' against it. Status-divisions existed between the academics on the basis of whether they trained teachers, or taught the diversified degrees, and within that whether staff taught 'major' or 'minor' courses. This hierarchy had an effect on the academic class-structure and on the distribution of power. The Principal and an oligarchy of Heads of Department who had secured 'major' status, controlled academic development and any addition would reduce their power, status, and control of resources. Academics therefore sought to gain an identity by securing a personal academic option within a subject. The Institute therefore had team-cultures and individuals 'paddling their own canoes'. A cultural pattern was established like Douglas' 'thought styles' of hierarchy, enclave, isolate, and individual enterprise to be a member of the hierarchy. The later unitisation of courses built on the existing academic status structure. It was also shaped by the view of the Dean of Unitary Courses on the inadequacy of staff and departments which external reports did not confirm; a partial opinion of staff inadequacy was deployed to serve 'personal goals', as Wortman defines them. In fact the Institute had a national reputation for the quality of its teaching and graduates that placed it at the top of lists of successful institutions.


The last HMI report on the Institute's facilities and some courses identified features that recur in the story: the inadequacy of some of the accommodation; individual staff working hard, teaching long hours\textsuperscript{79} and creating specialist option courses which other staff were unable to support; and the infrequency of students' debating ideas within courses was often mentioned\textsuperscript{80}. This lack of time given to discussion was typical of the teaching-style but mirrored the lack of formal debate and discussion amongst academic staff themselves. Their effective informal team-approach and lack of debate about policy made their generosity and collaborative qualities vulnerable to any assertive policy devised and approved behind closed doors.

Structural diagrams, though only single snapshots of a particular moment, help to encapsulate the ethos and, if viewed as a sequence, start to reveal the 'plot' in the story.

A simple hierarchical and patriarchal structure that had endured for a long time was in place as the story opened, prior to Thatcher's government introducing independence from the local authorities.


\textsuperscript{80} HMI Report quotations: 'and ways in which students can be more consistently challenged to formulate and debate their own ideas'. 'Tutors are sensitive to the wide differences amongst the students in ability, attainment and experience and they adopt a sympathetic approach to build confidence'. 'Many staff are teaching very long hours. There has been a reluctance by the teaching staff to reduce the number of hours taught not only because of strong professional concern to support students in their studies, but also because staff have been anxious to develop and retain a large number of options within some of the major subjects taught.' 'Staff team is industrious, thorough, well prepared, committed and seriously intentioned. Rapport and concern for students are apparent...'
The Principal was answerable to a Board of Governors; these were elected County Councillors of the Local Education Authority, LEA administrators, the Institute's officers, staff representatives and others. Exceptionally, the Governors had given the Principal the exclusive right to award an internal staff promotion every other year. This emphasised the paternalism and patriarchy of the culture of the institution: hierarchy and patronage at the higher strata and a culture of worthiness, decency, humanity and a search for identity at the lower level. The last LEA Principal's management-style was laissez-faire, in which the administration had taken a civil service role. Supported by two deputy-advisers and three heads of faculty, the Principal managed basic operations. Subject areas had no ownership, nor management of resources but considerable autonomy, which gave staff a feeling of responsibility and participation. There were monthly meetings for all staff, a version of a town-meeting, at which The Principal reported, could be questioned and was sometimes harshly criticised by staff who voluntarily attended. Crucially no propositions were tabled nor votes taken, to my knowledge. In the first days of independence from the Local Authority, all the elements that were to be played out over the coming years were present. A Board of Governors had been officially appointed by the Secretary of State for Education, but it was rumoured that they had been selected by Conservative Party Central Office from local businessmen and Conservative Councillors. Whatever the case, they were
political appointments. The crucial, but universally overlooked, factor in the new constitution was that these Governors were both appointed and were self-perpetuating. The new Chair of Governors asked for office space, and was heard to talk about 'My Institute'.

The existing Director resigned and a new Chief Executive was appointed on a five-year contract. This short-term contract placed her under a certain personal pressure. A woman Principal was not unusual for Abecedary Institute, which had a tradition of women Principals.

She invited all staff by the post to her first meeting. So her opening address was given to the whole of the Institute – for once, all employees assembled together. Of her remarks, which must have been deliberately chosen, one was to be remembered and referred to as part of the history of the Institute. In this climate of change, she called on them to ask themselves whether they were part of the solution or part of the problem. It may have been intended to motivate but it divided staff. Each person left the meeting asking themselves if they were 'solution or problem', 'sheep or goats', in a struggle for the Institute's survival in a changed world. The verdict was personal insecurity; each anticipated being judged.

The other crucially important statement was that knowing the Institute's national reputation for quality, she was not going to have any direct input into the nature of the academic courses. Given that these were the Institute's main business and the focus of the staff's working lives, this was a disappointment for some, though it may have been meant to reassure. This statement was a real disappointment for many staff for whom innovating courses was almost their main concern.

Later, after she had left, it emerged that she had been the only candidate for the new director's post who has secretly visited the Institute; the interpretation was that she had recognised that she could make her mark. One interpretation was that she thought that the place could be modernised, however that might be interpreted, but that the academic programmes could be excluded from this top-down management exercise. It also implied, wrongly, that the management could be separated from the academic, when the latter was the main activity.

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81 Cf. 'There is nothing more difficult, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of opponents who have the law on their side and partly from the fear of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have experience of them'. Machiavelli 'The Prince'

The first change was to re-shape the organisational structure with management, which formerly had a small role, now taking centre-stage and to give it a team ethos by including a wider constituency of senior personnel.

Another change was for the new Principal to make a series of half-day visits to departments. Though there were delays and postponements, eventually all were visited. To her great credit, she was the only Principal to attempt to do this, but each visit was cut short by the 'centre' management recalling her back to the centre for some reason of its own, like a court without a monarch. This lack of relationship between the centre and the periphery, the subject areas where the main activity of teaching took place, would be a principal cause of failure, because there was no central reading of the 'graffiti on the walls', no knowledge of what was happening at the chalk-face. The persistent criticism was there was no 'listening'. The previous laissez-faire management had taken few organisational initiatives, but the new order was making them without consultation and without knowledge of what was good at the periphery. Termly 'strategy days' took place to involve everyone in management. At these events management asked rhetorically for a definition of the Institute's future.

During this first full academic year, there was gossip that the management team was at loggerheads and of 'clashes of personality' between the 'old' and 'new'. A substantial restructuring budget from the Government for the Institute offered 10 year enhancements to pension-benefits and it was announced that all the long serving Heads of Faculty were to retire early, along with the Assistant Director of Administration, leaving only the Deputy Director who would also retire a year later.
This would be a break in continuity. It would also herald a process of 'very rapid change'. A new flatter matrix-style organisational structure was to be created with the Governors' approval. It would be a web or net-like structure of relationships and functions rather than a hierarchy. There would be no Heads of Faculty, but there would be a new role for Heads of Department, now called 'managers'.

It was rumoured that it all came from Belasco's 'Teaching Elephants to Dance':

"Flexible bands of disciplined people focussed on a vision; that's the key to success" 83 Another fashionable 'culture' changing strategy of the time was Peters' and Waterman's 'In Search of Excellence' and its ideas of 'down-sizing' 84. It has become general knowledge that the Governors were trying to reduce the salary budget, principally to avoid the financial difficulties experienced by other similar institutions, and also to raise capital for building projects, that would demonstrate the Institute's positive approach to change and progress.

This was the moment at the end of Year One when the research began as part of an Organisational Development management strategy. It was designed to monitor its effect on the newly emerging role for the Heads of Department, in order to understand the personal and emotional reactions of these people at the heart of the change. This political change in the power relationship would have an impact on all staff in the institution. Academic Heads of Department and Service Heads of Department were to be placed on an equal footing in a collaborative relationship. A new, crucial role was to be introduced for all Heads of Department. Academic Heads of Department had the responsibility to lead the process of expansion, to maintain quality and efficiency and to play a key role in the management of the institution. As presented the idea was that the institution would be less hierarchical, less bureaucratic, and more responsive 85. The most important relationship was between staff and students and was at the heart of each subject area. It was made clear that the role of Head of Department was one that all should come to understand because of its crucial position in the structure. They were to be central to the total quality rationale behind the introduction of the matrix, and the process and responsibility for the success of this rapid change would fall heavily on them. They were to be given 10 days of specialist management training, including implementing Total Quality Management, prior to

83 Belasco J. A. People are the Key in Teaching the Elephant to Dance Crown 1990 p. 174
85 Cf. Director's Cut
the introduction of the matrix structure. Total Quality Management implied a drive toward a continuous improvement of courses. Their job description had three areas of responsibility; Corporate: part of the collective management responsibility for the Institute's success and development; Specific Responsibility: the delivery of quality courses; and Specific Duties: from day-to-day accommodation to promoting the institution worldwide.

The announcement of the new job description for Heads of Department was followed by published policy documents on the differentiation of the roles and responsibilities of the members of the Directorate, the Heads of Services, the structure of the Management and its Monitoring Committees.

One of the features of such Organisational Developments was the Feedback survey, for which French & Bell\(^86\) outline the advantages as:

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<th><strong>Traditional Approach</strong></th>
<th><strong>Feedback Survey Approach</strong></th>
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<td>Data collected from</td>
<td>Rank and file, and maybe foreman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data reported to</td>
<td>Top management, departmental heads, and perhaps to employees through the company newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of data are worked on by</td>
<td>Top management [maybe]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party intervention strategy</td>
<td>Design and administration of questionnaire. Development of report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action plan done by</td>
<td>Top management only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable extent of change and improvement</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Advantages of French’s and Bell’s Feedback Survey Approach

This research was an ‘independent, freelance’ initiative modelled on the action-research 'Feedback Survey' because it belonged as a possible or recommended activity within the management strategy being implemented. The research was discussed with the retiring Vice-Principal because the usual processes of the Feedback Survey should involve organisation members at the top of the hierarchy in the planning and having collected the data from the organisation members it should be fed back to the top executive team and then cascade down through the hierarchy into function teams. At the subsequent meetings, presided over by a member of the executive, the organisation members would discuss and interpret the data and plan further constructive change, and then the data would cascade

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down to the next level. Most meetings should include a consultant who has briefed the executive and who would act as a resource person.\textsuperscript{87}

Staff's reflections, interpretations and judgements on working in Abecedary Institute would be recorded. The questionnaires regarded the respondents as though 'every man is his own sociologist, committed to understanding his everyday life'\textsuperscript{88}. It might act as a pilot study to demonstrate the positive capacities of staff to manage change and to respond to changing demands and times and support the implied autonomy in the operation of a flatter, matrix organisation and form of governance. The intention was that it might make an annual contribution in the form of a checklist questionnaire to all members of staff toward the development of this flatter management structure in a UK higher education institution.

At the initial stage a complete survey of the whole institution was unrealistic. As independent research, a pilot survey was a possibility. Because Heads of Department were to assume the central role in this structural reorganisation and because some of these departments had only two of three staff, the research decided to base its data gathering on a sample of academic Heads of Department by examining the effect of their newly emerging role at the heart of a UK higher education institution; their new function was described as 'a role in the making'.

With one exception, the research retained its respondents over the whole period. With one exception, the majority of the respondents remained 'bystanders'. One rose to a dominant position of 'strategic' importance, three others rose to positions of significant leadership of sections of the academic staff, seven others retained their posts but one moved 'sideways'. Though possessing the qualities of highly educated professionals with a measure of responsibility most lacked a high level of discretion in the institution. They did not have the lowest discretion, i.e., the grounds-staff, but most were not in a position to change events, though one incident involved a group of many of them in a formal attempt to reform the governing constitution of the organisation. It became a story about the respondents' reactions to the whole set of circumstances in which a level of expectation of discretion and autonomy was raised and then lowered.

Eliciting the personal reactions of highly educated and experienced respondents, with proven reflection and analytical skills, called for more than a checklist.


\textsuperscript{88} Burrell G. and Morgan G. Op. cit. p. 250
questionnaire. It was decided to use an instrument based on a British Airways middle management analysis of its own culture and operation. This was an internal survey used by British Airways, which was in use at Salford University. Though enquiries have been made, it has not been possible to identify the individual authors of this research instrument. This used a checklist questionnaire covering many aspects of the operation and management with some written answers. The instrument was adapted to suit the context of this research. The changes to the original British Airways Questionnaire were concerned with altering the context of the questions to match an institution of Higher Education and with the respondent's perceptions of the need for further training to meet changed roles and functions. In its original form as a checklist, it had the potential to be used later by all employees in the Institute in subsequent years, if the pilot study proved to be of value.

With these matters in place, Year One of the collection of data began. Out of the 31 Heads of Department a sample group of ten respondents representing a cross section across the currently existing Faculties was selected at random, with the important extra procedure of selecting at least one from the area of Teacher Studies. In the final group there were three from that area. There were only two women Heads of Department in the whole institution and one was included by lot in order to reflect the representative make-up of this tier of middle management. All were invited by letter to participate in confidential interviews; all but one accepted, leaving an initial group of nine respondents.

The procedure and timing of the interviews was the same on each occasion. The research interviews took place at the end of the summer terms. In Year One, this was three months after the announcement of the structural change and three months before it was implemented at the beginning of the following academic year in September. The importance of the timing was that everything was in flux. Given the likely quality of the respondents' reflection, it was decided to replace the written answers with a taped, confidential semi-structured interview with each of the nine Heads of Department. Respondents moved from past to present to future and back again as they thought themselves through the topics. Each interview was conducted by the researcher, in confidence, recorded and lasted up to 90 minutes. Most over-ran because of the quality and quantity of responses. It

Note: All that could be found from contacting researchers at BA was that there had been a cupboard full of employees' responses to a survey that had yielded more data than could be analysed.
was as though being asked for a serious opinion on their working lives opened a floodgate of comment, and some recorded that they had never before been asked about their working lives and careers. The majority of the interviews took place in the solitude of a recording studio - after 'office hours'. Only on two occasions did respondents ask for the recording to be switched off because of the information in their reply. In both cases the machine was switched off, but the researcher made detailed notes after the interview and the information was added to almost verbatim and made part of their evidence. The researcher has taken, and is taking, the view that nothing told during the interview is 'off the record'. The respondents and the researcher were seated at a small table, but deliberately not opposite each other. The researcher took a neutral but supporting situation to one side. The questions were placed before the interviewees - one per page - as well as being asked. Questions were included on the effectiveness of the interview and the appropriateness of the interview and the checklist.

The Year One research instrument, conducted as structured interviews, had the following topics, in the following order:

- External environment
- Mission and energy
- Leadership
- Culture and ethos
- Structure
- Systems (policies and procedures)
- Management practices
- Climate (feelings, climate, relationships)
- Task requirements and skills/abilities
- Individual needs and values
- Motivation
- Individual and organisational performance
- Evaluation of Questionnaire.

At the beginning of Year Two and the second year of the research the matrix organisational structure was in place and in operation. It consisted of The Principal who was now called The Chief Executive Officer [CEO] and who led four Directors and a 'flat' matrix structure with no Heads of Faculty, but with the middle managers taking on wider responsibilities derived from powers devolved from the Heads of Faculty. The students were placed at the top of the organisational chart to represent their importance as the 'customers'.
The comparatively small size of the institution, with only 31 Heads of Department and from 2 to 12 members of staff in department, allowed an easy line of command from lecturers via Heads of Department to the Directorate. The new institution was to provide its own legal and financial functions, previously undertaken centrally by the Local Education Authority. The new structure was to be 'less bureaucratic', 'more streamlined', 'capable of ensuring quality provision', and to 'assume increased academic responsibility' for work, and achieve, in the future, accredited status as a University. There was to be a climate of innovating expansion without loss of quality, supported by a 'flexible administrative system'. The role of the Heads of Department was seen as being 'at the heart of the Institution', and their importance was seen to have been recognised by the Governing Body. There were further Strategy Days and a series of weekly meetings took place between the Directorate and the Heads of Department.

During the next months three unconnected events coincided to shape the future of the institution. They all concerned the academic programmes and the Chief Executive became heavily involved in the academic arena she had not wanted to enter. The catalyst was HMI inspections on three departments that had produced two unsatisfactory and one satisfactory verdict. The reasons harked back to past issues of levels of investment in capital resources under the Local Education Authority, the lack of students' debating ideas, and the co-ordination of the work
of individual staff members into teams. The fall-out from the HMI's reports had thrown the Directorate into acrimonious conflict with these Departments and their Heads, which spilled over into the relationship with all the other Heads of Department. It also involved the Governors personally because staff began lobbying Governors openly or secretly, so that the crucial and historic relationship between the Governors and their chosen appointee, the Chief Executive, were soured. Another problem was the Secretary of State's speech threatening the future of Initial Teacher Training by basing it entirely in schools.

Finally a process had begun to 'unitise' the existing degree structures to meet the needs of the predicted market in part-time students' collecting credits toward a final degree award, creating their own combinations of units, and transferring between institutions by taking their 'credits' with them. Subject staff had expected unitisation to liberate the academic programmes; it did not; the existing academic hierarchy was largely preserved. A Dean of Unitary Courses was appointed internally. He was one of the respondents in the research whose views on the staff, faculties and teaching were to be absolutely influential. More importantly academic control and power was ceded to him, not formally, but he exercised autonomy and managed the whole unitisation of Courses. His ideological views on central control would prove decisive. The new Director of Quality Control, an external appointment, either accepted or shared similar views, but certainly brought views from outside the institution, rather than building on what already existed. In collaboration with the Head of Extension Studies renamed Teacher Development, they would determine policy and operations as the first level below the 'top management', much as the oligarchy of the powerful Heads of Department had done in earlier days. Meanwhile quality assessment was being forcefully implemented by central government.

As a result, before the end of the academic year another change was announced. At the beginning of the Summer Term, eleven months after the research's first interviews and nine months after the introduction of the matrix system, 'Faculties' were to be re-introduced as a new layer of management between the Heads of Department and the Directorate.

The rumoured reason for the introduction of Deans of Faculty was that the 31 Heads of Department were too numerous for the management to talk to, but there is no evidence to support this. The reason given in the staff's Strategy Meeting was to facilitate communication between individual members of staff who
were now answerable to and responsible to a number of managers, particularly and including the Dean of Unitary Courses.

'Colleagues [i.e., members of staff] are functionally accountable to a number of managers and have appropriate responsibilities to each of them. In an academic community whose members are mutually interdependent, the respective line manager cannot be the sole senior colleague to whom an individual member of staff feels her/himself accountable.' [From the Official document announcing the re-introduction of Faculties.]

This had a sort of post-modern-relativist and, supposedly, libertarian ethos. It implied an 'individualisation' and an isolation of each member of staff, despite their working alongside colleagues in Departments on named degree programmes. It projected a Kafka-esque uncertainty about professional relationships. Dangerously it implied the germ of an excuse for the later encouragement of reporting on colleagues.

The proposal made it absolutely clear that Heads of Faculty had been created to serve 'the academic systems and processes required' by the 'unitisation' of courses and the introduction of quality control and 'assurance mechanisms'. It was increasingly clear that control was driving the organisational structure. The new 'Change-Reversed' Structure took on this form.

Fig. 5. Abecedary Institute: Change Reversed
Ironically, while these changes were just announcements, a visiting management academic from the US spent over a month in the Institute, talked to many people and prepared a report on strategic management issues affecting the institution. One of his suggestions - in a plea for academic autonomy, perhaps - was that the proposed change in the Management structure 'should neither be forced nor rushed'. He reported a 'gulf' between the management team and the rest of the staff. The high quality of the teaching staff - 'dedicated and loyal staff that is committed to caring for and teaching students' - too featured in this report. "All [the staff] seemed to say that they understand the pressures [from external funding, quality assurance bodies, Government] confronting the corporate management team and the need for the Institute to change. Yet, most were frustrated by their desire to help and the lack of clear ways to do so. Most stated that when they had offered suggestions and/or requested information from the corporate management team they would not receive any response. Yet, they believed the corporate management team was often demanding and unreasonable in its requests for information. They all wished a more collaborative approach to decision-making would be used.'

He defined the apparent resistance to change as a matter of style:

'Conflict appears to occur when one person's view of a tried and true tradition is another person's view of an archaic institutional practice. Yet, the nature of these conflicts seem to be based more on style, or the way decisions are made, than on content, or the actual decision'.

As a visitor he reported that his own

'personal interactions with the corporate management team... were based on openness and trust. In contrast a common criticism was expressed by those with whom I spoke that the corporate management team was closed and hierarchical in its decision-making style. Where I had found the corporate management teams to be open and honest, they thought the team was closed and secretive'.

Amongst many recommendations intended to bridge this 'gulf', significantly he suggested that 'the corporate management team might consider meeting with staff in their offices as a way to get to know them' - a simple suggestion that the mountain might go Mohammed.
The reintroduction of Faculties had rendered the original research redundant. Its role, as defined, no longer existed. A redefinition was required. A democratic structure – at least one that was presented as such - was being replaced prematurely before it had got going. This reversal raised questions about restructuring and change process. A book title: 'Managing Change and Making it Stick' - even though it suggests that it is going cleanly from one clearly defined state to another - implies the difficulty of achieving change. The objective for the research had changed to making a record of a change that did not 'stick'. It would have needed god-like foresight to set up a feedback research to coincide with an institution changing its structure and then changing back again. This research had caught a unique moment in a UK institution's life and had willing interviewees on board who were living through a period of change. Moreover the research had the previous year's evidence and could track back and forward. The quality of the research's first interviews and the realisation that the institution was engaged in further change made the redefinition of the research essential. The point of view of the middle management that had been most crucial in the first phase would still be at the centre of the next phase. This offered a unique perspective and the research instrument used in the first set of interviews had originally covered a comprehensive review of aspects of the institution's development. The research assumption was there were strong reactions to events that had taken place and to those that lay ahead. The research was now taking a critical stance.

**Year Two's** set of questions asked for reflection on the quality that had been the target of the first change, and for interpretation/identification of what critical incident, if any, had taken place. Critical Incident Theory\(^{90}\) was chosen because the respondents had been at the forefront of the changes and had been involved in talks with the Directorate and had been under pressure throughout the period. The choice of incident would focus on 'direct observation of human behaviour' and respondents reflections on their own working and personal lives as well as of those of colleagues and the institution, all of which were in transition. It was at this point that it became apparent that the interviews might require full, verbatim transcription.

In the second series of interviews the respondents were to be asked how their views on the topics covered in the first series had changed from the year before, and secondly they were to be asked an additional set of questions about how management might 'do things differently’, identifying tasks for management, improvements, degradation, satisfaction and critical incidents for themselves and others.

The collection of evidence from **Year Two** began by inviting the original interviewees by letter to participate in confidential interviews and all accepted. The interviews took place in the same month exactly one year after the first set of interviews and the conditions and process were identical and all the respondents participated. The principal difference was that the first interviews had been partly transcribed and extracts taken from each respondent on each of the questions. Each was given her/his comments to read, but no one else's, and was asked to comment, if they had any comments, or state how their views had changed. This helped connect the past with the present in each respondent's reflections.

**The Year Two** research instrument was a structured interview in two parts. In the first part each respondent was asked “How have your views changed?” in comparison with each individual's own answers on the following topics from the first set of interviews:

- External environment
- Mission and energy
- Leadership
- Culture and ethos
- Structure
- Systems (policies and procedures)
- Management practices
- Climate (feelings, climate, relationships)
- Task requirements and skills/ abilities
- Individual needs and values
- Motivation
- Individual and organisational performance

The second part asked for a review of the past year the following topics:

- What should the institution be doing differently?
- **Identification of** tasks for management
- **Identification of** improvements over the year
- **Identification of** degradation over the year
- Suggested improvements
- Satisfactions over the year
- Signs of quality
- Critical incident/s during last year
- The incident that changed you/other people last year
In reality two years elapsed before **Year Three**, the third and final set of interviews. It had been impossible to conduct interviews in the intervening year because appraisal was being introduced, and everyone was on two-day appraisal-training programmes.

But, in the meantime, much had happened. The immediate and significant response of the Heads of Department to the announcement of the re-introduction of Faculties and Deans was that about two-thirds of them signed a proposal to the Governors to be recognised as a 'Forum' and part of the management structure. This would be a formal group to represent their 'managerial and academic' interests as an officially constituted body in the Governance of the institution. It was in fact an alternative management of academic affairs but was presented as 'helpful'. It was also about restraining both the 'spot' salaries that were being promised to the new Deans of Faculty and restraint on their powers by making the posts rotational every three years. It had taken almost a year but the Heads of Department had cohered into a group. The proposal was rejected but a concession was made that there would be debate amongst the Heads of Department and the Directorate about the number and constituency of such Faculties.

In the midst of a meeting where the Heads of Department were discussing their alternative proposals, a highly significant remark was made: ‘If I have to be in a faculty, I want to be in a big one.’ What this concealed was a classic case of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’. For many years this Head of Department had been part of large faculties where he had been able to disguise his department’s actual student statistics and staff ratios and had thereby preserved jobs. A small faculty would have given less scope for concealment. However, his strategy had deprived others of valuable resources, closed off any positive developments and partnerships that might have remedied the deficiency, because such solutions would require an open accounting. He made his remark after a strong contender for the Deanship of his future faculty had left. Later, he was able to create a part-time appointment for the partner of that Dean of Faculty, and so the concealment continued unchanged, with charm and evasion, until the moment of his compulsory retirement a few years later. Then the truth came out. The Department was closed and courses phased out with the consequent damage to staff, families, and students. What this incident illustrated is both the inefficiency
of hierarchical management and the sensible knave’s recognition that small organisational units provide the conditions that forestalls their gambit. Within a couple of months, Faculties were formed and permanent Deans appointed to create a unified traditional hierarchical management under the CEO. Each Head of Department worked through his/her Dean, who in turn related to the Directors of Quality Academic Control Systems and the Unitary Courses. These functions over the core activity of the institution operated a centralised control in a manner that respondents identified as hierarchically totalitarian. However the aspiration for democratic organisation lingered in the service functions and in one faculty, with the encouragement of the CEO, according to its newly appointed Dean’s account of his briefing instructions. Eventually respondents identified this dual trend in the institution.

If the unitisation of courses was and is about academic control at Abecedary Institute, since the credit transfer/modular system operates nationwide, it probably is also about control in other institutions. The reason for unitisation was that student could study part-time and move between institutions. There have been unintended consequences, because many students have in effect become part-time because they have taken jobs in the service sector, sometimes fulltime jobs, while also taking unitised courses fulltime. This is to finance their time at college. Students have pursued what they have always primarily wanted from higher education: a full-time, independent ‘rite of passage’ with their own generation. The credit transfer and semesterisation scheme entails a considerable bureaucracy and extra assessment time, estimated as 10% of courses. Students also tend to specialise more under modularisation, presumably because they want to acquire a qualification that others recognise. Moreover, they are not transferring between institutions. Unitisation is an enterprise that had lost its original purpose and appears to be retained to give managements control over academic staff, erode academic autonomy and provide a reason for bureaucratic career structures and employment.

As part of this research the HEFC were contacted by telephone to enquire about how to access the information on the number of students transferring between institutions. There was a compulsory entry for this on the official annual return to be made by all Higher Education institutions to the HEFC. The initial, open and helpful response was that there was little or even no information and that it was

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not collected, but the matter would be looked into. A follow up response was less helpful; at first, the information was not available and finally it was made clear that the information would not be made available. A subsequent formal request could only give information on the number of part-time courses. A request inside a university for the number of students involved in their internal credit transfer processes revealed that they were very few and these they were assessed by academics in the departments. Transfers between institutions might entail the assessment of prior learning. An enquiry at a particular large university revealed that these were 'guessed' by the Department of Prior Learning to be less than 10 per annum and student’s prior learning was often assessed by the departments concerned, in exactly the same way that it had been done before unitisation. Thus in practice the professional judgement and autonomy still lies with the academics who sustain a set of redundant procedures that transfer professional academic autonomy to a career-bureaucracy.

In the middle of this two year period, the Director/CEO had opened a new library at Abecedary Institute and had secured a Junior Minster of Education to perform the ceremony. A few months later she had resigned after three and a half years of her contract to take a full-time post as head of an important organisation. Apart from getting another and, this time, full-time, permanent job, conflict with the Governors figured in the gossip. Long after she had left, The CEO admitted that she had under-estimated the forces that were ranged against change and had misread the informal networks that existed in the institution and outside. Moreover according to the account of one of the 'voices', she had a different, more supportive view of how Heads of Faculty might operate\(^\text{92}\), which suggests that her democratic intentions were genuine, but she too had misread the nature of the constitution of the new institution. The informal networks to which she referred extended to those between staff and Governors.

In the next twelve months, during autumn and spring, the search for a replacement Chief Executive followed. The first round of interviews in the autumn was inconclusive. The former Research Development Officer who had been made temporary Director of Funding was made Acting CEO. A second round of interviews confirmed his permanent appointment to the position, i.e., not on a short term contract like the first Chief Executive. This person had been a Course

Leader and Assistant Dean of Faculty under the Local Education Authority's aegis and had been a member of staff for about 16 years.

During this period, following the rejection of the Heads of Department proposal for constitutional reform of the Institute's governance, it was made clear to some staff representatives on committees that all committees were solely advisory. Internal bodies had no legal powers. In other words the constitutional nature of the division of power was being spelt out. Most staff would never know or appreciate the significance of this. Staff had different perceptions of the nature of their powers, partly from the laissez-faire management of the Institute's previous regimes, but also from their knowledge and experience of other, differently constituted higher education institutions. It may even be a projection of what happens where a country and its citizens have no written constitution and so have little real knowledge of power and rights, but instead have intuitive illusions.

The managers were also coming to realise that the Governors had devolved a power to them that was extensive. A new diagrammatic structure was published [See Fig. 5.]. The mission statement values were now 'Open, Honest and Professional'. Abecedary Institute now settled into a pattern that it would follow for a decade with much the same cast.

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**Fig. 6. Management Structure following the appointment of a new Director:**

*As you were - but upside down*

NB. No communication lines were drawn

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93 Cf. Text p. 317 line 28-p. 318 line 8; Text p. 319 line 1-9
The fortunes of the different respondents had changed. By the time of the final series of interviews, three of the 'voices' had been made Heads of the new Faculties and had been in post for about 15 months, another was now Dean of Unitary Courses, which was located centrally in the structural diagram of the institution, reflecting its power and importance. Together with the staff appointed to improve the quality of teaching, the Unitary Courses bureaucracy had grown large enough to take over most of one floor of the now empty library. At the time the third research interviews took place, two significant external reports appeared, but most staff, including the respondents, were ignorant of their findings at the time of the interviews. One report was about Unitary Courses and the other was a Quality Audit.

Months earlier an investigation had begun into the workings of the Unitary Course and Quality Departments that now affected every aspect of all the staff's professional lives. The author was an independent external consultant employed by the Institute and was reporting after some months of individual staff interviews. The report examined the workings of nearly 30 personnel in the Unitary Courses, Registry and Quality Departments and the turf wars between them as Unitary Course had tried to absorb all other functions concerned with students, staff and courses. Unitary Courses had become the dominant and central academic organisation in the Institute, which 'had in less than three years' outstripped the accommodation 'set aside for it'. Unitary Courses had fulfilled Tulloch's94 'law' on the nature of bureaucracies: 'as a general rule, a bureaucrat will find that his [interests are best served]...if the bureaucracy in which he works expands'. This external report found 'a considerable degree of de-motivation, unhappiness and unease [in]...issues surrounding management styles, supervisory roles and attitudes and the absence of leadership and stimulus [which were] fundamental to [the report's] concerns so that a further confidential note was to be sent to the Director'. Unitary Courses administrative staff were invited to meet with the Personnel Department to feed in issues on an individual basis. The report coincided about the same time with the resignation of the Director of Unitary Courses who had resigned to take up an important academic post in higher education; the report concluded that, despite his academic strengths, being a

'systems and office manager [was] a role to which he seem[ed] neither temperamentally nor professionally suited'. The second report came from the Quality Audit exercise by the Higher Education Funding Council for the whole institution. Over three days the auditors had met over 200 staff. They found a 'plethora' of different kinds of course reviews, gave examples of seven, and questioned 'whether the Institute had a clear and articulated overall rationale for imposing multiple accountability on this scale'. Just as the HMI reports had noted nearly a decade earlier, the auditors found evidence of the same kind of personal and professional commitment to 'quality and standards [for students' learning] by staff, coupled with enthusiasm, which the [audit] team found [was] a major strength of the Institute'. It was this that had kept the Institute going, rather than the management, whose progress was publicly measured, as with all monarchies, in new buildings and refurbishments. Ironically, given the view that not-for-profit organisation were driven by short term targets and 'personal goals'\textsuperscript{95}, the Director of Quality Management announced the Institute's response to this plethora of reporting was to set up another committee to review procedures, and to 'axe' one major committee: Strategic Planning: Academic and Resources, which had a brief concerned with long term goals. The management had brought little before it and its demise had been long mooted by managers. Its brief implied encroachment on management's preserves. In the context of its constitutionally advisory role, it was redundant, as were all the committees; as one respondent stated: 'It was a fake democracy'\textsuperscript{96}. \textbf{Year Three's} series of interviews gave an opportunity for all to reflect on the events that had passed, while commenting on the current organisational operation and changes. The questions asked interviewees to speculate on conclusions and to give concrete examples to support them. The research instrument built on the previous second series questions. The same questions relating to change, influences, improvements, degradation, advice and their change of views were retained but were given a more open and longer, reflective-reach, stretching back to the first interview. Some respondents had spent most of their careers working in this institution and for them the memories went back over thirty years. However focussed the questions the respondents' answers tended to reflect on the

\textsuperscript{96} Cf. Text p. 275 line 37 – p. 276 line 21.
political power structures of those years in making a comparison with the present organisation and on the nature of higher education over that period. The questions on critical incidents were retained in order to elucidate where the staff's minds focussed when interpreting their own and others' working-lives. To emphasise and prompt them to reflect further on the notion that "change is loss", there was a series of reflective question on this topic.

All the procedures were repeated. The original respondents were all invited by letter to participate in confidential interviews; all but one accepted. There was no refusal from the missing respondent but he was in the midst of leaving to take up a professorship at one of the latest batch of universities. Because there were only now 8 respondents, the researcher decided to add two more respondents to retain the numbers. They were chosen on the basis of the perspective they could bring to the enquiry: one was a long-serving member of staff and Head of Department, the other, also a Head of Department had been appointed after the institution was made independent of the LEA and had been appointed as Dean of one of the new Faculties. It was thought that their contribution might be illuminating since the questionnaire ranged over the whole period of the research.

The Year Three interviews, i.e., the third and final set, took place two years later at the same time of the year but over a two to three month period. Each interview was recorded but not always in a studio, but mostly in a vacant room. Interviews still lasted over 90 minutes and sometimes over two hours.

The Year Three research instrument, conducted as structured interviews, had the following topics, in the following order:

Identification of external influences on the institution, on the profession and changes in your views.
The Past and the institution doing things differently
What improvements? What degradation?
Future and the institution doing things differently.
Management tasks for the future.
Suggested improvements.
Job Satisfaction. Satisfactions over the year. Signs of quality/improvements
Crucial critical incidents. For the institution For you personally.
Change. Turning points over the years. Personal. Institute.
Professional.
Change & Loss.
Analysis & Presentation of the data and findings

The research data was so rich that only full transcription of the material could do it justice and enable it to be interpreted. Once that was complete it was evident that a conventional research report of a third person, 'objective', 'authorial' commentary with edited extracts robbed the respondents of the authenticity and authority of their 'voices'. An alternative presentation would be required. One Critical Management approach recognises the need for research to 'take into account several aspects without giving priority to any of them... in a critically imaginative way'. Two issues are therefore the gathering of rich and authentic evidence, and the other is the presentation of the evidence, so that the multifaceted nature of it is preserved and is open to multiple interpretations. The long-term but distant relationship, perhaps meeting only once or twice in a year between the respondents and the interviewer produced just this kind of revealing material. The other evidence available included the public documents of the institution, e.g., proposals to The Board of Governors, structural diagrams of management, that were made available to these interviewees, and official reports on aspects of the working of the institution prepared by external third parties, which offer an impartial perspective or corroboration. In addition, there is the context of the state of higher education. The real danger is that the researcher may be 'swamped', or may hold to one theoretical explanation in the face of multiple meanings.

The research focussed the gathering of data on three separate 'situational' events; the first two separated by one year, then the second and third by two years. All the respondents 'lived through' the events between the interviews in the same context. These 'slices of life' were taken at significant times for the institution and the respondents. As one respondents put it: 'You [the researcher] are taking an annual biopsy'. Biopsies diagnose the condition of the whole. Moreover the respondents had perceptively reflected on and interpreted the events and actions, and collectively through their combined 'voices' had revealed an almost common view. But this did not take account of the volume of data as well as its richness. The application of content analysis [QSRNU.DIST99] assisted in the identification of significant thematic relationships, and so it was possible to confine the

99 QSRNU.DIST Software for Qualitative Analysis Qualitative Solutions and Research Pty Ltd.1997
interpretation to a limited number of themes, while leaving the text as a resource for other interpretations. The complete transcribed interviews, some 250,000 words in total were prepared for the Content Analysis in text only format and the following nodes [Viz. below] starting with the first ‘control’ were identified. The one concerned with the “Directorate” and “management” was huge, which is not surprising because this was the principal topic of the first questionnaires. “Individual” was rejected when examined because it could be both noun and adjective with quite different connotations.

The clusters that were revealed were as follows:

- Control; Change; Communication [interaction]; Information [interaction]; Interaction/discussion /discursive; Democracy/democratic; Trust;
- Honesty/decency; Group; Team; Autocracy/autocratic;
- Directorate/Management Managing; Culture; Blame; Rules/procedures;
- Hierarchy/hierarchical; Authoritarian; Authority; Money; Values;
- Collegiate/community; Ethics/ethical; Freedom. [Individual - rejected ambiguous]

This content analysis seemed to yield a tree of connections that could be expressed as follows [Viz: below):

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Change
  └── Autonomy/Freed
     └── Interaction
         ├── Communicative Interaction/Discussion
         │     └── Collegiate/Community Trust
         │         └── Team Group
         │             'Honesty/Decency' 'Honest/Decent'
         └── Informative
             └── Culture
                 ├── Ethics/ethical
                 └── Money
             └── Hierarchy/ hierarchical
                 └── Authoritarian
                     └── Autocracy/Autocratic
                         └── Management/ Directorate/Managing
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Fig 7. Content Analysis Tree Ref. 100 [see next page]
This opposition between the discussion, including listening, and being informed without any discussion was the recurring theme underlying the respondents' reflections and analyses of events. They also perceived that it is through the nature of communication and social interaction that the culture of the institution was created and defined. Their interpretations were grounded in their own experiences and were intuitive interpretations of their exclusion from the decision-making processes. A theoretical analysis makes the political nature of these forms of communication explicit. Deetz\textsuperscript{100} defines the discursive as 'Constitutive Processes' and information as 'Expression Processes' and both as part of political practice. He expresses the political dimension thus: [Viz. below]:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{diagram.png}
\caption{Deetz's Communication and Information Orientation}
\end{figure}


Deetz takes a Critical perspective in analysing the nature of information and communication that is discursive or as he prefers, dialogic. Therefore information is regarded as 'expression' while communication is 'constitutive'. The information processes are marshalled to convey messages that are already formed and complete to persuade others or to give orders to others. The 'dialogic' are incomplete and are intended to discover 'new and more satisfying ways to be together'. This is made clear in the decision-making processes where diversity in a community is managed by either 'control and domination' or 'processes of negotiation and co-determination'. Deetz translates these into everyday circumstances where a person either issues orders or 'has a voice'; or where a person persuades or 'learns and creates'.

The process is political because it describes the intention behind the communication which is to achieve some social end or action. Therefore Deetz intends 'expression' to convey the notion of something that appears neutral, or is a private view made public and is therefore made to seem 'neutral or transparent, or capable of being [so] in a ideal world through definition or the removal of ideology'. 'Expression' gives the impression of interaction as neutral rationality as though emotion were 'independently somewhere else'. In contrast the 'constitutive' admits meaning, perception and feelings as 'active' elements and is not neutral. Difference and distinctiveness and 'individual identity are 'active fundamental' to discursive processes.

'Decision practices can be relatively open and participatory or closed and exclusive'. Deetz invokes Habermas' conception of 'strategic action' which is aimed at control, while communicative action is directed toward understanding. The open 'inclusionary practices will be called co-determination because they are directed by coordination. The closed exclusionary practices will be called political domination because they are directed by control. Informational approaches to interaction study have tended to be guided by the desire to extend control, and dialogic communication approaches to extend codetermination. Deetz explores his model further by identify the types of political practice characteristic of each quadrant [Viz. below]:

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Deetz acknowledges the limitation of his two dimensional model and that the practices are 'continua', so that in the complexity of real life a particular strategy may move towards involvement and consent. His definition of the practices makes them instantly recognisable. Thus, Strategy, as a political practice, uses 'dominant expression' and is 'direct, visible' and is based on Weberian 104 kinds of power and uses 'rewards propaganda, manipulation and coercion to control'. The distribution of information serves the dominant group's interests. 'Control is of motivation,

104 Max Weber - power and types of authority [notes based on Haralambros & Holborn Sociology 4th Edition Collins: London 1995 pp. 501-502] Weber's definition of power: 'the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action against the resistance of others who are participating in the action'.

Weber's Kinds of Authority - these following were ideal types and in reality authority may stem for more that one source. Commentary talks about the 'pluralists who 'concentrate on the will [or desire] of interest groups to achieve a particular ends, so the achievement of a group's set of desires[will] is indicative of the power of that particular group[ viz. Haralambros & Holborn Op. cit. pp 506-513]

Weber's Authority types: Charismatic Authority comes from the devotion of underlings to a leader whom they perceive to have exceptional qualities, such as supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional compared to lesser persons. Control achieve by direct emotional appeal for devotion and loyalty . Found in 'great' men and teachers and managers! Traditional Authority: based on the 'rightness' of established customs and traditions; obedience given to traditional status which is usually inherited [cf. PRINCES; underlings feel loyalty and obligation to long-established positions of power, as in feudal system and monarch and nobles. Rational-Legal Authority: based on the acceptance of a set of rules, a legal framework which is widely accepted and which supports their authority, such as judges, tax inspector, and military commander. The framework is one that has been rationally constructed to achieve a particular goal e.g. Justice and judges.
attitudes and action\textsuperscript{105}. 'Strategy' was a term widely used by management in the 1980s, and was 'celebrated as an essential component of "rational" organization and control. This was a rationality that enabled management.....to assess the prevailing, and forecast the future, environment conditions...[for] the market potential and competitive advantage of the business\textsuperscript{106}. The effect of this form of thinking was to identify a special kind of person, make legitimate a particular political and social order, and define the forms of knowledge and information that would be allowed. In non-specific terms it is nearer to endowing a monarch with the same transcendental right to rule that was bestowed by the Divine Right of Kings and the manners of the monarchical court\textsuperscript{107}. This is confirmed by an authoritative account\textsuperscript{108} of 'strategic...power relations in the organisation', where it provides managements with 'a rationalization of their own success and failures', supports and 'enhances the prerogatives of management' while outlawing alternative views on the organisation, makes the managers feel more safe and 'secure', emphasises the masculine "macho" management style, presents a picture of 'managerial rationality' to staff, customer, the market and to superiors and governments, makes the right to exercise and hold power more legitimate, and confirms the 'subjectivity', i.e., the personal character, and identity of person as someone capable of engaging in strategic thinking. By such means control systems establish forms of consent within the organisation which in turn leads to 'a non-responsive corporation'\textsuperscript{109}. Deetz defines patterns of consent or compliance to a dominant constitution as an acceptance of the situation, of ways of proceeding and of practices that are 'indirect, unnoticed', 'common sense', typical of "the way of doing things here", but which, in fact, reflect an ideological perspective. This is the kind of perspective described in Foucault's use of the metaphor of the all-seeing, total-supervision of Bentham's 'Panopticon'. When information is distributed, it is likely to be filtered to suit the dominant perspective. Thus, when it is totally dominant any form of protest appears 'irrational' and once

\textsuperscript{107} Cf. Director's Cut
defeated declines into 'unfocussed resistance'\textsuperscript{110}. Control remains the organisational intention.

The alternatives are different levels of constructive participation in the organisational process and decision-making. One is Involvement, which Deetz defines as 'negotiative expression' as an explanation, through a constitution like the representative democracy of the political state as formulated in the Eighteenth Century by concepts like citizen's rights. Decision-making is a process of evaluating the arguments, and positions, deploying expertise and adhering to legislative processes and voting. Any challenge to a dominant point of view would have to follow this same process. There is a 'free market-place of ideas and freedom of speech'\textsuperscript{111}. Deetz's final quadrant is Participation - defined as 'negotiation constitution' - where Habermas's 'ideal speech situation', i.e., the conditions for determining what is true, would be located: 'a situation of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents'\textsuperscript{112}. The implication of an agreed definition of the conditions of freedom and the conditions of coercion is contained in Deetz's account of the other political practices based on 'expression'. In circumstances of Participation the opportunity exists to voice difference, to negotiate values and the foundations of decisions and to strive to reach new syntheses of arguments, so that dominant positions may be challenged. Therefore, 'new positions are generated out of the 'subject matter', or 'otherness', through processes called by Gadamer [as] "genuine conversation"'\textsuperscript{113}.

Therefore, out of the Content Analysis of the raw data and the corroboration with Deetz's account of communication in the workplace, there came the basic theme for the exploration of the extensive material in terms of commentary: the dualism between - in Deetz's terms 'domination and control' on the one hand and 'co-determination and coordination' on the other. This theoretical position provided a lens through which to consider what the case-study evidence is intended to reveal, i.e., [Viz. above] 'a human struggle that is not always vicious or visible but a struggle that is always present'; 'the right to participate in the construction of

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. p. 100. Cf. Director's Cut
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 100.
meaning that affects our lives'; to get closer to the 'core empirical phenomena' in order to offer a 'profound insight into social relations and processes in companies' through detailed description of naturally occurring events. The political/governmental connotations in Deetz's approach also coincided with the tenor of some of the respondents' perspectives that they were being ruled rather than managed and that what they experienced was about politics and not management or 'making things work'. These judgements were coming from people who were and are normally not heard, at least commenting publicly on such matters and in such a fashion. This raises two issues: the first, is that throughout their years of employment such voices are usually never or hardly ever heard and yet they have much of value to contribute to any common enterprise [Cf. Geertz]; the second was to allow each respondent a voice and not to mediate that through a third person commentary that offered 'an objective, socio-scientific' interpretation that represented the 'truth' of the situation. Such 'truth' would only be that of the researcher and would only be one possible view because everything in the real-life story could not be known, and others might, would even, read the evidence in totally different ways.

Given the nature of the evidence and the requirements specified by Alvesson and Deetz, the choice of presentation led logically to forms of narrative. Narrative is how we represent the world. Eagleton gives narrative centre stage in our thinking: 'We cannot think, act or desire except in narrative; it is by narrative that the subject forges that "sutured" chain of signifiers that grants its real condition of division sufficient imaginary cohesion to enable it to act'. An overview of personal narratives makes the point that memories are how people, singly and collectively, define and give meaning to their lives because embedded within them are our values and what we are as a society and a community. Narrating them uses the past to define the future and the present. Narration translates memories from personal reflection to a communication of significance for others' lives and so the narrative becomes part of the process of how people construct a

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115 Geertz C. Works and Lives: the Anthropologist as Author Stanford: Stanford University Press 1988 p.133 'a tribune for the unheard, a representor of the unseen, a kenner of the misconstrued.'
world. Broadly, as a glass through which to see into lived lives and processes, narrative is a basic research method for discovery and analysis. Thus the use of narrative in social science and anthropological case studies has been part of the solution to the question of ‘How to represent groups who are not heard? Who shall represent them, to what purpose? How to represent silenced voices?’

However one problem is deciding who is ‘silenced’ and who is not. Spivak\textsuperscript{118}, in her account of the subaltern, rejects Foucault’s and Gilles Deleuze’s view that such oppressed groups can speak and be heard, if they are given a chance. Spivak identifies the tendency for other views to dominate the voices’ narratives. Moreover, she questions the existence of an audience for such voices’ narratives, for without listeners there is no speech and no narrative. Her exploration of the notion of the ‘subaltern’, a description applied to oppressed groups, reveals that research on the ‘subalterner’ understands subordination by placing it in a binary opposition to dominance, and consequently subaltern groups in opposition to elite groups. Thus the examination of the subaltern groups is a lens through which to reach an understanding of the operation of elite groups and the elite groups’ view of their operation. Therefore any representation of the subaltern or silenced is likely to expend as much time and space, if not more, on an analysis of the dominant. The same applies to workers and managements.

The earliest and major researches in subaltern studies have been in South Asia, where subaltern has been used ‘as a name for the general attribute of subordination…. where this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender, office or any other way’.\textsuperscript{119} Originally ‘subaltern’, a term usually used to identify a military rank, was used by the imprisoned Italian political activist and theorist, Gramsci in a political context. One reason behind his use of it was that it was a codeword for ‘proletariat’ to hide the subject of his writings - some 29 notebooks - from prison censors. Another\textsuperscript{120} defines it as a controversial term used in connection with poverty in Southern Italy. Gramsci defined subaltern groups as disorganised, lacking in class-consciousness and excluded from the histories of the dominant classes in civil society. If such subaltern groups attempt to be heard, they come directly into the world of political and textual representation, which is

civil society. This is reminiscent of Douglas' definition of the Dissident Enclave in Thought Styles, and that if they too articulated their view and organised they would have moved powerfully from the Enclave into the domain of Active Individual Entrepreneurial Affirmation. However, Spivak still regards representation as partial and that groups should be able to speak for themselves. It is only those groups that do not attempt to be heard or never attempt to be represented that remain voiceless and subaltern. She also demonstrates that those who are truly subaltern are those with no chance to speak and only by 'voiceless' acts are they able to point to what they might have said. Though she refers to a particular cultural example, the psychology of it is reminiscent of the withdrawal by strong reciprocators. In his accounts of cooperative experiments, Gintis describes how *homo reciprocans* remove their cooperation from a task, though this may harm themselves. There is need for research into the narratives of the early retired in education and the public service who, though they accept an early pension for lives of 'genteel poverty', 'kill' a lifetime's commitment to public service and learning and take themselves from public life and fall silent.

Lincoln, an advocate for research on and with the 'silenced' identifies its problems as a shortage of 'authentic texts', the 'Western flavour of texts' and a 'suspicion of social scientists'. The 'silenced' have been defined generally as 'the non-mainstream gender, classes and, races', specifically 'women, racial and ethnic minorities, Native Americans, the poor, and gay and lesbian persons'. Lincoln develops this definition further as those that are 'marginal' to the 'normal' white, male, middle-aged' concern of the 'social world'; disregarding the stereotyping, this does not take account of the cultural divisions that Mary Douglas identifies. Another definition widens the constitutuency to include 'lower participants of formal organisations'. The 'silenced' are created and usually have no access to knowledge production or dissemination of their views. The 'silenced' are those who have no voice; those who have been denied a voice without their consent by oppression; those who have to be identified, 'named' as 'silenced', because they may lack 'consciousness of their own oppression or, if they were once conscious of oppression, ... they have

121 Cf. Director's Cut
123 Cf. Director's Cut
suppressed that knowledge\textsuperscript{125}. The reasons for their being 'silenced' may be social stigma, or inferior status. Lincoln finally settles for the definition implied in the title: 'under-represented'\textsuperscript{126}. In this research because all the persons were highly educated, articulate, capable of publishing their views, verbally and orally, both within and without the organisation, it is difficult to conceive of them as 'silenced' or subaltern. Yet their views were disenfranchised; they were under-represented, by their own lights, in the constitution of the organisation and they felt they were neither listened to nor valued and had no formal opportunity to talk to each other, and at its very best their views had the weight of optional advice. LeCompte\textsuperscript{127} makes the crucial point that the key uniting variable of being 'silenced' or 'voiceless' is relative. Though the researcher may define a group as 'silenced' by those in power, such a framing of them, though they may accept this title, is the researcher's decision and not the choice of the 'silenced' themselves. This research's respondents are relatively 'silenced' and became more so by the end of the story, compared with the direct participative democracy at Oxford and Cambridge Universities\textsuperscript{128}, and at those created before 1992. The staff of these universities have varying levels of ownership of power and form electoral constituencies that need to be listened to and persuaded in varying measures. There is no consistency of governance in the UK higher education sector. This illustrates the need for research about such constituencies to be placed against a wider context in order to evaluate the significance of the evidence. Without a wider context, the stories of the 'silenced' are placed only within their own frame. Their evidence can be trivialised, be interpreted as limited to specific circumstances, typical of a particular context and state of mind, so is robbed of significance. '[Relativism] imposes a false consensus that all is well; relativism justifies the status quo by measuring it only against internal conditions rather than permitting its assessment against possible external sets of standards and material conditions.'\textsuperscript{129}

Representing that significance may tempt a researcher into imposing her/his point of view on the evidence out of an 'evangelising tendency' where the researcher takes up the mantle and the cudgels on behalf of the 'silenced' as the 'sole

\textsuperscript{125} LeCompte M. D. Op. cit. p. 10
\textsuperscript{126} Lincoln Y. S. Op. cit. p. 32
\textsuperscript{128} Cf. The Background
\textsuperscript{129} LeCompte M. D. Op. cit. p. 12
theoretical representative of the oppressed'. This tendency can occur when the researcher is an outsider to the situation. The researcher may be working for the 'emancipation of the 'silenced' in ways that the researcher might see as appropriate but which do not take into account the circumstances under which the 'voices' live or believe they live and work. In the field the researcher may fail to hear or deny evidence contrary to her/his assumptions and the research would be about what the researcher 'knows ' is there, rather than what the 'voices' have to say about their own lives. When completed the research evidence is just another example of oppression gathered by a researcher who assumes a high-status role and who may benefit as a result but leave those researched unchanged. 'Rights to dignity, agency, and individual control are often displaced or suspended in favour of the scientist's right to know'. The crucial issue is the maintenance of the integrity and authenticity of the 'voices' and therefore curbing the extent to which the researcher's voice dominates the 'voices's' stories which as a consequence become supporting material buried in another's point of view. Thereby the same 'silencing' is perpetuated, that a researcher intended to avoid. Among ideal recommendations for guiding this kind of research there is the suggestion that the 'voices' become fully involved in the presentation and interpretation of their evidence because the researched provide the authentic 'evidence' and by telling their stories they consent to making the world less unjust. It is a research situation of total openness and no holding back by the respondents and this places a different research relationship on both. Given that research may be either descriptive or instrumental, change is not achieved nor is empowerment achieved just by the production of a narrative text that raises the consciousness of the respondents and of a wider public. 'Accurate translation' of the evidence has to be 'fram[ed]...within a social, economic, political and historical context'. LeCompte illustrates this by referring to situations where this kind of research has been used in the long term commitment of priests in Latin America, where there are confrontations, real danger, losing battles and constant confrontations with the Establishment. Reconciliation between' warring

134 Cf. Director's Cut
constituencies of stakeholders' is not to be anticipated, because this kind of empowering research is 'a revolutionary activity that requires wrenching privileges away from entrenched interests - even those privileges without which members of the Establishment feel they cannot survive. In these terms, the problem of empowerment becomes a problem of life or death.' Raising awareness is not empowerment; awareness has to progress to activism. In the end someone - and not the researcher - somewhere has 'to want to change the situation, take action, and define the change as both possible and worthwhile'. These are the criteria and the path that Critical Theory outlines. One view regards the 'imperialist narratives as a form of systemic violence.... Constituting [a] dominative systems of knowledge and structures of intelligibility that construct forms of social life' while 'critical narratology' [offers] personal narratives 'against society's treasured stock of imperial and magisterial narratives'.

In a similar vein, Spivak uses Gramsci's definition of 'subaltern': disorganised proletariat, - to which one might add Douglas' Dissident Enclave - to advance her view that textual representation is like parliamentary representation, a matter of speaking for others, with an inevitable distortion, rather their speaking for themselves. She advocates that those researchers who seek to work on behalf of the voiceless subaltern group should not just write and speak about them but bring them into places where they can represent themselves. Bringing the words of the 'voices 'to the front of the stage is the nearest, that this research can aspire to the Babel, which is the sentiment of Barbara Czarniawska in the conclusion to her 'Writing Management'.

A case-study of some USA teachers illustrates the issues as well as paralleling themes and presentation issues that are present in the evidence of this research: 'how educational organisations marginalise and silence different groups' and that participants and organisations in education 'operate within ongoing patterns of struggle that embody competing conceptions of what counts for knowledge' and counters the usual functionalist analysis of education in terms of efficiency and effectiveness and reveals education as 'a cacophony of voices mediated within different layers of reality and shaped by an interaction of dominant and

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137 Cf. Director's Cut Text Act 2 pp.503 line. 20 - p. 504 line 7.
subordinate forms of power'. The case-study began by researching new teachers' professional knowledge but realised that before long they were concerned with the 'micro-political and contextual realities of [working] life'. These elements crucially affected the 'personal, practical and pedagogical knowledge' in the teachers' stories. The evidence moved into areas of "the politics of the institution", the constraints, the roadblocks to change, the need to acquire early insight into the politics of an institution in order to bring about change, collegiality in the college and issues of power and control in relation to status in program design and development...the notion of the need for new people to conform." The frustrations and anger about "the system" took over, and the research quotes one respondent, whose comments parallel views in this research: 'I love my job, I really do, but constantly institutional politics intercede. People trying to build empires with hidden agendas and all the bullshit shouldn't be getting in the way between me and the student. It ticks me right off. I've never been good at politics. I just want to do the damned job. But it gets to the point where it's almost impossible to do it properly. There are people who just do what they want to do, and that's it. It keeps them happy. Sometimes it's bloody sad. In fact, to me, that's depressing because that spark of enthusiasm just gets smaller and smaller and smaller. And in the end it's going to be extinguished. What do you do? Do you fight the system until you just end upon the floor or do you roll along with it?' The researchers acknowledged the richness of the evidence and advanced the proposition that though requiring an audience to read unedited transcripts of teacher's voices may be a 'dereliction of duty', they were conscious that conventional reports have, 'unwittingly or not, silenced teachers' voices and teachers' lives. It is not by chance that paradigms have silenced the teacher, but without such rehabilitation we believe much of the research on teachers will continue to be as arid and decontextualising, and irrelevant for the teachers it so systematically silences and disenfranchises'. Such case studies need to be placed in the context of the 'imperial narratives' in which 'market forces are stronger than they have ever been in American history......public schools under a massive and co-ordinated assault... the very idea of public institutions is

141 Ibid. p.92.
increasingly becoming threatened by the New Right's clarion call for privatization of the public sphere.\textsuperscript{142}

The similarities between the experience and expression of respondents in this USA case-study and the research presented here suggests that narratives and autobiography have the capacity to be 'mirror exemplar of his or her place, time and context'.\textsuperscript{143} The suggested method for achieving this is double description, portraying the unique and socially constructed experience and 'inner reality' of the respondents and framing this reality in a context external to that of the respondents which considers socio-historical patterns and regularities. The recommendation is based on Bateson's 'binocular vision' approach to studying and understanding the world. Double description is suggested by a single perspective's lack of depth that comes from 'a combination of two versions';\textsuperscript{144} it is sense-making by having multiple versions rather than a single researcher-centred and constructed text. Normally this is proposed where the researcher and the researched collaborate on the interpretation of the evidence. The advantage of Double Description is that it takes away the danger of a relativistic interpretation by connecting the evidence to an external context and therefore offers a better chance of reaching a greater truth than one confined to the context. 'The text created within the study, whether by the researcher alone or in collaboration with participants, and the sense of reality it conveys, is mediated by and situated not just within itself, but within constraining networks of time, place, beliefs and historical context... Double description has great power and this power poses great danger to vested interests. The depth of vision which it creates is not seen simply as a contrast to accepted notions; rather it is redefined as a confrontation.'\textsuperscript{145}

However, it does make replicability impossible because of the unique elements of people, time and place. Therefore scientific enquiry regards such research with suspicion and the accounts of marginal people are disregarded as truth and attacked because they often challenge accepted truths.


Lincoln rejects the 'presumed objectivity' and 'ahistoricity' of mainstream normative research which presumes a singular set of values and views\textsuperscript{146}, in favour of a commitment to change, empowerment, and social transformation. To this end she proposes a multi vocal and a critical studies approach which is achieved by 'the creation of narratives in multiple forms with multiple voices represented'.\textsuperscript{147} In this kind of research, the narrative is the evidence and narrators should be the arbiters of the content, if they are available to collaborate; the researcher is listener, observer, collator, and then commentator. This research has attempted to meet all of these requirements fully by presenting the silenced in a multi-voiced text, in its local and wider historical context. It characterises the evidence by preserving the individual language of the respondents in verbatim transcripts that yield hints of character and temperament, rather than another's interpretation. This research has respected these criteria by presenting the actual statements of the respondents in a multi-voice documentary and has changed all the names and specific details of the institutions, people and times.

'Narratives which are faithful to the lives of those they represent and persuasive to the various communities which are consumers of such narratives [especially as policy documents], create a convincing environment for those who might otherwise continue to ignore and silence groups'.\textsuperscript{148} Lincoln recommends that ideally the researched should decide if the text is a valid and true representation of their lives, but this is not always possible, though this research did ask respondents to review an edited transcript of their Year One responses. Such texts should have the capacity to take readers into the nature and lives of the researched. Lincoln therefore recommends that texts should demonstrate authenticity which together with faithfulness to the story lines requires a 'feeling tone'\textsuperscript{149}, a phrase used by the American journalist and documentary-writer, Studs Terkel, to describe empathetic quality of a text to draw readers into the lives of the researched. Lincoln calls it lives 'in the round' - with a range of mood, feeling, experience, situational variety and language. The reader should come away... 'with heightened sensitivity to the lives depicted, and with some flavour of the kinds of

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. pp. 31-32.
\textsuperscript{148} Lincoln Y. S. Op. cit. p. 36
events, characters, and social circumstances which circumscribe those lives'. As a consequence Lincoln advocates that the form of the narrative should break away from the usual conventions found in research reports. Lincoln acknowledges that this might be regarded as not just unconventional but unnecessary by mainstream researchers, but summons up a list of strong unconventional qualities for such narratives: 'power and elegance, grace and precision, creativity, independence [of the researcher from the disciplinary strictures and conventions], openness and the problematic quality of the lives under discussion, courage - [in the sense of extending the case beyond the "safe" boundaries or disciplinary limits], egalitarianism towards respondents, participant, and collaborators, and passion'. These make for a tall order but this research has kept as much of this in mind in trying to present its evidence and commentary.

Though Lincoln acknowledges the case for the social justice implicit in such research, policy makers are resistant to the findings of field research. She points out the rarity of 'descriptive studies on those that are silenced, and even fewer from the perspective of the silenced'. Her conclusion is that grounded theories should be built based on 'comprehensive and vivid description of personal and community lives, from narratives and histories.' Any policy changes will come from theory that comes from the silenced themselves. Lincoln significantly touches on the naturalistic nature of these narratives grounded in people's lives and contexts and the presentation of them by acknowledging that if one 'scratches a naturalist, one finds a moralist'. Ethics, morality, committed ideological approaches become central issues. To contribute to changing for the better the social lives of the 'silenced' contrasts with those concerned with maintaining the status quo or a so-called 'apolitical non-involvement'. Narratives collected by research are unique, rich and evocative but the problem exists of how any generalisable truths or common themes may be drawn from them. A close examination of the text alone will make any findings relative to a particular context, but literary studies will examine naturalistic texts for repeated variants of behaviour that are often the image structure for the whole meaning of the work.

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153 Ibid. pp. 43-44.
154 Cf. Director's Cut.
like mother cooking and baking defines her feelings to her family members in D. H. Lawrence's 'A Collier's Friday Night'. LeCompte offers two further solutions. The first is a comparison of cases that can lead to profound insights. Since each respondent to this research could be considered a case-study, that is a separate perspective linked together by context, there is an automatic comparison of cases which can lead to such insights. The other solution is this research's use of content analysis which is a variation on the interpretation of anthropological evidence admired by Douglas in her acknowledgement of Hume's application of observed frequency in determining cause and effect; it is a matter of searching for recurring patterns and repetitions of themes, which indicate continuity and change as a companion processes. In a similar way, LeCompte recommends the application of chaos theory which is about order in a world of apparent disorder and the identification of the general shape of a process without identifying its individual and specific constituent parts.

Two kinds of order are suggested by Dobbert and Kurth-Schai as of particular importance for social science: fractals are simple recurring shapes that create an infinite number of boundaries within a finite space. The other, Lorenz's stable, aperiodic order, is applied to evidence such as weather cycles, where the unpredictable, like human behaviour, exists alongside weather patterns that stay on well-defined courses, like the seasons, but nothing is repeated in exactly the same way though certain features are regular, 'until a small variation leads to a major shift in the behaviour of the whole system'. All of these approaches and metaphors indicate notions of continuity and change in the manner Pettigrew has suggested. Dobbert and Kurth-Shai propose both these forms of order; against a background of unpredictability and complexity there coexists a uniqueness and complexity in human life and as well as a simplicity, so that what in 'close-up', or

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viewed in isolation, may seem chaotic and changeable is, in fact, in the long view or wider context, identifiable as a recurrence of an organised and predictable system. LeCompte defines the task of analysis to find 'basic principles that generate larger social systems and sub-systems' in the chaos of a closer description of social and organisational life.

The disadvantages of this kind of research are considerable; the first is that they are long term projects requiring double, if not far more time to complete; it is painstaking and a lot of trouble, and courts controversy and conflict and may not in the end be respected by the academia.

The logical consequence of the multi-voice requirement in the presentation of the 'silenced' through their 'voices' is that a drama documentary is necessary. This approach builds on the advocacy for narrative techniques that have been explored by Czarniawska, Boje and Weil. Czarniawska deals with these and other issues in her 'Writing Management' and toward the end of her discussion she makes the point that any respondent becomes a 'textual device' under the researcher's control. She then concludes with an ambition and a sense of direction for such a representation. The ambition is political reform: 'If rendering these voices to a wider public is our goal, the way to go about it is to silence our own voices and to engage in the political activity of creating speaking platforms for those who are not heard.' Her direction for such research studies is that of the Tower of Babel, which offers the prospect of respondents' providing very different, complementary perspectives for envisaging the realities about which they speak to us.

Much of this debate about the writing of organisation and management studies repeats one that took place with the arrival of the Naturalist movement in the arts in the Nineteenth century. The movement was from its birth confusing because the terms Naturalism and Realism were virtually interchangeable but this confusion reveals the ambitions of the artists. In fact they do differ, but Naturalism is dependent on Realism. Both had a 'fundamental view that art is in

essence a mimetic, objective representation of outer reality. 'A slice of life' is how it is commonly described. To Realism's approach of detached neutrality, Naturalism added a view of humankind's existence in which heredity and environment act as conditioning factors in human existence together with a sense of determinism, [cf. Bourdieu's "habitus"]. These had derived from the scientific advances of the nineteenth century - in all the sciences, but significantly for Naturalism, from Darwin's Theory of Evolution, that had also given birth to the social sciences. Naturalism sought to apply to literature the methods of science. Zola was the principal voice of the movement and his ally, Paul Alexis summed up the movement as follows: 'A way of thinking, or seeing, of reflecting, of studying, of making experiments, a need to analyse in order to know, rather than a particular style of writing'. This general scientific method of thinking bred the philosophy of 'positivism'. The writings of Comte promoted the supremacy of the scientific method that proposed that knowledge comes from observation or from deductions made from such observations; that we can reach conclusions through a chain of cause and effect and that there are constant natural laws. Scientific method was applied to areas of learning that were in fact more speculative, and so was instrumental in the development of sociology. When applied to the study of man the scientific method produced definitions of man such as Taine's in 'Le Histoire de la Litterature' that man is 'machine with an interacting mechanism of wheels' and that 'vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar'. What outraged the nineteenth century sensibility was the notion that the machine that could produce vitriol was neither worse nor better than the one that produced sugar. Therefore the evil man and the good were on a level and neither was responsible for what he did because forces beyond their control had conditioned both. This last closely foreshadows Arendt's 'banality of evil', and the 'machine' definition acted as a spur to notions of 'scientific management', viz. Chaplin's 'Modern Times'.

All of these representational themes - objectivity, motive, multiple voices arise in this research study. In terms of the presentation, the most relevant is the Naturalist writers' attempts to make sense of rapidly changing times by wishing to be like scientists or doctors objectively observing, recording, analysing and

166 Cf. Director's Cut
167 Darwin C Origin of Species by means of natural selection 1859 and The Descent of Man 1871
'dissecting the human mind and body'. 169 'To carry research further by solving scientifically the problem of how men behave once they become members of a society' 170 sounds like an aim for an examination of 'lived relations' 171 in everyday life by using the real words of people involved. In its rationale it includes reference to Darwin's theory because the 'intra-organic' relationships reveal the 'considerable importance of the environment' and so, by implication, suggest evidence for the discovery of 'the determinism of events in living beings'. Similarly 'in the study of a family, or a group of living beings... the environment has similar capital importance.... We shall know how a man thinks, loves, and swings through rationality to madness; but these phenomena do not appear ... in a vacuum. Man is not alone but exists in society, in a social environment.' In this Emile Zola laid down the principles of the Naturalist movement in 1880. He adopted the scientific approach of the age and wished to take it further, so while the environment is only chemical and physical for the physiologist, which makes it 'easy for him to determine its laws', for the novelist the 'social [Zola's emphasis] environment' is not only chemical and physical, but also made up of the 'mastery of the mechanism of human events: demonstration of the way in which intellectual and sensory processes, as explained to us by physiology, are conditioned by heredity and environment; and finally portrayal of the human being in the environment which he himself has made and alters daily, and in the midst of which he in his turn undergoes continual transformation'. And in these scientific terms Zola outlined the purpose of the experimental novel and the Naturalist movement. From Zola's first exposition of the theory in his second Preface to Thérèse Raquin 1867, naturalist writers produced theoretical treatises, like scientists, and debated and formed separate factions around variations of theories. The movement ran into the problem of reconciling theory with practice. By 1891 L Huretin in Enquête sur l'évolution littéraire declared Naturalism dead ['C'était une impasse, un tunnel bouché'. It was a dead-end, a blocked tunnel.]. Like contemporary acknowledgements of the subjectivity of social science interpretations, it was acknowledged before the nineteenth century was over that it was untenable to impose scientific method on to the arts, which interpreted and speculated on humankind's existence. Complete objectivity was a fallacy. Though

170 Zola E. Le Roman Expérimental Chapter 2. [1880]
the writers adopted a style of factual reporting, with characters and events seen from the outside, the individual creative mind could not avoid being present in the interpretation, in the choice of an adjective, and when the author intervened to 'describe' motive and intent or place an event in a wider context. Zola admitted a higher level of subjectivity in his later commentaries on the theory and admitted that 'a work of art is a segment of nature seen through the eyes of a certain temperament'.

There is a conjunction between the three elements of the 'dead end' of scientific objectivity that Czarniawska and others are responding to, and that Alvesson and Deetz imply in advocating presentations that will allow other interpretations and Naturalism's journey toward an understanding of the problems of presenting the affairs of humankind. Current thinking about social science acknowledges the subjective aspect of interpretation. The arts seem to have got there almost a century earlier. The strategy of Alvesson, Deetz, and Czarniawska and others, for reporting social science and organisational studies is to minimise the influence of the subjective by acknowledging its existence. Their ambition is to create a form of presentation that will allow multiple perspectives within the study itself and in the reading of it. They are looking for a situational approach for the presentation of 'multiple and indeterminate aspects of social processes' in a form accessible to readers where they may make their own interpretations [Alvesson and Deetz, and Czarniawska's suggestion of a 'Tower of Babel]

In presenting this problem Czarniawska et al., have concentrated on the novel as the appropriate narrative form. The Naturalist arts also had another solution - the play - which is the one that it is proposed to use to attempt to meet the requirements that Alvesson, Deetz, Czarniawska et al. stipulate. The Naturalist drama on the stage encourages the presentation of a 'slice of life' and offers the 'ideal of total clinical objectivity'. In a naturalist drama there is no possibility for authorial commentary and explanatory descriptions and the characters speak for themselves. The form creates presentational problems in the sense that all the relevant data should be present and the background of the characters needs to be known and the action usually takes place in one location [the equivalent of the 'situational approach' of Alvesson and Deetz]. The finest Naturalist drama in the English theatre is that of D H Lawrence whose plays were set in the Erewash

Valley coal fields and were written between 1909 and 1913. In them his authorial voice is silenced so that, for example, the portrait of his father is more balanced and sympathetic in his play, *A Collier's Friday Night* than the similar portrait in the novel, *Sons and Lovers*. The plays take the audience closer to the people; all the characters have equal weight and presence; the language is that of the reality of life near the pits, and the plays have image systems based on the reality of the characters' lives, e.g., cooking, baking, fires, washing, the dirt of the pit. It is this capacity of drama and theatre to present within a context both what people say, and what they do, that makes it a powerful medium to reveal 'deeper levels of meaning that lie beneath the superficial surface appearances.' An analysis of the symbolism of rituals in institutions and organisational management refers to their theatricality. It describes the perpetrators of such rituals as mythmakers. 'Organisations are judged not so much by their actions as their appearance.' This analysis regards the ritual theatricality, in educational institutions, as pretence or a lie rather than reality, e.g., change, when there is no change. Though this view of theatre as mere pretence is too superficial, it does point out the false and the true in organisational culture by referring to instances where the symbolic action stands in place of real action, e.g., creating a post for an affirmative action officer rather than reforming 'practices that are deeply embedded in both individual beliefs and organisational culture...One purpose [of such theatrical symbols] is to express the prevailing myths... the way society thinks [the organisations] should look.' An example from drama is to be found in Francis Fergusson account, in 'The Idea of a Theatre', of the court rituals, - pieces of organisational theatre, - in 'Hamlet'. It is the inability of the usurping king, Claudius, to hold any formal court ritual that does not break down, that is the concrete representation that 'something is rotten' in the state of Denmark, e.g., his stepson turns up at the wedding-celebration dressed all in black, or mourners at a quiet court funeral end up fighting in the grave. What seems and what is, comprises one of the themes of the drama. From the drama perspective, the author of works on the church ('Racing Demon'), the law ('Murmuring Judges')

175 Thomas J. Op. cit. p 34
and the Labour Party ['Absence of War'] that have been called 'an analysis of the state of the nation', playwright David Hare, makes the point that 'one of the reasons for the theatre's possible authority, and for its recent general drift towards politics, is its unique suitability to displaying an age in which men's ideals and men's practice bear no relation to each other...The theatre is the best way of showing the gap between what is said and what is seen to be done, and that is why, ragged and gap-toothed as it is, it still has a far healthier potential than some of the other poorer, abandoned arts' 180.

As such, the theatre for Hare, as it was for Brecht, is about 'judgement' by the audience. Brecht's intention for the audience attending his 'epic' theatre was that 'they [the audience] are to sit and reflect on the lessons to be learnt from those events of long ago, like the audience of the bard who sang of the deeds of heroes in the houses of Greek kings or Saxon earls, while the guest ate and drank. Hence the term epic theatre. [original emphasis] 181.

The capacity of plays and theatre to achieve this is a debate that dominated the thinking of the theorists and playwrights of naturalist and realist/social realist theatre. It is usually associated with Brecht's theories and plays. Some of his views prefigure the social science theorist of the second half of the Twentieth Century: Brecht rejected Naturalism. '[Naturalism offered] A crude and superficial realism which never revealed the deeper connections... The environment was regarded as part of nature, unchangeable and inescapable' 182. Brecht never acknowledged the pioneers who had preceded him and whose experiments of the 1920s were trying to create theatre as a social and political art. Erwin Piscator pioneered the concept that theatre should 'intervene actively in contemporary events' and 'open the spectator's eyes - Kenntnis, Erkenntnis, Berkenntnis [knowledge, understanding, conviction]...with the aim of exposing 'objectively' the workings of society, [and] the desire to alter the spectator's consciousness' 183.

The starting point for Brecht was his 'belief in the causal nexus in society and in the possibility of analysing all social phenomena and explaining them rationally' 184. From 1926 onwards Brecht had accepted and followed Marx's view, in the sixth

182 Brecht B Gesammelte Werke: Die Strassenszene: Grandmodell einer Szene des epischen Theaters (Street Scene: Basic Model for and Epic Theatre) Vol. 15 p. 214 [Translated by J Willett Brecht on Theatre London; Methuen 1964.]
184 Ibid. p.41
Feuerbach thesis: ‘that the human being is the sum of social circumstances... and the dialectic between the individual and the social context: “The concept of man as a function of his milieu and of the milieu as a function of man, in other words the resolution of the milieu into relationships between people, is the product of a new kind of thinking - historical thinking”\textsuperscript{185}. Hence his intention that plays ‘must be understood as the ‘totality of all conditions’\textsuperscript{186}

But, later in the 1930s, Brecht retreated from this view that explained humankind in relation to their historical context and in rigid socio-economic terms in order to allow for human individuality. Thereafter his plays were less structurally rigid and stylised than the plays written in the 1930s Germany\textsuperscript{187}. In Brecht’s 1956 addendum to his statement of theory, \textit{A Short Organum for the Theatre (Kleines Organum für das Theater)} he sought to move on to a dialectical theatre. So Brecht invoked social sciences to adopt a focus that ‘the new science which was founded about 100 years ago and deals with the character of human society [which] was born in the struggle between the rulers and the ruled’. [Willett J]\textsuperscript{188}. Brecht’s dialectical approach was concerned with content and moving the theatre back to ‘the ideas of society [political, economic, sociological] that see society as an organic process of men’s living together in continual flux and change’.

This revealed the tension between his theory and the actual practice and the raw material of life itself. It is a conflict that organisation studies\textsuperscript{189}, and Critical Theory share [Viz. below].

His purpose for the audience included, as well as ‘enjoyment’, ‘Produktivität’, that which comes from revelation, thought, teaching, enquiring, solving problems, reflection ‘mastering reality’ and enlightenment: “What is that productive attitude in face of nature and society which we children of a scientific age would like to adopt for our own pleasure in our theatre?” The attitude is a critical one. Faced with a river, it consists in regulating the river...faced with society, in turning society upside down’. [JW adapted]\textsuperscript{190}. His theory was ‘interventionist’ in that it had an intention to reveal what was hidden or not understood, in a way that is

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. p. 41 citing Brecht B. \textit{The Short Organum for the Theatre} in Willet J. \textit{Brecht on Theatre} London: Methuen 1964.


\textsuperscript{189} Cf. Director’s Cut

reminiscent of Critical Theory's revelation of 'delusion' based on 'false ideology', i.e., 'The new alienations are only designed to free socially conditioned phenomena from that stamp of familiarity which protects them from our grasp today.' [from 'The New Technique of Acting' 1940.] So his statement of theory A Short Organum for the Theatre was principally about change by harnessing the social 'scientific' theatre to 'change the consciousness of the audience and hence facilitate the altering of the reality that is reflected on the stage' The insight that is created 'simultaneously' brings into operation the 'emancipation' and the 'audience is encouraged to adopt an actively critical stance towards the representation on stage. The audience is put into a position to see more that the protagonists [in the play], to grasp the wider context, to assess the evidence presented and adopt an attitude as to its wider significance. Brecht made clear that his was a scientific, analytical approach to reality with the intention of:

'laying bare society’s causal network
showing up the dominant viewpoint as the viewpoint of the dominators
writing from the standpoint of the class which has prepared the broadest solutions for the most pressing problems afflicting the human society
emphasising the dynamics of development
concrete so as to encourage abstraction'
[Trans. J. Willett].

The suggestion has been made that this clarity of purpose assumes that the audience already share the Marxist beliefs of the playwright for the drama and theatre to make sense. The implications of this for the Brecht theatre are that instead of enlightening a new audience, it refines and reinforces the beliefs of the committed. Its concern was with the large social issues and influences: 'The epic theatre is chiefly interested in the attitudes which people adopt towards one another, wherever they are socially significant [typical]. It works out scenes

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191 Cf. Director’s Cut: The stance taken by Critical Theory it to engage in dialectic between the inherent truth and the fallacy of a form of consciousness, and its origins, history and function in society.
192 Subiotto A. p 40-41
193 Ibid. p.41.
where people adopt attitudes of such a sort that the social laws under which they are acting spring into sight' [Trans J. Willett] 196

Whatever the theory, the dramatic effect of his work was different. The tension that exists in the plays is that between Brecht's statements about the primacy of social 'scientific' content and the aesthetics of character, particularly in the case of *Mother Courage*, where the fortitude of the survivor elicited the respect of audiences and not their disgust for the pecuniary and human failure of a free-market, wartime profiteer. Since his death and in the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the plays that have been revived are those with survivors and strong individual characters, as manifested in his individual stage characterisations, like Azdak and Gruscha [The Caucasian Chalk Circle], Mother Courage, Galileo, where the relationships between context and people cannot be explained by 'causal relations in society' 197. Though these, like Galileo, might seem individualistic and reactionary, they are much more ambiguous, so that Galileo's recantation is insignificant compared to the truth that he initially made public and which, once revealed, was always present: 'He was well aware the earth revolved...' The next line of 'A Career' by Yevgeny Yevtushenko is: 'but he also had a large family to feed'. It is a character study of complexity.

Brecht's approach to theatre seems to have run in parallel or ahead of Habermas and Critical Theory but both emerged out of the thinking in the first half of the twentieth century and the influence of Marx and the Frankfurt School. The rational and analytical processes and strengths of both are challenging and compelling in theory, and similar, and so, it seems, are the limitations of an exclusive rationality which 'over stresses the possibility of rationality as well as the value of consensus' and 'counts on knowledge and argumentation to change thought and action' 198 and which, as we have seen 199, breaks down in both instances in the face of the individual passion and desire. The potential truth of their analyses cannot be denied but for both it is not the whole story. Character has its place too.

199 Cf. Director's Cut
The principal difference between drama and narrative is that of 'showing' and not 'telling'. In a drama and in a documentary-drama, the utterance belongs to that character and is not addressed to an audience - unless that convention is being used - but to the other characters present at the moment it is uttered. There is no actual author, like Dostoevsky, nor a mediating narrator who is framing the story, like Ivan. There is only the speaker, the Grand Inquisitor and the listener, Christ. Other listeners, the audience, are outside this internal communication system of utterances and what is communicated to the audience is what is shown or heard. The advantage of drama as a form over the novel/narrative is that it is 'absolute'. Though the playwright is the 'owner' of the text, that relationship is not 'an essential component of its existence... a drama exhibits the same absolute quality with regard to the spectator. A dramatic utterance is not addressed to the spectator any more than it is a statement by the author - or, in this case, a statement by the researcher. It is a convention that audiences accept when the curtain goes up in a proscenium theatre on a realist play: there is an "invisible fourth wall" and the world observed is absolute, independent of any relation to other things, but, like the play itself, that absolute autonomy is a fiction. Though using the actual words of respondents, they have been 'fictionalised' by being edited and arranged as a drama documentary.

The same 'apparent' absolute qualities relate also to time and space. But, in a novel like Proust's *Time Regained* the author moves through time and space as the narrator pursues his task 'To describe men first and foremost as occupying a place, a very considerable place compared to the restricted one which is allotted to them in space, a place on the contrary immoderately prolonged – for simultaneously, like giants plunged into the years, they touch epochs that are immensely far apart, separated by the slow accretions of many, many days in the dimension of Time'.

In a drama the needs of plot or scenic organisation by the playwright may change locations and times. When these are fixed, like *Waiting for Godot*'s setting – 'A country road. A tree. Evening' - there is only the immediacy of the moment, in which the utterance is both enacted and received simultaneously. Though there may be a fictional narrator in some dramas, like Arthur Miller's *A View from the Bridge*, in a drama, a narrator is usually absent and the characters present themselves directly to the other characters and to the audience.

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200 Szondi P. *Theorie des modernen Dramas* Frankfurt 1956, p. 15.
Though action has its part, all dialogue is confined to the situation from which it arises and yet it is active in producing the drama, defining the characters, conveying the themes. Its performance as dialogue advances the drama and is self-evidently in essence a speech-act, as defined by Austin: 'There is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering\textsuperscript{202}. The difference between the dialogue in a play and the utterances of this research's text lies in the role that the respondents take up. In this research the 'action' is or has already taken place 'off stage' and at another time. The respondents therefore are like a Chorus to the action, because they are commenting and reflecting on those actions and consequences. However, unlike most Choruses, they are not outside the action; they have been and are participants, who are taking a moment outside the action to reflect. Schiller described the benefits of the Chorus to the drama as 'cooling things down', because it undermines the 'power of feelings and emotions' that the audience might feel if it became 'completely enmeshed in the subject matter and [might] fall from our position above it. By separating the various parts and cooling the inflamed passions with its calming observations the chorus hands back to us [the audience] our freedom that has been lost in the whirlwind of affects and emotions\textsuperscript{203}. As a chorus it rises above the detailed level of information and is able to draw comparisons and references to the 'past and the future, events and peoples, distant in times and place\textsuperscript{204} and like some of the respondents take an authorial role and create a narrative interpretation of events. Dialogue also characterises the respondents, not only by how they say it, with certain syntactical forms, metaphors, and approaches, and may give the readers insight into temperaments and characters, however incomplete the evidence. This is the approach of Goffman's \textit{Presentation of Self in Everyday Life} and subsequently by Luhman who summed up the approach as 'All action ['action' here in the broadest sense of the word] in the presence of others is also communication; it does not merely make the action and its immediate consequences visible but also gives an indication of who the person conducting the action actually is\textsuperscript{205}. Pfister sees that this form of analysis does not deal directly with fictional characters presented on a stage because of the layers of reality involved; character and actor, but are applicable to everyday life. However,

\textsuperscript{202} Austin J. L. \textit{How to do things with words} Oxford: OUP, 1962, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. p. 75
this does not take account of the fact that a reader of a text will almost certainly “imagine” the respondents and endow them with a physical presence to fill out their envisioning of the speakers, and part of this will involve characteristics that communicate what the audience member is “reading into” the dialogue. However, one piece of advice in characterising individuals in a play, was to prevent ‘characters speak[ing] about their own inner selves. All utterances must refer to something external. It is only then that they really express the inner workings of the character’s minds most colourfully and powerfully, because that inner self can only be formed as a reflection of the world and life\textsuperscript{206}.

The effectiveness and power of multiple voices is endorsed by Mikhail Bakhtin, using Dostoevsky’s *The Brother’s Karamazov* as his reference. His view is that this novel is the ‘polyphonic novel par excellence: ‘*A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of his novels*’ [Bakhtin’s italics]. In the novel, ‘the polyphony operates simultaneously at different levels - in the interplay among characters...thus readers must be able to listen - if they are to experience the text as a whole - not to a single “spokesman” but to several "voices" [sometimes] within the same sentence...’\textsuperscript{207}

This contrasts with Bakhtin’s critique of monologism - in that the search for a unified truth, he insists, need not be carried out under monologic conditions. ‘It is quite possible to imagine and postulate a unified truth that requires a plurality of consciousness, one that cannot in principle be fitted into the bounds of a single consciousness, one that is, so to speak, by its very nature full of event potential [original italics] and is born at a point of contact among various consciousnesses’\textsuperscript{208}. Bakhtin’s task is to demonstrate how to make unified truth compatible with multiple consciousnesses. He turns for insight to the genre of the Socratic dialogue. ‘At the base of the genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which pretends to possess a ready-made truth, and it is counterposed to the naïve self-confidence of those people who think they know something, that is, who think they possess certain truths. Truth is not born nor is it found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between

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people collectively searching for the truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction\textsuperscript{209}. Bakhtin's powerful endorsement goes on to recall how Socrates called himself a 'Pander' because he drew people together to 'collide in a quarrel and as a result truth was born', for this reason Socrates also called himself a "midwife" and his method "obstetrics". The main features of this method were "syncrisis" and "anacrisis". The heart of the genre was syncrisis which juxtaposed 'various discourse opinions on a specific object'. Anacrisis was a revelatory technique in that Socrates pushed people to express their opinions fully and clearly so that they eventually illuminated the notions and exposed them for what they were and 'drag[ged] them into the light of day'. It was by these means that Socrates challenged the view of the status quo that 'something goes without saying', that something may remain hidden\textsuperscript{210}.

The multi-voice, open-ended perspectives face the reader and the audience with a problem of interpretation. There is no single final perspective. The Text has no end. The actions are not resolved. The organisation, like time, just moved on. It is a matter of conjecture if the track was now set and would remain unchanged. The problem for an audience of having no end or resolution and nothing that draws all the perspectives and the characters together is that they are left with doubt and ambiguity. It is not possible to draw a line under it and move on. The openness serves a positive function, as recommended by Alvesson and Deetz, of leaving the audience with the choice of accepting ambiguity and the continuity or perpetuation of the circumstances, or of coming to its own verdict, as Brecht wanted his audiences to do, aware that it must always be provisional.

It is the conjunction between drama's capacities, the 'silenced', organisations, and giving voice to the respondents that has led to this form of presentation of the research evidence. Given those criteria, above, from social scientists, it is proposed to present the evidence of the research in two parts. The evidence will be presented as a free-standing documentary text using the verbatim interviews and a separate commentary covering the themes, with cross-referencing between the text and this explanatory commentary. There is a long tradition of such works from the Plays of G. B. Shaw, where the preface was sometimes longer than the play and not always directly relevant to it, through to the documentary dramas of

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  \item \textsuperscript{209} Bakhtin M. Op. cit. p. 110. Cf. Director's Cut
  \item \textsuperscript{210} Bakhtin M. Op. cit. pp. 110-111.
\end{itemize}
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To make evidence accessible and, hopefully coherent, there has to be a structure both of content and situation. More than half of the evidence has been edited out to reduce the scope. The original structure or sequence of the responses to questions has been retained so that the themes that emerge in the evidence occur at moments that are relevant for the respondents, just like an image system in a play or novel. The events of the story provide a backstory with a 'plot' with major events for each Act: the announcement of change, the reversion of change, and the return to stasis. These accounts include information that became available after the events in order to clarify and explain the circumstances, like the final external reports on Unitary Courses and Quality Assessment. The respondents speaking at the time are unaware of such information. Their comments range backward and forward over their careers, so their backgrounds become part of the presentation of the evidence. Respondents were also asked to review past answers, which also creates the individual and institutional backgrounds. The 'fictional' contrivance in the story is firstly that the respondents are all exchanging views with each other, when they were, in fact, originally given solo and in confidence. The fixed location for all the Acts is the staff-room. Though the staff room existed in the institution, meeting there together on four occasions would not normally be likely but it was a place where groups habitually met and had a long history as a place for 'collegial' meetings, both formal and informal.

Similarly the respondents' reason for meeting though based on the actual staff development events in the story i.e., an imminent institutional announcement, is fiction. The audience may imagine that respondents come and go, and join in or leave the discussion as a break from or while they do other things. The nature of the 'apparent' discussion creates something in the manner of the collaborative discussions that should have taken place as the essential part of the originally planned Feedback Survey of Year One. The change to a hierarchical structure terminated the possibility of any meetings where they might have talked freely over such issues and made a contribution.

The presentation in the form of the documentary/drama also reflects the 'ideal speech situation' because the members appear to be exchanging views on the same or related topics freely, without reserve, and as equals. It is as if they are

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socialising and a consensual view might emerge in the way that a community might form its own world-picture. And yet it is also indicative of the variations in the views and perspectives. It is particularly powerful where views coincide [totalitarianism, no change.]. It is also indicative of the quality of the argument that could exist in making judgements and decisions in the 'ideal speech situation' or in terms of 'deliberative democracy' as Dunn\textsuperscript{212} defines it. In its way it simulates a democratic process and indicates the seriousness and quality of the debate and free exchange of ideas that could exist if it were given the opportunity. It is also indicative of the 'false' ideological view that such people as the respondents have no interest, capability or would be ineffective in organising and managing their own affairs; it helps to expose the ideological belittling of those with less power\textsuperscript{213}. It is also exemplifies the fear that these same princes have of the power of the 'underrepresented', which Mary Douglas\textsuperscript{214} also identifies as unrealised. In this respect it is also indicative of the waste because their potential contribution is lost to the institution and to other members of the community: importantly one indicated they had never been asked or talked to like this in the whole of a career of thirty and more years, and the experience for others was similar.

Just like Critical theory this presentation has reflection at its core. The respondents are recounting and at the same time reflecting on and trying to make sense of their situation. In doing so, they bring to bear criteria drawn from their 'world-picture' onto their experiences and evidence. By giving them the chance to reflect on their own responses after the first series of interviews and as part of the second series, the reflection was verified and there was an element of reflection upon reflection. When it came to the third series they were asked to reflect on the whole narrative as well as recent events and some extended the range to cover their careers and life-choices. In their reflections they provide the research with the many themes, i.e., ethics, the politics of being ruled, freedom and autonomy, collegiality and deliberative democracy. They were identifying and clarifying their 'world-picture' as Critical Theory suggests. The structure of the simulated discussion adopts the argumentative structure of critical theory with the observer/researcher and the reader/audience left to make their own reflective interpretations.

\textsuperscript{213} Cf. The Prologue
\textsuperscript{214} Cf. Director's Cut
The relationship between *The Director’s Cut* [Volume One] and *The Text* [Volume Two] will be established by cross-referencing examples with ideas and analysis, i.e., Text, page and line reference. This cannot be exhaustive. It is a strength of the research that the evidence, *The Text*, is separate and leaves other interpretations as possibilities.
The Background

All UK local authority controlled institutions of higher education were part of the 'Thatcher Revolution' of independently managed institutions of higher education, set free of the control of Local Education Authorities. This move was situated within the expansion of higher education in the UK and the projected increase of access by non-traditional participants into higher education. The expansion involved all institutions. Increased access was becoming closely linked, through managerialism, to quality assessment and quality provision, and to quality-linked funding in a national bidding system. Institutional development strategies increasingly were concerned with 'economies of scale', competition between institutions for students and the need to maintain student retention rates. The 'market', the 'customer', 'value for money', and 'quality of service', became the ruling mantras in the public services. The higher education system in the UK has doubled in the last decade to over 2 million students and is still growing and by 2010 50% of young people will be in receipt of higher education. It is never expressed as such, but to describe this target as one half of a generation places on it a great weight of meaning for the society.

Before that it had grown from 119,000 students in 1962/3 to 964,000 students in 1988/89. One American commentator took the view that in 1988 'the problems, which taken together we can call a crisis, have developed largely in the public life of British higher education - in its finance, governance, organization - rather than in its private life, in the areas of teaching and learning. A crisis of this magnitude ...can be instructive...as it wrenches old patterns and relationships awry and makes suddenly problematic what has long been assumed.' ¹ The new national system of higher education that was introduced in 1988 has remained unchanged. Just as the students have increased in numbers, so the literature that has grown around this change is equally vast and growing. One of the major contributors to the study of the change, A H Halsey, over a period of more than forty years of study of educational sociology, based his analysis on two publications from 1918, because they throw up recurring themes for the debates about higher education. One was by the German sociologist, Max Weber and the other by the Norwegian-American sociologist, Thorstein Veblen.

The principal issue was and still is the relationship between universities whose corporate culture and ethos originated over 1000 years ago and modern industrial economies. Weber pointed to the modern industrial economy's need for 'highly trained specialist manpower, the advance of bureaucracy in all forms of social organization, and the 'proletarianization' of the university worker and teacher' and he also pointed to America as a model for Europe's future. Veblen, himself an academic in the American university system and with the reputation of 'the last man in the world to have known everything', rejected the American model. He identified the perennial range of issues that must be considered in defining the role and purpose of a university as: scholarship, teaching, ethical and pastoral care, initiation into citizenship, governance, relevance and application to industry and society.

At the core of Veblen's 'Higher Learning In America' was 'the quest for knowledge that constitutes the main interest of the university and for him the 'only end that indubitably justifies itself.... and utilitarian impulses and applications are alien to that purpose'. The university staff were students too, in pursuit of new scientific knowledge and scholarship and not school masters; they would train only the next generation of scholars and take no responsibility for their moral, religious, financial, domestic fortunes. It was not part of the university's role to take on 'extraneous matters that are themselves of such grave consequences as this training for citizenship and practical affairs... These are too serious a range of duties to be taken care of as a side issue by a seminary of learning, the members of whose faculty, if they are fit for their own special work, are not men of affairs or adepts in worldly wisdom.' Veblen's utopian-style university of scholars, in Halsey's view, had a Rousseau-like view that men are corrupted by their social institutions. He saw in existing universities a channelling of energies 'into habitual parochialism... and the meticulous manoeuvres of executives seeking each to enhance his own prestige' and therefore unable to forgo their preoccupation with petty intrigue and bombastic publicity'. Veblen's subtitle 'the conduct of universities by business men' indicated his view that the concept of scholarship was 'corrupted by the predatory ethics of business salesmanship'.

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described the power structures in the universities, which were business enterprises in competition with each, and 'bureaucratically organized under a president or "captain of erudition" in pursuit of the aims of "notoriety, prestige and advertising in all its branches and bearing" at the expense of and to the accompaniment of vast competitive waste of resources'.

His complaint was against the 'order of egoism'. Nearly a century later Veblen's concerns resonate in some of the reports of UK University activities. For example, The 1997 Research Assessment Exercise determined how much money the universities should receive from government on the basis of their research rating scale of 1 [the lowest] to 5. Two months before the Labour Government landslide victory of 1997, there was a report that as a result of this research exercise the Vice-Chancellor of Nottingham University had set an aim for his institution. It was to create 'a world class institution that can be part of international networks - clubs, if you like - of like-minded universities'. The AUT, the university staff's trade union, was protesting at a 'witch -hunt' policy toward staff with below the average of a 3 research record of either making them concentrate on teaching or making them redundant. A Nottingham University spokesman was reported as saying that 'shedding staff was the "key to success in the research assessment".'

The report went on to state that the 'surviving [universities] will be the "fittest", who can afford to set up multi-million pound research centres and pay "transfer fees" to lure the best staff. This is common in America where top academics at the Ivy League universities [Harvard, Yale, Princeton, MIT] are treated like celebrities. The report went on to quote other experts on the university sector who could predict 'universities in the future being run like companies, with the chancellor acting as chairman, the vice-chancellor the managing director and chief executive, the bursar the company secretary, and the senate as the board of directors'. Six years later, the same vice-chancellor was part of a UK Labour Government delegation of 11 top university officers, led by the Minister for Higher Education, on a tour of China. This was to continue a process of consultation and partnerships that UK universities had established in China. The Chancellor of Nottingham University is a highly distinguished Chinese physicist whose investiture at Nottingham was watched by 300 million people in China. The UK government was encouraging these links by the UK's top universities, whose

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7 Ibid. p. vii.  
9 Guardian Education 4.3.2003 p.13
reputations are defined by their world-class research, and international links are crucial for the 'brand' - the commercial term is used for the kind of education offered. In his speech to the House of Commons introducing the Labour Government's plans to introduce top-up fees, the Minister of Education referred to: 'Growing competition from institutions in China and India changes the terms of trade for the UK's great historic universities.' The article made the point that China 'is a dictatorship with which higher education has decided to do business and share research and from which it will take money and students, in the knowledge that such assistance may help China eventually overtake the best UK universities in the competitive world market..... [One of the UK delegates continued] "higher education is both an issue of institutional competition but also a general enterprise that doesn't really have a nationality... it's about the advancement of learning...and if you are dealing with a civilisation such as this [China], much the wiser part is to build relationships and get the benefit of working collaboratively". Another vice chancellor in the party interrupted to remark that 'the idea is on the way to forming virtual global universities...We will have different sites in different places [in the world]... I think we will stop being national'. Only three months later, Peter Scott, a modern university Vice Chancellor, reached back - and not too far back - into the legacy of the university's social, civic and ethical roles and could warn that the 'rush to increase our [UK universities'] market share of the global knowledge economy, [is] a grab for the developing world's talent that recalls the "grab for Africa" a century or so ago'. He based his critique on three failures by the universities. They have failed to produce real research on economic development instead of 'hand-me-down neo-liberal economic theory'. There is the lack of human compassion in this globalisation which is about 'hobnobbing with Harvard, beating the Aussies in the race for international students or boosting UK plc in the knowledge economy', but failing to 'give voice to ... global resistance to mass markets, neo-imperial culture...World bank imposed free markets'. Lastly the universities' role as social critic has 'atrophied', and they no longer have the confidence to exercise their 'responsibility to act as just such a creative critic.'

This exchange reflects interpretations of the role of the university and though the 'market' is the latest, the others are part of the UK tradition of university values.

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10 Scott P 'Our social conscience has been swept away by the rising tide of globalisation' Guardian Education 3.6.2003. p. 15
From the middle of the nineteenth century Oxford was the centre of this debate. It was the oldest UK University foundation. Its staff had jealously guarded their 'ancient and established forms of democratic academic government in which Congregation ruled and the Council proposed but the dons disposed, and occasionally did refuse the proposals of those they had elected to the 'formal heights of university authority'. Cardinal Newman was part of this debate and advocated that teaching universal knowledge was 'the university in its essence', while placing the Church and theology at the core for its necessary contribution to 'its integrity'. This value of academic integrity fed into concepts of academic freedom and of universities as the guardians of that freedom. Pattinson, later the Rector of Lincoln College and a contemporary of Newman's, held opposite views. Some were radical, like the abolition of all examinations and entry requirements, but his views changed from a collegiate one of small communities to a large university. His constant view of a University education was the dedication to academic life of like-minded students, seniors [staff] and juniors [students] living an ascetic life 'consumed with the purest love of learning'. Jowett, the Master of Balliol College in the last third of the nineteenth century, made this college into the foremost university institution, the fame of which has never quite diminished. This came principally because of the steady stream of distinguished Balliol students who went on to high office in all corners of the world and in all the domains of British government, public institutions and society. Jowett, a person of confident liberal authority, was dedicated to the tutorial as companionship in learning for a ruling imperial class. As the British Empire declined Faber noted the change in Balliol's mission as 'becoming concerned for the cure of a sick society rather than the improvement of a healthy social order.' Oxford was making explicit the relationship between its education and the social and imperial political order.

In the eighteenth century this had been implicit. Cannadine used his three definitions of social class, hierarchical, tripartite and dichotomous, to make the point that places of learning were located on a hierarchy from Oxford and Cambridge universities, through the public schools, then the grammar schools, down to the parish elementary school. The higher up the social scale one was the

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longer and more expensive the education, so while the aristocracy went to Eton and Oxbridge, the professional middle classes attended the grammar school and later professional training; and the lower classes nothing or at best the parish school. The dichotomous division was between those with a university education and those without, or between the educated or literate and the uneducated and illiterate. 'And however education was envisaged in social-structural terms, its purpose was more to teach people their place than to give them opportunities to advance'.

This makes clear the symptomatic network of relationships between education and society and the political power structure. Weber acknowledged this relationship and identified two forms of power: the traditional and the rational and their role in the organization of a university, its curriculum and the eventual places in society and social status that its students might occupy. His analysis of the historical operation of universities showed that they brought up young men in the life style and outlook of the dominant class and created two kinds of product: the 'cultivated man' and the 'expert', with the consequent effect on the kind of curriculum, as either 'education' or 'training'. Industrialisation created a running fight between the cultivated man and the expert\(^\text{16}\), which was representative of the 'irresistibly expanding bureaucratisation of all public and private relations of authority and by the ever-increasing importance of the expert and specialised knowledge'.\(^\text{17}\) The 'expert' role gave rise to the role of research in the modern university and the impact it has had on changing the nature of the institutions. Veblen took the 'elitist research' approach in advocating a 'pure search' for new knowledge. In contrast the relationship between the economy, industry and the global economy and university research has dominated the last decades.

Universities are in the middle of a debate about where research should be located, either in all institutions or in an 'elite research group of institutions based on those with the best research records, i.e., the Russell Group. The latter would break the tradition of the 'expansionist researcher', advocated in the last year of Word War Two by Truscot in his idea of the 'redbrick' university. This took a practical

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\(^2\) The Introduction of Liberal Studies into the training of technicians in the Technical Colleges in the 1960s and 1970s could never escape its being regarded as patronising. The underlying conflict was like a 'class struggle' between the cultivated liberally educated aristocrats and the 'rude mechanicals' of lower orders, and this applied not just to staff and students but between the staffs of liberal studies and vocational training faculties.

approach to the purpose of the university 'two chief aims [of which], research and
teaching blend so frequently and at times so completely, that it is often more
accurate to describe them as one single aim which can be regarded from two
aspects'.\(^\text{18}\) This has been the dominant view of research in the universities in the
last half of the twentieth century. By linking teaching and research together it has
widely perpetuated the Oxbridge elitist-teacher ethos because of the implications
for the tutorial way of teaching, rather than the industrial emphasis that applied
expert research implies. It is Halsey's conclusion that the ideal of the 'elitist
teacher' has never been challenged and is the personal vocational idea of many
university teachers still. It is still the closest to defining the nature of the task of
teaching itself. [Cf. the American researcher, Flexner: 'they [the British] are
excessively conscientious teachers'.\(^\text{19}\)] However, as we have noted above,
'globalisation' and competition are swaying the argument toward specialist
research institutions, which will have consequences for the quality and character
of the rest of UK higher education.

In twentieth century terms, Oxbridge and the interplay of values between
teaching, scholarship, collegiality, citizenship and social critique, were determined
by the cultural ethos of the nineteenth century and could be interpreted as elitist
and out of date. A Marxist-class-based interpretation of Oxford would have been
like that of Touraine at the end of the 1960s of 'a polarised factory of intellectual
production, owned, managed, and controlled in the interests of the ruling class
with the values of the ruling class permeated down from the top and determined
what was to be considered academically permissible to teach and research.'\(^\text{20}\)
However, this excludes those that sought to expand higher education. One was
Ruskin College, Oxford, independent of Oxford University but using Oxford staff in
promoting a non-ideological liberal education. Another was the WEA [The Workers'
Educational Association], with its enrolment of 111,351 students by 1948-1949
from its creation in 1903. Both sought to expand the ideals of university education
by bringing higher education to the proletariat. The WEA was a 'self-governing,
democratic, decentralised organization', supported by trade unions, co-operatives,
Labour and Liberal political parties, churches and chapels. Its core was the
'University Tutorial Class' in which university lecturers went to the workers'

cit. p. p. 38
communities to teach three-year courses 'ostensibly to University level'. Its aims were to 'open up communications across class lines, to allay working class distrust of the universities and, in turn, to educate the 'educated classes' in the realities of proletarian life and to train workers to exercise power in a democracy'. The organization, set up by Mansbridge from the Co-operative Movement, gave control mainly to working people; there were no diplomas; competition and vocational training was eliminated from the classroom: 'It's essential characteristic is freedom. Each student is a teacher and each teacher is a student.' Such ideals echoed views of an Oxford education and it is no surprise that a Balliol, Oxford man, R H Tawney should have been an early tutor with the Association and its president from 1928-1944. The central debate around the Association was political. On one side were those who thought that it was a 'Judas goat' to lead the working class into acceptance of the ruling status quo by emphasising open-mindedness and objective scholarship, and so 'integrating them into the hegemonic national culture'. On the other side, in 1946, working men who had regarded the universities as extensions of the ruling class were taken aback by the hard-leftism of Oxbridge graduates that they met in adult education classes. In 1912 one student recorded - in words reminiscent of Ruskin's 'The Stones of Venice' - that though many WEA students fell in love with the university the experience left them 'with a feeling of greater rebellion against our present cruel system, and with strength and outrage to alter the lot of our co-workers, that they might also know and enjoy at some period in their existence the beauties of such places as Cambridge, instead of becoming mere human profit-making machines'. While in 1911 another student could bemoan the lack of real educational opportunities for the workers and wondered how things might have turned out if they had been educated, she/he could see that in the free discussions between working men and tutors the latter could 'know more of the putrid atmosphere of the workshop and factory, and the deadening effect of much of the present-day labour, combined with the insecurity of livelihood. By these means I think they will better understand and appreciate our position, and wonder why we are not more

extreme'. A future Labour MP, Bessie Braddock, [born 1899], a beloved figure in the poorer areas of Liverpool, declared that what she got from the WEA was, 'the political and economic history I had been denied at elementary school. I began to find out how society evolved, and how trade unions grew up....how capitalists controlled money, business, and the land; and how they hung on to them'. The WEA's covered all subjects in the curriculum, including laboratory-based science, but it also had an effect as a counter-balancing political education to that of the elite ruling classes at university in the nineteenth century. It also came to have its day.

In 1938 an incomplete survey showed that more than 2,300 present and former WEA students held public office and in the 1945 Labour landslide victory, when it was declared that 'it was an England largely moulded by the WEA that has been swept into power', the prime minister, the chancellor, 12 members of the government, were WEA tutors or executives and a total of 56 MPs were former members of the WEA. The expansion of higher education after 1945, when all students were given access on merit to university, with fees paid and a maintenance grant provided, like 'pensioners' of the state, and then the foundation of the Open University in the 1960s by Jennie Lee, were logical extensions of the expansionist movement of the WEA and the enfranchisement of the working class into the opportunities of higher education.

From a 1970s survey of academics, Halsey and Trow defined four functions of a university in society: the expansionist or the elitist approach, and the 'reserving and transmitting knowledge' to students or the search for new knowledge. From this they inferred four positions in defining the purpose of a university: elitist teachers, elitist researchers, expansionist teachers and expansionist researchers. The great names of Oxford, Jowett, Newman, Pattinson, were elitist teachers. The WEA movement was expansionist but interestingly and perhaps significantly because of their democratic, discussion-based ethos adopted the form of the elitist-teaching of Oxford.

Amongst the persistent themes in the changes of higher education has been the nature of Oxford University. As the oldest institution it has become more than a university. It has almost become the image of an UK university itself and criticised for its elitism. Its persistence is based upon its ancient democratic form of

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28 Halsey A H and Trow M The British Academics London 1971
governance. Commentaries on 'Managing Change and Diversity' in the UK university system begin with an account of Cambridge and Oxford and focus on the latter's educational processes. These characteristics include its tutorial system, peer pressure on staff and students, and finally 'collegiality'. The elements that make for 'collegiality' are: the interaction amongst staff, though this is less easy for staff of the same discipline based in different colleges; the democratic control of the governance of the university - the academics are the university and the 'Congregation' is the staff's 'parliament'; college life - a way of life based around the running of a small diverse, but historically based community; and lastly the function of the colleges in breaking up a large university into 'human chunks' of a few hundred students. 29 This particular commentary questions where this kind of 'educational process' belongs on a continuum for the effective governance of higher education institutions that has collegiality-shared values at one end and managerialism-corporatism at the other. Future developments that may affect any judgement of its effectiveness are about how this process can cope with global brand images linked to corporations, and the e-university or 'the world wide web.' 'The prospect is one of 'throwing out an [unappreciated?] collegial baby with the [over-valued?] managerial bath water?' The conclusion is that the process will adapt 30 and it warns budding management consultants that it is not easy to distinguish what makes this Oxford and Cambridge educational process uneconomic, inefficient and yet 'eerily effective'. Though general and simplistic, the only possible answer is the 'human scale' of the activity. Teaching and scholarship are about people interacting. Halsey's account of Oxford and the 'Collegiate Alternative' 31 asserts an important principle that 'there are fundamental forces supporting autonomy in the very nature of scholarship and science. Professions based on theory and research are, as it turns out, more efficiently pursued through collegiate than through 'line' management. Tension between these two working principles is a commonplace in industrial, civil, military as well as academic service. But in England there is a special factor - the historical existence and influence of the Oxford and Cambridge colleges'. 32

32 Ibid. p. 149.
The central place of Oxford in the general debate on the governance of higher education is persistent because of its unique and evolved democratic form. The attacks and pressures that the University came under during the 1950s to 1970s charged it with being a bastion of privilege, a nursery for the ruling class, recruiting from a narrow social band of students, its inability to make rapid decisions, its financial and administrative arrangements, its failure to meet the needs of the scientific and management professions, and of industry and the economy. The Robbins Report of 1963 created a national higher education system with the government as paymaster and Oxford had to be placed within that. To this end the Franks Commission, an internal University enquiry, was set up to examine these failures. The question was: Would the ancient 'guild-like' Oxford, i.e., academic producer co-operatives....in an ancient syndicalist federation\textsuperscript{33}, renovate its democratic governance or adopt the hierarchical managerialism of the bureaucracies of other universities? The Franks Commission answered the University's critics on matters of student selection and targets, and re-interpreted its traditional collegiate ideals, so that Warnock, the retiring Vice-Chancellor in 1985 could assert, 'We have found ways while remaining an essentially federal and inevitably rather complex system, of speaking with one voice\textsuperscript{34} when necessary and of acting when necessary with respectable decisiveness and celerity; we have found ways too of presenting ourselves, to Government and the UGC, and particularly schools, as one university, and not a disorderly rabble'.\textsuperscript{35} Formal power was emphatically not put in the hands of the administrative officers under the Registrar, like many modern universities. They were to have no formal power at all. They were classic civil servants - serving the academics in their many tasks, like government civil servants. Halsey notes that academic staff can be dismissive of their 'civil servants' but interprets this as anxiety over proletarianization. A 1991 report stated that there had been 'not many cases of a damaging divergence of opinion between the administration and the rank-and-file as to where the University's real interest and commitments lie - something that cannot by any means be said of all British institutions of higher education.' \textsuperscript{36} Oxford has

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. p.173
\textsuperscript{34} In Roman law University meant corporation and referred to the whole corpus of the citizens of Rome i.e., Chambers Dictionary definition - 'Corporation: a collection of people authorised by law to act as one individual and regarded as having a separate existence from the people who are its members, a town council [In North America - a company].
\textsuperscript{35} Halsey A. H. Op. cit. p.163
continued to adapt and evolve and its democratic but 'eerily effective' democratic governance still make it a target for central government. The criticisms continue sometimes from the 'big guns' about elitism, like a recent Treasury commissioned report that says that Oxford and Cambridge would benefit from being more business-like in the way they run their affairs, and goes on to admit that the universities 'compare with the best in the world', but asks how long this will continue if they do not modernise37. And notably Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's, attack in 2000 on the failure of a good applicant to secure a place. The President of the Oxford Students' Union, Will Straw, son of a New Labour Foreign Minister and Home Secretary at the time, defended the university's record by referring to subsequent reports from the college principal revealing that the applicant in question had been 10th in a field of 40 for 5 places, 3 of which had been awarded to state school students and two from ethnic minorities. He also reported that 42.2% of students from state schools successfully gained places at the University, compared with 41.7% from independent schools. He pointed out that not enough state school students are applying, and in an initiative that echoes Balliol and Oxford tutors' involvement with the WEA, students are going into state schools to persuade their students to aspire to further and higher education.38

In his account of Oxford's collegiality, Halsey uses Weber's view that classes are formed out of distinct market and work situations and applies it to higher education where the role of the state as monopolistic employer determining financial constraints has been growing. He makes the point that Weber's theory that proletarianization comes into being because 'the bureaucratic form of organization facilitates it, if not positively requires it' and that it can take place under the free market and state control conditions. But he states that autonomy of working conditions hinders the tendency toward the introduction of proletarianization. He asserts that autonomy of working practices are inherent in the nature of scholarship and science and that 'professions based on theory and research are, it turns out, more efficiently pursued through collegiate than 'line' management. Tension between these two working principles is commonplace in the industrial, civil, and military as well as academic service. But in England there has been an additional special factor, the Oxford and Cambridge colleges. He

37 Guardian 15.03.2003
38 Straw W.[President of Oxford University Students' Union] Right Tune, Wrong Key Guardian 4.7.2003.
reminds us that Oxbridge represents the continuity and evolution of an effective, adaptable democratic alternative to the proletarianization and 'managerialism' that has been established and which are the least effective management systems for the efficiency that it aims at. The qualities he describes are the same that made the Roman Republic successful. The truth of this argument is evident. However, he was writing before the implementation of the post 1992 Research Teaching Quality and Audit Exercises that came with the 'freeing' of the sector in 1988.

For the present generation of university institutions, 1988 was the most significant date in the development of the UK system of higher education. It was the year of the Education Reform Act, which freed the existing polytechnics and colleges from the control of the Local Education Authorities that had founded and financially controlled them, and which turned them into 'independent corporations'. It was a kind of 'privatisation' though the government remained the principal source of funding through two new funding bodies [the University Funding Council, via the UGC, and the Polytechnic & Colleges Funding Council, PCFC]. The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act finished the job by granting university status, with that title and degree-awarding powers, to all the 33 English and Welsh polytechnics, the 15 Scottish Central institutions and seven other colleges. There was now a total of 88 universities in the UK. The 'internal market' competition between institutions was only one ongoing tension in this privatisation. Other tensions were the sources of funding either from the state or from the 'market' by income generation, e.g., attracting students, of whom the full-fee-paying, foreign, full-time student was the most sought after. This aspect fed directly into the nature and purpose of the universities and their governance: Were these 'independent corporate' universities 'businesses'?

In 1988 this issue of governance highlighted the relevance of one commentary on the changes in higher education in the UK which stated that the system had undergone in the previous ten to twelve years the most profound 're-orientation' of any system in the industrial world and that one element of it in particular had changed university life. A H Halsey, who drew on this in an epilogue to his 'Decline of Donnish Dominion', reports this commentator's identification of the

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the emergence of 'managerialism' in the government's [Thatcher's] own direction of the universities where managerialism is understood by central government as a substitute for relations of trust'.

This change was identified as more significant than the changes and debates of the Victorian era in which the participants were amongst the intellectual luminaries, and heads of Oxbridge colleges: Newman, Pattinson, Matthew Arnold, Jowett, Sedgwick, Seeley, and John Stuart Mill. This Victorian debate resulted in an idea of a university - 'an idealised representation of Oxford' - that was embodied in UK universities, with variations of size, region and industrial needs, and persisted into the middle of the twentieth century. A national system evolved via national committees, like the University Grants Committee for the distribution of government funding. Two traditions emerged: 'Oxbridge' with a gentlemanly, civil, liberal education and links to the political, administrative, and business 'Establishment', and the civic universities [Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, London] with their utilitarian curricula geared to the middle classes heading for careers in the professions or the scientific and technological industries of their regions. These utilitarian values that had been part of the universities since the mid-nineteenth century took an even more prominent role in the rapid post-1945 development of higher education:

'The support of business had been a precondition for the establishment of the civic universities from 1850 onwards, whether this had taken the form of sponsorship by local industry [e.g., Sheffield, Birmingham, Manchester], funding by a particular firm [e.g., Bristol and Will's tobacco, Reading and Palmer's biscuits], or industrial support for a national concern [e.g., Newcastle and mining].'43

Oxbridge and the regional civic universities existed first in parallel and then as a hierarchy with Oxbridge at the top.44 This persisted with the addition of more civic universities in the 1920s, and after the Second World War the granting of independence to the regional university colleges tied to London, the creation of new institutions, and the new English and Scottish Universities of 1961. Throughout this period there were appraisals of higher education including some that captured the spirit of post war reconstruction and criticised the lack of


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residential capacity in the civic universities and sought to set up institutions that retained the Oxford teaching and residential ideal with the state as a generous patron\textsuperscript{45}. Other pressures that captured the minds of politicians came from the aspirations of the middle classes for higher education and the persistent fear of economic decline from failing industrial production and the need for skilled labour. The Robbins Report\textsuperscript{46} of 1963 intensified the increase in higher education provision setting a target of 20\% by 1980. In fact numbers of students in higher education grew from 119,00 in 1962 to 964,000 in 1988/9. A large proportion of this increase came from the creation of the 30 polytechnics which came from the response of the then Labour Secretary of State, Tony Crosland, to the Robbins Report's recommendations that technical higher education was an area that required redefining and development. A 'binary' system of an array of universities on one side and polytechnics and colleges on the other was created in 1966 and persisted until the 1988 Act set them 'free' and on their way to becoming the 'new universities'. According to Robinson\textsuperscript{47} the polytechnic-education manifesto included the aims of responsiveness [i.e., via part-time study], inclusion, work-related skills, regionalism and 'student-centredness':

'The polytechnics should attempt to redress the balance by making their students their primary consideration unambiguously and without fear or favour - students should come before subjects, before research, before demands of employers and before demands of state. If they do this they will change the pattern of higher education in this country. If they do not they will fail to do anything of significance. They must challenge many of the assumptions and practices of the existing institutions and not merely fill a niche which these institutions have neglected. None of the preserves of other institutions of higher education is sacrosanct. Academic education and research cannot be left to the universities, professional education cannot be left to the professions, teacher training cannot be left to the colleges of education, industrial training cannot be left to employers and trade unions.'

Watson and Bowden claim for the polytechnics a more complex and 'very special trick: of bringing the values associated with subjects and disciples together with those associated with professions and vocations'. But it was CNAA [Council for National Academic Awards], an invention of the Robbins Report on Higher Education, that gave rigour to the standards of course design, delivery and provision across the sector, that ensured parity or better with other higher education institutions. Though it was a hard and uncompromising task-master that made testing demands on academic staff, the CNAA was more often friend and champion in 'battles' with management who sought to impose academic degree schemes without discussion and justifiable academic rationales, or to circumvent making proper resource provision. Often teaching staff felt empowered for the first time by the CNAA's concerns for courses and teaching\textsuperscript{48}. Not surprisingly, given this record, the CNAA was summarily ended together with the role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate for all aspects of higher education except teacher training, in the 1992 Thatcher creation of a restructured university sector. 'Re-organization' of other public bodies, like the National Health Service, the professions and unions was part of the Thatcher 'revolution'. What replaced them in the university sector were controlling, internal and external, bureaucratic mechanisms [Teaching and Learning, Teaching Quality Audit, Research Assessment] for monitoring teaching quality, for assessing the quality of teaching or research of each subject, and the cost of research. Debate in the House of Lords on these mechanisms provoked Lord Annan [former provost of King's College, Cambridge and Vice Chancellor of University of London] to come to the verdict that: 'the truth is, at the very moment when the universities need every penny to keep teachers in post and research on the boil, a vast new administrative burden has been put on their shoulders that removes what money they can cobble together for teaching and forces the teachers to become low grade administrators'.\textsuperscript{49} Eventually the bill for this burden would be put at £250 million per annum. Though in theory the universities remained autonomous, a state system had been created, paid for by the state and subject to 'extensive

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Validation events at Midshires College of Higher Education 1980 - 1982. Within six months intransigent management, unwilling to accept advice from its own staff and CNAA visitors that would have allowed course to operate in an academic structure other that that proposed by management, presided over about 60 redundancies of highly qualified research and teaching staff, many of whom never worked full-time again in the university sector. No management personnel were made redundant. Management would have had to surrender control to the academic; management's role would then have been a civil service.

central control'. Those representing the universities themselves accepted it with 'passive compliance', but teaching and research staff objected and viewed the changes as detrimental.50 Almost ten years later, in 2002, at the conference51 to celebrate the first decade of these new universities a questioner from the floor to a panel of three chief executives of these institutions [Kingston, Sheffield Hallam, Leeds Metropolitan] asked: 'Did the staff of these 'new universities' believe they were well managed? How have the new universities done as employers?' All three of the panel openly and frankly admitted they were not well managed. One acknowledged that the Government and the Treasury thought they were poorly managed but this did not square with the bottom line of 'results' versus the cash given, and that 'managerialism' had resulted from the cult of the individual. Another acknowledged that staff would not give them 'good marks' as managers, though they had coped with scarce resources, but the tendency to 'over-manage' had crushed creativity and the managers must learn to respect the expertise that teachers have and develop the right kind of rhetoric with which to communicate with staff and manage change. The third admitted failing to create a meaningful collegiality, and that universities were not managed, they 'were over-administered.' This provides confirmatory evidence of the reality of Weber's views on bureaucracy and proletarianization of the academic staff.

Unhindered by these matters the expansion of higher education rolled on and justified claims of creating a system of 'mass' higher education, but it had been achieved on a shortage of funding. Taking the resource of unit funding for the whole of higher Education at 100 in 1988/89, it fell to 63 in 2001/252, while students numbers more than doubled from just under 1 million to over 2 million. Universities had funded their work through income generation and efficiency savings, like more short-term contracts and early retirements for experienced staff. Issues recurred that had been present at the time of the creation of the polytechnics: should there be community control, with the local authorities as key players, the status of institutions, each with the other and within the sector, and lack of one trade union voice for the staff because of the divisions between different organizations.53

The 1997-2001 Labour Government set another student participation target for expansion from 43% in 2002 to 50% of those aged 18 to 30 by 2010. This proposal intensified the crisis in the universities and the DFES has responded by proposing that universities be given the right to charge 'top-up fees' - a client specific graduate tax, rather than loans - with inducements to widen participation by students from poorer backgrounds. In 2002 a DFES Discussion Paper laid out three challenges: finding the substantial funding for the universities so that they maintain and improve their world-class reputations; increasing access for students from unskilled or semi-skilled parents backgrounds when the child of a professional family is four times more likely to attend university; and the need for a highly skilled workforce to counter global economic competition. The DFES makes its case based on the enviable reputation the UK's world class universities which attract 220,000 overseas students and the government's plans to increase spending on higher education by 15.6% after inflation, compared to 1997 when New Labour was first elected. As a document about education it is worth considering as indicative of the complex mix of business thinking, national economics, and social engineering that the New Labour Government is contending with and its acceptance of the legacy from the previous government, to which it was opposed. It perhaps provides evidence of the very narrow band of discretion and room for manoeuvre that it has over certain national issues. It may indicate the extent to which a previous Tory government's 'revolution' produced a change in thinking and a limitation on future action that has circumscribed the options of subsequent governments. The document refers to 'customers' and 'individuals', and places higher education as an industry in the UK's national economy and, though much of this is factual, what is worth noting is the scale of the shift in thinking compared with other views of higher education in other times.

The DFES Discussion Paper of 2002 acknowledges that the balance between teaching and research remains an issue. Britain has produced 44 Nobel Prize winners during the last 50 years, and with 1 percent of the world's population has 9 percent of the citations in the world's scientific publications. 84% of the 80,435 full-time staff in the Universities are both teachers and researchers and the debate focuses on whether specialisation in one or the other would yield better

55 The following is based on the DFES Discussion Document on Higher Education HMSO: London November 2002
results, as in the US where there is a greater distinction between the two activities. While academics point to the historic view of the interdependence of research and teaching, the DFES makes the pragmatic point that it is possible for a brilliant researcher to be an exciting, well informed lecturer or to be an uninspiring and poor teacher - one does not necessarily produce the other. It does not make mention that it is possible for staff to improve their performance in either activity.

A large part of the rest of this DFES 2002 Higher Education Discussion Paper describes the system as a business, under headings like 'capital infrastructure', 'human resources and human capital' and 'customers'. The system has 'capital stock' valued at £26 billion for buildings, and a further £8 billion for equipment. It receives over £300 million for 2002/3 in earmarked capital, and from 2003/4 a permanent stream of capital for science research infrastructure in universities worth £500m per year. It points to an estimated £4.7 billion backlog in university teaching infrastructure needs – buildings, equipment and libraries. The 'human capital' is 116,405 full time equivalent staff. Their earnings are only slightly more than school teachers, and professorial earnings are half as much as an 'average' such post in America. The term-time working pattern for university lecturers is similar to schoolteachers: 54.8 hours per week with 18 hours for administration. Between 1995 and 2000 staff numbers grew by 6.5% and there would be a need to recruit more, especially as 41% of staff are over 50. These 'capital assets' and £12 billion turnover of the universities prompt the consultation document to call the universities 'an industry' with a potential for national and regional development and with responsibilities of professional - rather than 'amateur' - management of finance and personnel. The point is made that the universities are subject to fewer requirements and controls in the way they are governed than private companies under the DTI's corporate governance requirements. The kinds of governance that currently exist range from modern corporate style to that conceived in medieval times - this last has to be a jibe at Oxbridge's democratic systems.

The document then looks to its 'customers', but on this aspect there is a mixture of national business and economic thinking, expansion of student numbers and social equality - often referred to a 'social engineering' - and the individual.

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Footnote: Source: AUT 1994 Survey
'customer's' advantages. The 'business' has a growth target of increasing its proportion of the 18-30 'market' to 50% by 2010. Though the proportion of young people in full time university education has increased from 1 in 8 in 1980 to 1 in 3 in 2000, a young person from a professional's home is still four times as likely to get to university as a child from a working class home. The present situation, where a third of young people and those in their 20s get a degree, provides a base for an expansion of the system. This is driven by economic demand and personal advantage to those who get degrees because a graduate can earn 64% more than a non-graduate, or in OECD terms, the personal rate of return for a male British graduate is 17% [15% for women]57. Though 35% of graduates' first jobs may not require a degree, their promotion prospects are higher. The groundwork is laid for the proposal for 'top-up' fees on the basis that the 1997 introduction of fees has neither encouraged nor discouraged working-class participation in higher education. The key factor is reaching the age of 18, when the law treats the students as independent citizens, who can vote, pay taxes and get married without permission, but at the moment the exceptions to this independent status are: 'higher education, driving a heavy lorry or having an air weapon in a public place.' This argument of 'adult independence' moves some the burden of expenditure from a government's investment in the future of its citizens and work force to an individual's investment in her/his own future adult life. So 80% of students study away from home and can receive subsidised loans, spend 38 per cent of their income on rent, food and bills and 31 per cent on entertainment, and yet their parent's income is used as the measure for assessing whether they should pay fees. The taxpayer pays about 90% of the cost of tuition and since 1998 half of all students have contributed to their fees. In the end the proposal is asking for a contribution from students in recognition of the lifetime salary expectation of a graduate of an average of £400,000 more than someone without a degree. The impact of this approach of independent adults' investing in their own futures perpetuates the 'market' culture that 1988 independence brought in to the UK higher education system. So this discussion document continues the practice of calling the 2 million students 'customers' which makes

57 Education at a Glance 2002: The 10th Annual Study of Education by the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] October 2002 made comparisons between 32 countries across all sectors. Using data to compare 10 countries the report found that a university education brought a bigger rate of return than savings rates in all ten countries. Great Britain had the highest rate. Statistics were: Great Britain: 17% [men 17.3%; women 15.2%], US, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark: between 10% and 15%; Italy and Japan 7%. Guardian 30.10.2002
education not a process but a 'product' that provides 'value for money'. Hence the Discussion Paper's use of potential earning power in the rationale for introducing 'top-up' fees, because an investment produces a return. This language and emphasis does not diminish the need for universities to be accountable to their students for the quality of their education, but it has changed the nature of the education and exchange between staff and students and this DFES Discussion Paper perpetuates this change.

The 'higher education industry's' impact on the economy is a key justification for government expenditure: the final impact of the £11 billion annual turnover in UK higher education is over £40 billion, including overseas income of £1.8 billion; it generated 562,000 jobs in 1999/2000 directly or indirectly; industry/university collaborations have grown 79% from £135m in 1988-9 to £242m in 1999-2000; overseas students contribute £1.3 billion a year to the UK economy in addition to their course fees, and it has been estimated that £1.00 spent on research is worth £1.80 to the UK economy, compared to £1.42 in the US and £1.50 in Germany.58

The government clearly states that higher education's contribution to the economy in a competitive world is in producing a highly skilled workforce and many European countries and the US have more graduates than the UK. It is also sector specific, pointing to shortages in science and engineering. However, while emphasising the individual financial return to graduates, the consultative document admits that some degrees lead to better job prospects than others, for example, better than in the poorly paid public services. Some employers would prefer fewer graduates and more skilled workers. The issues of university study for its own sake and of pure research as against that with an economic pay-back is only briefly touched upon to complete the set of arguments about the nature of a university education. The economic and 'market' driven arguments are the dominant purposes and have a devaluing effect on other forms of higher education. They are intended to make people think differently about higher education.

Definitions of the purposes of higher education are culturally determined and the 'market' arguments of this present generation began with the Thatcher Government and the Liberal thinking of the nineteenth century with which Mrs

58 Griffin R 'How important is business R & D for economic growth and should the government subsidise it?' Institute for Fiscal Studies 2000, cited in DFES Discussion Document on Higher Education HMSO: London November 2002
Thatcher had such an affinity. Thatcher's revolution of the university system in 1988 was to use the 'market' forces to control, and the motive was political: to change British perceptions of themselves and of all their enterprises, especially the public ones. Cannadine\textsuperscript{59} supplies a lucid account of her view of the British social structure, based on her own writings and, largely centred on her childhood perceptions of living above the 'corner-shop' in a town without any large-scale industrial enterprise and no mass, segregated workforce, despite going to Oxford, studying the law, marrying a businessman and living in London. In terms of Cannadine's three definitions of class, one of her perceptions was of a hierarchical and layered society with everyone and every organization fixed in its place 'loyal to Queen and 'empire' [Thatcher was speaking of her childhood in the 1930s], like a civic procession. He quotes her lack of awareness of 'the division of conflict between classes' and her view that class was 'not important'. Her triadic view placed her in the middle of the middle-class world of shopkeepers, with way above the local landed dukes, and way below the dole queue of unemployed at the Labour Exchange. Her dichotomous view was one of a 'deep, fundamental divide': 'the real distinction in the town was between those who drew salaries for what today would be called "white collar" employment, and those who did not'.\textsuperscript{60} Her fundamental view of people was not of manufacturing producers nor of industrial masses, but of individual customers. 'We lived by serving the customer.' These views remained unchanged and became firmer, as she opposed any measure that undermined the hierarchy of British society. She attributed all the virtues of the enterprise economy of wealth creators - thrift, hard work, self-reliance, independence, responsibility - to the middle class, but these were the values of her father's 'shopocracy' [after Hugo Young 'One of Us']. For her the country's future prosperity depended on the interest of the middle classes and she would laud their values in criticising the 'wet' aristocracy and the propagandising working class. The other group that she attacked were the 'self-interested, self-perpetuating, unaccountable elite, contemptuous of 'the people' which occupied entrenched positions in the BBC, the universities and the Church of England - these were the 'old Corruption' in its new form - 'the chattering classes'. Significantly they were all institutions, with their own Royal Charters and historic reputations of independence, and intellectual and ethical autonomy, though the


universities were and always had been subject to state interference, certainly since the government became the major paymaster, via the University Grants Commission from 1921. Thatcher went to 'war' on behalf of the producers against the parasites, 'to create an irreversible shift of power in Britain in favour of the working people and their families'. The important emphasis here is the 'irreversible' nature of this change. This derived from her views of communism, and socialism which produced the most stratified of all societies, the powerful and the powerless, 'two nations: the privileged rulers and everyone else'. Whatever her instinctive perceptions of the private Conservative Party and Gallup polls during elections, it cannot have escaped her attention that the constituency of the universities' voters was biased to the political left. In presenting the finding of his 1989 survey of university and polytechnic lecturers, Halsey compared them with his previous surveys of 1964 and 1976.

In 1989 only 18% of university and polytechnic lecturers felt close to Mrs Thatcher's Conservative Party and this number had declined from 32% in 1964. 37% of university lecturers felt closest to the Labour Party and their polytechnic colleagues 44%; and 25% and 18% respectively to the Social Democrats. The remainder aligned with regional independence parties or added to a growing presence of support for the Green Party 7% and 11%. Halsey only offered the opinion that 'academics were 'unloved by their political masters'. This understated the adversarial nature of Mrs. Thatcher's attitude in wishing to bring about 'irreversible change'. Cannadine demonstrates how her rhetoric could move between the three models of social structure, i.e., from a Gladstonian support for the 'masses' against the 'classes',

or 'a Burkeian hierarchy of disciplined authoritarianism and ordered subordination', or a laissez faire support for the entrepreneurial ethos, or as leading 'a peasants revolt' against the established and entrenched elites. Like a duellist selecting her weapon, she used these views of British social structure interchangeably depending on the political, confrontational purpose for which each might be required. Hugo Young in his biography of her points out that she was very sensitive to notions of class, and took on conflicts as though they were class wars, like the 1984 Miners' Strike. Then her view was that she was taking on 'the crack division of the working class' but her victory was 'for the whole working people of Britain' over 'the rule of the mob'. Her rhetoric reached above the class divisions in society to find a greater unity, but in the classic manner of 'divide and rule'. So her vision was not of society, which might have class divisions, but of something both universal, yet fragmented, and Mrs Thatcher came up with 'there is no such thing as society. There are only individual men and women, and there are families'. Almost two years after her resignation as Prime Minister [November 1990], she stated, under the title 'Don't undo my work', in Newsweek [27 April 1992 p.37] that 'The more you talk about class - or even about classlessness - the more you fix the idea in people's minds'. This summarised one of her successful political strategies: to remove 'class' as a description of any unity or affinity between individuals, and all discussion of it from the political agenda and to make the case that Marx and his views were flawed and wrong. But it did not filter into her perception of the working class, which Thatcher regarded as 'idle, deceitful, inferior, and bloody minded' while she was the champion of the majority of the decent respectable population against the intractable and perverse sections of the working class.

Another strategy was to link individuals to the 'market', in the manner of her 'shopocracy', because the market 'devolved "the power of consumer choice to the customers"'. In this market the producer's power passed to the customer. For Thatcher it was the duty of producers of goods and services 'to discover what the customer will buy and to produce it'. 'People must be free to choose what they consume in goods and services'. This became generally acceptable as a climate

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and ethos for administering public services. One consequence for the newly independent universities in 1988 was that University brochures addressed students as 'customers' while competitively advertising their attractions to prospective 'customers'. Getting a higher education became putting one's name down on a waiting list for a product, rather than giving a small part of one's life to a process. This redefinition of the relationship between university and student moved from those we have referred to historically as 'scholar and pupils', 'equals in scholarship' to 'customer', a shift which was hardened by the introduction of student loans, tuition fees and, lately, of New Labour's top-up fees. The reality was that though these 'customers' made a small contribution to their education, 90% of it was free, funded by the government. However small this contribution, for the Thatcher government, the culture of the 'customer' provided a rationale for introducing more control through extensive accountability to protect and represent the interests of the 'customers' on behalf of 'the working people' [Thatcher's phrase], in order to ensure 'value for money'. While the 1988 and 1992 higher education legislation gave the nation more universities, it took more central control through the Higher Education Funding Council. In classic political strategy terms it gave freedom from the local authorities or the University Grants Council, and took a price in the form of central government control. This new Council offered, via competitive tendering, funding for particular projects in recruitment, or teaching. Audits of teaching and research followed, and universities had little choice but to be compliant in the hope that the paymaster would reward them. Over the next years there was a steady decline in funding and a requirement to expand provision by making efficiencies. 'Thus, in a very short time...despite the fact that the universities remained in theory autonomous bodies, they had been forged into a state 'system' largely paid for by the state and subject to extensive central control.' In classic Max Weber terms, a 'rational-legal' authority established its dominance in the form of a bureaucracy. The annual cost and scale of this bureaucracy has been estimated, conservatively, in 2001, for England only, at £250 million and their equivalence is estimated in terms of the fees of 250,000 students, or 10,000 lecturers or the annual cost of five universities. Scotland and Wales would match that expenditure in proportion. The effect of this


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bureaucratic control has reached into every moment of university life, for example, each member of staff regularly, in 'transparency exercises', itemising the time spent on teaching, research, administration. The culture behind this is a lack of trust between teaching staff and management in a move where trust has been replaced with the language of business, customers, efficiency and accountability. Responses to completing these exercises have a large element of faking and are acknowledged as such, and certainly do not reflect the reality they seek to assess. In this respect they are evidence of the mediocrity that bureaucratisation produces. Jackall's account of 'The World of Corporate Management' demonstrates how the criteria to assess quality are not and cannot be fixed and so depend upon interpretative judgement, that is subject to 'shifting groups', 'changing social structures', and 'market exigencies'. While skilful leadership can gain consensus about appropriate standards, resist compromises, confront backsliders, - in public if necessary - and enforce judgements with effective sanctions, it runs the risk of making enemies and being fatally labelled as 'inflexible'. The result 'when it is socially difficult to extol or uphold high standards, a kind of levelling process occurs that produces a comfortable mediocrity, a willingness to settle for, say, whatever the market will bear... provided there is no undue social disruption.' Mrs Thatcher's language of markets and about the working class, her advocacy of the entrepreneurial spirit and criticism of those lacking it ['The unemployed should get on their bikes and look for jobs'] is reminiscent of the strict and authoritarian advice to manager's of one of McGregor's two assumptions about what motivates people to work. Though Theory Y has a very optimistic philosophy about people's positive attitudes to work, McGregor's 'Theory X' is dubbed as 'traditionalist'. Theory X advances the views that 'the average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it...must be coerced, controlled, directed or even threatened...to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational goals...is lazy,

Ibid. p. 1.
prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition
and wants security above all.\textsuperscript{74}

Bureaucracy fragments work down into pieces, just like Adam Smith's description
of the mass industrial production of pins the dawn of modern managerialism,
and the breaking down of guilds of craftsmen into a proletariat. Much of the
language of Thatcher, of business, customers, audits, resonates with the
management practices of the nineteenth century. One account links it to a
treatise by a nineteenth century industrialist on the superiority of the factory
system as a form of education. It included the contrasting inference that the
academic needed to be pushed to achieve more, which is suggested as a
persistent attitude of industry and society toward academia: 'Children in factories
are...much better acquainted with the general economy of the arts [of
manufacture]...than the recluse academician can possibly be, who from a few
obsolete data, traces out imaginary results, or conjures up difficulties seldom
encountered in practice.'\textsuperscript{75}

The inappropriateness in higher education of these rigid styles of management
thinking, mass production and bureaucratic control, given the very high quality of
the staff in UK higher education is summed up best by a critic of this nineteenth
century industrialisation:

'We have much studied and much perfected, of late the great civilized
invention of the division of labour: only we give it a false name. It is
not, truly speaking, the labour that is divided; but the men: - Divided
into mere segments of men - broken into small fragments and crumbs
of life...the great cry that rises from our manufacturing cities....is all for
this, - that we manufacture everything there except men: we blanch
cotton, and strengthen steel, and refine sugar, and shape pottery; but
to brighten, strengthen, to refine, or to form a single living spirit,
ever enters into our estimate of advantages.'\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74} McGregor D \textit{The Human Side of Enterprise} McGraw Hill: New York 1960 pp. 33-34, 47-48, cited in

\textsuperscript{75} Ryan D 'Neo-Luddism - How Thatcher destroyed Britain's Potential to become the mindshop of the
Philosophy of Manufactures; or an exposition of the scientific, moral, and commercial economy of the
factory system of Great Britain'}. His account covers the development and rationales of 1980s and their
relationship to industry and its needs.

Ruskin's famous criticism of the management of mass production ends with an appeal to have a 'right understanding of what kinds of labour are good for men, raising them up and making them happy'. Most of the current generation of commentators on the state of higher education, post 1988, tell of lowered morale amongst staff. Their criticism hovers around the appropriateness and inevitability of a managerial style for mass higher education based on nineteenth century mass production and bureaucratic managerialism, with its inherent lack of trust. The logic for its use is that it follows the industrial revolution's progression from 'self-regulating craftsmen's guilds', like the craft of teaching, to mass production which entailed a factory-style 'division of labour'. Echoing Weber's inevitability of a bureaucratisation in modern industrial society, the policy of control and proletarianization is advanced as the only way in a 'customer' oriented market', - Mrs Thatcher's 'TINA' - 'There is no alternative'. In essence it was motivated by a view of the professions as 'no longer benign civil servants, but rather self-interested monopolists, carving out their share of taxpayers' money, resistant to competition or to scrutiny. Instead of deserving trust, for a protected domain in which their judgement was allowed to be sovereign, they were subject to audits, oversight and demands that they justify themselves. This was [and is] true for the theatre director as it was [and is] for the lecturer.'

Whether these changes are 'irreversible' is the question. Many writers try to end on a note of optimism, like Halsey, referring to the permanence of the private and often enthusiastic relationship between teachers and taught. Such hope flies in the face of Tulloch's 'rule' of bureaucracy, that bureaucrats are just like other men and therefore 'they will make most of their decisions in terms of what benefits them, not society as a whole... and as a general rule a bureaucrat will find that his [interests are best served], if the bureaucracy in which he works expands'. This echoes Thorstein Veblen's view that Jackall also supports that most managers eventually come to 'realise that there are no intrinsic connections between the good of a particular corporation [corporate university, perhaps. My insertion], the good of an individual manager, and the common weal'. Icily Jackall concludes that 'given their pivotal institutional role in our epoch, they [managers] help create and recreate, as one unintended consequence of their personal striving, a society where morality becomes indistinguishable from the quest for one's own survival

and advantage.' 79 Thatcher's 'irreversible change' put power on the side of centralised bureaucracy and management. The outcome has not been as expected and in the US and UK one academic, Professor Geoffrey, Academic Dean of the American InterContinental University, London, could write in the national press, in a line of thought reminiscent of relative success rates of monarchies and republics80, that: 'My point is that the lessons of recent history give no grounds for faith in such managerial structures [concentrate[d] power in the hands of a small executive, typically appointed by the vice chancellor and governing body]. On both sides of the Atlantic collegiality and academic empowerment bring results. Managerialism in higher education seems only to breed mediocrity"81. The model of republican collegiality that many writers favour and would like to either retain in Oxford and Cambridge, and to institute more widely depends upon power being devolved. Tulloch and Jackall make it plain that such power is unlikely to be given up, and it is hard to see an opposing force that might provoke its surrender, even partially.

This makes plain that the issue is about power and politics and governance.

Twenty one years after the event, a retired Vice-Chancellor 82 confessed to an order of egoism's lobbying in closed rooms, and that the 'reforms of 1988/ 1992 were politically driven and represented the effective political lobbying by Douglas's 'Conservative Hierarchy' 83. The author, a recently retired CEO of a new university felt secure so long after the event to boast of the political significance of a private meeting of polytechnic directors and a political courtier. The lobbyists were the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics, who met with Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State of Education in 1986 and told him of their difficulties in exercising their legal autonomy to manage the operational elements of their organisation, i.e., they wanted to exercise 'their right to manage'. What they claimed was restraining them was the strong influence of the elected local representatives of the Local Authorities on their respective governing bodies, whose role was 'the educational strategy and the mission of the local poly'. They claimed these elected representatives were interfering in operational matters. He gives the evidence of the elected representatives' outlawing of the purchase of 'The Times' for poly libraries because of the Wapping Strike and exercising the legitimate return of
budget surpluses from income generation at the end of the financial year - a normal local authority procedure for unspent funds. The accusation was that Labour councillors were the problem, because 'they had to be 'fixed' before the meeting in order to implement policy. The article calls the lobbyists' account of their difficulties 'a simple truth', but the article does not acknowledge its own political bias nor the logical, two-way management link between strategy and operation. It ignores the closures of sites, colleges, redundancies, the increase in bureaucrats and administrative expenditure that was taking place under their leadership. It does not admit that their difficulty was with a democratic process of accountability, that required Humean 'opinion', i.e., persuasion. The profound significance and political nature of this meeting are revealed by the response from the Secretary of State and the subsequent use of political 'force' - that classic manner in which all republics are overturned. Joseph reacted 'genuinely horrified', became a 'different man', 'energised'. In conversation, privately, with the article's author, Joseph stated his intention of conferring with Prime Minister Thatcher in order to produce 'action...quickly, at the highest level'. The result came in 'messages from government, via the usual roundabout channels[ My emphasis], that they [polytechnic directors] should do nothing to rock the boat. The problem was going to be solved'. The 1988 Education Reform Bill was the result, with its provision that 'the polytechnics [and institutes of higher education, including Abecedary Institute. My Note] be removed from local authority control and established as independent corporations'. The author extols the result of this political stealth as the ending of the difference between polytechnics and universities by privatisation. His remarks echo with others by directors. [viz. above, about corporate form of governance and the personal desire for status, i.e., some to the personal trapping of the 'order of egoism' and the search for self esteem]. 'The not rocking the boat' probably refers to the fact that privatisation as a policy did not appear in Thatcher's 1976, 'Right Approach' policy statement, nor the 1979 nor the 1983 manifestoes; nothing was mentioned other than the partial privatisation of British Steel84. Therefore it was not brought formally before the electorate as a public policy for their endorsement. Florio's account examines the documentation and the economic evidence in great detail, and he asserts that privatisation was ideologically driven by the struggle between two concepts of

liberty, after Isaiah Berlin\textsuperscript{85}: the 'fundamentally positive “socialist” idea of the “good society” was being overwhelmed by the ‘negative, liberal one’ of the “good person”. Privatisation was the weapon for the assault on the “good society” or “dependency culture” as the ‘right’ would define it\textsuperscript{86}. Privatisation was implemented by a ‘very determined government driven by elementary convictions’\textsuperscript{87}. In assessing the effects of privatisation, Florio concludes that it did not bring about ‘a full restoration of the market economy’; existing managements stayed in place and the advance of ‘the penetrating role of higher public bureaucracy was not halted. Ownership passed not to the public, except temporarily, but to a few large and sometimes foreign investors, and the taxpayer was the ‘loser’\textsuperscript{88}. Privatisation did not increase productivity nor efficiency; there was no ‘productivity after shock’\textsuperscript{89}. The top management of the ‘privatised firms comprised the same people appointed before’ and that the rate of ‘turnover’ of managers remained ‘virtually the same’\textsuperscript{90}. One of the charges brought against pre-privatisation managements was that they were inefficient, but as Florio concludes, if this were the case, ‘one could have expected a considerable turnover in managerial staff upon privatisation. On the contrary, however we observe the retention of commanding positions by the same people for several years after privatisation. This phenomenon appears to have happened on a large scale’\textsuperscript{91}. Unions became ‘a hindrance and must be more forcefully contained’ rather than continuing their role as an agent of negotiated consensus.

‘Therefore...privatisation means increased power for firm’s management and a decline in the power of the unions’\textsuperscript{92}. The ‘increased insecurity for the workers’ did not produce ‘increased effort’ and ‘an increase in productivity’. Amongst workers there was ‘loss of jobs’, ‘insecurity about the future’ and less union support and security from the weakened unions. ‘Managers...gained a lot from the privatisation, both in terms of income and wealth [often becoming shareholders] and in terms of power, having succeeded in securing themselves a larger quota of income than in the past’\textsuperscript{93}. The ‘order of egoism’ has always secured for themselves money and

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p. 28.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. p. 46.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. p.38.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid. p. 133.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. p. 166.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. pp. 202.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. p. 203.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. pp. 205.
power, and the same applied in the universities and at Abecedary Institute where the main management stayed in post for more than a decade and the anecdote was that the salaries were so good they could not afford to move to other posts and are still there, when, in very recent times, Abecedary Institute was granted university status. Significantly this has been followed by press reports of the 'new' institution 'sacking' all its staff and introducing a new pay scale that reduces earnings and breaches national rules for academic institutions.

The ideological impact on economic management continues so that some are regretting its emphasis. The Dearing Report on Higher Education defined four purposes for Higher Education: 'to inspire and enable individuals... to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their application to the benefit of the economy and society'. Reviewing his crucial report on higher education, a decade later, Lord Dearing stated: 'One of the things that surprised and disappointed me was that [the aims] attracted no controversy and seem to have stood the test of time'. The economic argument ruled the day but he went on to say 'On reflection there was another one I would like to have added and that was to develop culture. I think of a social culture. We don't realise what our culture is very often'.

Under Blair and New Labour the language of 'customer' and 'citizens' persists rather than the language of the collective 'workers' and 'classes', and the top-up fees legislation has reinforced the 'shopocracy' 'customer' culture in higher education. Moreover the numbers of staff in higher education do not make a significant voting block vote, because they are normally scattered over many constituencies. Students do make a concentrated block, and in the 2005 elections voted out one senior Labour politician on the 'fees' issue. The academic staff's political lobbying power is much greater. However, the priorities of New Labour are elsewhere, in the welfare state or in the pre-school years for the education system. Funding is the key and the Thatcher neglect of public services and the present economic climate have left any government, left, right, or centre, with only a narrow band in which to exercise power for change. Politicians of both left and right distrust the university; the right because university staff are generally leftist and the hard left, Douglas's high minded dissident enclave, are to be found there [Viz. Halsey's statistics, above.]; and the left, because of the hierarchical

elitist traditions, and inflexible practices in their perception of the ancient Universities, when the reverse is more likely to be the case. The radical republican nature of the governance of the Oxbridge universities is ignored or forgotten, though the debates over their forms of governance have reached the national press. The conservative hierarchy has lobbied for reform and modernisation of their governance, while the dissident enclave, who in these rare instances hold the power, has halted them in favour of their existing direct participative democracies. In an interesting reversal of Mary Douglas' communities, the negative portrait is made up of high minded protests at tradition and privilege in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's criticisms in an Oxford student admissions case in 2000; the Minister of HE's comment on 'Mickey Mouse' degrees in 2002, the Secretary of States comment on Medieval Studies in 2003, the 2002 DFES Discussion Paper's comments on medieval procedures in Oxbridge administration; and the claims and counter claims of various admissions statistics and procedures. The positive portrait will take longer to emerge, if ever, with recent admissions initiatives and commitment of university departments to local schools and communities, not least by Oxford and Cambridge Universities. There is a considerable and crucial variation in the levels of democracy in the governance of UK higher education. There are two outstanding international universities that are 'labour-managed' and directly owned with participative democracies, while elsewhere institutions have a partial democracy or, at worst, are owned by small, self-perpetuating corporations originally appointed by a Neo-con British government and which the succeeding Labour administrations did not reverse when it re-organised the financing of higher education.

Administrators use the stereotype that academia has little or no concern with such practical matters. Since the universities began in ancient Greece, scholars have had the false reputation of being little interested in worldly matters. This is a stereotype that serves either the derogatory or comic purpose of others and which is easily exposed as a self-serving slander or a Habermasian 'self-justifying' false ideology [Viz. Critical Theory] by a quick mental survey of the subjects and topics that concern scholars in the universities. The reason to denigrate scholars may well lie in their republican political origins. Evans' account and case-study\(^95\) provides a reverse image of the Abecedary story, and the issues in it also reach

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back to reveals continuities.

The first universities were founded 800 years ago as a practical solution 'to meet student demand and the demands of society for a "qualified workforce" of a clerical, secretarial and civil service sort\textsuperscript{96}. Before that scholars were either wandering independent teachers, a state indicative of the enduring sense of autonomy that teachers value, or serving in schools attached to religious establishments. 'Medieval scholars started something new in joining forces and learning to work together within institutional structures\textsuperscript{97}. 'University' derives from the Latin \textit{universitas}, a corporation or corporate body, and referred to 'the whole body of the citizens' under Roman Law\textsuperscript{98}, as well a guild or college. The guild, a trade union, was the institutional structure adopted by the scholars who established the first universities at Paris and Oxford. It was this structure and governance that was taken by Oxford scholars when they established Cambridge University. These republican origins in republican Rome and its politics offer a relevant parallel to the story of the undermining of Cambridge University's direct democracy [Viz. politics of Roman Republic in Management section].

The medieval institutions were all teaching institutions. They adapted the guild structure of masters, journeymen and apprentices, so that the University 'masters' supervised the teaching of the 'apprentices', students, who, when they attained the grade of Bachelor or graduated, could go on to higher taught degrees. Once the next stage of Master was attained, by undergoing a live 'disputation' - debating and developing arguments and responding to set questions - the 'apprentice' became a 'Master' himself [NB. Women were not allowed at Cambridge University until 1948]. The skills and abilities to make an argument, debate, listen, respond in a free situation as an equal recurs as a theme throughout this research. It was seen as a crucial skill then, and though neglected, remains so today.

'In this medieval community of scholars, the body of the Masters was itself the University, and above all a teaching body. It admitted students to membership. It created the course requirements. It provided the teaching. It examined the students. It admitted them to the degrees\textsuperscript{99}. These fundamental functions describe the core operations and organization of any university at any time, in any

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid. p. 6  
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid. p. 5.
place and the roles of teaching academic staff who carry them out and who
eexercise their judgement in doing so. Evans crucially adds one further sentence:
'The masters constituted a 'brotherhood', its members collegially equal, free to
participate in the running of their own affairs'\textsuperscript{100}. The alternative model was the
medieval University of Bologna where the students, already graduates, were the
legal corporation, hiring and dismissing lecturing staff because the students were
paying fees for a postgraduate legal qualification that gave them entry into
profitable careers. Glasgow and Edinburgh Universities bear a resemblance to this
model. 'At Paris and Oxford the legal corporation was the masters'\textsuperscript{101}.

In the next phase of these foundations, external authority, principally the Church
of Rome, began to institute universities and control their affairs, and there
followed centuries of battles between external authority, usually the church,
because as clerics the masters fell under its jurisdiction, and the corporations of
scholars, like Oxford. Finance came from fees, rents, and endowments. Apart
from having to receive 'Visitors' to inspect the members' spiritual health, the
colleges as autonomous charities and communities of scholars remained outside
the jurisdiction of the Church, but could not resist the State. In 1571, Elizabeth I
constituted both Oxford and Cambridge Universities as 'civil corporations governed
by statute'\textsuperscript{102} and so they remain today. 'They have preserved their direct
academic democracies and the principle that they remain communities of scholars'.
The assembled members of the university constitute a 'Congregation' at Oxford
and 'Regent House' at Cambridge - the academic staff, senior administrators and
others form a constituency of about 3000 at Cambridge - 'remain the governing
bodies of their respective universities'\textsuperscript{103}.

It is the origins of and the continuance of the direct democracies of Oxford and
Cambridge that is important for this research. The universities' persistent and
continuing record of 'very efficiency' and their international success is probably
attributable to the cultural ethos of equality of membership that encourages the
highly intelligent and independent-minded approach that is part of the mark of
scholarship. The story of their origins and the later stories of the attempts to
subvert the democracy illustrate the processes of interpretation [hermeneutics]

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid. p. 6.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. p.6.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid p. 8. Footnote: 'Now the Oxford and Cambridge Act, 1923'.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. p. 6.
outlined elsewhere. They demonstrate Burrell and Morgan’s\textsuperscript{104} view that institutions are ‘humanly constructed phenomena’. Evans’ evidence-based case-study account of these events and the respondents of this research both provide texts for others to examine and both clearly support Gadamer’s view that ‘being is manifest in the language’. The themes in the stories show that people carry with them a past greater than their own lifetimes. This suggests that people are aware, as Vico suggests, that though the new order may be found in the old, what is lost is the values of the old. Evans quotes the Secretary of State for Education’s progression of recantations from an originally reported view that mediævalists were ‘ornamental’, to an ‘adornment’ to ‘no place for mediæval ‘communities’ of scholars in the modern university world’ and proceeded with the economic arguments for universities, a graduate workforce and the economic benefits to them, which have subsequently declined as time has passed\textsuperscript{105}. Vico’s view was that the new order that replaces the old is somehow less and therefore the new is impoverished by that absence. Vico attempted to demonstrate how the present, the institutions, the places, the language, all the elements that yield evidence of the living, was made: ‘sciences must begin at the point where their subject matter begins’\textsuperscript{106}. The complete value, concept or institution might no longer exist but there would be fragmentary evidence that would reveal its source and the larger idea behind it. Vico’s ‘new science’ was ‘the art of finding in anything all that is in it’\textsuperscript{107} and this process would transform the view of the present with an awareness of origins, potential and loss. The power of residual elements, traditions and origins is implied. Cambridge and Oxford are the living residual elements of a highly successful direct democratic structure of governance and the existence of this governance and its success demonstrates the falseness of the ideological thinking that would dismantle it. In terms of Critical Theory they point to a real and achievable objective of a liberating and successful alternative form of governance, i.e., an achievable objective that confirms the viability of the course of action that the process of Critical theory advises:

’Critical theory’s credibility as a guide for action is crucial. Therefore its role in emancipating a particular group of agents in a particular situation

must include demonstrating that the change from an initial state of coercion to the final state of emancipation is 'objectively' [Original emphasis] and 'theoretically' possible. The transformation into the final state must be one that is possible, achievable and sustainable [that is, 'by means of specified institutional or other changes']. Without a grounding in reality, the Critical Theory would be another vision of an ideal world rather than a sustainable classless society\textsuperscript{108}.

Moreover, the incident of the Heads of Learning seeking to make themselves a constituted body of the governance of the Abecedary Institute indicates a desire to return to the sense of autonomy and professional worth with which the universities first were established. Finally, a Government Department's own evidence-based research indicates that this model is close to the conditions of 'high performance work' and is a modernisation into a more productive and happier basis for governance and productivity. The existence of the governance at Oxford and Cambridge, offers a constructive alternative to the experience of working in higher education in an Abecedary Institute. As a general notion for the purposes of a university, it illustrates the effect of external authority establishing institutions founded on their contribution to the economy and training its workforce and providing research of immediate developmental use, while losing the republican, direct democratic, collegiality of electoral equals, a sense of ownership, the skills of debate, discussion and persuasion. It also includes the loss of the power and efficiency of shared 'specialist' knowledge through cooperation's capacity to yield greater efficiency and productivity. Some would suggest these last are what make for civilisation\textsuperscript{109}.

Until 1923 the governing body of Cambridge had been all the academic members administrators and others of the University, including all who had not only graduated but who had also been awarded the Cambridge M.A. a few years after graduation. These last were all members of Senate with the right, amongst others, to vote for the next Chancellor. The growth of this constituency whose members could well be scattered across the world, out of touch with events and


\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Director's Cut
implications, made it impractical, but it took two decades of fierce argument before 'Regent House' was constituted as the legal body of the University in 1926. Its current membership is 'the holders of listed offices in the University and the Colleges, already more than 3000 in 2002 and expanded still further on a vote in 2003'. This direct democracy, Regent House, must give its approval for almost all the business of the University.

The details of Cambridge University's procedures of governance are intricate; therefore it is more relevant to deal with the fundamental principle embodied within them: direct democracy; matters may be proposed by one body but agreement depends upon assent disposed by majority approval of the office holders and others of the University: Regent House. It entails equal voting rights and therefore distributed power, full information made publicly available, and formally constituted discussion amongst equals with the right to propose issues for formal discussion. The actual structure for the 'Conduct of Business' is a Council that deals with 'detailed business', in the form of proposals for courses of action or discussion, like new buildings or new appointments, most of which are put to the direct democracy [Regent House] for discussion and approval. The Council proposes but the body of the University disposes. The proposals are published and circulated. The proposals may be debated at the regular, term-time, fortnightly meetings [Discussions] and all speeches are reported verbatim and published to all the electorate for reflection and the benefit of the absent. A debate could be called during a nine-day period after a proposal's publication, if 25 members of the electorate [Regent House] signed a petition or submitted an amendment. After such a debate, proposals and/or amendments would be put to the vote in a general ballot or postal vote by total electorate of all the academics, administrators and other post holders. Each member of Regent House has the equal right to call a debate and to vote.

Another principle was that of rotation of office as a means of placing control on power and in Dunn's suggestion controlling the 'order of egoism'. If the legal and constitutional body is all the academic and administrative staff and others, the titular head is the Vice-Chancellor, who until the early 1990s was 'a temporary first among equals'. Bearing some resemblance to the rotation of Roman Republican senators, the Vice-Chancellor's post was held in rotation by a member

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111 Cf. Director's Cut.
of the University. So that person was a 'familiar face in the institution' who remained based within his 'home' college and who returned to his duties there afterwards. The appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor did not herald the arrival of a "new broom"...indeed no one was there long enough to do much sweeping. He would be handing over the broom to the next Vice-Chancellor in the relay-race almost as soon as he had wiped the sweat from his palm and got a grip on it. In the early 1990s, as a result of a series of constitutional reforms the Vice-Chancellor served for seven years and could be head-hunted from candidates world-wide. This principle of rotation appears not to extend to Heads of Department, a significant anomaly in Evans' account of how this governance operated, for they could act imperiously and as she comments: 'One of the besetting sins of the University was the 'arrogance' of the Heads of Department, for it was 'not easy to get...Senior Cambridge academics to accept that they did not already know it all'.

Oxford and Cambridge Universities are described as 'eerily effective' and are permanent members of the top higher education institutions nationally and internationally. They began with principles of direct democracy, equality, a legally constituted membership that equates with 'ownership', availability of full information and debate. The conjunction suggests that this model of governance and the effectiveness are linked. The reasons for suggesting this is that these principles go a long way toward meeting the criteria that are suggested for the high levels of productivity resulting from high performance work, for the criteria that Habermas suggests for the self-perpetuating process that is 'ideal speech situation' and that Gintis records in the effectiveness and success of cooperative activities. Further confirmation of a negative kind comes from a comparison with the constitution governance of other UK universities and higher education institutions, where there had been a retreat from direct democracy. By the time Abecedary Institute was constituted in the early 1990s there was hardly any semblance of it, but it was a benchmark memory of the respondents to this research because the implications of the change in governance appeared to have not yet dawned on the academic staff [Viz. research responses]. Evans makes the comment that other university constitutions 'reflect in their structure the

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113 Ibid. p. 65.
115 Cf. Director's Cut.
understanding of 'membership' and 'community' which was in force at the time they were created\textsuperscript{116}, the implication is that these are also reflections of the political opinions of those times. If that is the case then it is merely returning the compliment that respondents to this research referred to the organization of the institution in which they worked in political terms as if they were 'ruled'.

Universities created before 1922, other than Oxford and Cambridge, include 'membership' in their charters. The University of Leicester's Charter of 1958, a late arrival in the creation of 'redbrick' universities, names the legally entity of the university as 'a one body politic and corporate' consisting of a Court, Council, Senate, Faculties, Graduates and undergraduates, the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Treasure, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Deans of Faculty 'and all others'. The Court is the 'supreme governing body'; the Council, the governing body and executive; the Senate as the regulatory body for the superintendence of the education and discipline of the students and a Convocation of the university and a Students' Union. 'Active and significant participation' by academics is 'intended', 'but layer upon layer of checks and balances are woven in so that the institution can be governed. This is still recognisably a community of scholars at work, but only just\textsuperscript{117}.

The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act established the new Higher Education Corporations which were created out of the polytechnics and colleges of higher education, which included Abecedary Institute, the subject of this research. The Act specified that in each case the corporation was to consist of:

- appointed members' [\textit{My emphasis}] who shall be 'not less that twelve and not more than twenty-four members' and 'the person who is for the time being the principal of the institution, unless he chooses not to be a member'. These appointed members are to consist of

- 'up to thirteen [referred to below in this Schedule as the "independent members"] shall be persons appearing to the appointing authority to have experience of, and to have shown capacity in, industrial, commercial or employment matters or the practice of any profession';

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. p. 9.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. p. 9-10.
• 'up to two may be teachers at the institutions nominated by the academic board
• and up to two may be students at the institution nominated by the students at the institution';
• 'at least one and not more than nine [referred to below in this Schedule as the 'co-opted' members] shall be persons nominated by the members of the corporation who are not co-opted members'. ‘The required ‘one’ of these ‘shall be a person who has experience in the provision of education’.
• The corporation has the right ‘to establish committees to include members who are not members of the corporation’.
• The corporation has the right, under various provisions of the Act, to appoint new members as required, and this right may be also exercised by the ‘independent’ category of members, once set up. If the number of ‘independent members’ falls below those required ‘under the articles of governance for a quorum’, then an external authority has the authority to appoint members. That authority is the Secretary of State for Education 118.

In these corporations the principle of a universal franchise and right of membership of a community of scholars 'has disappeared'; as communities of academic, apart from two representatives, they have no role in the running of the universities. The power and authority is vested in the Secretary of State and the independent members who are given the right to keep power within their ‘appointed’ circle. Since the original ‘independent’ governors are an appointed elite group able to select and appoint other ‘co-opted’ members, the basic form of this governance is an oligarchy. What is remarkable are the accounts of the surprise at the creeping managerialism into higher education 119, when the governance specified in this Act clearly gave it full licence to operate such institutions as commercial corporations. Theory X was given full licence [Viz. Above] 120. Given the assault that the Thatcher government intended on the higher education sector, [see elsewhere in this chapter], this removal of academic professional interest from the governance of higher education institutions is not

surprising. There was no respect for nor trust in academics’ professionalism, nor in their ability to manage their own affairs. Two axioms of Vico’s clearly seem to be in operation; the first is that cultural change and loss can be accounted for by suggesting that a new order of things is to be found in the old order, rather than the opposite view that the old are contained in the new. Therefore, there is a sense of loss because the new order that has replaced the old is somehow less and therefore the new is impoverished by that absence. The initial origins [Viz. above] were concerned with vocational training for the ‘apprentices’ of - in twenty-first century terms - a new service sector of the ‘clerical, secretarial and civil service sort’[^121^]. The original curriculum that was devised to service this vocational aspect covered the seven liberal arts: grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy and was delivered in communities, which managed and ‘serviced’ the administration and teaching through a process of direct democracy, equality, a legally constituted membership that equates with ‘ownership’, availability of full information and debate. This is emphatically not a call to return to this curriculum, but it is an indication of the range that has been lost, including, in modern terms, the ability to deliver, listen to, and frame arguments in debate: skills that industry too would like to see in its employees. It is an illustrative invocation of the depth and range and skills and sense of community that has been cast off in the cause of focussing contemporary higher education on a vocational aspect that was there at the inception as only a part of the wider aims of university education. For example, in a House of Lords debate in 1991 on the Bill: ‘the Treasury’s sticky fingers have been on the bill...education is about building a truly civilised society, which includes people with competence to earn their living and to be successful in the economy. That is important, but it is not, never has been and never should be the primary purpose of education[^122^].

The second axiom of Vico’s that this seems to endorse is that ‘The nature [original emphasis] of an institution is identical with its nascence [original emphasis] at a certain time and in a certain manner[^123^], because the business and commercial bias of its governance indicates an industrial style of organization and systems rather than educational collegiality. The story of Abecedary Institute indicates

that this is the case. It is also indicative of the 'irreversible' change that Thatcherism intended: 'to create an irreversible shift of power in Britain in favour of the working people and their families'; especially when Halsey could record that 'academics were 'unloved by their political masters', who did not trust academics. The consequence was a manoeuvre to shift power on to the side of centralised bureaucracy and management. The Blair/New Labour Government endorsed and continued the policy and the attitudes, 'scarcely changed'. Opposition to the 1988 and 1991 Thatcher government's Bills came from the Labour benches on the basis of their being expressions of a government's 'lack of belief in a liberal notion of academic freedom' and of 'the need for academics to have their freedom protected' to publish without permission from Government and protection from industrial sponsors. In the 1992 debates, it was put openly and bluntly: 'They [universities] must in particular be free of Government intervention ... Universities may be threatened by governments directly and should be free to criticise them if they feel that that is right. In this country today there seems to be a coalition between Government and big business'. Where such an ideology achieves such dominance, Critical theory suggests that the consequence is that enlightening the oppressed will not suffice. Habermas' Critical Theory suggests that the abolition of 'an established social institution...deeply rooted in the interests of some social class will...require a long course of political action'. Until that happens, 'the institution will continue to exist and exert its baleful influence on even enlightened agents, restricting their freedom and frustrating their desires'. In other words, that which was introduced by an Act of Parliament will have to be undone by an Act of Parliament. No internal change in organizational systems will be able to undermine the established fundamentals of the governance unless that same governance decide to give up its power, and the evidence of this case study of Abecedary Institute


seems to bear this out. If the governance supports such organizational change and innovation then, as the recommendations for high performance work indicate, such change may take place, but that would require a form of oligarchy to hand over power, and ownership in name only, to the employees.

In a mirror image of this situation, Evans points to the fact that the 'constitutional assumptions' of Oxford, Cambridge and the 'old' universities were not changed by the 1992 Act, nor by New Labour's 'Top-up fees' Act of 2003. The situation, therefore, is left with a question hanging in the air as to whether a government might 'address the question of changing [Oxford's and Cambridge's] fundamental constitutions'. Evans implies a veiled threat in suggesting that Government would require considerable rashness and 'temerity' to dismantle existing academic democracies. The strength of that argument reaches out to the whole of society; the members of universities have as teachers and researchers a bond of integrity with the truth and the search for truth, and, as legally independent bodies, they have had an historic role in telling truth to power. In this respect, their freedom, the freedom of speech and the freedoms of a democracy are bound together and are matters for all the citizens. The economic charge of waste can be brought against its operations, but so can they against every operation. Of late, much praised, privately managed, commercial enterprises and government projects are far from immune to waste, sometimes on a very grand scale: Maxwell, Marconi, Enron, Tyco, i-Soft, the rail privatisation, and so on.

While the constitutions of Oxford and Cambridge and the older universities have defended themselves – Oxford was persuaded to admit external members to its Council, but retained the 'final authority' in the Congregation of academics and office holders – that has not kept them clear of subversion of their democratic elements. However ideal a democratic franchise and government by ballots and votes might be, it is open to all the electoral sharp practices and prone to the

132 Footnote: Oxford University faces both the same type of constitution changes and administrative failure, which like Cambridge are not linked. In Autumn 2006, Oxford's Congregation, 'parliament' of academics, voted against their Vice-Chancellor's proposal for the admission of external members to the governing council. This was after extensive, whole page lobbying press coverage by those wanting reforms and more money, while little or nothing was included from the dissenters. The point was repeatedly made that US universities had more money to attract 'stars', when the evidence from elsewhere is that the republican constitution requires less administrative expenditure. 'One of the great things about Oxford is that people are willing to contest and offered...opinions at all times', Julie Maxton, Registrar, Oxford University. 'What most academic want is to get on with life, without the frustration of botched student records...and financial systems', Donald Macleod. Marathon Woman in EducationGuardian Higher Sept 12, 2006, p.11. Cf. Director's Cut: Roman Republic: A patrician opinion.
voters' indifference and neglect typical of mature democracies, though compulsory voting with financial penalties has proved effective in some states. Symptomatic of this Evans reports few of the three thousand Cambridge University electorate 'really understood the power they had, collectively'\textsuperscript{133}, until it was nearly taken from them and they rallied and voted down such proposals. Few understood the constitution. The democratic process involved the chore of reading the reports of proposals and debates [Discussions] that were sent to each member of the electorate, when there were always more pressing concerns. Matters rarely struck home until the issues became personal, like revision of employment contracts. However, stories of the need to manipulate the vote are powerful indicators that real power actually lies in the collective and consensual. Voting intentions could be manipulated by patronage and pressure on those, both high and lowly, with hopes of promotion and advancement, or in need of research support. Heads of Department might try to impose their view by creating a 'block' vote that was at odds with the constitution. This became, so Evans suggests, a general symptom of managerial control. Evans compares it to a nineteenth century situation of 'employees...routinely [being] instructed how to vote in General Elections on pain of being refused a pay-rise if they did not vote with their employer'\textsuperscript{134}. Documentary evidence of a company line and the 'whipping' of votes supports Evans' conclusion that 'direct democracy could be "managed" by a few and line-management could undermine collegiality and the equality of voters. The trend to undermine traditional direct democracy became more apparent in the second half of the 1990s, as Cambridge started 'to behave more and more like a business'\textsuperscript{135} and with a 'management'. The established Cambridge organizational structure is somewhat like the national government, an academic democracy and an administrative 'civil service', and though the latter had become more important since the nineteenth century, the administrators are the 'servants' of the academic democracy, and none of them are the managers. This had been put in place in the nineteenth century to transfer power from the constituent colleges to make the University a more cohesive entity. The central officers were the Vice-Chancellor, and a triumvirate of The Registrary, The Treasurer and the Secretary General, and then the Pro-Vice-Chancellors, who had been nominated by the Vice-

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. p. 44.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. p. 45.
Chancellor and 'rubber-stamped by the Council'\textsuperscript{136}. In 1996, following acceptance of an advisory body's proposals, the triumvirate was made into a hierarchy with the Registrary elevated into the line-manager of the other two, and a Unified Administrative Service was born. This was then sub-divided into eight divisions. Though their newly appointed Heads were specified as being responsible for their area throughout the University, they were neither members of the electorate nor ex-officio officers of the direct democracy. Their roles did not conform to the governance of the University and its direct democracy; they were responsible but constitutionally 'outside' the University's governance. Meanwhile their existing staff, though underlings, remained members of the governing electorate. Muddle ensued and much redrafting produced notions of their having policy-advisory roles to the Oligarchy, but, the situation became one of the three thousand governing electorate being squared up to by those administrators trying to be 'professional', then facing 'frustrating realities' and departing. It became an impenetrable 'thicket' and the tangle 'could be a recipe for line-management to turn into tyranny'\textsuperscript{137}. In many ways this example is illustrative of the reverse of implementation of high performance work, where the issue is the modern approach of dismantling centralised control and delegation to teams, this example was about the imposition of central control.

'In many respects, the University was 'really run' by a relatively small number, the Oligarchy, who appointed one another to all the most important committees, forming the 'central bodies' and the professional administrators\textsuperscript{138}. These worked behind the scenes. In the 1990s, according to Evans, - expressed in a language that suggests motives steeped in desires, passions and character - the professional administrators 'got it into their heads that they would really like to be managers'\textsuperscript{139}. Her account illustrates the issue that no set of management checks and balances in the form of committees and procedures can stand neglected and unguarded against the operation of character. The account of these committees mentions 'gamesmanship', of their being 'self-appointing and self-perpetuating', and the use of strategies like 'cancelling' committees 'because there was nothing on the agenda'\textsuperscript{140}. Evans sees here the playing out of a 'classical and even

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. p.51.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. p.63-64.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. p.41.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. p. 60-61.
universal’ scenario of basic characters, like the stock character of the Oligarch by a pupil of Aristotle:

The Oligarch ‘when the people are deliberating...will come forward and express his opinion that...directors ought to have plenary powers; and, if others propose ten, he will say that “one is sufficient”...It is very much his manner to use phrases of this kind: “We must meet and discuss these matters by ourselves, and get clear of the rabble and the market place”...”Either they or we govern the city.”’

The administrative oligarchy ‘feared’ the direct democracy [Regent House]: ‘It did not suit them to have it awakened...embarrassments might follow’.

In the simplest terms, the Council proposes but the body of the University disposes. The Council [Viz. above for details] deals with detailed business by considering proposals which are submitted, through a process of publication to the entire electorate of equals [Regent House]; this may provoke a petition for debate or amendment, and then a ballot of the electorate of all the academics, administrators and other post holders [Regent House].

Evans’ narrative around the topic of the Council illustrates how the democratic process was easily subverted and how negligently protected. For example, The Council was elected by a free vote of the direct democracy of the whole of Regent House, and the three student-members were elected by the students. To avoid the embarrassment, and presumably hurt pride [Cf. Hume], of uncomplimentary election results, a ‘private agreement’ between Heads of Colleges existed that only sufficient nominations to fill the vacancies would be put forward. Any nomination by a ‘radical’ would provoke a last minute flurry of nominations to ensure there would be a ‘fight’. Candidates’ manifestos contained little about their professional competence; those elected were not offered training. Yet an independent report on University governance found that the importance of the role and tasks of an elected representative meant that ‘being on the Council was a job’ [Original emphasis].

142 Ibid. p. 46. Cf. Director’s Cut
143 Ibid. p. 55.
In a similar vein, despite being a democratic body, the conduct of the Council meetings reinforced hierarchy based on rank and length of service, according to Evans, and the ethos of general conformity made difficult the discussion of anything radical. Evans' verdict, specific to Cambridge at a particular time, but relevant to many more such meetings in other institutions, is that the Administrative officers 'had it all their own way, deciding the agenda, writing the papers, leading the Vice-Chancellor through the meeting'\(^{145}\). This demonstrates the point that, the introduction of any hierarchy, including a seven-year, rather than two year term for the Vice-Chancellor, focuses power and patronage despite democratic foundations. At Abecedary Institute, the 'management' gradually packed the committees as ex-officio members and restricted further the limited democracy in the committee structure.

Power was really based in The General Board which served The Council by producing proposals for it to consider and to recommend to the direct democracy [Regent House] for consideration, and if requested, discussion and a general ballot. The General Board was 'powerful', 'unelected', chaired by the Vice-Chancellor and its members were the Chairs of the various groupings of academic subjects, and some others nominated by The Council with the intent of providing a 'larger vision'\(^{146}\). The Council was supposed to supervise the Board, but, in reality, according to Evans, agendas and minutes were kept from The Council. During the 1990s, 'exercises, initiatives, and procedures, which land on them [the staff] hard, from the centre'\(^{147}\) appeared from this secretive and easily manipulated world'. Evans cannot identify the source but suggests that 'a stream of piecemeal initiatives' 'seemed' [Original emphasis] to come from The General Board\(^{148}\). Amongst them was the abandonment of a 'visible published salary scale' for particular grades of post; salary 'top-up' payments; the first staff contracts with 'draconian' confidentiality clauses; 'an undertaking to accept future changes in terms and conditions' of service; a bid to 'seize intellectual property rights of staff'; and an end to the official residency requirement for students on degree courses\(^{149}\). These were not put to the electorate 'as policy-questions' for discussion, but were 'stowed away in half-sentences in Reports ostensibly about other things'. They appeared to be being 'smuggled in'. They were presented as the 'wills' of the

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\(^{145}\) Ibid. p. 57.

\(^{146}\) Ibid. p. 57.


\(^{148}\) Ibid. p. 58.

\(^{149}\) Ibid. p. 58.
administration committees of which the administrators were the 'servants'.
‘Papers’ came to The Council as *faits accomplis*, because they had been considered by 'the committee below', 'The work had been done. It was too late'. Administrative officers...began to use..."management" and "managers” more and more bare-facedly. The Regent House [the direct democracy] as governing body was being effectively side-lined.

The consequence of the creation of a hierarchy with the Registrary in charge of a unified administration, with a subordinate Treasurer and General Secretary, was that it had 'left the Registrary with too much power. There was no one to check him, if he made mistakes and few who could provide him with a sounding board or frank comments on the wisdom of some of his decisions. The best of men could get it wrong sometimes'. Evans' forgiving account here confirms themes and ideas about 'princes' and their follies from 'the order of egoism', Tuchman's *The March of Folly*, Gibbon, Castiglione, Dostoyevsky and which also played out in Abecedary Institute. When hierarchy faltered the solution was to produce more of the same, so that 'bureaucracies expanded, because mistakes 'would not have happened if there had been more administrators'. An independent report agreed, suggesting more administrators at the centre and in departments, and so did the Board of Scrutiny, but it 'doubted' that the increased number of administrators had proportionately outstripped the growth in work. Good administrators were rare, not easy to retain and therefore higher salaries were offered, while young, highly qualified academics gazed on with envy.

This added to the general enmity between academics and managers. A study of Australian institutions could comment: 'The academic-management polarity is deeply felt, as numerous studies of academic attitudes attest'. Evans points up Cambridge’s hyper-sensitivity to the 'management invasion', because of its centuries-old academic direct democracy. Abecedary Institute’s respondents in this research had also been invaded and looked hard for change but found only more of the same, because it had never been a direct democracy, but a paternalist organisation with a laissez-faire approach mirroring its own vocational

150 Ibid. p. 59.
151 Ibid. p. 58.
152 Ibid. p. 65.
purpose to train the young to train the younger. Its laissez-faire approach meant that over time some teams had acquired a measure of autonomy and identity and had been allowed to get on with the job.\(^{156}\)

Evans defines the ‘acceptable’ and the ‘unacceptable faces’ of management, that mirrors the incompatible alternative models of control or cooperation that have been a theme through this commentary. One face of management is unexceptionably acceptable: ‘running things well and smoothly and efficiently and with a proper sense of service and stewardship’ the other is ‘top-down control of academic life’. This last was the invasion that Cambridge ‘feared’. From her perspective of working in Cambridge’s direct democracy and, perhaps, perceiving at firsthand for the first time evidence of managerial control, Evans’ observation is that ‘Such line management and collegiality are perhaps fundamentally incompatible...\([where]\) independently-minded and articulate and challenging academics \(\text{[That is their job.]}\) \(\text{[are concerned]}\) “line management” is not going to work’.\(^{157}\) The basic question that Evans puts is whether academic democracy ‘has a place...in the management of universities’. Incisively Evans refers back to the parallel with governing a country, in much the same way that respondents to this research, who worked under hierarchies, turned to being ‘governed’ and ‘ruled’ as their measure of management; given the relationship between government and the civil service, Evans trenchantly concludes that ‘If it is an unacceptable way to run a university, it is an unacceptable way to govern a country’.\(^{158}\)

Evans’ narrative is one of an absence of trust and openness. The bottom line is that the location of power in the direct democracy of all the academic and office holders in Regent House brought much to light that conceivably would have remained concealed amongst the management. On the other hand, it is an account of the neglect and lack of vigilance on behalf of the democratic processes by the electorate and of its eventual awakening. Continuing the image of the similarity between government and civil service, she tells of specific responsibilities being blurred, with administrators engaging in ‘creeping managerialism, leading the civil servant to think he is the Minister’.\(^{159}\) She tells of administrators taking decisions on their own initiative without consultation or

\(^{156}\) Cf. Director’s Cut


\(^{158}\) Ibid. p. 69.

\(^{159}\) Ibid. p.47 & 48.
approval from the body that supervised staff, and other decisions that were ‘hastily ratified retrospectively’ amongst ‘crowded agendas’. However, the direct democracy, once aroused, legitimately stood in its way. For example, though a requirement to advertise all posts had been put in place, it ‘could be waived for “managerial” reasons; one consequence was ‘senior [administrative] appointments, carrying vast salaries and great power...were able to be made under the counter’ without internal or external competition. This arose out of a convoluted scenario of the creation of new senior administrative posts, including a Director of Finance, at the highest level, the consequent duplication, restructuring and avoidance of redundancy and ‘covering of tracks’\textsuperscript{160}. The debate within Cambridge reached the Times Higher Education Supplement – open democracy in action, perhaps – where a member of the Board of Scrutiny could include in his account phrases like: duties passing ‘in a less that transparent manner’, ‘none of the bigger heads has rolled...at a time when all academic posts are frozen’, and ‘sticking plaster proposals’\textsuperscript{161}. The Chairman of the Board of Scrutiny labelled it ‘confusion at the top’, senior officers’ difficulty of ‘making hard choices because of longstanding relationships’, and ‘the ambiguity of reporting responsibilities’. Her verdict required the Council to ‘remind itself of its responsibility towards the hundreds of members of Regent House [the direct democracy] and the employees of the University’\textsuperscript{162}. This formally reasserted that power actually lay with the direct democracy of the institution.

From the days of Thatcher’s changes to higher education in the late 1980s and early 1990s, government had exhorted higher education institutions to generate their own income by being more enterprising. New Labour from 1997 continued that policy. The Labour Minister for Higher Education could declare in 2002 that ‘she wanted ‘the market to play a much stronger role’ in research investment in the Universities’\textsuperscript{163}. Government had other public expenditure priorities and the driver for enterprise was to make higher education institutions pay their way.

Without any science or practical research base and little presence in the region except for teachers, Abecedary Institute seemed to be both out of luck and out of assets apart from conference accommodation, and even there its competitors had more attractions. Nevertheless, it set up an Enterprise Unit as a freestanding

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid. p. 49.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. p. 72.
company with the Institute's Chairman of Governors and the Chief Executive
taking over similar roles as the Enterprise Unit's Chairman of the Board and
Company Secretary. Its story of business enterprise through courses and
conferences raised exactly the same issues as Cambridge University's links with
business. The difference between the two stories is that because of the difference
between the governance structures of the two institutions, Cambridge's 'direct
democracy' and Abecedary Enterprise Unit, the latter could keep its operation
almost private, while Cambridge's business was brought out into the open.
Cambridge University's international reputation and resources would seem to
make it easier to find industrial and commercial partners to forge the links that
the Government theorised would help fund the University and also stimulate the
national economy. Evans' verdict on Cambridge's enterprise [Cambridge Liaison
Office or CLO] which has all the advantages of a world-wide brand-image is that
the 'assertions...remain untested' that future 'world-class' status depends upon the
University's integration...with business and the community at all levels' and that
'the forming of strategic partnerships plays a key role' in ensuring its [the
University's] 'relevance'. Central to Evans' detailed narrative of Cambridge's
partnership funding and corporate initiatives is the comparison with Oxford
University's attitude to the potential 'stresses between different cultures and
objectives, and to unhealthy mixed motives. We [Oxford University] shall have to
be attentive to manage this and to understand clearly that our function is research
not development'. Oxford had identified that 'a big issue here is quality
control... The universities are overseeing quality to protect their reputations, even
though they are not giving credit for the courses or even selecting the students'.
Cambridge had already encountered such problems for industry looked for short-
term project development by teams, while university 'blue-skies' thinkers puzzled
alone at problems. Time had also shown that big business was not always
soundly operated, in some cases, calamitously and sometimes unlawfully.
Marconi's funding of a building was withdrawn when the latest version of the once
most successful British company, GEC, crashed; controversy dogged funding

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164 Cf. Research Design.
166 Ibid. pp. 73-74, citing Oxford University Gazette, Supplement (2) to No. 4560, 11 October 11, 2000.
p.131.
168 Ibid. p. 83.
from Tyco when Kozlowski was charged with US tax fraud\textsuperscript{169}, and likewise when funding was forthcoming from British American Tobacco Industries\textsuperscript{170}. The controversies centred on ethical issues to which the 'policy' solution was that 'since there could be moral objections to almost all sources of money it was probably best to ignore them and just take the cash\textsuperscript{171}. The same controversy haunted other funding and in the absence of considered policy, the line was 'best to swallow scruples and take the money\textsuperscript{172}. Once funding had been accepted on these terms, it became an 'approved source\textsuperscript{173} from which further funding could be accepted. However, companies, even multi-nationals, pulled out of agreements when 'it suited them\textsuperscript{174}. Even partnerships with élite US institutions, like MIT, with the British government putting in £68 million over 5 years to produce measurable benefits, clear targets and transparency\textsuperscript{175}, had resulted by 2003 in 'failure to get off the ground anything which could deliver value for the public money put into it\textsuperscript{176}. Other projects like the e-University and competing with the 400 US corporate universities, that existed by the mid-1990s but which lacked 'staying power', led the university into making what was on offer 'sound\[s\] less like a university and more like a corporate marketing department\textsuperscript{177}. Once embarked on these kinds of enterprise, managing them, whether at Abecedary Institute or Cambridge, followed similar patterns, so that Cambridge was not good 'at drawing on its in-house expertise' and ignored 'internal help in favour of an expensive consultancy of external providers\textsuperscript{178}, because projects were not in the hands of educators or 'deliverers'. The problem for both organizations was the different cultures and of keeping 'separate the commercial and the academic in the 'delivery' of the resulting programmes\textsuperscript{179}. By and large, the academic lost. Of the Cambridge Programme for Industry, Evans reports that the 'purely academic supervision of the provision and standards of courses in the University was being side-stepped. Control passing into non-academic hands with business priorities, who took to 'report' to the University the outcomes of its quality

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. pp. 81-82.  
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. pp. 77-78.  
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. p. 78.  
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. p. 80.  
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. p. 80.  
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. p. 83.  
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid. p. 97, citing \textit{Cambridge University Reporter}, 22 March 2000.  
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid. p. 102.  
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid. p.103, citing \textit{Guardian Education Section}, 10 September, 2002.  
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. p.104, Cf. Director's Cut  
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid. p. 110.
assurance monitoring. Evans supplies copious detail of the difficulties and dependability of commercial partnership funding and repeats the BBC Programme 'In Business' verdict that the result of the University's efforts was a 'modest proliferation of rather small projects'.

Evans' account of Cambridge's enterprise initiatives is typical of the responses to the government policy to which the proverbs: 'Beggars can't be choosers' and 'Everyone has their price' could apply to all the national Higher Education Institutions.

There was nothing new about the ideology behind it. The late nineteenth century debate on the reforms of education had rejected a wholly government scheme in favour of a Church and State, private-public match-funded system, where 'value for money should be secured'. The Governments of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries had merely changed partners for the delivery of their ideological policies. In the nineteenth century Lowe, its proponent, reversed the wider aims of the philosophy of education as a 'centre of social life and culture' in favour of usefulness. His notion also included the idea of fees because he thought that poor people would perceive the economic and social advantage in keeping their children at school at their own expense, just as the evidence of the future earning power of a degree was used in the late twentieth century. Lowe also believed in 'markets' and announced that 'Hitherto we have been living under a system of bounties and protection. Now we propose to have a little free trade...If it [education] is not cheap, it shall be efficient; if it is not efficient, it shall be cheap'. The Labour Minister of Higher Education evoked the 'market' to match the 'free trade'; the efficiency and cheapness were more implied.

Evans outlines the external, ideological, government pressure on the higher education sector, to which Cambridge University responded, thus: 'to do what the Government wanted and become more businesslike, form partnerships and links, attract industrial funding and adapt its educational system to meet the needs of the modern world and particularly the commercial modern world'. Cambridge's mission statement of 1993 offers a wider view of the University's 'main

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180 Ibid. p. 111.
purpose...to foster and develop academic excellence across a wide range of subjects and at all levels of study...[and] to develop new areas of teaching and research in response to the advance of scholarship and the needs of the community. Business industry and commerce were not prominent in those needs'. Yet, ironically, the essence of Cambridge's and Oxford's eight hundred year-old direct democratic structures of governance already reflected some of the progressive management thinking and organization currently being promoted by another government department [Viz. high performance work]. In contrast, Evans points up the success of Management studies at Cambridge [Judge Institute of Management] in its 'corporate friendliness' to 'would be benefactors to set up new named professorships', but also its failure of its 'in-house 'experts''' to offer 'common-sense practical advice for the University administration'. Evans' account goes into intricate detail but her narrative shows that what happened depended upon the character and abilities of the people, not the systems and procedures. Systems, including democracy, can be subverted if they are not vigilantly observed and protected.

The relationship between the desires of an individual and the context of procedures and systems within which that individual chooses how to act and conduct herself/himself has been one of the constant themes of this commentary. It is a universal. This is a matter of public interest when it affects institutions financed by government and taxpayers. Constitutions, regulations and procedures are drafted carefully, after the manner of Hobbes' egoism, with checks and balances to offset the actions of an individual. This is the theory that lets us sleep safely abed, though at the end of the twentieth century in Britain, a senior civil servant could comment on the tendency of government 'to hold fewer...meetings, covering diminishing subject areas. He traced the replacement of real collegial debate with Prime Ministerial fiat'. This had not shaken the civil servant's confidence in the constitution's capacity to adapt to such 'subtle but far-reaching shifts', while its integrity remained unchanged. Lord Butler had confidence that what went under the name of a 'different style', 'fashions of operation' and finally

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186 Cf. Director's Cut.
188 Ibid. p. 86.
189 Ibid. p. 111-112.
'a personal bid for Prime Ministerial power' [My emphases] could not get 'out of hand' because 'I think the instruments are all there for, if a Prime Minister gets off the leash, doing something about it'191. This is the same Lord Butler whose report on WMD and Iraq Enquiry ['The Dodgy Dossier'] was written in the same oblique civil service mandarin style. His thesis was in effect that the constitution had the capabilities to prevent a wild character making a bid ['style', 'fashion', 'personal bid' for despotism, but the implication was that they were not automatically [My emphasis] triggered. He was admitting, as though it were perfectly obvious, that the character of the principal figure in a hierarchy affected the nature of the government and the organization. What Lord Butler was defining here is the heart of the matter as far as those who work in organizations: if there is a hierarchy which has a measure of permanence, the person at its head defines the conditions under which the organization operates and how others shall work and live. If power is leaked down to the second tier, as Castiglione suggests, then it will norm into a collective character, based on mutual dependence, that will define the nature, ethos, culture of the organization. The rules and regulations may define the range within which operations may take place – and Castiglione even allows within that range for the murder of 10,000192 - but within that the head, monarch, oligarchy193 or directorate194 have far more discretion than most would like to believe, let alone allow. Rules and procedures in managing organization therefore only lay down the range within which a manager may operate. This can be viewed negatively as a wide range within which it is impossible to check a manager. In Abecedary Institute, the response to an Industrial Tribunal which found against the Institute over a grievance about an unfair appointment, brought a response from the management that the correct procedures had been followed; as though working within a 'tick-box' range of activities was an indication of legality, never mind the actions themselves and justice and ethics. There is enough anecdotal evidence and trade unions have a history of confidential

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191 Ibid. p. 6, citing an answer to a question.
193 i.e., of Cambridge University.
194 i.e., of Abecedary Institute
examples, both within and outside the rules and procedures, where persons under the name of 'managers' do exercise their own individual discretion and actions and which therefore illustrate that all depends upon character, the passions or interests of the person who is called a 'manager'.

Evans uses Lord Butler's comments to introduce her account of the operation and subversion of the controls of Cambridge University's direct democracy under the stewardship of particular officers. They were part of a pattern of conflict between administration and governance, though their personal 'style' or character had led them to choose certain courses of action.

The University had undergone a set of governance reforms in the 1990s, which included the introduction of the fixed seven-year term Vice-Chancellorship. These reforms bore a resemblance to those in the British Civil Service in the 1990s, which differentiated between the principles of 'accountability' and 'responsibility'. Thus, 'a division of the functions or operations of the civil service was devised which was intended to allow the 'responsibility' for the superintendence of practical operations to proceed under different practical rules from 'accountability' for the taking and implementation of policy decisions'\(^\text{195}\). In Government this 'clear rationale' was frustrated by politicians; in Cambridge, Evans' account uses the same 'mandarin' expressions: it 'was frustrated by politics...a certain confusion of function among the 'civil service' administrators, in part the behaviour of the coterie \(\text{[Original emphasis]}\) in the Oligarchy'\(^\text{196}\). Evans reasserts that Cambridge's constitution depends upon 'a strong conscious collegiality', i.e., 'an equality of all those with a vote' in the direct democracy. Though some University 'civil servants' took 'pride' in functioning as 'servants' of the academic community, the direct democracy ['one person one vote, including the Vice-Chancellor] was 'being overlaid by the practicalities of line management' – 'this was the era of management studies'\(^\text{197}\). Evans sees the 'spirit of the times' encapsulated in a contribution to the consultation [GB 886 -634] about the reforms of the early 1990s, when a senior administrator 'criticised the spirit of independence' of the culture of 'a self-governing community of scholars which is administered rather than managed', and could 'think of no useful role for [the direct democracy] Regent House'. The published response of the General Board [\text{which was the proposing group of Vice-Chancellor, senior administrators and their nominees}]

\^\text{196} Ibid. p. 171.
\^\text{197} Ibid. p. 171.
which produces propositions for the Council] to the reforms denounced the way
members of Regent House regard themselves as sharers in decision-making
rather than simply as employees of the University' and finished by showing
a 'dislike' for having to 'refer 'recommendations to the Council for decision". The
General Board went on to propose the transfer of 'certain additional powers' from
the direct democracy and the 'delegation of authority' to itself, the General
Board'. As presented in her account, it was as obvious a take-over as Caesar
crossing the Rubicon.

Evans allows some confusion of roles because the administrative post holders
were also voting members of the direct democracy. Evans also identifies in the
administration something that in politics is very dangerous, though she does not
present it so, i.e., 'an investment in its own "rightness" which went very deep'.
Evans quotes an email commenting on the Oligarchy which points to the strong
identification between the administrators and the University: 'most important of
all, it [the University] stands for them, for the collective and individual being,
providing them with a powerful feeling of self-worth...[anyone asking them to give
and account will] constitute such a painful reproach and sleep-depriving threat to
them'

One of the strengths of the direct democracy was that everyone could speak and
their speeches were published verbatim. The Oligarchy on the other hand
regarded it as 'letting off steam'. The Oligarchy tried to introduce restrictions
on the frequency of members' contributions to debates; one administrator
admitted that he 'hated' the debates and that they were superfluous in an
'electronic age'. An attempt to dispense with the debates was met with a
groundswell of protest, including from the students, and subsequent attempts
focused on restrictions via a proposal that ruled on 'relevance', which meant
that the speech would not be reported or published and so would be lost to the
general electorate. When this was put to the general vote, there was confusion
over the administration of the general ballot and the vote was lost and with it the

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198 Ibid. pp. 171-172.
- 7 line 16-28; Text p. 480 line 21 – p. 481 line 1; Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10; Text p. 619 line 1 – 7
line 16-28; Text p. 558 line 25-559 line 8; Text p. 479 line 25 –p. 480 line 19 & Text p. 479 line 1-15.; Text
200 Ibid. p. 173.
201 Ibid. pp. 174-175.
202 Ibid. p. 178.
203 Ibid. p.178.
204 Ibid. p. 179.
'right to know what happened when a speech was “cut off”; there would be no record of the 'silencing' nor any reason published why\textsuperscript{205}. This seriously compromises democracy and the conditions that Habermas advances for a democratic 'ideal speech situation'.

The account of the attacks on controls available to the direct democracy in the form of debates gives the impression that they were many and frequent. Evans makes the point that at Oxford these referenda were 'rare'\textsuperscript{206} and had been less frequent at Cambridge but were used more frequently under the regime of the first full-time Vice-Chancellor [Viz. below]. Their frequency was an indication of the loss of trust. However, to call a debate by getting the 25 signatures was a time-consuming and difficult task and for a debate about maladministration 50 were required; 'academics like to understand a matter before they get involved' and so the time-limits meant that calling a debate was a serious and considerable undertaking\textsuperscript{207}. The reforms of the 1990s had created another form of control, the Board of Scrutiny, but this was nearly killed at birth because it was said to be 'unnecessary'\textsuperscript{208}; publication of its reports were delayed months after the events reviewed, but it did eventually play an important role in the assessment of the failure of the University's accounting system.

Evans demonstrates that the existence of safeguards in the rules and procedures of the governance of Cambridge University was not sufficient to prevent 'the wilful failure of the administration to allow them to be used as intended...when the results might have been criticism of senior administrators and the self-perpetuating oligarchy\textsuperscript{209}.

Evans' account is revealing in the sub-textual use of the language of emotions, passions, desires, pride and humiliation: frustrated', 'wilful', 'hated', 'feeling of self worth', 'painful', 'sleep-depriving', 'threat', 'deep...sense of rightness', 'dislike', 'pride' in serving the academic community, spirit of independence. It is clearly illustrative of Gadamer's view that 'being is manifest in the language'. Evans is recording and explaining events and people and indicating in this use of language corroborative evidence of the predominant role of the passions in the motivation of action, after the views of Hume, and therefore of the dominance of character over organizational and management procedures and regulations.

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. p. 181.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. p. 43.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid. p. 181.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid. p. 187.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid. p. 189.
Evans describes as a ‘subterranean torrent’ the persistent undermining by the Administration of the University’s constituted direct democracy through ‘by-pass[ing] the University’s constitution and domestic laws when it suited them’. The relevant issue was ‘whether personal managerial power [My emphasis] should replace democracy and be allowed to override ‘accountability’ checks and balances’²¹⁰. Professor Edwards, in his Foreword, supports this view with a longer perspective, beginning with constitutional changes in 1963, that ‘redistributed authority’²¹¹, and records the period 1970-85 when named senior administrators in permanent posts ‘started to dismantle the constitution...cleverly, and legally...careful to obey the rituals, but drip by drip they ensured that the executive power of the [direct democracy] was drained away into their hands.

When challenged they professed innocence, and many, especially Vice-Chancellors were taken in’ [My note: At that time, Vice-Chancellors had only two years’ tenure of office. Viz. above.] His story goes on to recount the shifting fortunes in the battle between the Administration and the direct democracy, with the seven-year Vice-Chancellor as the result. This introduces the period from 1997 that Evans’ book records. Edwards gives the arc of her story and lays the initiative with the named Vice-Chancellor and Registrary, who ‘brushed’ other administrators aside, ‘statutes not withstanding’; set ‘in earnest’ about the destruction of statutory government’; ‘acolytes and sympathisers commenting on the absurdity of trying to run a “world-class” university under a set of “medieval” rules; and records a variety of actions entered into without the knowledge of the governing ‘direct democracy ‘charged by Parliament with carrying the ultimate responsibility for Cambridge. Edwards seats the guardianship of the direct democracy in the offices of Vice-Chancellor and Registrary. If the persons holding those offices are bent on ‘subverting’ democracy, because ‘they may sincerely believe that firm managerial and executive action is in the best interests of the institution, as many in different forms of government have believed before them... they cannot have understood the nature of democracy or the independence of the academic mind. To challenge academic democracy whose values are deeply respected is a sure prescription for confrontational politics’. His remarks – ‘firm management and executive action’ - hint darkly at totalitarian governments and the totalitarian tendency that Critical Theory Management Studies has also identified. ‘Cambridge

²¹⁰ Ibid. p. 160.
has both ‘governance’ [academic democracy] and ‘administration [an internal civil service], a dual-control system that worked well enough...until the administrators got it into their heads that they would really like to be ‘managers’. ‘Management’ can have meaning incompatible with civil service. In Cambridge there was a power-struggle, a battle for control, to a degree where common sense was lost sight of and risks multiplied, unobserved by the combatants until disaster struck"^{212}.  

This summary and Evans’ whole account confirms that people being managed think of it as being ‘governed’ and evaluate it accordingly, as a political act that is a public deed, guided by ethics, that affects their integrity as human beings; moreover, they see in those actions the operation of character and passions, not rational systems and procedures. These last are merely the tools to hand. The difference in the Cambridge and the Abecedary Institute stories is that Cambridge has its democracy, which managed to preserve itself from attack. Abecedary thought it had once had something like democracy but it was an illusion. Finally, it had to endure under an appointed oligarchy that respondents compared to 1930s totalitarianism, thought some did make an attempt at some form of democratic representation that it wished it had^{213}.  

‘Cambridge’s inner life is relatively easy to penetrate because so much of it is on public record^{214} and its debates were not only recorded verbatim but often attracted reporters from the national press. Abecedary Institute’s proceedings were minuted but the arguments never presented, and the internal newspaper was published by the management and independent commentary was impossible. An external observer at the Cambridge debates, who was also charged with reporting on the failure of a new university accounting system attended the relevant debates [Discussions] and commented on the freedom of the exchanges: ‘Anyone from outside the University who has read or been present at [the debates/the Discussions of the direct democracy]...must be surprised at their tone and the freedom with which personal criticisms are ventilated^{215}. Similarly one speech included the debate contribution: ‘Reports and notices dripping with

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contempt and utterly dismissive of dissent have convinced many that the Administration of the University is out of control\textsuperscript{216}. This comment on the ‘management’ of the University is supported by the Oligarchs’ communications on three occasions to a reform review [The Lambert Review, which suggested ending the direct democracy] without informing the direct democracy ‘what had been said on their behalf’. Evans lays the charge at the ‘individuals’ concerned: Vice-Chancellor, senior administrators and the oligarchy of academics. Their submission had been for ‘much more personal power for a Chief Executive and his close circle, the Oligarchs themselves\textsuperscript{217}.

Evans’ narrative demonstrates how the manoeuvres to subvert the direct democracy were woven into the events like a permanent thread. The path toward such changes in the governance had followed the failure of the accounting and financial control system and the imminent appointment of the Vice-Chancellor’s successor. The new computer accounting system had been introduced in haste, ‘under-specified’\textsuperscript{218} and ‘had failed to make provision for some of the most fundamental accounting needs of the University’, for example, Ph. D students’ payments, and payment of salaries\textsuperscript{219}. Evans’ narrative is a clear illustration of the lack of knowledge of what was going on and of detailed planning, in fact the specialised knowledge that Gintis identifies as the operational strength of cooperative teams. These were the kind of criticisms that were levelled at the committee given the oversight of the new accounting system: lack of ‘professional[ly] relevance’, ‘being closer to the project of management’\textsuperscript{220}. The steering committee had been appointed by the principal officers. Evans comments on them as though they were courtiers: ‘They were never great boat-rockers and did not like to have the boat rocked about them. They chose from the Oligarchy and its entourage [Original emphasis] as they always did’\textsuperscript{221}. Evans comments on the absence of anyone ‘taking responsibility or exercising leadership...[and] creative or commonsensical thought into planning’\textsuperscript{222}. The report on the failure commented that it had been thought that ‘change could be driven by the implementation of the system’ without ‘facing[e] up to the

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{216} Ibid. p. 258, citing Cambridge University Reporter, 20 November 2002.
\item\textsuperscript{217} Ibid. p. 258-259.
\item\textsuperscript{218} Ibid. p. 126
\item\textsuperscript{219} Ibid. p. 127, & 129
\item\textsuperscript{221} Ibid. p. 124.
\item\textsuperscript{222} Ibid. p. 124-125.
\end{footnotes}
arguments’ and the discussions necessary to persuade all the users to change. The end of the story includes the auditor’s refusal to certify the University accounts and the threatened extinction of small academic departments because of the effect of the model for the allocation of resources. Significantly, this did not apply equally to administrative departments which, at some moment, might have made their ‘specialised knowledge’ known.

Perhaps all higher education managements had systems failures but what is interesting about them is what they reveal, just as Abecedary Institute’s accounting problems, computer timetable system and unitisation of courses did. Implied in the Oligarchy’s recommendation alone are the ideas that in a hierarchy the organization reflects the personal style and deficiencies of the head of it, [Viz, below comment on ‘big’ achievements, politics and word skills]; the reluctance to consult outside of the managing group and the failure to reach a ‘truth’ by not discussing freely; Gintis’ account of the superior efficiency of cooperative groups because of their grounded specialised knowledge; and the self-imposed isolation of the management from others, like the court from the people, and the totalising tendency of systems and procedures to treat everything as the same and so diminish the individual parts.

The failure of the accounting system brought about a demand for reform but this did not include addressing the inadequacy and failure of the officers responsible. Instead, the blame fell on the University’s Constitution of democratic governance for the administrative failure and so hastened proposed changes or ‘reforms’ to the constitution. The administrative failure was not separated from the constitutional issue because that would have yielded clarity and identified personal responsibility. The changes therefore proposed endowing the Vice-Chancellor [as Chief Accounting officer] with ‘a new personal power’ and other administrative officers with additional powers. This is the classic self-belief in the transforming power of the leader, like Mussolini’s thunderbolt as he boarded the train: ‘From now on everything must function to perfection.’ The recommendations seem characteristic of the classic takeover, from republic to imperial power, as in the

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224 Cf. Research Design.
225 Cf. Director’s Cut
226 Cf. Prologue.
narrative of the overthrow of the Roman Republic to temporary Triumvirate, and finally Imperial power for Augustus, who had the cunning to call himself the 'first citizen' to preserve a semblance of republicanism. It also illustrated how managements norm, conform and stick together, like courtiers round a Prince\textsuperscript{228}. Without dwelling on the details, the direct democracy was to be diluted with external nominees and the new Council would decide on the size and nature of the future electoral franchise. Instead of the usual democratic process of proposals and subsequent debates, the consultation process took place by email and 'road-shows' where the presentation of the detailed changes took up most of the sessions. However, protests succeeded in securing a debate in which one comment was that the 'consultation' was devised 'to deliver the Regent House's [the direct democracy's] acquiescence. This exercise invites comparison with the appointment of Josef Goebbels in 1933 as Reich Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment\textsuperscript{229}. This resonates with views on the regime of control and procedures issuing from the Directorate at Abecedary Institute\textsuperscript{230}. Systems and procedures are rarely watertight and unassailable from politics and politicians. These constitutional changes were put to the electorate but the timing was in the control of the Oligarchy who originally set the ballot for the Christmas vacation when the holiday period would make it difficult to organize opposition. This was thwarted and the changes were narrowly voted down with less than 1000 voting out of an electorate of 3000.

From inside the story, Evans verdict is that these reforms were ideologically based and bent 'to Government wishes' and that without both these constraints 'a community of very intelligent people could have done better\textsuperscript{231}. From the perspective of Abecedary Institute where 'imperious' managerial control was a reality, the Cambridge electorate were very fortunate in having the final say. A remark from the public debate about the totalitarian tendency of the process is chillingly accurate but it could hardly have been made in public at Abecedary Institute, because not only was there no opportunity to do so, but the personal courage required would have been outstanding. However, it was made a number

of times in confidence by the respondents from that institution toward the end of their story\textsuperscript{232}. In Critical Theory terms this account reveals the deliberate dismantling of democracy as defined by the conditions that Habermas describes for his democratic ideal speech situation \textsuperscript{233}.

Within the story of the defeated constitutional changes that centred on increasing the Vice-Chancellor's executive power and that of the administrators, Evans identifies how and from where these proposed changes emerged. Though only serving for seven years, instead of two under the old regulations, the duration of office made the Vice-Chancellor, the head of the University, a more important figure in the Cambridge story and Evans gives due weight to his role, and how he chose to interpret it. Since Thatcher's changes to the higher education system in the late 1980s, government had explored 'in the name of 'value for money' how to make university research accessible to business\textsuperscript{234} by forging partnerships with business and industry. The 'stick' was that, as university paymaster, the government could control university disobedience by withholding funds. The 'carrot' was the government's policy to give the universities freedom to appoint staff [who were not civil servants as in Europe] and to determine and manage their resources with autonomy\textsuperscript{235}. The links with business and industry implied that universities should start to 'imitate business and industry in their practices'\textsuperscript{236} and this occurred in the post 1992 institutions, like Abecedary Institute, where almost all the new governors were from such backgrounds. In fact, Government had other priorities and restricted funds, so this new autonomy was pushing the universities to make up the shortfall in funding wherever their enterprise might lead\textsuperscript{237}. Fees contributed something from 1997, but no private source, endowment, business partnership could ever provide a steady, assured income-stream. Stock markets falter and fall; industries fall out of fashion and fail. Some Vice-Chancellors had been early in accepting the business model of Chief Executive Officer and Board as the organization model of universities and others

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{233} Geuss R. Op. cit. p. 65, citing Habermas J.
\bibitem{235} Cf. above: Florio.
\bibitem{236} Cf. above: Vice-Chancellor's comment about becoming CEOs with boards of directors.
\bibitem{237} Cf. Research Design
\end{thebibliography}
had defined universities as ‘major wealth-creation players’ with ‘an economic justification for supporting the wealth-creation and societal benefits of universities’238. Accepting the government line was a general trend amongst university leaders, which confirms the view that the leaders of ‘not-for profit’ organizations are without vision and are, by nature, administrators. When the top-up fees debate was taking place with the economic advantages of a university education as its principle justification, notably no alternative vision for higher education came from the Vice-Chancellors.

In this context, the Cambridge Vice-Chancellor had a choice, which could be rationalised as strategic: to be concerned with ‘the inner well being of the University’, or to be ‘an outward facing Vice-Chancellor’ and direct his energy at ‘seeking links with industry and commerce and politicians and wealthy benefactors, whose money as well as their influence was in play’239. Whatever the case, Evans’ account suggests the choice was at bottom personal and her evidence supports Hume’s analysis of the supremacy of the passions and desires. Rather than developing his own vision for Cambridge, he therefore accepted the government’s, except his interpretation of it was to make it ‘big’.

His substantial list of interests included being on the Prime Minister’s Council on Science and Technology and there seemed to be some confusion between those interests that reflected his role as Vice-Chancellor, like an organization for overseas graduates, and those that were personal, like the membership of the board of one of the top five companies on the London Stock Exchange. A former commonwealth Cambridge student and doctorate, he had spent 22 years at a US based multinational information technology giant240, where he ‘learned to be proud [My emphasis. Viz. Hume below] to think himself as a business man241 and ‘the link between engineering and management is close to the Chancellor’s heart’242. This suggests that one strong influence would have been the American mass-production-line-organizational-thinking of the Taylorism management style243, rather than the accounting base of the British style244. He had declared that he was ‘intent that the big ideas at Cambridge are turned into big companies’

239 Ibid. p. 38.
240 Ibid. p. 21.
241 Ibid. p. 36.
243 Cf. High performance work [above] which recognises the deficiencies of the old style production line management for creative work and higher performance.
244 Cf. Director’s Cut
and the creation of 'Big International Players'. Elsewhere he quoted Pye and Philips as examples of companies emerging from universities. When it came to appointing new staff in the Management subject areas there were 'fanfares' for these 'Big Leading Players'. During his term of office there was also the 'excitements of...'[the] announcement of a big building funded by a big name...[which] emptied the University's coffers. Evans comments that his style as a Master of a College was that 'he would have the contents of agendas and papers explained to him; he did not take readily to mastering them himself. A personal command of detail was not for senior management; it was for apparatchiks. 'His one clear 'management principle' was that the detail should be left to 'his' staff. He let the Registrary get on with it. Later Evans suggests 'he identified himself with the administration which he regarded as 'his'. He was 'prime minister and 'civil servant'; impatient from the first with the constitutional requirement...that he should work by talking things through' first with the Council and then, that he and the Council should have put every important proposal for policy change to 'the direct democracy which required a 'regular "referendum"'. The constitution gave him 'few powers beyond those of a figurehead, but every opportunity should he choose to do so for him to exert "moral authority". He found this frustrating. Evans suggest that the Vice-Chancellor's press office encouraged the media to be 'derisive about the operation of this democracy', because the Vice-Chancellor did not like it at all. 'He was heard to claim that it got in the way of speedy decision-making if a mere few individual among the voters were allowed to challenge what he and his immediate circle of senior administrators wanted. He was irritated by the inevitable delays ballots caused. Evans concedes that the issue is important but locates the focus of the issue in 'trust...in a well run régime' [Original emphasis] and in the

247 Ibid. p. 141.
248 Ibid. p. 37
249 Ibid. p.51.
250 Ibid. p.172.
251 Cf: While under a monarchy, the king was the country - echoing Louis XIV's famous 'L'Etat, c'est moi' - and displaced the people, a government might fail but the people were always there to appeal to and rely on. 'Only when [the people is] corrupted, is liberty truly lost. Happily the people is naturally virtuous. A nation becomes truly corrupt only when it passes from democracy to aristocracy or monarchy'. Robespierre M. Discours et rapports à la Convention Paris: Union Générale des Éditions, 1965 p.218., cited in Dunn J. Op. cit. p. 117.
252 Ibid. p. 43.
Vice-Chancellor; she draws the parallel with Oxford where referendums were rare. Oddly, no category of decisions that would require such 'speed' is identified, and Evans does not suggest that this was a false debating point. Yet most events that happen in institutions of higher education are predictable from year to year; when there is a crisis, it is rare. If the daily routine becomes a 'fire-fighting-crisis-management, it is more than likely that the condition is caused by the absence of the 'specialised knowledge', that is, knowing the detail of the actual circumstances and operation. This is exactly the 'specialised knowledge' that Gintis identified in co-operative teams and which contributed to their effectiveness\textsuperscript{254}. This is clearly illustrated in Evans' account of the reactions to the early warnings of the failure of the university-wide, new accounting system, where she reports that the Vice-Chancellor 'had been seen to chair the Council \textit{[which considered proposals from the General Board (of administrators) My note.]} with an air of bafflement and impatience while it ignored the clear warnings and expressions of concern 'being expressed months before the failure of the system\textsuperscript{255}. It is a common strategy amongst principal officers to choose between almost exclusive 'external' and 'internal' roles but this really begs the question of whether such a choice is necessary, when the authority of their role is founded in their expert knowledge of the activity they serve, in this case teaching and scholarship. This Vice-Chancellor's background in teaching began on his return to Cambridge and he 'was disarmingly frank' that his knowledge of teaching was scant and the students 'explained...to him what he was supposed to do\textsuperscript{256}. His first teaching post was as Head of Division and over the next thirteen years, he moved up to Head of Department, Master of a College and then Vice-Chancellor. Evans bluntly comes to the point by itemising the nature of the internal role in which this first seven-year term Vice-Chancellor could have 'been a guiding mind, keeping an eye on the threads of the University's many activities, watching over the welfare of students and staff with a kindly and knowledgeable eye\textsuperscript{257}. Amongst many others she gives the examples of the students' complaints procedure; the route for part-time doctorates; 'concern over the unhappiness and the high levels of stress among all categories of staff to get attempts made to improve things'; procedures for staff promotion and upgrading; settling grievance procedures; and staff and

\textsuperscript{254} Cf. Director's Cut
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid. p.36-37.
\textsuperscript{257} Cf. Text p. 170 line 16 - p 172 line: Ideal model.
students seemed to 'sense there was no one to 'go to' at the top. Evans suggest
that there was considerable 'personal authority' to be gained, without the 'need
for power', if he immersed himself in the procedures, business and activities of the
University. Above all else, he 'lost the opportunity to make the University's
existing and recently revised constitution work [i.e., the direct democracy. My
note.]'.

Elsewhere Evans offers the view that the Vice-Chancellor was 'not a politician',
and he 'lacked personal authority and skill with words'. This resonates with
David Hume's account of the need for those with power to persuade 'opinion': 'It
is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this extends to
most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and
most popular'. The choice by this leader reflected his own background,
character and personal assessment of his abilities and his own sense of self worth;
in Evans interpretation it was being 'proud to think himself as a business man'
[Viz. above]. Hume's assessment was that the passions and their reactions
crucially create reflexes within us as we react to other persons and other stimuli
and therefore he derived his general rule that 'everything related to us, which
produces pleasure or pain, likewise produces pride and humility'. Choices that
are made are made by the pleasure that would yield pride or shame; these
prompt our actions, given the possibilities open to us. As Hume puts it: 'Our
reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and
importance; and even the other causes of pride: virtue, beauty and riches; have
little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others.'
A Humean interpretation would be that the choice of roles was based on the
passions, and reason would have been the servant of that decision. It may have
been rationalised, and Hume recognises that, as does Habermas when ideology of
a particular group is rationalised in a 'self justifying' form. However, the matter is
ultimately one of character.

Veblen had identified the leaders of American universities as captains, and
accounts of those in real life have likened them to Roman Emperors. These
observers interpret the general tendency as 'monarchical', while the observed

259 Ibid. p. 51.
Political and Literary Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1987 p. 32.
262 Ibid. p. 316.
provide enough glimmers of evidence to lend credibility to the interpretation. It is
difficult to say which comes first. Obviously the behaviour but the question
remains on what was the behaviour modelled in the first place. Hume's pride
provides a psychological core for such an interpretation and Castiglione's Courtier
a model for the outward behaviour. Castiglione's metaphor for the effect of power
on character is that power is like water and character is like a vessel, so that if the
vessel, which may seem good when empty, has a flaw, the water finds every
chink. His view was that power tests character and finds any weakness. His
analysis suggests that character can lead the Prince to rule in a 'tyrannicall
fashion [s]', and amongst other failings, lead him to outlaw 'assemblies and
conferences among Citizens in Cities'. The tyrannical Prince's main motive is
'feare of them they rule over'.

Evans' account identified the fear of and the
attempts to subvert or abolish end direct democracy, and replace it with more
power for the 'Oligarchy' and for the regime to announce policies. Evans'
evidence of the tendency to think 'big', claim 'big' conquests in the worlds of
commerce and 'big' money and make 'big' announcements of appointments and
new buildings resonates with the qualities that Castiglione said should characterise
a Prince's government like a certain greatness, gained by military prowess,
'gorgeous banquets, feastes, games, people pleasing showes', and for setting up
civic construction projects for great buildings and public works
This mirrors Juvenal's classic formula of bread and circuses,
but it also links with Hume's sense of pride. As Evans puts it the 'favourite game of companies' was to link
their name with Cambridge by 'Naming Chairs' [professorships] and to 'leave so
huge and visible legacy of building' was a 'big attraction to an outgoing Vice-
Chancellor

All these tendencies in Evans' account seem to conform to the classic evidence of
a monarchical mind-set that falls on those who succeed to a hierarchical position,
as though the part is already written for them. All the rituals and signs are
already in place and the roles are written for the members of the court. Most
importantly, it is a role that they covet in the first place. And they all play it the
same way, whether Roman Emperor, Renaissance Prince, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini
or Saddam Hussein.

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265 Cf. Text p. 458 line 19 – p. 460 line 29: Buildings as the measure of change.
Cambridge's Vice-Chancellor has few statutory powers but 'symbolic capital', which matches Bourdieu's description for cultural power, manifest in the deference that Bagehot defined as belonging to office and status with all the theatricality of Royalty, of processions and of those that attended the office. There is evidence in Evans' account of Bagehot's deference, e.g., in advice given in meetings: 'I think you were about to say, Vice-Chancellor', and even the Vice-Chancellor addressing critical meetings and being listened to attentively and in silence. This carried through, particularly, off the University campus where 'office' was not defined by actual contextual powers but by the institution's international reputation and its 800-year history. The alternative history is that of republican equality and freedom of speech, with an accompanying 'civility', as Hume describes it and which Habermas also advocates267, but with none of Bagehot's illusory, theatrical deference. The behaviour of the Vice-Chancellor could be interpreted according to Bourdieu's habitus and Evans could be said to have failed to realise that the game had changed and that a new game was now in progress between 'big' business and Cambridge's direct democracy. Placing them on opposite sides seems quite misplaced given the evidence of greater productivity and success from democratic cooperative organizational structures268 and even Hume's comment that republics produce a commercial but potentially corrupt society and monarchies a world of status and honours269. Bourdieu's habitus does not fully explain the fact that a Vice-Chancellor, with a knowledge of both worlds, 'big' business and academic direct democracy, appeared, in Evans' account, to choose a course of action of accepting that a new game was in progress, when the 'old' game's rules of direct democracy are in operation, and the core traditional task of the University were and are still in progress. He had the choice to attempt to do both; to play the Republican Tribune and be an arbiter, walking the labyrinthine streets and reading the daily graffiti on the walls270. Bourdieu in this context provides an enlightening interpretation of the contextual elements in operational practice but when they account for change there is ultimately, it seems, that element of personal choice and the influence of the desires and passions that gives Hume's psychological and philosophical account the final word.

267 Cf. Director's Cut: Hume & civility.
268 Cf. Director's Cut: Discussion of high performance work.
269 Cf. Director's Cut: Hume on Republics and commerce.
270 Cf. Director's Cut: Roman Republic
Evans' reaction is of one who was looking for a continuation of the Republican form of Vice-Chancellor before the changes in the late 1980s, the transitory leader of two-year terms who returned to the populace afterwards, so ensuring that they followed the republican public virtues of promotion of the good of the general public. She identifies these qualities in the 'internal' choice of role which was not chosen. Castiglione also identified these qualities like justice, 'godly zeal of true religion', love of country and its people, and, a certain gentleness of manner, but existing alongside those of personal grandeur and personal achievement. These former are the qualities of continuity and process. Their only memorial is, not stone tablets and honours but the quality and success of the lives of the people and their enterprises, or as the Roman Republic identified it, 'the public good'.

The hierarchy also determines others' roles, because as soon as it is formed, it takes on the characteristics of a Court and courtiers. It could be maintained that the deep-seated and original behaviour for a hierarchical structure is that of prince and court. Thus, in describing this first full-time Vice-Chancellor in operation in the Council, Evans exemplifies how they had slipped into the courtly roles when she records that when he chaired the Council, the head of Registry and a Master of a college 'would assist the Vice-Chancellor through the agenda, leaning across to murmur, 'Vice-Chancellor, I think you were about to say'. Evans also records that he left details to 'his' staff, while Castiglione suggests that this was a teacher-role for those Courtiers closest to the Prince with implication that they were the filters and shapers of his knowledge and understanding of the world, and would have a dominant influence both generally and on particular topics. He makes the point that by this means power leaks from the apex to the second tier, not in a way that is formal, openly delegated or accountable; it is power as personal influence gained through personal interaction. In Castiglione's account, the Prince sees in this his own protection and security because the responsibility for the information lies elsewhere, and the Courtier has protection because, to some degree, the decision is shared. This is exemplified by Evans' account of the

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Vice-Chancellor announcing the collective acknowledgement of the Council for the mistakes that had been made in setting up the new accounting and financial control system and promised speedy remedies. No resignations followed, though Evans suggests that some should have resigned out of 'decency', because this had come about after the long period of warnings in the direct democracy that had been met with 'bafflement and impatience' [Viz. above]. Castiglione’s account of the teaching and training of the Prince indicates that power leaks to the Courtiers but princely rewards buy trust and so seemingly return power to the Prince: a cycle of interactions is set up within an élite Court. Yet in this cycle of mutual dependence, the Prince’s power is reduced and also restricted by the quality and the nature - real or false- of the sifted information served up to him.

In the subtext of Evans’ account, prior to her mention of the 'court' in action [Viz. above.] is the corroboration of the perception that this is a monarchical and courtly mentality in operation, the information is given, in passing, that one courtier was 'the “king-maker”' on the selection committee for the first full-time Vice-Chancellor. "Throughout, that knighthood was a glint of hope in many eyes. "He wants his K". This was a realistic ambition in Cambridge, for many senior figures became Sirs and Dames, even Lords and Ladies." Freud and Hume had called monarchy the most primitive form of government and Hume had refined this view by saying that good government depended not upon character but upon the political scientist’s 'balancing of separate interests and the skilful division of power in order to best secure the public interest'. It was Hume’s view that the achievement of the public good depended upon good laws regardless of the morals of the times and he drew on history for his evidence. In her conclusion Evans intuitively comes to the same conclusion as Gibbon and Tuchman about monarchical leaders: 'Professional headhunters cannot reliably deliver intellectual and moral greatness' and without the guarantee of such leaders, direct democracy is the only best option, failings admitted. The essence of the Cambridge example is that without power being equally shared in a direct democracy, it is doubtful if the same level of accountability or openness would have been achieved. Unless, as Hume recommends, the regulations are drafted

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275 Cf. Director’s Cut; Mangham and Blau.
277 Ibid. p. 59.
279 Cf. Director’s Cut
rigorously and carefully, forms of governance other than direct democracy depend wholly on the character and interests of the governors. This foolishly places trust in 'a few, necessarily fallible individuals...[with qualities of] vanity, shallowness, failure to keep an eye on the details or on implications, a disproportionate and blind preference for one of two aspects of the University work with no real concern for the others'\textsuperscript{281}.

This confirms a much-repeated lesson that democracy has to be continually fought for. Democracy needs its guardians, even an 800-year-old democratic community of some of the cleverest minds in the country. This constituency of academics has been 'slow to help itself. Evans suggests the academic community of Cambridge has 'only itself to blame' for its 'lack of greater vigilance' in warding off some of the misfortunes that have befallen them. She identifies the academic's general characteristic of having difficulty in the 'formation of that habit of looking at the larger picture'\textsuperscript{282} as one cause, as exemplified by the few responses to the 1999 consultation process for a new University mission statement\textsuperscript{283}, so that the 2002 Mission Statement appeared in the advertisement for the Vice-Chancellor's successor as a \textit{fait accompli}\textsuperscript{284}. Gintis might have offered an alternative interpretation that it was partly due to strong reciprocators withdrawing cooperation from the 'order of egoism'\textsuperscript{285}. The academic direct democracy has been 'slow to get an intellectual grip on what is happening, and the onward movement of the Government's grand plan'\textsuperscript{286}. It is a 'tall order' and Evans makes the appeal based on the distinguished history of intellectual and academic achievement that does not conform to the production line, but which can find its place in communities of equals and in teams interested in the generation of new ideas, like those illustrative of \textit{high performance work}, but the conditions of devolution of power and a form of mutual ownership of a public resource has to be met or these means become just another form of oppression\textsuperscript{287}.

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid. p. 263.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. p. 27.
\textsuperscript{285} Cf. Director's Cut
\textsuperscript{287} Cf. Director's Cut
'How we view the human species constitutes the departure point for any philosophical or political orientation towards the world.'

Lived Relations, Lived Values and Organisations

In an office one man is sitting at a desk. Another is standing before him, waiting. The man at the desk is writing. When he finishes, he looks at the other. According to the man waiting, this look would convey the 'very core of the organisation' in which he is trapped. The look said, 'This thing standing before me obviously belongs to a species that must be eliminated. But with this particular example, it is worth making sure that he has nothing we can use before we get rid of him.' This is how Primo Levi describes being evaluated at a concentration camp by the application of 'instrumental reason over moral arguments' for a function he might temporarily fulfil. Elsewhere, about the same time, another man with others was regarded by their supervisors 'as though stripped of all humanity' and yet a stray dog came daily to greet them: 'For him without question - we were men'. The conclusion is that these exemplify instrumental rationality's 'forgotten idea of humanity': the twentieth century's 'contribution to 'the history of inhumanity'. The journey that Alain Finkielkraut takes to arrive at such moments is full of contradictions. It starts with people recognising that difference begins at the boundary of their tribe or village and that such difference is made concrete by social custom. Yet religion challenges the truth of such local man-made conventions and traditions and accepts all human beings as the same. However, the search to understand the order of the universe directed philosophy toward rational classification according to difference, and calculation according to change and permanence, and produced the philosophical view that the permanence of the heavens indicated an eternal and external truth. The revealed and natural order was not equality but a hierarchy: heavens and earth. Thus rationality reigned supreme and ruled the emotions. The world may be shared but it was

vertically arranged\textsuperscript{5}. There was a cosmology of those who were naturally
gifted with sovereign powers and those who were not and who were ‘by nature
belong[ing] not to himself but to another, is by nature a slave; and a human
being belongs to another whenever, in spite of being a man, he is a piece of
property, i.e., a tool having a separate existence [i.e., separate from its
possessor, (unlike a hand...severed from its owner)] and meant for action\textsuperscript{6}.
This seminal political world-view of rule based on hierarchical difference co-
existed with the theological vision of human beings’ common humanity.
Imperial conquest only strengthened this difference by overwhelming other
peoples and cultures and reinforced this heavenly design.
But if belief in an external deity wavered, and even no longer existed, then the
differences based on hierarchical order and the accolades and honours that
ornamented its tiers were only the products of human imagination: ‘But when
Heaven stops serving as a protective cover, the supernatural loses touch with
human experience and relies instead on the realm of illusion...Credulity, not
faith, holds up the social structure’\textsuperscript{7}. And yet, because ‘everybody wants to
rule over everyone else, and is therefore everyone’s enemy’, the alternative to
hierarchy was the threat of civil war\textsuperscript{8}. Therefore ‘intelligence’ is put to sleep and
the pretence plays on\textsuperscript{9}, and hierarchy is restored, but the new reality is that the
emperor stands naked but everyone pretends otherwise, and sees only robes,
rank and office. The question that this charade begs is whether the descent
into Hobbes’s civil war is inevitable and whether all individuals are dominated
by egotistical intentions. Some of the Enlightenment philosophers mapped the
limitations of rationality and gave the feelings and passions the supreme place.
Consequently the human being was no longer ‘this “sublime misanthrope”: the
self is not hateful, or no longer is, for man is compassionate’\textsuperscript{10}. ‘Defining
human relations in these terms’ meant that: ‘the democratic man who emerges
in the process has lost his innocence but has gained feelings...“When people are
all almost equal in rank, they have, more or less, the same way of thinking and
feeling. Each one can judge in a minute what all the others are experiencing”.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. p. 9.
\textsuperscript{6} Aristotle [Trans Sinclair T. A. Revised and Pre-presented by Saunders T.J.] Polities: The Slave as a
Tool I, iv, Par. 1254a9 London: Penguin, 1992, p. 65 and Footnote, also quoted in a different form by
\textsuperscript{7} Finkielkraut A. Op. cit. p. 17.
\textsuperscript{8} Cf. Humankind is at ‘Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man’. Hobbes T.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid. p. 19.
Let imagination bridge all the difference between people, then add it to compassion and all human beings become 'one's fellow man'\textsuperscript{11}. The wrongheaded view would be to suggest that such ideas exist in the library. That would be to ignore the evidence of the fatal and appalling totalitarian ideas embodied in the stories of Primo Levi and Emmanuel Lévinas. In The Text to which these writings stand as commentary, the words of the respondents tell the ideas and reflections that they have lived. The whole work tries to establish a conversation between real life and philosophic and sociological analysis. Moreover, the 'ordinary reaches back' and has the potential power to embody something universal.

Science's and scientific method's authoritative dominance of thought from the eighteenth and through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced the presentation of a more complex and diverse view of life and existence in the literary and artistic imagination, in the novel, drama, and poetry and the arts generally. For example Dostoyevsky rejected the 'arid observation of everyday trivialities...as realism – it is quite the reverse'. Though he drew upon newspaper reports and stories, he presented situations that some thought 'fantastic and lacking in universality' but which 'I [Dostoevsky's own emphasis] hold to be the inmost essence of truth\textsuperscript{12}. The novelist and critic, E. M. Forster, could attribute to Dostoyevsky's characters and situation a sense that 'infinity attends them' and that their 'ordinary world reaches back'.\textsuperscript{13} And it is this sense in which moments in narratives, novels or dramas, reach beyond their 'everyday' contexts to become poetic expressions of something universal\textsuperscript{14}. Other writers take similar positions. Flaubert claimed that 'There is no Truth, there are only ways of seeing\textsuperscript{15}. Henry James declared 'life is all inclusion and confusion' and art was 'all discrimination and selection\textsuperscript{16}[This might be replaced with "interpretation"]. My note]. In 1881, a year after the publication of Dostoevsky's novel, De Maupassant declared the aspiration to seek beyond surface reality for a more universal 'truth': 'The realist, if he is more an artist, will seek to give us not a banal photographic representation of life, but a vision that is fuller, more vivid and more compellingly truthful than even reality itself...to give an account of everything would be impossible, for we should need at least one volume for each day in order to record the multitude of insignificant


\textsuperscript{15} Flaubert G. cited in Dumesnil Le Réalisme et le Naturalisme 1955 p. 367.

\textsuperscript{16} James H. Preface to The Spoils of Poynton 1897.
incidents...Selection is therefore necessary...Life, moreover, is made up of
elements that are utterly different from each other, of things utterly unexpected,
contrary and incongruous..."17 Forty years later Virginia Woolf showed how
fiction strived to go beyond the observed reality to enter into the consciousness
and spirit of human existence: 'Life is not a series of gig lamps [Note: lights
fixed on either side of a horse-drawn carriage.] symmetrically arranged; life is a
luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning
of consciousness to the end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this
varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or
complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as
possible?'18 All these aspirations of novelists and writers indicated the
romantic's desire to go beyond analysis of an external observable world and to
venture into the complexity, contrasts, contradiction and confusion of human
life. Authors' search for authenticity in the portrayal of actual life led to greater
deepth than observing and recording life's facts, as if 'photographing', and deal
with the inner life of humans and the interaction between their environment
and the nature of their being. In 1880, Zola, the main proponent of Naturalism,
described the novelist as both an observer and an experimentalist, because
having the observer establish the 'solid earth' for both characters and
phenomena under observation was the preliminary to the experimentalist
producing his novel as the 'report of the experiment the novelist conducts
before the eyes of the public...to exhibit how the complicated machinery of his
[a character's] passions work and as a result to possess knowledge of the man,
scientific knowledge of him, in both the individual and social relations'.19 This
position would eventually be modified when he rejected the charge of being
'simply photographic' and acknowledged the artist's possessing an individual
temperament and a personal expression20, through which this evidence was
presented. Writers presented with great accuracy human existence and strove
to reach greater realism by plumbing the diversity and depth of human
experience in the cause of even greater reality. The linking of 'time', 'place' and
'the primary molecule' the inherent characteristic of a human being, placed
character and action at the centre of the novel. Though Virginia Woolf, a writer
with a different approach from Zola to writing itself, could declare that the
purpose of the novel was 'to express character - not to preach doctrines', she
also acknowledged that the novel had evolved. However, she qualified this to

17 De Maupassant G 'Le Roman', Introduction to Pierre et Jean 1881
18 Woolf V. Modern Fiction 1919 reprinted in The Common Reader 1925
20 Ibid.
admit that ‘You see one thing in character and I another. You say it means this and I that. And when it comes to writing each makes a further selection on principles of his own’. 21 The writer makes choices about character to add another element to the artistic construction and their relations to the other character-constructions within the novel and to the themes of the novel.

As E. M. Forster expresses it: ‘Homo Sapiens’ is totally different from ‘Homo Fictus’, for ‘we can know more about him than our fellow creatures, because his creator and narrator are one’. 22 ‘Homo Fictus’ lives only within the pages and is forever tied to the world of a book and the only characteristics that are evoked are those that serve the writer’s intention. One would not meet Hamlet, Ivan Karamazov, Mrs. Gamp, and Emma Bovary anywhere but in their own worlds.

However the accusation that a writer sometimes has drawn character-portraits from life has been persistent and creates in the reader a ‘sleuthing’ mode that see the novel as roman à clef searching for the real person, relating it to a specific life-world. Writers like Robert Louis Stevenson do take ideas from life, but translate them into another character, culture and world. In a confessional in which he acknowledges possible debts to Robinson Crusoe’s parrot, Masterman Ready’s Stockade and Washington Irving’s Tales of a Traveller, he admits that Long John Silver was ‘cut away’ in a form of ‘psychical surgery’ from his acquaintance with ‘an admired friend’ by ‘depriving him of his finer qualities and higher graces’ and ‘leaving him with his strength, his courage, his quickness, and his magnificent geniality and to try to express these in terms of the culture of raw tarpaulin’. 23 And Ivy Compton Burnett offers a warning on the use of real-life portraiture: ‘we know much less of each other than we think... it would be a great shock to find oneself behind another person’s eyes. The things we think we know about each other, we may often imagine and read in.’ 24 What however the novel does and can do is embody ideas in characters - part of the moralising function of literature – ‘Never present ideas except in terms of temperaments and characters’. 25 The arts know that ideas and ideologies are lived.

This is similar to the way some philosophers think of ideology and ideologies existing within people. Eagleton describes ideological discourse as having a ratio between empirical propositions and ‘a world view’, in which the latter has the edge over the former and any empirical statements exist to support the

21 Woolf. V. Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown 1924 first printed in The Captain’s Death Bed 1950
24 Compton-Burnett A Conversation between I. Compton-Burnett and M. Jourdain Orion 1945
overall 'world view' of the text itself. Therefore a person might reject contradictory evidence or propositions and search for other evidence to support his world view. In this respect a person is the author of his world-view and creating a world view is similar to the creation of the world view of a novel: 'whatever the empirical evidence a complex organization of empirical and normative elements, within which the nature and organization of the former is ultimately determined by the requirements of the latter. And this may be one sense in which an ideological formation is rather like a novel.\textsuperscript{26} It does not matter whether the evidence and propositions are false or true, they are gathered together as 'supports' for the formation of a particular 'world-view'. The person creates her/his world-view, as a writer creates a novel-world or drama-world. There is then some purpose in considering character as the embodiment of ideology and the notions of character in this research as ideological positions and the interaction between them as the interplay of ideological positions within a particular place and time in the 'lived relations' existing between people; such is Althusser's definition of ideology. For this French philosopher, it is not a matter of the truth or falsehood of descriptions of the world, but ideology represents 'the way I "live", my relations to a society as a whole, which cannot be said to be a question of truth or falsehood. Ideology ... is a particular organization of signifying practices which goes to constitute human beings as social subjects, and which produces the lived relations of production in a society\textsuperscript{27}. Ideology is the dominant factor in the formation of social life and enfolds within it all political positions including those aligned to and opposed to the 'dominant power'.

In the Text, the guiding element for an attack on the traditional values of education was the 'not very articulate' expression of a view of fairness and rights supported by a generalisation about the inadequacy of traditional humane values. The means for this attack lay in management and bureaucracy and it informed the dominant group's academic planning. In the judgement of some respondents, this created a totalitarian management regime and it lay at the heart of the Institute's final 'malaise'. Their condemnation was based in the same 'residual' principles which the bureaucracy was attacking.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. p. 18.
Eagleton and Althusser make clear that the formation and power of ideology is not just a rational process. It includes our emotional and unconscious relations with the world, how we spontaneously react to the world, and seek for our self-esteem, self-value and self purpose in the world – loosely, our identity and who we are. One only has to think of how work and working relations define people’s lives, in which they describe what and how work happens, how it used to be and will be, what it is like to exist within those activities and what aims and purposes they wish to fulfil. Althusser states that ‘Ideology ... “expresses a will, a hope, or a nostalgia rather than describing a reality”; it is fundamentally a matter of fearing and denouncing, reverencing and reviling, all of which then gets coded into a discourse which looks as though it is describing the way things actually are’\(^{29}\). This follows the line of Austin’s speech-acts’ which are ‘performative’ because they ‘get something done’ rather than describing or participating in a discussion\(^{30}\). Ideology for Althusser is made up of rational and strongly, if not dominant, emotional traits, so that any statements that carry within them the trace of an ideological position also convey the speaker’s approach to the world and how they live within it. Such statements are ‘speech-acts’ that convey their ‘lived relations to the world. A writer would simply call them their character and describe the fundamental beliefs that drive the person and their actions.

Such statements are not just preferences, like a preference for Ceylon rather than Indian tea, but might be the act of choosing only to purchase Fair-Trade tea rather than any other proprietary brand. This choice makes it no longer a matter of taste but of solidarity with the developing world and of economic fairness in opposition to the global dominance and exploitation of former colonies by the companies that were themselves the origins of imperial expansion and exploitation, like The British East India Company. It is not about the taste of tea but political appreciation of ‘lived relations’ with other people, both near and far. So the simple statement that turns down a proposal such as “That’s not the way we do things at Abecedary Institute”, may be a simple account of there being in place another well thought out, universally accepted, regularly reviewed and validated accounting practice for the order of paper-clips. Or alternatively it should be read as an ideological statement that means:

“You and your ideas are a challenge to the established dominant order, that controls subject-staff by killing dead any initiatives or


suggestions that remove any power, however slight, from the dominant group, and that such proposals are a direct attack on me, as a member of the dominant group and on the dominant group itself. As your nearest representative of the dominant group to which I have been elevated, such proposals challenge my legitimate right to be a member of the dominant group, weaken my control because they reveal my own lack of intelligence, imagination, and initiative, and so make me look inadequate. I shall therefore be placing you on my 'To Watch-Out For' list. Consequently this proposal will be met either by the withdrawal of my favours or by punishment, covert or open, at a later date, to be chosen by me, which will warn other subject-staff of the consequences of such lines of thought and will thereby re-enforce both my personal and the dominant group's authority and control. If I introduce the idea subsequently, I shall take all the credit for it and enhance my own position within the hierarchy of the dominant group itself."

Any parting "Thank you and good wishes" would be part of the social fabric that conceals the 'savageries taking place beneath the surface' and cloak the ideology and character that lurks there. Though it might seem like a combination of 'The Grand Inquisitor meets the manager, David Brent, from The Office' this line of rejection occurs thousands of times a day in workplaces all over the world. Whereas 'The Office' used drama's power to show the difference between appearance and reality, 'The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor' used the format of the confessional with the 'penitent' full of hollow self-justification. If the rejecting manager in this little Narrative of The Paper-Clip Requisition could be put in a position to expound in full the implications of his rejection, he might begin a process of recognition of his own mentality and character. In reality, it would remain private, subject-centred and silently held,

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31 Cf. Text p. 181 line 16-29: Decent culture but with a darker side.
as is the Grand Inquisitor’s rationale, except when confessed to the ‘silenced’ Christ. Yet his statement is not just that of an individual character but representative of a dominant order’s ideology. In this sense, it is indicative of the complexity of the oppositional dynamics between the ‘residual’, ‘emergent’ and ‘dominant’ elements and ideas within a culture.

The many organizations, groups, combinations, collectives, signs and symbols that compose the elements in a culture make up a pattern of labyrinthine complexity and of flux. Culture is the separate elements and their changing inter-relations. Identifying a ‘culture’ is associated with spans of time.

Historical periods are characterised as the epoch of the ‘English philosophers’, that is, the nineteenth century liberal economics. These are the ‘big stories’ or meta-narratives of cultural analysis and history, that fall in and out of fashion. What gives cultural processes such titles is the identification of the dominant characteristic as a system. Yet they are not static, nor are they impersonal. Eagleton defines all these as ‘ideologies’ and as being lived and living rather than isolated practices, and so both he and Williams confirm that such elements are active. They are collective names for the lived relations between people, like ‘ideology’ for “lived relations” and ‘order of egoism’ for the dominant group in society, for as Hume makes clear, the basis for all these values is not the rational but the passions and character, and Williams concurs in his ‘structure of feeling’ hypothesis for such values.

Since these values are lived and alive, there is within the ‘dominant culture’ dynamic and complex movement that connects the present with the past and the future. This dynamism is a characteristic of both the ‘dominant’ and other trends that exist ‘within and beyond a specific and effective dominance’. These other trends are always defined and described in terms of their relations with the ‘dominant’, often as ‘alternative’. For example, the economic liberalism that dominated the mentality of the nineteenth century had rivals in this same epoch from the Owenite co-operative movement that reached back immediately to the French Revolution and back to early Christianity and forward to Mondragon; and within the Liberal economics, there were those like Ricardo and Bentham who pursued the logic of the ‘English philosophy’ and at the same time revealed its limitations and whose ideas have been championed, in the twenty-first century, in discussions of ‘happiness’. It is against the background

35 Cf. Eagleton and Althusser on ideology.
36 Cf. Dunn, below,
37 Cf. Hume in below
of this complexity that Raymond Williams advances his hypothesis that to the
‘dominant’ should be added ‘emergent’ and ‘residual’ in any description of
culture.
His purpose is to identify movements that had and have a life of their own
within a culture and that help to refine the appreciation of the control or
hegemony of the ‘dominant effective’ culture. The ‘residual’ and the ‘emergent’
are usually in opposition to the ‘dominant’. Consequently, one characteristic of
the ‘dominant’ is to absorb and integrate such elements into its sphere of
influence in order to make its dominance more effective. For example,
Bagehot\textsuperscript{39} in his classic description of the operation of the nineteenth century
English constitution identifies the effective dominance of the cabinet in
government as the centre of power, but integrates the ‘residual’ traditions of
monarchy as the focus of deference to power. In a culture, the ‘dominant’
defines the controlling, ruling order of the society, and like all ideologies it
works within its own sphere of certainty; evidence is unnecessary and contrary
evidence is both unlooked for and actively excluded. The certainty provides a
self-assured sanctuary\textsuperscript{40}. The ‘dominant’ selects elements that re-inforce and
excludes aspects that challenge or oppose its dominant value-system. As
needs arise it may tap deep into any ‘residual’ or ‘emergent’ values, but what it
usually ‘neglects, excludes, represses or simply fails to recognise is what it
regards ‘as the personal, the private, or as the natural or even the
metaphysical’\textsuperscript{41}. As times change, so do its exclusions\textsuperscript{42}. It is amongst the
‘excluded’ that the constituent values of the ‘emergent’ and the ‘residual’ tend
to form. Williams offers a principle that determines the inevitability of this
process and a characteristic of all ‘modes of domination’:
‘no mode of production and therefore no dominant
social order and therefore no dominant culture ever
in reality includes or exhausts all human practice,
human energy, and human intention\textsuperscript{43}.
The ‘emergent’ and the ‘residual’ are usually in opposition to and challenge the
dominant and Williams admits that distinguishing one from the other is difficult.

\textsuperscript{39} Cross reference: Discussion on Bagehot’s \textbf{English Constitution} below in text. Cf. Text p. 58 line 22 -
p. 60 line 6; Text p. 444 line 27 – p. 445 line 11: Tradition of a ‘distant’ cabinet management and its
continuation under the new regime.
\textsuperscript{40} Cf. Text p. 111 line 20 – p. 112 line 14; Cf. Text p. 58 line 22 - p 60 line 9; Text p. 58 line 20 – p
59 .line 16: Distant directorate and CEO behind an unmarked door
\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Mary Douglas and Organizations, below
\textsuperscript{42} Cf. The Background
The ‘residual’ is easier to identify because it is likely to relate to significant lived values of past cultural structures\textsuperscript{44}. It is reminiscent of Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’\textsuperscript{45}. The ‘residual’ is not an archaic hangover from the past, but one ‘formed in the past, but still active...as an effective element in the present’\textsuperscript{46}. The ‘residual’ is a set of values, different from those of the dominant, but which are found in the lived values and experiences that reach back to a past ‘social and cultural institution and formation’\textsuperscript{47}. The ‘residual’s’ power and importance lies in its embodiment of ‘human experience, aspiration, and achievement, which the ‘dominant’ culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, represses, or even cannot recognise\textsuperscript{48}. It may well have shared elements of the past with the dominant culture\textsuperscript{49}. Yet it may offer resistance or alternatives to the dominant, and as the dominant opposes it, it may challenge the ‘dominant’\textsuperscript{50}. Though the ‘residual’ may be remote from, if not alienated from, the centralised control of the dominant culture, its posture may in any case be oppositional and challenging. For its part, to establish its effective control, the ‘dominant’ culture will have taken over part of, or even large swathes, of the ‘residual’. The ‘dominant’ culture will have initiated and brought into operation a process of sifting characteristics from this residue for a process of ‘re-interpretation, dilution, projection, [and] discriminating inclusion and exclusion’\textsuperscript{51}. In this form, elements from the residual may become part of the ‘dominant’ culture\textsuperscript{52}. New sets of values are always being thrown up or emerging. These may be novel variations of the dominant culture, or genuinely new values that offer challenges or opposition to the dominant. New values may emerge faster from subordinate sources than any organization that may arise to represent them. These new values are threatened with take-over and being neutralised by the ‘dominant’. If the ‘emergent’ has some leverage on power and is effective, the

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Text p. 155 line 16-22; Cf. Text p. 454 line 33 - p. 456 line 22: Accounts of the collegiality and trust in the past culture of Abecedary Institute.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Bourdieu below.


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. p. 122. Cf. The Background: Account of Cambridge case-study and governance,


\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Text p. 525 line 21 – 526 line 3: New managerialism disguised under individual rights.

\textsuperscript{50} Viz. Research Design: The Heads of Department Forum’s bid for constitutional recognition,


'dominant' will seek to take it over and so control its development and potential power. Such 'takeovers' are presented as 'recognition, acknowledgement and thus a form of acceptance'\textsuperscript{53}, but sometimes it is only the appearance of the 'emergent' that is integrated and not the value itself\textsuperscript{54}. Where and when 'takeover' is avoided the 'emergent achieves considerable significance, but because its materialisation is complex, identifying the 'emergent' needs foresight and powers of prediction. It has to be identified at its earliest active stage, because once observed it is no longer 'emergent'. Williams points out that identifying 'dominant', residual' and 'emergent' cultures as objective manifestations, - in a sociological description - tends to place them in the past as generalisations of experience. In this form, they and the relations between them may be further analysed and made into 'big stories' or meta-narratives. What is pushed further into the background are the 'lived relations', the sense that such values were personal, lived, and were present and in the process of formation. Evidence of them does not come in the form of crafted detailed theses, but is by its very nature fragmentary glimpses, and as with this research, it is mostly language. Yet these fragmented but lived values, at heart, provide the living evidence and substance of these cultural elements or ideologies.

As a response to this problem Williams offers the aspiration of there being an alternative to the 'fixed forms' of analysis and generalities because 'the living will not be reduced...all the known complexities, the experienced tensions, shifts, and uncertainties, the intricate forms of unevenness and confusion'\textsuperscript{55}. His alternative is an aspiration to go beyond 'systematic beliefs' to find a form where 'the social forms are...more recognisable, when they are articulate and explicit...systems of explanation and argument [that] have effective presence'\textsuperscript{56}. His search is for a new form where there can be 'frequent tension, between the received interpretation and practical experience...an unease, a stress, a displacement, a latency...Practical consciousness of what is actually being lived and not only what it thought is being lived'\textsuperscript{57}. Williams identifies this process in language, which changes styles, like clothes, manners and social life, and can convey a distinct and 'particular quality of social experience and relationship' typical of a generation or epoch. . Williams defines this complex flux of lived

\textsuperscript{54} Cf. Cf. Text p. 320 line 14-21 & p. 189 line 19-31, & p. 317 line 28-p.319 line 8; Cf. Text p. 486 line 8 - 487 line 3; Text p. 275 line 37 – p. 276 line 21: Abecedary Institute’s committees and boards were purely advisory, not democratic – a staff delusion. Cf. The Background
values as 'structures of feeling... thought as felt, feeling as thought... practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-relating continuity', as something in process, in order to distinguish them from and to go beyond the formal concepts of ideology and systematic beliefs\textsuperscript{58}. Williams' cultural hypothesis of 'structures of feeling' seeks to give a more complex and a more accurate view, than the formal simplifications or generalisations of social values. It is an attempt to capture the sinuosity, range and history of the lived nature of cultural elements. He is searching for that which will communicate social content that is connected with the immediacy of lived experience and that may contain early indications of significant values that connect with other times and generations. The hypotheses leans more toward the arts than the social sciences because of the arts' capacity to embody and reveal the sometimes concealed 'specific feelings, specific rhythms'\textsuperscript{59} of individual lived experience. The arts have a capacity to predict and be the advance guard for emergent social content. Art also has the capacity to transmit presence, for though each work of art is complete in itself, it is in a sense incomplete till it has been experienced by an audience and located in a time and culture. Each time a work of art is experienced it is re-made afresh in the present-time experiences of the beholder or audience. For example, the documentary account of women reading Jane Austen's novels, Scott-Fitzgerald's 'The Great Gatsby' or Nabokov's 'Lolita' shows how such works were re-made by their readers to have relevance to life under a highly conservative regime in late twentieth century Iran\textsuperscript{60}. A work of art is therefore of its own time, the time of its manufacture, and of the present as an experience. This is true of drama, which is always in the present moment – an eternal 'now'. The social values are present in its content, within the dramatic form – comedy, tragedy, naturalism – within the place and processes of its production, and within its audience. The act of performance – whether on stage, film television, radio, or even on the 'stage' of a reader's imagination – creates a present presence for the specific, lived experiences that embody and prefigure the generalised social values. The social values are therefore both encased in the content of the work and its means of production, and connect with other audiences and other times, and so have a new life that the work itself cannot wholly control. 'The Grand Inquisitor' connects with The Middle Ages, nineteenth century Russia, twentieth

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p. 131-2.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. p. 133.
and twenty-first century Europe, because its re-making by an audience makes
it, in effect, 'timeless'.

In his self-explanation, the Grand Inquisitor reveals the ends of domination and
control to which all his efforts are exerted. Domination is a process of
'alternative political and cultural emphases, and the many forms of opposition
and struggle are important not only in themselves but as indicative features of
what the hegemonic process has in practice had to work to control'. The
Grand Inquisitor's ideology is negatively defined by the silent Christ and the
values that the reader associates with Him.

Eagleton defines ideology broadly as 'a process of the production of ideas,
beliefs and values in social life...it would allude to the way individuals "lived"
their social practices rather than to those practices themselves'. He suggests
that this shares much in common with the 'broader meaning of the term
'culture' '. This general definition is 'narrower' than an anthropological
definition of culture which would include 'all of the practices and institutions of
a form of life', for example, the economic infrastructure. He suggests this
'cultural' definition of ideology as the 'social determination of thought' lacks the
dimension of political conflict and is 'unworkably broad'. What the nature of
ideology brings additionally to 'culture' is the relations between these signs
[i.e., the signifying practices associated with a particular activity] and the
processes of political power. He goes on to refine this general definition to
include: the 'ideas and beliefs [whether true or false] which symbolise the
conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or
class'; the 'promotion and legitimation' of such social group's [which] 'must
have some relevance to the sustaining or challenging of a whole political form
of life'; how this promotion relates to the activities of the 'dominant social
power' by both unifying social formation in ways convenient to its rulers that is
not simply a matter of imposing ideas from above but of securing the

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account of the fragmenting and then centralising of the elements that had been and are more efficiently
carried out at the periphery by autonomous professionals. Viz. below: What is common to all these
accounts is that in these circumstances the exercise of the professional role at the periphery of the
organisation reduces the management's functions to a minimum. Cf. Text p. 518 line 20 - p. 521 line 11
& p. 522 line 3-25: Creation of a faculty marketing strategy taking over a central management function.
Cf. Text p. 516 line 16 - p. 524 p. 13: Full account of the democratic style of management of one faculty
illustrates most of the issues identified.


63 Cf. Text p. 94 line 10 - p. 95 line 10; Cf. Text p. 101 line 22 - p. 102 line 23; Cf. Text p. 105 line 2-6;
Cf. Text p. 103 line 15-p. 104 line 16; Cf. Text p. 320 line26- p. 321 line 1; p. 616 line 23 - 618 line 2;
Cf. Text p. 271 line 29-32: Some of the values of pubic service ethic of care and democracy.

64 Cf. Text p. 573 line 17-p 575 line 2; Text p. 473 line 17-p. 474 p. 5; Text p. 471 line 2-27: Quality
and nature of the education.
complicity of subordinated classes and groups; how ‘distortion and dissimulation’ legitimate the interests or a ruling group or class; and lastly the possibility that such beliefs arise not solely ‘from the interests of a dominant class but from the material structure of society as a whole’. Eagleton points to the need to change the reality as the far-reaching consequence of such a definition: ‘a transformation of our lived relations to reality could be secured only by a material change in that reality itself’. Yet changing such realities may be well nigh impossible, and even Habermas insists that the enlightened must have a viable form of alternative organisation. The question is then: What might be the ‘residual’ or ‘emergent’ alternative to the dominance of hierarchy? Dostoyevsky’s fictional Grand Inquisitor may offer insights into the mind-set of a dominant organizational ideology, yet his regime is a projection of the hierarchical organizational structure that has been the most enduring prototype for organizations, whether political, social and government, in Western society. A case can be made for calling it the archetype of the Western organization, though, in its turn, it had taken its model from the Roman Empire. It is the model for the accepted, the conventional, the ‘normal-way-of-doing-things-round-here’ organizational structure. The ideology is inherent in the structure itself. The Church, first the Roman and then other denominations, is inextricably incorporated into the warp and weft of society: Church and State are inextricably joined principally through the monarchy and government; state ceremonies and rituals incorporate religious rituals. For nearly 1,500 years the Church was the principal provider of education; monastic scholarship was the origin of universities; in the mid-to late-nineteenth century teaching institutions, including teacher-training colleges, were set up by the various religious denominations, and continue to operate in some form in modern universities. For example, the University of Chester was brought into being on July 25th 2005, by the Privy Council of the Queen. It was originally established as a Church of England Teacher Training College in 1839, in the same era that Roehampton and Winchester Colleges were founded. It was opened by a future Prime Minister, Sir William Gladstone in 1842. Geoffrey Fisher, Bishop of Chester and later Archbishop of Canterbury fought to prevent


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its closure in the 1930s and the Dean lobbied for Chester to have a university in 1930s on the grounds that it would raise the cultural consciousness of the City, a reminder of the Church’s historic role in the preservation and promulgation of knowledge and culture. Chester Cathedral is still the only concert-hall venue for visiting orchestras. The Cathedral is the venue for the award of the new University’s degrees and its new Chancellor will be the Duke of Westminster.

The influence of teacher-training institutions on society cannot be overestimated for they reach and have influenced generations of teachers\textsuperscript{69} and pupils\textsuperscript{70}. That it takes only one year for a graduate to train additionally as a teacher for any age-range means that teacher education is the most immediate and direct way of influencing education\textsuperscript{71}. Furthermore, universities receive their charters from the Privy Council and top official roles in the organizations are given to representatives of state or church or both. This is a list that reaches deep into society and history.

The development of the Western Church’s own enduring organisation both reflects and influences the complex swirl of ideologies, attitudes and politics that endure within organizations – and not exclusively religious ones. How people should live together - 'lived relations' - and their relationship with their God is at the heart of religious belief and social politics. It reflects influences that are more secular, concerned with power and control, that are pervasive and deep-seated. The characterisation of heads of state and subjects [not citizens – a term that one would confine to republics], leaders and led, gods and people embody concepts about separate worlds and their currency confirms their enduring continuity.

The conversion to Christianity of the Roman Emperor Constantine in 312 A.D. was the acknowledged watershed in the Christian dominance of Western thought and governance. Since then the social and political organizations of Western society and the centralised and hierarchical Christian establishment have been in partnership to offer mutual support for the authority vested in God, pope, king and prince. The resulting union of State with Church worked on the maintenance of public order, governance of citizens, and the oversight of their activities and values. It also ensured the Church’s endurance as an organization over the centuries. The Christian beliefs and world view dominated,
permeated and inspired the lives of millions in western society, and even when a contemporary secular way of life seems to be dominant, Judaeo-Christian beliefs provide the basis for virtues and values that are respected as core values in society: decency, honesty, trust, integrity and humane compassion.  

When Constantine decamped the capital of the Roman Empire to Byzantium, later to be named 'Constantinople', the Church remained behind and was the only organization to fill the political space vacated by Roman Imperial hierarchy and to inherit the role of the stronghold of governmental functions with the bishop of Rome as its principal ruler, amidst the confusion of invading hordes. The Church brought the arts and knowledge into its service; it created the clergy as the only educated class and as a separate elite who serviced the clerical and administrative needs of Church and State, and it vested supreme authority over all, including kings and princes, in one man, the Pope, like an Emperor. The centralised Church hierarchy was the historical successor of Roman governance and the Church and its believers became a new Roman Empire and citizenry. The Church took unto itself universal authority as a distant, benevolent, wise, priestly hierarchy ruling over its subjects. A satirical but researched account of the basis of how the right to rule and divinity combined for mutual support tells of how the first Roman Emperor, Caesar Augustus, was made a god by Rome on his death. The provinces had deified him while he was still alive. According to Robert Graves's account of the event, the citizens of Rome grieved for him as children for a father and wanted to deify him. One rational senator protested that the grounds to convince 'educated citizens to worship one of their own number' were insufficient. But by fortunate collision of coincidences, the weather intervened and 'imagination' supplied the chopped-logic. One hundred days before [sic 'C'], a flash of lighting had obliterated the 'C' in his title on his statue; the remainder 'AESAR' meant 'GOD' in ancient Etruscan; and the proposal to deify Augustus came from his Imperial successor, Tiberius, who asserted that Jove spoke Etruscan, and not Latin or Greek. This simply confirmed the precedent of hierarchies, that if people want to do something, then 'imagination' can find the means and the deed can be done. And that can include making a man into a God – another case of the Emperor's 'new clothes'. Succeeding Emperors, regardless of merit were assured of the same honour, sometimes, while still

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72 Cf. Text p. 238 line 18 – p. 239 line 5; Cf. Text 239 line 18 –p. 240 line 5; Cf. Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9; Cf. Text p. 617 line 4-p. 618 line 2: Traditional values to be attacked and the consequences.

73 Cf. Text p. 139 line 23- p. 140 line 10; Cf. Text p. 111 line 20 – p. 112 line 14; Cf. Text p. 58 line 22 -p. 60 line 6: Management as separate elite, a chosen but a remote body.

alive. What this conferred was sanctity and absolute authority upon a man who was the king, the commander in chief, the master and the lord of all, endowed with mystic, unfathomable and unchallengeable wisdom and justice, and the harsh despot, who chose favourites upon whom to bestow his bounty. It mattered little that few emperors died peacefully in their beds. As a god, the Emperor made his own and 'universal' morality – for his lifetime – much as modern corporate leaders admit to doing. In a study of modern corporate management Jackall describes the situation as he found it and takes an empirical approach to corporate morality. It makes the point that: 'Actual organizational moralities are thus contextual, situational, highly specific, and most often, unarticulated'. He quotes as an example the words of a large US firm's former vice-president: "'What is right in the corporation is not what is right in a man's home or in his church. What is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you. [His emphasis] That's what morality is in the corporation.'" [My emphasis] 75

Organising Beliefs

As part of establishing a durable, organizational structure for Christianity, the Christian Church adopted the model of the Roman Empire's legal and juridical framework and with it a model definition of God, based on the Emperor of Rome. Humankind's relationship with God, as defined by Augustine, became a legal one in which Adam's original sin rendered null and void humankind's contract with God, because according to Augustine's doctrine of 'original sin', all were guilty of sin, even the unborn. This legalistic approach allied to the centralised, authoritarian and hierarchical Roman Imperial culture produced a Church organization, headed first by a bishop ordained by God, with delegated unquestionable authority that percolated down through the chosen elite of the clergy; a legalistic and highly regulated form of worship and morality that demanded slavish compliance and deference, and an absolute compliance to the official dogma which was zealously enforced and any independent thought suppressed. 76 Ultimately the bishop, became a divinely infallible father, the Pope, the living representative of God, the Father. The other influence to add to this Imperial organizational culture came from Christianity's Jewish origins and its relationship of fear of a 'jealous God' was included together with active

intervention in human affairs, like the flight from Egypt, or the captivity in Babylon.\textsuperscript{77} The deity was an intelligent force ordering the universe with universal reason. Humankind’s task was to have unquestioning trust in that vision, be obedient to the laws and fear retribution because God interfered either to save or punish humankind as its actions assisted, betrayed or hindered the realisation of God’s ultimate vision\textsuperscript{78}. This is recognisable as the standard hierarchical monarchical organisation.

One of the major narratives of the foundation of a dominant church organisation is the use of orthodoxy to place humanity in bondage to the organisation. Augustine’s view of human nature\textsuperscript{79} rested on the doctrine of ‘original sin’, which was embodied in a wilful, rebellious and wayward humanity that needed constant supervision and regulation. He made belief the fundamental test for being ‘saved’, and getting to Heaven. Other virtues, like good deeds, were defined ‘by their end’: So, it is not what you do, but who you are and what you believe that defines the worth of one’s deeds.\textsuperscript{80} The consequence of orthodoxy is its ‘pre-occupation with doctrines and dogmas’ which led to councils at which ‘authoritative’ views were refined and heresy outlawed. The purpose of orthodoxy was to establish the dominance of the organisation and ‘because so much is supposedly at stake, the Church claimed infallibility and demanded absolute power of life and death over anyone suspected of harbouring dissenting opinions...The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century were equally preoccupied with the control of thought. But in comparison to their more successful antecedent [i.e., the Church], they were mere amateurs’\textsuperscript{81}.

The question arises how does one come to believe and the uncompromising answer is that you can do nothing because ‘belief’ is a gift from God, and Paul thought that the gift was made before birth\textsuperscript{82}. This raises even more questions about who are the chosen few that are the élite\textsuperscript{83}, and how they were chosen, how might one be chosen, do ‘good works’ count, or ‘repentance’? Drury

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Bible. \textit{Deuteronomy} Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{78} Footnote: Cf. Bauman Z. \textit{Modernity and the Holocaust} Cambridge: Polity, 2000. p. 102: In a bureaucracy ‘morality boils down to the commandment to be a good, efficient and diligent expert and worker’
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{82} John \textit{Gospel}, Ch. 6 v. 44: ‘No man can come to me, except the Father who has sent me draw him’; and Paul Romans Ch. 8 v. 11; cited in Drury S. B. Op. cit. p. 31.
\textsuperscript{83} Cf. Text p. 139 line 23- p. 140 line 10: Selection of a managerial elite to implement change.
describes a ‘harsh inscrutable’ God who condemns ‘most of humanity, including those who believe in Him to eternal torment’ and the evidence suggests, not the ‘rationality’, but ‘the capriciousness of the Christian God...that has come to define Western civilisation from Saint Paul to Heidegger84. The story does not get better because there is Augustine’s doctrine of ‘original sin’: that the sin of Adam and Eve is to be paid for by all the rest of humanity for all the rest of time. All are sinful; and those that think they are not, are just in denial. ‘They are too evil to repent85. The alternative reading is that this is metaphorical and that humanity has only its own sins to answer for, and the Church invented ‘Purgatory’ as a ‘half-way house’. Unfortunately that still leaves the fundamental test of belief which is still a gift from God, and so though Christ has paid for our sins, it is not the total answer because God is still capricious.

How is humanity to cope with the world? Christians could ‘humanise the world’, bring ‘social justice’ through their brotherly love for their fellows, but ‘Augustine assured them that they have no moral obligation to improve the world or make it more just. On the contrary, he declared that they must resign themselves to the ways of the world’. As Augustine had proved humanity’s sinfulness, so there is little point in the attempt to bring heaven to earth, ‘in trying to remake the world’ even when it lies in their power to do so. ‘The rationale is that Christians are not part of the earthly city, but merely pilgrims, strangers, and sojourners in this world86. Their role is merely to keep order. Therefore reform or revolution to improve the world is evil because it brings disorder; ‘men are too wicked to be free87. In part, this suggests reasons why people do not wish to initiate reform or change, because it is not their given role or function and they are neither committed nor involved, and the people are not worth it.

Drury condemns this because ‘Christian principles lower the standards of morality in politics. By perverting natural human decency, they leave the world a much worse place than it was before the advent of Christian high-mindedness’. It is the politics of resignation: humanity must be resigned to a sinful world. Drury’s condemnation is absolute: ‘The politics of resignation is an active and malevolent complicity with the evils of the world. It does not leave the world as it found it - but makes a definite contribution to injustice. By silencing the natural pangs of conscience, it makes human beings more wicked

85 Ibid. p. 61.
86 Ibid. p. 47.
than nature intended. Though Protestantism contributed to movements of liberty and democracy, there is no doubt that the Gospels were egalitarian in spirit, but the Church managed to censor the good book in favour of its own hierarchical organisation. The characteristics of this dominion, e.g., characterising 'intellectual opponents' as 'the forces of darkness', or as rebels against God’s truth, or as 'obstinate', or 'unrepentant' are not just the foundations of political extremism and intolerance but also the basis of totalitarian regimes that aspire to thought control.

In establishing the legitimacy of this orthodoxy to underpin his church organisation, Augustine used all the political practices, first in a series of condemnatory judgements in council, a letter campaign, and then the excommunication of supporting bishops and deposing all dissenters. The intention in neither to demonise Augustine or his intentions, but solely to demonstrate that this was totalitarian control to establish a form of hierarchical organisation of the Church based on Augustine’s orthodoxy.

However, his opposition came from the plural views of his intellectual challenger, Pelagius. Augustine advanced the doctrine that Adam and Eve and humanity are born free but are bound by the guilt of the first sin. Pelagius had defeated this doctrine and had rightly won the intellectual argument by the simple logic that if humanity was bound in sin, then it was not free to choose between good and evil, and therefore humanity could not be responsible because it was not free to choose. Augustine’s response was the assertion that his views came from God, and they should ask God for enlightenment. And the law finished the task; if you have the power, anything can be done. When Constantine was converted to Christianity, he proclaimed in the Edict of Milan of 313 AD., that people could worship as they pleased. Augustine applied politics, pressed for and gained its revocation in order to give his orthodoxy total dominion, like history told by the victors. However, Pelagian ideas of freedom went underground, as 'residual' ideology, and became the basis of British or Celtic Christianity which separated it from Rome for 200 years. Pelagian ideas were then revived by Erasmus in 1559, but his works were banned and placed on the Index under instruction from Rome. In the seventeenth century, Quakers were persecuted for the same views. The ideas are still current and are now more...

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89 Ibid. p. 68.
91 Ibid. p. 60-61.
widely acknowledged within the orthodox church. They had persisted as the 'residual’. while the Augustinian remained the 'dominant'.

The 'heresy' that Pelagius taught was that, drawing on the Epistles of St. Paul, good and evil, for which we are praised or blamed, is not born with humanity but done by humanity. [ Cf. Prologue: Ivan’s encounter with the Devil in The Brothers Karamazov ]. Christ and the word of God had been furnished to help uncover God in humankind. His teaching gloried in the presence of God in all things. This had and still has incalculable consequences for 'lived relations': how people shall live and work together individually and collectively. In a sequence of questions that draw upon St James' every good gift is of God, Pelagius' conclusion is that God gave equally and any imbalance is 'human injustice': "For why would God want men to be unequal in the lesser things when he has made them equal in the greater?" Pelagius offered Christ's own example as the ethical model for 'lived relations', so that Christ's summary of his teachings in Matthew was given a central place in Pelagius' teaching for he advocated that

whenever you have the kind of attitude to another that you wish another to maintain toward you, then you are keeping to the way of righteousness; but whenever you are the kind of person to another that you want no one to be to you, you have abandoned the way of righteousness'.

It was a positive set of teachings conveying the obligation to do good rather than following a set of laws and regulations and avoiding evil-doing. It was about engagement, rather than being a bystander. This returns again to Matthew: 'Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me.' There is an 'instinctive knowledge' of good and evil, a remnant of the image of God, within humankind that prompts what one might call conscience, but is more like an innate sense of natural justice that is indicative of the presence of God in all humanity. Pelagius taught an early

93Viz: Ideology and Althusser's definition as 'lived relations' above.
94James Gospel Chapter 1 Verse 17. "Every good gift and every perfect boon is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning."
96Matthew Chapter 7. Verse 12.
redistributive morality: ‘All should posses impartially and with equal rights’\textsuperscript{100} and Let no man have more than he really needs and everyone will have as much as they need, since the few who are rich are the reason for the many who are poor\textsuperscript{101}.

Pelagius’ emphasis on humankind’s equal opportunity to share in God’s salvation or grace, and in the fruits of creation, brought Pelagius and the Celtic Church into direct confrontation with the Roman Church and with Augustine. Pelagius’ teaching on salvation was distorted to present it as humankind’s ability to save itself without divine intervention was one heresy to add to a litany of others like married priests and admitting women to the priesthood, but the financial and organizational issues it raised were more important. Pelagius’ and the Celtic Church’s generosity to the poor was said to contrast with the Roman Church’s acquisition of great wealth and institutional buildings, though, as one might suspect, nothing exists as proof.\textsuperscript{102} The conflict with Augustine led to Pelagius’ excommunication as a heretic and exile, some suggest to Bangor, Wales. Augustine’s dark view of humankind’s wickedness dominated. But the Celtic Church had proliferated and established deep roots in communities and was itself an organic network of monastic communities\textsuperscript{103}. The Celtic mission lost. Rome won. Rome was about the foundations of the Apostle Peter and ‘build[ing] my church’\textsuperscript{104} and its organization. Central control, uniformity, building programmes were established. Though suppressed and ‘fragmented’ as an organization, Newell shows that the Celtic ‘tradition found a continuity of expression in the fields of art and education’\textsuperscript{105} as part of the oral tradition of local cultures. The great German theologian, Karl Barth\textsuperscript{106}, a few years ago described British Christianity as “incurably Pelagian” and though few people attend church each Sunday, ‘yet to the Britons, church-goers as well as absentees, the primary test of faith is not religious observance, but behaviour towards our neighbours - and towards one’s pets, livestock and plants.’\textsuperscript{107} It offers evidence of one description of a ‘residual’ ideology in Britain, that re-

\textsuperscript{104} Matthew Chapter 16. Verse 18.
\textsuperscript{106} Barth , Karl, [1886-1968] Swiss Christian Theologian, author of Church Dogmatics.
\textsuperscript{107} Hefner A.G. www://the mystica.com/mystica/articles/p/Pelagius.html
emerged among the founders of Christian Socialism, 'a daring attempt in mid-nineteenth century Britain to call for a re-ordering of society on the basis of co-operative principles ...that] criticized those who dominated the wealth and natural resources of the country, and who argued against political change on the basis of a divinely instituted hierarchy of power and privilege'.

It was this Christian Socialist movement that was one of the strands that evolved into such organizations as the British Labour Party. Pelagian morality, with the teaching of Christ and the Bible as the reference point, had a political legacy, which was tied to ambitions of freedom.

It was a freedom based upon equality of humankind, not in the erroneous and impossible sense all being equally talented, intelligent, beautiful and so on., but of being equal as a human being before God, or, if not before God, then as one equal in the right to dignity and life. Nearly a thousand years later John Ball, an itinerant priest - a hedge-row-priest, preaching in the Celtic Church tradition, out of doors, in field, street and square, because he had been banned from churches - began a sermon with:

'Whan Adam dalf [delt], and Eve span,
Wo was thane a gentilman?'

One interpretation of John Ball's place in history, suggests, that he acted a spokesman for the 'silent ' and 'silenced', for he 'drew into him the longings of the outcast, as though those longings took...voice when he spoke and called for action'. His congregation was two hundred thousand commoners who had assembled at Blackheath to protest about the Poll tax – shades of Mrs. Thatcher's 1990's 'Community Charge'. The year was 1381 and it was The Peasants' Revolt which King Richard II put down with a stage-managed assassination in front of the crowd. And the victorious King's words to them were: 'You were and you are serfs and shall remain in bondage, not that of old but one infinitely worse.'

A spate of beheadings and hanging, drawing and quartering ensued. And yet this event has a significance that reached forward into the twentieth century. Marx referred to the Peasant Revolt in the Communist Manifesto, 1848, and Frederick Engels identified John Ball as an example of 'peasant insurrections' opposed to feudalism, as an identifiable 'party' of a European trend, in his 1850 interpretation of 'The Peasant War in Germany' when he and Marx were applying their economic interpretation to the past rather than the contemporary events. Both Engel's account and Marx's

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109 Lindsay P. & Groves R. The Peasant's Revolt 1381. London: Hutchinson 1950 p.73
110 Ibid. p.171.
'The Eighteen Brumaire' displayed what Edmund Wilson called 'the excitement of a new intellectual discovery'. Engels makes the point that one basis for insurrection is the protest of the plebeian and peasants, 'though it shared...the demands [for] the revival of the early Christian Church constitution,...went infinitely further. It demanded the restoration of early Christian equality among the community, and the recognition of this equality as a prescript for the burgher [i.e., civil government (my note)] world as well. It drew on the 'equality of the children of God' to include civil liberty....' and equal distribution of wealth and power 'as natural implications of early Christian doctrine.' Engels interpreted these movements as an' anticipation of communism nurtured by fantasy [that] became in reality an anticipation of modern bourgeois conditions'...[with] issues such as common ownership resolving into charity, Christian equality into 'equality before the law', and elimination of authorities into elected republican governments.

Yet the influence of John Ball lived on importantly through the writings of William Morris, the socialist, friend of Ruskin, and advocate of guild workmen's organizations as a counter to mass production and industrialization, who in 1888 published 'The Dream of John Ball' alongside another fable, 'A King's Lesson', and both were continuously in print thereafter. Both are about the division of power and property and both take the form of a duologue or series of duologues to which the reader 'listens' in, like Dostoyevsky's 'Grand Inquisitor'. The accompanying 'A King's Lesson' is a fable about a king and his court setting out on a fact-finding mission to discover the truth of whether the worker-peasants needed to be worked so hard and given little and whether, if they were given just a little more of wealth, they would demand more of a share of the general wealth, like the 'first parents in the Garden of God'. On his journey he and his armed retinue stopped at a vineyard, invited themselves into joining in the work and put in two hours work. At the end of it the King asked the foreman how they had done. He reported that in the first thirty minutes they had done forty-five minutes work, in the second, thirty minutes, in the third, fifteen minutes and in the last half hour two minutes. Having recognised the King, the foreman added his own 'sermon', that they would still

114 Cf. The Background: Ruskin; Cf. Text p. 531 line 24 – p. 532 line 2; Cf. Text p. 472 line 1-20; Cf. Text p. 276 line 16-34: Mass production education.
be working at the same rate beyond sunset and would do the same day after
day. The King let the foreman's lesson pass without comment, but on the way
back to court he asked his Captain what was 'the craft of all these
[courtiers]'whereby ye live?'. His reply is 'we live by robbing the poor...[and]
Thy trade is to be a king of such thieves, yet no worser than the rest'. The King
then disclosed what he had thought during the foreman's sermon; 'were I thou
[the foreman]..., then I would take in my hand a sword or a spear...and bid
others do the like...[and]...we would do battle and prevail, and make an end of
the craft of kings, and of lords and of usurers, and there should be but one craft
in the world...to work merrily for ourselves and to live merrily thereby'. The king
then admits he would not preach this in public, though one day 'it shall
[Morris's emphasis] be preached.' To which the captain replies that it will only
be preached by those who propose "new things that are good for the world.
Our trade is safe for many and many a generation". Morris ends with 'and the
world went on its way'.

The organisation and professionalism of the guild system of craftsmen inspired
William Morris and Ruskin. Their ideas contributed to the late nineteenth and
Edwardian ideas of a 'silenced' people, who, according to G. K. Chesterton's
version, had gained nothing from a succession of rulers, barons and the like,
but only 'dying like lions to keep ourselves in chains':

"Smile at us, pay us, pass us; but do not quite forget.
For we are the people of England, that never have spoken yet" ['The
Secret People', 1915, G. K. Chesterton]

Another contributor was the Christian Socialist Movement of which one of the
founders, A. J. Scott [1805-1866], a supposed 'heretic', was a staunch member
of the Celtic movement that followed in the teachings of Pelagius. G. B. Shaw,
who argued with the movement, gave one of the clearest accounts of
their ideas by making them concrete in a detail from his description of the
bookshelves of the Christian Socialist, the Rev. Morrell in 'Candida', where he
specifies that next to his theological texts, there are 'the reformer's politics
[of]...a yellow backed Progress and Poverty, Fabian Essays, A Dream of John
Ball, Marx's Capital and half a dozen other landmarks in Socialism'. The
movement that emerged from this, under Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, was
called the 'Distributists', who believed in a society of owners on which a better
social order might be built. They argued against monopoly capitalism, state

Morris' 'Dream of John Ball' was printed with 'A King's Lesson'.]
socialism and bureaucracy, and for the 'means of production' to be distributed as widely as possible. In many ways they re-affirmed the ideas of the French Revolution, which had given the next two centuries their politics: liberty, sociability, equality, and democracy – the antithesis of fascism, one of the accusations made against them. The movement went in to decline after Chesterton's death in 1936, and acquired the reputation of being romantic and eccentric, but it did not die. Almost like the notion that no good idea is ever lost, a number of movements sprang from it. It took root in Nova Scotia, Canada, and was the source of the successful Antigonish Movement, founded by a priest, which was a response to the economic hardships of the 1920s. Its principle informed influential theories in the late twentieth century, like, E. F. Schumacher's 'Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered' [1973], Dennis Lawrence's 'The Third Way: The Demise of Industrial Democracy' [1988], and Daly and Townsend's 'Valuing the Earth: Economic, Ecology' [1993]. Its principles of maximum participation, and devolved power, a version of the principle of subsidiarity, and the notion of shared ownership appear in the British Government's Department of Trade and Industry own recommended practices for 'high performance work'. And finally and most importantly in Mondragon in the Basque region of northern Spain where there is one of the most successful and powerful examples of a labour-managed complex set of enterprises. From the initiative of a local priest with a strong social conscience and out of the first endeavour of a few technical education classes in the 1940s, the enterprise had grown forty years later to a conglomerate large enough to furnish crushing evidence to counter any view that labour management is only for small organisations. In the 1970s it comprised organisations in education, industry and banking, including 70 cooperative factories with 15,000 employees, a cooperative bank with 93 branches and about a third of a million accounts. By the mid-1990s, Mondragon was Spain's largest exporter of machine tools, and the third largest supplier of automotive components in Europe, with output and profitability rising dramatically each year. 'This is a success story'. It is both successful and complex and proves that 'workers can create and extend a system of self-management in an environment which is changing rapidly and is becoming more competitive'. Most importantly it is a 'system of self-

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119 Cf. Director's Cut: high performance work.
managed enterprises\textsuperscript{122}, of distributism and mutualism, that has acted as a model for other cooperative developments in Peru, Chile, the Netherlands and Britain. There is a British tradition of cooperatives from Robert Owen to the Rochdale cooperative movement, but the primary struggle in Britain has been to secure better working conditions through the existing system. Yet there are a number of worker cooperatives that equal, if not outperform capitalist enterprises\textsuperscript{123}. Moreover, many of the characteristics of such organisations are shared with the UK government's own advocacy of 'high performance work'. The ancient Universities of Oxford and Cambridge share these governance characteristics and are internationally outstandingly successful\textsuperscript{124}.

The principal characteristic of Mondragon is the high level of worker participation in management\textsuperscript{125}. One founding principle was that what mattered most to ordinary people was work and property, because on these were the foundations of a society. Thus labour should hire capital. The second principle was subsidiarity: that no higher body should assume to undertake on behalf of a lower body any function that the lower body was capable of carrying out itself. Injustice will arise if matters are organised in any other way. Thus the organisation includes General Assemblies in the factories where all workers have equal rights and this assembly has ultimate control over the work of the organisation. The Bank and educational institutions also have General Assemblies with 'different constituencies'. There are consumer and housing cooperatives. Each kind of institution is both 'outward looking' and wishes to strengthen its organisations. Their educational brief extends to the workers and to the secondary and primary schools. Factories strive to be both profitable and to develop new enterprises and new employment opportunities. The banks invest resources according to both the profitability and sustainable development. Defined in relation to other economic and educational organisations, Mondragon is a 'labour-managed situation' in which the ultimate control and authority are vested in those who work in the specific organisation. The other defining characteristic is that the ownership of capital resources must be such that it does not entitle 'control to the owner', who receives only a 'scarcity rent'. Though there are 'great similarities between all "capital controlled" systems',


\textsuperscript{124} Cf. Director's Cut High performance work, & Cf. The Background Cambridge University

the principal criterion is 'whether the workers...can exercise control over the many problems related to production at the micro, meso, and national level'.

The second criterion is 'ownership'\(^{126}\). Vanek groups the criteria for his definition of socio-economic systems under two major headings. [Viz. diagram, below].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. First order Distinction [concerns control]</th>
<th>2. Capital-controlled [dehumanised]</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-managed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control &amp; management</td>
<td>Capital income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All active members of firm [exclusively on equality of vote]</td>
<td>Capital ownership</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Second Order Distinction [concerns capital ownership]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. state [social]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. collective of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. all participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. some participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. consumers or</td>
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<tr>
<td>Users</td>
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<td>Users</td>
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<td>users</td>
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Note: \(\gamma_W = \text{worker management}\)

Categorisation of economic systems and types of productive organisation


The first difference is the location of control: 'the pure model furthermore assumes that all who work in the productive organisation exercise rights of control'. This is the 'extreme form of self-managed work organisation as opposed to those that are capital-controlled'\(^{127}\). There are variations on the nature of this self-management system: in a labour-management system the workers regard 'the means of production as capital that belongs to society', and they pay a rent for their use; worker-management acknowledges that the means of production 'belong to the state or society' but have no obligation to pay rent for them. However at Mondragon there is a range of forms of ownership and worker-control, worker or labour -managed, depending upon the nature of the organisation. From evidence where such systems have been introduced elsewhere, for example, Yugoslavia, the 'pure labour-management system', where the organisations succeed the best, were where all who work have rights of control\(^{128}\).

The internationally successful universities of Oxford and Cambridge have more ancient forms of governance but they share the same form of control as the

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\(^{128}\) Ibid. p. 7.
'pure-labour management' system. Abecedary Institute, post the 1992 reform, though a state-owned and largely state funded organisation, belonged more to the 'capital controlled' system of organisation and management; the workers had very limited rights of representation, two elected representative, and no control nor ownership\(^{129}\).

Both of these ideological views of humanity produce or encourage different structures and different psychologies or at least patterns of behaviour. Once achieving the place at the top of the hierarchy, be it as Emperor, prince or CEO, the motivation to achieve further seems no longer to exist. Gibbon’s monumental history of the Roman Empire, significantly called 'The History of the Decline and Fall', recorded in its first paragraph that under the Emperors there was only one 'happy period' of more than 80 years out of its 500 that the administration of the Empire 'was conducted by the virtue and abilities' of five of the emperors. Gibbon opened his second paragraph with the contrast between the achievements of the Empire and the Republic, which had been in existence for five hundred years before. The Emperors, 'for the most part, were satisfied with preserving the dominions which had been acquired by the policy of the Senate, the active emulation of the consuls, and the martial enthusiasm of the people'. The first Emperor realised that there was risk in 'ambitious designs' and more to be lost than gained by expansionist policies – a survival tactic raised to the level of policy and incorporated into his final will and testament, and thereby quickly adopted by 'the fears and vices of his successors'. Though international peace and 'repose' were meant to be the consequence of this policy, the Empire’s history is one of turmoil and disaster. Gibbon’s account, within a page\(^{130}\), lays out the characteristics of the fundamental model for hierarchical organizations in Western Civilisation: the essential importance of character; the drive for personal and dynastic survival; the unfavourable comparison in dynamism between hierarchy – 'decline and fall' and 'republican' forms of organization which had brought Rome an Empire. In these same opening paragraphs Gibbon indicates the two 'swindles' that help to maintain Imperial hierarchy; both were appearances – the persistent case of the Emperor's imaginary clothes. Gibbon identified 'the image of a free constitution' and the existence of 'a Roman senate [that] appeared to possess the sovereign authority', but like Abecedary Institute’s committees, was advisory only, because 'all the executive powers of

\(^{129}\) Cf. The Background.

government' had been 'devolved on the emperors'.

Gibbon's interpretation of hierarchy has been described as 'forging an alliance between intellectual sweep and antiquarian precision' - similar qualities that a systems analyst would recognise and use. Gibbon was not a surface 'chronicler', but sought 'order and regularity', perceiving 'a system, relations, connections' by employing the 'science of cause and effects'. What he perceived was that there was no divine intervention in human affairs because 'human agency accomplished everything, although not in the way the actors themselves intended'. Secondly it was not the history of dominant heroes, for the 'lives of millions were not determined by a masterful will of a single actor'; in any case such individuals would 'tend to emerge as deluded, and even defeated figures: the instruments of a past they imagined they were directing, the inhabitants of a realm of illusion blindered to the causes ordering their own lives'. Finally, there was what might be called the law of 'unintended consequences', - a harmless sounding phrase that underestimates the threat that such could pose to people and institutions, because consequences might emerge from 'the actions of individuals and policies of institutions' that were 'repugnant or antagonistic to them'. Some could be ironically beneficial, like the foundation of the republic of Venice as commercially and politically pre-eminent in feudal Europe, as a constructive consequence of Attila the Hun's destruction of Roman imperialism. Similarly the transfer of the centre of Empire from Rome to Constantinople drew two different reactions from Gibbon. While he condemned the despotism, he identified ideas of his contemporaries, like Adam Smith and Hume, in the way that 'society was enriched by the division of labour and the facility of exchange' in the developing prosperity of the Empire in the East.

Power, politics and the structure of society were the areas of concern for his

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131 Ibid. p. 9. Cf. Text p. 320 line 14-21 & p. 189 line 19-31, & p. 317 line 28-p.319 line 8; Cf. Text p. 486 line 8 – 487 line 3; Cf. Text p. 275 line 37 – p. 276 line 21; Cf. Text p. 82 line 26- p. 83 line 15; Text 415 line 20- p. 416 line 4: Abecedary Institute committee structure was purely 'advisory'. Though there were elected staff representatives and some issues were discussed, no votes were taken and the Directorate had ultimate executive power, devolved from the Governors. Cf. The Background


philosophical approach with an aim of discovering how the contemporary world came into existence. Gibbon’s history of Rome was concerned with the constructive and destructive forces at work in civil society, its ‘political forms, the effects [of] commerce, personal and civic virtue or ethics, the impact and nature of barbarism, and the origins and positive or destructive functioning of religion both in society and within the individual’s psychology and actions. The accepted eighteenth century opinion was that the fall of the Roman Empire was a catastrophe for Western civilisation. Gibbon however did not write a lament for empire, because he regarded the empire as a ‘dreary’ political ‘prison’ after that empire fell into the hands of a single person’. He quoted Cicero in support of his view: “Wherever you are,” said Cicero to the exiled Marcellus, ‘remember that you are equally within the power of the conqueror”’. But what Gibbon identified amongst the citizens were residual ‘sentiments’ about the Republic derived from Greek philosophy about the ‘justest and most liberal notions of the dignity of human nature’ and from their own history, a reverence for ‘a free, a virtuous, and victorious commonwealth’. Even tyrannical emperors would seek to achieve some legitimacy for their deeds by hypocritically cloaking their murders ‘in the formalities of justice’. Likewise members of the senate acting as ‘accusers assumed the language of independent patriots’, and judges invoked ‘the majesty of the commonwealth’, while ‘the tyrant beheld their baseness with contempt...and avowed hatred for the whole body of the senate’. Craven compliance became complicity and accrued deserved contempt. Thus hierarchical operations cloaked their exercise of power under the cloak of republican citizens’ rights. Gibbon demonstrated that everything is the result of human action and that there is always a moral dimension that can be set aside but not ignored, because the agents acknowledge and own their guilt. The question that Gibbon’s account raises is about whether an ‘imperial’ hierarchy is the most appropriate organisational structure for all sizes and kinds of organisation.

139 Cf. Text p. 607 line 12- p 614 line 5: Principal’s influence and recruiting staff.
Princes and Courtiers

Imperial hierarchy, and hierarchy in any form, as a consequence of its inherent nature, creates a particular form of behaviour in those below the apex of its pyramidal structure. An English version of descriptions of this behaviour, drawn from sources contemporary with those of the first Roman Emperors and with pertinent reference to similar conduct in its own Elizabethan age, - testimony to the permanence as a feature of hierarchical-existence - is to be found in Ben Jonson’s (1573-1637) play ‘Sejanus’ (1603). The opening of this story of the ‘second in command’ and favourite of the Emperor Tiberius, manoeuvring and manipulating people and politics, to secure for himself the Imperial throne, sets the scene and basic action of the times by describing the behaviour of the courtiers, who:

'[These] can lie,
Flatter, and swear, forswear, deprave, inform,
Smile and betray: make guilty men; then beg
The forfeit lives to get their livings; cut
Men’s throats with whisperings; sell to gaping suitors
The empty smoke, that flies about the palace;
Laugh when their patron laughs; sweat when he sweats;
Be hot and cold with him; change every mood
Habit and garb, as often as he varies;
Observe him, as his watch observes his clock;
And, true as turquoise in the dear lord’s ring,
Look well or ill with him; ready to praise
His Lordship, if he spit, or if he piss fair,
Have an indifferent stool, or break wind well;
Nothing can ‘scape their catch.'¹⁴³

Jonson’s noted his main sources himself in the margins as proof of the authenticity of his interpretation. Tacitus’s ‘Annals’¹⁴⁴ described a political life of survival and rivalry under the Roman Emperors from Augustus to Domitian, which included Nero, Caligula, Trajan and Hadrian. Juvenal’s ‘Satires’¹⁴⁵, full of

¹⁴⁴ Tacitus circa 56-117. Senator and the foremost historian of Roman Imperial history. His dramatic narratives have a strong sense of moral instruction and his works have an enduring legacy as political theory, used to support both republican and pragmatic politics [realpolitik].
¹⁴⁵ Juvenal c. 65 - c 127. His early military career might have included service in Britain as a cohort commander. In his later life he wrote sixteen satires in which his anger and upright moral condemnation
anger and moral outrage, provided not just realism but a moralising and ethical
tone, particularly in his Third Satire, a portrait of Rome. One of his phrases has
carried down the centuries and been applied to the twentieth century
totalitarian regimes of Stalin, Hitler, Mao Zedong to describe their handling of
the masses: 'bread and circuses'. The rest is usually passed over but it is a
lament for the republican organization that had been overtaken by Augustus's
cleverly veiled autocracy:

'The people [of Rome] that once bestowed commands, consulships,
legions, and all else, now concerns itself no more and longs eagerly for
just two things – bread and circuses'\textsuperscript{146}

These works by Tacitus and Juvenal, as part of the basic classical education up
to the twentieth century, were read for their instruction on political theory and
tactics and for their pragmatic approach to the moral dilemmas of hierarchical
organisation, dynastic power, succession and ethics\textsuperscript{147}. Machiavelli's personal
'job-application' 'The Prince', with its advice to autocrats, was not printed in
English till 1640. Courtiers and potential courtiers would know of these works
and they passed into the curriculum of higher education.

But there were others, one of which, Castiglione's 'The Courtier', was the
constant guide of Sir Philip Sidney[1554-1586], 'the very embodiment of grace, 
courtesy, and heroic virtue', the fine flower and ornament of his time... scholar,
poet, man of action and man of letters\textsuperscript{148}. It was a conduct-guide or manual on
courtly behaviour and ethics in four volumes by Count Baldassar Castiglione
[1478-1529]\textsuperscript{149}, presented in the form of dialogues. This highly popular,
international best-seller was first published in English in 1561 and reprinted in
1577, 1588, 1603 and 1900 with an introduction by Sir Walter Raleigh; other
translations and editions were published in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century; there were over forty editions published in Italy in the Sixteenth
Century. Scholars suggest that Shakespeare knew it, and find echoes of it in,
for example 'Hamlet' and 'Much ado about Nothing'. It was banned by the
Spanish Inquisition – shades of 'The Grand Inquisitor', and placed on the
Church of Rome's Index of Proscribed Books in 1590. Currently, in the twenty-
first century, there are approximately half a dozen editions in print.

\textsuperscript{146} Juvenal Satires X.
\textsuperscript{147} Note: The performances of 'Jonson's 'Sejanus' [1603] took place in the middle of the politics of the succession to the throne of Elizabeth I, who died in 1605.
\textsuperscript{149} Castiglione B. Op. cit.
It is worth examining in a little detail because it describes a world of improvised relationships based around the pinnacle of a hierarchy, the monarch. There are no systems except those created by and completely dependent upon personal qualities, behaviour and character; it is a situation that Giddens would describe as 'structuration'. The structural networks though are similarly discrete, individual and private, rather than open and public. It relates to The Text evidence because respondents described 'princely power', a history of courtly rituals, and no systems and rules and so open to the influence of character. It resembled more a monarchical court than a managed organisation.

'The Courtier's account of the highly structured, courtly manners and rituals made it an essential part of a gentleman's education at the universities, though it carefully avoided the contentious issues of religion and war. Significantly Castiglione chose to present this courtly manual as a series of dialogues between real persons who were actually present at the Court of Urbino during a particular week in March 1507 when a series of diversions was presented every evening. Castiglione deliberately wrote himself out of the dialogues as a participant, though he was present at the Court. Castiglione, resident at the Court of Urbino from 1504-1508, produced his first draft of the dialogues in 1508, though the work was not published till 1528. One might presume that it is a work of remembered ideas and facts, fictionalised into Platonic dialogues - a work of 'faction' - to convey the freshness of the debate, which contributed to its popularity. It served a world-view that was more medieval than Renaissance, despite the external brilliance of the age, and which, according to Tillyard's classic 'The Elizabethan World Picture', was dominated by two intertwined, dominant ideas: degree and order. The strict hierarchical structure ranked all creatures and all matter, each according to its degree, under God and the angels, in 'The Great Chain of Being' in which every element knew its destined place and responsibilities, the successful execution of which ensured the well-being of the whole. Bullet emphasises that 'Any rebellion against authority was ... a deadly sin, and the proposition that all men were in any sense equal

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151 Cf. Text p. 546 line 13 – p. 547 line 3: Principal as 'monarchs'
152 Cf. Text p. 74 line 4-p. 75. line 28: Rituals.
154 Cf. Text p 121 lines 8 – 28: No rules; open for the assertive.
would have seemed to the(m) [the Sixteenth Century world-view[sic] – My addition] the craziest heresy' and significantly he adds that 'the 16th century Book of Common Prayer [1559, of the Established Church of England - my addition], still in use [commonly, until 1989 and later - my addition], is crystal clear on that point.\textsuperscript{156} The cosmic dance of the spheres embodied the ideas of order and harmony and there was a consistency and unity throughout based on correspondences between different elements and creatures, lesser and greater, in the world. Over all ruled the 'God-King', in James I's Divine Right of Kings [1609] in which he proclaimed to Parliament that monarchy was the 'supremest thing upon Earth: for kings are not only God's Lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called Gods' – a concept derived from St Augustine and St Paul, who coined the phrase for the mysterious higher echelons of all hierarchies: 'the powers that be'.\textsuperscript{157} A worldview of such strict conservatism was the necessary stable context from which to offer advice on conduct, because of the need to be certain that the personnel and the structure, in which one was to operate, was permanent. Castiglione's aim in 'The Courtier'\textsuperscript{158} was to offer a manual of advice to gentlemen living at the Court of Princes to carry out the 'trade' of serving 'perfectly'...to 'obtain thereby favour of them and praise of other men'.\textsuperscript{159} His manual is for those in the middle,\textsuperscript{160} the lesser ranks but far from being the least in rank and importance. The central issue of the work is the Courtier's ability to read the mind-set of his Prince, to understand his pleasures, and how to use that knowledge and how to be a 'bent will' to be pleased with something the Prince likes but not that which displeases him.\textsuperscript{161}

Castiglione first offers his interpretation of the qualities of the perfect Courtier. His foremost quality was that of breeding ['a Gentleman borne and of a good house']; his thinking is that the Courtier has to protect the family reputation from shame. Anyone with good qualities but of low birth lacks that essential guarantee of well-bred, quality-control and their path to acceptance will require

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans Chapter 13 V. i. ‘Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained by God.’ Political interpretation of this chapter suggests that it was intended for the Roman authorities to prove the non-subversive nature of the growing Christian communities.
\textsuperscript{158} Note: The quotations have all been taken from the original 1561 translation, using that spelling. The intention is that this unusual and archaic spelling will act as a ‘distancing’ device to make the reader aware of both the embedded and enduring nature of the ideas and contrast that with their contemporary familiarity.
\textsuperscript{159} Castiglione B. Op. cit. p. 15.
\textsuperscript{160} Note: The respondents in this research were all in the middle strata of the organization. Castiglione’s account gives a full picture of a courtly organisation. It is relevant to most individuals in organizations.
\textsuperscript{161} Castiglione B. Op. cit. p. 106
long term, maximum effort and struggle ['much travaile and long time'] to 'imprint in mennes heades a good opinion of himselfe'. In comparison, the well-bred Courtier will get a good reputation 'in a moment'\(^{162}\). So the Courtier’s qualities are: some intelligence ['a wytte'], handsome and good-looking, charming and instantly attractive ['comely shape of persone and countenance...grace...hewe...at first sight acceptable and loyving unto who so beholdeth him', 'faire comelynesse of finamye and person'], confident ['hardinesse'], a 'finisher' ['for achieving his enterprises'] and a loyal and faithful servant, deferent, temperate, measured, unirritating, reserved, prudent ['lowly, sober and circumspect'], and modest ['fleeing...bragginge and unshamefull praising himself'], physically fit and well-proportioned ['neither of the least, nor of the greatest sise', 'good shape and well proportioned', 'strenght, lightnes and quicknesse'], skilled in the use of all kinds of weaponry and an all-round athlete, 'witte and discrete' and good, pleasant company in a social setting\(^{163}\). Castiglione did advocate that the Courtier be as equally learned as he was skilled in arms, but in such a way that any learning, study, or cleverness was hidden, so that people might accept the point of view put forward as though 'nature and trueth lead them' rather 'that study and arte which 'would have put a doubt in the peoples minde for feare least he beguile them', for 'to shewe arte and such bent study taketh away the grace of everything'.\(^{164}\) This is as clear an indication as one might find of the distrust of clever people and of the pejorative condemnation 'too clever by half', and the rejection of debate in favour of will and the exercise of power. He would be an effective, clear and grammatically correct communicator with some, but not ostentatious, knowledge of other languages. Castiglione offers advice on the Courtier’s skill and taste in the arts of music, writing, painting and sculpture. The Courtier’s character would show a 'pure and amiable simplicity' and he would be 'an honest man and well-meaning' with few ethical precepts other that to be 'good'\(^{165}\). Having achieved a place at Court the conduct that would ensure the Courtier’s continuing place was not to be 'sad...nor melancholic, nor solein' [solemn]... that a man would ween were at debate with their Lordes, which is a truly hateful matter', 'not yll tunged, especially against his superiours', not impudent ['sausinesse'], not a gossip ['trifling news'], intransigently argumentative with everyone ['stubborne and full of contention'] 'to vexe and stirr men like flies', 'no babbler', no Joker ['lyghtenesse'], 'no lyar, no boaster,

\(^{162}\) Ibid. p. 31 - 35.  
\(^{163}\) Ibid. pp. 31-41.  
\(^{164}\) Ibid. pp. 41-46.  
\(^{165}\) Ibid. p. 47-68.
nor fonde flatterer, but sober’...[showing] ‘the reverence and respect that bececommeth the servaunt towarde the mayster’, and never patronising and over-familiar ‘to make of one their equal’.  

Castiglione gave the Prince two possible characters: a good Prince or a bad one led by liars. When the crucial and direct, ethical question arises:  

‘whether a gentleman be bound or no,...to obey him [the Prince] in all things which he shal command, though they were dishonest and shamefull matters?’  

the reply is:  

‘In dishonest matters we are not bounde to obey any body.’  

But the issue is not left there because the next question is about being commanded by the Prince ‘to kyll a man, or any other like matter.’ The first and ethical answer is now modified to an evasive:  

‘you ought....to obey your Lorde in all things that tend to his profit and honour, not in suche matters that tend to his losse or shame’.  

The Courtier is left to his own judgement and so is both bound to commit such acts, and not bound to, in order to protect himself and his Lord from dishonour and shame. This lifts the moral imperative to a God-like, all-knowing, hubristic pragmatism. It gives licence and defines the culture and persistent modus vivendi within all hierarchies: the pragmatic politics of hierarchical organizations and governments. In the words of the late Sixteenth Century proverb contemporary with the publication of Castiglione’s ‘The Courtier’ in England:  

‘The end justifies the means’; what seems evil can deliver good. Or as Castiglione put it:  

‘Truth it is, many thinges seeme at first sight good, which are il: and many ill, that not withstanding are good.’  

The conclusion is that  

‘it is lawfull for a man sometime in his Lordes service to kill not one manne alone , but ten thousande, which if a man waye them not as he ought, will appear yll, and yet are not so in deede’.

The implication of this is that the Prince has the omniscience and vision to see into the future and that others do not, consequently complete loyalty and trust in the Prince is the sole course of action. The Courtier is advised that in matters of rivalry between courtiers, Castiglione’s dialogic format gives him the chance

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167 A late Sixteenth Century Proverb. Also ascribed later to Hermannn Busenbaum (1600-1668) in his Medulla Theologiae Moralis 1650: ‘Cum finis est lictus, etiam media sunt licita’; translated as: ‘When the end is allowed, the means also are allowed’. Source: The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations.

to offer conflicting advice. His last advice is that he did not ‘lyke that oure Courtier shoulde at anye tyme use any deceyte’ but use his ‘prowesse, discreet, sober... heedfull and wise’. However this is preceded by contrary advice based on a proverb that ‘When a mans ennemye is in the water uppe to the middle, lette him reache him his hande, and helpe him from daunger: but when he is up to the chin, set his foote on his head and drowne him out of hand’. So any other direct strategy, like speaking ill of one’s rival, is delayed and replaced by playing the hypocrite, until the moment when it is possible to ‘overthrowe them with sure riddance, reportinge all yvell of them, be it true of false, they doe it without sparynge, with art, deceit and all wayse that they can imagin.’

Religion, ethics and their role in the governance and politics of the organization of the court and the governance of the state, are notable by their absence from Castiglione's 'The Courtier'. As a consequence his advice to employ pretence and hypocrisy suggests two worlds, one open the other private and concealed, and lays Castiglione, his court and his advice open to Hannah Arendt's condemnation not only of the person but of the organizational-culture that will cultivates it: 'Only crime and the criminal, it is true, confront us with the perplexity of radical evil; but only the hypocrite is rotten to the core.'

This condition of the Court is made clear in Castiglione’s advice on the role of the Courtier in telling truth to power [the Prince]. Castiglione made no mention of striving for the common good, for he made clear the objective of the Courtier was personal gain and reputation: 'obtain thereby favour of them [Princes] and prayse of other men'. The Courtier’s relationship with his Prince is personal, a one to one relationship in which the Courtier is the lesser and in which he is in personal competition with other Courtiers for ‘favour’. The life of the Court, on the surface, with so many well trained Courtiers at its beck and call, might have seem very urbane, civilised, smooth-mannered, decent but the way of life beneath hosted ‘savagaries’. Castiglione gave the ‘perfect Courtier’ the responsibility of achieving the Prince’s ‘good will and favour’, so that he would be able ‘alwaies [to] enfourme him francklye of the trueth of everie matter...without fear of peril to displease him’, so that if the Prince is ‘bente to commit anye thinge unseemly for him [the Prince], to be bould to stand with him in it and to disswade him from everie ill pourpose and to set him in the way to vertue’. Castiglione trails off in his listings of all the support on

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169 Ibid. p. 250.
the Courtier's side, thus implying that the Courtier was being advised to take a large personal risk, 'sticking his head over the parapet', and any other organizational cliché for his putting his career on the line – not to say his life. The mission Castiglione gave to his Courtier was to ensure that 'the Prince shall not be deceived, nor lead with flaterers, railers [scoffers and complainers] and liars'. On the other hand Castiglione has to admit – much as Gibbon did over the few Emperors that brought happiness to the Empire – the good Prince was an extreme rarity. Self-deceit and ignorance are the greatest vices in many of the Princes of the time:

'the greatest are ignoraunce and self leekinge [i.e., liking My note.]: the roote of these two mischeeves is nothing else but lyinge'. 173

What these Princes lack is 'suche as shoulde tell them the truth and put them in minde of goodnesse' because such persons would 'feare to be punished'. These Princes are therefore not in control but are in the hands of those who advise them174; most of the time power lies at a level below that of the Prince – the top of the hierarchy - until such time that the Prince feels threatened or compelled to act. Those at this lower level 'woorke always to please, and for the most part open the way with lyes', so that the Prince is 'ignoraunt, not of outward matters onlie but of his owne selve...[this is] the greatest and fowlest lye of allother, because the ignorant minde deceiveth himself and inwarlie maketh lies of himself’. The result is that 'great men’ 'never understand the truth of any thinge...are so corrupted in seeing themselves always obeyed,... so that afterwards they admit no counsel nor advise of others'175. The dire consequence of this is that 'they beleave that the understanding how to rule is a most easy matter, and to compass it there needeth neyther arte nor learning, but only stoutenesse'.[i.e., they bully measures through.] As a result they change neither their course nor their minds, and 'some abhorr reason and justice, because they weene it a bridle and a certaine meane to bring them in bondage' [limit their freedom of action].176 Castiglione was forthright in his condemnation of such Princes, which he had already defined as the rule rather than the exception, for they are vain, given to pomp and ceremony and special conditions. Like the Medici constructing their nearly two kilometres overhead walkway between the Uffizi Palace, on top of the Ponte Vecchio bridge over the


175 Cf. Text p. 58 line 22- p 60 line 9: Directorate never seeking specialist advice.

River Arno to the Pitti Palace, these Princes 'comminge (in a maner) never abrode to be seene', they thinke they get estimation and authoritie ande to be counted (almost Goddes'). Castiglione found only a resemblance not to gods but to the triumphant figures of men and horses, the 'Colosses' made in Rome that were in fact full of 'towe and rags'. The inherent hypocrisy is also condemned for courtiers 'that make their honest and pleasant maners and their good qualities a cloke for a ill ende...do infect with deadlie poison, not one vessel wherof one man alone drinketh, but the commune fountain that all people resorteth to'. In effect, as Mangham states in his account of the executive process in 'Power and Performance in Organizations', the paradox is that power passes to the supplier of the information and makes the receiver into the 'subject' with an implicit obligation to reciprocate with some reward.

'Supplying benefits to others... may serve as a means of "establishing superiority over them". A benefactor creates obligations and implicitly claims superiority to those he obligates. If the Prince [Manager, Director, or Chief Executive] is the receiver, then as a result the control of the state, or organization or situation, passes to the informant/supplier. For example it transpired that the orchestrated accusations of the Salem witch trials, with one informant setting up a chain reaction of denunciations aimed at individual members of the community were for gain. They were motivated by the desire to get hold of others' lands and farms. Mangham is referring to Paul Blau's 'exchange theory', which is the essence of 'The Courtier', for, from the very outset, the Courtier serves the Prince in exchange for personal reward.

Power is not a commodity. Power exists in the nature of the relations between people. Where one has a source of rewards, that person, the controller, is in a position to demand obedience or help in return for an allocation of such rewards. Another person, the subject, reads the mind of the controller, weighs the profit and loss of obeying or disobeying, and chooses whether of not to be compliant and deferent. Controller and controlled enter into a relationship, a bargain is

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182 The Puritan Salem Community had banned plays, theatres and play-acting and so were ignorant of and had no experience of staged hysterics and theatrical choruses, especially when played out with such immediacy that it would have been like a promenade production with the actors amongst the audience. Cf. Francis R. Judge Sewall's Apology: The Forming of a Conscience London: Fourth Estate Ltd., 2005

struck. Power is not evenly balanced between the two. A common bond exists between the two, but each may have a different reward: the controller has more control of a circumstance from the information received; the subject has an 'IOU' to be cashed in at a time, place and opportunity that she/he might prompt, for an internal promotion, for instance, but the controller remains in ultimate control of the nature of the reward. The subject, the informant, is in control of the controller's subsequent behaviour, especially if the controller does not exert an independent mind and does not investigate further nor check with the person informed against 184. Blau describes the four conditions for gaining power as almost a matter of supply and demand: 1. there must be only one supplier for each side of the bargain; 2 there must be no alternative supply or supplier; 3, the reward can only be gained by bargaining, even implicitly, and not by force, i.e., the informant becomes a 'trusted' source, and 4. the desire for the rewards or information must not be subject to any shift in values on either part, so that, if the controller later checked the truth of any information, a shift in values might follow and an edifice of assumptions and prejudice might collapse. Light would have fallen on a dark space.

This potential power of 'lyers' and the perfect Courtier's responsibility to 'enforme him [the Prince] franklye of the trueth every matter', so that the Prince 'shall not be deceived'185 places Castiglione's idealised 'perfect Courtier' between autocratic power and the common good. This impossible situation where every element in the state/organization is dependent upon the character of one man, the Prince, with only those 'perfect Courtiers' left to save the day - like a Hollywood, fantasy-melodrama, such as 'Die Hard', - led Castiglione to a consideration of alternative forms of government. He was aware of the consequences of a Prince's lack of skill 'to governe people' that such unskilled government may be called 'the deadliest plague on earth. And yet some Princes most ignorant in government are not bashfull nor ashamed to take on them to governe...but in the face of the world: for their degree is set so on loft'. 186 It is indeed exceedingly rare that any person has excluded themselves from accepting the role of Prince, CEO or Chairman on the grounds of their personal lack of training or qualification, formal or informal; most regard selection as


186 Ibid. pp. 264. Note: None of the Directorate, except Tom Mason had a management training but none sought any training, even the new CEO.
endorsement of their qualifications, since an application is tantamount to a self-
approval of qualifications, in addition to ambition.

Castiglione also offered an organizational structure as a control on personal
power through a debate amongst some of his cast of characters but the nature
of the kind of government had to be established first. The future Doge of
Genoa was in favour of the ‘reigne of a good Prince’ because it was ‘more
agreeable to nature’.

In contrast his opponent, a humanist from the Venetian Republic, secretary to
Pope Leo and later a cardinal, is given only a brief statement in the debate. But
his contribution raises two interlinked universal ideas that oppose Princedoms:
the God-given freedom of Humankind and the manifestation of that in
‘Commune weales’, or republics. What this republican opponent advances is
the variant of Pelagian view that since ‘God hath given us libertie as a sovereign
gifte’, it is irrational to let ‘one man’ annex it ‘which happeneth under the rule of
princes, who for the most part keepe their people in most strict bondage’. He
advances the view that ‘in Commune weales well in order this libertie is well
kept’. His reasoning is based on the fact that while one person, the Prince,
might have a false notion based on his emotional responses this would not
happen because the multitude would dilute any such single evil notion. ‘A
Commune weale, [rather] than a kingdome,...may be called a true and equall
liberite, when they that sometimes commaunde, obey again an other while’ and
so ‘the government of a Common weale is more to be coveted, then of a
kinge’. 187

This view is rejected in a brief analysis of how three forms of government may
be corrupted: a kingdom can degenerate into a Tyranny; the rule of ‘good men’
to a few great and ‘not good’ men; and the ‘governance of the people’ to ‘the
wil of the multitude’. The notion of hierarchy is not questioned; the rational
proposition of humankind’s freedom is turned into ‘true liberty’ which is ‘to lyve
according to good lawes’; the alternative is ‘live as a manne will’ which raises
again the Augustinian idea of the wilful, intractable nature of human kind’s
burden of original sin and takes no account of the republican idea of living in a
‘Commune weale’. The basis of all this a natural principle that again harks back
to Augustinian determinism and it is expressed in language that belongs either
to Aristotle or in the Church’s liturgy and divine commandments, that ‘some
[thynges i.e., persons] are borne and so appointed and ordeyned by nature to

187 Ibid. pp. 273-274. Cf. below. Weber on the rotation of office and limited tenure as an arbitrary
measure of democratic control; democracy seeks ‘to replace the arbitrary’, hierarchical “master” by the
equally arbitrary disposition of the governed’, viz. Weber M. Bureaucracy: The “Rationalization” of
commaunde, as some other to obeysance'. Reason rules over desires and a
Prince rules with reason over his subjects and even those who are not amongst
the chosen elite and are rationally less gifted have enough sense to obey.\footnote{188}
Therefore, the advocate of Princedoms concludes that 'these be naturallye
bondemen, and better it is for them and more profitable to obeye, then to
beare sway' \footnote{189} [i.e., have any power and exercise rule]. However between
them and the Prince exist those, who 'discret and virtuous', may be ruled by
'kingly and civil' command. It is they, moreover, to whome may be devolved
certain 'offices... that they may likewise beare sway and rule over others of less
wit \footnote{understanding} than they bee', while the 'principall government' depends
completely on 'the chiefe Prince'.\footnote{190}
This view of those that are 'naturalle bondemen' and those of 'less wit' is the
view of the dominant group that excludes and suppresses from consideration
the existence and operation of other forms of governance, i.e., republics,
contemporary with Castiglione's debate. Their notion that this was a natural
state of life, after The Fall of Man in the Christian tradition, has persisted down
the centuries, like a deep and steady underground river watering a self-serving
prejudice and 'order of egoism' that propagandises the view that its actions and
character are steered by superior rationality, that is somehow divinely ordained.
The Doge of Genoa, however, had not finished his case for Princedoms.
There follows an extensive account of the nature of the relationship between
the Prince and the Courtiers. Princes are born princes, 'of noble progeny,
inclined to virtue of hys own naturall motion'. While such descriptions and
qualities reinforce the 'natural' claim of princely hierarchies, they are
predominantly survival propaganda to safeguard their self-preservation and
dynastic continuation and are also expressions of their anxiety over their
security. A scant knowledge of the English monarchy or the Italian Princes of
the Renaissance cities reveals a history of upstarts, usurpers and outsiders; the
elusive goal of Princes was dynastic continuity. 'To be thus is nothing, But to
be safely thus'.\footnote{191}
Despite his 'demy-god' status and divine reason, the Prince could be taken over
by 'appetite' and desire and, like Lord Acton's famous axiom: "Power tends to

\footnote{188}Ibid. pp. 273-4. Note this sentence paraphrases the following: 'There be also manye menne whose
doinges be applied onlye about the use of the body: and such as these be so farr wide from the virtuous,
as the soule from the bodye, and yet bicause they be reasonable creatures, they be so much partners of
reason, as they doe no more but know it, for they possesse it not, ne yet have they the use of it.'
\footnote{189}Ibid. pp. 275.
\footnote{190}Ibid. pp. 276
\footnote{191}Shakespeare W. \textit{Macbeth} Act 3. i. lines: 47-48.
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Castiglione uses an evocative metaphor to describe the effect of power on character; a flawed character is compared with a cracked vessel which seems good when empty but, when filled, water, like power, finds every chink. Power tests character, finds any weakness and leads the Prince to rule in a 'tyrannicall fashion [s]', to give full rein to 'greedy desire, pride, wrath', to 'persecute the good and wise and promote the wicked', and outlaw 'friendship, assemblies and conferences among Citizens in Cities. But maintaine spies, promoters, murdererers and cutthroats'. The tyrannical Prince's main motive is 'feare of them they rule over'.

To counteract this possibility, ironically Castiglione proposes that the role of the Courtier was 'To teach my Prince and traine him' as a ruler was the good Courtier's vocation. This provoked one of the debaters to conclude that the relationship was more like that 'of a good scholemaister than a good Courtier; and hee [he, i.e., the Prince] of a good governour rather than of a good Prince'. This emphasis on nurture and education rather than just nature, suggests an attempt to train character, but also raises the issue of the relationship between the 'demy-god' pupil and the 'Courtier teacher'. Any conventional master-apprentice, expert-learner relationship is impossible, for as the Doge of Genoa states, when asked if he could 'tell him [the Prince] franklye what ever cometh into your minde', he would incur the disfavour of certain Princes. However this teacher-role for those Courtiers closest to the Prince implies that they are the filters and shapers of his knowledge and understanding of the world, and would have a dominant influence both generally and on particular topics.

Power has leaked from the apex to the second tier, not in a way that is formal, openly delegated or accountable; it is power as personal influence gained through personal interaction. The outcome for such Courtiers is the recommendation to the Prince that he should reward them all with a certain 'equalitie', 'justice, and liberalitie', and those of special qualities should receive very generous 'recompences', for example, 'promotions and honours'. The Prince has an ulterior motive for such a policy because it would secure protection, and therefore his own safety and security. Yet it is a cycle of


194 Ibid. p. 279.


dependence and the Prince’s power is reduced and also restricted by the nature - real or false- and the quality of the sifted information served up to him.\textsuperscript{197} The outcome was the survival and preservation of the ‘natural!’ hierarchy of leaders and led. The resulting exclusive ‘Court’ is a classic mix of centralism and oligarchy: the rule by a small group of persons who hold supreme power in their hands.\textsuperscript{198} From this point the discussion moved toward pragmatic reforms to this hierarchy based on what the Doge of Genoa thought the Prince ought to be taught. In a context where there were no systems because ‘assemblies and conferences among Citizens’ were not tolerated, the Doge surprisingly suggested the need for the Prince and ‘a certain number’ of gentlemen, characteristically chosen from among the noble and wise to engage in ‘debate on all matters’ [my emphasis]. The proposed organizational structure would have comprised a ‘Counsell of the nobilitie’ and, in a tone that indicates a revolutionary suggestion, the Doge would add ‘an honest substantial Councel’ of others chosen ‘among the people of the baser degree’ and for the two councils to debate issues relating to, and apparently limited to, the ‘common and private estate’. Moreover, from the description, these debates involving Prince and Councils were not meant to be token consultations. When it came to the Prince’s debates with the ‘Counsell of the nobilitie’, ‘all matters’ were to be debated. The Prince was to give this ‘Counsell’ assembly the ‘authoritie and free leave to utter their mind franckly to him without respect’, so that the Prince was fully informed and ‘know the truth and abhorre lying’.\textsuperscript{199} The extent to which this level of frankness is possible is doubtful. The purpose of this structure is that of unity, which is described in the body politic, with the Prince as the ‘heade’, and the ‘nobilitie’ and ‘commons’ as the ‘members’ or limbs, to create ‘one bodie alone knitte together’. However, power remained with the Prince upon whom the governance depended, though there is the single phrase to indicate that ‘the rest [might] beare a stroke also in it’. All is at the discretion of the Prince, and though the councils might debate, there is no suggestions of votes, resolutions, and devolvement of power, accountability, openness nor even that the Prince would listen.\textsuperscript{200}


The Prince was the pinnacle and final repository of power. The qualities that should inform his government are justice, 'godly zeal of true religion', love of country and its people, and a certain greatness, gained by military prowess, a certain gentleness of manner, and fame and notability for 'gorgeous banquets, feastes, games, people pleasing showes', and for setting up civic construction projects for great buildings and public works\(^{201}\) — in other words, Juvenal's classic formula of bread and circuses.\(^{202}\) The view of the fundamental wilfulness and wickedness of the people is unchanged for if they are kept in 'too much bondage', the people will turn to 'seditions, conspiracies and a thousand mischiefes', or if given 'too much libertie' will ignore the Prince and turn to 'licentiousness and riotous living...theft, roberie, morther...oftentimes [cause] the decay and utter destruction of Cities and kingdomes'.\(^{203}\) Self-survival and self-preservation is placed at the top of the Prince's priorities, with the extra burden of the anxiety and suspicion that are its permanent partners. The best solution for the Prince is 'to preserve his subjects in quiet estate', by

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\(^{202}\) Cf. Text p. 45 line 19 – p. 460 line 29: Main change over the period : the buildings , not the organisation.

'exercising' their minds, by following the proverb that 'Rest is not to bee given to the bondsman'\textsuperscript{204} and finding projects like the 'Pyramides [which] were made to keepe the people occupied'.

The political topic in Castiglione's debate at this point had almost reached its conclusion. The issues that it has raised are constant themes in the politics of any organization: the control of power or, more accurately, the character of he who holds power; the psychology of or the interests of leaders and led; the presentation of self; status and interaction with others, and the networks that emerge. The Doge proposed reforms to the hierarchy but these were really checks on the exercise of power by an individual character. The Doge proposed the three forms of government together 'so should this state have the forme and manner of the three good governments, which is, a kingdom, men of the best sorte, and the people'\textsuperscript{205}, in which each has some element or system of 'checks and balances' to power that signify a movement to devolving governance. He offered a pragmatic view of the way of the world and of those pragmatic reformers who try to improve governance by leaving the apex in place and re-organizing the structure on the lower levels and try to get them to talk to each other.

These reforming ideas illustrate the question that has been hanging in the air throughout Castiglione's debate: 'What certainty, faith and trust can a people place in being ruled well, efficiently, successfully by a Prince and his hierarchy - or any hierarchy for that matter?' Castiglione's and his cast of debaters reach the rational conclusion that all the training of Courtiers and the teaching and training of Princes provides no certain conclusion nor guarantee. They reject other forms of governance and accept monarchy as an answer of sorts. Character - together with circumstance\textsuperscript{206} – are the crucial factors in the operation of a hierarchical form of governance and organization. The debaters conclude that it is a matter of 'good lucke' that one might live under the rule of an 'excellent Prince'. The odds are poor. The debaters think the chances are that one is as likely to encounter such a prince in Heaven or to see Plato's utopian 'Republic' become a reality on earth, because they are so rare that 'in so many hundred yeares wee doe scantily see one'\textsuperscript{207}. The debaters are reduced to condemning their contemporary princes and set their hopes on skipping a generation and gambling their hopes on forthcoming sons and

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. p. 282.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. p. 284.
\textsuperscript{206} Cf. 'Events, dear boy. Events.' Attributed to Harold Macmillan 'when he was asked what his biggest problem was'. Knowles E. [Ed.] Oxford Dictionary of Quotations Oxford: OUP. 1999.
\textsuperscript{207} Castiglione B. p.294.
daughters. Gibbon's account of the rule of the Roman Emperors - the model for hierarchical thinking in Western society - comes to the same conclusion by looking at the history - the form-book, to pursue the gambling metaphor - and is able to set the odds at 80 years out of 500: odds against of 1 in 6, or 16% chance of getting a good Prince. And that applies to those installed on the throne, appointed and in post, not all the pretenders, upstarts, and legitimate and illegitimate fruit on the family-tree, nor the short-list of possible and probable 'runners' standing by in the waiting room. Nor does it take account of how long individuals might sit on their throne, nor occupy the post and position. For gamblers on happiness under a hierarchy, a string of bad luck is more common that a lucky-break. Generations of the population might never even come close to living happily under an excellent monarchical hierarchy. It is little wonder that grumbling about the prince, the chief, the boss and the person in charge is so common. It is more than likely the norm. And it is likely to be deserved. The greatest likelihood is that individuals will rarely encounter a tyrant, but will live and work out their lives under a permanent and self-sustaining mediocrity that chooses other mediocrities because they pick and choose to live comfortably amongst others mediocrities who will not challenge nor threaten their self-survival.

Castiglione's 'The Courtier' is one ancestor of a thriving modern management industry of the so-called personal management manuals on how to climb the greasy pole to promotion to the Executive suite. The bookshelves of any international airport will carry at least half a dozen such manuals. 'Never Eat Alone - and Other Secrets to Success, One Relationship at a Time' is the title of a recent addition to the shelves\textsuperscript{208}. Its target-readership is the shy and introverted who do a very good job but find meeting-and-greeting other people difficult. It seeks to help such individuals to present themselves in such a way that they do not appear excessively over-ambitious or insincere: a better kind of hypocrisy. Its rationale is the well-known truism of hierarchies that who you know is more important that what you know. Its recommendation is that, having set personal goals, the 'climber' identifies the people who can help achieve them. The advice covers 'follow-up telephone calls, hosting dinner parties and mastering the art of small talk...developing relationships with business journalists, getting past gate-keepers, and becoming a “conference commando”'. A review\textsuperscript{209} of the book comments tellingly that 'the approach to

\textsuperscript{208} Ferrazzi K. with Raz T. Never Eat Alone... and Other Secrets to Success, One Relationship at a Time. New York: Currency Doubleday 2005

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building relationships seems to border on manipulation' and that the targeting
of people is devious and disingenuous. Like Castiglione's courtier, name-
dropping and personal anecdote exist as corroboration of the author's personal
success or failure. The proliferation of these many manuals of which this is just
a very recent example, confirms the continuity of the nature of hierarchies in
whatever age, the high personal value placed on self and the reification or
depersonalisation of others – making other people into furniture or objects to
be moved around and 'manipulated', which has within it the seeds of
totalitarianism. As a closed world with its own learnt customs and manners
characterised by passive reactions, the Court fulfils some of the qualities of a
'total institution'210. Finally, its recommendation of pragmatism, action and the
suspension of any rational or emotional reflection and any personal ethical
judiciousness only adds to the portrait of a total institutional approach. It
assumes that this is the way of the world, natural, stable and unchangeable,
and the thing to do is not think about it but 'get on with it', because the only
place to be is at the top because anywhere else is painful, insecure and
humiliating. In Augustinian terms there can only be a very few who will be
'saved' and the rest are 'damned', and success is a capricious gift. In taking
care of their own interests they create a culture and a society that reflects back
at them the selfishness they create and condemn in others. It has a surface of
decency, etiquette and self-control rather than ethics but 'savageries take place
beneath' the surface211. Such manuals may be derided because they offend the
self-image of personal altruism but they are hard to deny entirely 212. They also
strip the hypocrisy from the pleas that in helping oneself, the common good is
being served because progress is driven by individuals. These manuals of
pragmatism may attract scorn and appear unethical, but they both reflect and
tell the naked truth about the nature of hierarchies and what Augustine called
the 'libido dominandii', and what Jackall, Hales, Pfeffer and Mangham identified
in their studies of power and corporate life. The contemporary political theorist
John Dunn also calls it what it is: 'the order of egoism', and regards it as 'a
form of life and a milieu in which to live' and defines it, following Thomas
Hobbes's seventeenth century definition, according to its needs and desires:

210 Cf. Goffman, below.
599 line 19; Cf. Text p. 525 line 21 – 526 line 3: Veneers

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'Within the order of egoism a large part of the point of power is always money, and a large part of the point of money is always power'

and immediately points to the importance of structure in curbing 'the order of egoism':

'But it is difficult [and possibly flatly impossible] for them [the order of egoism] to override the main structuring principle of the form in which they live'. 213

In essence the story of this research is about this structure and the tensions with the 'order of egoism' and its hostility to certain organization and governance structures. 214 Thorstein Veblen identified a trend for 'captains of enterprise' in US universities in the early part of the twentieth century and one recent example, amongst others, records the persistence of the monarchical aspiration. Quoting Louis XIV's famous 'L'État c'est moi' ['I am the state'], is how a spokesman for a group of Trustees of the Board of the American University describes The President of the University and his 'imperial' interpretation of the terms of his contract and his personal conduct of his official and family expenses. In case the themes of egoism, imperialism, and character explored in this discussion of hierarchies seem inappropriate in a discussion of the nature of the structure of the governance of a place of learning, a university, this appears in a report in The New York Times, September 24th 2005 filed by Michael Janofsky. He reported the comments of those participating in a meeting of the Board of Trustees of The American University about either the suspension or possible re-instatement of The President of that University. This private university has a student population of 10,000 and, according to one spokesman for the Trustees, the University 'struggles to increase its endowment each year, raise faculty [staff] salaries and compete with colleges of comparable size and reputation'. An anonymous letter had requested the 25-member Board to examine the President's 'spending patterns' over three years. The Board of the University was divided over 'assertions' by investigators that he had charged the university $600,000 for products and services that appeared to be for personal use. One faction cites expenses for travel, services for his wife, every meal they ate at home or elsewhere, trips to Europe for a chef and numerous

parties. Describing the situation spokespersons for this group said that the President had operated "an imperial presidency with the mentality of 'L'État c'est moi'", that 'he assumed he was the president 24/7' and that the President had 'exercised poor judgement in his expenses and lifestyle'. Those Trustees defending the President state that these assertions are both exaggerated and that the expenses fall within the conditions of his contract as President of the University: 'There was nothing he was not entitled to', because his contract of 1997 'allowed him wide latitude in spending, including the right to travel in a "first class" manner'. There is a dispute between factions on the Board of Trustees over the negotiation of the 1997 contract which was a follow-up contract to his initial first three-year term and whether it was disclosed and approved by the full Board of the Trustees or whether the Compensation Committee only were 'apprised of it'. This disputed contract was negotiated by a former senior vice-president of an international credit-card company. The President is seeking his reinstatement and has offered to return over twenty thousand dollars, to have a tax expert assess how much extra tax he should pay to cover financial benefits received in addition to his $663,000 salary and to negotiate a new contract with more accountability over expenses and the setting-up of annual performance reviews. The dispute is not settled. There is an obvious surface likeness between Castiglione's 'The Courtier' and Erving Goffman's classic 'The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life'215, but while the earlier work recognised the essential importance of structure, Goffman evaded the issue. Castiglione acknowledged the close relationship of the top to the bottom in hierarchical societies, the relation of the macro to the micro and vice versa. Mangham quotes Gouldner's criticism of Goffman's lack of acknowledgement of the notion of structure:

"Goffman's rejection of hierarchy often expresses itself as an avoidance [Gouldner's emphasis] of social stratification and the importance of power differences, even for concerns that are central to him; thus it entails an accommodation to existent power arrangements".

Mangham concludes from this 'frequently voiced criticism' of an important sociological analysis of the interchanges between people and the social creation of reality that 'to ignore the notion of structure is to imply that life consists of

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adjustment to the status quo'. 216 Damningly he concludes that as a result Goffman's work becomes 'a companion volume' to Machiavelli's 'The Prince' 'instructing the masses how to cope with the "overpowering social structures that they feel must be taken as given"'.

This is like one delusion imposing another on humanity. Moreover, being a manager, like being a monarch, is not the wholly neutral rational activity it might pretend to be. Such thinking is based on the idea that the manager is in control. Modern management thinking bases its view of itself on Descartes' idea of a separation of mind and body, as though the latter may be left out of the equation; therefore the manager's world is wholly objective, capable of being weighed and measured and therefore changed, by deploying people and resources. The management 'order' understands 'the sensual world as manageable, in the sense that it stands waiting to be shaped by the vision of the knowing subject'.218 To achieve this requires control and the manager's overwhelming prerogative to order, set output levels, and 'police' them with the power of punishment. 'Managers therefore need to demonstrate their ability to command, to show that they are capable of 'being on top of things...to appear always in control of situations, even where circumstances dictate that this could not possibly be the case'.219 Being in control is a matter of politics and therefore serves interests other than any rational objective one.

Robert Jackall in his twentieth century account of 'the world of corporate managers' in America, reached a similar view to that revealed as a 'swindle' in The Grand Inquisitor,220 that the striving to serve others, but on their own terms, camouflages a personal drive to maintain a permanent role of domination. Though called 'managers' they inhabit a world of politics and political cut and thrust that permeates the total organization:

'And, of course, those who do succeed, those who find their way out of the crowded, twisting corridors and into the back rooms where the action is, where the big games take place, and where everyone present is a player, shape, in a decisive way, the moral rules-in-use

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that filter down through their organizations. The ethos that they fashion turns principles into guidelines, ethics into etiquette, values into tastes, personal responsibility into an adroitness at public relations, and notions of truth into credibility... They [Corporate managers] pursue their own careers and good fortune as best they can within the rules of their world. As it happens, given their pivotal institutional role in our epoch, they help create and re-create, as one unintended consequence of their personal striving, a society where morality becomes indistinguishable from the quest for one's own survival and advantage\textsuperscript{221}.

Colin Hales in a critical management studies approach to 'Management through Organization' concludes that 'the reluctance of the organizationally powerful to relinquish the means by which their power is sustained, a reluctance born either of political or material interest or of a mistrust of subordinates, explains why hitherto, decentralisation and despecialisation have taken the form of limited, cautious and often short-lived organizational experiments.'\textsuperscript{222} This reluctance to surrender power is matched in history by democratic reform of society's institutions invariably arising from the bottom strata of society, whether in British history by the Chartists in the early nineteenth century or the trade unions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This alone lends importance to getting a hearing for the voice of the 'silenced', for just as history is written by the victors, management is written by the managers.

In a similar vein, Pfeffer, an acknowledged authority on power in organizations, wanted to end one book with a section on 'The Managers as Politicians', but was told by manager friends that calling them 'politicians' would be:

'taken as an insult. Managers aren't politicians, I was told. They are rational, interested in efficiency effectiveness, hard-working, and engaged in the serious business of resource allocation and strategy formulation in major enterprises that control vast sums of wealth and energy. They certainly are not politicians...'

\textsuperscript{222} Hales C. Managing through Organization: the Management Process, Forms of Organization and the Work of Managers London: Routledge1993. Note: This case-study is another such example.
As their conversations developed his informants started to talk about 'manoeuvres' relevant to ...career advancement, defeating opponents, accessing information, impressing the boss, forming alliances, 'in short I heard a lot about political activity'. And the informants were:

'normal in their selective perception, motivation and responses to commitments - not at all like the calculating, disinterested, highly motivated, and completely objective paragons I seem to encounter in my books on management and organizations'.

He concluded that it is 'normal that these managers behave like politicians....Power and politics are often part of organizations, and need to be understood as fundamental and important processes. Power and politics are basic processes which occur in many organizations much of the time'.

It seems inconsistent that such an authority on the topic should use 'fundamental' and 'basic' as descriptions and yet suggest that sometimes people take a 'politics-break', as though there could be such a thing as an armistice in politicking rather than the political strategy of alliances.

The world of managers as described by Jackall, Bales and Pfeffer seems to follow in the tradition or 'order of egoism' famously defined by Hobbes as the 'NATURALL CONDITION of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery' as Hobbes entitles his account of human kind's nature in his analysis of political science, 'Leviathan'. Hobbes's view of humankind is that a dominating power is necessary because 'men have no pleasure in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them', and that it is their nature to 'quarrel', the causes of which are 'Competition, Diffidence' [i.e., in modern terms: Distrust] (Latin: diffidere - to distrust), and 'Glory'. To satisfy these objectives humankind use 'Violence' to achieve the respective goals of these 'quarrels': Gain, Safety and Reputation. In consequence in this 'natural' state, 'the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short', because humankind is at 'Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man'. He finds the proof of his view in the security that a person needs to take to guard

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226 Ibid. p. 185.
227 Ibid. p. 186
228 Ibid. p. 185.
her/his person and property. Hobbes acknowledges that this description is mythic, except amongst the 'savage people...in America', but advances the view that this is 'the manner of life there would be, where were no common Power to feare'. Hobbes uses this premise to establish the theoretical concept of humankind surrendering liberty in exchange for a contract offering security between the individual and a sovereign power, in his case, monarchical hierarchical government, which has passed into ideas of management and organisation and the role, functioning and rule of managers.

Action, Character and Management

How to present the nature of people, their functioning in society and their characters has been and is a perpetual concern of writers. The Naturalist movement from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards brought social and political issues to the stage and the page and though the surface realism of their presentation and descriptions were informative, the naturalist action of the narratives was driven, not by 'Fate' as in earlier works, but by the conflict of heredity, a person's inherited characteristics, and the social environment. These elements were 'unchangeable and inescapable'. Its foundations on these two elements implied a determinism that ruled out the possibility of change.

Brecht reacted against this naturalistic determinism and took the aim of rationally explaining and analysing the structure of society in order to enlighten the audience and provoke a reaction that might lead to social change. In the 1920s Brecht adopted as the guideline for his writing Marx's view of 'the concept of man as a function of his milieu and of the milieu as a function of man, in other words the resolution of the milieu into relationships between people, is the product of a new kind of thinking – “historical thinking”.'

However, this had the disadvantage of presenting a 'behaviouristic, socio-economic determinism, leaving no room for the essence of life, individual difference and unpredictable human action'. Characters became solely representative of social, political and economic forces. However in his later plays, Brecht moved away from historical accuracy to 'parables' which were 'abstracting [but] concrete, [and which]...open[s] our eyes to what is

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229 Ibid. p. 187.
232 Ibid. p. 42.
essential' 233. The focus of what he called his 'Epic Theatre' was a realism that 'laid bare society's causal network' 234 in 'scenes where people adopt attitudes of such sort that the social laws under which they are acting spring into sight' 235. Subiotto suggests that this depended upon the audience's acceptance of the political philosophy of Marx's dialectical materialism. In his later plays like 'The Caucasian Chalk Circle' and Mother Courage and later theorising, Brecht had moved away from this rigidity to more an ambiguous relationship between character and action and more individuality. Willett records that, in 1953, Brecht produced a theoretical piece, 'A Conversation about Empathy' which suggested a compromise between empathy and detachment and that in the last year of his life, 1956, he suggested that the notion of 'Epic Theatre' should be thrown into the 'melting pot' in favour of a new doctrine about "contradictions" and on the chain of conflicts in the story 236. It was never completed.

The aim of Brecht and his solutions illustrate the virtues and problem of distance, both for the writer and the audience who were presented with these distanced ideas. Distance allows reason the ease of generalising on matters of cause and effect and to suggest trends and movements at the socio-economic-political level. When he presented these in concrete form, as lived relations, as fictional figures on stage, given flesh and blood actors inter-relating and negotiating in a situation, the ideas may have been present but the characters of the figures were imbued with human motive and emotion. Ideas, when lived out in the concrete form of people's lives, are accompanied by emotion and a personal history that give an individual emphasis to elements of those ideas and so define the uniqueness of situation, action and combination of characters. Both worlds are present; the distanced and the concrete are not different worlds but only views taken through different lenses; both are descriptive however, and neither view explains why actions take place.

This tussle between individual character and determinism, whether naturalistic or socio-economic, has also been played out in organisational analysis. Fifty years after Brecht, organisational analysis, in the form of Labour Process Theory 237, adopted a similar maxim from Marx to push individual action and discretion back into the wings and leave the stage open for 'individuals only insofar as they are the personification of particular class relations and

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236 Willett J. The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht London: Methuen, 1967, p. 185
This is a radical analysis, and Willmott points out that this sidelining of character and action, i.e., agency, takes place in ‘mainstream’ analysis, for reasons that seem reminiscent of Naturalism’s account of the impact of particular environments on inherited characteristics. Both accounts, the naturalist and the socio-economic, imply determinism and therefore reduce human action to that of automata. Both approaches set aside, ignore, or take for granted the actions of individuals. In his essay on agency, Willmott chooses to refer to its ‘open’ quality, which one can only interpret as ‘liberty and discretion’. He quotes studies that demonstrate that it is by virtue of this openness or discretion that ‘organising is possible’. While Giddens places individual action at the heart of the ordering of the organisation: ‘It is the specifically reflexive form of the knowledgeable human agents that is most deeply involved in the recursive ordering of social practices’.

A commonplace of organisations is the map or chart of the organisational structure. Such charts define the functions, responsibilities – the division of labour – and, most particularly, the ‘hierarchy of authority’ and convey the false impression that organisations exist outside and beyond the interactions of their members. The organisational chart seems to provide the official account of the context and organisational structure within which actions take place. However, an analysis of these charts concludes that they may be historic, reveal only ‘past relationships’, and so are ‘never accurate for very long’, and ‘conflict and jealousy over relative positioning leads top management to keep the charts a secret or not at all’. This not only confirms the view that such formal ‘structures’ are ‘abstractions’ that do not do anything, but that organisations are, in fact, the changing relationships within a particular ‘world’ or context. Moreover, it admits the power and influence of the emotional lives of individuals in organisational contexts.

Berger and Luckmann developed the idea of the subjective interactions in organisation into a theory that social order is created by ‘interpersonal negotiation, and implicit understandings are built up by a shared history and

241 Cf. Research Design for organisation charts for the changes to the organisation.
243 Cf. Hume.
shared experiences...and then [people] assume that these patterns exist apart from the interpretations that produced them\(^{245}\). In this way 'organisational structure' makes an object of the subjective interactions between members of an organisation and so it takes on a 'subjective/objective' dual existence.

Later, Giddens' theory of structuration rejected this separation and integrated the fundamental role of agency [character and action] in both making and reproducing social structures of organisation. In Giddens' interpretation the structures and the character, action and interaction [agency], are present and function simultaneously in establishing a social practice: 'the contribution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality\(^{246}\). Structuration is neither about the agent nor the 'societal totality', but 'the social practices ordered across space and time'\(^{247}\). This is a process of constant making.

Giddens' approach follows in the tradition of Hume's theory of cause and effect based on the observed recurrence of behaviour or phenomena, in the same way that Mary Douglas applied it to the anthropology of organisations: 'logical structures in nature...all we ever see are...frequencies and from these we form habits and expectations'\(^{248}\). Social structure in Giddens' naturalistic structuration theory is not fixed but is created by the 'co-operative movement of tentative and ever-changing interactivity sustained by the complicity of the individuals involved in a particular place and time...[beneath a seemingly 'inflexible' structure, organisations have a dynamic and] structuration theory examines assumptions of structural stability and reveals the underlying dynamics by which the organization is sustained in a particular structural form\(^{249}\).

Giddens provides an interpretative theory. It may be used to interpret how people accomplish what they want to achieve by deploying the appropriate rules and procedures, or examining the rules and practices to decipher the patterns of social interaction. It is founded on the agent's 'playing' of the 'rules\(^{250}\) of an organisation, its procedures and techniques, and resources, either actual or symbolic, to achieve an end, which then yields further procedures and resources to accomplish a repetition of the ends and more

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\(^{247}\) Ibid. p. 2.


\(^{250}\) Cf. Text p 121 lines 8 - 28: Culture of Abecedary lacked rules.
besides\textsuperscript{251}. Such rules and procedures may be intended to constrain agent’s practices, but they can at the same time enable them and link them into an organisation’s resources, systems and routines: ‘The knowledge of social conventions, of oneself and other human beings, presumed in being able to ‘go on’ in the diversity of contexts of social life is detailed and dazzling...Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day life\textsuperscript{252}. The practices and ways of doing things in an organisation depend on the people, agents, who have the appropriate status, power and social standing, actually following a set of practices and deploying the resources to support them. The consequence is that the practices are sustained and the resources, in terms of existing procedures and support, are available to the same people in order to keep the ‘continuity’ going.

Repeated patterns of interactions, identifiable as routines and habits convey a sense of permanence and stability\textsuperscript{253}, but this stability is only an assumption because their nature has not been examined. Interaction and non-interaction may be included in the patterning\textsuperscript{254}. Social structure is therefore created by the choices people make about their activities. Though some rules may be intended to inhibit and rein in action, others may enable. The total result is that social structure is always under construction by the ‘cooperative movement of tentative and ever-changing interactivity, sustained by the complicity of the individuals involved in a particular place and at a specific moment in time\textsuperscript{255}.

The implication is that within whatever rules exist in a social organisation, people have the capacity and the discretion to make choices or actions, however minor, and as Giddens suggest these can have considerable impact\textsuperscript{256}. People are not automata, nor stock characters, nor living embodiments of social, economic and political forces. One account of the way people make such choices suggests that ‘all organising activity involves...the “myriad of intersecting individual moral choices which rest on purely subjective and emotive ground”’\textsuperscript{257}. This is another rejection of the image of the ‘rational’ manager. The metaphor of an orchestra appears regularly in organisational

\textsuperscript{251} Cf. Text p.175 lines 14-18; Text p. 492 line 16-20, autonomous action; Text p. 496 line 6-25, ‘games’ playing.


\textsuperscript{253} Cf. Cf. Text p. 74 line 4-p. 75, line 28: The rituals of morning and afternoon refreshments.

\textsuperscript{254} Cf. Text p. 58 line 29 – p. 59 line 16: Management rituals and ‘distant’ management; Text p. 492 line 16-20: Individuals ‘paddling their own canoes’


\textsuperscript{256} Cf. Text p. 399 line 30 – p. 400 line 20. Director’s body language in an interaction.

analysis, because one presumes it encapsulates one vision with the role of carrying the main theme passing selflessly from one section to another in the orchestra. Willmott uses it to admit to a recognition that 'the more "selfless" the action, the more existentially valued, ethically defensible and socially harmonious the activity'\(^{258}\). The fundamental role of character is a theme that other theorists and political philosophers, Plato included, have identified either as a type, like the 'order of egoism'\(^{259}\) whom Dunn describes as seeking power and money in the governance of the nation state, or Gintis\(^{260}\) who describes the effect of the self-interested in reducing if not destroying the total potential benefit in order to pursue their own advantage. The common theme is the ethical balance between the selfless and the self-interested. Willmott uses the orchestra to suggest the need for a search for an ethical dimension of the whole person, including the impersonality of "the politics of organisational experience" and to produce a response "to the criticism that radical analyses of organisations lack a critical psychology or "a theory of the subject"."\(^{261}\) Willmott explores the division between the humanist idea of a human being as an autonomous 'sovereign' agent and that of the human beings as 'product[s] of their environment... conditioned by their circumstances...[so that] impersonal process[es] [are] reflected in the actions of individuals quite separate from their intentions"\(^{262}\). Interpretation could place the emphasis totally on one or the other of these factors. So theories could take the line that individuals were created in large part by the dominance of the socio-economic and political forces of a historically defined society, people and institutions. Other approaches suggested that individuals created organisations through interactions with each other and their historical context. Willmott's account offers an analysis of various theories that place greater weight on either the influence of the socio-economic-political forces or individual agency but which leave open the question of individual human motivation.

Thus, one research approach accepted that organisations were not separate entities, and that people react according to their interpretation of a situation so that 'organisation do not react to their environment, their members do'\(^{263}\).


\(^{260}\) Viz. Gintis, below.


Singly and collectively people act and react accordingly so that 'the action of men stems from a network of meanings which they themselves construct and of which they are conscious...People assign meanings to situations and to the actions of others and react in terms of the interpretations suggested by these meanings'. Though this is common to all people in all circumstances, the interpretations are also shaped by the specific context, time and place, and also by the wider social context and forces. Willmott adds in a footnote that this does not take account of the interactions of individuals in the process of making such interpretations; some will have the status, power and assertiveness to impose their interpretation on others and have a motivation for doing so. This raises the issue of 'why' an individual chooses a particular interpretation of a set of circumstances, and so raises issues of individual motive which brings the matter back to individual agency and discretion. Another theory transfers the personification of socio-political-economic forces from people and embodies them in the structures of organisation and production and assumes that they are objective realities. This offers an explanation for the motives of individuals in accepting and working with the conditions imposed upon them. In an account of the relationship between the work done by employees - in Burawoy's account, shop-floor workers - and the wider social economic context, it is suggested that workers are able to exercise their discretion and initiative, i.e., agency, to make their work more efficient and successful. This success in completing their tasks gives the employees a reward, not monetary, but in terms of a sense of self-esteem, a sense of 'prestige, sense of accomplishment and pride'. Though employers limit the range of options available to the workers' discretion, the employees take pride in taking decisions that ensure they complete the job to their own satisfaction within those limitations. This not only serves the employers' intention but crucially neutralises, or 'completely eliminates[d]' the workers' capacity to question the validity of the structures under which they are operating. The motive to achieve, the capacity to exercise discretion, and the achievement itself of a personal sense of identity, success and fulfilment, mask the nature of

the social, political and economic forces that exploit them in the first place. At Abecedary Institute, academic staff could and did retreat into their teaching where they could exercise their limited autonomy, and took pride in students' achievements and successes, and yet accepted the increase in student numbers, teaching loads and the restructuring of courses as part of the task. While this was the case, they were also aware of the social, economic and political pressures that were being exerted externally and internally within the institution; but their interpretation was not always that these were objective forces. Moreover, while a sense of personal satisfaction was achieved in matters associated with teaching students and research, it is a matter of interpretation whether this weakened any dissent and inhibited their confrontation of exploitation. However, it may also be projected that it is indicative of their tacit consent to, acceptance of, commitment of personal effort to and complicity in their own exploitation. As in Burawoy's case, the irony was that the employees' personal satisfaction and self-identity gained through teaching and research, served the management's and ultimately the Tory Government's objective of increased productivity, i.e., graduates, from the same or fewer resources. As Burawoy puts it, 'We participated in our own subordination'.

In relation to his shopfloor workers, Burawoy expressed the reason for the preservation of a working modus operandi as a 'common interest': 'The workers are interested in the relative satisfaction games [i.e., shop-floor productivity games. My Note.] can offer while the management, from supervisors to departmental superintendents, is concerned with securing cooperation and surplus. Willmott chooses to interpret it not as 'humanist sovereignty' but as a process 'fuelled by the individualising effects of capitalist practices, the understanding that human beings are, and should act as sovereign agents is productive of a heightened sense of responsibility for 'making' something of them/our selves'. This is another account of the desire for self-esteem.

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In Burawoy’s account ‘structures are deemed to have an autonomous existence’, including the ‘ideological and political structures’. While such forces may originate far from a specific context, for example from a Thatcherite Government, giving them that label indicates that such forces are not impersonal. Both this and their interpretation and implementation at a local level, demonstrate that they are the result of individual initiative, discretion, advocacy, implementation and operation. What Burawoy’s theory lacks is an account of the motivations that drive the dynamics that create and reproduce a social and organisational structure and that explains that sense of individual identity, self-worth, and security that organisational practices can create.

Another explanation follows in the path marked out by Habermas and Critical Theory: ‘Hegemony in the factory is born out of specific practices devised by an intellectual cadre and mediated by management’. Hegemony [Herrschaft] is linked to ‘the power to repress, i.e., to enforce the frustration of some given human preferences’. According to Habermas, ideology may function as a ‘world-picture’ to support and justify, and then to legitimise ‘reprehensible social institutions, unjust social practices, relations of exploitation, hegemony [Herrschaft], or domination’ in the form of social institutions. There is a melodramatic aspect to this explanation, because people appear as ‘duped’ victims, or ‘fodder of class domination’. Therefore a later development of the theory accepts that ‘people are not just exploited workers [‘labour power’] nor the embodiment of the influence of socio-economic forces and that organisations are not geared for ‘economic exploitation’ but ‘organizational action is an indeterminate outcome of substantive struggles between different agencies: between people whose organizational identities will be shaped by the way in which their disciplinary practices work through and on them’.

Willmott comments that though this theory accepts that the individual is defined through interactions with others, Clegg does not explain how such
'disciplinary practices' work on people, nor why they accept a level of autonomy but are obedient to the limits imposed on them. This comment does not take account of the way in which teams and task-groups feel the need to extend the scope of their influence and activities to include those core aspects that managements regard as their prerogative. Such initiatives directly challenge management. On the other hand other employees prefer or tolerate the security of being subject to authority because it helps define 'a sense of themselves as sovereign beings'\textsuperscript{281}. In some respects this harks back to ideas of identity and certainty of self in the feudal world where status was defined by clearly identified social strata. Such certainties fell with the questioning of religious convictions in the Renaissance under the power of reason so that the human individual defined herself/himself as sovereign, independent, and self-determining and as a result took on the role of ordering the universe in the absence of divine authority. However this modern identity was less clearly defined. In his narrative of human identity, Willmott's objective is to define the egoism that he and others define as the modern condition and to suggest its consequences in terms of self-centred action and the disintegration of community\textsuperscript{282}. Willmott is identifying the group that Dunn identifies as 'the order of egoism', whose drive for power and money works counter to democracy\textsuperscript{283}. Thus, the self-determination and self-affirmation of the modern worker in a capitalist society places on the individual an obligation to prove herself/himself as a person of value and ability in order to secure the respect of others\textsuperscript{284}. However, nothing is certain because 'the modern worker cannot take it for granted that s/he will be valued irrespective of the social status s/he achieves'. As a consequence, in a capitalist society and organisation, the individual is 'required to apply the logic of “egotistical calculation” in the conduct of their lives'\textsuperscript{285}. The result of the application of such "egotistical" reasoning is the fracturing of social ties and communities and the development of identity through interaction. Agency has become the possession of the individual and not something negotiated through social relations: 'social relations are increasingly viewed as an impediment to individual advancement or they are treated instrumentally as a means of

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\textsuperscript{282} Cf. Text p. 455 line 6 and p.455 line 19 -- p. 456 line 22: Decline in collegiality. \\
\textsuperscript{283} Cf. Dunn. \\
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supporting individual attainment. In other words, other people become obstacles to or a means to the achievement of the individual's egotistical ends. A world is created that is the embodiment of Hobbes's view that the 'natural' state of 'the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short', because humankind is at 'Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man'.

In Hobbes's theory the individual submits 'herself/himself to a higher authority, the monarch, to achieve security. A twentieth century account follows the same general line. Zygmunt Bauman's view of the market society is that the individual's sense of sovereign freedom is based on choice. Remote social and cultural forces influence those choices but they are so distant that they seem general rather than specifically targeted on an individual. However, the freedom creates feelings of insecurity and unease, which are eased by finding, subjecting herself/himself to and submitting to a 'powerful authority' which, instead of a monarch, may be a career or an organisation. Willmott's account of individual agency has shifted to become an account of individual autonomy, in which he includes a Foucauldian approach to individuality. This suggests that in order to confirm their individuality and autonomy of choice, people submit to institutions that are like powerful authorities in the modern world, in which individuals participate with and as part of the institution so that the organisation's 'capillary form of power...reaches into the very grain of individuals'. Such practices as the examination system, the staff appraisal system, or the unitisation [or modularisation] of academic programmes offer a sense of autonomy and choice to promote a notion of being independent and sovereign, but in fact are restrictive, oppressive and exploitative.

Capturing this participation in institutions as an aspect of realising individual autonomy and independence was the strategy of the management guru who advised the controlling, monarchical, authorities that this commitment could

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288 Ibid. p. 185.
291 Cf. Text p. 474 line 7 - p.475 line 9; Cf. Text p. 479 line 25 –p. 480 line 19. & Text p. 479 line 1-15: Unitisation a rigid system that limits opportunities. Cf. Text p. 315, line. 16-18 Students tend to specialise, Cf. Text, p. 471, line 26-29: Students do not change institutions. Note: Full-time students enabled to become in fact 'part - time students and fund themselves through part-time to fulltime working at the same time thereby keeping the HE system cheap or efficient according to the recommendation of Robert Lowe, below.
serve the ends of management and the organisation. In a version of Plato's 'noble lie' – a myth with which to govern the people - what such gurus as Peters and Waterman offered to workers was a semblance of autonomy, 'an illusion of control' with the effect that if the worker feels she/he has autonomy, she /he will commit more whole heartedly to the organisation's objectives and activities: 'a bit more discretion leads to much greater commitment' 292. Workers are therefore encouraged to 'share the organisation's values'. They are also encouraged to express their individuality, 'to 'oppose [herself/himself] to the rest of nature (stick out), by 'sticking out', but in scenarios that the management have devised, and so they are 'managed' into willingly acting out the management's vision of the organisation. There are several inconsistencies in this stratagem so that the compliance with the shared organisational values produces a rigid conformity in the workers, and so later versions of Peters' theory stress constant change in the culture, that obviously destabilises the original objectives of security. Similarly organisational rules, procedures and hierarchy can be undermined by the participation and initiative released through allowing workers' autonomy and agency. This is of course the heart of the matter, the unpredictability of human motives and actions, and the impulsiveness of human agency. It is the heart of Foucault's theory of power and knowledge: 'At the very heart of the power relationship and constantly provoking it are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom' 293. This applies to those who hold power and those without power, but no one is powerless because of it. Power exists within a society and organisation, and, expressed very simply, for Foucault, the power relations are not 'necessarily' 'necessary', and may be 'undermined' 294. Willmott develops this line of nihilistic analysis that does not differentiate between 'more or less acceptable forms of power' 295 and crushingly refers to Rorty's comment that 'Foucault "forbids himself the tone of the liberal sort of thinker who say to his fellow citizens: "We know there must be a better way of doing things than this: let us look for it together"." 296. This indicates the establishment of agreements, or 'conventions' between individuals, through interaction, but the implication is that this possibility may only be established between equals [Viz. Hume below].

Moreover the agreement of convention is a new element in the situation and emphatically not the acceptance by one individual of the possibly better argument of the other; such, as Deetz points out is the moment, when 'the stage is set for the control of self and the control of others'. This is part of his discussion of participatory democracy based solely on the false but 'everyday' idea of communication as 'the act of self-expression and the processes by which personal meaning is transferred to others...[On the contrary] communication in its democratic form is productive rather than reproductive. It produces what self and other can experience, rather than reproduces what either has. Self expression is misleading not because people do not or should not try to express their experiences but because such expressions are the raw material for the production of something new rather than the product of self-interests' There is in this process the implication that the self, the individual, can transform and develop, whereas the alternative is 'fixed and knowable'. This latter view suggests an egotistical view of identity and that the ego is constant and responsible for her/his own actions; this brings the discussion back to the alternative view that the individual is the expression of 'socio-economic-political' forces.

Willmott leaves the discussion with the following positions: that 'human agency is a complex contradictory and shifting process open to many possible modes of being'; that to understand human freedom and agency it is necessary 'to recognise and respect the power of disciplines that challenge and dissolve dualistic theory and practice [i.e., 'being from consciousness...self from...social...reason from feeling'] and 'the more "selfless" the action, the more existentially valued, ethically defensible and socially harmonious the activity'. The conclusion to which Willmott is therefore drawn is that there is 'an escalating crisis of governance in which the established principles...of social, economic organization are...seriously and perhaps terminally, deficient - morally, politically and ecologically'. Crucial in this deficiency is the failure of 'the humanism of reason...[which] produces and reproduces and even legitimates, conditions of alienation and oppression'. Part of this failure is the assumption that sovereignty lies in reason. This is manifest in the 'moral

300 Ibid. p. 123.
vacuum as the (capitalist) systems of money and power eat away at interpersonal values of the life world and the need to release the 'diffuseness and heterogeneity of the repressed' from the 'coercive unity' of 'bureaucracies that foster and naturalise these contradictions'.

Finally Willmott finds 'the neglect of agency as a topic of analysis...surprising and incongruent' because 'the cutting edge of conventional wisdom has emphasized how relationships between 'organizations' and 'their environments' are mediated by the choices of the decision-makers; and how processes of organizational design and development are negotiated through political and cultural processes'. Thus, commentators, such as Pettigrew identify the need for 'a strong emphasis...[to be given] to man's capacity and desire to adjust social conditions to meet his ends, and the part played by power relationships in the emergence and ongoing development of the processes being examined'. 'Man's capacity' and the power that can be acquired is neither identified nor evaluated. In a footnote Willmott touches upon what seems to be the heart of the matter: 'The neglect of agency would seem to stem from a belief in its self-evidence'. It is 'deployed unreflexively, as an unexamined resource, to highlight deficiencies in other 'deterministic forms of analysis, where all the attention is on their actors and action, but not their agency'. When examined by conventional and critical analysis, through their 'dualistic lens' [viz. above, reason or feelings etc.], 'agency tends to be regarded as a property of individuals. In this regard the neglect of agency lies outside the unit of analysis studied by students of organisations, and is properly a matter for some other academic discipline, such as psychology or perhaps philosophy'.

In effect he has come to the conclusion that is a commonplace of literature: the interdependence of character and plot.

To take the classic definitions of E. M. Forster, story [is] a narrative of events arranged in their time sequence. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. Forster adds these narrative explanations: "The king died and then the queen died" is a story. "The king died, and then the queen died of grief" is a plot. The difference is that the 'time-sequence' is the same but 'the sense of causality overshadows it'. A 'plot with a mystery' in it

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305 Ibid. p. 122.
can be created by "The queen died, no one knew why, until it was discovered
that it was through grief at the death of the king". Forster suggests this is 'a
form capable of high development'. Of story we ask: "And then?"; of plot, we
ask: "Why?" Appreciation of plot requires memory and intelligence.

'Incident springs out of character'. And possible actions can only arise from
the possibilities existing in a context. Plot is similar to Aristotle's **mythos** which
makes the story into an entity with a beginning, middle, and end and within
which mythos provides 'a unified causal context'. The different elements in the
mythos are combined together to make a unity 'so that if one of them is
transposed or removed, the unity of the whole is dislocated and destroyed'.
The order is defined by probability and necessity; therefore Aristotle rejected
the episodic structure because it could be arranged without reference to them.

This classical discipline of 'totality, unity and closed structures' in which
individual characters' conscious decisions merge into fate are tied to particular
times and literary conventions, in what Max Frisch called a 'dramaturgy of
submission' – a phrase that echoes with ideas of determinism. In contrast,
Frisch took the line that 'where real life continues we see things that are more
exciting: we can always conclude from chance actions that they could have
developed differently'. Chance as an element in the combination of time,
space and a human subject reveals the 'intentionally chosen and not casually
defined transition from one situation to another'. Chance, as in real life, is the
individual nature of each of the elements, so that context, time, place and
colorature are infinitely variable, but equally decisive elements. In real life, this
is translated into 'lucke' by Castiglione and Gibbon, in terms of the best person
coming forward as emperor or monarch in a given set of circumstances. 'If plot
is defined as a series of changes in a situation, and situation as a given
relationship that exists between a number of figures both to each other and to
a concrete and ideal context, then the dialectical relationship linking plot and
figure becomes obvious'. Pfister uses 'figure' to differentiate a fictional from
a real-life character, because of the tendency to interpret fictional characters
as real people. 'Figure' makes clear that a fictional character is like a chess
piece, an artificial construct. While knowledge about a real life character is
boundless and unknowable, that of a fictional character is bounded by the text
which they inhabit, and so they are totally knowable and analysable to

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exhaustion, for no fictional detail is insignificant and contributes to the understanding of the text. A fictional character is confined to his text, like Prospero to his island. Whereas in real life it is legitimate to consider the "What if?" of what would have happened if someone else were to be appointed as, say, Chief Executive.

A narrator in a novel may fill out characters by commentary on their biographical, sex, age, class details, and interior musings. A dramatic characterisation has 'a fragmentary quality'\(^{313}\). Therefore a particular actor will likewise fill out a role with aspects of herself/himself, physical, vocal, intellectual, and emotional, and it will be regarded as an interpretation. Thomas Mann has suggested that the 'fragmentary quality' of dramatic characterisation may 'be seen as an approximation to the condition of reality under which we perceive our fellow human beings in the real world'\(^{314}\).

Figures in drama appear as speakers or as reacting listeners and present themselves to us in terms of how they react with others. 'The human being of the drama is a talking person, that is his limitation, and the purpose of action is to compel him to a particular speech'\(^{315}\). Dramatic figures have a structural function in their world in either changing or stabilising a situation. They also provide contrasts and correspondences with other characters, and this information emerges as the plot develops and as the characters change and develop. Dramatic figures and their dramatic functions change according to situation and the style pertaining at a particular period of dramatic history. In certain genres, figures may be stereotyped according to sex, age, social class, town or country, and with wit or 'witless'; others as hero, accomplice and adversary. Some of these 'types' remain static, unchanging and constant throughout the plot, like those characters based on the seventeenth century notions of humours. Others are dynamic and undergo a process of development and change in the course of the plot. Those figures that are static are 'often based on an ideology of social, biological or psychological determinism'\(^{316}\). Forster called such characters "flat", because they were made of a very limited number of features and are easily recognised by the 'emotional eye' so that they never need 'reintroducing, never run away, have not to be watched for development, and provide their own atmosphere - little


luminous discs of a pre-arranged size, pushed hither and thither like counters across the void or between the stars... they remain in [the reader's] mind for the reason that they were not changed by circumstances\(^{317}\). In the drama the most abstract of such figures is the personification of a single quality such as a vice in a medieval morality play. The type is separated from reality so that certain characteristics may illustrate certain universal or typical qualities, based on a sociological or psychological set of features drawn either from the contemporary social life of a set of 'stock types', like the country squire or the scholar. The opposite of such representative figures are those in naturalist and realist dramas where the characters are created as multi-dimensional individuals, and for this reason they are ignorant of the totality of their circumstances and react irrationally and emotionally under the influence of the unconscious pressures of experiences.

Following in this tradition, one contemporary philosopher\(^{318}\) takes the character of the Manager as one of the key representative emblems of the contemporary social context. The rare occurrence of this approach is noted: 'most texts purporting to study organisations and/or management scarcely mention the term'\(^{319}\). 'Character' is defined as a type that reflects both a personality type within a particular role and the ethics of a particular culture.

In a reference to theatrical convention, MacIntyre calls them 'the masks worn by the moral philosophies'\(^{320}\) of the times. Likewise he uses 'character', for like the dramatic and literary 'types, they present readily recognisable qualities. These are taken as guides by those who assume the mask or the role, and as criteria by those, like the other characters on stage and the audience, who interpret and react to them. What differentiates MacIntyre's characters from the social roles is 'the moral constraint [they place] on the personality of those who inhabit them'\(^{321}\).

MacIntyre states that his approach is that of an 'Augustinian Christian'\(^{322}\). He perceives a decline from a starting-point with Aristotle's notion of 'telos', a goal, function or purpose for a human being, that might be fulfilled or rejected, to the current state of morality in which he 'sees the human being as a rational agent with no end other than that which he/she determines for himself/herself'\(^{323}\).

His approach is to attack the Enlightenment's notion of morality based on


\(^{318}\) MacIntyre A. \textit{After Virtue} London: Duckworth 1981.


rationality, with the view that there exists a set of impersonal criteria, for issues such as justice and generosity, 'independent of any specific understanding of human nature or purpose and independent of the social and historical context in which individuals exist'\textsuperscript{324}. MacIntyre's view is that this rationality has not delivered what it promised, so that there seems to be 'no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture'\textsuperscript{325}. Contemporary morality is dominated by 'emotivism' in which dialogue has been replaced by emotive assertion, where one party seeks to persuade others of the rightness of her/his views: 'moral debate from this perspective is fundamentally manipulative'\textsuperscript{326}. In this emotive context moral judgements are neither true nor untrue; impersonal or objective criteria may be used to deceive both the self and others but 'the sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt of one to align the attitudes, feelings and preferences and choices of another with its own. Others are always means, never ends'\textsuperscript{327}. Emotivism rejects the idea of impersonal rational moral standards. It may present justifications as rational but there are no 'real rational justifications' and agreement is secured by 'non-rational effects on the attitudes and feelings of others'\textsuperscript{328}. This ends in treating people as means not ends. When treated as ends, people are allowed to decide a course of action based on the quality of the reasons given. Treating people as means is to compel them to do something that advances one's own purposes by using the most effective forces at one's disposal\textsuperscript{329}. MacIntyre identifies the impact of emotivism on organisations and on the character of the Manager as 'the obliteration of "any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations"'\textsuperscript{330}. In contrast Deetz sets aside the moral criticism that managers treat people as means not ends and adopts the view that people accept such treatment as the price of 'consumption', or, more likely, security and 'getting by'. People put away their sense of morality and values and so come to accept that they have little or no choice but to 'work in systems

\textsuperscript{324} Ibid. p. 183.
where subordination based on expedience was the limit of thinkable agency.\textsuperscript{331} They are in this sense complicit in their subjugation.

MacIntyre’s definition of ‘character’ is that it is the distinctive feature of a particular culture and provides it with its moral definitions. The ‘character’ acts as a ‘moral exemplar’, which may attract controversy but any critical comment contributes negative definitions to complement the others. MacIntyre’s Manager is ‘that central character of the modern social drama’,\textsuperscript{332} in which ‘we know of no organised movement towards power which is not bureaucratic and managerial in mode, and we know of no justifications for authority which are not Weberian in form’.\textsuperscript{333} Efficiency and effectiveness are the universally applied criteria by which society orders and judges the performance of its commercial and non-profit making organisations and institutions. The Manager and ‘most writers on management’ appear to have the notion that they are ‘morally neutral’ persons, expert operators in a world of morally neutral facts, which is ‘subject to law-like generalisations from which particular applications can be derived’.\textsuperscript{334} The Manager turns to rational criteria to define what is true; he claims moral neutrality for his actions. The Manager’s task is to organise resources so that they serve the purposes of the organisation by making a profit, or producing goods or services. He deploys techniques to achieve that purpose. “Bureaucratic rationality is the rationality of matching means to ends economically and efficiently”. We can talk about the means: they are factual. Ends are quite another matter. Questions of ends are questions of values and no conflict can be rationally settled.\textsuperscript{335} As a Manager, such matters fall outside her/his scope and range. ‘As a person, a self, he/she operates in the realm of the personal in which judgement and debate about values are central, but in which no rational resolution of moral issues is possible...the self finds no limits set to that on which it may pass judgement’.\textsuperscript{336} The Manager, for MacIntyre, has separated her/his self from the role/s; that which is to be admired about the manager and given a heroic status is her/his ‘claim to effectiveness’, but the result is a ‘self which ”can be anything, can assume any role or take any

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\textsuperscript{336} Ibid. p. 187.
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point of view". But as Mangham adds, this is the 'pure form' of the Manager, who in reality brings with her/him a rag-bag of shards of moral argument without a substantial core.

A characteristic modus operandi and a context may be added to this character of the Manager. The process of negotiation is the basic modus operandi. Enteman's description of managerialism is that its dominance is based on manager negotiating with manager, while 'society responds to whatever managers come up with as a product of their transactions'. Managerialism has permeated both business and not-for-profit organisations, like higher education, through managers taking over the negotiation of the ordering of the socio-economic-political groupings in which real decision-making takes place. These groupings are the crucial seats of power and not the individual nor society. 'MacIntyre's Manager has largely taken over the society of which she/he is a part'.

Other depictions of this managerialism present a far bleaker picture than MacIntyre's. 'In general, managements of organizations try to make the best possible arrangements for themselves (first) and their organization (second). In making those arrangements, managements find it necessary to negotiate, bargain and transact with the management of other organizations. Those transactions are not conspiratorial: they are carried on by people with differing interests'. In this negotiating process, managerialism has developed, in the name of efficiency and effectiveness, a pecking-order of priorities: the protection and development of the manager's interests, first; the interests of the enterprise, second; customers, workers and the elderly will have priority, but only if they are organised and well managed by they themselves 'having managers who can perform well' in negotiations. Following in the wake of these are the politicians and their activities about which the manager is 'sceptical', and then those who are not 'represented' about whom the Manager will be 'unconcerned', for 'if you have no manager to speak for you, your influence will be slight'.
The context or structure in which the Manager operates has been called a 'Maze', but its features make it resemble more the Court described by Castiglione, for there the individual makes their own way without a guide and there is no system. As a princely monarch dominates a Court, the Maze is dominated totally by the most senior manager. Jackall presents concrete evidence of manipulation, of treating people as means, and of 'managerial neutrality' to support MacIntyre's portrait. The manipulation exists in 'the willing adoption of a senior manager's perspective by his/her subordinates.

Indeed, a team player...is a manager who "amiably chooses the direction his boss points out". Young managers learn quickly that, whatever may be said to the contrary, "bosses generally want pliable and agreeable subordinates".

Jackall provides concrete evidence of the characteristics of MacIntyre's Manager, such as protection of their self-interest and a 'pervasive manipulation': 'Our motives are purely selfish. We're not interested in old Joe failing, but we are worried about how his failure will reflect on... when somebody fails [we]...put him in a boat, tow him out to sea and cut the rope. And we never think about him again.

Jackall's description of a successful manager's manipulation of people and willingly allowing her/his own manipulation parallels Castiglione's advice to the Courtier in listing the all important attributes to rising at Court or in the modern organisation: 'when to defer without being deferential; when to "brown-nose" without falling in to grotesque fawning; when to be self-promoting and when self-effacing; when to do what one's boss expects of you'. Jackall concedes that none of this is easy, but above all it requires 'continual compromises with conventional and popular notions of integrity'.

What dominates the organisation are resources and power and these are seated in whoever happens to be one's superior in the courtly hierarchy: 'What is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you. That's what morality is in the corporation'.

Jackall's evidence points to the fact that the Manager does not operate in a morally neutral world and does not have a divided identity of role and self. This raises the issues of the claims and counter-claims for neutrality in the definitions of the self.

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344 Cf. Text p. 121. line 8-28; p. 495 line 37-p. 496 line 14; p. 492 line 16-20; No or few rules and no systems at Abecedary. Text p.318 line 1-9 Like a country without a constitution: Advisory committees and Tsarist Russia; Text p. 501 line 32 – p. 502 line 8. No systems so open to the influence of character.
349 Ibid. p. 186 and p. 6.
Jackall’s evidence describes disintegration of the moral self in the maze of the organisation, as in the Court. Thus bureaucracy poses ‘moral dilemmas [which] are pervasive, taken for granted and...regularly denied’. This takes place in a world where there are ‘situational moralities’ based upon what other actors might do or have done. What is clear is that it is not what a person is that matters in a bureaucratic world, but how closely that person’s “many personae mesh with the organizational ideal”. The Manager’s morality is not like a rock, but like a rag blown in the wind, twisting with all the suppleness of Castiglione’s Courtier, and utilising ‘agility in avoiding blame; not his acuity in perceiving falsity or errors but his adeptness at protecting others...not what he believes or says but how well he has mastered the ideologies and rhetoric that serve his corporation; not what he stands for but whom he stands with in the labyrinths of his organisation’. Like a trusted Courtier, those who are successful graduate from the metaphorical corridors of power to the mythical inner sanctum or the political ‘smoke-filled back room’. The ethos that they fashion turns principles into guidelines, ethics in to etiquette, values in to tastes, personal responsibility into an adroitness at public relations, and notions of truth into credibility...As it happens, given their pivotal institutional role in our epoch, they help create and re-create, as an unintended consequence of their personal striving, a society where morality becomes undistinguishable from one’s own survival and advantage. The verdict on such Courtly role-playing is that it is an empty activity that gives little or no meaning to life: ‘multiple role interactions are seen to provide particularly barren ground for development’ of the self. Mangham perceives a division between role-playing and the self.

Every airport bookstall has examples of Courtier-ly advice on how to role play one’s way up the hierarchy, and it is no revelation to describe it as a manipulative, egotistical activity, engaged in by ‘rational egotists’ who engage in social interaction solely to further their own personal ends. The validity of the overwhelming motivation of self-interest is assumed in the approaches of scientific management and the political analyses of organisations. Economists accept the truth of egoistical behaviour and see its regulation in the operation of the market. Significantly Milton Friedman, a guru and considerable influence

350 Ibid. p. 13.
on the Thatcher government and the social philosophy that dominated the late twentieth century and beyond, rejected as ‘subversive’ any notion of social responsibility in the manager’s role, which was, in his view, to serve the ends of her/his employer because ‘few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible’. Acting the role of agents or representatives of the organisation substantiated the managers’ claims to rationality and to moral neutrality: to be impersonal ... and “more or less ethically neutral”. Once given a set of defined goals, as though a programmed robot, all decisions are thereafter ‘empirical [factual] questions about ways and means’. Therefore such management gurus advocate that ‘the decision is to be made nonpersonally...and that officials [as the agents of the organisation] are required to abdicate their choice in obedience to the impersonal organizational order’. ‘This kind of effectiveness is called rationality’ [Original emphasis]. Having presented this picture of rationality, Ladd continues his account to suggest that this apparently pure technical analysis could not suffice and that there had to be a judgement, even in the weighing of alternative courses of action. Therefore ‘ethical neutrality is a “fiction adopted, perhaps, to absolve managers from responsibility for the decisions they make”’. The rational manager is a ‘fictional figure’, like a created character in a literary or dramatic work. Mangham finds that this is not a new critical interpretation because he quotes a view of Chester Barnard from the late 1930s that the probability was that ‘moral deterioration and loss of personal responsibility is more frequent among executives than among other persons. The very complexity of the moral situation and the “over loading” that is inescapable, make this credible. That is, I think, confirmed by current observation. Either moral bewilderment or loss of ability can and does produce “collapse of character”.

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358 Ibid. p. 504.

359 Ibid. p. 509.

Such a "collapse" is the theme of a study of government decision-making that charts a path through history to demonstrate that 'while all other sciences have advanced, government is at a standstill, little better practised now than three or four thousand years ago', as John Adams, the second US President put it.\textsuperscript{361}

The litany of supporting evidence stretches from the Trojans admitting the Greek horse inside their city walls, through an English King deciding on suppression of rather than negotiation with American colonists, through three disastrous invasions of Russia, through the King of the Incas yielding to a few hundred mercenaries, and Chinese leaders rejecting reform in the twentieth century, and British Trade Unions wrecking their own political party in government as though separate from the rest of the country, and American commerce guzzling oil, land, water and air regardless of consequences and finally Vietnam and Iraq. Tuchman suggests mis-government - and one could add, mis-management - comes in four kinds: 'tyranny and oppression'; 'excessive ambition'\textsuperscript{362} [The Armada]; 'incompetence and decadence' [late Roman Empire and Tsarist Russia under the Romanovs]; and lastly folly.\textsuperscript{363}

'The March of Folly' dissects this last, the "folly" of not heeding and placing first the public interest, 'the welfare or advantage of the body being governed'.\textsuperscript{364} Monarchical hierarchy was founded on authority transferred from God to the ruler, but as Alexander Pope viewed it "the right divine of kings to govern wrong".\textsuperscript{365}

Though the Stoics called reason the "thinking fire", so that a ruler was supposed to be 'the servant of divine reason [appointed] to maintain order on earth', Tuchman's evidence demonstrates how reason is overthrown by the passions - ambition, anxiety, status-seeking, face-saving, illusions, delusions, fixed prejudices.\textsuperscript{366} Reason was an important feature in all the examples given above, but was over-ridden by the passions which Tuchman identifies as the force that unseats reason. Plato strove for government by reasonable men but recognised that 'when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural laws, that I call folly'.\textsuperscript{368}
The principal compulsion toward folly is the lust for power, according to Tacitus 'the most flagrant of passions'\(^{369}\). Having power over others is the only way it may be satisfied, and though it may be more completely satiated in government, it may be satisfied in commerce, though the trappings are less. Acton was not the only one to remark on the moral corrosiveness of power, for Jefferson diagnosed that 'Whenever a man has cast a longing eye on [office], a rottenness begins in his conduct'. And Adam Smith recognised what Jackall and others have perceived in managers' placing of self before the interests of the organisation and the scramble for status in any hierarchy; 'And thus Place...is the end of half the labours of human life; and is the cause of all the tumult and bustle, all the rape and injustice which avarice and ambition have introduced into this world\(^{370}\). Having formulated a plan for a utopian state ruled by a hierarchy of philosopher-kings, Plato changed his mind and concluded that 'laws were the only safeguard\(^{371}\), because excessive and unfettered power leads to injustice; the possession of arbitrary power\(^{372}\) is corrupting because 'there is no one who will not under such circumstances become filled with folly, the worst of diseases'\(^{373}\). Tuchman uses examples from the Renaissance Papacy and from US President Lyndon Johnson who spoke of "my air force"\(^{374}\) [Original emphasis] and thought his position entitled him to lie and deceive; and most obviously from Richard Nixon\(^{375}\).

Among the distinguishing features of the practice of folly, Tuchman identifies 'protective stupidity' and 'mental standstill or stagnation'. This last is 'the maintenance intact by the rulers and policy makers of the ideas they started out with'. Henry Kissinger's view is that leaders in government – and this can legitimately be projected into other spheres of public life – bring certain 'convictions' with them, which make up 'the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they are in office' and do not learn beyond them\(^{376}\). The stages of 'mental stagnation' are, first, the definition of the fundamentals and boundaries of the problem and establishing the principles; second, as failure and difference become apparent, instead of rethinking and reviewing, the first

\(^{369}\) Ibid. p. 478.

\(^{370}\) Ibid. p.478.


\(^{372}\) Cf Text p. 320 line 14-21; p. 189 line 19-31; p. 317 line 28-p. 319 line 8 Committees were all advisory.


\(^{374}\) Footnote: In the first years of the transfer of Abecedary Institute from LEA into the control of the Secretary of State through local governors, there was the anecdote going the rounds that the new Chair of Governors requiring a desk and office in site but of his referring to the Institute as "My Institute"


\(^{376}\) Ibid. p. 479-480.
'principles rigidify', egos are protected and more 'investment' ploughed in; finally, the leader plunges on pursuing failure on the grounds of a lack of choice. Tuchman makes clear that choice is always available, however little difference there may appear to be between the alternatives. Moreover, there is always the choice of stopping and changing direction but this requires the uncommon activity of asking and listening, and so 'wooden-headedness' is the principal companion of folly. The other companion practice is 'protective stupidity'. In 1984 George Orwell called it "Crimestop" – [which] in short means protective stupidity'. It is 'the faculty of stopping short, as though by instinct, at the threshold of a dangerous thought. It includes not grasping analogies, of failing to perceive logical errors, of misunderstanding the simplest argument...and of being bored and repelled by any train of thought which is leading in a heretical direction'\textsuperscript{377}. It might also mean a manager’s halting all ongoing processes, until the manager can control everything, regardless of consequences, like a new General halting a battle while he reads or even makes a new map. Restructuring to supplement the leader with a government class of educated civil servants has not achieved the desired results. The Chinese mandarin system ended in 'corruption and incompetence'. The Ottoman Empire's 'Slave Institution', or Kapa Kullari, eventually cast off the restriction of having no families, or property, became a permanent hereditary ruling clan, made an unsuccessful bid for total power and were 'slaughtered', bringing down the whole infrastructure, so that the Turkish Empire declined into being the 'sick man of Europe'.\textsuperscript{378} The Prussian civil service fared better but their 'arrogance and power-hunger' ended in the carnage of the First World War\textsuperscript{379}. Tuchman has a little praise for the English system in producing 'distinguished civil servants' with training, skills, 'continuity and maintenance of the long view as against transient issues and political passions', but it has shown incredible ignorance of what takes place at the grass roots, even in its own departments as the careers of Blunt, Burgess, Maclean and Philby testify\textsuperscript{380}. The American Civil Service has yet to achieve the goals set for it in 1937 of a 'real career service...personnel of the highest order, competent, highly trained, loyal, skilled...by reason of long experience and assured continuity'. In Tuchman's view this service has not

\textsuperscript{377} Ibid. p. 481. Cf. Text p. 500 line 21 – 501 line 21 Dean of Quality Control stopping all approved programmes when he arrived and not adapting to what Abecedary Institute was like.

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid. p. 482.

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid. p. 483.

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. p. 483. Cf. Text p. 341 line 9-17: Databases do not reveal what is going on. Viz. Research Design and the account of the 'sensible knave'
'affect[ed]' the elected 'government at the top', which is the outcome of an electoral process 'drowning in commercial techniques of fund-raising and image making'\textsuperscript{381}. Modern government by a single 'chief of state' faced with innumerable tasks, is limited by the sheer scale of the multitude of tasks, so that 'the field is open to protective stupidity - bureaucracy safely repeating today what it did yesterday, rolls on as some vast computer, which once penetrated by error, duplicates it forever'\textsuperscript{382}. The desire, ambition and compulsion for re-election [My emphasis] place limits on elected governments. Under such circumstances, Tuchman suggests that the search for 'wiser government...should look for the test of character first. And that test should be moral courage'. Swift had Gulliver bring back a report on the Lilliputians' selection process for people for public appointment: 'They have more regard for good morals than for great abilities, for, since government is necessary to mankind, they believe...that Providence never intended to make management of publick [sic] affairs a mystery to be comprehended only by a few persons of sublime genius, of which there are seldom three born in an age. They suppose truth, justice, temperance...to be in every man's power: the practice of which virtues, assisted by experience and good intention, would qualify any man for service of his country, except where a course of study is required'\textsuperscript{383}. As an issue for elected government which can bounce between 'brilliance and decline', it comes down to an issue of educating the electorate to select 'integrity of character and reject the ersatz'\textsuperscript{384}. Tuchman's analysis is about government but the issues of ambition and hierarchical structure apply universally. In the case of organisations, Mangham points to an alternative to this self-interest that is based on a unity of role and relationships. This approach is offered as questions: 'Can we release the fixity of our role...can we release our structural fixity, drop the assumption of our prerogatives in hierarchical positions, and instead see ourselves as just another player in what is in fact one big network?...Better to think of oneself as part of a network [team] no matter how close your name is to the top of the page'\textsuperscript{385}. These questions balance two incompatible ideas: 'fixity' of structures and hierarchy and being one 'player in...a big network'. The question is founded on

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid. p. 484.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. p. 484. Cf. Research Design and the Unitisation of courses
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid. p. 485.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid. p. 485–486.
an idea of integrated contributions of equal importance and the sentiment is a republican rejection of monarchy as an organisational structure. Making a 'far-reaching' contribution to this sentiment, MacIntyre's bleak and fundamental judgement of his Manager is that she/he is an 'Emperor with no clothes'\(^{386}\) and like the members of the Court in the original tales, 'managers and writers about management' are 'socially and politically committed to maintaining the disguise'\(^{387}\). It is the conclusion that others have recognised as inevitable, as soon as the limitations of rationality have been reached. The fruits of this charade are 'authority, power and money', because she/he 'claims' to have the 'expertise in controlling – managing – change'\(^{388}\). The Manager's 'pretensions' include possessing the 'skills and knowledge for the successful manipulation of others', and for 'controlling certain aspects of social reality'. However Macintyre sees the Manager as other than he might seem because her/his 'everyday, hard-headed, practical, pragmatic, no-nonsense realism' depends upon 'the systemic perpetuation of misunderstanding and...belief in fictions'\(^{389}\). He suggests that the operation of 'levers of power' may only coincide accidentally with the effects that the managers imagine they are creating\(^{390}\). MacIntyre strips away 'managerial effectiveness' and renames it a 'fictitious, but believed in, reality' and that the claim is 'emotivism', a pretence of 'rational justification through a manipulative emotional assertion'\(^{391}\), 'real rational justifications' to secure 'non-rational effects on the attitudes and feelings of others'\(^{392}\). MacIntyre concludes that the hollowness of managerial claims to effectiveness exposes 'our morality...as a theatre of illusions'\(^{393}\).

Using the scientific basis of some management thinking, MacIntyre states that, instead of a 'stock of law-like generalisations with strong predictive powers', like Boyle's Law, or the Newton's Law of Gravity, the social sciences offer 'maxims for enlightened practice' none of which are proof against 'unpredictability'.\(^{394}\). 'The Manager, far from pursuing objectively based aims based upon law-like generalizations, is doing nothing more than advancing his

\(^{391}\) Cf. Prologue
\(^{394}\) Ibid. p. 88.
own arbitrary, but disguised will and preferences. The effects of 18th-century prophecy, MacIntyre claims "have been to produce not scientifically managed social control, but a skilful dramatic imitation of such control. It is a histrionic success which gives power and authority in our culture. The most effective manager is the best actor".

Given the emptiness of what is suggested as a world of smoke and mirrors, the direction of MacIntyre's analysis is towards ethics, and given his leanings towards Aristotle and Augustine, it is 'rationalistic ethics, a morality dominated by the mind'. Its variation on the rational idea of an impartial set of criteria for virtues offers an element of relativity in that his ethic accepts that a person is 'embedded in a community', within which the person follows a set of practices - 'cooperative human activities', which become a self-sustaining 'tradition', in which an 'understanding of their importance across [the] generations' defines the virtues, which enable that person to pursue the good life'. The tradition is contextually defined, is 'dynamic and, therefore, open to reflection and revision'. These traditions are 'the repositories of standards of rationality...crucial to moral deliberation and action'. They therefore represent an external authority, however much there is an element of definition by practice. MacIntyre's approach follows the custom of dividing the psychology of the human being into reason and emotion; this rational basis for ethics provides the person with laws to be obeyed and defines the passions and emotions as something to be resisted, guided and controlled: 'the role of Reason is to supply the Will with the ammunition for the control of needs, desires and whims'. As an Aristotelian and an Augustinian Christian, MacIntyre's rational basis for ethics depends upon beliefs that are based on a return to notions of original sin and humankind's dependence on divine authority and rational standards.

395 Cf. Text p. 514 line 8- p. 515 line 14: Abecedary Management stereotyping and reinforcing their own prejudices.
It is the division of reason from emotion that provides the area of contention. The place and role of emotion and passion separates this morality from what we might recognise in real life, our own and the lives of others. Emotions like compassion and benevolence have their role in ethics, and yet the rational tradition diminishes their role and place. Much of this arises from the traditions of external moral authority derived from the Western Christian Church and Augustinian views, which persist in the culture. The control and restraint of emotion underpins philosophy, legislation, organisation and management. Amidst the Babel of competing modern claims and voices, philosophy and gurus look for the certainty that an external authority and set of standards could provide – and usually find only their own. The problem has returned to that which Willmott described of the need for a different psychology and philosophy that can redefine human agency and character. One commentator suggests that the postmodern moral condition is to have no belief in certainty. This contemporary view of ethics rejects the notion of an external set of laws and standards providing 'uncontested and all-powerful social agency which could [or, for that matter, would wish to] forge the universal principles, however firmly founded intellectually, into effective standards of universal behaviour'\textsuperscript{400}. Mistrust of 'unemotional calculating reason' is crucial in this approach, and what has to be rejected is the suppression of emotion. Postmodern ethics acknowledges its 'non-rationality; its being its own – both necessary and sufficient –reason'. Therefore it requires that 'not all actions need to justify and explain themselves to be worthy or our esteem'\textsuperscript{401}. The practice of such a morality requires a 'moral responsibility - being for the Other before one can be with the Other – is the first reality of the self, a starting point rather than a product of society'\textsuperscript{402}. This provides the foundation on which negotiation may take place between people, though elsewhere another earlier philosopher deemed it only possible among equals\textsuperscript{403}, because the 'moral capacity of human beings...makes them so conspicuously capable to form societies'\textsuperscript{404}. The morality of society is a practice that is negotiated between its members which is dependent upon 'human moral intuition and the ability to negotiate the art and usages of living together'\textsuperscript{405}.

\textsuperscript{401} Ibid. p. 36.
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid. p. 13.
\textsuperscript{403} Cf. Hume.
\textsuperscript{405} Ibid. p. 33.
MacIntyre's idea of morality and justice as negotiated 'in a determinately structured form of community' with a 'hierarchy of offices' [My note: 'offices' not officers; the function not the person...]...in which the contributions to the overall good are made by such office-holders and by individual members of the community... echoes with the Stoics, Cicero and the philosopher, David Hume. MacIntyre identifies Hume, the 'infidel', who stood opposed to the rationality of the Enlightenment, as the philosophers' 'antagonist par excellence', whose 'views had to be defeated in open debate' and sets himself the same task, because though they share much they are separated by issues of reason versus passion, atheism versus Augustinian Christianity and external authority. MacIntyre's agrees with Hume about the negotiation of justice, manoeuvres the independent Hume into being part of the tradition, and conflicts with him over a rationalistic ethic, and an external authority founded on Christian belief. Thus, while Hume sets his negotiations in a totally human and real context, MacIntyre follows Augustine "'civitas Dei'...a divinely ordained form of community...[where] every human being is summoned to find his/her due place. MacIntyre finds Hume guilty of MacIntyre's own idea of being a part of a community and a tradition by citing the evidence of Hume's rejection of the devout Calvinism of his early life for atheism and also his rejection of his own Scottish background for English society, and his 'egotism' in breaking with the rational philosophical tradition. MacIntyre interprets Hume's psychological philosophy based on the passions that are common to all persons as 'each person...[responding] to others who are in turn responding to us'. Consequently MacIntyre sees Hume's 'personal identity as socially imputed...and to that extent the way of ideas has been left behind. MacIntyre rejects this as a fundamental error because what was presented as 'universal was to a significant degree local and particular' and belonged to 'highly specific social and cultural forms'. He accuses Hume of using his own experiences, that is, 'material provided by his own development and transformation of the way of ideas', to confront the tradition of Locke, Pascal, Berkeley and others. MacIntyre adds for good measure that Hume's vices and

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408 Ibid. p. 322.
410 Ibid. pp. 281-284.
411 Ibid. p. 290.
412 Ibid. pp. 292-293.
413 Ibid. p. 293.
414 Ibid. p. 295.
virtues are linked to a particular social order, the 'dominant' 'way of life of the eighteenth century English land owning class'\textsuperscript{415}. Though it can be argued that pride and humility are universal but that which yields pride or humility is culturally defined, defending Hume is unnecessary at this point, but it is notable that this very specificity and the centrality of the emotions give a postmodern relevance to Hume and lends importance to his idea of socially negotiated laws and conventions – an idea which MacIntyre shares. He has to admit the relativity of Hume's position and central ideas that 'every particular evaluative and practical judgement is of course the expression of someone's particular passion or passions' but finds no common 'agreement or concurrence of the passions of each in the patterns of mutuality which constitute the transactions of society'. His argument proceeds to acknowledge the individual passions as deviant and the 'partiality of passionate attachments' - which is almost like a definition put forward by the postmodernists. In fact in his opening of 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' he admits that 'modern political orders...lack institutionalized forums within which...fundamental disagreements can be explored and charted...[and] the fact of disagreement go unacknowledged, disguised by the rhetoric of consensus...without fundamental principles to inform...background beliefs....private citizens are thus for the most part left to their own devices'\textsuperscript{416}.

MacIntyre's own basic position requires the intervention of 'general rules which correct our evaluations'\textsuperscript{417}. His intention is to prove that Hume's psychology 'does not provide a foundation for Hume's political philosophy'\textsuperscript{418}. As a rationalist MacIntyre requires that 'the passions must be educated and redirected so that the human being qua rational being may pursue those ends specific to that rationality'. But according to Hume there can be no such ends\textsuperscript{419}, for his psychology places passion and emotion in the governing seat. Macintyre objects to rationality being knocked from its traditional central philosophical role in defining 'the metaphysical and moral principles constitutive of the political and social order', and to theology being deprived of 'its traditional centrality'\textsuperscript{420}.

Hume placed the passions at the centre of his psychology and philosophy. MacIntyre undermines this by suggesting that a more modern, complex and

\textsuperscript{415} Ibid. p. 295.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid. pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid. p. 297.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid. p. 298.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid. p. 301.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid. p. 301.
sophisticated definition of passion is necessary\textsuperscript{421} and that Hume meant something other than 'emotion' when he identified them as - desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear [Treatise III 3. i.]. This leads to his redefinition of them as providing the intentionality for action by linking the passions to objects, i.e., "to get such and such\textsuperscript{422}, and from that idea, to the governance of passions by rationality by answering the 'type of questions which the passions provide motives for asking and answering"\textsuperscript{423}. 'Such reason' - which MacIntyre has 'constructed' from Hume's work - 'has the same logical form as any other reasoning' and thus MacIntyre has regulated the passions, so that a person aspiring to satisfy 'passion and desire will have to include in his reasoning about means and ends reasoning about his or her own passions and the regularities which relate those passions to each other and to actions, and in similar fashion about the passions of others and the regularities which relate their passions to our own\textsuperscript{424}. By these means he corrals Hume into the tradition and the community -two of his principal ideas. So MacIntyre's version of 'Hume's portrait of human nature reasonableness' draws him into a community with 'an interest in social reciprocity and harmony [in which] the development of amiability toward and sympathy with the other members of our society serves that interest\textsuperscript{425}.

MacIntyre is able to manage the same manoeuvre for justice without changing the definition or downgrading the role of the passions. Hume condemns all self interest: 'self-love, when it acts in it liberty...is the source of all injustice and violence' [Treatise III, ii, 1], and regards it as an unsuitable basis for the rules of justice; nor can 'regard for the public interest', nor sympathy for others 'a love of mankind' [Treatise III, ii, 1], provide a basis for justice\textsuperscript{426}. Hume based justice on property and the necessity for negotiated artificial rules and MacIntyre welcomes Hume into a tradition of thinking, shared with Thomas Aquinas, that endorses the concept of external authority and the enforcement of 'the rules of justice - in the face of the violations of public and private interest', including the classic dilemma of the person who steals to save the life of a family member. Hume's justification for such rules is the effects on social life when there are no rules and no means of enforcing them\textsuperscript{427}. MacIntyre's

\textsuperscript{421} Ibid. p. 302.
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid. p. 303.
\textsuperscript{423} Ibid. p. 304.
\textsuperscript{424} Ibid. p. 306.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid. p. 306.
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid. p. 306-307.
interpretation is that both he and Hume follow in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle that 'great inequalities in property characteristically generate social conflict and that injustice in the form of acquisitiveness characteristically produces such inequalities' and enforcing such inequalities and injustice may lead to 'disruption and even revolution'\textsuperscript{428}. In 'Of Commerce' [1752], Hume made the significant point that 'the great equality of fortunes among the inhabitants of the ancient republics' and 'their want of commerce and luxury' contributed to their strength, but, unfortunately, he did not conceive it possible for a ruler to return to such 'maxims of ancient polity'\textsuperscript{429}. MacIntyre uses this last comment to justify high-growth capitalism. On the other hand Hume's republican leanings - a republic being an artificially negotiated form of governance - accords with his idea of justice 'which is not among "the natural sentiments of humanity"' [Treatise III, ii, 5] and "those impressions which give rise to this sense of justice, are not natural to the mind of man, but arise from artifice and human conventions" [Treatise III, ii, 2]\textsuperscript{430}. Likewise government is also an artifice and a 'well contrived government' protects life and property and provides for the enforcing of contracts\textsuperscript{431}. But Hume, at heart a republican who came out in favour of the American colonists, also recognised that 'nothing is more essential to the public interest than the preservation of public liberty' [Treatise iii, ii, x]\textsuperscript{432} and stated that it is in "a mix't government" where power is shared among kings, lords and commons that public liberty is preserved' for each part of the constitutional whole has an interest in protecting certain rights and privileges against any encroachment by others\textsuperscript{433}. Bearing in mind the times were filled with memories of the Civil War, rebellions, restorations and contending claims to the monarchy, a writer on political theory had to proceed with caution. Hume suggested this power-sharing held true of the constitutional monarchy of British Government established on the Restoration , which he called "a civilised monarchy" and this was "what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are the Government of Laws, not of men. They are found susceptible of order, method and constancy to a surprising degree" [Of Civil Liberty, 1758]\textsuperscript{434}. Hume asserts that the process of negotiating such forms of governance - MacIntyre prefers 'reasoning' - exists

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid. p. 308. Cf. Text p. 635 line 21 - p. 636 line 4; Text p.346 line 24 – 347 line 24: Spot salaries for administrators and the increase in their number.


as 'an agreement in passion and sentiment' which constitute practical reasoning, so that those not of a philosophical frame of mind can also understand the nature of obligation to and from government, so that “all men have an implicit notion...and are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest; and at the same time, that human nature is so subject to frailties and passions, as may easily pervert this institution and change their governors into tyrants and public enemies” [Treatise III, ii, x] MacIntyre’s gloss on this proposition strains to add elements of reason to Hume’s ‘implicit notion’, but both philosophers are in accord since the line of argument is driving toward the notion of a negotiated cooperative community: that there is formed ‘a will to and a habit of agreement with others within the dominant social framework itself’ and that this too ‘is a motivating factor’. Within this context people adopt an attitude of impartiality, rather than bias, and express certain constant socially approved attitudes: ‘Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments or at least of correcting our language’ [Treatise III, iii, 1]. It is from these sentiments that government arises because as Hume states: ‘The obligation of submission to government is not deriv’d from any promise of the subjects....[but] from the universal consent of mankind’. And it is with this set of beliefs and within this context that Hume states that humankind is a good judge of ‘any sentiment or character’: ‘the opinions of men, in this case,...are in great measure infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it , it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as everyone places in it, and thus 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken’[Treatise III, ii, 8]. MacIntyre shares similar view to Hume’s about values negotiated within a community and about government because in part it is negotiated and because of tradition. As has been remarked, despite his republican sympathies, Hume supported the constitutional monarchy and rejected the Jacobite rebellions for obvious pragmatic reasons, and thus offered the view that governments achieve legitimacy through ‘long possession...we shall find that there is scarce any race of kings or form of

commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion’
[Treatise III, ii, 10] 440. Where no long-established government exists, the
present government can achieve legitimacy by conquest, succession and ‘the
right conferred by positive laws’ 441. Macintyre refers to the inconsistency of
Hume’s advocating the right of people to withdraw consent and to rebel, and
his acceptance of the British eighteenth century ruling monarchical regime, but
does so without taking account of the context in which Hume was living, in
which the dilemma is the same as that of Galileo’s recantation in order to
survive. MacIntyre uses this to show that Hume was being inconsistent in
letting his reason over-rule the philosophical principles arising out of his
passions.

However, MacIntyre shares with Hume, and also with Aristotle, the view that
justice comes from the ‘sound reasoning...shared by at least the vast majority
of the community to which one belongs’ 442. Therefore judgements and
reasoning on ‘all moral and practical matters’ take place ‘as a member both of
a particular community and of a type of social order characteristic of all
civilised people’, and not alone as an individual or even isolated group. If that
‘reciprocity of shared responses and the consequent possibilities of shared
reasoning’ are withdrawn from human beings, then the consequence is the
social order that restrains the violent passions is also withdrawn. The social
order is thereby surrendered to the ‘superstitions of ancient barbarians or to
the enthusiasm of the barbarous of modern times’ 443. There is finally common
agreement that the person who ‘reasons rightly’ does so not as an isolated
individual, but as a ‘member of a particular type or political society’. Midgley
puts it more succinctly: ‘morally as well as physically, there is only one world,
and we all have to live in it’ 444.

Significantly for the character of the Manager, MacIntyre adds that ‘the kind of
reasoning that merely matches means efficiently to ends can be exercised
apart from membership of such a society. But to reason apart from such a
society is to have no standard available by which to correct the passions’.
MacIntyre goes on to recognise the ‘central’ nature of defining such standards,
whether by reason, by transcendental Christian values, or Hume’s negotiated
conventions, like Dunn’s recommendation for limiting the duration of tenure of

442 Ibid. p. 320.
an office\textsuperscript{445}. Regardless of this, he wishes to lay down the common agreed observation: ‘that practical rationality with a determinate structure is always informed by and itself informs the practices of some distinctive form of social order and that it is \textit{qua} member of such a form of social order and not merely \textit{qua} individual that someone exercises practical rationality’\textsuperscript{446}. The description of ‘practical rationality’ parallels the thinking of Giddens on structuration and how organisational forms are made by the actions of individuals exercising their roles and places his theory within a Humean tradition.

Willmott, Deetz and MacIntyre offer distanced and perceptive descriptions, while Jackall and Hume plunge into the guts of life and describe what motivates the human actions that others observe and rationalise from a distance. Thus Deetz also follows the established analysis with which Finkielkraut’s account began this commentary, that the breakdown of the dominant values arising from philosophy and especially from religion, like moderation, the Renaissance ‘Temperance’, which defined how to live and the purpose of life itself came with the Enlightenment’s promotion of rational scientific thinking, like economics, and ideas such as the market and choice. As a consequence two sets of ideas were invented: the rationally scientific thought and the private thought; any ideas beyond the reach of the market and science were redefined as personal, individual matters of concern, like a person’s emotional life. The notion of emotivism, the individual emotional base of values rather than any external rational basis, arose from this separation of values. Foregrounding the individual – Mrs. Thatcher’s denial of society and identification of individuals and their families – admitted cultural difference but only so long as it could be accommodated in impersonal systems like the market and choice\textsuperscript{447}. Therefore a person expresses their individuality with the choices they make in a marketplace of goods, services, or, in this context, units in a higher education degree. In the latter case it is easy to comprehend the extremely limited extent of that choice, but the same limitations apply in the wider world-market. Moreover, the false impression was encouraged that there were two worlds, one private with its own gurus, like psychiatrists and belief-systems and belief-institutions, and an apparently impersonal, rational

\textsuperscript{447} Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10; Cf. Text p. 558 line 25-559 line 8: The Unitisation of courses attacking the culture of decency and values, giving skills, and account of the management ideology as totalitarian; also making students part-time in effect.
public one; each was separated from the other. But this separation was also false, as Weber's account of the 'confluence' between Protestant religion and capitalism testifies. Habermas and Deetz have demonstrated that the rational public world of systems has encroached further into the private in order to seek more justification for its existence, and the private world has resisted it. However, as communities have weakened so have the justifications for the rational systems also weakened along with them, but the response has not been to review and change direction, but to add more systems. Within this wider context, managers and organisations have played their part as technocrats, so that people are valued only as a means of keeping the organisation operating, which is associated with an increase in control and a loss of autonomy. Onto this stage have strolled the managers, 'more distant, more economically driven... more coldly rational in their decisions, having shed the old affiliations with people and place. Their break with tradition and their modus operandi has been given the title 'managerialism', which is not class nor group based, but according to Deetz's view 'a kind of systemic logic, a set of routine practices, and an ideology'. In an analysis that he prefaces with a statement from MacIntyre's 'After Virtue' that resonates with ideas of being governed rather than managed, that 'the barbarians...have already been governing us for quite a long time', Deetz follows the line that managerialism is a new 'orthodoxy'. 'Managerialism is one of the main philosophical issues of our time. Its orthodoxy values trivialise the human essence, diminish human dignity, and widen the gap between a privileged class of managers and the rest of the people.'

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Deetz defines 'managerialism as a 'discourse', a means rather than a group of persons, a way of thinking and debating, 'a systemic logic, a set of routine practices', real structures and rewards', a code of representation and an ideology'; he also calls it a 'discursive genre' different from other 'manners', a set of discursive moves that interpellates a particular type of subject and produces a particular world [My Emphases]. It also structures people and groups, and 'suppresses each group's other way of thinking'. The use of 'discursive' suggests both a level of rationality but also a different logic that proceeds from one thing to the other with little formal plan, as in the idea of 'fire-fighting' management, while 'interpellate' though usually referring to something like a question, here relates to a 'subject', thereby suggesting a person butting in and creating a new structure. It also takes over people's thinking. What Deetz makes clearer later is that 'managerialism is not necessary'—i.e., persons have butted in—in that the structure of modern corporations could work with other models or logics...large corporations per se, while fostered by managerialism, do not require it. Managerialism, in this scenario, forms an 'imaginary' identification between the corporation and the management so that they become 'a unitary identity; its central motif is control; its primary mode of reasoning is cognitive-instrumental'; it prefers to express issues in monetary terms; and it reproduces itself in 'the formal organization'. The use of the third person pronoun helps to depersonalize qualities that are in fact highly personal: identity, desire for control, technical and acquisitive thinking, and formal style. The account of 'routine practices', 'moves' and the existence of a 'type of subject' [i.e., individual or person] and the creation of a type of world in which that person intercedes and identifies with the corporation are characteristics that resemble modern versions of

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459 Cf. Text p. 495 line 1 — 496 line 4: Crisis decision-taking, but the staff are so 'nice' they accept it.


Viz: Background to HE i.e., in the 1990s, according to Evans described how, - expressed in a language that suggests motives steeped in desires, passions and character – at Cambridge University, the professional administrators 'got it into their heads that they would really like to be managers.' Evans G. R. Op. cit. p. 41.

Castiglione’s separate world of the Court and courtiers seeking to please for reward and preserving the monarchical hierarchy with either a Chairman or CEO as monarch, while being fearful of the people outside.

Deetz suggests that managerialism advances the idea of a particular world and a particular kind of person to inhabit it. The corporation and the management share the same ‘imaginary identity; the central motif is control; its primary mode of reasoning is cognitive-instrumental; its favoured modality is money; and its favoured site of reproduction is the formal organisation’\(^\text{463}\). However Deetz suggests that thinking of managers in terms of class or as a special group is hardly accurate. Instead he prefers to conceive of managing as a way of thinking and acting, which could equally be the manners and customs of the Court. That is why he suggests, in a remark that evokes the pigs’ occupancy of the farm house and their adopting the human lifestyle in Orwell’s ‘Animal Farm’, that it can be used by anyone and any group from boss to worker. Even worker-ownership does not outlaw it as a way of thinking. He subscribes to Ingersoll and Adams’s idea of managerialism as a ‘pervasive quality’ or a ‘metamyth’, which has three core elements:

\((1.)\) Eventually all work processes can and should be rationalised, that is broken into their constituent parts and so thoroughly understood that they can be completely controlled, (2.) the means for attaining organisational objectives deserves maximum attention, with the result that the objectives quickly be subordinated to the means, even to the extent that the objectives become lost of forgotten, and (3.) efficiency and predictability are more important than any other consideration’\(^\text{464}\)

Deetz suggests that the second and third can be made into realities, the first is ‘more subtle and less important’. However, in this research narrative, the ‘breaking down’ of subjects, courses and teaching was the principal operation that overtook the core activity. It then took on the characteristics of the remaining elements, eventually lost sight of the original objectives for the initial operation and then concentrated on the means and exercises in the

\(^{463}\) Ibid. p.223. Cf. Text p. 359 line 4-27; Text p. 594 line 28 – p. 597 line 3; Text p. 184 line 9-17; Text p. 310 line 18-24: Formality; more money on management

\(^{464}\) Ibid. p. 223, citing Ingersoll V. and Adams G. Beyond organisational boundaries: Exploring the managerial myth Administration and Society, 18, 1986 p. 366.
operation of a 'paper' efficiency\(^{465}\). Though this appears impersonal, it is merely a façade for 'the value-laden and personally interested rationalities that invade managers' decisions...It is not just the coldness that is at issue but also their rationality’ Managers’ ‘perceived neutrality’ or at least ‘economic rationality’ have ‘excused them from moral scrutiny’. They have carefully used science to support this image and they have overclaimed their own contribution to the outcome of companies. Deetz finds little public support for the idea of the manager as an ‘efficient technician’ with a sense of ‘value neutrality’; instead he finds ‘a colder more calculating management [that lacks] an ‘irrational commitment to its country and employees’. The public, on the other hand, want ‘good managerial stewards...of integrity’ making decisions that are for the public good\(^{466}\). Deetz’s choice of expression for these ideas seeks to keep the traits at a distance but a closer examination: ‘personally’, ‘excused’, ‘cold’ and ‘coldness’, ‘perceived’, ‘lack of the irrational’, ‘values’, absence of ‘integrity’ are heavy with the connotations of passions and character. In fact, the ‘perceived’, ‘neutral’ ‘image’ implied deliberate deception and self deception. Eventually Deetz suggests the language of the market is used, as a 'code', to promote the idea that the self-interest of the manager is a reflection of the public's own self interest and that putting the 'issue' in this way 'deflect[s] attention from their own character failings and...increase[s] internal corporate control. It gives licence to indulge\(^{467}\). The personal and private interest is camouflaged by the pseudo-scientific lingo of economics and the market, and it is the managers' capacity to be a conspicuous consumer that draws public respect rather than their efficiency. 'System output, not rationality, holds the public attention'. Thus increased numbers, more buildings, new libraries, Castiglione’s 'feastes' and public buildings’ are symbols of management efficiency and not the processes that engage people that take place within them\(^{468}\). Deetz suggests that while 'corporate economic successes' may in fact be 'unsystematic and coincidental' results of management, there are effects on people's working and home lives that are directly attributable to the operation of managements and corporations. The raising of a Government target for

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\(^{467}\) Ibid. p. 219.

increased student numbers may make an institution flourish independently of any publicity strategy that the management has implemented\textsuperscript{469}. The manager is meant to be 'invisible', and so can appear as unnecessary, so success for a manager requires her/him to be noticed, which initiates more work and more entrepreneurship\textsuperscript{470}. The manager's basic role is as an intermediary between competing demands, or as Deetz calls it a 'medium' between conflicts. As a medium, its characteristics are 'an interest in efficiency, rationality and significantly no visible conflicts'\textsuperscript{471}. These means then tend to become the ends of the organisation, and so become ends in themselves. Solving a conflict quietly becomes an end in itself rather than reaching a morally right, just and satisfying conclusion; it is a result that Deetz captures in the phrase 'everything went smooth'. Far from being interested in the result, the manager wishes to demonstrate the calmness of the processes, because this reflects the high quality of his conduct and processes as a manager. To achieve this, the manager must avoid being drawn in to the concrete details of the situation – it is management that can only succeed by not knowing what is actually going on. The blandness of the management process is achieved by abstraction and generalisation which distances the manager from 'a richer understanding of the particular, the individual and the concrete'. This can be achieved by procedures and processes\textsuperscript{472} which separate the decision from reacting to the local and particular facts of a situation and make the outcome uncontroversial, not 'creative', and not 'a mistake'\textsuperscript{473}. "A quiet organisation is a well managed organisation" is an expectation that is imprinted on the manager. Consequently decisions of principle, ethics, or involving the emotions are buried or translated into other seemingly neutral terms like finance. Issues are hidden behind a façade of economics\textsuperscript{474}. Though Deetz

\textsuperscript{469} Cf. Text 239 line 18 - p. 240 line 5; Text p. 614 line 7 - p. 618 line 2; Text p. 377 line 5-21: Destruction and damage to people.


\textsuperscript{471} Ibid. p. 225.

\textsuperscript{472} Cf. The theme of a distant management that was not involving staff in decision-making, nor listening to their specialist knowledge persist throughout the Text: Cf. Text p. 55 line 18-30; Text p. 105 line 29 - 34; p. 93 line 15 -20; Text p. 55 line 18-30; Text p. 275 line 37 – 276 line 31; Text p. 245 line 19-29; Text p. 244 line 6-27; Text p. 188 line 26–42 ; Text p. 184 line 19-28; Text p. 160 line 25-28; Text p. 58 line 22 - p. 60 line 6; Text p. 559 line 6-21 ; Text p. 353 line 24 – 354 line 13; Text p.328 line 2 - 329 line 14; Text p. 96 line 25 – p. 99 line 2; Text p. 53 line20-27; Text p. 632 line 8- p. 633 line 16; Text p. 589 line 22 - p. 590 line 15.


\textsuperscript{474} Cf. Text p. 552 line 13 – p. 556 line 32 Series of conflicts resolved by senior management by suppressing them and fear of disturbances from conflict.
concedes this may be a simplification, he conceives of it as 'the key to issues of control and conflict as they arise in modern organisations'.

On this basis the manager deludes herself/himself that smothering a conflict is in the interests of the organisation while it is in fact in the interests of her/his appearing to fulfil the role. It is not management but political positioning. The pretence is then played out that the conflict 'never existed' or it is personalised as someone being 'unreasonable'. By keeping his distance the manager keeps himself ignorant of the facts, values and context of the issue, and therefore free of taint; however, as the law has often demonstrated oppression, guilt, and unethical conduct often accompany such suppression of conflicts. Not only is ignorance a wrong basis on which to make a decision, ignorance lays a manager open to being deceived by false reports. Within this context, finance and the allocation of resources are regarded as socially approved problems and are able to be defined as single 'one-off' issues rather than failures of the systems of distribution and allocation. The manager is therefore able to lay off the fault for such conflicts on a range of impersonal, almost neutral causes, like poor information or communication, that can be remedied by similar impersonal solutions, like specialised expertise and training. Deetz suggests that modern corporations are filled with these kinds of 'approved conflicts' that are largely unproductive. Other conflicts like ones for control or autonomy are translated into economic demands, so that systems are implemented that rule out 'freedom and control' and put in place a 'regressive cycle'. The conflict-free organisation perpetuates itself by translating conflicts into ones that the management may approve and then resolve without disturbing the calmness of the organisation. Managerial decisions therefore become 'reactive'. Instead of serving the goals of the organisation they may be "system corrective", "putting out fires" and [provide] remediation [but overlook] the existence and reproduction of values and goals that, although not deliberated, define both problem and solution. What they like most is a crisis, or something unusual that requires the application of judgement.

Deetz's bleak portrait of managers is that they manufacture the work that

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479 Ibid. p. 227.
480 Cf. Text p. 432 line 9-23; Text p. 384 line18-23; Text p. 495 line 1 – 496 line 4; Text p. 631 line 10 – 633 line 16: Crisis decisions; and ignorance of processes; staff tolerance.
justifies their jobs, rewards, and existence. He paints them as 'highly skilled communicators in systematically distorted systems', who work 'hard' and with commitment - perhaps too hard and too zealously - and look for where they can control when control is not necessary, and use their skill and energies to cover up 'real problems and avoid upsets and conflict'. What managers offer is a routine of "skilled incompetency" that becomes systemic and then creates the chaos that gives skilled managers their reason to exist and fulfills their need to control. Created problems self-referenced in the system are far easier to manage than the intrusion of the outside environment.

There is a contrast between the technical and the practical: the technical was driven by 'the desire for mastery and control', and the practical by 'the attempt to reach understanding'. In traditional cultures, 'technical interests' were subordinate to the 'practical'. It has been suggested that, in the modern world, 'a ruling class in advanced societies has largely outgrown its earlier dependence on general culture and a unified world view and relies instead on instrumental culture resting its claim to legitimacy, not on the elaboration of a world view that purports to explain the meaning of life, but purely on its capacity to solve technical problems and thereby to enlarge the supply of material goods'. As a consequence technical reason has come to dominate reason, and so 'meaningful work, participation in decision -making and the enhancement of the autonomy of personnel have rarely been treated as goods in themselves'. Managers only perceive value in them, if they can be used to increase their control of the workers, as in the management of culture. The emphasis on skills training - a technical reasoning - is a manifestation of this increasing dominance in shaping the courses, the structure of learning, and in defining the purpose of higher education in the promise of increased rewards, and the

481 Cf. Text p. 58 line 22- p 60 line 9; Problems may not be problems when viewed by those with grassroots specialist knowledge.
decreasing amount of time that it is possible to give to seminars in which debate and discussion may examine values.\textsuperscript{487}

Ethics has no place in business that is concerned with efficiency - which is usually defined as cheapness - and managers' efficiency which is defined as calmness. Morality is not discussed as an aspect of a decision or strategy: 'It is nondiscussable issue. Efficiency remains above moral reproach'.\textsuperscript{488} The market defines and arbitrates on the ends and, as they say in the Mafia films prior to an 'execution': 'It's just business'. The moral dimension has been confined to church, state or private life and expunged from corporate organizations as organizations and managerialism has come to define its practices as 'neutral and/or universal. Thus matters of being efficient or meeting productivity targets become ends in themselves, without considering that such matters are 'grounded in the ends they serve and ultimately in relation to some social good'.\textsuperscript{489} Productivity rewards for meeting such targets rarely filter down to the lower ranks. But the effects of managerialism extend beyond the workplace's entrance gates to impact on workers lives,\textsuperscript{490} their personal economic circumstances\textsuperscript{491} and to the towns and districts in which they are located. Instead of being the site of debate on the nature and direction of society and its people, managerialism's decisions are located within economics and the self-interests of the managers.

As an illustration of the 'significant moral implications', Deetz explores an aspect of US higher education, that has relevance for UK public policy and the operation of the now privatised public services. The interpretation that he takes is a variant of means becoming ends: that by breaking down a process into stages, they become ends in themselves that embody an ultimate goal. The UK New Labour government presented its 'top-up fee' changes on the prediction that a graduate-education was 'instrumental' in yielding access to better employment prospects, salaries and life chances. Students may also take the same view. The same education also provides a 'practical' advantage

\textsuperscript{487} Cf. Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9; Text p. 586 line 2- p. 587 line 2; Text p. 627 line 5 – p. 628 line 2 & p. 626 line 30- 32: Educational emphasis on skills not values, and the question of what will be "known".


\textsuperscript{491} Cf. Text p. 594 line 28 – p. 597 line 3: Cutting staff wages to create managers
of a better understanding of the world, how to deal with problems in life and
the sheer enjoyment of learning. The two forms of learning, 'instrumental' and
'practical', are not 'incompatible'. When 'technical' reasoning becomes
dominant, so does the 'instrumental' view of education. The 'practical'
enjoyment of learning is relegated to being a 'useful by-product and aid'. This
translates into behaviour and attitudes when technical aspects like units and
grades predict something of the future economic success, and therefore the
'instrumental' becomes dominant, however 'imaginary' the link might be.
'Teaching to the texts', teaching to the assignment, completing the unit,
breaking the subject into smaller and smaller units, each with grades,
intensifies the 'instrumental'\textsuperscript{492}. 'Efficiency makes learning less pleasurable,
and since it is not pleasurable, it must be more efficient'\textsuperscript{493}. The consequence
is, in Deetz's view, a 'dysfunctional cycle' because the imbalance is not
recognised at the managerial level and so as the system declines' more control
is introduced' and 'more clearly articulated objectives, more motivational
devices - more technical solutions....Productivity and pleasure both fail'\textsuperscript{494}. 
Sadly the kind of reasoning and mentality that set this in motion cannot reform
itself because a 'technical' expert cannot understand why the less regimented
and fragmented, 'why the less orchestrated system plays better'\textsuperscript{495}. Deetz's
analysis provides generalised corroboration of the negative impact of the
unitisation of courses, but he adds pointedly that this kind of instrumental
managerial thinking within organisation is self-replicating and acts as a
'training ground' for more such thinking within organisations.
Control lurks within the shadow of these operations. Meanwhile, elsewhere 'the
human desire for freedom, autonomy and collective self-determination of the
future' continues to exist. Moreover successful achievement and material
prosperity do not necessarily suffer in the wake of emancipation: 'Emancipation
is to reclaim the choices against all forms of domination or privileging of any
arbitrary social formation. Managerialism operates against emancipation. Its
move is control, preservation and self-reproduction'\textsuperscript{496}.
The workers, like lecturers, may enjoy the work and the pleasure of 'helping
people'. In contrast, '[the] managers work, are devoid of pleasure, suffer the

\textsuperscript{492} Cf. Text p. 475 line 31-p. 478--line 30; Text p.478 line 19-29; Text p. 408 line 17 – p 409 line 14: 
Breaking courses and the academic year into smaller units & loss of coherence.

efficiency or cheapness of the education system.

\textsuperscript{494} Ibid. p. 232.

Cf. Text p. 315 line 16-18; Text p. 471 line 2-27: Students staying at their original institution and
specialising not diversifying.

\textsuperscript{496} Ibid. p. 233. Cf.: High performance work; Gintis below. Cf. The Background Oxford and Cambridge

Though Deetz acknowledges that ‘self-interest’ in terms of money and power is the principal motivation for managerialism, he suggests that money is taken to another level of influence because expressing everything in monetary terms shifts ‘the responsibility from the corporate members to the manager, because ‘the control drive [i.e., motivation. My note] of managerialism seeks the medium of its extension, and money is it’. Consequently, any problem or issue that can be turned into monetary terms is capable of being managed. If not, whatever it is, will be ‘suppressed’ or marginalisedootnote{499 Deetz S. [1992] Op. cit. p. 234-235. Note: Cf. Text p. 327 line 16-29; Text p. 345 line 13-32. The Abecedary Governors had financial control and the replacement Director retained financial control: Cf. Text p. 327 line 16-29; Text p. 345 line 13-32.}. ‘The manager’s prerogative’, or as expressed in this narrative, ‘the manager’s right to manage’ is founded on this monetary responsibility and is defined as ‘so-called rights...not negotiable with the union and protected from owner intrusionootnote{500 Ibid. p. 235. Cf. Text p. 342 line 4-20: Authoritarian management and ‘the manager’s right to manage’.}ootnote{501 Torrence G. W. Management’s Right to Manage Washington, D.C: Bureau of National Affairs, 1959 p. 1, cited by Storey J. Managerial Prerogative and the Question of Control London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 99, cited in Deetz S. [1992] Op. cit. p. 235.}. This has been ‘aggressively’ promoted in the US, and Torrence has refined this definition of ‘management’s rights’ as: ‘we’re talking about management’s right to decide what is to be done, when, where and by whom’. Deetz and Storey are aware of the mixture of personal and neutral, so that a right to do something ‘because it wants or could’ be done or ‘management desires’, uses the impersonal to disguise personal motives and subsume this muddle in the aim of profitability. This idea of prerogative is associated with a monarch’s first right in governing and the confusion seems no more than the projection of state into person, as exemplified by Louis XIV’s ‘L’État, c’est moi’. Prerogative is based on ‘property rights of ownership’ which may or may not exist if the manager is an employee but is replaced by ‘efficiency’. Deetz comments that both “are traceable to...the primacy of market rationality”...which provides a
monetary steering mechanism for managerial technical reasoning, strange grounds for democracy based on the ultimate transferability of all goals into the money-code\textsuperscript{502}. In this narrative, monetary control was vested in the externally appointed Governors and retained by the Chief Executive; they conceived of matters in monetary terms which placed their thinking at a distance from and in conflict with the ethos of the organisation and the staff's vocational sense. Moreover, since they were supervising public funds – government finance - with a 'managerial prerogative', they were inevitably characterised by muddled motives and goals\textsuperscript{503}. Moreover trade unions' strategy of combating managements solely on issues that are translatable into monetary terms – obviously, salaries, contracts, hours - further define managerial authority and prerogative and excludes the possibility of their participation\textsuperscript{504}. Significantly for this narrative Deetz suggests the alternative of locking the management out and showing that 'work could be done without them',\textsuperscript{505}. In the case of British Universities, it would mean the quite ordinary action that the staff had chosen to have the same legal constitution as those of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, two of the most successful international educational organisations; and in terms of this narrative, the acceptance of the request for heads of department to have constitutional recognition and a participative function\textsuperscript{506}. Deetz's conclusion is that 'money power and control operate as an invisible steering mechanism encroaching further into each stakeholder's conception of self and world\textsuperscript{507}. The desire to control is driven by managerialism, not the market. Managerialism suppresses diversity in order to introduce control. The irony is that the market may be used as the reason to introduce choice, but managerialism reduces it\textsuperscript{508}. Courses arranged in discrete units may seem to offer choice but they in fact control, when compared with a lengthy syllabus with the opportunity to explore independently within it; it is rather like having to choose between a restricted, instrumental set of text-books and the resources of a section of the British Library that includes these and more. The conclusion that Deetz reaches is that the technical instrumental thinking and decision-making of the market


\textsuperscript{503} Cf. Text p. 327 line 16-29; Text p. 359 line 4-27; Text p. 94 line 10 – p. 95 line 10: Relationship of Governors' financial thinking from the ethos, and function of Abecedary Institute.


\textsuperscript{505} Ibid. p. 236.

\textsuperscript{506} Cf. Background to HE constitutions Cf. Back story: account of request for constitutional change.


\textsuperscript{508} Cf. Text p. 472 line 1-20; Cf. Text p. 605 line 13 – p. 606 line 17; Text p. 474 line 7 - p. 475 line 10; Text p. 505 line 23 – p. 507 line 13: Veneer of rights and customer needs hides a 'factory' organisation and 'strait-jacket'
distorts and transmutes the multiplicity of human needs. He draws on research on communities and small institutions as an alternative to the corporation and big government in providing 'social settings... to satisfy different desires ' for example' desires for economic goods, disciplined and innovative thought, group affiliation and interaction and creative personal detachment'. He regards these as having 'equal legitimacy in a democratic society [but] the translation of all needs into monetary terms is not a simple distortion because the presence of distortion was not recognised'. He calls it 'a strategic instrumental “mistake” — a systematic distortion. The code establishes control'.

Though these give the appearance of impersonal forces, and there is a widely believed fiction that an organisation has a reality outside the interactions of the people who make up its membership, contrary to the Giddens' theory of structure and action: 'structuration'. The point of perpetrating this fiction is to make the 'organisation' seem to be a naturally occurring reality so that its constitution and legitimacy may not be questioned, nor changed. In Deetz's view, the initial violence that accompanies the establishment of such institutions is quickly forgotten. Thus Abecedary Institute's history as a completely publicly owned, local authority administered organisation becomes lost and forgotten; and the imposition of a new 'privatising' constitution that was framed for domination by a Thatcher government and its successors ceases to figure in the public understanding. This forgetfulness also cloaks the continuing forces of domination that operate as it becomes accepted as a naturally occurring reality. Only rarely is an individual made personally aware of the operation of political forces reaching down into her/his life when officially stated management objectives and conduct are revealed as the expression of a political ideology. Some remember but those who do are whittled away by time or by their replacement via the early retirement of the less 'amenable' as a way of establishing a 'new' organisational culture. What the organisation defines is itself and how people behave in a self reproducing cycle, and the organisational map formalises the definition by defining the pattern of hierarchy based on managerial authority over power and money, rather than scholastic achievement, benevolence or age, all of which could be hierarchically arranged. Making things formal rather than informal signifies what is "official"", "proper, methodical and punctilious...and takes on the virtue of a moral order".

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510 Cf. Text p. 332 line 33 – p. 334 line 28: The connection between political ideology at a national level and action at grassroots.
The formal restraints emotion while the informal conveys 'confusion, familiarity and intimacy'\textsuperscript{512}. This contrast may be further developed with contrasts between mind and body, female and male with the formal, bureaucratic rationality as a 'patriarchy'. Its supposed rational 'neutrality' conceals class and gender interests. Weber’s definition of 'rationality' has been interpreted as a form of masculinity that excludes 'the person, the sexual, and the feminine...The values of instrumental rationality are strongly associated with the masculine individual, while the feminine is associated with that "other" world of chaos and disorder\textsuperscript{513}. Thus the emotional and feminine gets marginalised as the 'repressed and unpaid'. In the context of teaching this is a vital element of vocational giving\textsuperscript{514}. The obvious manifestation of the formal is in language and minute-taking that enforces dominance and if accepted makes everyone complicit in or accepting of the dominance\textsuperscript{515} and thereby transferring to managerialism the prerogative – the first right - to rule. Formality and facility of expression and use of language take on the importance of being one of the defining characteristics of a manager and managerialism. In some circumstances the worker feels demeaned by his lack of facility and formality of expression, and so enhances the authority of the managerial voice. Instead of supporting 'expression and open consensus', language 'supports control and exclusion'\textsuperscript{516}. In a higher education context, facility of expression is less of a factor, hence strategies of 'managing' meetings by packing committees with more representatives from 'management', so diluting the elected staff representation, and then downgrading the representatives' role to advisory, 'like a country that doesn't have a constitution. We're like Tsarist Russia\textsuperscript{517}.

The manager and managerialism can and do claim to be efficient and productive and cite production targets and prosperity as proof - like the number of graduates. However, while this technical evidence is both obvious


\textsuperscript{515} Cf. Text p. 310 line 17-p. 311 line 9: Staff wary of minute taking and formality.


\textsuperscript{517} Cf. Text p. 319 line 1 -9; Text p. 320 line 19-37; Text p. 513 line 22- p 515 line 17: Constitution and representation.
and supportive, the matter of quality is not so obvious\(^{518}\). Layard’s account of ‘happiness’ questions those conclusions fundamentally\(^{519}\). Studies of administrative productivity have yielded evidence that: ‘“It appears as if the administrative bureaucracies of the economy absorb a large share of the total investment without making corresponding improvements in efficiency”...Drucker even more boldly claimed that the US companies have 20% to 30% more managers than they need\(^{520}\). Moreover managers seek short term projects from which they can accrue kudos and reputation before they move to the next post. ‘Long term development and the broader social agenda are not part of their routine’. Deetz points out that the evidence of such actions has prompted hardly any effort to redefine managerial practice and costs while the ‘invisible cost to the human character and social welfare are hardly mentioned at all\(^{521}\).

To make any progress in these circumstances requires the recognition that there is no solution currently present. Opposing forces should be required to debate. However this evocation of Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ has yet to be tried. He also recognised that ‘to abolish an established social institution...deeply rooted in the interests of some social class will...require more than a change...in the form of consciousness of the oppressed; it will require a long course of political action. Until that course of action is brought to a successful conclusion, the institution will continue to exist and exert its baleful influence on even enlightened agents, restricting their freedom and frustrating their desires\(^{522}\). Debate is one way but the ‘order of egoism’ has the weight of dominance and power on its side, and it is not until that is balanced with the rest of the institution, or until it gives up power, that any meaningful direct participative debate on constitution can come into being.

Deetz’s account seeks to distance the role from the person, the ‘agency’, as it is called. As Brecht found, ultimately they are one. Though there are many social economic, political influences on the individual and on the context that contribute to a judgement, decision, action and event that may be attributed to them, the existence of the human agent with a character, who chooses ‘to go

\(^{518}\) Cf. Text p. 380 line 16-382 line 4: Appearance of efficiency and attention to detail for quality.

\(^{519}\) Cf. Text p. 573 line 13 – p 575 line 2; Cf. Text p. 408 line 17 – p 409 line 14: The nature of the higher educative experience.


along with their influence cannot be ignored. Therefore, the result of the social, economic and political influences is the same as the person’s act: the fish is in the water and the water is in the fish. There seems to be offered a point of view based on the evidence of experience, that social, political and economic forces are joined with the inherited elements including ‘passions’ to make up what we call ‘character’ and that it is possible to group people according to types, or ‘humours’, or roles but there is always the decisive individual variation that provides human distinctiveness. It is this distinctiveness that we all are engaged with and the typing is only a rough and ready way or method of interpretation. This is the dilemma that Brecht’s theory encountered in his characterization of Mother Courage and Galileo. Giddens acknowledges that ‘structure-agency is not an either/or, but a both /and’.\(^{523}\) In a comment on the nature of the debate on the nature and extent of agency, Gray comments on the matter of the ‘choosing individual’ as a manifestation of Western cultures: ‘I buy the argument that agency is socially constructed, but given that it is so constructed, its effects are the same as if it were an essential property of human beings’.\(^{524}\) Deetz, however, describes how the public rejects the ‘colder and more calculating management’ in favour of ‘good managerial stewards, people of integrity who make good choices for them’ [My emphasis]. This ‘choosing person’ not only has ‘integrity’ of character but ‘morality should be present’.\(^{525}\) There is no mention of the processes by which legitimate choices shall be made or how accountable such choices should be. The implication is of a self-proclaimed monarchical prerogative, or just simply taking power, like Aristotle’s Oligarch.\(^{526}\)

It is impossible to give credibility to the manager as a wholly rational being and to exclude from their actions the individual character that each brings to managing, given that self interest or the ‘order of egoism’ runs through managerialism’s characteristics. Deetz offers others, like ‘the manager is a highly insecure subject, desperate for reproduction’; ‘their personally interested rationalities’; managers have ‘overclaimed their own contribution to the outcome of companies’ and the ‘manager’s belief in efficiency, science and


\(^{524}\) Ibid. Footnote, p. 30.


\(^{526}\) Viz: Background Evans comments that the administrators displayed the characteristics of Aristotle’s Oligarch and the administrative oligarchy ‘feared’ the direct democracy [Regent House]: ‘It did not suit them to have it awakened...embarrassments might follow’. Evans G. R. Op. cit. p. 46. Cf. Hume.

\(^{527}\) Cf. Text p. 417 line 21: Appointment of Heads of Faculty as ‘barons’ to keep staff in their place.
consequences is...a security blanket', and like the market economy, 'managers are not economically rational'\textsuperscript{528}.

The management may be considered impersonally as a 'discursive set of procedures', i.e., a function, or a role. The basics of the role are that workers need to be controlled and managers have a need for control\textsuperscript{529}. This role may be assumed or implemented by any individual who is drawn from the historically 'right' caste. It is the factor of individuality that expands the idea of management beyond the scope of abstract generalisations of management because that individual may execute the role or procedures in an infinite variety of ways that may serve her/his own interests or however she/he decides to interpret them. This individuality is genetically, historically influenced, like 'habitus', and is reactive to other individuals within a specific context. The variations are infinite. But the implication is that whatever general trends may influence a situation, the individual is the crucial factor. For example, ever since his arrest by the Allies, Albert Speer, at the Nuremberg Trials and in his own autobiography and in extensive interviews, denied that he knew anything of the Nazi policy of exterminating the Jews; and yet in a letter, written in 1971, he does admit being present when Himmler announced the policy that all Jews would be killed\textsuperscript{530}. His lie saved his life at the Nuremberg Trials. He presented his situation as 'misguidedly [slipping] into Nazi circles to further his career'. As Hitler's architect and armaments minister, Speer had options in his use of forced labour. A case can be made that he was compelled to obey orders by the impersonal, industrialized, organisation of which he was a part, but there are cases where others did not, like Schindler and many more. Acknowledgement of the power of the individual and individual judgement is fundamental and it is this realisation that expands the theory of management rather than reduces it. Scientific management tried to remove this human element, the 'order of egoism', from managing and the implication of Deetz's account is that individuals have found ways of using its techniques to further their own purposes within the role.

The most powerful and enduring control over the individual is time: the duration of any person in office before they return to the commonality, and another is participative direct democracy, as in the existing model of the internationally successful Oxbridge Universities. Therefore, as Hume defined


\textsuperscript{530} Speer A. 'There is no doubt - I was present as Himmler announced on October 6\textsuperscript{th} 1943 that all Jews would be killed...Who would have believed me that I suppressed this, that it would have been easier to have written all of this in my memoirs.' \textit{Letter to Hélène Jeanty, December 23\textsuperscript{rd} 1971}, cited by Connolly K. in \textit{Guardian}, March 13\textsuperscript{th} 2007, p. 19.
the situation, everything depends upon the constitutional rules that are initially devised. The control and implementation of both of these processes lie outside the organisations themselves in the public political processes that formulate their constitutions. The modern world’s speed and diversity and the individual’s multiple roles and personae help define the post-modern fragmentary world. It is easier said than done to accept the absence of certainties about individual identity, social order, reality and the purpose of life. ‘Our problem is the hope for order rather than disorder, wrong or opportunistic use of declining orders’. In this context the manager as the principal representative of ‘the organisation’ is rootless; Deetz describes her/him as ‘homeless’ and develops the idea to suggest a persona like Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, who follows self interest while expecting others to cooperate, ‘the social union of confederacy’, while she/he creates a sphere of influence that ensures the necessity of his continued existence and yields personal benefits. The ethical implications are rendered neutral by translating issues into matters of economics, or its euphemism, efficiency. In developing a response to this world, Deetz’s possible options are a cynical acceptance of the absence of ‘commitment, guilt and responsibility’ and that it is the way of the world, or to return to traditional, authoritarian values. A scientific and dehumanising alternative is the modern ‘stock-taking’- ‘literalness’, or the measurement of all aspects of life and assessment of success with strategies, like Total Quality Management, which Deetz declares are worse than the problem. The opposite is to build a world around the idea of the community, the interdependence and interconnectedness of people, but these set up alternative worlds without taking into account the economic forces that have developed the modern world. He applies the test of the ‘homeless manager’ or Hume’s ‘sensible knave’ to this world to demonstrate as Hume had done before him that the community has no adequate response, other than to shame the individual if found out or to rely on individual

conscience. The significance of this test reveals the fundamental nature of selfishness and its erosion of the common good, and that character is the ultimate decisive factor in decision-making within organisations. This trial and analysis leads him to a Humean solution - of 'conventions', or agreements between equals. Deetz's solution is 'dialogic...better negotiations rather than community principles'. He acknowledges the essential presence of the 'passions' - Hume's term - in the form of 'the body, the emotions, the feminine, pleasure, alongside the rational. Conflicts are accepted as a source of potential solutions that may produce 'innovative and mutually satisfying, if temporary arrangements' i.e., Humean conventions. There is the suggestion of a process of continuing negotiation that admits of perpetual change, like Heraclitus's 'flux'. The attitude of following illusory, external or transcendental principles may suppress 'alternative conceptions and possibilities'. The central issue is the inclusion of all people in decision making rather than treating them as means to an end.

Deetz develops his 'dialogic' solution in the notion of the stakeholder which is based on the notion of equality of rights in a world where corporate decisions affect everyone, and therefore people have a right to be involved which as a result is far more productive. While private and public institutions may have different conceptual origins, the modern world has created so many confusing hybrids that these historical distinctions are blurred. Confirmation may be quickly found in a list of privatised but regulated public utilities, not-for-profit organisations managed by trusts, and almost wholly government funded institutions with self-perpetuating private governance answerable to a government minister. Deetz cuts through this confusion with an approach that is reminiscent of the demands of the American colonist for independence: 'No taxation without representation'. Therefore he establishes the principle for all organisations that 'rightful public participation increases as the number of public decisions made within the corporate site increases...Collective direction and taxation without representation cut to the heart of democracy. Relevant democracy disappears as corporations make more of the significant public decisions'. His assessment is that no justification can be found to support

537 Cf. Hume
540 Cf. Background.
the view that managers using 'economic processes' can achieve better social direction and planning than 'elected officials' using political processes. Like Hume, Deetz makes the issues a matter of constitution: 'how to make the entire system better represent the stakeholders. The question is not whether there should be planning and direction, but by whom, through what processes and towards what ends\(^542\).

Such organisations and institutions are central, powerful decisive constituents in contemporary life, but hardly any other part has matching power, and so this lack of balance threatens democracy. They reach into every aspect of life. Thus, in the case of public education, the call for skills - transferable skills\(^543\) is indicative of the preparation of people for corporate life. Education’s role in the fostering of values and citizenship is under attack\(^544\). However the market as the principal organising mechanism is 'faltering' because the 'consensus of overarching meanings and values' which underpinned it is no longer present\(^545\). What threatens democracy is when managers take decisions that benefit themselves more than they benefit the business\(^546\). Primitive and crude rights of business ownership have been usurped by managers who have deluded themselves by appropriating these rights as their entitlement.

'Corporate leaders believe in themselves and their values. We developed a modern version of the divine right of kings\(^547\). Any public interest is set aside in favour of managerial rights in order to create a separate and well endowed and privileged world for themselves. Any misfortune, like redundancy, is insured against by 'golden parachutes'\(^548\). Deetz notes that modern stockholders have little control over the management of companies. In a similar way, if the Board of Governors or Directors is not fully engaged in an enterprise, but confines its attention to the 'figures' or the 'bottom-line', then this tacit 'removal of the owners [or in this case the Governors . My addition.] in most cases from the daily operations of the company leaves the management group with the rights of the traditional owners, but not with the traditional responsibilities and risks\(^549\). In a pattern of despotic rejection of reform, that mirrors history, managers have exerted their right to control and

\(^{542}\text{Ibid. p. 31.}
\(^{543}\text{Cf. Text p. 586 line 2- p. 587 line 2; Text p. 627 line 5 – p. 628 line 2 & p. 626 line 30-32: Transferable skills.}
\(^{544}\text{Cf. Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9; Text p. 617 line 4- p. 618 line 2; Text p. 238 line 18 – p. 239 line 5; Text p. 573 line 17-p 575 line 2: Attack on values}
\(^{546}\text{Cf. Text p. 503 line23 – p. 504 line 9: Ethics of independent ‘empire building’}
\(^{548}\text{Ibid. p. 39.}
\(^{549}\text{Ibid. p. 39.}
'knew what was best for everyone'\textsuperscript{550}, and have adhered to the belief that what could not yet be controlled would eventually succumb to more up to date scientific and technical procedures, because their managerial prerogative is based upon the translation of everything into finance. Ironically, 'although arguing for profits, they repeatedly rejected more profitable democratic approaches to work design and decision making'\textsuperscript{551}. The idea of the corporation has spawned the manager, just as the idea of monarchy produces the ideal of the king. In both cases it is 'the lack of systems of accountability: accountability to no stakeholder, let alone all' that is the issue. A lesson of history is that isolated monarchs, however benevolent, but accountable to none, 'make bad decisions for the wider group'\textsuperscript{552}. Meanwhile, the people accept these managers as they accept monarchs, as though they had a 'legitimate right of ownership', in the hope that they will make good 'economic' decisions, or they accept them because they have no choice\textsuperscript{553}. This resignation is the result of long term 'subtle forms' of control that can apply to congenial as well as harsh working environments: 'It is not so much abrupt moments of humiliation as month after month of disregarding his[or her] employees, of not taking them seriously, which establishes his domination. The feelings he has about them, they about him, need never be stated. The grinding down of his employee's sense of self-worth is not part of his discourse with them; it is a silent erosion of their sense of self-worth which will wear them down'\textsuperscript{554}. Deetz characterises the modern commercial corporations as both influential decision-makers that affect the public and as models proposed for public services, in a way that excludes:

'consideration of alternative forms of management...Certainly universities usually suffer from the same pressures and managerial control tactics as other large businesses...Corporations are created to work for people. [But] Most

\textsuperscript{550} Ibid. p. 40.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid. p. 42. Cf. Text p. 319 line 1 -9: Abecedarly Institute was 'a country without a constitution'.
\textsuperscript{553} Cf. Text p. 494 line 23 – p.496 line 14: Poor communication; distant decision making and staff accepting decisions 'with a shrug'.
stakeholders come to serve corporations rather than corporations serving the stakeholders.\(^{555}\)

The intention of Deetz’s analysis is to establish the principle of the legitimate equality of rights in the workplace. Just as Hume had suggested that the negotiation of conventions can only take place between equals, so Deetz’s principles of more productive and beneficial relations depends upon equality of rights.\(^{556}\) Moreover most workers have more to lose, in terms of jobs, family, homes, from the failure of the organisation in which they have a role and therefore invest much more in the organisation: ‘each stakeholder is an important claimant in that each invests in the corporation and is affected by its decisions’.\(^{557}\) Therefore ‘there is no legitimate social basis for those inequalities and advantages that characterise work in organisations. He also challenges the way corporations reject the multiple stakeholders’ legitimate claims, establish fixed self-interest and the way in which union and consumer-groups seek to establish power-bases of representation within the corporation in ways that produce costly and also not very ‘creative solutions’.\(^{559}\)

Deetz identifies his stakeholders as the consumers, workers, investors, suppliers, host communities, general society and finally the ‘world ecological community’.\(^{560}\) His stakeholder model recognises that stakeholders will embrace the long term goals of the institution rather than the fulfilment of the short-term, and also wish to be involved in defining those goals. He takes a view also defined by Hume as ‘a general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object’, that people do not always and usually pursue self-interest...[which, being the philosophy of the ‘egoists’ only justifies] the lack of morality on the part of the most powerful.\(^{562}\) Deetz predicts that like the observed behaviour of teams, stakeholders will have commitment and interest that will encourage them to extend their brief to wider issues than their self-interest. However, crucially they will need to learn how to participate and this is a lengthy process and will need the skills of listening, evaluating, responding and expressing that inform all aspects of life, especially citizenship: ‘Learning to participate in collaborative decision making is also a value in itself, and increasingly important in our pluralistic context.


\(^{558}\) Ibid. p. 51.

\(^{559}\) Ibid. p. 48.

\(^{560}\) Ibid. p. 50-51.


Not only are people who participate physically healthier, but they are increasingly capable of making good family and community choices. His advocacy therefore extends to open participatory democracy [which] supersedes all other goals of communication. From a communication perspective, efficiency, effectiveness, and information transfer cannot stand alone, but are interpreted within the promotion or demise of participation.

Deetz identifies characteristics that in total change the dynamics of the organisation. For example, in such a 'strong representation model' for institutions and corporations, the management's role would be that of being employed by the stakeholders 'to coordinate optimally the meeting of all the interests, as if they were interests of the corporation, thus seeking the most creative co-determination for the benefit of all stakeholders.' This kind of facilitator role is defined in the context of the administration of universities in the UK as a 'civil service' function. Deetz's advocacy of the stakeholder model sees managers as facilitators and therefore able to escape their own 'control-centred leadership' model and take on the role of furnishing alternative strategies to resolve conflicts of interest which would require creativity and skill but which will produce 'impressive pay-offs.' This applies fittingly to 'knowledge-intensive work and management' which has the characteristics of a high level autonomy and self-management by the workers, because of their special expertise, the qualitative nature of the standards, 'professional codes, the presence of work...outside the employment site...and alternative employment possibilities'. There are also 'complex communication processes' requiring negotiation of solutions and problems with high levels of cooperation to 'determine what needs to be done and how to do it'. While the market system is 'fragmented and unstable', such adaptable and creative organisations will have 'chaotic or postmodern' environments, and 'fluid' role definitions.

Power shifts from management to employees. Managerial control is devolved and there is a closer relationship between worker and customer as

564 Ibid. p. 108.
565 Ibid. p. 49.
569 Cf. The Background: Narrative of the degree validation by CNAA.
the emphasis moves to the product rather than the process. Thus the relationship between the worker and the client is crucial because circumstances are never standard and uniform, and therefore depend upon an individual’s specialised knowledge. Workers come to identify with their work, strive harder and feel valued, if they are given financial control. Though such work is infinitely more satisfying in terms of professional identity, financial standing and security, the human cost in terms of longer hours and high expectations still produce conditions of subordination, however voluntary. Despite this workers feel they are involved in quality work with ‘cooperative professional associates’, though Deetz adds that conflict can arise between individual interests and the team which may lead some to ‘cheat’ in order to advance their interests. Another account of this kind of working, i.e., high performance work, emphasises the training that people require in order to work within the ethic and ethos of this organisational approach. What is common to all these accounts is that in these circumstances the exercise of the professional role at the periphery of the organisation reduces the management’s functions to a minimum.

However, Deetz outlines the political scenario of management’s response to the reduction in their control by their striving to retain or re-establish control principally by taking on the function of ‘integration’. Management invents a role for itself. So, if management is at the centre and the professional work is at the periphery, and if management can fragment or unitise the professional work into small specialist units and tasks, then integration is required to combine these elements through the procedures of coordination, assignment and supervision of all processes. Hence the provider-client relationship is reduced in importance. Minimising the size of the tasks creates ‘instability’,

570 Cf. Text p. 115 line 31 – p. 116 line 21; Text p. 127 line 18 – 29; Text p. 154 line 4-17; Cf. Text p. 205 line 6-8; Text p. 253 line 6- 25; Text p. 123 line 16-30; Text p. 125 line 26 – p. 126 line 7: Devolved financial control was promised but withdrawn and central control retained.
571 Viz. Account of team working and management, below.
572 Viz. Account of high performance work, below.
which is manifest in the use of part-time workers\textsuperscript{576}, and thus the necessity is created for more technical and economic control which becomes inherently increased in importance for integrating functions and for ‘managerial control’.

Deetz’s interpretation of the manager and managerialism follows independently in a tradition established in some of the principles and concepts about rationalization and rationality, power and organisation of Max Weber [1864-1920]. Deetz shares the tone, of Weber’s “liberal in despair” facing ‘the future [which] will be an icy night of polar darkness’ as he examined ‘the peculiarities of modernity and in particular its fateful or even demonic properties\textsuperscript{577}.

Weber’s account of the modern politics acts as a model for the definitions of managerialism and suggests the view that it is a power-based political phenomenon. His causal analysis is based on evidence of historical frequency and his analysis of the individual on the psychology of human motive both of which place him, like Mary Douglas and Durkheim, in the tradition established by David Hume\textsuperscript{578}.

One of Weber’s principal subjects was the development of ‘rationalization’ as a method and its encroachment on all aspects of life in the form of ‘instrumental rationality’. ‘The monopoly of economic power’ in society was the basis of Marx’s sociology, while Weber’s was ‘alternative monopolies’ and how they came to be ‘constituted’. Arising at the same time was the growing dominance of ‘the expert and professional knowledge’ and associated with it, ‘the division of labour’, ‘the separation of the worker from the means of production...and the alienation of the intellectual from the university’. ‘Rationalization’ spawned ‘disenchantment, specialisation’ and ‘powerlessness in the face of bureaucratic management’. Alienation’ arose from its ‘division, specialisation and separation’.

While Marx perceived how capitalism destroyed traditional societies at great human cost\textsuperscript{579}, Weber’s rationalisation introduced ‘the machine like regulation of bureaucracy’ which challenges all beliefs and creates a world where ‘systems of meaning could no longer find authority’\textsuperscript{580}. Generally in modern society and

\textsuperscript{576} Cf. Text p. 147 line 10-14: Prediction of the use of more ‘outside’ i.e., part-time workers.


\textsuperscript{579} Cf. Text p. 614 line 7-1 & p. 614 line 27 -. 615 line 5 & p. 615 line 23-31 & p. 616 line 23 – 618 line 2; Text 239 line 18 –p. 240 line 5: Reflection on the deliberate destruction of people’s values and collegiality.

particularly in this case-study, both of these forces, embodied in the manager and managerialism, play out their 'demonic properties'\textsuperscript{581} [viz. above]. Modernity tests everything against [the] unitary principle of rationality' and so 'disrupts the traditional order' and the traditional authorities and values that make the world 'intelligible and legitimate'. But Weber also recognised that the questioning of 'reality by reason was ultimately self-defeating and self destructive'. Rationality would eventually begin to question itself, and would raise its own question that 'instrumental rationality' might be 'in fact, life-denying'\textsuperscript{582}.

Weber's view of democracy was dialectical, a debate between two opposing forces. While democracy in the modern world would require its own professional political machine, democracy had a duty to oppose a bureaucracy operated by 'a cast of mandarins, removed from the common people by expert training...tenure of office', but democracy lacked the efficiency of bureaucracy. 'Thus democracy has to promote what reason demands and democratic sentiment hates'. Weber uses the example of the American workers who prefer to operate with 'a set of corrupt politicians' they could 'oust and despise' rather than 'a caste of expert officials who would despise them and were irremovable'\textsuperscript{583}. Weber opposed authoritarianism because, once destroyed, everyone is left 'directionless', whereas selecting and voting people for offices was more 'toughening', because people had to prove themselves in office; there was an automatic measure of accountability.

Similar contrary views clashed in his account of freedom and individuality. His assessment, at the beginning of the twentieth century of the growing inevitability, greater efficiency and precision of 'bureaucratic management' collided with his 'feeling himself on the defensive' as a 'nostalgic liberal'. Weber thought that the modern capitalist state was not 'irrational', that it knew exactly what it was about: the modern state through the dynamism and anonymity of its rationally managed institutions 'prepared Man [sic] for his absorption in the clattering process of bureaucratic machinery'\textsuperscript{584}. It, in other words, was a self-replicating machine. Foucault's account of power and Deetz's example of the self-defeating instrumental fragmentation in teaching provide subsequent confirmation\textsuperscript{585}. Thus, the rationalisation inherent in

\textsuperscript{581} Viz. The Prologue.
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid. p. 49.
bureaucracy is associated with 'mechanism, depersonalisation and oppressive routine' and is the opposite of personal freedom. Weber 'deplores the type of man [sic] that the mechanisation and the routine of bureaucracy selects and forms'. His portrait is one that foreshadows the kind of characteristics identified by Deetz's portrait of the manager: 'The narrowed professional, publicly certified and examined and ready for tenure and career. His craving for security is balanced by his moderate ambitions and he is rewarded by the honour of official status...a petty routine creature, lacking in heroism, human spontaneity, and inventiveness: "The Puritan willed to be the vocational man that we have to be' 586.

Weber hated bureaucracy as 'a shackle upon the liberal individual' and rejected Marx's idea of a worker's revolution: 'For the time being the dictatorship of the official and not that of the worker is on the march'. Weber took the view that the 'salaried officialdom of the modern bureaucratic state' had merely taken over the political means found in the feudal estates.

Weber identified the antidote to bureaucracy in 'charisma: the gift of grace'587, and though the concept of inspirational leaders whom people follow, when viewed later in the twentieth century appears extremely dangerous, the qualities he identifies of 'truly revolutionary forces', interpersonal ability, and opposition to 'institutional routines' offer a set of opposed ideas that Deetz updates as the opposition between 'instrumental' and 'practical'. On his own concept, Weber constructed sets of contrasts: the 'mass versus personality', 'routine versus creative', ordinary versus exceptional, rules versus spontaneity, and drudgery versus imaginative588. 'Man's [sic] spontaneity and freedom are placed on the side of heroic enthusiasm'589. Weber sees this as the initial start of the dynamic of charisma that begins with the initial enthusiasm for a leader's ideas leading to the democratized ideas of followers, to traditions and eventually into bureaucratisation. Therefore Weber perceived that charisma could be 'routinized'590. The basis of his concepts and 'the ultimate unit of analysis' for Weber 'is the motivations of the single individual'591. From patterns of frequency in the historical evidence that he amassed, Weber drew conceptual tools based on what institutional elements remained of an

589 Ibid. p. 55.
590 Ibid. p. 54.
individual's actions: 'Not Julius Caesar, but Caesarism'\textsuperscript{592}. To which could be added "Not the manager, but managerialism'. When such a concept is taken back to a body of evidence, individual motivation and individual discretion come into play. Weber's approach admits onto the stage the actions, influence, discretion, choices and responsibility of the individual character in a particular context. He sought to "understand" rather than record 'social facts'. Weber looked to people's motives and suggested that a human being 'can "understand" or attempt to "understand" his [sic] own intentions through introspection, and he may interpret the motives of other men's [sic] conduct in terms of their professed or ascribed intentions'\textsuperscript{593}. To devise such conceptual tools Weber grouped motives into a typology of actions along a continuum from the rational to the irrational, so the most "understandable" were the "rational expediencies...of which the conduct of "economic man" is a prime example'; others are ""affectual" flow[ing] purely from sentiment...[and] "traditional"...: unreflective and habitual'. This typology of motive corresponded to his basic types of social structure: "society", "association", and "community"\textsuperscript{594}. According to Gerth and Mills, there is, however, a fundamental inconsistency between Weber's portrait of the autonomous individual and his 'structural' explanations of organisations and systems. It is the same inconsistency that Brecht and others found in characterisations based on social, economic and political forces and the actions of the individual in a particular context. Weber advocated as a method restricting 'the understanding and interpretation of meaning to the subjective intentions of the actor. Yet, in his actual work he is...aware that the results of interactions [between persons] are by no means identical with what the actor intended to do'\textsuperscript{595}. One tentative suggestion is that the difference between Weber's analysis of the individual action and the identification of structural trends is not an inconsistency but a matter of distance and frequency, in which his idea of the 'individual unit of action' is not compromised because it remains the ultimate source of action within a particular context which is influenced by a range of values. The unpredictability of outcomes based on intentions and the motives and actions of individuals brings into the equation the matter of 'chance' or as Castiglione

\textsuperscript{592} Ibid. p. 55
\textsuperscript{593} Ibid. p. 56. Cf. The Text, and its Presentation in Research Design,
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid. p. 56 - 57.
\textsuperscript{595} Ibid. p. 58.
refers to it 'lucke', whose influence Gibbon observed in his account of the
history of Roman Imperialism\textsuperscript{596}.

The existence of 'chance' could account for his own avoidance of any
philosophical explanations of either the subjective or the structural, and
instead grouped historical evidence and objects under generalisations sharing
the same name, nominalism, to show their relationship to each other but in
name only. The selection of evidence may show an awareness of the limitation
of generalisations to be universal but also of their potential to be analytically
useful. Weber's concept of the 'ideal type' is somewhat similar. 'Ideal' was not
a value but a distancing device to separate 'a logically controlled and
unambiguous conception' from any particular reality, evidence or example.
Supporting evidence was therefore drawn from the most extreme or the purest
instances. Thus democracy is defined as a dynamic device for the 'minimisation
of power', because this was the principal constitutional effect of its various
'sub-types' that involved restricted tenure of office, and 'checks and
balances'\textsuperscript{597}.

Similarly his analysis of 'Politics as a Vocation' uses these 'ideal types' in a way
that evokes descriptions of management and managerialism, and so obliquely
suggests that management is not a neutral but a political act. Abecedary's
Institute's respondents intuitively compared management with political states
as the natural comparison, confirming the view that domination by
management is the same as domination by the state\textsuperscript{598}. Weber defines politics
as 'any kind of independent [Original emphasis] leadership in action\textsuperscript{599}'. Thus
the state is not 'defined by its ends' because these are and have been so
diverse, and so the state may only be defined by its 'specific means\textsuperscript{600}'. The
same applies to management, and in both cases the means served the motive.
The politics of the state is focussed upon sharing or influencing 'the distribution
of power, either among the states or among groups within a state'.
Management fulfils the same role within its 'territory'.
Those involved in politics 'strive for power either as a means of serving other
aims, ideal or egoistic, or as "power for power's sake", that is to enjoy the

\textsuperscript{600} Ibid. p. 78.
prestige—feeling that power gives. And, as Deetz and Jackall confirm, so do managers.

Those with power are obeyed because they can exert 'violence'. And so can managers in the form of economic violence. The holders of power base their 'domination' on 'tradition charisma, and legality', founded on 'legal statute', and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules. 'This last is domination as exercised by the modern "servant of the state" and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him'. Obedience is achieved by 'fear and hope —fear of the vengeance of magical powers, or the power-holder, or hope for reward'. To obey is therefore a statutory obligation. To obey managers is also a contractual, if not statutory, obligation. But both have an element of violent reinforcement.

Weber acknowledged that the maintenance and retention of 'organised domination' by a particular politician or political group is a universal issue relevant 'to political domination in all its forms, traditional as well as legal and charismatic'. This therefore includes the management and governance of organisations including public service organisations, and the respondents to this research intuitively used analogies with forms of government or being ruled by the state as logical points of comparison with being managed whatever the type of regime, for domination existed in both.

'Organised domination' requires that people be 'conditioned to obedience' to those claiming legitimate power. In its armoury domination requires control of 'personal executive staff and the material implements of administration'. Weber's detailed analysis of these elements is characteristic of his method of 'typology', using the principle of frequency of historical incidents to identify cause and effect, in the method advocated by Hume. Thus, in addition to any legal obligation for obedience, Weber identifies the inducements of 'material reward and social honour' and draws on examples of their use in
feudal, church, knightly code, estate management and civil service contexts.

Significantly, adopting a Humean approach, Weber deduces that what binds
underlings to power are the passions of losing such gifts and the vanity of
possessing them\(^{610}\).

The maintenance of domination by force, as with any economic organisation,
depends upon 'material goods' and Weber defines the decisive issue as the
ultimate ownership of them. To this end, Weber offers the governmental and
political principle that 'all states may be classified'\(^{611}\) according to this
distinction of ownership and translates it also to the 'salaried employee and the
proletarian in the capitalistic enterprise'. The distinction runs through all
administrative organisations of the past\(^{612}\) and it is a distinction that holds
whatever the circumstances. The right of ownership is the ultimate distinction
and this is reflected in their 'separation ' from the material means of production.
The ownership of Cambridge and Oxford Universities lies with the members of
their governing bodies who are, generally speaking, all the members of the
universities. The ownership of other universities shows a withdrawal from this
mutual ownership progressively over the decades, till by the time of the
privatisation of the polytechnics and colleges post 1988 and 1992, 'ownership'
lay with the Governors who had a self-perpetuating right over new
membership, and, at arms length, the Secretary of State\(^{613}\).

The 'obedience of staff members' and ownership of the 'administrative means',
which may be any valuable asset, are the two pillars upon which the control of
the power-holder, monarch, representatives of the republic, or management of
the organisation depends. Control may be by the 'power holder' directly or 'by
delegating executive power to personal servants\(^{614}\), hired officials, or personal
favourites and confidants who are non-owners...but are directed by the lord.
The distinction runs through all administrative organisations in the past\(^{615}\).

Direct rule of the administration by a lord requires that he has officials who are
dependent upon him. If he delegates power to a 'dependent administrative
staff', domination is maintained 'with the aid of an autonomous "aristocracy",
who share[s] his domination with him. They are 'a propertyless strata having
no social honour of their own', nor any power of their own...materially they are


\(^{611}\) Ibid. p. 81.

\(^{612}\) Ibid. p. 81

\(^{613}\) Cf. Background: Constitutions.

\(^{614}\) Cf. Text p. 543 line10- 13; Cf. Text p. 607 line 12- p 614 line 5: New CEO was Governors' choice; tradition of 'princely' principals selecting staff.

\(^{615}\) Weber M. *Politics as a Vocation* Op. cit. p. 81
completely chained to him'. Weber adds that 'the bureaucratic state order' is 'precisely of this type'. And so is the management, for Weber regards the 'prince' as the chief initiator and this dynamic is 'completely parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through the gradual expropriation of the independent producers. In the end, the modern state controls the total means of political organisation'. The process that Weber defines is expropriation, a dispossession of public means by the private interest for political power. Public funds or means are amassed by expropriation, like taxes, and apportioned to activities. What Weber calls 'the most modern development' arises from the nature of the bureaucratic state – and organisation – where 'no single official owns the money he pays out', because everyone, officials and workers, is 'separated' from the administrative organisation's...material means'. What takes place is 'an expropriation of this expropriation', in order to achieve political power. This matches Deetz's account of what he called managers' assuming rights of ownership to which they have no title, but thereby 'expropriating' the political power of the owner or monarch. Though Weber suggests that capitalist enterprises follow different laws, his analogy applies to public, not-for-profit institutions of the state: 'In the bureaucratic state machine', it is the process of rationalization [that] parallels the centralisation of the material implements of organisation in the discretionary power of the overlord. And this applies to management and its centralising tendency over the professional autonomy, both individual and team, existing at the periphery.

This analysis of domination clashed with Weber's desire for freedom and prompted his despair. Rather than 'too much democracy and individualism', the weight of his historical evidence pointed to the 'relentless...sic...rebirth of aristocracies and authorities': 'all economic weathercocks point in the direction of increasing servitude. As for the bureaucrats in this world, Weber did not regard them 'as harbingers of freedom'. He identified two alternative moments in history: the emergence of the armies of the English Revolution and the assemblies of the French Revolution, when there existed 'certain conceptions of ideal values, grown out of a world of definite religious beliefs'.

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616 Ibid. p. 81-82.
and which have put a stamp of 'ethical peculiarity and cultural values on modern man' \(^{623}\).

Though the individual is influenced by social institutions and acts out social roles, Weber asserts that she/he is not a 'social product' because he endows each with his idea of 'individuality', i.e., the 'gift of grace' or charisma. This connects Weber back to 'the humanist tradition of liberalism' and its belief in 'the freedom of the individual to create free institutions' \(^{624}\). Though an individual's choices were neither completely free nor pre-determined, such a person 'can be more than a mere cog in his occupational groove...[and] if...responsible he will have to make informed decisions' \(^{625}\). Weber's view was that material interests did not further the cause of democracy, and so his prediction was that freedom of choice in the future would be diminished and that the prospect was for 'new servitude' because the complex economic processes encouraged more 'work for clerks' and the beginning of a 'caste' of bureaucrats. His bleak vision was that 'too much provisions had been made to see to it that the trees of democratic individualism do not shoot into the sky' \(^{626}\).

Writing these predictions a century ago, in 1906, he could already detect that 'the rational construction of institutional life, doubtless after having destroyed innumerable "values"...at least, in principle, has done its work'. This particular statement previews not only the residual values of Abecedary Institution with a living continuity that could be traced back to its foundation, but also, almost verbatim, the institutional intention of one influential member of the management in the cause of what Weber called 'the standardisation of production' \(^{627}\). In the case of Abecedary Institute this meant the 'unitisation' of courses and associated 'quality' procedures, a trend reflected nationally by other schemes of a similar nature \(^{628}\). Of his own time, Weber judged that this had made 'the external way of life uniform' and that 'no shadow of probability' existed that modern 'economic "socialisation"' could give rise to 'inwardly "free" personalities or "altruistic" ideals nor to freedom and democracy' \(^{629}\).

While 'capitalism is the embodiment of rational impersonality', the 'irrational sentiments and privacy' are the seat of the 'quest for freedom'.

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\(^{624}\) Ibíd. p. 73. Cf. Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9: Calculated attack of management of unitisation of courses on liberal humanist values.


\(^{628}\) Cf. Text p. 472 line 1-20 Unitisation and factory education.

Weber imagined these two forces as embodied in two kinds of person: ‘the cultivated man as a well rounded personality...[and] the technical expert, who, from the human point of view is crippled’\textsuperscript{630}, but who was in the ascendant. Tellingly, Weber represented ‘humanist and cultural liberalism rather than economic liberalism’ and ‘saw education and the social production of personalities as dependent upon politics and economics’\textsuperscript{631}. However, the picture is more complex than it seems for, in The Rationalisation of Education and Training, Weber describes a ‘fight that intrudes into all intimate cultural questions’. On one side was the ‘cultivated man’ - a ‘value neutral description’ - who represented the product of an educational ideal where all the subject matter was not always useful, but also represented an old ruling elite, common to several civilisations including class-ridden Britain. Opposing this person was the ‘trained expert’, whose rise had followed behind the ‘irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of all public and private relations of authority’\textsuperscript{632}. Weber places their ‘fight’ within the arena of education and training, particularly in universities and further education, because it was in such institutions that the ‘the rational bureaucratic structure of domination’ had its far reaching effects. The debate amongst the ‘silenced’ of Abecedary Institute on precisely this issue and the imposition of such a dominant bureaucracy had effects that corroborated Weber’s analysis.

Weber outlines the features of such systems for which the corner-stone was the ‘special examination system’ for the trained expert. This was not new but a development of existing systems amongst the professions. One of its purposes was to draw ‘talent [charisma]’\textsuperscript{633} from ‘all social strata’ and not just from the ruling ‘notables’; ‘bureaucracy...destroyed the structures of domination that had no rational character’\textsuperscript{634}. However, the expansion of the ‘bureaucratization of capitalism’ created a universal demand for ‘clerks, etcetera’, who enjoyed increased status and ‘economic advantage’ and who also formed ‘a privileged stratum’, a ruling ‘caste’ that demanded ever higher status, rewards, honours and advancement. The passport to this world is the qualification, but its acquisition requires ‘considerable expense’ and some ‘period of waiting’ before the rewards are seen, which ‘sets back talent in favour of [those with] property’ [wealth My additions/ explanations.]\textsuperscript{635}.


\textsuperscript{633} Ibid. p. 242.

\textsuperscript{634} Ibid. p. 244.

\textsuperscript{635} Ibid. p. 242.
Weber predicted that as such qualifications increase in number, so do their 'intellectual' costs 'decrease'. As bureaucracy overcomes the obstacles in its progress towards the 'levelling process necessary for bureaucracy', the initial phase of the advance of newly qualified experts is regarded as democratic because it weakens the hold of the ruling establishment. As Weber predicted elsewhere, it then 'relentlessly' proceeds to form its own 'aristocracies and authorities'. Thus democracy eventually comes to 'react against the dominance and "status" character of bureaucracy' by seeking 'to put the election of officials for short terms in the place of appointed officials'. Democracy seeks 'to replace the arbitrary', hierarchical "master" by the equally arbitrary disposition of the governed.

Economic efficiency and advantage provides the rationale for bureaucratic administrative procedures, but Weber questions whether other reasons might also be factors, like 'the purely political', or, 'autonomous logic from the bureaucratic technology' i.e., the self-perpetuating and expansive dynamic of bureaucratic careers. Significantly, by suggesting that such bureaucratic structures might not 'release specific economic effects', Weber hints at the more pressing influence of politics and career. Weber adds that the older the administrative structure 'the more typical is the absence of bureaucracy and officialdom in the structure of domination', a remark that could account for some of Oxford and Cambridge's success and also describe the culture of Abecedary Institute prior to privatisation.

Though bureaucracy's impressive efficiency, to Weber's despair, was conquering the private, commercial and public worlds, these hints at political and career interests, indicate that its impartiality, its efficiency and the rationality of its ends are all questionable. Bureaucracy's purpose was to remove 'individual discretion', i.e., autonomy, by its rational and impersonal operation because of 'its complete harmony of individual actions untainted by discretion'. At this level bureaucracy's intention was to nullify the effects of 'discretion', or character. However, the rationality of bureaucracy 'resides in the system of rules, not in the judgement of individuals, except those, usually high up in the organisation, who make the rules, and who retain discretion to

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some degree\textsuperscript{640}. And so from its inception, bureaucracy sets up a dichotomy of systemic and individual rationality\textsuperscript{641}. Thus in the debate over whether people are treated as ends or means, it is questionable whether bureaucracy is impartial or rational. Similarly, bureaucracy assumes its own efficiency, proved by minimum ‘wastage’ and maximum ‘production’, and yet today, as a description, bureaucracy is synonymous with waste and inefficiency. Bureaucracy supposedly worked towards rational ends because its processes of planning, deliberation and calculation indicate rationality. But though planned and schemed as rational in its deployment of means, bureaucracy may be irrational in its ends.

Like Weber’s use of pure and extreme examples to reach structural analyses, Grey draws upon Baumann’s account of the genocide of the Holocaust as an ‘extreme application of bureaucratic logic...with its systems of rules, impersonally applied’ and its technical efficiency. The Holocaust’s ‘impersonal, ethically neutral pursuit of means’ gave the semblance of rationality but its genocidal end was irrational, but Baumann wants us not to see the Holocaust as ‘an aberration or anomaly when compared with mainstream western culture, rather it was a manifestation of the habitual way of organising within that culture\textsuperscript{642}. This social analysis makes it relevant to the contemporary world. Baumann demonstrates how some factors – ‘a powerful centralised state...a huge, efficient, bureaucratic apparatus... the non-interference, the passive acceptance ...by the population\textsuperscript{643} - that produced the Holocaust are ‘constantly present in every modern society, and their presence has been made both possible and inescapable by those processes which are properly associated with the rise and entrenchment of modern civilisation\textsuperscript{644}. The theatre, as ever, had shown the way by identifying this link with everyday life, so that in Trevor Griffiths’s ‘Comedians’, Eddie Waters, the old time music hall comedian who has been teaching an evening class for new comedians explains why he no longer performs. He is responding to his best pupil, Gethin Price, who has given a final audition performance expressing his anger at and alienation from his ‘unitising’ world, and wants to know where Eddie’s anger at the ways of the world had disappeared:


\textsuperscript{642} Ibid. p. 25.

\textsuperscript{643} Cf. Text p.480 line 9-19: Staff ‘went along with the prevailing’ regime.

'Just like you fifty years ago. We're still caged, exploited, prodded, and pulled at, milked, fattened, slaughtered, cut up, fed out. We still don't belong to ourselves. Nothing's changed. You've just forgotten that's all.645' Provoked, Eddie reveals that he learned that jokes can embody intolerance and hatred of people on his visit to Belsen extermination camp at the end of World War Two, where he found there was: ...'In this hell-place, a special block, 'Der Strafbloc', 'Punishment Block'. It took a minute to register, I almost laughed, it seemed so ludicrous. Then I saw it. It was a world like any other. It was the logic of our world...extended...........And I discovered there were no jokes left. Every joke was a little pellet, a... final solution. We're the only animal that laughs. The only one. You know when you see chimpanzees on the PG Tips things snickering, do you know what that is? Fear. They're signalling their terror.646

These perspectives are highly relevant to this narrative because of the reactions of those respondents who, in the final stages of the research, found similarities between Abecedary Institute's managerial actions and behaviour and the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s647. Their reflections suggest that the particular evidence was not an exaggeration nor an 'aberration' but indicative of 'the habitual way of organising' within western culture.

There are obvious examples of such institutions whose principal aim is either to keep people in to protect the society beyond its barriers, and to keep people out so that those inside the barriers may be cared for. A list would range from every kind of prison and gaol to orphanages, sanitaria and asylums648. More complex organisations are those that are somewhat withdrawn from general society in order to be more dedicated to serving a particular purpose, like education and training. The military barracks, boarding school, monastery indicate such institutions. They are all 'forcing houses for changing people'. Goffman calls them 'total organisations' which are 'a social hybrid, part residential community, part formal organisation'. In its earlier years like countless others, Abecedary Institute was established for the training of young women to be teachers and was similarly set in a country location at a distance

646 Ibid. p. 64.
from the local town. What characterises all of them is 'the bureaucratic organisation of whole blocks of people', regardless of whether or not this form of 'social organisation' is 'a necessary or effective means'. What is important is that 'persons' are either under surveillance or surveying, usually the many by the few: 'a seeing to it that everyone does what he [sic] has been told' 649.

Regardless of any constitution, there is a concentration of power and the total character of the organisation depends upon what people do. Clegg brings this concept and studies of the Holocaust together in a way that supports the relevance of respondents' comparison of being managed 650.

Clegg takes the same position as Baumann and Eddie Waters that the Holocaust's horrific scale and 'demonic' efficiency needs to be analysed to understand how bureaucratic means were put to evil ends'. What is alarming is that these views converge on the idea that these means were typical of everyday life so that once inside that world 'certain actions became routine', like any other system 651. Baumann's view is that the application of the rules of bureaucratic rationality were the essential factor, because of their impartiality and amorality 652. Others identify the contribution of such factors as ideology 653; or 'a social movement...animated by spontaneous improvisation' 654; or the overthrow of the legal-administrative bureaucracies and the consequent appointment of like-minded officials 655, and lastly Grey's analysis of ends divorced from means and the weakening of ethics 656.

Clegg is aware that the Holocaust's destruction was not a unique event in a century where modernity's 'organizational capabilities' were put to the cause of

649 Ibid. pp. 16-22.
death and destruction and that its means or techniques 'dwelt in the midst of
the categories of reason' 657, alongside the finest works and institutions of
Western civilisation. No one and nowhere was immune. No one person could be
identified as the initiator of the Holocaust but one account identifies the trend,
common to many organisations, that, in the 'disorderly and crony ridden world
of Nazi politics', one factor was clear: the path to success lay in "impressing the
boss". Once a strategy has been found to please, others follow the same path
with greater enthusiasm: 'Once one crony hit on it the rest followed suit'.
Clegg takes from Rose 659 the techniques and technologies for achieving the
aims of a total institution, for it is suggested that the process of making its
goals impersonal and technical contributes to the achievement of such goals.
These included: removing any distinctive identity 660; delegate centrally
conceived projects to peripheral experts by concentrating on the means rather
than the ends 661; using value-free science i.e., numbers 662; setting up a
factory-like mass production 663; getting 'the highest authority to sanction the
organisational action' 664; 'routinize the actions', work is a ceaseless round
with little time for reflection; 'dehumanise those subject to power and always
be selective in your mercies' 666; maintain a distance between the exercisers and
effects and subjects of power 667; make those who are subject 'complicit' by
involving them; have conviction that the regime is the best for all - 'wrap its
purpose in the rhetoric about it being in the best interests of the other and
society at large' 668; police the system so that there are no exceptions and

658 Ibid. p. 428, citing Higgins W. Journey in to Darkness Blackheath, Australia: Brandl and
being assessed as 'delivering the goods'
660 Cf. Text p. 129 line 24 - p. 130 line 11; Cf. Text p. 284 line 1-22; Cf. Text p. 129 line 24 – p. 130
line 11; Cf. Text p. 284 line 1-22; Cf. Text p. 129 line 24 – p. 130 line 11: Subjects to be broken down
a 'central resource', but subjects give identity.
Unitary courses a 'grand strategy' but its work delegated to the faculty staff.
662 I.e., course unit numbering system.
663 Cf. Text p. 472 line 1-20; Text p. 531 line 24 – p. 532 line 2: Unitary courses is factory system of
education without considering the process of education.
665 Cf. Text p. 526 line 6 – p. 258 line 27; Text p. 261 line 3-16: Standardising documentation and
'rubber stamping' decision.
666 Cf. Text p. 482 line 23 – p. 483 line 10, & Text p. 483 line 12-17 & Text p.483 line 23-p 484 line 2:
Imposition of bureaucratic work and condemnation of staff. Cf. Text 173 line 32 – p. 174 line 6; Cf. Text
line 7: Manner of dismissals/sackings.
667 Cf. Text p. 58 line 22- p 60 line 9; Text p. 58 line 20 – p. 59 .line 16; Cf. Text p. 111 line 20 – p. 112
line 14; Cf. Text p. 428 line 16- 25: Directorate traditionally 'distant; incognito office for director; and
advice to be distant from staff.

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'make everyone aware that they may be being spied on and informed about'\textsuperscript{669}; control all communications in and out and 'misrepresent the reality of the situation'\textsuperscript{670}; reward the 'institution's keepers with rewards and perks'\textsuperscript{671}. If these techniques foster the growth of 'total institutions', the question that arises is what can be deployed to defeat them. Rationality cannot help, because Bauman shows that rationality 'was instrumental in bringing it [the Holocaust] about'. Academia and churches were silent. The 'civilised manners' of the bystanders made them look away. 'Civilisation proved incapable of guaranteeing moral use of the awesome powers it brought into being'\textsuperscript{672}. What cleared the way for the Holocaust was 'the collapse of democracy'. He suggests the general notion that when and if 'the old authority system of control had been broken' and if 'done in a hurry' - thereby creating the kind of instability that happens 'after deep reaching revolutions' - then all the checks and balances are removed. Only 'political democracy' can prevent 'extremities'\textsuperscript{673}. Traditionally small 'grass-roots, communal' units can maintain themselves by falling back on their own resources\textsuperscript{674} when the levels above them 'disintegrate'. But in modern circumstances, political extremism sweeps all before it, because the 'old elites are weakened or 'pushed aside' and 'new centrally supervised forms emanating from, and legitimized by the state', replace them. Unions\textsuperscript{675} and local authorities were excluded or disbanded. Instead of a 'self-governing citizenship', 'a total monopoly was created, surrounded by a 'wall of secrecy', where there is no need for spontaneous intercommunication between constituents, and so preventing and frustrating the establishment of the basis of a 'political democracy'\textsuperscript{676}. Modern conditions make possible this level of control and as Bauman states: 'Modernity...is an age of artificial order, and of grand societal design, the era of planners, visionaries, and - more generally - 'gardeners' who treat society as a virgin plot of land to be expertly designed and then cultivated and doctored to keep to the designed form. There is no limit to ambition and self-confidence.

\textsuperscript{669} Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10; Cf. Text p. 558 line 25-559 line 8: Ideological management culture of anonymous reporting.
\textsuperscript{670} Cf. Text p. 380 line 16-382 line 4: Tale of maintaining an 'efficient front'.
\textsuperscript{671} Cf. Text p. 635 line 21 - p. 636 line 4; Cf. Text p.346 line 24 – 347 line 24: Objections to 'spot', i.e., non-unionised or special salary rates.
\textsuperscript{673} Ibid. p. 111.
\textsuperscript{674} Cf. Text p.181 line 5-9 ; Cf. Text p. 365 line18 – 366 line 30; Cf. Text p. 374 line16 – p. 375 line 2; Cf. Text p.37 line 23 - p. 38 line 2: Working in teams.
\textsuperscript{675} Cf. Text p. 588 line 13-18; Text p. 571 line 6-20: Weak unions, conditions of service and control from above
\textsuperscript{676} Bauman Z. Op. cit., p. 113. Cf. Text 417 line 2 - p. 418 line 11: Curtailment of meetings/discussion and growth of central controls. Cf. Research Design : HODs representation to be part of the constitution,
Indeed, through the spectacles of modern power 'mankind' seems so omnipotent and its individual members so 'incomplete', inept and submissive, and so much in need of improvement, that treating people as plants to be trimmed [if necessary uprooted] or cattle to be bred does not look fanciful or morally odious\textsuperscript{677}.

Though Bauman is charting the nature of the ideology that led to genocide and the conditions that allowed it to flourish, he makes it clear that such situations are 'thus special, yet are not at all exceptional\textsuperscript{678}. It is only in times of 'deep social dislocation' that such ideological 'reality-improving' views that make up a 'modern stance' can 'come[s] into their own', when society seems:

'so formless...- literally waiting for a vision and a skilful and resourceful designer...The combination of malleability and helplessness constitutes an attraction which few self-confident adventurous visionaries could resist. It also constitutes a situation in which they cannot be resisted. The carriers of the grand design at the helm of modern state bureaucracy, emancipated from the constraints of non-political (economic social cultural powers)...The design gives it the legitimation; state bureaucracy gives it the vehicle; and the paralysis of society gives it the "road clear" sign [Original emphases]'.

It has to be repeated that Bauman is talking about genocide, but that the conditions he describes are not 'exceptional\textsuperscript{679}. At Abecedary Institute, the Thatcher privatisation, the decisions to implement rapid institutional change, to remove hierarchical structures, to 'elbow out' established members of the Directorate and so fracture continuity, to introduce a flat management structure while retaining an 'elite Directorate, to introduce the unitisation of academic programmes, to have only an 'advisory' committee structure, and to take decisions elsewhere, created the conditions for the flourishing of an ideological design that brought none of the benefits that it promised but


\textsuperscript{679} Ibid. p. 114.
created a rigid strait-jacket of working practices, supported by a rational and
growing bureaucracy with an 'encouraged' 'spying' or report procedure. And all
this took place while the populace were bystanders.
Bauman's analysis of the Holocaust 'demonstrates' what the rationalising,
engineering tendency of modernity is capable of if not checked and mitigated,
if the pluralism of social powers is indeed eroded - as the modern ideal of
purposefully designed, fully controlled, conflict-free, orderly and harmonious
society would have it.' The concluding warning is that the only action that can
prevent such conditions becoming feasible is social democracy: 'grass-root
ability to articulate interests and self-govern', 'social and cultural pluralism and
the opportunities of its political expression', 'freedom instead of secrecy' and
'vigilance'680. Bauman calls up others to provide supporting corroboration of
his analysis and from these is able to draw out how instrumental rationality
sidelines the ethical dimension by giving the 'supreme authority' to efficiency,
calculated by the collection of data and so inserts 'a psychological distance'
between the data and any ethical or social purpose681.
Those analysts of organisations share with Bauman his view that the Holocaust
should not be regarded 'as a bizarre and aberrant episode in modern
history...[but] as a highly relevant part of that history...capable of telling us
about the hidden capacities of present-day life [Original emphases]682.
Bauman's account by touching upon 'visionaries', 'ambition and self-confidence'
allows for the involvement of the passions of the individual character, but
recognises that 'in our modern society people...neither morally corrupt nor
prejudiced may also still partake with vigour and dedication' in such acts by
'the suspension, obliteration and irrelevance of their moral or other
convictions'683. And this remains an open question about normal everyday-life
but at the same time a warning that power requires checks and balances, and
limitation of tenure, in order to provide a measure of vigilance for democracy.
Bauman's account illustrates this by recognising all but two of the factors that
made the Holocaust possible are constantly present', and 'made present and
inescapable [by] the rise and entrenchment of modern civilisation684. What
was exceptional was the 'chance encounter' between an ideologically obsessed
power elite and the tremendous facilities of rational systemic action developed
by modern society'. When that 'power attains freedom from effective social

681 Ibid. p. 115-116; p. 88
682 Ibid. p.223.
683 Ibid. p. 250.
684 Ibid. p. 95.
control' the holocaust happens. The extraordinary conditions were war: 'a state of emergency' which made it possible for the government and bureaucracy 'to get away with things which could, possibly, face more serious obstacles in time of peace'. And in all this there was the 'non-interference, the passive acceptance of those things by the population at large'.

This 'passivity' is part of the characteristics of a 'total institution'. Abecedary Institute's CEO's most memorable remark was in her opening address about the Institute facing a time of challenging change and difficulties in which the survival of the Institute was an issue, and that within that context individual staff had a choice—to be part of 'the problem' or part of 'the solution'. This became etched in everyone's minds and often referred to. If it was meant to urge them into the 'breach' to save the Institute and themselves, then it misfired. It gave the immediate impression that all staff were to be judged, and the judging might be done by the new CEO or 'events'. It divided staff without even defining either problem or solution and made them all deferent because they were about to be judged by criteria that were a secret or just unknown. It was a dangerous consequence of using a 'headline remark' without defining it. But the idea of exceptional times and a state of emergency lay in the subtext. The missing ingredients were the 'grand design' and 'designer', and the bureaucratic means. The staff were already deferent and this made them more so or it just meant they were going to 'keep their heads down', given one or two exceptions. The existing 'total' nature of the Institute had merely acquired a new kind of 'totalisation' but the effect was the same. The origins and operation of Abecedary Institute until the 1960s would have qualified it as one of the less permeable 'total institutions' that Goffman defines. 'Permeable' is defined as the extent to which the outside world intruded on an institution that was to an extent 'cut off from the wider society' and in which people led an 'enclosed, formally administered round of life'. In this respect the relations with the outside world were principally conducted with the schools and the general education system and establishment. It had been set up in the last decades of the nineteenth century, about the time of the publication of 'The Brothers Karamazov' to train young women to teach in the new national school system and it operated along the lines of a nunnery or barracks, with staff and inmates 'living in', a standard pattern for a 'total institution'. It was a self-replicating system of national education. The 1960s and the national growth

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685 Ibid. p. 94.
in higher education led to the first intake of male students, male staff having
arrived shortly before, and then diversified undergraduate degree programmes,
and the increase in student numbers meant that students and staff started to
live 'off-campus'. The accounts of life and work during those times confirmed
the total nature of the institution, not only in terms of the social behaviour and
formal conduct of the curriculum and associated way of life but the training and
supervision that accompanied it, together with a world kept at a distance.

EXTRACT NOT INCLUDED IN THE TEXT.
TED POTTER: The Blairs, he and his first wife,
were wardens of Newton [Hall of Residence].
Every hall had its resident warden (often
husband and wife teams) so that feeling of
maternal/paternal relationship was bound to
exist and particularly some of the bigger halls,
Newton and Burke Halls. They were very
demanding jobs being a warden of those places.
They were very lively students there. Edgar Blair
was warden, and a character. They were
enormously influential. They had a wardens'
committee and in terms of domestic
arrangements, a good influence on academic
arrangements because of the importance of the
domestic (arrangements) Any problems of
discipline were stamped out at hall level before
they expanded. Now, maybe people are not
prepared to do it any more a lack of
willingness perhaps. They seem to have less
control now over what the students do. If the
students had any personal problems they would
go to the hall warden. Today if you say to
students we're going to have lights out at mid­
night - if they object, people seem to think they
have the right to object, whereas I can't see that.
If you are living in a social situation you have
got to have a mind for other people in the place
within certain hours. I think that puts people off
being wardens - they are vulnerable in that
situation. I mean, when Edgar Blair was there,
he'd just go up in the middle of the night and tell them to shut-up. He'd do it in a nice way but there was no doubt that he was in charge of the hall. Another thing about the halls is that [now] they are mixed, which has changed them slightly. I know that quite a few of the women were against having the women's halls mixed whereas a lot of the Institute management thought they would all welcome it. The girls, I suppose are the same as men really, in that they would just nip down the corridor to have a shower whereas now they have to make sure they are decent!

Miss Blackley was of the old school - she had this lady friend who used to patrol around the grounds at night and she'd be peeping through the windows and everything. A girl was found to have a male baby in the women's hall of residence and they had them removed and housed in the health centre overnight because she couldn't have a male baby in a women's hall of residence - and that is really true... How can you have the naivety of a Principal of a place like Abecedary Institute with this sort of story. Now the librarian at a particular time was "knocking off" one of the students. One day, you know those doors at the end of the hall, someone looked through those doors one night and between the bookshelves, this gentleman was on the floor with this student copulating and it was reported to the director, Miss Blackley, and she said, "On the floor? Is it possible?" Maybe she thought it only happened in bed or something - but that was her naivety. The same person who had the baby boy moved from the women's hall of residence. It amazed me that someone like that could get to be a director of the Institute.
The nature of the hierarchical regime, including spying\textsuperscript{688}, was monarchical. The manners provide the context of the organisation by their collective impact and corroborate Giddens' 'structuration' that the actions of individuals create a self-replicating structure.\textsuperscript{689}

During the daily routine breaks, a monarchical court was held, and courtly favour, patronage and displeasure could be disposed as a result:

**EXTRACT NOT INCLUDED IN THE TEXT.**

TED POTTER: [At tea at 4 o'clock tea-time]...The director could discuss anything with you. Of course. I think it was always a patina. You were on your best behaviour because it was the director and, certainly if you were not one of the senior members of staff you were very much on your manners when the director was there...In those days the director had you in their gift. Yes, they could make or break you, whereas today the union might come in with unfair dismissal or something like that. You've got more personal freedom because you have protection\textsuperscript{690}.

Originally staff had processed into these daily gatherings, like going into dinner in a country house or Oxbridge College. The evidence of other Principals' searching schools looking for and recruiting future staff, the pattern of Institute life and work, daily rituals of dress and behaviour and the eccentric character and the luck involved in the characters of the Principal and Directors reinforce the portrait of a 'total' institution based upon a hierarchy in which there existed monarchical powers\textsuperscript{691}. Beneath that was a power-structure based upon the dominance of a group of Heads of Department, as chief ministers or 'barons'\textsuperscript{692}, with power over future academic development based upon the initial academic

\textsuperscript{688} Cf. Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10; Cf. Text p. 558 line 25-559 line 8: Reference to secret reporting in the later regime and its comparison with totalitarian regimes.


\textsuperscript{690} Cf. Text p. 386 line 19 – p. 388 line 7: The pattern of dismissals at the later time does not suggest this protection.

\textsuperscript{691} Cf. Text p. 607 line 12- p 614 line 5; Cf. Text p. 546 line 13 – p. 547 line 3; Cf. Text p.162 line 4-7; Cf. Text p. 73 line11 – p. 76 line 26: Accounts of working in Abecedary Institute in the decades prior to Mrs. Thatcher's privatisation.

\textsuperscript{692} Cf. Text p. 417 line 21 & Text p. 515 line 26 New Heads of Faculty created as 'barons' to keep everyone in their place; barons diluted in the Senior Management Group by including all service Heads, thereby diluting academic dominance.
plan and from which it was almost impossible to amend or expand, because that would dilute their power base\(^{693}\).

Of the strata in such institutions Goffman suggests that 'the top most and bottom most roles tend to be relatively permeable to the wider community standards', while the most 'impermeable tendencies seem to focus in the middle range of the institution's hierarchy'\(^{694}\). At Abecedary Institute the top-most and bottom-most were the governors and directors and the domestic and ground staff. Of the other groups in such institutions Goffman states that the middle and lowest levels of staff, the domestic and teaching staff, 'are likely to be the long-term employees and hence the tradition-carriers, while the higher staff, and even the inmates may have a high rate of turnover\(^{695}\). At Abecedary Institute students were there for the normal three or four year undergraduate courses; the Chief Executive completed almost four years; the teaching staff stayed for very much longer and for whole careers in some cases. It is the groups of teaching and domestic staff who 'personally present the demands of the institution to the inmates', i.e., the students. These would be the values and traditions that their profession and the careers which they served, honoured and wished to inculcate. As products of the system themselves they had the public service ethic of giving and helping\(^{696}\). By and large they were all post-1944 beneficiaries of the opening-up of higher education opportunities. It is not improbable to suggest that they were continuing a tradition that Hobsbawm identified in the nineteenth century working class treasuring education in order to help their fellows\(^{697}\), and that had influenced the initial trainees and trainers at Abecedary Institute.

Since the 1960s, and the diversification of academic programmes, there had been a greater diversification of staff and students that had gathered in pace with the addition of more degree programmes outside the traditional humanities\(^{698}\), but they adapted slowly. Consequently some were impatient and others perceived the success of a gradual adaption\(^{699}\). This contrast suggests

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\(^{693}\) Cf. Text p. 80 line 26 – p. 81 line 25; Cf. Text p. 78 line 24 – p. 80 line 5: Pattern of academic planning and power; partial democratisation at one stage.


\(^{695}\) Ibid. p. 107


\(^{698}\) Cf. Text p. 65 line 2 - p. 66 line 4; Cf. Text p. 69 line 16-p. 70 line 5: Community changing with different students.

\(^{699}\) Cf. Text p. 67 line 12-30; Cf. Text p. 595 line 13-22: A contrast of no change with adaptive change with preserving communal values.
the validity of Mary Douglas’ concept of different ‘thought styles’ existing in the same time and place\textsuperscript{700}, for the Chief Executive is reported as advising one new member of staff not to become like the others\textsuperscript{701}.

The hierarchy of group-roles within a total institution include ‘the official representative of the institution... in the councils of the wider society’ but it is a role that will require a non-institutional polish to play their role effectively. At Abecedary this would be the Chairman of Governors and, perhaps, the Governors, but the Chief Executive had duties and a share in that role\textsuperscript{702}. The next is the exclusive role of the Chief Executive herself/himself to deal with external relations between the ‘inmates’ and the wider world. On ‘privatisation’ Abecedary Institute’s Governors appointed Pat Smith as the new Chief Executive and staff recognised her potential strength in political networks and current trends, but also that these might be ‘band wagons’ introduced to ‘ape’ developments elsewhere without assessing existing internal strengths and so demonstrated a lack of ‘vision’. What was introduced was the layer that Goffman identifies as next down in the hierarchy: those who offer a range of professional services, administration, financial management, personnel relations, and estate and domestic management. Lastly there are those who ‘have to spend their time in relatively close contact with inmates or students. These last are the carriers of the tradition, which at Abecedary Institute was the public service ethic, which became an object of ideological criticism from the future designer of the Institute’s academic profile based on the assertion that it was ‘in decline’\textsuperscript{703}. Their public service ethic/ideology would be implemented and played out regardless of consequences\textsuperscript{704} as the Institute was changed from this traditional total institution to another total institution that three years later would be compared with regimes of the 1930s. Both were ‘total institutions’ and that is why respondents when asked what finally had changed all paused for about thirty seconds or longer and then replied ‘The buildings’. They were still in total organisations and all that had changed was the cast in the hierarchy with a different set of ‘courtly manners’, which brought a worsening in working relationships and a deterioration in what their

\textsuperscript{701} Cf. Text p. 591 line 12 – 592 line 11: Old staff seen as the enemy.
\textsuperscript{702} Cf. Text p. 443 line 6-31: Account of the CEO and Chair of Governors academic credibility and the understanding of the public service ethic.
vocational skills could accomplish\textsuperscript{705}. These advisers were already being identified as the causes\textsuperscript{706}.

Goffman found that in asylums and prisons those who have most contact with the inmates are the target of the criticism or 'hate of the inmates'\textsuperscript{707}, and deflect criticism from the 'higher staff person' who acquires an avuncular status by not having the 'immediate task of disciplining inmates' and can dispense boons and 'clemency' on inmates, i.e., students, without disrupting the orderly discipline of the institution. Goffman drew his analysis from inmates of prisons for example, who develop the 'illusory feeling that although most staff persons are bad, the man [sic] at the top is really good - but perhaps hoodwinked by those under him'. Goffman finds corroboration of this model in popular movies where the "bottom level" is sadistic, prejudiced or corrupt', but the 'top man' is 'OK'. Thus different moral qualities characterise different roles and tasks\textsuperscript{708}. It is difficult to judge whether this applies to students, but the 'top -person' is always the place to lodge appeals.

Deference exists in all total institutions and is an essential element of them in a way that is different from 'civil life'. Deference in total institutions is 'placed on a formal footing with specific demands made and specific negative sanctions'\textsuperscript{709}. Goffman identifies this as existing between staff and inmates, i.e., students\textsuperscript{710}. The process is that the lowest level of staff carries out the training so that the top most group may 'receive personally uncoerced grants of deference'\textsuperscript{711}. This is the basis of the socialisation and conformity that the education system inculcates. The staff are the 'lowest level' trainers and in their own conduct practice what they preach; they show deference\textsuperscript{712}, but at the same time they are also likely to be strong reciprocators and withdraw total cooperation, even unto self-harm, in reaction to something which they find unfair and unjust\textsuperscript{713}. Deference is shown by inmates to staff, who protect themselves from 'insolence' by characterising the inmates as 'not fully adult' and by insisting

\textsuperscript{708} Ibid. p. 107.
\textsuperscript{709} Ibid. p. 108.
\textsuperscript{710} Text p. 473 line 11 - p. 480 line 19; Cf. Text p. 587 line 11 - 588 line 3: Relationship with students does not change.
\textsuperscript{712} Cf. Text p. 495 line 1 – p.496 line 4: Staff accept the unexplained decision and remain "nice"
\textsuperscript{713} Cf. Gintis
that respect is shown to the office or uniform rather than the person.\textsuperscript{714} Power is not distributed according to rank and overlaps between different groups can occur. Just as Goffman found in boarding schools, the housekeeping, Domestic Services and Estates Departments of Abecedary Institute decided priorities because of their allocation of resources. The sharing of ceremonies, like graduation and Christmas\textsuperscript{715}, or the same deprivations, as in the shared lifestyle of the inmates of nunneries, make the groups homogenous\textsuperscript{716}. Unsurprisingly given the monastic origins of the oldest universities, the monastic model is cited as an important organisational form to preserve the equality between members and the deference paid to the experienced leader of the community. Such ‘single collegial groups [are] internally stratified in terms of a single finely graded rank order’, and one respondent offered it as a model of organisation and the basis on which any respect might be earned\textsuperscript{717}. Such grading depends upon the internal values of the total institution and the extent to which other external differences of class, wealth and connection influence internal grading. Goffman states that the less these impinge on the internal organisation then ‘in thus suppressing externally valid differences, the harshest total institutions may be the most democratic’\textsuperscript{718}. However Goffman acknowledges that the role of representing the institution, which falls on those at the top of the hierarchy, may be better fulfilled by someone coming from the ‘same small grouping’ from which the representatives of similar organisations are recruited. If such external differences of ranking, like social class, permeate the institution, so that one group, the staff for example, represent a particular class, this may increase the ‘support and stability of the rule of this staff’. If the staff share the same ‘lower social origins’ of the inmates, they also share a ‘natural communication channel, but at the same time compromise their social distance’ as staff. Goffman offers the example of the prison warden, who may in such circumstances appear as ‘decent, reasonable and corruptible’\textsuperscript{719}. Institutions do not live in isolation and it is inevitable that some external social distinctions permeate institutions and influence their internal workings, groupings and rankings. At Abecedary Institute there was a network of connections to the Chairman of the Governors and to other governors because they lived locally and with the average long-

\textsuperscript{714} Cf. Text p. 70 line 7 - p 71 line 14: Formality of staff differentiation and the traditions.
\textsuperscript{715} Cf. Text p. 66 line 16-p. 67 line 7: Social rituals and cohesion.
\textsuperscript{716} Cf. Text p. 626 line 1-3: Abecedary Institute compared to a nunnery.
\textsuperscript{718} Ibid. p. 112.
\textsuperscript{719} Ibid. p. 113.
tenure of the staff there were connections which were used confidentially to lobby and represent matters that had arisen in the Institute. There was also a longstanding ‘Tennis Club’ that included governors and staff, that had a regular ‘gossiping space’ in the Institution and that seemed to operate a network of power\textsuperscript{720}. Other instances occurred over the censure of a member of staff following an adverse HMI report, and over the friendly connection between the Chair of Governors and the Principal of another institution determining the proper management of a ‘franchise’ arrangement for a course\textsuperscript{721}. Conversely, whether a graduate from Oxbridge or from HM Prisons, some institutions furnish connections to future life-chances in the external world.

This notion of total organization is expressed and defined rather differently by Foucault, who regarded the complexity of organizations as the manifestation of the microphysics of power: ‘the diverse and intersecting ways in which power is exercised through shifting networks of power relations and struggles’\textsuperscript{722}. The effect is the same for both because the organizational processes are more organic and fragile than the instrumental perspective which regards them as the outcomes of ‘top management’ or totalitarian ideology. While negative in effect for most in the organization, his interpretation also suggests that these microphysics of power relations are ‘positive’ for and are ‘valued by those populations whose subjectivity they constitute [e.g., career ladders that are being valued and defended by managers whose sense of identity they serve to shape and reproduce]’\textsuperscript{723}. In this account, Alvesson’s and Willmott’s use of a ‘sense of identity’ and ‘subjectivity’ evokes aspects of individuality, personal taste and opinion that are not based in objective reasoning, are not impartial, not objective, but reflective of a mental state or reactions, if not the irrational and emotional. It is a choice of language that seems deliberately to avoid suggesting a character’s desires, passions even interests. The philosopher, David Hume, would clearly accept that the ‘positive’ element of such networks is the means by which such desires or passions are made manifest.

Passions, Interests and Conventions: Hume’s Take.

Admitting passions and desires opens up the issue of the role of rationality in organizational structures in that it now seems to represent the ‘interests’ of a section of the organization and to be the means by which they may be satisfied.

\textsuperscript{720} Cf. Text p. 360 line 19 - p. 363 line 9: Informal networks connecting staff and others.

\textsuperscript{721} Cf. Text p. 552 line 13 - p. 556 line 32 Cf. Text p. 550 line 16 – 553 line 2: Confidential meetings with governors and the account of the ‘franchised’ degree course.


\textsuperscript{723} Ibid. p. 166.
The question arises as to whether an interest is a passion, and the role of rationality. In fact, David Hume placed primary importance on the passions; he defined the relative importance of rationality and the passions within character as: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them'\textsuperscript{724}. Hume crucially overthrew a persistent, philosophical and commonsense view that there is a war between reason and the passions and that any good action, decision, or judgement is based on reason because that is uncontaminated by 'human nature': 'Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates'\textsuperscript{725}. This proposition of separate worlds – rational/public and emotional/private - suggests the illogical notion that in each of us there are two persons, one rational, the other emotional. Hume's natural philosophy treats persons as unified and refutes both this war between reason and the passions and the hidden assumption is that both equally possess the power to motivate action. He asserts that 'reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will'\textsuperscript{726}, and nor can passion, but passion holds the dominant and final power, while reason merely informs. Reason has the function of establishing facts, in terms of establishing ideas and beliefs: 'Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgement concerning cause and effect'\textsuperscript{727}. For an action to be executed, the circumstances or consequences must matter to the self either as a direct or as an indirect effect: 'It can never in the least concern us to know that such subjects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and the effects are indifferent to us'\textsuperscript{728}. Reason is advisory not motivating and 'it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will'\textsuperscript{729}. Eagleton accepts the logic of Hume's theory by suggesting that the notion that a person can be wholly and rationally impartial and can remove her/his 'prejudices from the scene of the inquiry, behave as though I were not there...[is] a project that can never get off the ground'\textsuperscript{730}. Though an early Enlightenment philosopher, Hume's psychological/philosophical theory of its basic tenet about the passions is relevant as a prediction of and theory for the

\textsuperscript{725} Ibid. p. 413.
\textsuperscript{726} Ibid. p. 413.
\textsuperscript{727} Ibid. p. 414.
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid. p. 414.
\textsuperscript{729} Ibid. p. 413.
postmodern world. Eagleton explores the relation between passions and reason by examining the crucial difference between 'interests' and 'passions'. Hirschman tracing the history of the connotations of these terms. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "passions" were 'base' or 'blind desire'; "interest" suggested a degree of rational calculation. "Interest "figures as a compromise between reason, which is 'ineffectual', and "passions" which are vile and reprehensible. Reason makes the 'passions' acceptable as 'interests'; in turn reason is given vigour and 'direction'. Thus 'greed' is changed to 'making money' which is 'a noble goal'. "Interest" now had the sense of a rational self-love about it, and was seen as conveniently predicable, whereas desire was not [Original emphasis]. An individual's interests could be rationally predicted, and therefore reason had the upper hand. Helvetius suggested the doctrine of the natural inevitability of interests was akin to a physical law, and was the natural basis for ethics, so that 'the moral universe [is] ruled by laws of interest'. Eagleton declares that 'it is only a short step from this classic bourgeois doctrine to the assumptions of postmodernism', i.e., fragmentation, distortion, deception, instability and the forces of control marshalled to control other rivals. Reason is easily transformed from being a 'neutral instrument of the passion, to claiming that it is a mere reflex of them'. He suggests that reason might be the fact or 'a modality of desire', or 'divine reason' might just be 'a disguised form of malice, longing, loathing, aggression'. If this is the case, then 'reason ceases to be the opposite of ideology, and becomes itself ideological through and through...first because it is more than an expression of interests; secondly because it dissembles those interests behind a mask of impartiality'.

To accept this view is to recognize that 'the mind is itself chronically distorting; it is simply a fact about it that it travesties and disfigures reality, squints at the world sideways, grasps it from the falsifying perspective of some egotistical desire'. Reason is now a distorting lens through which to view the world. It is suggested that Hume's philosophical/psychological approach is post-modern and supplies the psychology that Willmott had declared was needed in order to provide an ethical dimension of the whole person, and to provide 'radical analyses of organisations' with a critical psychology or 'a theory of the subject'. Though very rarely mentioned in organisational texts his views and

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733 Ibid. p.160.
734 Ibid. p.161.
interpretations are never far distant. Other philosophers follow in Hume’s distinctive wake. Schopenhauer identifies reason as Will - an ‘empty insatiable hankering... at the core of all phenomena...[where] the intellect...is just a crude, blundering servant this implacable force [of the Will], twisted out of true by it, an inherently misrepresenting faculty which believes itself pathetically to present things as they really are. All thought is now ideological, and in a Marxist perspective, the intellect offers a prejudiced view that society is ruled by ‘interest and appetite. The greed, malice, aggressiveness of the bourgeois market place are now simply the way it is with humanity, mystified to a metaphysical Will. This line of thought is taken up by Nietzsche but now it is our powers that are the dominant force and reason is but a tool of those powers, and as such has no position from which to criticize the powers that use it. As merely the means, the reason may not examine itself. Nietzsche forms the basis of the postmodern thinking, and ideology dominates Nietzsche’s thought but never by name, for the implication of his approach is that, ‘there is no such thing as truth; everything is a matter of rhetoric and power; all viewpoints are relative, all talk of ‘facts’ or ‘objectivity’ is merely a specious front for the promotion of special interests. This basic drive of the post-modern seems to lie at the heart of the reorganization of academic courses, the ‘unitisation’, for there is evidence of a purposeful and sustained ideological ‘attack’ on traditional values and the values of education; the basis of the ‘attack’ was seemingly objective ideas of individuality and independence to be achieved by a process of fragmentation; the consequences are what this research is about. The pretence of ‘objective’ reasoning produced totalitarian control. Eagleton’s encapsulation of Nietzsche and his purpose sets out to reveal the false link that the liberal tradition has created between ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘objectivity’; there is no such objectivity. Moreover, Eagleton calls on his readers to recall their own experience of the ‘shifty self-interestedness of those pretending to be ‘disinterested’ and to be suspicious of invitations to see an objective situation as it really is ,as an ‘invitation to see it as our rulers do...Capitalist society is a battle ground of competing ideas, and cloaks this incessant violence in the

736 Schopenhauer The World as Will [1819]
738 Ibid. p. 161.
739 Ibid. p. 165.

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guise of disinterested ideas'. His final reference to capitalism brings the issue back to political domination and, specifically to the context of this research, the ideologies and aftermath of Thatcherism.

The most obvious successor of Nietzsche's line of thought is Sigmund Freud, for whom the 'unconscious' is the opposition to reason, but reason is an extension of the unconscious which is based on physical drives, the libido: 'To know, for Freud as for Nietzsche, is inseparable from the will to dominate and possess'. This brings the discussion directly to Alyosha's declaration that the Grand Inquisitor wishes to dominate and the identification of libido dominandi. 'Desire infiltrates our routine projects, causing them to swerve, falter, miss the mark. False consciousness is, in Freud's own phrase the "psychopathology of everyday life"'. Moreover, Althusser derived from Freud his notion of ideology as "lived relations", which exist at the level of the unconscious and involve an inescapable structure of miscognition. For Freud the role of reason is much diminished, for it is powerless in the face of the desires and instincts: "arguments are of no avail against (human) passions" and "even in the present day man's purely reasonable motives can effect little against passionate impulses". Any prospect of a world ruled by the persistent but 'soft' voice of intellect, Freud suggests is far off: 'The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant future, but probably not in an infinitely distant one'. Freud therefore seems to end with the same dismal view as Hobbes' egoism, so that Eagleton places Freud's judgement on humankind in the catalogue of 'classically bourgeois' views about individuals and society: 'the individual as an isolated monad powered by its appetites, society as some contractual device without which libidinal anarchy would be let loose'. There is no place for a society that is concerned for the general or common good such as Hume suggests at the conclusion of his theory based on the dominant role of the passions and desires. Eagleton's conclusion endorses 'the claim that the whole of our thought moves within the

742 Cf: Prologue, above: 'There's no mystery... It's simple lust of power...of earthly gain, of domination, something like a universal serfdom with them as masters...they don't believe in God' Dostoyevsky Op. cit.
frame of certain practical, 'primordial' pre-reflective interests is surely right”. This basis, via Freud, for ideology in the passions and the desires of Althusser's "lived relations" suggests that countering an ideological position is not easy. There are political consequences in the impossibility of making any considerable change to an ideological position by offering 'true' factual evidence, as though someone did not have access to, did not know, or had misunderstood a set of circumstances, because the ideological view is not a 'mistake'. As Freud has stated [Viz. above], 'arguments' and 'reasonable motives' can effect little against 'passionate impulses'. Factual errors should be corrected; the 'soft' voice of the intellect and rationality should still speak up, but as Eagleton suggests any change in 'lived relation to reality could only be secured by a material change to that reality itself'.

Eagleton's solution to use reason to challenge ideology parallels Habermas' Critical Theory method of the "ideal speech situation": 'as many people as possible actively participating in a discussion of these matters in conditions as free as possible from domination'. It is a reality that is reflected in the conventions of decision-making advocated by Hume; in the conventions of the operation of teams and task groups; in aspects of the operation of high performance work; in the direct democracy in the ancient universities; in the teaching seminars that Alvesson and Willmott see as the means of propagating managerial reform; in the same teaching seminars that featured in the HMI reports on Abecedary Institute, and in the absence of teaching seminars with the introduction of the unitization of courses because of the reduction in hours. Nevertheless the crucial 'material change' in the reality remains 'freedom from domination' [Viz. above] by the devolution of power and resources, including time, to these institutions and productive elements, task-groups, teams and team members.

This modern stripping away of the pretence of rationality from ideology makes David Hume's approach an enduring glass through which to examine humankind, especially where political pretence is a feature of the practice of organizational management. If one takes a simple definition of organization and management as organizing elements so that a result is achieved, it is identifiable as an arrangement of people and elements. Hume was concerned with the legitimacy of organizations as constructed institutions, so that 'the

747 Ibid. p.166.
750 Ibid. p.31.
sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature but arises artificially, tho’ necessarily from education and human conventions. Self-interest and social usefulness share in its establishment: “Self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with the public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue. His definitions of human nature forms the basis of his definitions of society. He takes as his benchmarks, the ownership of property and possessions, wants and needs, and co-operation. Independence and self-sufficiency end in competition and rivalry. Co-operation is more forceful: “By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented...”Tis by this additional force and ability and security, that society becomes advantageous. Society is the means by which humankind develops and mutually benefits. Hume bases his society on the model of the family, which forms the basis for notions of co-operation and the division of labour, and hierarchy based on the parent–child relationship and generalises these into larger groupings and so extends Hume’s theory to the government of societies. “Selfishness and the confin’d generosity of men are equally the cause of the conflict between self-interest and public interest and the solution is the application of conventions that encourage good interpersonal relations of co-operation, based on a clear understanding that ‘like for like’ co-operation is in every individual’s eventual self-interest. Hume concludes that short-term personal benefits and society’s long-term advantage should be balanced in social conventions that ‘incentivize’ and promote co-operation. For Hume this is the ‘origin of civil government and allegiance. Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is change their situation, and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons, and its violation the more remote. These persons, then are not only induc’d to observe those rules in their own conduct, but also constrain others to a like regularity, and inforce the dictates of equity thro’ the whole society.

752 Ibid. p. 499.
753 Cf. Mondragon, below.
754 Cf. Text p. 315 line 16-18 Unitisation of courses was about fragmentation but students wanted to specialise.
756 Ibid. p. 495.
These ideas reveal some of the republican tendency in Hume’s thinking and the logic of them informs democratic forms of organisational cooperation and Weber’s ‘arbitrary’ or rotational forms of democratic governance. ‘Things’ and ‘events’ are far too general as terms, but they are the way in every day life in which we talk about the actions in which some human agency is involved. The occurrence of an earthquake, a thunderstorm, a sunny day, or a chemical reaction, for example, can be explained in scientific and objective terms. To explain ‘things’ people do and manage and how they organize themselves brings us into realms of psychology and philosophy.

One useful and appropriate approach to this discussion of hierarchical organization is to take it back to David Hume’s ethical and political theories [1711-1776]. Hume was also a historian and contemporary of Gibbon, and a precursor of Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith, whose ‘Wealth of Nations’, was published 1776; Hume read and admired the first volume months before his death; in 1751, Hume applied for the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University when Adam Smith vacated it to take up the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. Both Smith and Gibbon were his followers on matters of ethics and political economy and Hume asked for Smith’s comments prior to publishing the second edition of Essays, Moral and Political [1752]. Bentham’s reaction on reading Hume was to announce that ‘I felt as if the scale had fallen from my eyes’, and yet his own endorsement of Hume was ignored for decades. David Hume has been called the greatest of British philosophers. Hume’s work is regarded as a philosophical masterpiece of lasting importance in the sphere of moral philosophy. Some of the problems of moral philosophy, such as belief, for which Hume offered an analysis, ‘still await[s] solution’. After the dominance by positivist and linguistic analysis of twentieth century philosophy, the resurgence of naturalism has, according to one commentator, made Hume ‘more modern and relevant than ever’. In the interpretive Critical Theory school, Husserl [1859-138], a member of the Frankfurt School, who opposed positivism and sought to describe personal experiences within a grounded

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759 Note: Hume D A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects Vol. 1. Of the Understanding. Vol. 2. Of the Passions. Vol. 3. Of Morals. 1739-1740; themes first introduced in this first work were later published in more popular form as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding 1748, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 1751. These themes recur with other themes in subsequent works. There are several editions of Hume’s writings and the editors have been acknowledged for identification purposes.


761 Ibid. p. 41.

context rather than the transcendental\textsuperscript{763}, regarded Hume as ‘one of the most important philosophers\textsuperscript{764}. The English philosopher, Simon Blackburn calls Hume’s contribution to understanding human reason as ‘pivotal\textsuperscript{765}’ in comprehending our perceptions and the world. The cross disciplinary nature of moral philosophy in the eighteenth century, included in its bounds politics, history, morality, logic and criticism, and there were no clear distinctions drawn between the natural and social sciences and philosophy, making it akin to the cross-disciplinary nature of modern management and organizational studies.

The natural sciences, which we would call ‘physical’ sciences had accelerated in analytical understanding under the influence of Newton and Boyle far ahead of moral philosophy. Hume and Locke regarded moral philosophy as central because it was ‘the science of human nature’:

’all the sciences have a relation, greater of lesser, to human nature and that, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another...It is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in our reasonings.’\textsuperscript{766}

At that time there were no boundaries between disciplines and so moral philosophy’s search for an understanding of human nature included psychology, politics, social science and history as well as ethics. The necessarily brief sketch of Hume’s philosophy, here, does a disservice to its thoroughness and detail. Hume’s moral theory is secular and pragmatic. Consequently it was controversial amongst his contemporaries because it was the first to be entirely secular; it did not take into account the necessary existence of God, nor God’s role as the final arbiter of morality, though Hume admitted the existence of God on the practical grounds that sentiments, such as fear or the need for protection when threatened by disaster, propel humankind to a belief in God, which, in the history of humankind, led to different religions. As a consequence of this controversy university professorships in Scotland were denied him; the


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clergy and churches of all denominations condemned him as an 'infidel' and he retaliated by describing the clergy as a profession motivated by ambition, conceit and revenge and Roman Catholicism as superstition to put fear in 'unhappy mortals' - shades of 'The Grand Inquisitor' - and consequently all his writings were placed on the Roman Catholic Index of prohibited books in 1761.

An academic professorship in moral philosophy in the eighteenth century had an influence beyond the walls of academia; in Scotland, all society looked to such professors to provide 'those fundamental moral principles, conceived of as antecedent to both all positive law and all particular forms of social organization' and so moral philosophy defined institutions and attitudes and was accorded a cultural authority rarely found elsewhere.

Hume's philosophical predecessors were the rationalist and empirical philosophers John Locke ['Essay concerning Human Understanding' 1690] and Bishop Berkeley ['Principles of Human Knowledge' 1710] and the usual interpretation of his work is as a continuation of their sceptical theory that humankind's knowledge of the exterior world is entirely based on their sensory perception and these senses perceive an object, identify qualities within it and form an impression of it. The mind conceives an idea of that object from this impression and this is an approximation of the object itself. One way of describing this view is that each of us is trapped within her/his sense data, and that even our self does not exist - only sense data. Hume rejected this sceptical view as negative and a futile dead end. Most philosophers now reject this line of thought and assume the common sense view that those persons performing any deed that can be perceived and any such acts take place in the same external world of concrete physical objects and that this world exists independently of being perceived by any mind. As Hume puts it: 'Nature, by an absolute and incontrollable necessity has determined us to judge, as well as to breathe and feel'... and those that have proposed this 'total scepticism' have 'disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour'd by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render'd unavoidable'.

It was not until the 1940s that Hume was considered and re-evaluated as an original contributor to philosophy. Ayer attributes this re-evaluation to the

767 Hume History of England Vol. 1. 1754-1762. [He deleted this and an attack on Protestantism in later editions. cited by Fiesner J The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/humelife.htm
work of Kemp-Smith\textsuperscript{770} who based his interpretation on a close study of Hume's works and on Hume's stated aim in the introduction to his 'Treatise of Human Nature': 'to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security'\textsuperscript{771}. Kemp-Smith's evaluation of Hume was that his aim was to bring natural and moral philosophy together; in the realm of moral philosophy Hume followed the tradition of the 'moral sense' philosophers who ascribed to human nature a dominant 'moral sense'; but in natural philosophy's study of the physical world Hume gave the 'sovereign' role to what Kemp-Smith defined as our "natural beliefs", which 'are expressions of "feeling", itself largely governed by habit of custom and not subordinate to reason, in any strict sense of the term. It is only in the limited field of what we now call purely formal [\textit{i.e.,} formal logic. My interpretation] that reason holds sway\textsuperscript{772}. Hume's famous statement was that 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' and Kemp-Smith and Ayer interpret its importance as applying not just to 'judgements of value but to all the purely formal exercises of our understanding\textsuperscript{773}. Hume's approach therefore stands apart from the age's rationalist philosophies of Hobbes and Locke that dominated the succeeding industrial age. The reactions to Hume in the nineteenth century were either a return to rationality or the return to God as the source of morality.

Hume's moral theory has a 'common sense' appeal and he wrote popular versions in his Essays, Moral and Political [1741]. His intention was to overthrow the scepticism of Berkeley and Locke, not to throw out philosophical reasoning, but to be 'absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk and act like other people in the common affairs of life\textsuperscript{774}. Hume's theory offers a secular model for the common sense opinions of the respondents to this research, since, like an audience at a play, they are the spectators passing judgement on the mentality and reactions of the actors, both perpetrators and recipients. However, they are also actors in the play and though rarely, if ever, perpetrators, are the perpetual recipients. The relevance of Hume's theories to organizational governance and the reactions of the governed is that respondents assess how they are ruled or managed predominantly in ethical

\textsuperscript{774} Ibid. p. 269.
terms, and their responses are based on their sympathies and feelings\textsuperscript{775}, and their reason supports those judgements with corroborative evidence where this is available. Hume's theory\textsuperscript{776} follows the line of thought of the 'moral sense' philosophers. They offered an alternative to Thomas Hobbes's notion of the dominance of the motive of self-interest. They opposed the rationalists who regarded human nature as a battleground between feelings and reason.

Feelings had to be suppressed and made the slave of abstract reasoning; the rational intellect was the principal judge of vice and virtue and the controller of all actions; and that humankind's capacity for abstract reasoning represented humankind's true self. So actions and decisions made by abstract reasoning, clear of all feelings and emotions, were true and valid. Hume advocated the study of human societies and organizations through observable behaviour and history and in his Treatise on Human Nature mocked these egoist and rational models of human nature as unnatural and as hypothetical as fruit ripening in winter:

'and I am apt to think a traveller would meet with as little credit, who should inform us of people exactly of the same character with those


\textsuperscript{776} Note: The findings of a recent psychological experiment confirm Hume's basic theory that the emotions and sentiments are the final basis of action and decision-making and so place character at the centre of these processes, with rationality in an entirely supporting role. Dr. Ap Dijksterhuis, a psychologist at the University of Amsterdam, in Science, Spring 2006, reported the findings of his study on decision-making - 'deliberation without attention' - that in an experiment where people were given four minutes to pick their favourite car from a list of four attributes, most people chose the car with the most plus points, but when the attributes were increased to twelve, people could only pick out the best car 25% of the time, making the result no better than making a choice at random. This improved to 50% choosing the best car when the respondents were distracted before making the decision. The experiments were conducted in a laboratory and among shoppers in stores. His conclusion was that 'Conscious thinkers were better able to make the best choice among simple products, whereas unconscious thinkers were better able to make the best choice among complex products'. Thinking consciously meant a person could only focus on a few factors at once, and when given a complex decision the tendency was to give certain factors undue weight. Reflecting on the decision over a longer period produced inconsistency. He challenged the accepted notion that consciousness and rationality was the best way to make decisions and suggested that the opposite might be true. He advocated extensive fact-gathering, followed by 'sleeping on' the decision. If a decision does not arise, then further fact-finding may be required. 'In short, consciousness should be used to gather information, the unconscious to work on it.' It has been shown that during unconscious thought large amounts of information can be integrated into evaluative summary judgement' Dr. Dijksterhuis added that when he has to make an important decision he collects and concentrates on all the facts, and then 'I sit on things and rely on my gut'. Though the study was about individual consumer choices, Dr. Ap Dijksterhuis concluded that his findings were relevant to politicians, managers and negotiators. Alok Jha report, Guardian 17.02.2006.
Hume’s approach was to reject hypothetical man and to make his principle study and source ‘human Nature, upon which every Moral conclusion must depend’. His principal target was rational man, a favourite topic in management theory, where, in the battle between feelings and rationality over the control of decision-making and actions, feelings had to be controlled and suppressed. The tradition of moral sense philosophers opposed this view and accorded to the feelings a central role in human nature. They gave to feelings the principal and positive role, quite free of any rational analysis, in making moral judgements based on the pleasure or pain aroused by contemplation of actions and events. Rationality only had a supporting role to provide information that would justify the action as a means to an end. This end was defined by feelings and passions. All motives for action came from feelings and the passions.

The classical world personified reason and the emotions as Apollo, the god of order and reason, versus Dionysus, the anarchic god of the passions, with Apollo in control. Hume turned this model on its head but his theory is part of a tradition of ethical thinking about the relationship between reason and emotion that includes Bacon and Spinoza. For Hume, the passions and concerns decide the actions; reason provides the information on which to act. In the process of decision-making, reason provides the inputs, but the passions decide the output. The commonplace opinion is that poor decisions are irrational, are not level-headed, use faulty reasoning, lack clear thinking, and are unreasonable; the implication is that something can be done about it by education or employing a more intelligent thinker. When a decision proves to be wrong or unjust, Hume’s view is that it is not the reason that is at fault but the passions and concerns, and therefore the character. The implication is that changing character or even educating a person’s character is not only more long term but also considerably more difficult. No extra course in logic will solve the problem. It is also a more difficult issue to evade because it places the responsibility for decision-making squarely on the person and not the procedure. Reason does play an important role in decision-making in the initial analysis of the situation and therefore can contribute to defective decision-making. However, it is our emotional reactions to this information that defines

attitudes, policies and intentions; in this process, a clear understanding of the situation is still no guarantee of the decision the passion and concerns might take\(^{780}\). When making a decision about a practical problem, people use emotional terms like 'what shall we do...', how do you feel about....', 'how can we avoid...'. Hume wishes to reveal the flaws in the commonplace view of reason, where we deploy processes to make a decision seem 'reasonable', in order to cloak another set of concerns such as 'being in charge or control'. Such incidental but dependent concerns are secondary to the decision itself. Thus the use of more extensive deliberation, employing elaborate procedures, seeking others' opinions and controlling our self-interest, only give the impression of the operation of reason. Hume would assert that they are not part of the final decision but exist to satisfy other concerns, such as our pride, based on how we might be perceived in the eyes of others. Such rational procedures have a value; the issue is recognising why the individual is deploying them. False logic can create a similar impression of rationality by claiming that a particular decision, or end, is rational and that therefore the means by which it is to be achieved are similarly rational, where the means are not dependent on the end, and vice-versa.

Yet rationality has been given the leading role in morality and decision-making, principally by Kant, whose dominance in politics and morality owes something to the American Constitution and the current writings of John Rawls’ "Theory of Justice"\(^{781}\). In essence, the Kantian theory builds on an earlier view of morality as laws decreed by an external authority and that obedience to its regulations was achieved by a systems of penalties and rewards, hell or heaven. Kant rejected this idea of obedience because it was based on feelings and desires. He pooled all desires and passions together as subjective and therefore they were incapable of being the basis of objective laws of morality. Kant’s view was that the mind perceives the world according to certain laws that it imposes on experiences. From these the mind creates its world. The mind is therefore capable of legislating laws or maxims for conduct to which the practical reasoning must conform. Though laws and conduct exist at different levels in the individual’s psychology, the problem is that the laws or principles, which a man has created for conduct, become independent of their original creator, man: maxims which have been created by man becomes permanent, and man ceases to hold sway. Kant objected to Hume’s empirical approach of dealing only with that for which he could find evidence: people's sentiments as they conduct their

\(^{780}\) Viz. Freud, above.

lives. In structural terms Hume's theory could be seen as a collective and Kant's as a hierarchy. In simple terms, Hume regarded people as different according to the collective make-up of their sentiments and emotions. Some might be a mixture that was extremely volatile, difficult and selfish; others industrious, helpful and generous. Given that every person's concern was with her/his own happiness, she/he would prefer to work and live with the helpful, industrious and generous. In equally simple terms, Kant's view was that people had sentiments, inclinations and emotions but ruling over all, with complete authority, as in a hierarchy, was the will or reason, free and detached from all desire, sometimes completely free from all desires and inclinations and therefore in a state of bliss. For Kant reason was a thing entire unto itself, not susceptible to empirical evaluation, but something that could be reasoned as having an existence but not capable of being perceived, i.e., a noumenon. In his own words, 'it was thus that Plato left the world of the senses'. In Kant's world, reason shuns the emotional life, because:

'Inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish; reason when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but without regard to them, as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling, when preceding the consideration of duty...is burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them and subject only to law-giving reason'.

Reason is also the seat of morality and therefore any endorsement of one's moral status depends upon the power and authority of reason. When reason is in control, everything functions smoothly, for the person is both law-making and law-abiding, overseer and servant, manager and managed. However since reason may be divined but not perceived: 'The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct, thus remains hidden from us'. Since each individual is endowed with rationality, so each person is equal to another and therefore the potential of equality and democracy remains. One pro-Humean commentator, summarising the drift of the anti-Kantian 'groundswell', describes Kant's human being 'of pure authentic self-control' as

someone who "appeals to our wish to be...entirely the masters of our own lives, immune ...from the gifts or burdens of our internal animal natures, or of our temperaments as they are formed by contingent nature, socialisation, and external surrounds. Context-free, non-natural, and a complete stickler for duty, perhaps the Kantian self is nothing but the sublimation of a patriarchal, authoritarian fantasy. Elements in this critique resonate with ideas managers have of themselves and their behaviour, e.g., their superior rationality, while their staff are less rational and prone to being emotional, the 'mystery' or 'mystic arts' of their judgemental processes, the actual and hierarchical separation and detachment from the workers, and the dispensation and application of regulations and procedures rather than collective deliberation and collective control.

Making a choice and turning it into action is the stuff of rulers, managers, agents in the world generally. Both functions are preceded by a process of deliberation. Very briefly, for Kant, this process involves the individual in surveying both the collection of facts and data of a situation, and her/his own passions or desires, but the decision is driven by an incentive that is external to the other data and desires, but which is itself appreciated through those desires. Reason then plays the controlling role by identifying the agent's perception with a principle which reason makes into a law, and thus the self-selected law governs the choice for action. For example, an institute is over-budget and over-staffed [the data and situation]; the manager wants to be efficient and in control of the workers [desires]; further promotion and financial rewards will follow a successful conclusion [the incentive]; sound economics is the basis of all business [the law]; therefore, the manager issues redundancy notices. For Hume the process of surveying would still be reason's function, but the desires, including that for status, are inescapably part of the agent's make-up together with her/his values, background and history and they participate in the deliberation together with all the other elements in making the decision. No element stands apart from or above the whole person making the decision; the whole person is involved, and the individual's concern of how she/he is perceived and valued by others will determine that person's decision. Hume's decision would involve the whole complexity of the person and the particular details of the situation; the decision would be context-based. Modelling a

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general solution would be unreal; Kant’s model of action is a ‘seductive...fantasy’ in which ‘we think we can transcend the facts about ourselves...that we can do it from a standpoint independent of any desire or concern; independent of a desire for our own good, or for the happiness of humanity, or respect for this or that, or the myriad other passions that make up our individual profiles of concern and care.’ What Kant appears to offer is proof that the decision was correctly grounded and capable of being approved by other rational beings. On the other hand, Hume accepts that decisions are conditional on complex collections of concerns and desires. Kant cannot leave it as Hume does; Kant’s approach requires an external element, the noumenal’s maxims, to support the decision. Kant deliberates by standing separate and detached from the world, like an introspective spectator. Hume deliberates by engaging actively with a world that is constantly transforming itself and where new data, including truths about ourselves, emerge to create more transformations. Reason has its place in Hume’s approach as the servant of the passions and concerns of the individual. Reason’s function is to gather data and examine existing ideals for their validity and inadequacy because a decision based on true ideals and adequate data is likely to be a better one. However, reason knows that too much information can swamp and muddle decision-making. Reason also plays its role in the creative imagination by being like a dramatist and reading others’ interests and concerns and, accordingly, framing convincing arguments and ideas and timing the revelations. Reason has the capacity to be aware of both the individual’s own set of concerns and her/his own ideologies and those of other individuals. Reason also appreciates the processes of ‘civility’ that must be undertaken in order to find common ground between individuals. Reason also has an imaginative role to predict and weigh long-term consequences and advantages over short-term interests using data from other’s experiences, narratives or the imagination. Reason offers no guarantee that because human beings are being rational, they will be ‘good’ and compassionate to others. One individual’s rational interpretation of a situation may, and probably will, differ from another’s and so gives the lie to the existence of independent maxims. Reason is shaped by our concerns, by who we are and want to be. Reason or rationality is not independent of any of the passions, sentiments and concerns. For Hume and others, rationality is based in the context of the person and their situation and not a Kantian transcendental, independent authority outside human experience.

This is a fundamental philosophical debate persisting throughout modern times, between rationality and rationality/naturalism, but the issue ends in character. The debate usually fields Kant and Hegel in opposing camps, and massed behind them philosophers and schools of thought, the analytical tradition and the main philosophical schools of Europe, behind ‘barriers of mutual ignorance and distrust’\textsuperscript{788}. David Hume precedes Hegel and offers a psychological and philosophical approach that has endured and that includes elements of the philological interpretation of text, character and action. This philological aspect links with his near contemporary Giambattista Vico, and Habermas’ recognition, ‘under the influence of Gadamer’, of interpretation as the third kind of theory, the others being scientific and critical. Critical Theory is interpreted by different philosophers as either based on historical context, i.e., relativism, for example, Adorno, or the transcendental, going beyond human experience and context, for example, the later theories of Habermas.\textsuperscript{789} This debate, a fundamental one in philosophy, also divides management and organizational studies.\textsuperscript{790}

Faced with the need to evaluate the actions of a decision-maker, the crux of the matter is whether, in reality, an agent’s decision making is based on the rational neutrality, or whether it is based on character, functioning within a context in which personal concerns, ideologies and values play their part. For Hume, if reason were the only constituent in the psychological make-up of humankind, the desires, concerns and sentiments would have to be invented in order to make anything happen. Kant presents not a psychology but an ideal. Kant’s optimistic assumption is that rationality will lead to rational behaviour, because moral values are located, not in an external deity, but within the authority of the individual who becomes her/his own moral legislator/guide and follower, endowed with a rationale for obedience beyond her/his immediate of strongly held desires. Such a view is heading for a fall because its idealism can lead to spurious illusions. Given freedom people may behave with benevolence and goodness, but they may also do the complete opposite. William Golding’s ‘The Lord of the Flies’ tells the story of schoolboys cast away in a state of complete freedom, ‘like the Coral Island’. The narrative charts the loss of innocence and the fall into evil, ‘the darkness of man’s heart’, as the democratic collective spirit at the beginning - ‘“We were together then”’ - declines under an assault from either the ‘Original Sin of the Fall of Man’ in the Christian tradition, which its author was examining, or the ‘order of egoism’, and the resulting

\textsuperscript{789} Viz. Ibid. Footnote, p. 55.
tribal court, that the 'order of egoism's' state of mind breeds. The processes of education, encouragement and re-enforcement to perform the good are lengthy and expensive processes. Similarly the collective conventions created to ensure good conduct have to be defended.

Kant's view can be interpreted to give credibility to the culture of individualism because of the individual's self-legislative duty, responsibility and the freedom of action that is implied. As such this individual freedom extends to all and so endorses the democratic ideal. It also leads to the culture of individual blame and punishment. However, when things go wrong, the examination of failure will focus on the individual but usually extends to cover the failure to put in place collective procedures of deliberation and dialogue that might guard against predictable failure.

In an evaluation of the influence of Kant, Blackburn explores the moral and political dimensions of the idea of the contract and its political implications, particularly as a political and organizational tool of the late twentieth century. He traces a link between Kant, the American culture and Constitution, and contracts and the ideology of the Thatcher government that established the context and values that influenced events in this case-study. John Rawls's political philosophy in 'A Theory of Justice' provides the link. The American constitution provides the basis for the liberal state, which grants its citizens the guaranteed freedoms and rights to pursue their own ideals and their own idea of the good life, as they wish. This echoes Kant's ideas of the individual's rational self-legislation where the fundamental values and ends are 'integral' to the person and exist independently of the person's immediate desires; if they were external to the person, they would be subject to the individual's immediate wants and desires. The nature of the 'good life' is not defined nor legislated by the state. An individual has the right to pursue her/his ideal of the good life singly or by contracting with others to co-operate towards that end. Such contracting for mutual advantage and support does not define, limit nor rule out any idea of the good life that the individual might have. Rawls sees contracting together as the solution to the problem of being 'at the mercy, so to speak, of the existing wants and interests'. If the state defined the 'good life',

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793 Cf Background

it would lose its authority because this ‘good’ would be subject to the wants and
desire of individuals and potentially rejected, like other external values. The
state’s function is to maintain ‘the priority of the right over the good’ 795.
Blackburn’s criticism focuses on what he regards as the flawed idea that a
person can have values that are objective and independent of her/his own
desires and concerns. Not all such desires and concerns are short-term
gratification. He opposes the rejection of Hume’s theory that such concerns
and desires can be the basis of judgements. Blackburn sees this as a flight
from acknowledging the role and responsibility of traits and character towards
a position of seeking rational, objective and impartial, authority. Blackburn
rejects this view as ‘incoherent’. One ground for his objection is ‘the law that it
takes a value to make a value’. As a standpoint, it seeks to avoid the
responsibility of character and values in decision-making by having the excuse
of some rational failure of process, procedure or data, rather than character.
Another objection is the limitation of the rational basis for contracts. In theory,
a contract may be fair when no party to it ‘objects to its terms’ 796 because
contracts exist to avoid risks to either party. In reality, a contract is grounded
in the context, for example, one party may have no choice but to accept
exploitative terms. In reality, parties to a contract are not likely to be equal in
wealth, power, knowledge or experience. Markets are not always just and
ethical. If contracts and decisions were as straightforward as the time-
honoured contract of how to divide a cake between hungry children - ask one to
cut the cake, but the cutter will be the last to take a slice - matters might be
simple. Here an impartial objective principle appears to be reached, though the
driving force is the self-interest of the cutter, which all those waiting for their
slice would also hold in common with her/him and where everyone comes to
the only fair solution of making the choice of portions the same 797. In other

approach to the individual and the state: ‘If my fundamental values and final ends are to enable me, as
they surely must, to evaluate and regulate my immediate wants and desires, these values and ends must
have a sanction independent of the mere fact that I happen to hold them with a certain intensity. But if
my conception of the good is simply the product of my immediate wants and desires, there is no reason
to suppose that the critical standpoint it provides is any more worthy or valid than the desires it seeks to
assess; as the product of those desires, it would be governed by the same contingencies’. Sandel M.
cit. p. 270.
796 Ibid. p.271.
797 Footnote: Along similar lines, Blackburn quotes the formulation of Herbert Hart, lecturing in the
1970s, that ‘What one can choose, all can choose, and what one cannot choose, none can choose’. Ibid.
2000 p. 276. Note: This is also the original position for the philosopher, John Rawls’s notion of the ‘veil
of ignorance’ in ‘The Theory of Justice’ where behind this veil where nothing is therefore known about
yourself, others and the social and political institutions in which you are, but you do know that there will
be both a diversity of possible contexts and circumstances and a diversity of people of, sex, race, creed,
culture and different abilities and resources you have to make a judgement about the principles upon
areas of life, economics, principles, religious or political, as well as self-interest play their part in contextualising the contract. To avoid their influence Rawls instructs that all parties strive to reach a position that is fair and just beyond the context, in the belief that when contextual elements, like religious principles and social concerns, have been take out of the equation, human beings can operate on another level of human psychology.

Rawls's political solution is the modern welfare state democracy with its rights of freedom of speech, religion, freedom from discrimination, from poverty and from economic exploitation. These project into people's education, health, security, citizen's rights, legal rights and, to a considerable extent, define the 'good life', on which Rawls wanted the state to be neutral. While Blackburn admires, accepts and advocates the merits of Rawls's welfare democracy, he does not accept the proposition that it is neutral, because in his view it defines in specific terms an idea of the 'good' that others, for example, from other political systems, would not accept as the 'good'. That is, it is a good that is defined by a context. His principal objection to Rawls is the 'danger' in using the contract as a description of human relationships because it creates a model of society as a 'network of contracts' of exchange for mutual advantage. The basis for a contract is likely to be unequal, because some are unable to fulfil their part of the bargain. The contractual notion offers a limited view of human relationships. The idea of contract is misleading because it is really a choice about the nature of society, which its social inequalities skew in favour of one party to the contract. Others object to Rawls's contract theory on the basis that the division between individual rights and the 'good' is arbitrary: individual rights in the community are a value, and therefore are incorporated within the 'good'; they help to define it and are not separate from it. The individual requires the support of a community. However, the community consensus of values must be receptive to change and development, rather than a static stagnation. The 'good' is conditional upon social context, which is in a permanent state of flux, so that both immediate and timeless values and concerns can and do intersect and merge. The contract is more than a device or convention; it is a structural idea that embodies a vision of a society which you will establish your society or organization. Rawls concluded that fairness was the only just and safe principle.

799 Cf. The Background: Narrative of the monthly wage.
800 Cf. Heraclitus
801 Cf. Text p.466 line 1-22: Democratic management of the research budget.
or organization. The introduction of a particular contractual relation altered the nature and vision of the institution in this case-study.\textsuperscript{802}

This conflict between the definitions of values based upon and defined by social context, after Hegel, versus Kant's rational processes for the definition of morality is the core issue central to one of philosophy's lasting debates. The appeal of Kant is psychological, because it appears to provide support from a non-contextual, rational perspective. This transcendental theory reaches beyond human experience, so that a Kantian judgement offers rational, objective impartiality. An alternative view\textsuperscript{803} is that there are nine stages of certainty that a person may take: from there being a known 'right' answer, through 'There has to be a right answer, and it is 'just round the corner', to 'Maybe there isn't, but there will be a right answer eventually', and 'then panic - there isn't', and eventually to making 'a decision based on feelings', 'accepting the need to decide' and finally 'accepting judgement and the existence of opposites'. The contextual philosophers, like Hume and Hegel, interpret a judgement as a reflection of the desires and concerns of character and context, and likewise the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School analyse and reflect on the ideologies operating in society.

The danger that Blackburn identifies appears when the ideas are translated into political action. Mrs Thatcher's famous sentence: 'There is no such thing as society' gave a deliberate governmental seal of approval to the general idea that the sole relationship among people was the opportunity to sell services and goods and that people furthered their interests by exchanging goods and services in a market transaction. It offered a spurious rationality of individuality and contractual relations. It placed the individual as an independent operator, hardly a Kantian legislator, with self-interest at the core of social ideas. It undermined ideals of community - and collegiality, and benevolent ideals of vocation and public service, as it does in this case-study\textsuperscript{804}. Co-operation is not just undertaken conditional on its being to the individual's benefit. Communities do not combine solely for self-interest. The idea of the contract was used to support the ideology of Thatcherism. Blackburn identifies


the statement that 'There is no such thing as society - only individuals and their families' as a calculated assault on the idea of the 'community of welfare' and was based on the ideas of her mentors following Hayek\textsuperscript{805}. He does not, but could and should have linked his criticism to the assault on the professional classes, as well as upon the working class\textsuperscript{806}. The Kantian individual was transformed in the minds of the politicians into a device for control; inequalities in the social context were irrelevant, because the individual had the guaranteed freedom to make their own 'good life' and was self-legislating, and therefore politicians and governments were absolved from responsibility for the people's self-actualisation. This theme is one that seems to recur in this case-study: that the dominant group will take any idea that will support their ideology and maintain their position of power and the status quo.

The debate between 'relativist' [contextual] and 'absolutist' [transcendental] philosophies is an epistemological one: it is about what is the source of our knowledge and therefore 'the sources of our reason, and the control of belief by fact ...and about which claims to authority and knowledge we should endorse'\textsuperscript{807}. An account of the debate usefully personifies them as two temperaments that illustrates how they operate and function in real-life. Blackburn's accounts of these two temperaments are useful because they provide a characterisation outside of the case-study that animates some of the ideas and ideological positions that influence action and determine character in the same way as The Grand Inquisitor. Interestingly the account of the absolutist is more detailed and has qualities that seem to be taken from life, which suggests that we encounter them more often and find their rigidity and lack of compassion more dangerous.

The transcendentalist or absolutist seeks and accepts nothing but truth, preferably scientific truth, 'open', 'transparent', undoubted, undiluted, not 'nuanced' by art nor morality. For her/him the truth - an external, verifiable, external authority that can both lead and endorse action - exists to be found and she/he takes reason and objectivity with her/him on her/his quest. The absolutist 'shouts and bangs', 'sounds tough', 'happy in his own convictions, probably not caring to sympathise with those of others' but 'is tender to himself'. The philosopher, William James' description of the 'absolutist' is someone 'suffering from something very like a religious ambition', where religion may be a traditional deity or 'a new one like the Market, Democracy or


\textsuperscript{806} Cf. Background.

Science', for she/he seeks something 'haughty refined, remote, august and exalted'. The absolutist receives 'security and self-assurance' from her/his beliefs. 'He wants communion with a higher authority, a provider of guarantees that acting and thinking as he does, he is at the same time acting and thinking rightly'.

The contextualist or 'relativist' rejects the ideal and can find nothing that can claim to be objective, 'open, transparent' and unbiased. The relativist sees only the influence of events, ideology, wealth, status, nature, gender, culture, language and experience in the formulation of her/his view of the world. The relativist's mind-set embraces toleration: freedom of speech, debating the force of one idea with that of another, meeting a difference of opinion with public, critical reflection rather than subversion, domination and repression. It is not merely a matter of accepting those with different opinions but of acknowledging their equal importance and their ideas with equal respect. The relativist is tougher than this description of her/his tolerance might suggest; the relativist is aware of and, hopefully, ready for the dangers and disappointments of the real world. The relativist sees the absolutist as dogmatic, unreflective and naïve, as someone with a zealot's rhetoric, certain of the support of truth, reason and objectivity at her/his side, but probably 'just whistling to keep his spirits up, deliberately and self-deceivingly in denial about the dark forces that create his blind-spots'. The absolutist lays down the law but the relativist hears only the roaring and bawling. Or as William James famously put it in a crucial philosophical debate on belief: 'Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?'

However neither is it proper that we should create nor be taken in by simplistic absolutism or simplistic relativism. The relativist is victim to at least two inconsistencies: the 'Measure Doctrine' that if a relativist proposes that 'man is the measure of all things', then if someone believes that man is not, then their position has equal validity with the proposal, and that therefore the doctrine is false. The second Blackburn calls the 'Moving Bull's-eye', where the analogy of a person shooting at a barn-door, hitting it and then drawing a bull's eye

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810 Ibid. p. xviii-xix.
811 Ibid. p. xx.
813 Ibid. p. 25-26 citing Plato Theaetetus, 171a. Cf.: Vico uses the same issue.
around the place of impact and claiming a bull's eye renders scoring a bull's eye meaningless and irrelevant. The argument is used, sometimes by absolutists that if her/his judgement says x and another person comes up with y, then the argument is deadlocked. As Wittgenstein puts it 'if everything that seems right is right, that means we cannot talk about right at all'. If a person were to adopt either position, especially the 'Measure Doctrine', to discount all opposition to her/his view, such a person would be denying the relativism of the argument and assuming the very dominance and authority that relativism rejects. If this were the case the person would have ended debate, ignored all argument and decided to dominate by exerting his assertiveness, which action only reinforces the vital significance of character in real-life situations.

Blackburn resolves this battle between the relativist and the absolutist by reaching a solution that is Humean in spirit: 'He [the relativist] may retain his position...by pouring cold water on the idea of reason as a kind of divinity, an external of alien authority guiding our minds. For this he substitutes rules of our own making, ways of carrying on which we privilege, perhaps only at particular places and times...some socially constructed standards...[to make] a serviceable substitute...in norms and standards of our own making'. Hume's attack on the rational approach focused on how actions and events happen, cause and effect, and how judgements and decisions are made.

This is the important question for Hume to whom causation, the act of causing or the bringing about of an effect, was an issue of principal concern, and similarly important for any organizational research and analysis. Of all his work, his theory of causality has had the 'greater and more lasting influence' and though Ayer can point to 'vulnerabilities' on points of detail, Hume's 'fundamental tenets not only admit of no answer but thoroughly deserve to carry conviction'. Its importance lies in its sometimes enabling us to foretell and perhaps control how things might come to be. His theory for cause and effect requires that he takes his readers on a journey that has to cover perception, reason, the passion, beliefs, and the will and morality and politics. It is a journey that a modern philosopher in his 'Truth: a Guide for the Perplexed' declares that the 'urbane...David Hume seldom put a foot wrong'. One appealing strength of Hume's naturalistic philosophy is his commitment to

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the real world of experience and evidence and the rejection of "fancy and hypothesis" 818.

This theme of evidence-based enquiry strikes a common chord with this research and with lines of thought on the current state and nature of management and organization studies, as expressed by a modern authority on organizations and management, Barbara Czarniawska: "Theories that come not from reflection over practice but from a desire for a different practice can be called fantasies or designs, rather than prescriptions or recipes... (These are) built on a disdainful conception of human nature as suffering from "limited rationality." 819.

Hume's journey is a long one but it is an important one in establishing how and why things happen. His motivation for defining cause and effect is that:

"Tis evident, that all reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that we can never infer the existence of one object from another, unless they be connected together, either mediatly or immediately 820.

Hume's interpretation of cause and effect is much wider than more modern and limited examples that we might find in statistical laws. His theory of cause links any facts which may have a connexion and matches those we might hear about in a court of law or industrial tribunal. Hume's interpretation of causation was based firmly on his formulation of a science of the mind based on common, everyday observations and precise accounts of the mind's conscious operations: 'experience and observation'. 821 Ayer summarises the two deceptively simple questions that Hume raised as his starting point:

'what are the materials with which the mind is furnished and what uses can it make of them?' 822

The material which 'furnishes' the mind are perceptions; these are 'whatever can be present to the mind, whether we employ our senses, or are activated with passion, or exercise our thought and reflection' 823. Perceptions are of two kinds: impressions and ideas. Impressions are our immediate perceptions which enter the consciousness 'with most force and violence' and include 'all our

sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. Ideas are those impressions reflected upon in the absence of whatever caused the first impression. It is the immediacy and force of impressions that makes them different from ideas. When we reflect on a passion or an object which is not present, this perception is an idea. Impressions, therefore, are our lively and strong impressions; ideas are the fainter and weaker. It is the imagination that combines the basic or 'simple' ideas into more complicated structures and the only requirement is that each individual 'simple' idea corresponds to a single impression. Impression precedes idea. It is a relationship like that of evidence to proposition, so that an idea cannot meaningfully exist without a prior impression. The relationship between impression and idea is both a causal one and a test of validity and significance: '[If] any philosophical term has no idea annexed to it (as is too common), he always asks from what impression that pretended idea is derived? And if no impression can be produced, he concludes that the term is altogether insignificant.' Most importantly it is the mind's impressions that are the source of ideas, not the external objects or qualities that prompted the sensations that make up the impression. Cause is extrinsic to the object; it is not contained within any external object or thing of any kind. Power, force and agency are the factors that we would usually link with cause to explain why things happen, and the language in our descriptions of them has ideas of cause and effect embodied within it; a mirror has within its name the idea of reflecting, image and subject. But Hume dismantles all assumptions to reach his definition of causality.

The elements in Hume's 'science of the mind' are perceptions, ideas, memory and imagination. Memory replays ideas in the mind in the sequence in which they first occurred and memory preserves that sequence. In contrast, the imagination re-orders ideas in a new and different sequence and so creates new, complex ideas; imagination is the producer of complex ideas. Memory and imagination are both dependent upon prior impressions. There are no other faculties in the mind, so that any moral judgement is a complex idea created by the imaginative and rational abilities by re-organising our impressions of approval or disapproval of others or the self. It is the imagination that links or associates these simple ideas. Hume's principles follow the natural relations by

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824 Ibid. p. 1.
825 Ibid. p. 647.
826 Ibid. p. 4.
which the imagination links objects and ideas in 'real life'. This leads to Hume's principle that 'All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact'. Hume sets aside the Relations of Ideas, which are conceptual matters of branches of knowledge like the mathematical sciences, to concentrate on the Relations of Fact, namely resemblance, contiguity in time and place and cause and effect. Hume is establishing the principle that the second group of associations, 'identity, relations in time and space and causation' are separate from the object itself. He is establishing that any idea of cause and effect is separate from the idea of the object itself. It is possible to have an idea of an object without considering it to be either the cause or the effect of any other object or thing. Causal relations cannot be found in the qualities of an object and causal relations between objects cannot be demonstrated, and any that are put forward can be countered by contrary interpretations. Hume's psychological/philosophical 'science of the mind' is centred on the mind gaining all its ideas from impressions and there is no observable impression of cause and effect. The only observable qualities that Hume recognises in assessing cause and effects are that any supposed cause precedes or may overlap any effect in time, and that cause and effect are directly or indirectly linked in a continuous chain, and that when similar occurrences repeat themselves in time and in the same sequential chain, they may be predictors of future occurrences. Hume's contention is that each object is separate, complete and self contained in itself. An object may be in a time and space relationship with other things but this relationship is a general one, since no other particular thing is necessary to define the identity of the object itself. Our common use of language embodies notions of relationship between objects and notions of cause and effect, so that 'photograph' suggests a subject, camera, film, disc, photographer, digital or chemical processes for creating an image, and then an observer of the final picture. The single word for an object implies the conjunction between all these elements. But, if language can be used to imply relationships and to conceal, curb and keep in check a closer analysis of these relationships, language can be used to question the observable evidence and to unpick these complex 'relations'. Hume famously illustrated his principle by using the popular craze of his times, billiards, to demonstrate that his [Hume's principle] 'securely rests' on the

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causes that 'our language forges between descriptions of matters of fact', for example, when using such words a 'cannoning'; but there is no actual causal relation, only a change, in time and space, of the balls relative to each other, and the cue and the player:

'In the whole of such a process there is no observable relation [my emphasis] for which terms such as 'power' or force' or 'necessary connection' could be needed to provide a name. And the same applies to any other example one might have chosen...'

If, as Hume clearly states, there is no causal relation of power or force between phenomena, where does the causality lie? If an experience of causal power could be observed or experienced, it is likely that it would be a single, unique and unrepeatable experience and therefore no general rule could be inferred from it. Since Hume excludes such rational possibilities, where does he say that causality lies?

He finds it in the mind's processing of a multiplicity of similar instances. The basis for this is part philosophical and part psychological - his 'science of the mind'. He establishes: 'That there is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it ...That even after the observation of frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience'.

Hume has found no causality in the external world. His conclusion is that the repetition of factual observations of instances of similar kind leads the mind to expect that similar instances will be repeated: 'the mind is carried by habit, by the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist...this connexion which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant ...[creates] the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion'.

The mind's past experience of sequences where certain instances regularly follow others forms the basis of the mind's transferring onto the instances themselves properties of power or force or necessity, and so causality. The repetition of such sequences creates a habit or cast of mind. To adapt Shakespeare's Cassius: Cause lies not in the stars, data or facts, 'but in ourselves'. Hume has demonstrated that when we

830 Ibid. p. 79.
attribute to an ‘object’ or event that property of being a cause, we are at the same time revealing our mental habits, our character and ourselves. Our innate qualities, the influences of our education, background and pattern of interactions with others influence the processes and conclusions that occur when we make a perception. A person’s interpretation and judgement could act as a ‘working definition’ of character. Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ covers somewhat similar territory. Therefore Hume’s definition is that: ‘A cause is an object precedent or contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other’. Hume uses ‘object’ but the term artificially limits the range of potential things that may be causes. Hume also does not define how many, nor how regular, instances should make a cause. Nor does he define accidental causes. Hume establishes that the validity and truth of a cause is tested by the regularity of the perceived evidence. Consequently when we attribute a cause to an exceptional or accidental ‘object’ what is really revealed is our attitude toward it because we imaginatively project onto the unknown a regularity for which we have no evidence. The purpose of knowing cause and effect is to predict what is likely to happen, predicting probable effects from evidence, knowing the future, which is unknowable. Having established that cause is based on the observed regular occurrence of observed ‘object’-evidence, the presumption could be made that knowing the future or deciding what is probable [probability] is a matter of extending that regularity to unknown – and so unobserved – evidence, but Hume shows that a rational or reasoned account of probability is not possible: ‘probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects of which we have experience, and those of which we have none; and therefore ‘tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability’. Hume shows the limits of reason in inferring the future on the basis of the past and present by showing that the reason would have to proceed on that principle that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. Professor Kemp-Smith, whose 1941 commentary on Hume re-invigorated the appreciation of Hume and promoted the originality of Hume’s theories at a time when positivism in the

832 Cf. Bourdieu.
834 Ibid. p. 90.
835 Ibid. p. 90.
836 Ibid. p. 89.
social sciences and statistical generalisation had dominated for a century and a half, is of the opinion that Hume has ruled 'reason... in such matters...out of court' \(^{837}\).

Hume's theory has a role for the mind's rational abilities but his final view is 'that all our reasoning concerning matters for fact are deriv'd from nothing but custom: and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cognitive parts of our nature' \(^{838}\).

That our reasoning is based on habit might lead to the conclusion that we make up interpretations of facts to suit ourselves and while that may, sadly, be the case more often that not in real life, Hume would reject this by still requiring that any interpretation be backed by evidence. The scientific and experimental method proposes hypotheses and tests them against evidence but eventually interpretation confronts the problem of the causal assumptions that exist within language. No mathematical formula of regularity can predict which way a flipped coin will come down – heads or tails; past experience and a past record are no guides, as the opening scene of Tom Stoppard's 'Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead' dramatises. What we owe to Hume is his 'insight' that 'what we want and cannot obtain ...is a justification for our actual interpretation of the lessons of the past: a justification for adhering to a special corpus of beliefs. What he [Hume] neither proved nor even sought to prove was the consequence that the beliefs should be abandoned' \(^{839}\).

The crucial question is whether or not such predictions or beliefs arise from the rational understanding or the imagination. Hume rules out the rational understanding on the grounds that it would require acceptance of a principle of the uniformity of nature: 'that principle that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same' \(^{840}\). Hume states that this cannot be proven neither on the basis of prior evidence, however many repeated instances there might be, nor on the justification that what has been the case in the past will continue to be so. There is no rational reason to believe that one event will happen after another, nor that an object is linked to another in any external way, nor that one object can be inferred from another, other than from the mind's conceiving of such notions. Hume's explanation is that

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rationality is not involved, but that we choose to believe. He regards them as natural beliefs and makes the distinction between the world of philosophy and that of people living their lives. Justification independent of human nature is impossible for such beliefs are grounded in human nature and are the result of observed associations that have produced a habit of mind.

Belief in a cause is grounded in associations which are based on impressions: 'a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression.' A concept of a cause is based upon ideas and leads to further ideas. The vivacity of an impression prompts the greater strength of beliefs. Belief is not an integral element in an impression because that would change the initial impression of the object and transform the object to something else. Belief is the relation of the mind to the impression. Belief is one outcome of the mind's repeated experience of one particular object or event being followed by another. This constant repetition creates the idea of the necessity that one object must be followed by the other. This is the basis of belief. Moreover, the two objects or events become merged as a new impression so that the original ideas become associated and as a result there is created a reflection of 'determination' and expectation that the second object will succeed the first. Our minds are filled with such associations of ideas. Hume's explanation of necessity is that there is psychological association between objects and ideas in the mind, and not a logically 'necessary', nor rational nor theoretical association between objects and ideas that exist independent of the mind. Further recurrences of these same linked impressions, reinforce the impressions and the beliefs; the memory is crucial in such linked impressions for its reserve of past experiences.

Hume's two definitions of cause:

the philosophical:

'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.'

and the natural:

'A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other,'

\[841\] Ibid. p. 96.
and the impression of the one to form the impression of the other.\textsuperscript{842}

Hume's philosophical approach is based on our living in the 'real world' but his theory of perception leads to a dead-end where each person is only a collection of perceptions. He describes this dramatically as:

'The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine the simplicity and identity. The comparison with the theatre must not mislead us. They are successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which this is compos'd.'\textsuperscript{843}

It is when Hume adds the passions to this account of the mind's perceptions that the basis of his concept of personal identity or self is formed: 'the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one' and proceeds from the 'operation of the imagination.'\textsuperscript{844} The self is based on impressions and is not a fixed, single, unchanging object, but is based on the relation between perceptions, i.e., like Goffman's socially constructed self. The crucial element is the passions; their reactions create reflexes within us as we react to other persons and other stimuli. From this he derives the general rule that 'everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, likewise produces pride and humility.'\textsuperscript{845} Hume sets these passions in contrasting pairs, so we feel pride or humility about ourselves and love and hatred toward others. There is a causal relationship between pride and humility and the self because our self-concept is a consequence of pride or humility. These passions are the origins of human nature; they only concern the self, and so the pleasure of pride and the pain of humility are basic elements in the 'science of the mind'. Hume refines this by separating the passions into direct and indirect. The direct 'arise immediately from good and evil, from pain and pleasure'; the direct

\textsuperscript{842} Ibid. p. 170.
\textsuperscript{843} Ibid. p. 253.
\textsuperscript{844} Ibid. p. 259.
\textsuperscript{845} Ibid. p. 291.
passions are 'desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security'. The indirect passions are impressions, like the direct passions, but arise in association with them; the indirect passions are 'pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents'.

'All the resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises that the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole cycle be completed.'

In defining his philosophical and psychological theories Hume accepts as natural an everyday reality that humankind lives and believes in a social world and that no further proof of its existence is required. Our passions are by and large our responses to other people who, for their part, are responding to us. This places each person, each self, 'as part of a community of selves, each with an identity ascribed by others. Personal identity as socially imputed has emerged from the characterisation of the passions, and so, to that extent, the way of ideas has been left behind.'

The sense of pride and its opposite humility is directed toward the self. Love and hatred are directed toward others: 'As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious, so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious.'

Hume is presenting an account of our mental processes and identifies pride as a principal motivator when it operates through a process of comparison; pleasure alone does not create pride, but a process of comparing, for example, one quality to that of others. Hume invites us to consider the hostess and her dinner-guests; the guests enjoy and take pleasure from the occasion, but the hostess is the only one who can take pride in its success. Pride, therefore, arises when something pleasurable is closely related to something that is admired, or something particular to us, or generally rare, and when its qualities are generally known, admired, and, moreover, are constant and long-lasting.

All of these can, however, be influenced by the cultural context in which the person lives or works. The personal quality that gives most pride to the self

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846 Ibid. p. 276-7.
847 Ibid. p. 283.
- the others being bodily attributes and ownership of possessions and wealth - are mental abilities of which virtues are the most important. A virtue in this context is not a moral but a natural characteristic, like 'wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment'. The good opinion of others is also a source of pride.

Hume identifies sympathy as the mechanism by which the approval of others endows the self with pride, but his sympathy is nearer to empathy: to experience imaginatively a similar feeling to that being experienced by another human being. It is something that happens to audiences at plays, movies, or when reading, as well as when observing people at work and in their daily lives: 'sympathy...is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force or vivacity as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.' The imagination responds to the expression of someone else's pleasure or pain which generates sympathy. Sympathy is natural, involuntary, arises without reflection and is not impartial. It is an everyday experience for us to feel sympathy for family, personal friends, and also for those with whom our lives are entangled for a very long period at work. Sympathy can be pleasurable or painful. Its main consequence is to affect our judgements. It also affects our self-esteem and self-concept by the act of comparison of ourselves with others and their reactions to our own personality and characteristics. This can set up a reflexive chain-reaction of admiration, self-esteem and further admiration.

Hume describes further progressions of feeling for the passions of pride and humility and of love and hatred; hatred is joined with anger and love with benevolence. Benevolence generates compassion and hatred generates malice. Pity may rise from sympathy but malice arises from comparison, for the person feeling malice does so by comparing herself with another in some aspect, like intelligence, talent, popularity, generosity of nature or the admiration of others, and so malice - 'a kind of pity reverst' - emerges in her coming off worst in one of all of these comparisons. Its partner, envy, precedes it in the process of comparison; envy is a comparison of a present condition, while malice looks forward to an action or some ill-luck or harm to another person that will bring about a favourable comparison with the self. Both envy and malice arise from the pain of humility caused by an unfavourable comparison between oneself

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852 Ibid. p. 316.
853 Ibid. p. 317.
854 Ibid. p. 376.
and another. Respect and contempt make a similar pair of passions that can arise from comparisons. It can also give rise to self-loathing and harm to our self-esteem.

Hume adds qualities of individuality or particularity to persons or contexts and deliberate intent to his definitions of the passions aroused by sympathy. While sympathy's has a role in identifying the qualities in others, it is the subsequent comparison that creates the passion. Comparing oneself with another or one quality with another is the central process in Hume's definition of how we make judgements. We 'judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value' and 'we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy, in proportion to the degree of riches, and power, and merit, and reputation, which we think ourselves possesst of...The misery or another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight; the latter uneasiness. His analysis of the passions becomes more complex as Hume's theory seeks to accommodate more and more patterns of passions that arise from comparisons with the self. Malice is linked to the pain of anger and hatred. 'Benevolence and anger, and consequently love and hatred, arise when our happiness or misery have any dependence on the happiness or misery of another person, without any further relation.'

Hume's definition of the passions is a preliminary to his account of the will, which marks the last stage in his psychological process that leads to action. Hume has sought to eliminate from his account of why 'things happen' any notion of any objective, impersonal influence, factor or cause being at work in a similarly objective world. He has set out a secure basis - his 'science of the mind' - on which to build a theory of cause and effect, of actions, of morality and politics. Having described and defined the mind's processes in perceiving the external world, and classifying these perceptions, the relations between impressions and ideas, ideas and passions, his next stage takes him to a consideration of action and character. He takes the will to be something self evident and 'impossible to define and needless to describe any further...by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or a new

The culture of reporting. Note: Hume's account of the passions and the processes of comparison demonstrate the possible motives of those reporting and those receiving the reports.
857 Ibid. p. 382-3.
perception of our mind. The will precedes any physical act of new thought. His theory rejected any objective external causal powers, rather he located them in the mind. Cause and effect operate in the following manner: the mind experiences impressions and groups them into ideas; the mind records that the incidence of one impression is regularly followed by another particular impression; repeated instances of this combination of impressions create in the mind an association. The mind comes to accept that the first impression will be followed by the second and a causal idea is formed by their association in the mind. It is neither one impression nor our idea of the object that causes the other; it is our association of the two impressions in the individual mind. In reaching his definition of the mental processes that lead to action, Hume accepts that human nature is constant. Hume's 'science of the mind' takes its lead from the observed and universally accepted facts of human physical development. He makes light of it by asking if we would expect a four year old child to lift a three hundred pound weight or 'look for a philosophical reasoning, or a prudent and well concerted action?' Thus in reply to his question: 'Are there changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct?' he finds that both are equally predictable. Character and action are perpetually linked together:

'as the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same, in determining us to infer the existence of one from the other'.

Observed patterns of behaviour, of action/cause and effect, provide the evidence from which character can be determined and future actions and effects predicted: 'For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate?' And though human behaviour can be unpredictable, and though knowledge of that behaviour may have gaps in it, predictions and judgemental assessments are still made of people's characters and actions on the basis of 'moral evidence' as a 'reasonable foundation...Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motivations, temper and situation. An individual still has the liberty to act in any way - nothing is determined - but observers base their judgements,

858 Ibid. p. 399.
859 Ibid. p. 401.
860 Ibid. p. 401.
861 Ibid. p. 404.
862 Ibid. p. 402.
863 Ibid. p. 404.
explanations and predictions of action on the consistency of the relation between character traits and actions. Hume rejects any objection to his interpretation of the operation of the human mind by giving the example of a condemned prisoner who recognises the inevitability of his situation because the natural evidence tells him that his prison walls will not vanish away and the 'moral evidence' that his guards' behaviour has consistently not released prisoners or they would not be guards. So one could suggest that managers behave like all managers have behaved in the past from the nineteenth century factory onwards because that is the way all managers have behaved. It is a matter of 'habit of mind' that all future managers have observed and which they desire for themselves. The appointment of a new manager is like another 'Groundhog Day', till someone learns different.

Thus Hume rejects the notion that having an explicable or predictable character implies that a person is not free and that a person's life is determined. He sets aside such objection by acknowledging that human beings can be spontaneous, but since we believe in cause and effect, such spontaneity also arises from the desires and the passions. An 'unfree' act is one where some external force prevents us from acting as we would like, but this is a tautology because this force, like being imprisoned, becomes itself a causal necessity of action. On another level, human beings may feel they act freely, because they are not conscious of the past influences upon them, or they do not wish to admit to themselves that their actions are influenced by past motives and passions, so that they feel falsely free. Hume dismisses this sense of freedom by logically pointing out that if such an action is free, then others must be too, and so:

'According to this hypothesis of liberty, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crimes, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is character concern'd in any way with his actions; since they are not deriv'd from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be us'd as a proof of the depravity of the other. 'Tis on the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary'864.

An action to belong to someone must ensue from their character and the actor may not always be aware of the influences upon him, and so his actions may not be clear, rational and objective judgements, but an observer may have that

864 Ibid. p. 411.
insight into the character influences at play. To drive home this crucial point, Hume takes the observer's point of view:

'The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not properly a quality within the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer the existence of some preceding objects. .......We may commonly feel liberty in ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even when he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.

Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.\textsuperscript{865}

This follows the logic of Hume's theory of causation and perception where the idea of cause lies not in the objects or the actions but in the mind of the agent. Therefore actions derive from character and actions provide the evidence for the moral accountability, and approval and disapproval of the observer. The causal necessity is the individual human character. Morality is founded in human nature because the observer's moral judgements are based upon the pleasure or pain felt by their observations of human character in action and its effects\textsuperscript{866}. Hume also places humankind as the source of moral evil in the world – which surely does exist – for it is not logical that God would create evil\textsuperscript{867}. Hume has placed primary importance on the passions, and he defines the relative importance of rationality and the passions within character as:

'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office that to serve and obey them'\textsuperscript{868}.

Reason cannot therefore be a sufficient motivation for action and the passions cannot be defined in terms of rationality, e.g., a reasonable anger. Hume is

\textsuperscript{865} Ibid. p. 408-9.
\textsuperscript{866} Viz . The Prologue. Using the Devil's visit to Ivan, Dostoyevsky is proposing that what happens in the world is of humankind's doing. No one and nothing else is to blame. The Devil is only a scapegoat; the Devil is a cover story for the human mind: \textit{Je pense, donc je suis.} I know that for a fact, all the rest, all these worlds, God and even Satan - all that is not proved, to my mind. Does all that exist of itself, or is it only an emanation of myself, a logical development of my ego which alone has existed forever?\textsuperscript{861} Dostoevsky. Op. cit. p.681.
crucially overthrowing a persistent, philosophical and commonsense view that there is a war between reason and the passions and that any good action, decision, or judgement is based on reason because that is uncontaminated by 'human nature': 'Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates'.

This proposition suggests the illogical notion that in each of us there are two persons, one rational, the other emotional. Hume treats persons as unified and refutes the hidden assumption in this war between reason and the passions that both equally possess the power to motivate action. He asserts that 'reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will', and nor can passion, but passion holds the dominant and final power, while reason is merely advisory. Reason has the function of establishing facts, in terms of establishing ideas and beliefs: 'Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influence any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgement concerning cause and effect'. Reason establishes any relevant causal relations and then the passions motivate any action which will serve an aim which will give pleasure or avoid pain for the self. For an action to be made, the circumstances or consequences must matter to the self either as a direct or as an indirect effect: 'It can never in the least concern us to know that such subjects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and the effects are indifferent to us'. Reason has its part to play by defining facts and relations or ideas, but since the passions determine the purpose of an action, they have the dominant role, hence Hume's assertion 'reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions'. Reason is advisory not motivating, and 'it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will'. Freud's view and the common experience of rational argument being put forward only to be set aside in favour of the unspoken preference of the person being persuaded confirms Hume's assertion. The only way that reason can be effective is to change the objective of the passions, but this is neither opposing nor controlling them but surrendering to their dominance and working with the passions - going with the grain rather than against it. It is not a war between reason and the passions,

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869 Ibid. p. 413.
870 Ibid. p. 413.
871 Ibid. p. 414.
872 Ibid. p. 414.
873 Ibid. p. 413.
but as Dogberry puts it 'an two men ride of a horse, one must ride behind'\textsuperscript{875}, and the one in front holds the reins of power.

A principle of Hume's philosophical psychology is the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure. Actions are either caused by or can be explained by a set of passions/desires in the agent of the action. Accepting or rejecting the advice of reason does not make the passions irrational or unreasonable, nor true not false, but beliefs may be irrational, unreasonable, true or false. 'A passion is an original existence...[that has] no more reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high'\textsuperscript{876}. A passion may be caused by something which is true or false, but the passion itself does not have such qualities, but is directed toward an object – one loves or hates someone or something; so passions are directed and intentional. 'In short, a passion must be accompanied by some false judgement in order to be unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion properly speaking which is unreasonable, but the judgement\textsuperscript{877}.

To clarify the relationship between reason and passion, one commentator uses an example that mirrors the role of Castiglione's Courtier and the nature of the Prince's character [i.e., passion] and also that of the CEO of a big business:

'Consider the human agent as a company with passion and reason respectively represented as executors and advisors. Passion (that is the passions themselves) alone has the executive authority to motivate the will and initiate action. However it is incapable of determining the right thing to do. While it can 'press the button', supplying the final link in the causal chain leading to a volition to act, it relies on advice from a team of experts who can recommend the best way to satisfy its goals. Since a smart director takes the advice of his experts they can make the executive directorship change its mind on what it wants...reason can oppose passion in direction of the will by providing information that the desire is not viable, or is based on false information, it cannot do so directly but only via a change in the passions ...reason is relegated to a non-executive role within the mechanics of motivation\textsuperscript{878}.

However there is no individual Prince, CEO or single overarching power or faculty, there are only the separate perceptions and 'each of the two tiers [the

\textsuperscript{875} Shakespeare W. \textit{Much Ado About Nothing} Act III scene v. 36-37.
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid. p. 416.
passions and the reason] – are collectives, and the bargaining strategy [between them] is correspondingly complex. There is a difference in the nature of the motivation between belief and the passion of desire because belief attempts to describe the real world accurately and the passion of desire tries to remake the real world the way it would like to be. Although Hume places the main motivation on the passions he seeks to explain how it is that individuals conceive that they are acting entirely rationally.

One explanation is that though the passions may be violent, there are the 'calm passions'; any passion may be calm or violent according to its nature but some may be both. The violent passions are 'love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility', but the 'calm passions' are our responses to beauty, form and composition. Hume regards the calm passions almost as natural traits of character and characteristics of the individual: 'certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence or resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children, or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such'. These 'calm passions' become so much a part of our natures that they become our attitude and approach to life, living and other people. Such calm passions work unobtrusively and act to calm the violent passions so that people may be thought to be doing their duty or 'the right thing' and to be behaving entirely rationally. Hume is describing those people who appear to be steady and even-tempered characters but who, according to Hume, only have the appearance of rationality, because the 'calm passions' are dominant: 'when any of these passions are calm....they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that which judges of truth and falsehood'. As an explanation Hume has left philosophy behind, has strayed away from any evidence and is being wholly psychological in making his assumption about 'passions' that cannot be perceived, but he is maintaining the consistency of his basic and unchallengeable principle that the passions are the motivator for actions.

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879 Ibid. pp. 95.
880 Cf. Text p. 23 line 20 – p. 25 line 9; Text p. 190 line 25 – p. 191 line 11; Cf. Text p. 198 line 16 – p. 199 line 23; Cf. Text p. 238 line 18 – p. 239 line 5; Text p. 239 line 18 – p. 240 line 5; Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9; Text p. 475 line 29 – p. 480 line 20; Text p. 503 line 23 – p. 504 line 9; Cf. Text p. 522 line 20-25; Cf. Text p. 221 line 12-27; Cf. Text p. 229 line 5-p. 230 line 2; Cf. Text p. 619 line 1 – 7 & line 16-28: The motivation behind the unitisation of course was a desire to make a different 'world' and reflected the particular views of the person’s character who had the desire, the idea, and the task of implementing it, having had the executive power devolved down to him. Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10. It is also a motivation behind utopias and a kind of organizational management theory and both can appear to be rational in their presentation of their idea.
882 Ibid. p. 417.
883 Ibid. p. 417.
'Actions are objects of our moral sentiments, so far only as they are indications of the internal character, passions and affections. Character and passions have the dominant motivational role in deciding moral judgements. Our notions of vice and virtue come from the passions and not rationality. Without sensory impressions rational understanding alone cannot detect vice or virtue. Vice and virtue are not like an object or sensation. No direct sensory impression can be gained from vice and virtue, nor can they be ascertained by reason alone. Vice and virtue are identifiable when we consider a situation as complete human beings, because then we are susceptible to the impression of pain or pleasure that it causes. It is this pain or pleasure that is the origin of moral judgements and distinctions. Hume's famous analysis of this is to take his readers through a murder scene. The facts of the evidence as they strike reason do not have an effect. It is when the facts are inwardly felt by 'turning your reflexion into your own breast' that 'disapprobation' is aroused. 'Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. So when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue...are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind. The moral judgement of a person's character is founded upon our sympathetic responses to person and action. Hume recommended the consideration of a variety of perspectives before making a judgement, so that we can see 'virtue in rags' when a context can conceal a person's natural virtues. 'In order, therefore, to prevent those contextual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgement of things, we fix on some steady and general point of view: and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our situation. Therefore, someone describing his own personal point of view must recognise his own personal interest and temper the judgements so that when he describes a person as 'vicious, or odious, or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must chose a point of view, common to him and others. Benevolence is still the core of Hume's moral virtues and when

associated with the 'calm passions', he values it as the vital sense of a shared common humanity with other persons, since they too are human, though it is bound to be directed towards individuals and identifiable groups. Such a sense of common humanity may not be as dominant as the sense of self-interest within the individual. Within a group of people these self-interests may well diverge. Hume states that the cohesive power of the sense of common humanity to 'overpower' and demote self-interest, when people's sense of common humanity combines: 'moral sentiments are found of such influence in life...[and] the principles are social and universal; the form, in a manner, the party [original emphasis] of humankind against vice or disorder, its common enemy. As a benevolent concern for others is diffused, in a greater of lesser degree, over all men, and is the same in all, it...cherished by society,...roused from that lethargy into which they are probably lulled, in solitary and uncultivated nature. Other passions, although perhaps originally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often overpowered by its force and yield the denomination of our breast to these social and public principles. Hume's view is that in making moral judgements the individual should endeavour to and is capable of refining the initial subjective, emotional impressions by considering all possible known rational facts, by using an unbounded imagination to conceive of all possibilities, by balancing these against his true beliefs, by reasoning logically and by dispassionately and disinterestedly suppressing personal likes and dislikes. In all of this the individual is a normal human being; nevertheless Hume lays this 'tall order' on the individual's shoulders. In all this rationality has a supporting role in refining these judgements, but it is the sentiments or passions that finally motivates the action of blame or approval. Hume stresses rationality's role in 'instructing' about people's qualities or actions, but it cannot produce a moral judgement without the sentiments of passion. 'Utility' only provides direction or 'tendency' but it too cannot prompt an action or judgement, if the direction does not appeal emotionally as a desire: 'It is requisite a sentiment [Original emphasis] should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. The sentiment can be no other than fore the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote, Here therefore reason [Original emphasis] instructs us in the several tendencies of action, and

humanity [Original emphasis] makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial. The problem for humankind is achieving this capacity to be morally well-balanced in our judgements. Hume gives to sentiment and the passions the final, dominant and motivating influence, but his account has created a debate about rationality's claim on dominance. The strength of Hume's account lies in its naturalistic description of the psychological operation of the mind in reaching moral judgements, because he regards the individual as one mind, where the initial passions and impressions are refined by reason and the results are disinterested motivating sentiments. His account of the virtue of utility, i.e., that which is useful to society and personal to the actor, as well as the virtues that are socially and personally pleasing, provides only criteria or guides, not 'guide-dogs', to moral approval. The wholly rational approach to the making of moral judgements produces both mistakes and conflict by its judgements. Moral judgement based on personal 'likes' and 'dislikes' produces a futile relativism that ends in perpetual and indecisive conflict. Hume's naturalistic philosophical account admits the fallibility of humanity in making moral judgements: 'a complex interaction of empathic, imaginative and rational skills, each of which could fail to operate satisfactorily...[and] nothing guarantees that this newly activated calm passion of humanity will not be over-ruled by a stronger self-centred passion. This places character at the centre of the making of all decisions and judgements - and there are few decisions that do not have a moral dimension. Different characters, like different cultures, will produce different motivating judgements prior to action. For example, one issue may not give way to an easy straightforward moral judgement. Another issue might yield to two equally good and valid judgements, so that deciding between them needs further research, information, dialogue and debate; in such circumstances, if there is little to choose between two good, positive judgements, it becomes a straightforward matter of debating the merits of one versus its negative. The difference between these two cases is that the first is dependent upon character, and the second upon the application of necessary regulation in the form of conventions of justice and, particularly, tenure of power. The idea that there is a spontaneous 'goodness' among people, as projected by Tolstoy, is not generally trustworthy and sets aside the idea that people have to be educated into an ethic, by a process of praise or blame. Political constitutions are arranged on the basis that people are wicked and

therefore conventions of 'checks and balances' have been proposed by all constitutional lawmakers from Machiavelli, Hobbes and the authors of the American Constitution. The general view of such laws is to keep the people in order, when, in fact many of their regulations are there to curb and prevent the rise of tyrants and their extending the duration of their tenure in office. Hume offers a naturalistic account of how anyone makes a real-life judgement, particularly a moral one. This is one of his persistently famous and much analysed 'laws'; that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'; that is, that it is impossible to determine a moral obligation to do something solely from the stated facts of a case. In his account of morality, Hume recognises in everyday life and from some authorities a 'sudden' but 'imperceptible' change from 'is and is not' statements of fact to 'ought and ought not' statements of obligation without any explanation: 'a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from the others, which are entirely different from it'.

This forms part of Hume's refutation of the rational approach to human understanding in general and to morality in particular, that moral qualities do not exist as qualities in facts or ideas, but arise through 'some impression or sentiment they occasion so that moral judgements and morality was more properly felt than judged of', and that any apparent rationality is because of the 'calmness of such moral sentiments, and it is wrongly recognised as an idea'. Our moral evaluations of individual characters are based on impression and the ideas created from them, so that when we feel pride or humility, or love and hatred, virtue and vice are associated with them and these 'must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others, and excite pleasure or uneasiness; and must therefore give rise to one of these four passions'. Hume differentiates between a personal liking or loathing for an individual person and a moral judgement, which is only valid when 'a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest...as denominates it good or evil.'

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891 Viz: Dunn, below.
893 Ibid. p. 470.
894 Ibid. p. 473.
Personal hatred or affection for another person is not a moral judgement and
closeness to another person can distort moral judgement, but such an
impression forms part of the evidence for a moral judgement when it is set
against a general point of view. Hume clarifies further by identifying the general
character traits that provide the general principles for such assessments of
moral approval and disapproval: 'Why an action or sentiment upon the general
view or survey gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness'\(^{697}\). Character forms
the basis on which the 'natural' virtues are defined for 'In short it may be
establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally
good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from
a sense of morality'\(^{698}\). The natural virtues are those not demanded by
convention. Hume's conclusion is that morality is founded on these natural
desires and emotional responses. A virtue is defined as 'whatever mental action
or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation'\([\text{Original emphasis}]\); and vice the contrary\(^{699}\). While there are artificial virtues which are
based upon society's, the natural virtues that arouse our approval or
disapproval stem from the observation of character traits. Hume's defining
principle of moral approval is the natural virtue of 'Personal Merit'\([\text{which}]\]
consists altogether in the possession of 'mental qualities, useful or agreeable
to the person himself or to others'\([\text{Original emphases}]\)\(^{900}\). Hume bases his
definitions of virtues on his principles of the universality of human and personal
merit. He pairs the virtues and creates four groups in total: usefulness to
oneself and society and pleasing to oneself and to society. Those useful to
society, which makes them the source of a considerable part of the merit
ascribed to humanity: benevolence, friendship, public spirit, and other social
virtues of that stamp; as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation paid to
fidelity, justice, veracity, integrity\(^{901}\). Those virtues that are useful to the person
her/himself as someone who will and does perform actions in the world are
'true, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity [i.e., persistent

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897 Ibid. p. 473.
898 Ibid. p. 479.
900 Ibid. p. 72.
901 Ibid. p. 34.
application], enterprise, dexterity, generosity and humanity. Hume defines wit, eloquence, ingenuity, decency and decorum as those qualities that are intrinsically pleasing in another person's character, while contentment, cheerfulness and serenity are likely to be qualities that a person would find pleasing in her/himself.

Usefulness to society is the mainspring of the intrinsic merit of humanity and sympathy: 'a tendency to the public good...does always...engage us on the side of the social virtues...and... these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause. Far above all others, social usefulness is that which is the most important and within that benevolence, the concern for others, is the most important: 'no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than benevolence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species. These, wherever they appear, seem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own behalf, the same favourable and affectionate sentiments, which they exert all around. Such benevolence creates a similar feelings in others and Hume's account of the emotional climate that benevolence creates makes its 'mutual confidence and regard' sound like trust. The merit of benevolence, arising from its utility, and its tendency to promote the good of mankind... is the source of the considerable [Original emphasis] part of that esteem which is paid to it. Hume's description of the alternative condition to this 'tender tranquillity' is one that is more recognisable and which makes its case more easily: 'Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, amid mutual reproaches? The roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and displease us...'. Hume's two contrasting picture of benevolence/trust and a 'blame culture' are as near as one could get to the contrasting change in ethos in Abecedary Institute's story. Hume's picture of benevolence and its social usefulness is as near as one might come to an endorsement of the

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904 Ibid. p.18.
905 Cf. Text p. 155 line 16-22; Text p. 181 line 16-29; Text p. 299 line 4-11; Text p. 325 line25 –p. 327 line 25; Cf. Text p. 354 line 15- 25; & text p. 372 line 18- 24; Text p. 367 line 30 – p. 368 line 2; Text p. 480 line 21 – p. 481 line 1; Text p. 481 line 12 – 32; Text p. 500 line 21 – 501 line 21; Text p. 550 line 16 – 553 line 2; Text p. 589 line 20; Text p. 589 line 22 - p. 590 line 15: Trust between staff and management had broken down. This was also reflected the national picture of eroding trust in the professionalism of people.
907 Ibid. p. 66.
public service vocation that is a crucial part of this story and makes them
winners not 'losers' and those human values the prized part of the service.
Hume's view is an illuminating one for this research for it places the highest
value on the public service ethic in repeated descriptions of the ethos and
culture of Abecedary Institute as 'honest and decent'\(^{908}\). Though the
mission statement that was created embraced 'openness, honesty and trust', there was
also the sense of collegiality that was felt to be lost over the period of this
research, together with the professional sense of vocation that the respondents
felt towards their students' welfare, quality of their education experiences and
concern for their future. Within this world there were 'savageries' taking place
underneath the surface, but these would be isolated to individual character's
egotistical assertiveness on the one hand because there were no systems and
the institution was open to assertive characters\(^{909}\) and to the culture of 'money'
that dislocated and displaced the sense of vocation and so provoked the moral
disapproval or the respondents. Respondents tended to judge how they were
managed by criteria taken from politics, i.e., how they were governed and the
character of the individual 'ruler', and the ethics of their treatment\(^{910}\). 'Any
theory of the morally good agent [original emphasis] is derivative from this,
such a person being one who performs acts generally conducive to
happiness'\(^{911}\).

Both Hume and Bentham are in conflict with the views, generally held by the
'establishment', Princes, 'Grand Inquisitors' and 'the powers that be', that self-
interest and selfishness are the prime-movers of action. It is a philosophical
point of view represented by Thomas Hobbes. A contemporary of Hume wrote
a very popular poem about the necessity of selfishness in the production of
good, and seen as a defence of 'laissez-faire' political economy: 'Do we not owe
the Growth of Wine/To the dry, crooked, shabby Vine?' \[Lines: 419-420].

Bernard de Mandeville's 'The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turned honest' and
expanded to the later 'Fable of the Bees' [1705, 1714 and 1723] presented a

\(^{908}\) Cf. Text p. 127 line 2-13; Text p. 373 line 35 – p. 374 line 14; Text p. 443 line 6-31; Text p. 101 line
Text p. 86 line 31 – p. 87 line 3; Text p. 94 line 10 – p. 95 line 10: Decency, altruism and shared
purpose of public service ethic.

\(^{909}\) Cf. Text p. 72 line 30 – p. 73 line 9; Text p 121 lines 8 - 28; Text p. 181 line 16-29; Text 496 line 6-
25; Text p.495 line 37 – p.496 line 14; Text p. 501 line 23 - p 502 line 8; Text p. 492 line 16-20: No
systems and Institute's responsiveness to individual characters.

\(^{910}\) Viz. Reference above about reading characters. Cf. Text p 317 line 28-p 318 line 8; Text p. 454 line
558 line 25-p.559 line 8; Text p. 472. line 1-20; Text p.179 line 6-8; Text p. 320 line 26- p. 321 line 1;
Text p. 205 line 10: Valuing the staff.

world dominated by exploitative, self-interested greed, not unlike the view of
the Grand Inquisitor:

'All Trades and Places knew some Cheat,
No Calling was without Deceit'\textsuperscript{912}.

This view has not died. It is alive and well and doing infinite harm. A head-
teacher or college principal, the manager of an unchallenged public service,
observing a member of her/his staff working hard during extra-hours with
students, has a choice; he can reward such a member of staff for dedication to
the professional task of working with students, or he can do no such thing,
because the member of staff is deriving his own personal and selfish pleasure
from what she/he wants to do, and that it is better to save any rewards to
motivate unenthusiastic and idle staff. This attitude is a subtle projection of the
manager's own egoism and dominant self-interest. Moreover it is an application
of the view that every action is selfish and self-interested and that altruism and
benevolence are ultimately selfish\textsuperscript{913}. Hume strongly condemns as 'superficial
reasoners' with a 'depraved disposition' and 'a corrupted heart' those who
promote this 'pernicious theory' that is 'utterly incompatible with all virtue and
moral sentiment' and likely further 'to encourage that depravity'. He detects in
it a lack of 'affection and benevolence' 'to the species' who are presented in
'odious colours': 'all benevolence' is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public
spirit a farce, fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence, and that we wear
these fair disguises in order to put others off their guard, and to expose them
to our wiles and machinations\textsuperscript{914}. In refuting this view of human nature, Hume
also connects it with the view that 'no passion is, or can be disinterested; that
the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-
love;....unknown to ourselves we seek only our own gratification, while we
appear most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty of mankind...at bottom
the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and
most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own
happiness and welfare'. He rejects the theory of those who do not take the
altruistic and benevolent acts and characters for what they appear to be and so
concludes it is not 'material...to morality and practice'\textsuperscript{915}. Hume drives straight
at the political heart of this matter because it affects how we do treat and shall
treat each other, from those with whom we are acquainted to those in the

\textsuperscript{912} de Mandevelle B [1670-1733] The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn'd Honest 1705 [Ed Lynch J.]
www.cepa.nwschool.edu/het/profiles.mandev.htm


\textsuperscript{915} Ibid. p. 89-91.
wider society and universally. He denies the 'selfish hypothesis' on the grounds that it is an over-simplification and 'it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions'. It is 'the most obvious appearance of things' that there are 'such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects, operations, marked by a common language and observation, and plainly distinguished from those of selfish passions'. He also rejects it by placing character at the centre of his concerns by noting that even in the 'egoist' theory there is 'sufficient' evidence to show that there is 'the widest difference in human characters, and [to] denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested'. Though the 'egoists' declare that they are all the same, Hume refutes the 'selfish hypothesis' on the grounds that the evidence from humankind's common experience of life is 'solid and satisfactory' against it. He also disputes the apparent simplicity of all the proofs of 'so fallacious an hypothesis' because they arise from 'a love of simplicity [original emphasis] [and are] the source of much false reasoning in philosophy' and likens the philosophical contortions that have to be undertaken to prove the 'selfish hypothesis' to a contraption of 'minute wheels and springs, like those of a watch, giving motion to a loaded waggon'. The evidence that he brings in support of his case is that 'animals are susceptible to kindness', the love of a mother for her child, affection for friends: 'These and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object'. Hume also rejects the 'egotistical' Hobbesian view by asking what kind of character would a person devise for himself/herself and answers it by stating the they would choose a character made up from the virtues: 'No man is willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverse and unpliable disposition...These virtues are besides attended with a pleasing consciousness and remembrance and keep us in humour with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and society'. Moreover this evidence demonstrates that Hume's own view has 'more simplicity [Hume's emphasis] in it and is more conformable to the analogy of nature' than the egoist principle. He therefore concludes that his own theory is correct because he applies Ockham's Razor:

916 Ibid. p. 89-91.
917 Ibid. p. 92.
'the simplest and most obvious cause, which there can be assigned to a phenomenon, is probably the true one'.

Similarly he demolishes Hobbes' egoist's view that we may feel 'a darker passion' toward an object and its successful achievement gives us a secondary pleasure, by contrasting it with the fact that 'we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment...And what a malignant philosophy [i.e., 'the selfish hypothesis' and Hobbes's egoist philosophy] must it be that will not allow to humanity and friendship, the same privileges which are indisputably granted [by the egoist philosophy. My note] to the darker passions of enmity and resentment?'.

He also pursues the logic of this claim to consider whether this could not also apply in the 'greater society or confederacy of mankind' as it does in 'particular clubs and companies'; since the 'enlarged virtues of humanity, generosity beneficence, are desirable with a view to happiness and self-interest', he infers that they should do no harm and wonders why 'a man is more a loser by a generous action...since the utmost which he can attain, by the most elaborate selfishness [Hume is here repeating his point that the 'egoist' theory requires a distorting and over-complicated explanation of human nature], is the indulgence of some affection'.

Hume rejects the political and organizational consequences of control that lie behind the 'egoist' view of the mass of humankind which is the same as that of Princes and the Grand Inquisitor and its objective is authoritarian, organizational control. It also falls foul of Hume's belief that 'where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken'. It assumes a divided society of rulers and ruled, and greater and lesser in terms of many qualities and privileges. It accepts the necessity of indoctrination by rules and procedures in the control or 'domestication' of wild creatures. It uses education, as something like Plato's 'noble lie', to inculcate to denigrate and dupe humankind by a false interpretation of the nature of humankind's values. The conflict of philosophical views of egoism with altruism in humankind leads Hume to define how people can live together. Natural virtues and any resulting actions are complete and intrinsic in themselves, are not determined by context and are approved without reservation because they arise from human nature. Artificial virtues stem from the operation of rules and institutions but are based

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920 Ibid. p. 91.
921 Ibid. p. 92-93.
923 Ibid. p. 97-98.
in our concept of natural ones, and are subject to Hume's 'undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of morality'. Social usefulness - the touchstone for valuing natural virtues - becomes Hume's measure for artificial conventions. Such conventions are not natural: 'Is it by an [other] original instinct, that we recognise the authority of kings and senates, and mark all boundaries of their jurisdiction?...Have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and juries?' Likewise such conventions cannot be based in self-interest because that character trait is itself the principal cause of injustice: 'tis certain, that self-love, when it acts at its liberty, instead of engaging us to honest actions, is the source of all injustice and violence; nor can a man ever correct those vices, without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appetite. Elsewhere in his Enquiry, Hume links the following examples as similar: 'selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful and selfish and vain' and in so doing makes character the undisputable and permanent basis of action. Private interest and benevolence do not make a sound basis for artificial conventions of virtue because their vital independence is undermined by the personal. Justice is impersonal. Hume concludes that 'the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature but arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education and human conventions'. Self-interest and social usefulness share in its establishment: Self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with the public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue.

All that follows in Hume's account of the nature and operation of societies is founded on his definition of human nature. Property and possessions he takes as a bottom-line. He takes as his benchmarks, the ownership of property and possessions, wants and needs, and co-operation. Independence and self-sufficiency end in competition and rivalry. Co-operation is more forceful: 'By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments [i.e., division of labour. My note.], our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are less expos'd to fortune and accidents. 'Tis by this

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929 Ibid. p. 499.
930 Cf. Text p. 129 line 24 – p. 130 line 11.; Text p. 284 line 1-22; Text p. 285 line 7-32 & p. 286 line 7 – p. 288 line 4; Text p. 315 line4-15; Text p. 315 line 16-18: The introduction of the unitisation of courses, it was suggested, was to break up departments and associations between staff whereas staff and students derived their identity from these associations.
Hume's views on cooperation and republicanism parallel his view that society is the means by which humankind develops and mutually benefits. Hume's idea of the organisation of society is the application of conventions that encourage good interpersonal relations of co-operation, based on a clear understanding that 'like for like' co-operation is in every individual's eventual self-interest. Hume concludes that short-term personal benefits and society's long-term advantage should be balanced in social conventions that 'incentivize' and promote co-operation. Hume declares that this is the 'origin of civil government and allegiance. Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is change their situation, and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons, and its violation the more remote. These persons, then are not only induc'd to observe those rules in their own conduct, but also constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the dictates of equity thro' the whole society.

The implication of Hume's analysis of justice is that, as a result of bringing 'equity thro' the whole society' and in requiring the mutual observance of conventions, no one should have any advantage more than any other person. Any rules and conventions of governance must be simple. Hume's account of Justice in 'The Enquiry' contrasts the extremes of times of plenty, when justice is unnecessary, and times of scarcity, when 'Hobbesian' man is permanently at war. Altruism and self-interest, public and personal interest, long-term and short-term in a context of limited resources, such as normally exist, are held in a balance by mutual recognition; and Hume's proposition is that 'We are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage from a more equitable conduct.' The smaller the grouping the clearer will be the perception of the link between self-interest and mutual, reciprocal conventions; the larger the society, the more remote such consequences will be. Similarly the more remote, closed and secretive the society the less will be the likelihood of consequences coming to light until a

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935 Cf. Text p.341 line 25 - p. 342 line 2; Text p. 341 line 9-17; Text p. 511 line 21 – 29; Text p.468 line 4-27; Text p. 201 line 22 – p. 202 line 18; Text p. 165 line 5-28: Bureaucracy was inefficient and did not know what was going on.
change in circumstances; the less public openness, transparency and accountability, the easier will it be to arrange the concealment or delay of any consequences. It is this peer-group openness and consequent pressure which, 'as publick praise and blame encrease our esteem for justice...further contributes to encrease their solidarity...[through] the interest of our reputation, after the opinion, that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice, is firmly establish'd among mankind'\(^{936}\). Hume, however, is convinced also that this may not always be the case, for those who are without such natural virtues will also be incapable of acquiring artificial ones.

Hume's notions of conventions and their operation have direct implications for collegiality, groups, teams and organisations, while the parent-child relationship provides an interpretation of hierarchy in an organisational context. Though Hume's conventions seem complex, the transparency of their operation makes them simple.

In contrast, the parent-child relationship as the basis of hierarchy is complex and individual because it depends entirely on characters. Whereas the conventions are open and accept that people have to work together, the parent-child relationship is not open. One child may try to get some advantage over her/his siblings: the pleading for attention; the emotional blackmail of 'I'll scream and scream until I'm sick'\(^{937}\) to get her/his own way. Parents may favour one child like the prodigal son, or the relationship between a parent and an adopted child may not be the same as between natural children. Then there may be the dependence on the parent for instructions and approval and the security of someone else, i.e., 'a grown-up', being responsible, giving the orders, of 'their knowing best', all of which may be flattering for the parent but they maintain the child in infantile immaturity, dependence and control. The projection of these relationships into a hierarchical organisational structure reveals certain obvious parallels; the member of staff currying favour in order to 'cut a better deal' for her/himself, the pleading for attention, the new manager appointing new staff over or to replace existing ones so that she/he has and can deal with 'his own children' rather than the existing staff, who are like alien 'foundlings' or 'adopted'; it is an endless list of unique variations that eventually becomes a family, which history and literature show is a unique, complex interrelationship dominated by character - Forsytes, Joads, Bennetts, Plantagenents, Windsors, Corleones, ad infinitum - and is not a replicable structure.


\(^{937}\) Viz. Richmal Crompton's *Just William* stories and the character of Violet Elizabeth Bott.
There is merit in an examination of hierarchical organizational structures as ‘infantile’ and immature, and of co-operative collegial structures as ‘adult’ and mature. The length of time that it takes for students to learn to discuss purposefully, the training programmes of listening and talking that are a feature of high performance work, and the incidence of it in the Abecedary Institute narrative,\(^{938}\) all point to a process of learning conventions and maturity that are essential to the proper working of these democratic systems.

The criteria by which we may be a justifiable judge of character are most important. Guilt and shame direct our attitude to ourselves, and may be prompted by the anger and scorn of others. Adam Smith, a friend of Hume’s and author of ‘The Wealth of Nations’ provides a classical definition of ‘conscience’: that ‘within’ that judges our own actions and character. We have the capability of judging actions according to values, which are the subject of general praise or blame, and wish for our own actions to be those that invite praise and dread the blame that they could attract. We are not just aware of our own sympathies and passions in making such judgements, but we are aware of and internalise the judgements that society might make of our actions. Blackburn refers to the direct influence that Smith had on the Scots poet, Robert Burns, who put Smith’s view into the well known lines:

\begin{quote}
'O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us

To see oursels as others see us!

It wad frae monie a blunder free us

An' foolish notion'\(^{939}\)
\end{quote}

When Hume consider how we judge another person’s actions and character, he condemns those who use ‘the language of self-love’ in describing a person as an ‘enemy’ and lays down the rule that if one is to judge others then the position that has to be taken is ‘some common point of view... some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and sympathy’. Hume admits that the human heart may never change in its own ‘vanity and ambition’ but that it can never be ‘indifferent to public good’\(^{940}\). Hume’s optimistic judgement of human nature, in contrast to Hobbesian ‘egoism’, is that we have the capability of seeing virtues in the actions of people we may dislike and we are capable of taking an impartial point

\(^{938}\) Cf. Text p. 426 line 22 – p. 430 line 2: Account of group democracy/management, and his refusal to be a ‘policeman’; or a disciplinarian ‘father’; Cf. Text p. 546 line 13 – p. 547 line 3. Text p. 607 line 12- p. 614 line 5: Former principals were princes and matriarchs/patriarchs.


of view in judging what is for the 'public good'. He calls it 'virtue in rags' where our capacity for 'sympathy' enables us to see beyond appearance to the 'virtue' that may well be hidden there. One commentator draws out of Smith's and Hume's approaches a four-part process for making judgements of character. The basis is Hume's idea that our own pride or humility 'resonates' with the esteem or contempt that we imagine others regard such characters. We 'love' a quality or qualities when we encounter them in other people, probably because we have been educated to admire them. When we take up an impartial 'common point of view' and assess them, we either 'esteem' or loathe the characteristic. We may or may not find this characteristic in ourselves. The result of this search within our own characters prompts either our pride to swell with the imagined esteem that others give to this quality or our humility to shrink under the imagined weight of contempt.

Esteem is based on how useful or pleasurable a quality may be and the contempt that falls upon its negative aspects. These values are defined by the general social negotiation and discussion of other's behaviour. We are attracted or repelled by behaviour by our sympathy for or antipathy toward the acts, the agent or the victim. The 'office chatter' and gossip serve this function and an awareness of this constant commentary on behaviour acts as a curb on conduct and a motivation to improve behaviour. Hume's view is entirely naturalistic and recognisable. Therefore, if a group can isolate themselves from this commentary, then their conduct has the dangerous potential to be self-affirming - ['I did this. There were no consequences. It must be OK!']

For Hume sympathy is the natural human sentiment that responds to pleasure and pain, praise and blame, but that also rejects the harm, hurt, humiliation, and domination that humankind can perpetrate. 'Even if bullies have their admirers, the word is still a reproach.' Sympathy's companion is the deliberative 'man within' who sees through any false claims to praise and esteem and identifies only qualities which truly deserve admiration. Sympathy and deliberation provide the motive for action. Yet in an ideal world of truth, integrity and honesty, there may be a hypocrite or liar who lacks that voice of the man within with the 'common point of view', or whose education has failed.

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to inculcate it, and who judges that there is an extra advantage to be gained by manipulation and lying, so long as the rest of the world keeps to the 'straight and narrow'. Hume creates for consideration a classic case to which many defer: the selfish but 'sensible knave' who takes the line that it is to his/her personal advantage that she/he should secretly flout a rule which has been devised to provide some communal mutual advantage: 'a knave...may think...an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union of confederacy'. Character lies at the centre of the problem of the knave and Hume can think of no answer that will convince such a person to change her/his mind. If the person has no natural 'reluctance', he must have lost 'a considerable motive to virtue', but his 'speculation' is likely to succeed. Hume strongly condemns the action at the individual level and at the level of moral education, but can only suggest that conscience may intervene and the 'knave' may lose 'inward peace of mind'. In other words, the knave's fault is not his rationality, but his lack of sympathetic feeling for virtues that are admired by society. The moral education of his emotions has failed. The purely rational approach has also failed. The difficulty is finding another set of rational arguments for the moral course of action that will appeal equally or more strongly to the selfish interest, and one is unlikely to find them. The flaw is one of character. From the 'sensible knave's' point of view, the essential element for success is secrecy: 'not being found out'. Hume hopes for the satisfaction of such knaves being caught in their own 'snare', but he can only suggest it might happen by some 'accident' with the consequence that the 'knave' will suffer 'total loss of reputation...all future trust and confidence'.

Hume's image is of a society built upon co-operation, honesty, openness and trust and those values have to be strongly advocated and promoted. In this case-study the mission statement of Abecedary Institute included these same values of 'openness, honesty and trust' and were intended to define and lead the culture and context of the collegiate working life. Blackburn makes the valuable point that context defines the gravity of knave's selfish actions, so that 'in a particular context of trust and co-operation which he [the knave] exploits. This is certainly bad'. In another 'more hostile' context, for example the Hobbesian world where man is permanently at 'warre', fighting for 'advantage is not so much knavish as human'.

Hume's ethic is based on the notions of bringing utility and pleasure to oneself and to those with whom and amongst whom a person conducts their business. Under this guidance, passing judgement on a character entails weighing the interests of the character and of those connected to her/him – family, friends, and colleagues. Judgement should not be taken from an ideal, objective viewpoint but from a sympathetic assessment of the character's position and that of those associated with her/him. Blackburn suggests that Hume is an early 'communitarian' and develops a second stage of assessing a character: the 'ideal of civility: the requirement that in a conversation with others we find a common ground with them'. Ignoring or silencing the voices and opinions of others, or limiting the group to whom one speaks or whom one consults are political acts of exclusion, characteristic of a dominant 'order of egoism's' protection of its self-interest. Hume's 'communitarianism' suggests 'we all have an interest in pursuing conversations with others: we need to avoid the "continual contradictions" which arise if we do not do so'. This opens up the communitarian idea to a wider context and reveals that distance is not a factor in assessing ethics. A 'knave' may conform to the morality of her/his own group and may be trusted and admired for this behaviour, but still behave like a 'knave' to those outside that group. The 'knave' may even be praised by his group of 'insiders' for his callous treatment of outsiders. The consequence of acknowledging an ethical duty and responsibility to a wider context than the immediate group widens until it is boundless to the point of being meaningless. It is possible to avoid engaging with these problems by accepting the conventional morality of the old movies: 'Crime doesn't pay', and the knave will be detected and get his comeuppance. Acquaintance with the real worlds of business and politics provides contrary evidence of success and happy-ever-after. He might be shown that his reasoning is faulty and that he should reform. Alternatively Hume would say that knaves do not think, behave and react like that. A knave on the other hand, does not recognise universal laws or obligations and if the context remains closed and unstable, she/he will rise and flourish. If society openly values reputation, transparency, accountability, and if that society is not limited to a secluded, almost claustrophobic group, but extends to a wider social context rather than a clique, she/he might not succeed. Blackburn delivers a crushing condemnation of

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the knave's clever felonies and at the same time endorses Hume's foundation of ethics in sympathy and the passions:

'Those who are victims of his lying or cheating stay silent, or powerless, or do not recognise what has been done to them. He is despicable, no doubt but successful in his own eyes, and perhaps that of the world. But he is not on the face of it irrational: indeed to manage his knavery successfully he must be intelligent as well as daring. The knave is vicious and odious. We already have the words to express our contempt: it does not add anything except rhetoric also to call him irrational'.

While the knave's self-interest is condemned, his case raises the issue of partiality in taking actions versus there being a common ethical viewpoint. A Kantian person of principle who bases her/his action solely on what they might think of as a universal principle is a person who no longer has the need to engage in debating and deliberating her/his actions; all is settled by following the impartial, impersonal practical principle. Context and circumstance can distort the practical operation of such principles; context may necessitate a course of action that strays from the principle. This places community - the partial interests of friends, family, department - above principle and leads to endless sectional interests demanding 'We want'. This does not even admit the idea of dialogue. Without dialogue there is only war. The usual alternative to avoid this 'war' or conflict is to sidestep the opening dialogue in the first place by dismissing the other side as a 'waste of time talking to them because they don't listen...'. The alternative of confronting the other side would be to provoke a political attack on one's own position, which would then require a defence stronger than a partial 'because I/we want to...'. In real life, the disenfranchised and excluded are 'in the dark' and never get to know about such partial actions; in effect, they are therefore silenced, invisible, virtually murdered and disposed of, and in that silence one side can carry on with its own agenda without admitting openly what it is doing either to itself or to others. Exclusion is the

953 Cf. Text p. 558 line 25-p.559 line 8 Cf. Text p. 524 line 15 – p. 526 line 10: Management encouragement of reporting. Cf. Text p. 455 line 6 and p.455 line 19 – p. 456 line 22: Loss of collegiality and early deaths of retirees. Note: The whole programme of early retirements whereby many never worked again though they had a decade and more still to contribute in some form to the organization, is presented as a cost-saving exercise and a way of doing a favour to the retirees, but in
result either way. Blackburn sees clearly that the issue of partiality is one of character with traits that they share with Hume’s ‘sensible knave’: ‘Someone who shelters behind not actually having to conduct the conversation is what we always knew he was partial, selfish, perhaps a little blind, uncivil in his dealings with outsiders, defective in the finer sentiments of benevolence, or the finer feelings of justice’. But not ‘irrational’.

Hume’s view was that common ground has to be found on which the dialogue about practical matters may take place if ‘war’ and exclusion are to be avoided. Blackburn calls this ‘civility’ and points out that Jürgen Habermas ‘reinvented’ this notion in ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’ i.e., the ideal speech situation. Such a process requires understanding the interests of the other in order to find a linking interest or an aspect of one’s own plan that will appeal to the other. Doing this is an admission that the other’s interests have an equal weight and legitimacy and are therefore sound reasons for decision and action. However, it also legitimises partiality as a kind of ‘healthy competition’ that may produce positive action but will also produce individual winners, and negative elements of losers, cheats, flatterers and hierarchical climbers.

To counter this Hume asserted the material and psychological interdependence of humankind. Materially, ‘it is by society alone that he [man] is able to supply his defects’. Independent action is an implausible illusion, because ‘The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent’. The powerful force that binds humanity together is sympathy. It is the force by which we are aware of ourselves through interaction with others for ‘the minds of men are mirrors to one another’, both when we are in accord with and when we are in discord with one another. Hume is sometimes erroneously accused of promoting a universal and timeless idea of human behaviour but he was aware that culture and the nature of different societies and time will determine humankind’s actions and motives, but utility remains the basis for moral judgements. Utility too may be redefined by context but the principles of human nature on which they are based remain universal.

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values that create social solidarity will always be prized, like honour, decency, courage, compassion\textsuperscript{959}, but these will reflect the current definition of social solidarity, and as a consequence there will be variations in the morality, actions and behaviour. This provides Hume with the basis of an adaptable, broadly applicable moral principle. 'The inspiration of Hume's ethics [is] sympathy, the source of morality and moral judgements...means fellow-feeling, humanity – what moves men to praise or blame is what touches their common humanity...that fellow feeling of a sort, no matter how feeble, is common to all men, no matter how uncivilised: that no man is without some tiny spark, at least, of concern for others; no man is hermetically sealed in his own selfishness. Grant that, and you have found the source, in human nature, of all moral distinctions\textsuperscript{960}.

Hume also projected that we were therefore in a position to understand other persons, in other contexts and times, in the 'common course of human affairs the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations\textsuperscript{961}, and also takes into account any cultural variations. When seated at a play from an earlier time the audience can understand the workings of and assume the drives behind ambition, greed, true comradeship, false friends, grudging misers, envious rivals without a subtle knowledge of ancient Roman politics. Forbes suggests that 'because human nature in politics has this sameness...a science of politics concerned with universally applicable maxims is conceivable\textsuperscript{962}.

The line that Hume takes is that if the psychology has this 'sameness', then the structure or constitution of the institutions is the defining factor. This is a precursor of Lord Acton's maxim: 'Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Conduct is determined by character, and the importance of different constitutions or organizational forms is that they define the boundaries for different political behaviour for nations and for different characters. It is this theory that makes possible the idea of politics - and one might say, organizational theory - as a science: 'How could politics [original emphasis] be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society?\textsuperscript{963} According to Forbes, Hume's theories overturned

\textsuperscript{959} Cf. Text p. 24 line 21- p. 25 line 9; Text p. 86 line 31 – p. 87 line 3; Text p. 86 line 31 – p. 87 line 3; Text p. 238 line 18 – p. 239 line 5; Text p. 310 line 25 – p. 311 line 9; Text p. 617 line 4-p. 618 line 2: The culture of Abecedary Institute and liberal education, the attack on it, and the consequences.


\textsuperscript{962} Forbes D. Op. cit. p. 120.

his contemporaries' truisms about the moral health of a people defining the level of public interest and vice\textsuperscript{964} . Hume, however, was of the view that 'the ideal republic will function in any state of manners'\textsuperscript{965} . Hume describes how different forms give rise to different behaviours which are culturally determined, so that

\begin{quote}
'In ENGLAND [original emphasis]... Each practice has its advantages and disadvantages. Where birth is respected, unactive spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence, and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: The generous and ambitious seek honour and authority and reputation and favour. Where riches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail: Arts manufactures, commerce, agriculture flourish. The former prejudice, being favourable to military virtue, is more suited to monarchies. The latter, being the spur to industry, agrees better with republican government. And we accordingly find, that each of these forms of government, by varying the utility [original emphasis] of those customs, has commonly proportionable effect on the sentiments of mankind.'\textsuperscript{966}
\end{quote}

As a summary conclusion it implies that republican organizational forms lead to industry and financial corruption, while hierarchy or monarchy yields 'princely honours', control, favouritism and indolence. The form provides the opportunity for the character, but the spur to both is the 'utility', i.e., that which is useful to society and personal to the actor and which is largely determined by the constitutional or organizational form. 'Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a peculiar set of manners. Where it is altogether monarchical, it is more apt to have the same effect; the imitation of superiors spreading the national manner amongst the people.'\textsuperscript{967} This model is very clear for governments and organizations, and significantly it establishes that the ethos of regimes is based on the behaviour of the leaders with the rest 'playing follow my leader/s'. However, as Hume states, real life is more difficult to define, for he found in his eighteenth century England 'a mixture of

\textsuperscript{965} Ibid. p. 225.
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy', with those in control being 'composed of gentry and merchants' and with 'the great liberty and independency which every man enjoys'.

In Hume's view, the converse does not hold true, character does not decide the nature of good government. The idea of a science of politics was to assume that all persons could behave as knaves with the 'natural depravity' of political man, and therefore to put in place the checks and controls, so that if the constitution is correctly framed, even a bad man will behave in the interests of the public good. 'The political scientist is not concerned with manners and morals, but with the balancing of separate interests and the skilful division of power in order to best secure the public interest'. It was Hume's view that the achievement of the public good depended upon good laws regardless of the morals of the times and he used history as his source of evidence, so that the decline of the Roman Republic was brought about by 'an ill modelled government' rather than 'ASIATIC [original capitals] luxury'. In a similar vein, he credits the stability, long-standing success and wisdom of Venice to its democratic, republican form of government. Power is likewise controlled. Holding 'property' is decisive in the division of power and in organizational terms, property could be interpreted as having some stake in the business, in terms of permanent posts with options, bonuses, high salaries and pensions. The possession of this property has been a deciding factor in the location of power and in the history of the allocation of the vote, but Hume also subjects this to the legislation of the constitution. He notes that power does not always follow property, because if the monarch had to influence the general population every seven years, at the time of the election of members of Parliament, the monarchy's influence would fail and a republican government would emerge. However if this 'property' is not equally divided, i.e., universal franchise, and there are the people of property, i.e., with more 'property than others: 'where the original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for them gradually to stretch their authority, and to bring the balance of that power to coincide with that property'. Those who have no part in the original allocation of power would not succeed in usurping any power. If there is

968 Ibid. p. 207.
any inequality of power, the inequality will be increased. Where there is no power, or very little, it will be very hard to achieve it. Habermas takes the same approach in Critical Theory by amplifying delusion to a collective level and drawing out the political implications to suggest in ‘a complex of social institutions’ deluded ideologies may become so well established that they can no longer be changed by enlightening the agents ‘by a dawning recognition of where their true interests lie’. The consequence is that:

‘to abolish an established social institution...deeply rooted in the interests of some social class will...require more than a change...in the form of consciousness of the oppressed; it will require a long course of political action. Until that course of action is brought to a successful conclusion, the institution will continue to exist and exert its baleful influence on even enlightened agents, restricting their freedom and frustrating their desires’ 974.

This deeply depressing conclusion reinforces the narrative of this research, the scale of the task, and offers a strong reason why change did not and could not have occurred. Whatever the apparent redistribution of power in the proposed flatter structure, the basic hierarchy was left in place, the control of resources remained at the top, and the constitution of governance placed all power at the level of the Governors. As Hume demonstrates the form of constitution decides everything; at Abecedary Institute, hierarchy was the reality and the rest was all ‘smoke and mirrors’, as proposed by the advocates of culture management, such as Peters and Waterman. That is why Mondragon’s constitutional arrangements of universal franchise, in most cases, are crucial; and similarly the constitutional governance of direct participation at Oxford and Cambridge are equally crucial.

Forbes accepts Hume’s view that ‘opinion’, or the power of persuasion, and the form of the constitution and its checks and balances ought to be more fundamentally critical to the operation of the governance than property 975. In organizational terms Hume’s ‘opinion’ translates into vision and debate and the idea of the constitution to the location of power in the organization. If an

organizational change is to take place without any change in the location of power then the organization will revert back to its original form of governance. Hume’s conclusion is that ‘political institutions are made by “Legislators and Founders of States”...and legislators ought to make constitutional laws that last forever: “provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity. Effects will always correspond to causes; and wise regulations, in any commonwealth, are the most valuable legacy that can be left to future ages”’ and any ‘model of a perfect commonwealth’ can act as a pattern to which a society may progressively and peacefully work. Hume’s reliance on ‘wise regulation’ mirrors his ethical concern about justice. His historical evidence supports his generalisation that ‘among all civilised nations... the constant endeavour’ has been ‘to remove every thing arbitrary and partial from the decision of property...and the sentence of judges...as may be equal to every member of society’. He advocates ‘inflexible rules necessary to support the general peace and order of society’, despite their limitation, since ‘even the general laws of the universe...cannot exclude all evil and all inconvenience’. It is a rule that can result in justice and injustices, but it is fundamental to the creation of a common point of view ['a fixed view of public utility'] and of morality and trust in the operation of the regulations. Hume called these legislative rules, conventions, and explained them as follows: ‘Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without promise of contract: Thus gold and silver are made measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct’. In a footnote Hume cites this as the basis of organization. He also used the same analogy in his Treatise on Human Nature to explain the origins of humankind’s conventions of mutual support, social interdependence and co-operation without the necessity of artificial contracts, which collectively serve as a definition of trust. They also extend to the idea of promises. Education, the public interest and politics re-

inforce the moral disapproval that is incurred by breaking obligations, promises and trust.

Humankind’s survival supplies the motive for the creation of these artificial conventions to enable the safe and proper exchange of goods and services. These are not edicts generated by one person but are socially and generally defined. Such conventions are not just promises but guarantees, statements of trust, ‘on which the peace and security of human society entirely depends’\(^983\) and the operation of the general rule maintains the social stability.

The **Promise** and **Justice** are necessary for the survival of society, government is not. It is another of the conventions of society. Hume accepts that in the past, at the setting up of government, there may have been a promissory allegiance to it, but such a promise runs against nature, because:

> ‘All men...are born free and equal: Government and superiority can only be established by consent: the consent of men, in establishing government, imposes on them a new obligation, unknown to the laws of nature. Men, therefore, are bound to obey their magistrates only because they promise it; and if they had not given their word, either expressly of tacitly, to preserve allegiance, it would never have become part of their moral duty’\(^984\).

In his essay ‘Of the First Contract’, David Hume comments that he finds designs of governance and forms of organizational government as jerry-built by the people who are ‘rude builders...in this speculative way’ and the results show signs of violence and hurry and workmanship that is ‘a little unshapely’. He identifies two forms of government – reflecting the debate that has been taking place in this discussion so far: government traced back to the ‘DEITY...that must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it’; and that of consent of the PEOPLE where there exists an ‘original contract’, whereby the people have placed their trust in the sovereign but can resist when ‘aggrieved’ by that authority. Diplomatically Hume prefers nor denounces either, but condemns extreme forms of both and skirts around the issue of the Deity itself – conscious of the religious controversy of his views, but demonstrates that as a principle if an individual prince claims personal sacredness, then ‘a constable, therefore, no less than a king, acts by divine commission, and possesses an indefeasible right’. Hume asserts that ‘all

\(^{983}\) Ibid. p. 520.  
\(^{984}\) Ibid. p. 542.
governments are at first monarchical⁹⁸⁵ and imagines the origins of government in a chieftain's dividing up the spoils of war, and then establishing control by a gradual process of moving from persuasion to individual acts of coercion, the increased frequency of which produces the habit of 'acquiescence' in the people. Hume, typically of his method, draws evidence from history to show that usually Princes claim their subjects as 'property' and their authority from 'conquest or succession'; the people become so habituated to 'obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign', that they never question its basis or simply accept the 'subjection' as 'the most universal law of nature', and regard anyone who preaches that 'political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary consent' would be 'locked up by the magistrate, or be shut up...as delirious' by one's friends. It is therefore likely that, out of a habit of obedient inertia, the ruled will tolerate such despotism to the detriment of their own interests. The nature of government is a balance between the different perspectives of rulers and ruled: the short-term interest of the rulers' maintenance of power by enforcing law and order; the long-term interest of the people by restraining their short-term interests. The nub of Hume's criticism of the 'rationalists' is not that their belief is wrong. He admits that 'the consent of the people' is not only 'one just foundation of government...[but] is surely the best and the most sacred of any'; but Hume can find no historical evidence of its successful existence, no record of people respecting others' property or of knowing their own long-term interests; and so he concludes that it is 'a state of perfection, of which human nature is justly deemed incapable':

'Reason, history and experience shew us, that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular; and were one to choose a period of time, when the people's consent was the least regarded in public transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations are often consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquest and public convulsions, military force or political craft usually decides the controversy...[And so] The original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by

power and acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation.\footnote{Hume Of the Original Contract in Miller [Ed.] Op. Cit. p. 474}.

This judgement of new constitutions is remarkably prophetic, for the 'new' constitution of Abecedary Institute came out of the Thatcher 'convulsion' and reflected, not consultation, but 'political craft'. Moreover it was supported by the power of the Government, and the 'people' had to 'acquiesce' to it. Most if not nearly all had no idea of its structure, terms nor implications; their ignorance was complete. It was only two to three years into the change that they were being told that any consultation in committee was 'advisory'\footnote{Cf. Text p. 320 line 14-21 & p. 189 line 19-31, & p. 317 line 28-p. 319 line 8: Advisory Committees.} and that any democratic rights that they had under the old constitution, or that they had enjoyed in other establishments or that they recalled from their education and post-graduate rights at the ancient universities, did not exist under the new Thatcher constitution. Whatever status and rights they thought they had - and they did think they should share in the decision making and be listened to - was a delusion; they were not in a labour-management system and never had been whatever the illusion; they were now 'workers' in a "capital controlled" system\footnote{Viz. Mondragon, above.}.

Most people are born or arrive into an established constitutional situation and accept it and the rationalists' theory that the people have a choice is like saying' that a man by remaining in a vessel freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her\footnote{Hume Of the Original Contract in Miller [Ed.] Op. Cit. p.465.}. Hume is often labelled as a 'conservative', but his stance with regard to all parties, liberal or conservative, Whig or Tory, is to be philosophically argumentative but he cannot escape the context of his own times, because the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 had taken place three years before the publication of this essay. The nearest he might get to republicanism is in his 'Of the First Principles of Government', where Hume concludes that if the monarch had to influence the people every seven years at the election of members of parliament, not only would it fail but would reduce the government to 'a republic of no inconvenient form'\footnote{Hume Of the First Principles of Government in Miller [Ed.] Op. cit. p.36.}. It is by limiting the duration of a period of rule, and by strictly enforcing those limits, that power passes to the ruled, with whom the power actually lies:

'Nothing appears more surprising, to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye,
than the easiness with which the many are
governed by the few: and the implicit submission,
with which men resign their own sentiments and
passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire
by what means this wonder is affected, we shall
find, that, as FORCE [original emphasis] is always
on the side of the governed, the governors have
nothing to support them but opinion. It is
therefore, on opinion only that government is
founded; and this extends to most despotic and
most military governments, as well as to the most
free and most popular.991

Hume's statement takes us back to the Grand Inquisitor and the realisation that
the power of the Grand Inquisitor’s reasoning is only opinion, in the sense
Hume means it, the power of persuasion, which fails because the real power
lies with the silent Christ. Hume is identifying one practical limitation on power
by its need to persuade. Elsewhere in his refutation of the Hobbesian and
Lockean principles that property [i.e., rank, status, a stake, a position, a career,
a ‘key to the executive wash-room’] is the basis of power and authority he
reaffirms his principle that justice is the logical basis for power and identifies
the legal and constitutional constraints on such power, for the person possessed
of ‘legal authority, though great, has always some bounds, which terminate
both the hopes and pretensions of the person possessed of it: The law must
have provided a remedy against its excesses.992 Hume is applying his own
philosophical analysis of the conventions that society creates to order its affairs.
Dunn’s ‘Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy’ also points to the
might of such judicial conventions. He defines the ‘Order of Egoism’ as the
group-name for those who seek power, and so also seek wealth and ‘a large
part of the point of money is always power’, but that whatever freedom to order
affairs may be brought by power and wealth, ‘it is difficult (and flatly impossible)
for them [i.e., the order of egoism] to override the main structuring principle of
the form within which they live’.993

If those notions were linked together to devise the structuring principles of
duration in the form of ‘limited term of office’ and the necessity to return to a
‘commoner’ status, a constitutional structure for some organizations might

991 Ibid. p. 32.
992 Hume Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic,
result. Such structural principles would throw the emphasis onto Bentham's 'happiness of the many' and Hume's 'social usefulness' instead of the sterility, barrenness and wastefulness of control. Power genuinely resides with the people, persuasion is the principal political means of convincing a majority of persons in a democracy. The obligation that democracy places on politicians and leaders to convince and gain the support of the people acts as a restraint against the informal 'aristocracy' and princely despotisms that politicians are always tempted to create for themselves based on acts of excluding sections of their constituencies. In contrast, Hume's reasons for the favourable recommendation of republics are important: effectiveness of scale and the public interest, and there is no question of their capabilities: 'For...the people...when dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in great measure broken; and the public interest may be pursued with some method and constancy. Though he accepts the unruly character of a mob, he does not deny the capabilities of those same people to make judgements in the public interest: 'when a faction if formed upon a point of right or principle, there is no occasion when men discover a greater obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and equity. However the egotistical view is that the nature of humankind, as a mob and individually is to be irrational, greedy untrustworthy and self-interested and so dangerous to order and public good; control, directed by reason, is therefore necessary; those who take control are rational and that is why they are superior and higher in the hierarchy: the basis of Theory X management. It is a view that justifies control, and serves and flatters those in control, and oppresses the ruled. Strange also that Hume did not point out the irony that those who assume it is their role to dominate and control others, also belong to the same species and share that very same 'avarice and ambition' that also requires control. Hume's refutation and ideas did not prove victorious. By demonstrating that decisions, and therefore cause and effect in human action do not proceed from rationality but from the passions and character, Hume removes any shield from personal responsibility that might be claimed. He also removes any cloak behind which personal responsibility might conceal its actions, because the passions are particular to the person. On the other hand,
claiming that decisions are based on rationality supplies shield, cloak and flattery; it can claim falsely to be operating at a higher level of objectivity; it can propose a fiction that 'facts speak for themselves'; it can pretend that 'procedures' endow decisions with objectivity and justice and it can flatter those that make 'rational decisions' are superior in all respects to the lower orders who are dominated by the 'passions and so can be designated as Burke's 'swinish multitude'. It is the greatest misfortune for the organization of social affairs and governments that the Lockean and Hobbesian 'egotism' maxim did dominate industrial and political economic theory in the succeeding nineteenth century and beyond. It clearly demonstrates that the dominant group maps the dominant social culture according to those elements that it can incorporate and so add to its service, and excludes those that do not.

The Past is Present

If Hume provides a basis for action and for organisation based on the passions, while acknowledging the influence on both of past experiences, Bourdieu expands on that background and its influence.

His idea of 'habitus' illuminates the living relationship between personal action and historical context. Bourdieu's theory follows Husserl, whose own study of personal experience as phenomenology interpreted it as contextual rather than transcendental, and who regarded David Hume as one of the most important philosophers for his contribution to the analysis of personal experience. Bourdieu is also influenced by Hegel, Weber, and Durkheim, who all used 'habitus' in some form. Bourdieu claimed his version built on their foundations but added the idea of

'generative' capacities of dispositions, it being understood that these are acquired, socially constituted dispositions...[with]...a 'creative', active, inventive capacity...of an active agent. 999

Bourdieu was seeking a middle way in sociological thinking between the objective, i.e., human action determined by material and external reality, and the subjective, i.e., the world created by voluntary, self-directed human

998 Note: In a newspaper report of an industrial tribunal case, which found against Abecedary Institute, the Institute's defence was that the proper procedures had been followed; the case was about the interviews for an internal appointment, in which appointing interviewer/s were also the referees for the appointed candidate.

999 Bourdieu P. [Trans. Adamson M.] In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology
actions, in order to demonstrate how the social world reproduces itself.

'Subjectivism inclines people to reduce structures to interactions, objectivism tends to deduce actions and interactions from the structure'. One of these last is phenomenology which takes everyday personal experience and develops an interpretation of the structure of society from evidence of the unconscious acceptance of social conventions. The alternative is an imposed reading or interpretation of a situation, like a Marxist reading of a Shakespeare play, where evidence is found to support the interpretation. Bourdieu’s analysis aims to reach above both these perspectives to analyse social action as a modus operandi, or the practice of being. There are deep structural elements in society and these are embodied in the person’s experience. Thus, given a certain social context, certain actions are thinkable and others are unthinkable, because, though the world may be socially constructed and defined by human beings, their defining acts are limited by certain constraints. These are derived from the person’s habitus and the manner in which a person conducts her/his lives recreates these constraints.

Habitus, in layman’s terms, is the multitude of experiences of living that come from a person’s social, cultural and economic background. This is always being added to and is always being reflected upon. Habitus is therefore adaptable and responsive. It is also the way in which the social background experiences become imprinted in a person’s physical bearing, conduct and responses. In describing his notion of ‘honour’, Bourdieu envisions it as a disposition made physical in the body of the persons:

‘What is called a sense of honour is nothing other that the cultivated disposition, inscribed in the body scheme and in the schemes of thought, which enables an agent to engender all the practice, by means of countless inventions, which the stereotyped unfolding of a ritual would in no way demand."

Habitus is therefore a disposition, tendency, characteristic attitude and predisposition. It has been socially learned and shows in a person’s spontaneous behaviour, opinions, views and conduct, even ways of walking and talking. What Bourdieu is seeking to define is the nature of people’s spontaneous reactions and how they have been formed by the history and cultural influences of objective social reality. It is like a form of conditioning.

Habitus is a

1000 Ibid. pp. 129.
'system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or at an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them'.

For example, some of the respondents to this research talked spontaneously about helping students and the purpose and process of education in ways similar to that described by Hobsbawm. He contrasts on the one hand faltering developments like Robert Owen's industrial utopias and the later Co-operative Society movement with their sense of community and education, with on the other hand the promise of an "open society" through free business competition which, in effect, produces a "closed society" of bureaucracy. The working class attitude to education was that it offered emancipation. Yet, whatever their talents and merits they were unlikely to have been schooled in those understandings and skills essential to succeed in a society of cutthroat competitive individualism such as would be found in a Court or monarchical hierarchy. Examinations were not an egalitarian but a competitive device. As a system of organization, bureaucracy might have the appearance of selection by merit, pragmatism, good organization, and impartiality in its procedures. But procedural systems were implemented by character, and procedures have the capacities to reveal or conceal, and so the Masonic privileges and the monarchical favouritism were always there in any but the most open and public of systems. To have and to have received an education was highly prized. To see a member of a working class family achieve a place in society as a teacher, or parish priest, or even higher in the professions, was


a prize for which many working class families aimed and sacrificed. Its regular and modest incomes gave security. It was common for the working-class teachers to have a vocation to help their own kind to advance themselves in a similar manner. Respondents to this research recognised this vocation in themselves and some of their colleagues. This was the basis of their original vocation for entering the profession. Moreover, they could see working class applicants to teaching continuing the vocational aspect in their choice of teaching as a career. Hobsbawm tellingly points to the tendency of the educated person from the working class to be different from 'the selfish trader and employer' by not automatically turning on and oppressing his own kind. He gives as an example the small communities in Wales, with a legendary commitment to education, ‘pushing their sons into teaching and the ministry, and a bitter social resentment against wealth and business as such’. In the late 1950s, at a time when the respondents were in training or in their first jobs, Richard Hoggart identified the values of the working classes as a kind of ‘primary religion’. after Reinhold Niebuhr, with notions such as "There must be some purpose or we wouldn’t be here." They thought of Christianity 'as a system of ethics' which should be followed as a way of living.

'The sense of moral duties is what they chiefly understand...by Christianity. Christianity is morals ...they like to speak of “practical Christianity”’. The emphasis is always on what it is right for them to do, as far as they can, as people; people who do not see the point of “all this dogma”, but who must constantly get along with others, in groups; people who must learn how to co-operate; how to live on an exchange basis, how to give and take. The assumption behind the treatment of others is not so much that we are all children of God (though a form of that is there, in the background) as that we are all “in the same boat together”...Here, round the sense of religion as a guide tour duty toward others, as a repository of good rules for communal life, the old phrases cluster...

"doing good"
"common decency"... "being kind"
"doing unto others a y’would be done unto"
"we’re ‘ere to ‘elp’ one another"
"‘elping y’neighbour"
"learning to know right from wrong"
"decent living"

Their approach is empirical; they are confirmed pragmatists... "Ah like fair dealings” may seem an inadequate guide to the cosmos...but - said sincerely by a middle-aged man after a hard life - it can represent a considerable triumph over difficult circumstances.1008

These values of pragmatic morality reach back into the long tradition of the honest, god-fearing artisan whose ancestors were to be found in the radical movements of the Chartists, the Co-operative Societies, the Corresponding Societies and Tom Paine’s ‘The Rights of Man’ [1792], the ideals of the French Revolution, the Levellers of the Civil War and the Wat Tyler’s Peasants’ Revolt, and forward to the Labour Government of 1945 and the 1944 Education Act1009. It is a heritage of values of social justice, equity, freedom, fraternity, independence, a longing for dignity and self-worth respect, recognition for their work security, non-conformist religion, and belief in mutual self-help and self-reliance1010 in the face of the absence of access to real power. They also reflected the ‘decent and humane’ values of Abecedary Institute’s dominant ‘culture’ which one respondent exemplified as a living tradition carried in the lives of the staff that stretched back to the origins of the Institute1011. It was these that unisation put under ‘attack’1012 so raising the possible question of whether unisation was an example of the general Thatcherite assault on the working class, its collective values and the professionalism and values of academia.

1009 NOTE: One respondent cited a radio broadcast from the 1950s by a former member of the 1945 Labour Government, Lord Robens, who encapsulated these ideas of the altruism necessary in public service and the outlawing of ‘the order of egoism’. It is only speculative to interpret this as an inspiration for this respondent’s career and vocation: Text p. 577 line 25 – p 578 line 11, & p. 628 line 1 – p. 631 line 26:
The alternative branch of the labyrinth of the residual ideologies that exist in the culture of the society, its institutions and the people are suggested by Eric Hobsbawm in his classic "The Age of Revolutions":

'If the economy of the nineteenth century was formed mainly under the influence of the British Industrial Revolution, its politics and ideology were formed mainly by the French...France gave them their ideas, [and] provided the vocabulary and the issues of liberal and radical-democratic politics for most of the world'\textsuperscript{1013}.

Its accuracy and simplicity sum up changes in attitude and ideology that occurred at the time but also became so integral to society that their depth and gravity is highly relevant to this 21\textsuperscript{st} century. For example, a radio report on work practices in a variety of UK industries in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century suggested the interpretation that the UK’s poor productivity was attributable to the persistence of UK management’s nineteenth century attitudes\textsuperscript{1014} to workers and the ease with which they might be made redundant. These were symptomatic of 21\textsuperscript{st}. century UK. Managements’ "not making a good enough fist of managing the productive resources they do have, especially their people'.

Despite elevating the language of economics, i.e., 'productive resources', above the language of humanity, i.e., 'people', the account illustrates the persistence of ideas conceived two hundred years before\textsuperscript{1015}. Britain provided the theory of political economy and organizational ideology based on the empirical reasoning of Hobbes, Locke and later of Adam Smith ['The Wealth of Nations', 1776] and Ricardo ['The Principles of Political Economy', 1817]. Amidst a dismissive account of princely character and the 'chance idiosyncrasies and habitual mediocrity' of monarchy, that re-enforces other evidence, Walter Bagehot, in his political analysis of 'The English Constitution', 1867, identifies the "'stock-taking” habit that 'grows upon the world [is] a “certain matter-of-factness”’. He attributes it to the spread of commerce and business with its emphasis on 'material fruits of commerce, that we forget its mental fruits. It begets a mind desirous of things, careless of ideas, not acquainted with the niceties of words. In all labour there should be profit, is its motto...We have reached a “climate”

\textsuperscript{1013} Hobsbawm E. J. Op. cit. p.53
\textsuperscript{1014} Cf. Text 365 line 18- p. 366 line 30: Abecedary Institute Directorate using ‘Victorian’ practices.
\textsuperscript{1015} Viz. BBC ‘Today’ Radio 4, Feb. 2006 ; Seager A. Management misses its chance to reduce the productivity gap The Guardian 26. February 20\textsuperscript{th}. 2006.
where figures rule'. He describes this mentality as 'LITERALNESS [Original emphasis], a tendency to say, "The facts are so-and so, whatever may be thought or fancied about them\textsuperscript{1016}...[a] worship of visible value,\textsuperscript{1017} obvious, undeniable, intrusive result\textsuperscript{1018}. Thirteen years earlier, in 1854, the sentence 'Now, what I want is Facts' uttered by a fictional Mr. Gradgrind had been the beginning of Charles Dickens's 'Hard Times', began an attack not just on education, but one that he opened up to consider the state of the industrial nation and how "Facts" in a utilitarian age also meant the vogue for statistics and figures which were even then being used to abstract and anatomise the suffering of the urban poor\textsuperscript{1019}.

Hume's philosophical approach had refuted the conclusions of Hobbesian and Lockean liberal, rational empiricism or materialism of the seventeenth and eighteen centuries, which modelled itself on the scientific and mathematical advances of the age of Newton, that advanced the idea of the perfectibility of humankind and society by reason. Its almost arithmetical view of society was that it was the sum of self-interested, egotistical individuals who operated separately but who formed a 'contract', like a commercial arrangement, with each other as far as their individual objectives coincided. Hobsbawm makes the very crucial criticism that this ideology of Hobbes, Locke, and then of Bentham and James Mill [\textit{It should be noted that Hobsbawm does not include David Hume in his litany of philosophers.}] provided a rational cutting edge to social analysis and 'the sharpest of radical axes with which to chop down traditional institutions which could not answer the questions: is it rational? Is it useful? Does it contribute to the greatest happiness of the greatest number?' But Hobsbawm's verdict it that it 'swerved from the daring and rigour which made it so powerful a revolutionary force\textsuperscript{1020} because its own rational logic met with a blockage from an interested group. What stood in its path was the self-interest in money and power of the 'order of egoism', and its fear of losing both; or as Hobsbawm interprets it: the logical threat of its rational ideas about the redistribution of the middle-class's acquired wealth and their political weakness in any confrontation with the general working public\textsuperscript{1021}.

The view that emerges from Hobsbawm is that the implications of theories or

\textsuperscript{1016} Viz. Hume on illogicality of an \textit{Ought} from an \textit{Is} and the nature of judgements and perceptions.
\textsuperscript{1017} Cf. Text p. 94 line 10 - p. 95 line 10; Text p. 101 line 22 - p. 102 line 23: Monetary values. Cf. The Background
\textsuperscript{1021} Ibid. pp. 236-237.
models of organization, of politics, and of economics are always fully comprehended, but this understanding is filtered through the self-interest of the 'order of egoism' and the maintenance of its interest. The result is that 'the order of egoism' 'cherry picks' or selects and implements only those elements and ideas that will serve its purpose, and sets aside, or politically ignores, all other considerations. 1022 Ricardo's 'Principles of Political Economy' 1817 is a good example. He refined Adam Smith's economic theory and advocated free trade, which was enthusiastically accepted because it supported business interests, but his view on labour was not acceptable, because he concluded that the worker, labour, was the source of all value and yet the worker was poor because 'the capitalist appropriated in the form of profit the surplus which the worker produced over and above what he received in wages...The capitalist exploited the worker' 1023. The capitalist system and the 'order of egoism' ignored such 'internal contradictions'. Instead what it took from rational liberal philosophy was the idea of the market. The application of the 'market' mechanism and the social division of labour provided mathematical models that demonstrated that capitalists, hired workers and the market equalled calculable prosperity and progress, and any social and economic inequality reflected the natural order of differing human capabilities. What the 'order of egoism' rejected in rational liberal philosophy were Lockean ideas of rationality and the critical mind, that 'every man's thought...[as] a sufficient authority for himself...[and] individual reason [as] a competent and sufficient guide to truth' It rejected also the idea of a society artificially based on a contract or conventions in favour of a 'natural' society - an idea taken from conjecture on the nature of religion - based on custom, tradition and 'constitutional forms of accepted rule' which would preserve the moral, social and political order, that is 'the permanent convictions of society'. 1024. These ideas become embodied, as Bourdieu suggests, in the personal and individual, such as 'fitting in', 'not rocking the boat', conforming, the totalitarian effect of a conformist collective thinking and a resistance to rational independent thought, like Goffman's 'total institutions'.

When Burke applied to England his criticisms of independent revolutionary thought on government and rule, and the ensuing disorder of the Revolution in France, he created both general panic and approval from the established order and monarchies at home and abroad. In political terms the fear of some of the

1022 Cf. Text p. 417 line 21; Text p. 635 line 21 - p. 636 line 4 The re-introduction of Heads of Faculty.
people reinforced the demand for control to preserve the status quo from the political revolutionary movements that had activated the French populace and had infected Europe with radical ideas of equality and re-distribution of wealth. Edmund Burke's reaction to the French Revolution\textsuperscript{1025} founded the basis of conservatism that persists to the day: that all change is dangerous and can lead to chaos and anarchy, just like a French revolutionary mob. Conservatism endorsed the preservation of the authority of custom and traditional opinion. Thus, constitutional monarchy, whose authority was founded initially on property or vested interest, or, as in Europe on forms of absolutist control, and sanctions that preserved the continuity of the nation, would also preserve the wealth, power and status of the ‘order of egoism’. One summary of this composite ideology was that: ‘Nobody was dependent on the benevolence of others; for everything that one got from anybody, one gave an equivalent in exchange. Moreover, the free play of natural forces would be destructive of all positions that were not built upon contributions to the common good\textsuperscript{1026}. Therefore, Hobsbawm’s conclusion is that this dominant liberal ideology was ‘neither consistent nor coherent’ because, as practical politics, there existed a belief in ‘majority rule’ and a contradictory and ‘more prevalent belief in government by a propertied élite\textsuperscript{1027}. It is not unreasonable to project from this two conditions: a wider, current culture of a ‘lip-service’ to or public façade of democracy\textsuperscript{1028} and the pragmatic reality of rule by a self-nominating, rather than propertied, select few [Cf. the Governing constitution of Abecedary Institute\textsuperscript{1029}].

Writers, such as Carlyle, Ruskin and Arnold, produced pamphlets and journalism to continue advancing ideas critical of society and the middle class bourgeoisie. There was no consistency of critical view; Carlyle placed his faith in rule by an aristocracy; Ruskin attacked industrialisation and its social effects. Matthew Arnold [1822-1888] has a particular relevance. This great Victorian poet and critic, was for thirty-five years Her Majesty’s Inspector of Schools, 1851-1886, travelling throughout the country first as an inspirational philosopher, and then, as an administrator-examiner of the soul-destroying, ‘efficient but cheap’, ‘payment by results’ organization of state education. He had experience at a national level of the character of English society and developed an antipathy toward the lower middle classes, shopkeepers and small

\textsuperscript{1025} Burke E. Op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1029} Cf. Background
businessmen who were the managers of the local schools and who, because of
his job, entangled Arnold in 'their dismal and illiberal life... a life so unlovely, so
unattractive, so incomplete, so narrow, so far removed from a true and
satisfying ideal of human perfection'. This was the class of 'middle class
potentates' whose 'idea of human perfection [was so] narrow and inadequate'
that Arnold named them 'The Philistines'; the aristocracy were The Barbarians'
and the people 'The Populace'. The Philistines were the liberal, bourgeois
industrial and commercial class who were shaping society according to their
own image, whose controlling grip on the government of society was to
increase with the passing of the electoral Reform Act of 1867. The political and
social context for Arnold's criticism is encapsulated in the well-known
apocryphal sentence: 'We should educate our masters.' This was the
popularised, but inaccurate, version of the grudging and resentful opposition to
democratic reform of Robert Lowe, Lord Sherbrooke, British Liberal politician, in
the House of Commons during the passing of the 1867 Reform Bill. Lowe, the
cabinet minister with a commercial bent who introduced the 'bean-counting'
'payment-by-results' as a mechanical control into the education system, was
opposed to this electoral reform. He linked forever, within the education
system of Britain, the inconsistency of the notion of the majority rule of
democratic citizenship and the opposition of the English dominant class towards
any shift in power to citizens other than that self-nominating group.

Lowe's actual words were 'I believe it will be absolutely necessary that you should
prevail on our future masters to learn their letters', which was in reality even
more demeaning in its tone. As a consequence it placed the Education Act of
1870 which introduced compulsory education, squarely within the contexts of
politics and power. John Stuart Mill in 1859 had linked education and citizenship:
'Is it not almost a self evident maxim that the State should require and compel
the education up to certain standard of every human being who is born its
citizen?'

1031 Ibid. pp.102-105.
1032 Note: Lowe and his secessionist faction fractured the Whig government of Lord Russell in their
opposition to the constitutional Reform Bill 1867. One of his most famous and widely publicized
speeches in the House of Commons debates delivered, with complete self-certainty, the
residual ideology of the dominant group that the lower classes led an 'animal existence': 'You have had
the opportunity of knowing some of the constituencies of this country: if you want venality, if you want
ignorance, if you want drunkenness and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other hand, you want
impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do you look for them in the constituencies? Do you go
to the top or to the bottom? ' Those who supported the reforms publicized these sentiments throughout
the country amongst the lowers classes and where they worked in order to make clear the nature of the
opposition to reform and full citizenship for all. This publicity voted out Lowe. Cited in Wilson J. D.
compromised and undermined. Mill was reflecting the aspirations of working men and women from previous decades, who saw that work and state government were not separate worlds.

Lowe, a Liberal free-trader applied economic theories to education, which were much the same theories to which Mrs. Thatcher returned and in terms of which subsequent Labour Ministers of Education and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have endorsed the benefits of HE in the twenty-first century as a reason for 'top-up fees'. He came to be in charge of the nation's education at a crucial moment. In 1870 he put in place a private-public match-funded system and 'value for money should be secured' 1034 Lowe reversed a philosophy of education as 'an inculcation of habits, a training in skills, ... a development of intelligence... a centre of social life and culture' in favour of the usefulness. His notion was that the poor would perceive the economic and social advantage of keeping their children at school at their own expense 'if minor Civil Service appointments [e.g., postmen] were thrown open to competition' by public examination. He announced that 'Hitherto we have been living under a system of bounties and protection. Now we propose to have a little free trade...If it [education] is not cheap, it shall be efficient; if it is not efficient, it shall be cheap'. 1035 Efficiency and cheapness are, in fact, identical.

Arnold's experiences had given him a compassion for the conditions and life-chances of the poor which motivated officially sanctioned, fact-finding visits to European countries and produced reports on the state's role in popular education [1861], the state and middle class education ['A French Eton', 1864], and the state and continental schools and universities [1868]. Arnold was not a revolutionary; he was both a supporter of the existing executive order and authority in the state and a reformer; he chose education as his method of reform and culture as his weapon. He rejected men of 'systems', like Bentham and Comte. He rejected Jacobinism's imposition of one person's definition of man's perfection. His idea of culture was 'to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere' 1036. By advocating culture as his weapon, he leaped over and beyond all pragmatic and political horizons to an organic process of development the duration of which placed it beyond the perspective of any political, organizational or social science programme, placed the burden firmly on the individual teacher, and ignored the politics around that core activity of teaching. He acknowledged

how long it might take. Crucially it is the vision of a process for which the qualities of independence of mind, enthusiasm and enquiry, would require debate by its participants\textsuperscript{1037}. This is not all of Arnold’s vision. Arnold sinuously weaves into this mental image the ‘obstructions’ that have had to be endured by educators to reach this point. These are ‘the aridity of the aristocracies...the narrow-mindedness of the middle classes’, ‘the progress...reluctantly undertaken’, the ‘years and years retarded by barren common places, by worn-out clap-traps...the prejudices they had to dispel...the outcry they had to encounter...the fierce protestations of life from policies which were dead and did not know it and the shrill and querulous upbraiding from publicists in their dotage’ The efforts of those educators seeking this goal are the unbelievable ‘labour...in proving the self-proving’, ‘the doubts, the fears’ and the ‘bitter tears’\textsuperscript{1038}. This statement suggests it is informed by teachers that Arnold himself encountered first-hand in his role as HM Inspector of Schools and his own sense of waste from the decades of his professional life spent wrestling with a central government imposed, strait-jacket of ‘payment by results, and with self-nominating, education managements of ‘super-grocers’ with a ‘dismal and illiberal life’, in a political environment of ‘jealousy...disputes, tea-meeting, opening of chapels and sermons’\textsuperscript{1039}. The reality of the obstacles in the way of progress still strikes home as authentic.

They illustrate the intransigence of the controlling mind-set of the middle-classes with ‘potentate’ power. There is little or no evidence that in his own time, nor in later years, nor in the general conduct of education, that his vision took official root and became a reality. It remained an aim and an aspiration. The importance of Arnold’s ideas is that they were present at the same time that the nation was about to begin its state education system and could be regarded as the competing alternative to the commercial, ‘dismal, illiberal, unlovely, unattractive, incomplete, narrow controlling mind-set of the ‘order of egoism’. However, because of the significance of its vision, co-incidental with the beginning of the public education system, ‘Culture and Anarchy’, his gentle summary of his ideas for education would endure and have a lasting effect by gaining its place on the booklists for the philosophy of education teacher-training courses at least into the nineteen seventies, and perhaps continues to do so. It would certainly have been read, known, and at least referred to by

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\textsuperscript{1039} Arnold M. Op. cit. p. 58.
the respondents to this research who were not only teacher trained but were or had been at some time professional teacher trainers. Arnold’s vision embodies an aim for teaching and for what a teacher might aim toward in their classrooms. Its message would have been part of their own professional aspirations and a general view that they would carry in their advocacy of teaching methods. It gave them the role of being persons ‘of culture...true apostles of equality...with a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time’. This implies both their transmitting values and their being and creating independent minded, egalitarian enthusiastic persons who are excellent communicators of knowledge, that is not ‘exclusive’ nor elitist but relevant in all circumstances while being ‘the best’ knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore of sweetness and light\textsuperscript{1040}. This is exactly the independent-minded, enthusiastic, egalitarian and socially aware person the ‘order of egoism’ neither wanted nor wanted to be created by the education system it controlled, nor to have similar teachers emerge from this training\textsuperscript{1041}. As professionals, they were in a position to influence their own curricula and courses and to conduct their own teaching in such a way that, momentarily at least, there might have been something of Arnold’s vision. The political opposition to this vision would not have shared a place in their training alongside the vision that Arnold gives it in the conclusion of ‘A French Eton’ [viz. above]. No training course would have nor does prepare teachers for the long-suffering patience, multiple defeats, ‘the aridity...the narrow-mindedness of the middle classes’, the ‘labour...in proving the self-proving’, ‘the doubts, the fears...bitter tears’, ‘the years and years retarded by...common places...clap-traps...prejudices...outcry...policies which were dead and did not know it’\textsuperscript{1042}. Arnold accurately describes the political reality of two worlds of the dominant groups and the collective with entirely opposed cultures, ethos, aims and expectations\textsuperscript{1043}. Arnold’s vision of enthusiastically communicating ‘the best knowledge and thought’ and ‘sweetness and light’ might inspire, but it does and did not prepare teachers for the world of politics of the ‘order of egoism’. Teachers, and therefore their students, most likely from the working classes which was the traditional background of most teachers in training, and who from Victorian times saw the

\textsuperscript{1040}Ibid. pp. 67-70.


\textsuperscript{1043}Viz. Mary Douglas ‘Styles of Thinking’, below.
profession both as social advancement and also a mission of helping others, would be ill-prepared for the politics of the ‘order of egoism’. With their ethics of the community they made and make natural members of what Mary Douglas calls the ‘egalitarian enclave’. Given their background and the unsustained and tenuous hold of Arnold’s ideas on the education curriculum, any attack on them would encounter little resistance, as was the case at Abecedy Institute.

Arnold’s brief picture, like any ethnographic study succinctly encapsulates his times and also the nature of an education system at its very moment of creation. It is both a prediction of how it has continued, because those in power have never for long released their control of the system to the alternative vision, and it also provides the basis of a theory of continuity. Such a theory might propose the view that how organizations begin establishes how they will continue; the continuity is the activity: teaching and research; what changed is the governance according to the ethos of the times. The governance of Oxbridge was devised as a direct democratic, participative collective in the middle ages, the Victorian civic universities and training colleges at the time of Bagehot’s constitutional advocacy of power situated in the cabinet, elected representatives and industry’s needs; the universities of 1962 on local control via the electoral representation; and the 1992 universities and institutions on the corporate industrial model with an appointed board of directors and executives. None was a fresh beginning, but since then they have developed by an evolutionary model based not on the educational vision, nor precedent but the political dominance of the times which uses the economy as its rationale for wresting ownership and control from the educators. It is a movement from ‘labour managed’, like Mondragon, to ‘capital managed’, like a business.

Both sets of responses, the vocation of cooperation, public service and assistance and the conservative preservation of ‘property’ [position and rewards] illustrate Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, as the natural and spontaneous reactions that have been created by the social reality and are embodied in the physical person through learned behaviour. A reaction to a situation may seem spontaneous but its origin is to be found in some habitus. As Bourdieu expressed it: ‘agents merely need to let themselves follow their own social ‘nature, that is what history has made of them to be as it were, ‘naturally’


1045 Cf. The Background.
adjusted to the historical world they are up against. When a person comes into a context that is like the social origins that formed their habitus, that person feels comfortable in those surroundings, entirely natural, and so there is a kind of unity or harmony between the history of that social context and the roles that are embodied in it. Chairing a democratic debate for someone used to giving authoritative commands would be the exact opposite of this, and the perceived absence of verbal and political skills, together with the impatience might bear witness to that.

Bourdieu's view is that an understanding of the world is based in its social origins and these form habitus, so, as in the example above, home background and social origins not only form habitus but refer to a larger grouping of class, a history of social conflict and politics. Through these are acquired views of the world that seem generally true and accurate. 'The habitus...the generative principle of responses more or less well adapted to the demands of a certain field, is the product of individual history, but also through the formative experiences of earliest infancy, of the whole collective history of family and class.'

By these means, a particular field or social world reproduces and perpetuates itself through the behaviour of the persons inhabiting it. History makes the present.

"In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces the individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions - a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles, and internal law relaying the continuous exercise of the law of external necessities [irreducible to immediate conjunctural constraints] - is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able to give them a rational basis."
This interpretation combines the objective world and the subjective responses to it and is the middle way that Bourdieu's theory is proposing. It is the habitus, the disposition of the person, that leads a person first to act and then to choose to play out certain strategies in a particular world. Because the person's habitus, that is, background of social and cultural experiences, learned and practised skills, and reflections on them will be different from others, that person will operate in the world, or play the field, in quite a different way from another.

Sticking to a particular way of doing things will have a benefit to a distinct social group. Therefore, the habitus can be imposed in order to produce a particular way of doing things, so that the social objective of producing that benefit may be achieved. However, such actions are disguised, so that they are not recognised for what they are: misrecognition. Thus, actions may be 'thinkable' or unthinkable in a certain cultural context. This is often evident in the official practice, which is, in fact, a subtle imposition of a particular construct of the world. It is made to seem natural, and yet it is an official set of cultural rules, so that obeying them is made to seem an entirely neutral and disinterested adherence to commonly accepted rules of conduct. They are in fact the values that work to the benefit of the dominant.

The habitus is the principal factor that influences, motivates, and forms the positions that people take up on the field and how they play them. When similar circumstances arise like those that originally formed the habitus, they improvise a response drawing on those reserves of experience and learned responses. 'As a product of habitus, strategy is not based on conscious calculation but rather results from the unconscious disposition towards practice. It depends upon what position the agent occupies in the field.' Therefore, the taking of a particular position defines the actual positions that are available to be taken and since habitus decides the position-taking, it also forms the field or the world: 'the social agent in his true role as the practical operator of the construction of objects'.

Bourdieu's theory skirts the edge of determinism in the sense of human beings reacting passively to the social and economic influences. In the same way Zola's naturalism-theory described how a person's inherent characteristics,

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1054 Cf. Research Design.
the 'primary molecule', react with the social environment. But both wished to avoid the interpretation of determinism being imposed on them. Bourdieu therefore theorised the relationship between fields and habitus, in the 'generative capacity' of the latter.

'Fields' are most easily interpreted as games. In this they bear some resemblance to the idea of a play-script, because all the elements are related in a way specific to that play or game and there is commonly a beginning, a middle and an end, as there is in game of chess or football. And as in a play-script, the meaning is conveyed by the inter-connections between the parts. 'Hamlet' may be the play that is full of quotations but these separate lines do not convey the meaning and action of the events nor the interrelations between the characters; but no line or character or piece of action may be changed without creating an entirely new play, not called 'Hamlet', but perhaps Stoppard's 'Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead', or 'Dogg's Hamlet'. The analogy with a play-script falters because the relationships between characters are fixed and specific, and though fictional are virtually actual inter-relationships or a network. On the other hand, a piece in a game, like a chess piece has a prescribed range of movement laid down by the rules of the game. Wherever the game is played the potential movement will be the same, but within a context of a huge variety of combinations of moves by the other pieces. Each move by a particular piece makes an impact upon all the others during the course of a game, but that game can only ever be chess. Being on the same side is not as strong a likeness between pieces as the property of being a King or a Bishop. The property that they share is their pattern of movement, which defines their power, as for example, a Bishop. The whole field of a game of chess is therefore a vast diversity of different power relations, in which some pieces, like the Queen has the largest range of movement, and the Pawn the least. However, a Pawn may capture a King, because the field of chess makes that possible.1055

The analogy with chess falters now, because while chess has a pattern of alternate moves over 64 squares, alternately black and white, which it shares with dominoes, life has an infinite variety of fields where there are no prescribed moves or properties for each agent. The properties are defined by the relationships between the agents, which may become organised into an institution, but instead of being scripted like a play, they are improvised. Improvisation is the dramatic practice of the play-maker1056, Mike Leigh; he

gives each actor a character’s personal history of background experiences, cultural influences and physical attributes. He then places that group of created characters in a social structure within which the interactions are improvised according to the variations that individual actors might make of the initial personal history. In this respect, but in a different context, Leigh is working from similar principles as Bourdieu to explore the practice of living. Leigh establishes both the personal history of the individual and the collective identities of which they are a part but gives rein to a unique interpretation arising from the actor’s response to that personal history.

In life, that there are many worlds is a common enough statement, and for Bourdieu there are many distinct fields, like different games with different power relations and moves, that are different from each other by their hierarchy and lateral positioning. Thus a football player who, given the moment, picks up the ball because it seems like a cleverer and more successful strategy may do so but is no longer playing football but rugby and has broken the unspoken rules of the field. This player’s move comes from the wrong world and is not permitted, or is ineffective or abortive. The players or agents must know how to play the field, know the object of the game, and above all want to play. Though there are apparent ‘rules,’ the players improvise their responses in their struggle with others’ moves in the field, turning to their advantage whatever unique pre-dispositions, abilities and skills they may have. This requires practice as well as ability. What they all require is the motivation to play a game that all the players agree is worth playing. The usual object is to win, and in life that usually means power, as well as the victor’s wreath, honours and the self esteem that attends it.

The element of unique individuality is embodied in the predispositions that have originated in a particular, unique experience and history of social and economic elements. Its individuality is expressed in how proficient and natural a player that person has become because of skills learned and practised, and that individual’s personal record of failed and successful strategies. Despite all of this, the person’s habitus can be changed by circumstance or by some lesson of life. This element of uniqueness or individuality expressed in this way is almost psychological without admitting it. An account of character must include the experiences that have formed it. Bourdieu attributes to habitus a

1057 Cf. Douglas and ‘Styles of Thinking’, below.
1058 Cf. Text p. 428 line 16-25: Democratic Head of Faculty instructed to be distant from staff.
level of direction for the emotions: 'affinities of habitus experienced as sympathy or antipathy, are the basis of all forms of cooperation'.

This definition follows the psychological/philosophical views of Hume's ethics and understanding of emotional life in action and the social analysis of Gintis' cooperative communities. Bourdieu offers a clear and enlightening analysis of a social context and the players' practice within it. Additionally, Habermas and Critical Theory seek to expose deluded false ideology that is historically and culturally based, and Gintis offers an analysis of outcome that enables a constructive judgement of social benefits from the practice of cooperative social attitudes. Hume defines the motivators for actions in his analysis of cause and effect and offers the basis of an ethical judgement of conduct and character in society and the regulatory means by which to control Dunn's 'order of egoism'.

Like Giddens' structuration, Bourdieu's analysis provides an account of the workings of the bedrock of implicit structures and the acting-out of the roles that exist in societies and that at the same time shape the institutions, in which they are embodied. The focus is the present where the generating and recreating moment is. The perceptions, histories and predispositions that make up the habitus are not quite the same as character, but Hume's account of the operation of the desires and passions included the individual's background of experiences and learning, and in Bourdieu's overall scheme of things it is hard to distinguish between them in terms of how they operate and the effect they have. Hume's account of desires and passions as motivation for action is the key to understanding cause and for identifying something which seems not to be clear in Bourdieu whose theory skirts closely to determinism, i.e., choice and the extent to which agents have choice: 'The fact that there is no "choice" that cannot be accounted for, retrospectively at least, does not imply that such practice is perfectly predictable, like the acts inserted in the rigorously stereotyped sequences of a rite;...there is room for strategies.'

In Bourdieu's theory, persons improvise spontaneous actions and reactions to the infinite variety of changing circumstances according to a sense of appropriateness. This arises out of their pre-dispositions or habitus, which is revealed in evident behaviour and attitudes in which are embedded history, both personal and class alongside learned principles.

1061 Viz. Gintis, below.
Bourdieu's world accurately suggests one of unspoken assumptions, and undebated and unreflected actions in which historical attitudes and factors are at work in creating the social order. In this respect, it seems to share the notion of delusion based on false ideologies from which Critical Theory seeks to enlighten and emancipate people; the difference being that Bourdieu offers analysis, and Critical Theory, a basis for action. However, in describing such actions Bourdieu does indicate an ethical dimension that resonates with Hume's condemnation of self-interest over the public interest, with Critical Theory's identification of the deluded rationalisation of self-interest and with Dunn's 'order of egoism':

'Strategies aimed at producing 'regular' practices are one category, among others, of officialising strategies [Original emphasis], the object of which is to transmute 'egoistic' private, particular interests...into disinterested, collective, publicly avowable legitimate interests' 1063.

This introduces the idea of action by a group, such as managers, in their own 'egotistical' interests. His account seems to parallel the notions of group dynamics of a group forming, norm-ing and conforming in order to carry out a concerted action. This 'practical kinship' contrasts with ties of blood and kinship and asserts that the group norm is stronger:

'The extent of practical kinship depends upon the capacity of the official group members to overcome the tensions engendered by the conflict of interests within the undivided production and consumption group, and to keep up the kind of practical relationship which conforms to the official view held by every group which thinks of itself as a corporate unity' 1064.

This suggests, as in group dynamics, a group maintaining its status and position by combining individual interest, suppressing individual divergence and differences in order to present a common and unified front, in order to benefit from the 'symbolic profits' that follow the 'approval' 'conferred...by

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conforming to the official representation of practices\textsuperscript{1065}. Elsewhere Bourdieu describes 'the group...[as] the aggregate of the individuals endowed with the same dispositions, to whom each is linked by his dispositions and interests\textsuperscript{1066}. This seems to want it both ways and that diminishes the point of the definition of a group as divergent characters combined around a common purpose for a common action. According to Bourdieu, the common action for these groups is to 'officialise' the 'egotistical interest'\textsuperscript{1067}. Bourdieu describes such actions very convincingly elsewhere in analysing power, not as the use of actual force, physical or verbal, but a symbolic force through the construction of reality, which can include bullying\textsuperscript{1068}, but it is more likely to be defining officially what is or is going to be taken as 'real', 'realistic', 'common sense', 'the way to do or achieve things', which become, as described above, the 'official view' of the 'corporate unity'. This thereby maintains the status quo, the established order, and maintains the power and official position of the 'egotistic group' by making their viewpoint 'official'. Bourdieu recognises that the imposition of an official ruling based on the judgement of a particular person or group because it is 'realistic' or 'commonsensical' is the most effective and enduring way of maintaining power; 'Every established order tends to produce...the naturalization of its own arbitrariness'\textsuperscript{1069}:

'Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most important and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of objective chances and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the sense of limits, commonly called the sense of reality'[Original emphasis]\textsuperscript{1070}.

Bourdieu call this 'doxa' because unlike orthodox and heterodox, it does not imply the existence of alternatives or 'antagonistic beliefs'. Hume's psychological/philosophical argument demonstrated that such rationalisations are in fact grounded in the passions and desires of the individual and are self-deception. Habermas in different terms, but to the same effect, identified it as delusion and false ideology, the 'objectification mistake', where a sub-group

\textsuperscript{1065} Ibid. p. 40. Cf. Text p. 380 line 16 - 382 line 4: Instruction to maintain an 'efficient front' during a Directorate crisis and suppressing problems to maintain personal connections of Chair of Governors.

\textsuperscript{1066} Ibid. p. 15.

\textsuperscript{1067} Cf The Background: Oligarchy's submission on reform of the Constitution that proposed giving them more power, Cf. Text p. 78 line 24 - p. 80 line 5; Text p. 80 line 26 - p. 81 line 25 Control of academic development constant in both regimes..

\textsuperscript{1068} Cf. Text p. 516 line 16 - p. 524 p. 13: Bullying.

\textsuperscript{1069} Cf. Director's Cut: St. Augustine, above.

may falsely believe that what is in their interest is in the interest of the whole of society1071.

Bourdieu too regards it as an ideological ‘shutting down’ of debate, alternative opinion, and the possibility and proposition of constructive alternatives to organisational and political issues. Because debate is ‘shut down’ by this official construction of reality, the alternative does not get a hearing and cannot challenge, call to account or reject the official dominating position, unless a constitutional mechanism exists to bring it to account, e.g., Cambridge University’s direct democracy1072. The point of view of the dominated is ‘shut down’, silenced, cannot get heard, nor achieve official status, often with disastrous effect on the dominated1073. Bourdieu suggests that this domination is neither the work of villains bent on exploitation and profit, nor despotic princes, but of those who are trying to operate an efficient system without causing any blame to fall on them. This is achieved by devoting time, their lives, to the task: ‘the active principle is the labour, time, care, attention, and savoir-faire which must be squandered...’ but their reward is honour to themselves. Moreover, their own conduct and the operations of the system are conceived and conducted as the only and the natural way things are done. They both dominate the system and are dominating over others and reproduce the conditions of domination, and so perpetuate the habitus in themselves and others1074. ‘Wastage of money, energy, time and ingenuity is the very essence of the social alchemy through which an interested relationship is transmuted into a disinterested gratuitous relationship, overt domination into misrecognized, “socially recognised” domination, in other words, legitimate authority [Original emphasis]1075. However they do not see it that way.

Bourdieu calls this ‘institutionally organised misrecognition’, and Critical Theory


1072 Viz. The Background,


would identify it as delusional ‘false ideology’, so that what Critical Theory views as their own coercion and domination is self-inflicted, ‘imposed’ upon them by their own actions in participating in the practices\textsuperscript{1076}; this ‘normal’ operation of such social institutions maintains what Critical Theory calls ‘the world-picture’. The ‘illusion’ embodied in that world picture is the result of the agents’ own activity reacting on them\textsuperscript{1077}.

Bourdieu’s misrecognition is a variation of the simple idea of an exchange, which is the pattern of a gift made, with the implication that it will be reversed, i.e., that the receiver will, at a later date, return with a gift, that is not of the same kind but which is equivalent. A service has been carried out which the receiver deliberately misconstrues as not requiring a reward. Therefore, the giver acquires honour because they have behaved impeccably and demonstrated their finest qualities by endowing the service with their most valuable commodity, time or their life, and the receiver is grateful for a service well done. The giver has placed the receiver under a moral and emotional obligation. Castiglione’s Courtier gave similar advice when he advocated that a courtier should not ask for anything for himself. However the service becomes the way to behave and a bond has been established: a ‘fiction of a disinterested exchange...[but] the inevitably interested relations imposed by kinship, neighbourhood, or work, into elective relations of reciprocity’\textsuperscript{1078}.

When this takes place in the context of an institution, it is supported by both a continuous process of interactions within a personal network of alliances and by the official titles, honours, favours and positions that form a web of practices that institute the domination and form of institutional violence for which the motto normally is ‘That’s the way we do things here’. This generates the domination because it closes down openness, examination and accountability, defeats alternative aspirations and innovation, shuts out debate and consensual discussion, and wastes initiative and talent. As an approach, it echoes the legendary order of the Roman General wanting to establish domination and control: ‘Cut down all the tall poppies’. Of equal violence is the acceptance and support for the mild-sounding, ‘reasonable’, ‘commonsensical’, ‘realistic’ modus operandi of ‘the way we do things here’ which summarises the person’s conscientious operation of the system of silencing and domination for which the reward is a sense of honour and worth, or as Hume would describe it,
pride and self-esteem for 'a job well done'. As Critical Theory describes it, this coercion and repression falsifies and distorts all communication so that their world picture is never questioned, debated, re-evaluated, 'freely [discussed]...and hence may be immunised from criticism'. The person or group deceives herself/himself/ themselves that they perform this service for others, may falsely believe that what is in their interest is in the interest of the whole of society but as Hume and Habermas agree it is self-deception and false ideology. Moreover, the practice has the additional effect of perpetrating the habitus, the social, cultural and economic influences that generate the pre-disposition that will recreate this habitus because it shuts down all other possibilities. The effect of habitus is virtually the same as Critical Theory's account of groups' 'falsely "objectify[ing]" their own activity'. Castiglione's script for courtly behaviour comes in the form of recommended practice, a modus operandi for the courtier, who must have acceptable genealogy and conditioned habits. This too suggests the same relationship as Bourdieu's habitus between social structure and the person.

By adding the passions, Hume forms the basis of his concept of personal identity or self, which is based on impressions and is not a fixed, single object, but is based on the relation between perceptions, i.e., a socially constructed self. The crucial element is the passions; their reactions create reflexes within us as we react to other persons and other stimuli. From this he derives the general rule that 'everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, likewise produces pride and humility'. This returns the issue back to Bourdieu's sense of honour and worth as the motivator for conduct, which will regenerate the conditions, dominant or otherwise, that generated the habitus in the first place. Bourdieu provides an analysis of the continuing and self-

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perpetuating influence of the habitus, the pre-dispositions, generated by social and cultural history, but at the final analysis, it seems the decisive influence is the passions and character.

Cultures of Collaboration or Control

Changing cultural history is the heroic role that managers, according to MacIntyre have taken for themselves and use to justify their role. Thus, management theory presents the view that managers either have to bring about change or respond to it by changing their organization. This theoretical view presents the models of the world rather than the realities of people. A classic model-theory has generalized situations into opposing forces of ‘driving’ change and ‘restraining’ stability, so that one force is balanced by another, in the midst of which it is the manager’s role to weaken the restraints and promote the drives [Viz. Huse’s Force-Field Diagram, below]. It is rational, scientific in appearance, and works on the utopian premise of how managers would like people to behave rather than reality.

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Forces for maintaining ‘status quo’

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<th>Desired Balance Point</th>
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Forces for Change

Note: Length of arrow is equal to the amount of force.

Fig. 14. Huse’s Force-Field Diagram.

There is even a formula, Gleicher's, to ascertain whether change is going to be worth the effort:
\[ C = (ABD) > X \]
where \( C \) = change; \( A \) = level of dissatisfaction with status quo; \( B \) = clearly identified desired state; \( D \) = practical steps toward the desired state; \( X \) = cost of change. The process for this is a laboratory matter of 'unfreezing' the organization by making the need for change widely accepted, 'changing' values attitudes and behaviour through processes of 'identification' and 'internalization', and finally 'refreezing' the new behaviour pattern through praise or the satisfaction that all will feel at coming through the process. The account of these force-fields, process and formula admits - significantly - that 'eliminating' 'pointless bureaucratic bottlenecks' may affect more change than pressuring personnel. Despite the rationality of the models, however, the whole is interwoven with every indication that the emotional life of the personnel is the decisive factor in change, rather than any strategy: 'desirable', 'unwilling', 'altering long-established attitudes and behaviour', 'aggressive', 'abrasive', 'resent', 'violation of one's self image', 'indication of inadequacy', 'old, inappropriate values', 'unsettling', and 'new...values, attitudes and behaviour'

Moreover, change may fail because personnel may 'psychologically resist change because they wish to avoid uncertainty', 'distrustful of any change initiated from above', loss of benefits, 'power, prestige, salary, quality of work', or the specialized knowledge of the workforce tells them that the changes are flawed or ill-conceived. The principal factor is the 'passions'.

In organizational models, the convention is to explain it as one entity but with two parts, the overt which is visible in the public, seemingly rational elements and rules, and the covert which is the private, emotional aspect: an 'iceberg' [Viz. Fig 5]. As an image is a rarely explored. The delusional impression is created by the image that there is a separation between the covert and overt

elements, where the overt gives the impression of rationality. It is the Lockean separation of mind and body: the two persons in one body. What is never or rarely mentioned is that what lies beneath the waves is the dangerous part, just as it was for that model of organizational planning and hubris, *The Titanic*. Its hierarchical arrangement gives it a superficial resemblance to the delusions of the rational part of man ruling the desires, and its extension to a political myth of the rational manager - and prince - ruling a 'swinish multitude', enslaved by appetite, who make up the 'mob' that is dangerous and to be feared. It could be interpreted as a re-working of Swift's 'Houyhnhnms' – philosophical, rational horses, and 'Yahoos' – anarchic, bestial ape-men. Comparing it with the contrasts between the colonist and natives in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, 'Swift's Yahoos are both colonized wretches and humanity as a whole...If the Yahoos are all of us, then nobody deserves to lord it over anybody else...[and] both authors...see that the colonist ['rational manager' in this case. My note.] partakes of the savagery he imputes to the barbarians, indeed outstrips them in it.¹⁰⁸⁵

One account of this ‘formal-informal’ division of organization had declared that they were ‘a pair of concepts not adequate to deal with the complexities of organizational behaviour and structure’\(^\text{1086}\). Parker comments that ‘stressing either one is inadequate because it runs the risk of making one the repository of problems that must be solved by attending to the other’; so that if the ‘formal’ is in trouble, ‘use cultural means of analysis and control’, and if the ‘informal’ is the problem apply ‘structural means of analysis or control’ \(^\text{1087}\).

Expressed in imperial or monarchist terms, to control the mob, when the emperor is weak, use ‘bread and circuses’, or when the emperor is strong, send in the troops; or in animal husbandry term, the appropriate use of ‘stick’ or ‘carrot’, for one of the origins of “management” is the Italian “maneggiare” meaning ‘to manage horses’ \(^\text{1088}\). Rewards and punishment remains the means, control the objective, and the aim to keep the location of control in the hierarchy, the repository of the ‘formal’ \(^\text{1089}\).

The eternal struggle implied by this suggests that Heraclitus’ metaphor that you cannot step into the same river twice and that, therefore there is permanent flux, seems a much more realistic assessment of change because it admits that it is happening constantly as part of life. Flux is an ancient and classic dilemma attributed by Plato to a philosopher whom he admired and whose ideas inspired Plato’s own notions of the insubstantial and apparent nature of the real world of constantly moving shadows, in Plato’s model of the world, The Cave, while the true reality was knowable only to an elite who had


\(^{1089}\) Cf. Text 417 line 2 – 11 Text p.417 line 15 – p. 418 line 11 After the HODs attempt at constitutional reform, the hierarchy added more bureaucracy and ended HODs’ meetings.

Fig. 5. The Organisational Iceberg

gone out into the sun. Plato reported Socrates, though not the real character but a mouthpiece for Plato's own thinking\textsuperscript{1090}, in a dialogue with Hermogenes quoting some 'bits of wisdom as old as the days of Kronos and Rhea' [i.e., the dynasty of Gods before the Olympians], and which he thought had 'something very plausible about it'. Socrates is reported as saying: 'Heraclitus says somewhere that "everything gives way and nothing stands fast"', and, likening the things that are to the flowing (\textit{rhoë}) of a river, he says that "you cannot step into the same river twice".\textsuperscript{1091}

Heraclitus, the most important philosopher before Plato, had a notion of the world built on opposites, in this case sameness and difference. His general proposition is therefore that though different water is constantly flowing in the river, the river itself remains the same. Thus though everything seems to be in constant change, some aspects remain the same. In fact, change in the form of flowing water ensures that the river remains a river and does not become a pond or a lake. So though the waters may increase or decrease and though the river may alter its course, it will remain a river. There is change but also constancy. The theory suggests that change in the constituent elements maintains and supports the constancy and permanence of the main structure. No matter how many courtiers are replaced or executed, no matter how many soldiers are killed in battle, a prince's court and a regiment remain in existence with all their functions and roles and new recruits are brought in to serve it and 'to bring it up to strength' and take over the roles and functions. The new 'intake' of recruits, moreover, is likely to be selected on the basis that they resemble the past and present functionaries and servants in some important and self-defining quality. Objects and organizations share this characteristic, despite all the fixed organizational charts, and are more like processes than something static\textsuperscript{1092}. The river or the organization remains the same river or organization, though it [the river or the organization] is composed of different constituents. It is a concept that embraces two opposing ideas at the same time: the idea of permanent change and the idea of stasis or constancy. Vico made a similar judgement about institutions being defined by their original constitutions and implied that change beyond that was against their inherent nature\textsuperscript{1093}, and this point foreshadows an element in Czarniawska's 'right hand


\textsuperscript{1091} Plato [\textit{Cratylus}] Op. cit. § 402a., p.33.

\textsuperscript{1092} Cf. Giddens

\textsuperscript{1093} Viz: Vico G. Op. cit. p. 81 'Axiom 14. The nature of an institution is identical with its nascence at a certain time and in a certain manner. When these are the same, similar institutions will arise. Axiom 15.
Reforms cannot succeed by definition [a system] cannot reform itself because it is not able to conceive of itself in different terms.\textsuperscript{1094} Heraclitus’s notions are useful in describing the relations between change and constancy. That of not being able to step into the same river twice implies the constancy and permanence of the principal structure and the idea of renewal through a process of changing only the constituent elements. The idea of permanent flux suggests that reality is in constant change and that static, permanent arrangements are only apparent. This sense of opposition conforms with Heraclitus’s theory of opposites, that opposite qualities transform themselves into each other, so that dry becomes wet and then wet becomes dry, in a constancy of transformations, so that the opposites become equivalents. So a group of 'new brooms' joining an organization transforms over time into an 'old guard' of the establishment, and the characteristic elements of each are present in the other; the organization that they enter remains constant, although the constituent elements have changed. This is the crux of the events in this case-study.

The measurement of change is a problematic area. Measurement is the principal method in science; change in one element is compared with others that remain constant. Though relevant and useful in the laboratory, in real life, populated by human beings, nothing is constant, so measuring and predicting change is a very unscientific activity. Moreover, the time-span can give the impression of constancy. The elements are so many and so various that to break a continuous process of change, with many interwoven elements, into a few constituent parts may only yield a useful explanation. It is unlikely to yield understanding because of its limitations. Offering explanations reveals the limits and inadequacy of language to express ideas in such a way that they represent reality. Nietzsche certainly thought that language was an inadequate vehicle to represent reality accurately and favoured description over explanation: "Explanation" is what we call it, but it is “description” that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and science...how could we possibly explain anything? We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, and divisible spaces. How should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into an image

The procedures of grouping and classification are useful in aiding progress but not in providing something with a correspondence to the nature of things. If reality is a process of change, like Heraclitus's river, then points of comparison are arbitrary, since there is no end-point: 'Can we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this? This would be the case if something were attained at every moment within the process.'

However heedless of such warnings managers have been committed to changing 'the culture' of their organisations. Organizations like societies have a culture embedded with beliefs values and customs. In the later half of the twentieth century, the culture of British management went into convulsions in the face of the outstanding success of competition from Germany and Japan - the defeated of WWII - and prompted an examination of their success. One 'discovery' was that their management, particularly the Japanese, was found to contain approaches and assumptions that were founded upon values and beliefs that were held throughout their organizations and which the management actively maintained. In presenting his 'forty-five prescriptions for change', one influential guru pointed first to the conservative policy of low cost loans to Japanese industry, both established and emergent, and then to factors of 'group cohesion, lifetime employment and...and management and family practices', but capped both with the 'passion for smallness'. Peters went on to design a 'winning hand [for Western corporate businesses, of] smaller units and...highly skilled workers, serving as the chief source of incremental improvements and products and services.'

The first analyses of organizational cultures produced static models that did not accommodate the reality of actual organisations where there existed differences in values between the layers and networks; shades of Czarniawska's division between the almost rational models of the 'Knowledge we [i.e., academic Management Studies] teach' and the relativist 'Knowledge we have'. Thus, one such model identified the following simple types based on management structures:

- **power cultures:** *central control; orders and action*
- **role cultures:** *strict, bureaucratic administrative procedures*
- **task cultures:** *completion of the task*

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person culture: development and welfare of the personnel 1099.

An alternative approach followed by Waterman and Peters, and Deal and Kennedy, was to examine the rituals, symbols, logos, and slogans within the culture that indicated deeper values1100. This approach followed in the tradition of theatricality, which Bagehot identified in 1867, in the theatre of state, like the parades of British monarchy, as a means of ruling the ordinary citizens, while real power lay elsewhere in the prime minister and the cabinet1101. Tracing back not only its workings but its tradition to Bagehot demonstrates how politics becomes management and management is the politics of the nation’s ruling faction writ small. Thus, Silver could identify in its cult of entrepreneurialism ‘Reaganism writ small’1102 and Parker adds that others have identified the same ‘rhetoric of enterprise and individualism’ in Thatcher’s ‘new right’ thinking1103, including the motto ‘the right to manage’1104.

Behind the people orientation and behind the theatricality, Silver identified ‘Behind the hoopla and razzle dazzle of competitive games and prizes lies the dull monotony of speed-up, deskilled, Taylorised work - at McFactory. And McFactory fuel is cheap labour – part-time, teenage, minimum wage, non-union workers1105. The implications of this analysis become more alarming when it is placed in the context of higher education, where the less advantaged students have taken up virtually full-time work in these same consumer industries, while the same entrepreneurial consumerism has introduced the unitisation/modularisation’ [even the choice of language where a unit is defined as a module because the connotation of architecture and spacecraft give the
resulting 'module' a higher gloss\textsuperscript{1106} of courses have made that possible; where this course re-organization has promised more individual 'customer' freedom, but it is in fact from the same range, limited by logistics, but presented in its new format as a customer friendly choice, but now there is less time for exploration. Therefore their study and their work give them a double dose of the illusory autonomy but dominated by same controlling values. Moreover the unitisation has also facilitated the employment of more part-time staff; respondents in this research see the courses as less challenging, and that the purpose of the unitisation of courses, i.e., to enable more 'customer' freedom of access, has been applied to control the staff more rigidly and remove their professional autonomy\textsuperscript{1107}.

In a similar vein, referring to Peters and Waterman, Parker concludes that 'there is simply no compelling evidence here that organizational culture - whatever it might be - is related to profitability, efficiency job, satisfaction, and so on\textsuperscript{1108}. In another manual for excellence, Parker also recognises the political theme of individualism as the ingredient that makes capitalism work, for 'Individual leaders, not organisations, create excellence, and this particular version talks of the leader's 'unique skills', 'cultivating' his successors who will 'assume the controls' by 'passing on his gift for strategy and flair for building a corporate culture'\textsuperscript{1109}. This recipe's illogical impossibility of passing on 'unique' skills only highlights the idea of such managers assuming the powers of Emperors and creating dynasties, which jointly recalls the Gods' warnings of hubris and the remembrance of mortality that the slave would whisper in the triumphal general's ear\textsuperscript{1110}. This mortality punctures the heroic and brings the issue back to character as the decisive factor in hierarchies. The result for the people is the 'lucke', which Castiglione, Gibbon, and Tuchman's 'March of Folly' had identified, with the odds against a good leader taking over, despite courtier's advice from manuals on excellence. Meanwhile the people remained as the audience for the theatrical spectacles that the prince might produce\textsuperscript{1111}, as corporate manifestations of Juvenal's formula of bread and circuses\textsuperscript{1112}: 'For all their ideas of people mattering, they only matter as

\textsuperscript{1106} Cf. Text p. 503 line23 – p. 504 line 9: One respondent called unitisation: 'Starship Enterprise', suggesting the sci-fi fictional quality of its journey.

\textsuperscript{1107} Cf. Text p. 474 line 7 - p.475 line 9: Unitisation and control.


\textsuperscript{1110} Cf. Roman Republic, the slave and the General's Triumph, below.


\textsuperscript{1112} Cf. Text p. 458 line 19 – p. 460 line 29: Buildings – the general response to what had changed.
elements of the leader's will\textsuperscript{1113}. To back up the 'Courtier's manuals', there are many contemporary biographies of dynamic corporate leaders presumably with the intention of showing, like an alchemist playing out the old confidence trick of turning lead into gold, how 'unique skills' may be imitated, regardless of the evidence that a successful leader in one situation may fail in different one.

Moreover, if fundamentally the hierarchical structure is unchanged and unchanging, new buildings or refurbishments are the only tangible evidence that managers may produce to demonstrate their powers of changing the world, but the essential structure remains constant. It is theatre.

Management 'impressarios' adopted that theatricality and used logos, scripts and theatrical trappings to engage the workers in an emotional commitment to the organization. Promoters, like 'John Wayne in pinstripes', believed that 'in the new corporations, it is the role of those at the top to act as symbolic rather than rational managers; scriptwriters and directors of the daily drama of company life'\textsuperscript{1114}. The same advocates, famously Peters and Waterman\textsuperscript{1115}—proposed cultural scene-setting that gave a sense of control and autonomy to the workers in order to harness the emotional commitment that makes for highly effective and efficient organisations. Therefore, emphasis was placed on action rather than bureaucracy; being 'close to the consumer', and therefore committed to quality via customer feedback; workers' autonomy to explore new ideas and to risk failure; emphasis on people; harnessing commitment through openness of discussion and information and developing staff through training; brand-management through mission statements that embody the organisations values which are embraced by all staff; focussed organisations that specialise where they excel; simpler, leaner organizational structures with fewer levels of hierarchy; the whole a combination of 'loose-tight' properties of strong, binding values in a lean structure allied to maximum employee-autonomy. This set of concepts was derived from an examination of successful companies. The subsequent questioning of that evidence was only the beginning of the criticisms of its approach. A critic of 'In Search of Excellence' revealed how some companies had been edited out and others added and quoted Drucker that it was 'a book for juveniles' and a fad\textsuperscript{1116}. One of the flaws in this manufactured culture is the false assumption that an organization


is a unity, when the reality is that an organization is made of smaller units, both formal and informal, each with their own codes and styles of co-ordination and communication\textsuperscript{1117} with messages passed along through many different, eccentric or obtuse characters. The more the separate units cohere the stronger the organizational culture. However, this view places organizational culture in a permanent present. It ignores the idea that Vico proposes that the culture is a living cityscape in which the buildings make concrete the evidence of many phases of cultural development. In a similar vein, Lundberg identified three layers of cultural evidence within organisations: the symbols, anecdotes, rituals, the observable manifest elements; the beliefs and vision of leaders and senior management at the strategic level; and at the foundation of all the ideologies, beliefs, values and assumptions\textsuperscript{1118}. Each aspect of the culture is a social representation of deeply embedded values. These are held by members in the organisation. Those of the senior management and leaders of the organizations are particularly evident, like those of princes, such as the Medici in Florence. Schein identified values as underpinning everything that takes place in organisations and linked culture and leadership as 'two sides of the same coin; cultures are created by leaders and the function of leadership is the creation and occasionally the destruction of cultures'\textsuperscript{1119}. Anita Roddick of Body Shop fame is a much quoted example because her style and character permeated the whole organisation, a clear example of Weber's charismatic authority\textsuperscript{1120}, and her personal message was re-enforced by training, roadshows, and videos, which replaced the authority of inherited positions backed up by the palace guard, with softer measures to suit the times: harnessing personal belief in causes, downsizing as a revolutionary cultural change, 'being part of the solution and not the problem', individual achievement, individual choice and getting people's support for the leader's changes'. As the initiator of her enterprise, Anita Roddick was able to establish her vision of the culture from the very beginning on a clean sheet, rather than destroying one to create another and therefore established her culture without another tradition already embedded in the organisation.


\textsuperscript{1120} Cf. Weber M. Three ideal types of authority: charismatic, traditional, rational-legal. Power is 'the chance of a man of a number or men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action'; quoted in Haralambros M. and Holborn M. Sociology [Fourth Edition] London: Collins Educational 1995, pp. 501-2.
However, leadership retained its traditional top-down control but added to its armoury disguised control under this latest cultural ‘fad’ of ‘soft’ human relations in a bid to entrap the ‘the intractable and intuitive side of organisation’. Thompson and McHugh note the difficult inconsistency of management being rational and at the same time ‘embracing’ people management principles. They go on to quote the ‘usefulness’ of the ‘socially integrating myth’. This is virtually identical to Plato’s ‘noble lie’ as employed in the governance, if not totalitarian manipulation, of the individual in the state, and draws a clear parallel with the perception of being managed as being governed, like the perception of the respondents of this research.

It also links with Silver’s verdict that the ‘pursuit of excellence’ belonged in the same armoury of ruling stratagems as the ‘noble lie’ as used by the ‘Neo-cons’ of the US. The consequence was a shift from management by order and control to a ‘desperate casting about for methods of controlling the motivation and commitment of workers’. The aim was the ‘self-controlling organisation’ by leading the workers to accept ‘self-reinforcement, self-observation, evaluation and control; self-expectation, and goal-setting and rehearsal and self criticism’. The motive behind the introduction of this stratagem is securing the commitment to cutting costs by ‘work intensification and reduced supervision’, i.e., downsizing, removing a middle tier of management, increasing work loads and duties, i.e., the research assessment exercise. Doubts about the introduction of the ‘self-controlling’ organisation focus on the approach being acceptable to managers, which makes it clear that such acceptability resides in a shift in the location of power. Other doubts about the introduction of self controlling organisations rest upon the ‘democratisation of society in general and its institutions’. The governance of Oxford and Cambridge Universities are the sole examples of direct ownership and direct participative democracy in the higher education sector and both have been under immense pressure to change to ‘capital-managed’ organisations by the ‘order of egoism’.

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1123 Cross reference: Political slant in political responses to being managed.
The introduction of flatter structures, teams, and 'soft-skills' training aroused similar doubt and had a dangerous reverse effect, for as small groups became more immersed in their work they began to appreciate the wider context and the discrepancy between their work, and their measure of discretion, and the goals of the group versus those of the management. Thus, beneath the rhetoric and strategy lay the same passion for control.\textsuperscript{1129}

Such ideas of softer control have a tradition found in organisations that Goffman would call 'total'. They exist among the patriarchies of nineteenth century, often family-owned, small organisations in which there was a strong company and community life, clubs and welfare provision, and when the organisations became larger the employees still identified with the firm. Examples are household UK names, like Marks and Spencer, Cadbury, Rowntree, and Pilkington. Internal promotions came from the 'shop-floor' but 'top management tended to be imported'.\textsuperscript{1130} Their organisational objectives were 'high pay, profit-sharing and links with the local community'. Thompson and McHugh suggest that the growth in size caused the loss of 'the personal touch' on which they survived, but that humanist trends in management ideas show a strong resemblance to this paternalism and the 'future may look more like the past than the present'.\textsuperscript{1131} Abecedary Institute in its origins and operation until 'privatisation' shared most, if not all of these characteristics. However the basic 'monarchical' nature of the paternalism did not change and the basic structure of power had not changed. As one respondent put it, privatisation only removed the 'veneer', but the foundations remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{1132} It was its laissez-faire operation that allowed its 'team culture to be effective in the years before privatisation. In the account of the governance of Cambridge University, those defendants of the original participative democracy called themselves 'radical conservatives', because future thinking about management and organisation harks back to their original participative direct democracy.\textsuperscript{1133}

In this same vein, where there is team organisation, a positive view of team-leadership is that strength does not lie in the exercise of power but in the

\textsuperscript{1130} Ibid. p. 197.
\textsuperscript{1133} Cf. The Background,
maintenance of networks within groups and teams and 'a more or less skilful process of organising, achieved through negotiation, to achieve acceptable influence over the description and handling of issues within and between groups'\textsuperscript{1134}. Therefore, instead of leaders and led, the notion of 'participants' is proposed where all 'come to be expected to make contributions' to the social, cognitive and political process of the network. Power is not located in structures and offices but in the 'quality of the relationships' and the 'context of interdependence' within the network. This suggests that 'situational leadership', i.e., that leadership moves according to the task, context, problem or situation, which is demanding and educational for participants, for it requires not only the skills of listening and debate but a measure of emotional maturity. It is a mature, Humean set of conventions rather than a patriarchal and hierarchical, parent–child, 'immature' relationship\textsuperscript{1135}. The conditions for such an approach are 'sensemaking', 'networking, enabling', "open-minded thinking", participation, negotiation through "acceptable influence" enabling the values and ideas of all the participants and not just the leader derived goals and a "culture of productivity" where "all participants take responsibility for the relational processes through which they may help and be helped"\textsuperscript{1136}. The training and 'acclimatisation' for such roles will take a substantial and sustained effort. Any outside agency that can be drawn into that set of relationships to give one person an advantage will undermine the organisation; hence the recommendation in \textit{high performance work} for the full support of the most senior level of management\textsuperscript{1137}. This implies a change of governance and an approach that suggests there is need for a 'civil service' function providing information and resource assessment and some measure of implementation\textsuperscript{1138}. Interestingly one verdict on this approach is that it is 'a more rational and contextually grounded version of transformational leadership'\textsuperscript{1139}, a version of role-based leadership, in which 'leaders and followers raised each other to a higher levels of morality and motivation'\textsuperscript{1140}. The final comment is that this is a praiseworthy ambition but it does not take account of prevailing ideologies

\textsuperscript{1135} Cf. Hume
\textsuperscript{1137} Cf. Text p. 426 line 22 – p. 430 line 2: Account of a democratic team approach.
\textsuperscript{1138} Cf. The Background: the relationship between the Regents’ House and the administration in Cambridge University,
and 'defensive identities. After all, in the end leadership is no more than what you do with it ![Original exclamation mark. My emphases].\textsuperscript{1141} This throw-away remark by Thompson and McHugh, especially in its use of the second person singular, as if addressed to each individual reader, personalises the issue of leadership and could be interpreted to indicate that, despite all 'scientific', rational and legislative arrangements, above all else, the passions of individual character is the decisive factor. This is also embedded in the idea of 'defensive identity', in that the 'order of egoism' has a desirable place in the organization and is concerned to keep it.

These remarks suggest that beneath all the roles and tasks, there is the ultimate decisive element, the character of the order of egoism's passions of self interest. The ambition of 'higher levels of morality and motivation'\textsuperscript{1142} indicates an ethics of managerial conduct that echoes Hume's ethical psychological/philosophical rationale for admirable human conduct both in private and in public and the overwhelming importance of the general good over self-interest. However, their verdict about its conflict with 'ideology and defensive identities' accurately defines what Jackall describes as the unhappy fate of any 'democratic man' in a hierarchical organization, exemplified by how it played out in the narrative of Abecedary Institute. This suggests at least two worlds or cultures within Abecedary Institute.

Hayes suggests that 'in a lot of ways organizational cultures are [Original emphasis] social representations – they are ways of representing the realities of organizational life, which are negotiated and shared by individuals and working groups'.\textsuperscript{1143} They are a distillation of people's fundamental values, assumptions, habitus, desires; they are ideological.

Preceding the 'culture gurus' of Waterman and Peters, and regarded as more academically credible, was \textit{Theory Z} of William Ouchi\textsuperscript{1144}. This was a hybrid organization or a US adaptation of the Japanese management culture that was proving to be threateningly successful to Western industries. Its merits are that it is concerned with providing satisfying work for and caring about the emotional well-being of the workers. Field research into the organizational structure of US companies revealed three forms: 'the bureaucracy', 'the market' and what Ouchi defined as 'the clan', i.e., the US adaptation of the

\textsuperscript{1144} Ouchi W. G. \textit{Theory Z} Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1981
Japanese culture. Ouchi defines the three as having the following characteristics:

the 'market' sets each individual free to look after her/his own interests, to make a personal contribution to 'common good', which the market mechanism measures and rewards appropriately, i.e., no contribution, no reward.

the 'bureaucracy' issues a command: "Do not do what you want, do what we tell you because we pay you for it". This is the 'mechanism' that 'alone produces alienation, anomie and a lowered sense of autonomy'.

the 'clan' sets the individual free, but 'the socialization of all to a common goal is so complete' and the system has the capacity to measure accurately the 'subtleties of contributions' over the long term, that individuals 'naturally' strive to serve the 'common good'.

Ouchi suggests that serving an unselfish end in this manner is in fact also achieving selfish ends, 'quite thoroughly', and offers a monk, a marine and a Japanese autoworker as possible examples.

Tellingly, Ouchi suggests that the market and the clan are the 'governance mechanisms [that] realize human potential and maximize human freedom because they do not constrain human behaviour'\(^{1145}\). They do represent the contrast between individualism and the collective. They therefore face anyone choosing or advocating one of them with questions about which contributes most to the common good and which has been the most successful historically, and in what terms is that success to be evaluated. These are some of the most fundamental questions that humankind faces.

In evaluating Ouchi's 'Z organizations one commentator commends Ouchi's academic grounding of his antagonism to bureaucracy in 'sociological theory and organizational psychology' but points up the contrast between Ouchi's 'excellent' organizations that 'are like well run military units - only the fittest survive and the *esprit de corps* [sic] of the team ensures their fitness' and their providing 'the community ties and meanings that we are all supposed to crave'. The commentator interprets the outcome as following in a tradition that goes back to Durkheim - and therefore back to Hume - that 'it is only by serving

\(^{1145}\) Ibid. p. 84-85.
the collective association that we can truly become ourselves and play our part in society. However, this virtue contrasts with a mass of adverse criticism that, despite the sense of community embodied in cultural organization strategies, like the Organizational Development matrix structure and TQM [Total Quality Management] that were applied at Abecedary Institute, these elements merely disguised their 'despotic ['monarchical' is the term preferred by this research] or 'hegemonic' intention and the desired result is 'a compliant workforce and profitable company'. Moreover because the workforce is self-controlling and self-policing, it releases the potential of slimming down the layers of bureaucratic control, which was one motivation for its introduction at Abecedary Institute, prompted by the Thatcher government's introduction of economic stringency. A summary view of this criticism is that 'culturalism is a reflection of the need to gain control while disguising it and hence being able to solicit the responsible autonomy of the workforce'. It is a target for Critical Theory Management critics who draw their rationale from Foucault's idea of 'the microphysics of power' which are the 'diverse and intersecting ways in which power is exercised through shifting networks of power relations and struggles'. The merit of this analysis, to Alvesson and Willmott, is its capacity to suggest the 'messy and paradoxical qualities of management and organisation' rather than some grand overarching theory, like capitalism or "bourgeois ideology". However, Foucault's view resonates with Althusser's definition of ideology as 'lived relations' which indicates 'our affective, unconscious relations with the world...the ways in which we are pre-reflectively bound up in social reality...[and] how that reality "strikes" us [as] apparently spontaneous experience...the way human subjects are ceaselessly at stake [Original emphasis], investing in their relations to social life as a crucial part of what it is to be themselves'. Althusser's ideology expressed 'a will, a hope or a nostalgia' rather than a reality.

Eagleton links this analysis of ideology with I. A. Richards's 'pseudo-propositions' of textual analysis, which is evocative of Dilthey's verstehen [understanding] which proposed that cultural phenomena, e.g., art, literature, and institutions, are understandable 'in relation to the minds that created them and the inner experience that they reflected'. I. A. Richards suggests that a text may be 'referential', 'emotive' or 'conative', that is 'descriptive of a state

1147 Cf. Research Design
1149 Ibid. p.23.
of affairs, expressive of the lived reality of the human subjects, [and] directed towards the achievement of certain effects’. Eagleton calls ‘ideological language’ not only ‘performative’, after J. L. Austin’s ‘speech acts’, but indicates a certain suspicion of ‘a kind of slipperiness or duplicity’ built in to it. 

This view lends further weight to those critics of ‘culturalism’, i.e., controlling the ‘text’ of the organization as forms of ‘Orwellian brainwashing’, or ‘organizational vassalage’, or ‘its ambitions...to redefine the nature of employee identification so as to privilege the organization over other identities’. In analyses of working practices at McDonald’s and Pizza Hut, Parker goes further to suggest that ‘the cultural rhetoric here seems to function as a disguise for crude behaviourist models of motivation involving the stick and carrot’ in order to achieve ‘extraordinary effort’ for ‘ordinary pay for part-time teenage non-union workers [many of whom could well be University students working their way through college. My note].

In summary, culturalism, like Plato’s ‘noble lie’ on which it could well have been modeled, is a recent ruse ‘in a long line of capitalist attempts to generate compliance’. Parker traces a history of interventions in the morality of the workers expressed as self-discipline, punctuality, Ford’s ‘Sociological Department, and the paternalism of Cadbury’s and he interprets the proposal of informal workgroups in Taylor’s scientific management in the same tradition that he suggests combines Hobbes’s ‘egotistical’ philosophy with market economics - reminiscent of Thatcher’s ‘There is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families’. Each of these is a variation on a common theme, and in terms of organizations, it is the persistent theme of control by the ‘order of egoism’, based upon a lack of trust. As the anthropologist Mary Douglas suggests: ‘Each period is marked by its own thought style tailored to the concerns of the dominant class. At each period, a particular story of mankind drowns out other multiple contradictory versions’. Therefore whatever the

1159 Ibid. p. 24.
positive elements that may have been intended in organizational reforms, such as informal work groups, the dominant class takes whatever is there that will serve, or can be made to serve its own ends.

Mary Douglas' theory takes her analysis beyond Foucault's 1970 view that 'all significant institutions...straitjacket minds and bodies' and his demonstration of 'how thought is translated directly into institutions, or vice versa, how institutions overcome individual thought and trim the body's shape to their conventions'\textsuperscript{1161}. Douglas asserts first the limitation of Foucault's 'insight' on the simple basis that 'institutions cannot have purposes...Only individuals can intend, plan curiously and contrive oblique strategies'\textsuperscript{1162}. Since she rests her analysis on Hume, and earlier discussion of his philosophy/psychology drew out the importance of character, Douglas' statement is following in a similar vein. Moreover Eagleton's analysis that the opposite must also exist in Foucault's world for its nature to be recognised suggests that the individuals in such worlds have choice. Douglas pursues her analysis further in what might be interpreted as an account of the kind of moment of enlightenment that Critical Theory seeks to achieve - the freedom from false 'sovereignty' is, perhaps, only a coincidental reference to 'monarchicalism':

'At the point of revelation, when the spurious sovereignty of a past thought style is demonstrated, critical opinion has lost its ground unless it can find a way of distinguishing the influence of the current thought style on its own thought and still justify its own judgement. Institutions systematically direct individual memory and channel our perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorize. They fix processes that are essentially dynamic, they hide their influence, they rouse our emotions to a standardized pitch on standardized issues. Add to all this that they endow themselves with rightness and send their mutual corroboration cascading through all the levels of our information system. No wonder they recruit us into joining their narcissistic self-contemplation. Any problems we think about are turned into their own organizational problems. The solutions they proffer only come from the limited range of their experience. If the institution is one that depends on participation, it will reply to our frantic question: “More participation!” If it is one that depends on authority, it will only reply: “More authority!”

\textsuperscript{1161} Ibid. p. 92.
\textsuperscript{1162} Ibid. p. 92.
Institutions have the pathetic megalomania of the computer whose whole vision of the world is its own program. For us, the hope of intellectual independence is to resist, and the necessary first step is to discover how the institutional grip is laid on the mind.\textsuperscript{1163}

Czarniawska acknowledges that this analysis of Douglas' [above] offers 'a very convincing account of the dynamics of social institutions and that the above is a 'radical proposition',\textsuperscript{1164} but does not recognise its Humean ancestry. Douglas takes her analysis back to Durkheim and his accounts of 'people's... [with] elementary social forms [which] 'have no constitutions, kings or any superordinate coercive authority [where their] power came from consensus'\textsuperscript{1165}.

Mary Douglas suggests that groups define themselves by their opposition to the other groups and the others' norms or values, and in real life different groups within organizations and societies will hold different fundamental values. Moreover, each group with its own values or culture tries to persuade the others to help bring about their 'cultural ideal' world. In this conflict, 'little that is done or said is neutral...there is no line to be drawn between symbolic behaviour and the rest'\textsuperscript{1166}. Each cultural group is distinct and choosing one implies a rejection of the others, and each has its own conditions for survival that are alien to the others.

Douglas is examining the cultural and social worlds within institutions, which may be any legitimate social grouping, from a family to an organisation. Though Douglas' theory does not deal directly with organizations but with the generality of institutions, one background study of them concedes that Mary Douglas' 'aerial' perspective offers insight into organizations 'as products or consequences of thought worlds' and how 'organizational nets of collective action unfold against the background of thought worlds of various kinds, some more central, some marginal to their existence'\textsuperscript{1167}. Douglas' analysis of institutions is about 'cooperation and solidarity' and their opposites, 'rejection and mistrust'\textsuperscript{1168}. David Hume, 'as exactly the anthropologists' philosopher', provides the basis of Douglas' theory because of his 'radical constructivism'. His evidence-based approach led to his theory of causality so that when searching

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1163} Ibid. p.92.
\item \textsuperscript{1164} Czarniawska-Joerges B. Exploring Complex Organisations London : Sage 1992, p. 60.
\item \textsuperscript{1167} Czarniawska-Joerges B. Op. cit. p. 61.
\end{itemize}
for 'logical structures in nature...all we ever see are...frequencies and from these we form habits and expectations'\footnote{1169}. Hume provides the philosophical basis of Douglas' analysis of institutions. She points up the deficiencies in the Hobbesian and Lockean 'theory of rational behaviour based on self-regarding motives [that] an individual calculates what is in his best interests and acts accordingly'. As a line of thought it has 'difficulties with the notion of collective action', with action by social class in Marxist theory, and even with collective action in democratic theory, and yet it is 'the basis of the theory [of] economic analysis and political theory'. Moreover if pursued to its logical conclusion, if everyone is self-serving and if every unselfish motive is in fact self-interested and self-serving, the theory is simply reduced to nothing. Like Hume, Douglas is aware of the evidence of 'a contrary impression' that 'individuals do contribute to the public good generously'\footnote{1170}. Douglas' intention is to trace how groups come to have a view of the world but, instead of adopting the ideas of Durkheim and Fleck who suggested ideas, such as 'thought collective', Douglas came up with 'thought worlds'. The whole depends upon identifying in the evidence the existence of such a 'thing' as a thought world'. Douglas draws on Emile Durkheim but acknowledges that he too relied on Hume, whom he cited on the issues of causality: 'Hume had asserted that in our experience we only find succession and frequency, no laws of necessity. It is we who attribute causality\footnote{1171}. Durkheim quoted Hume and asked the question 'whence we hold this surprising prerogative and how it comes that we can see certain relations in things which the examination of these things cannot reveal to us'\footnote{1172}. Durkheim's solution was that 'categories of time, space and causality have a social origin: "They represent the most general relations which exist between things; surpassing all other ideas in extension, they dominate all the details of our intellectual life". Durkheim credited these as the essential basis for the meeting of men's minds and 'all life together'. The emerging ways of thinking are not just habitual but have "a special sort of moral necessity which is to intellectual life, what moral obligation is to the will"\footnote{1173}. Douglas adds the positivistic Fleck to the foundations of her approach because he suggested the notion of the 'thought collective (equivalent to Durkheim's social group) and its thought style

\footnote{1169}Ibid. pp. 113-114.  
\footnote{1170}Ibid. p. 9.  
\footnote{1171}Ibid. p. 11.  
\footnote{1172}Ibid. p. 12.  
Though Fleck's 'thought style' lays the foundations for a point of view, and defines the questions and the validity of the answers as well as establishing the context and limits, crucially it remains 'hidden'. The individual within the collective is never or hardly ever conscious of the prevailing thought style which...exerts an absolutely compulsive force upon his thinking and with which it is not possible to be at variance. However this view is difficult to accept, because it creates the impression that people are programmed automata. Douglas concedes that their thinking offers 'loose functional explanations', and that neither has an explanation for collective action or altruism that extends beyond religion or the system of knowledge itself.

Douglas' explanation is totally Humean: the demand for order and coherence and the practical control of uncertainty. Likewise Douglas does recognise that 'individuals do submit their private interests to the good of others, that altruistic behaviour can be observed, that groups have an influence on the thinking of their members and even have distinctive thought styles...This we know without having a theory of behaviour that takes it into account.

People's need to regulate interaction is served by justice 'for which we develop principles', rather than reactions to emotions and desires. Hume's advocacy of conventions is 'an intellectual system' - not a natural system - on which to base justice so that it has 'a kind of second order naturalness'. 'No single element of justice has an innate rightness'. These conventions are created to justify and stabilize institutions. This depends upon 'its generality, its schematic coherence, and its fit with other accepted general principles. Justice is a more or less satisfactory intellectual system designed to secure the coordination of a particular set of institutions. Hume's uncompromising sceptical approach, 'unassailable' in Douglas' view outlaws any condemnation of justice systems or other civilisations in other times and any appeal to 'intuition or to an ineffable sense of rightness'. As has been discussed elsewhere, Hume is a relativist, and other philosophers, like Gewirth, have presented alternatives, such as 'a supreme principle of morality to prove inequality unjust', but Douglas demonstrates that they are in fact presenting categories of oppression and

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1178 Ibid. p. 114.
1179 Ibid. p. 114.
coercion amongst others that are 'culturally defined'\textsuperscript{1180}. Douglas makes the point that demands for a substantive theory of justice as universally right usually appeal to religion, intuitionism or an innate idea. The conclusion is that if no prior freedom from oppression or coercion existed in a particular society, then the person cannot be 'deprived of that to which no prior right exists'\textsuperscript{1181}. This suggests the importance not only of the historical context of a situation and set of circumstances but the existence of conditions of freedom from coercion in other institutions within the same larger society\textsuperscript{1182}. By this logic they deny the legitimacy of oppressive regimes.

'Any institution...needs to gain legitimacy by a distinctive grounding in nature and reason'. Such institutions provide its 'members' with 'analogies to explore the world [and] to justify the naturalness and reasonableness of the instituted roles'\textsuperscript{1183}. Its values are reinforced by the ideas and recollection that these provide: 'categories for their thoughts...terms of self knowledge, and fixed identities'. Above all, it must establish principles of justice\textsuperscript{1184}. Douglas finds in Durkheim’s idea of the ‘sacred’ the explicit controls of an institution; an attack on the sacred is likely to bring down the whole institution; the emotions are roused to its defence, which takes explicit forms, e.g., books, flags, totems, symbols of all kinds to uphold the institution. Durkheim’s ‘sacred’ is clearly an artefact of society\textsuperscript{1185}. Similarly Hume’s sceptical concept of justice is important because it is defined as a creation of humankind and human society; it is an ‘artificial virtue’. Hume’s concept has tended to arouse opposition because it removes the mystery of justice and defines it as an institutional value that may be assessed on the basis of its coherence and practicality. Douglas chooses the ground of justice on which to battle for the notion that societies are artifices created by humankind and selects Hume as the ‘anthropologist’s philosopher’ because he challenges all assumptions about’ innate ideas, whether of causality, natural law or private property\textsuperscript{1186}.

Douglas finds in Hume’s analysis an uncompromising clarity. Hume’s view is that the artificial virtue and ‘abstract, formal standards of justice’ may only be worked out between equals or near equals. Therefore Hume suggests that at times of ‘perfect ease and affluence, there would be no need for a universal

\textsuperscript{1181} Ibid. p. 117.
\textsuperscript{1182} Cf. Background: The direct democracies of Cambridge and Oxford Universities.
\textsuperscript{1184} Cf. Text p. 558 line 25-p.559 line 8: ‘Nazi’ totalitarian practices.
\textsuperscript{1186} Ibid. p. 113.
regulative principle. Such a convention would never emerge when one part had 'overwhelming' dominant 'might, for the powerful are not disposed to let general principles affect their self-interested action'\(^{1187}\). In contrast, therefore, Hume’s proposes ‘artificial virtues’ that have an ‘internal coherence within an abstract system that harmonises everyday interactions in a particular society’\(^{1188}\). Hume’s test of the harmony of such a society would be its coherence and that the principles upon which it is based bring about the practical outcome of coordination. ‘Once formulated’, according to Douglas, ‘the artifice acquires venerability’, so that people conceive of it as natural and as having existed ‘forever’\(^{1189}\).

Those who object to the relativist nature of Hume’s conventions advance justice as a principle: that there are universal standards, and therefore justice is a universal independent of a particular context. Douglas suggests, for example, that where there is condemnation of inequality, based on class or birth, the principles upon which they are disapproved have been defined by the two hundred year old economic system based on ‘individual contract’\(^{1190}\). She sees it as part of the move from ‘a horizontal pattern of integration to a vertical one, which draws up individuals from the bottom to top’ and links it with Dumont’s analysis of Mandeville’s ‘The Grumbling Hive’ which set out to show the necessity of selfishness in the production of good, and led Western thought inexorably from hierarchical models of society toward ‘justifying individualism’\(^{1191}\). Douglas makes an interesting point about the nature of such cultural changes: when they occur ‘the whole information system has to be transformed’ [\textit{My emphasis}], because the ‘existing patterns’ cannot withstand the turmoil or perturbation. Douglas’ point is that the change has to be complete and that, given the implementation of equality, any retention of hierarchical positions cannot hold\(^{1192}\). She accepts Perkin’s theory that ‘equality has been entrenched as the overriding priority’ of our contemporary institutions, because of ‘the need to promote and recruit talent’\(^{1193}\). The basis for this assertion is questionable given the current findings of the lack of social

\(^{1187}\) Ibid. p. 117-118.
\(^{1188}\) Ibid. p. 119.
\(^{1189}\) Ibid. p. 120.
\(^{1190}\) Ibid. p. 118.
\(^{1192}\) Ibid. p. 118-119. Viz. Research Design. At Abecedary Institute one factor in the failure of the process of change to a flatter structure was that the hierarchy maintained its original relationship and did not devolve actual power; the failure matched Douglas’ interpretation that defines such changes as a way of inducing commitment in the workers without surrendering status, position, or power.
mobility in society, though it may have applied during the immediate post-
World-War II period. Her view that there has been a distribution of wealth and
property amongst 'shareholders and insurance companies' is equally doubtful,
given that 40% of the world's wealth is owned by 1% of the population.
However, she asserts that the principle can be found in the 'equality of
opportunity' that is promoted in the recruitment and promotion of talent into
the professions; it is also found in the criticism of unequal 'rival regimes' and
the abhorrence at 'stratified' hierarchical societies.
Douglas challenges the view that if the 'artificial virtues' are designed by a
society, that society is in no position to evaluate them: 'Recognising the social
origin of ideas does not commit us to refraining from judging between
systems'\(^\text{1194}\). Hume's philosophy accepts relativism and judges the justice of
systems on the basis of logic and practicality. These are objective not
subjective evaluations. Since social behaviour is organised on a coherent set
of principles, therefore the system may be evaluated on its coherence, and
accordingly reformed to remedy incoherence and arbitrariness. i.e., arbitrary
rules\(^\text{1195}\), which Hume stated 'defeats the essential purpose of justice'.
Evaluation of the practice of a system might consider how well 'a system of
justice performs the task of providing abstract principles for regulating
behaviour'. Systems may be compared as systems: 'they may be judged
better or worse according to the good sense we can make of their
assumptions'.\(^\text{1196}\) A system may be 'too arcane, too complex, too ramifying to
be understood', too secretive and mysterious, or too inefficient. Douglas offers
the examples of legal systems from one country being applied to another
country and culture, or of courts being 'too remote from the centres of
population', like a management from their staff. Hume's relativism prevents
taking a virtue, like equality, and proving that it is always 'right and best'\(^\text{1197}\).
Recently democracy has been suggested as a universally applicable value
across the world, but in each country where it has been introduced, it has been
differently applied and interpreted\(^\text{1198}\). In an argument that brings to mind
Critical Theory's assault on delusion, Douglas merges relativism with delusion
and cites examples of the arbitrariness of totalitarian discrimination, which may

\(^{1194}\) Ibid, p.121
\(^{1195}\) Cf. Text p. 99 line 8-23; Text p. 474 line 7 - p.475 line 9; Text p. 473 line 11 - p. 480 line 1:
Respondents make judgements using coherence and practicality. Text p. 523 line 24 - p 524 line 13;
Text p. 368 line19- 31: More bureaucratic procedures being introduced to remedy existing ones.
\(^{1197}\) Ibid. p.120-121.
\(^{1198}\) Note: The application of fee systems from other countries to UK HE students was an issue that was
much debated as an idea.
be evaluated and judged on the basis of 'what is real and what is illusory in the world...[because] there are objective tests of right and wrong versions of the world and how it works'.

Rather obliquely throughout, Douglas has been critical of the two centuries old rationality of Hobbes and Locke, that has placed individualism at the centre of Western thinking. As an illustration of her advocacy for the community and the institution, Douglas poses two dilemmas based on the test of the scarcity of resources: the distribution of its remaining food amongst a starving tribe and a medical board selecting a few patients among many for life-saving treatment. Based on evidence she explains that the tribe makes its decision 'by thinking through their institutions and preserving the tribal institution'; the medical board takes the 'big decisions individually...and in secret' which Douglas demonstrates, from a study of the evidence, were riven with ideological value assumptions: "the unbridled consciences, the built-in biases, the fantasies of a secret committee". The outcome is that for better or worse a community can let its institutions make its decisions, even if it means the weakest shall starve to save the tribe, but 'only when it has conferred legitimacy upon them'. The evidence upon which she draws counters those who suggest that groups and communities are incapable of making tough decisions. Douglas adds a stern warning from 'Tragic Choices' that 'allocation by responsible accountable political institutions is unsatisfactory. This is the price of living in a plural society where legitimacy is always in doubt'. Her conclusion is that 'when individuals disagree on elementary justice, their most insoluble conflict is between institutions based on incompatible principles...Only changing institutions can help. We should address them, not individuals, and address them continuously, not only in crises'.

In this diplomatic and rather oblique way, Douglas, throughout her analysis, is an advocate of democratic, in fact direct participative democratic, institutions, and Hume's theory of conventions amongst equals provides it with a rationale, just as it provides the rationale for task-groups and collegiality. Though radical they are not new, but, as Douglas suggests, they have not been given the
'deliberate bias' and 'extraordinarily disciplined effort' that supports individualism.

Hume's notion of conventions supplies her with the outcome of what happens when institutions come into conflict and diplomacy ensues: if the institutions are near equal, 'diplomacy has a chance'; if they are of 'different kinds', presumably one is powerfully dominant, failure is likely to result because 'warnings will be misread. Appeals to nature and reason, compelling to one party, will seem childish or fraudulent to the other'.

Freud held the same view that 'reasonable motives' are powerless against a 'passionate impulse'.

Douglas' approach is subtly democratic, consensual and anti-individualistic when she suggests that change would be a consequence of the recognition that the 'big decisions' are made by 'legitimated institutions'. Not only is this a downgrading of the power of individual action, it is rejection of Schotter's interpretation of institutions as 'machines for thinking' for 'institutional processing...the routine, low level, day to day thinking' so that the mind of the individual, freed from minor decisions, 'is left to weigh important and difficult matters' Therefore Douglas has to weigh the relationship between the individual agent and the community. A community only exists to the extent that it 'penetrates the minds of its members' and their common experiences help to define their 'wants', 'ideas of merit and self-definition' and also the member's idea of self and the nature of the community. Douglas rejects both the idea that community is external, and Rawls' two definitions that give the individual an identity created separately from the community and the context: that a community's members are motivated by self-interest and the common good 'consists in their achieving their individual goals', and that the community's sense of cooperation prompts an emotional response from its members.

Douglas prefers Sandel's theory that the individual is defined by the community: 'For them, community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens, but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely as an attribute but a constituent of their identity'

She also acknowledges the truth of its 'insight and rightness', and its parallels with

1204 Ibid. p. 126, and viz. above for the account of Hume’s conventions.
Durkheim’s ‘thought worlds’, because it provides a sense of identity and a focus for moral understanding\textsuperscript{1210}. Sandel suggests that the community is where an individual discovers an identity, which eerily evokes the idea of the exploratory purpose of higher education. Douglas is summoning up the idea of traditions and their ancient foundations, like Gintis’ notions of community and cooperation, in a challenge to the ‘extraordinarily disciplined effort’ that has been spent on creating the Hobbesian egotistical man. Hobbes offers ‘a theory of human behaviour’ with only ‘self-regarding motives’ with no room for ‘community-mindedness or altruism, still less heroism except as an aberration’\textsuperscript{1211}. In this she is echoing Hume’s rejection of egoism because of the clearly observable altruism in people’s behaviour.

Douglas offers a definition of culture that encapsulates the target of all the management strategies that seek to influence culture by working on individual choice and commitment: ‘Culture is the organization that it achieved by individual commitment...people choose to commit to a particular sector’.

People choose to commit themselves to a particular culture and cultural theory is about ‘the range of possibilities and the different effects of constraints which a particular culture persuades them to impose on themselves in order to sustain it’\textsuperscript{1212} [i.e., of Douglas’ map of the dynamics of culture (Viz. below)]

As a ‘theory of culture’, it is cogent and persuasive and the definitions illuminate the attitudes and behaviour of the characters and dramatic persona in this research, because Douglas is seeking to represent in these cultures the ‘constitution-making capacity of individuals’, a faculty that Hume called ‘conventions’. It also reflects the different groupings, ideologically based within the organisation, and provides an interpretation of the divided organizations that McNay found and observed in other higher education institutions. It follows in the tradition of Hume’s ‘conventions’ rather than Hobbesian and Lockean ‘contracts’. It seems to define the cooperative relationships in experiments with the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and evidence from group cooperatives that Gintis records in support of his theories.

‘Without a functionalist form of argument we cannot begin to explain how a thought world constructs a thought style that controls its experience...A focus on the most elementary forms of society brings to light the source of legitimacy that will never appear in the balancing of individual interests. To

\textsuperscript{1210} Cf. Hume’s concept of the ‘common good’.
\textsuperscript{1211} Ibid. p. 128.
acquire legitimacy every kind of institution needs a formula that founds its rightness in reason and in nature. Half of our task is to demonstrate this cognitive process at the foundation of the social order. The other half or our task is to show that the individual's most elementary cognitive process depends on social constitutions. Minimally an institution is only a convention, David Lewis' definition is helpful: a convention arises when all parties have a common interest in there being a rule to insure coordination, none has a conflicting interest, and none will deviate lest the desired coordination is lost.\(^{1213}\)

The legitimacy of authority and power lies not in an external authority but in mutuality, i.e., within the partners to the convention. Taking a perspective that is Humean, Douglas suggests that within the context of individual choice, as the reflection of 'individual need...and individual psyche', individuals also choose the governing conventions by which to organize their societies. Douglas suggests there is a kind of collective choice, because 'individuals are vitally interested in the kind of society they are living in [and] any act of choice is also active in their constitution-making interests. A choice is an act of allegiance and a protest against the undesired model of society. On this theory each type of culture is by nature hostile to the other three cultures.\(^{1214}\)

Douglas' four cultures are:

The **hierarchy**, thus 'in favour of formality and compartmentalization'  

The **enclave** of 'equality within a group' and thus in favour of spontaneity and free negotiation, and very hostile to other ways of life  

**Individualism**, thus a 'competitive culture'  

**Isolation**, 'the isolate who prefers to avoid the oppressive controls of other forms of social life'.\(^{1215}\)

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\(^{1215}\) Ibid. p. 42.
Unless the worlds are separate, like work and home, it is impossible for any one person to belong to two worlds, because the cultures are in opposition to each other. 'Certain key preferences denote unambiguous alignment because they cannot be reconciled with their opposite...No one can have both at once'. The 'cultural impossibilities' that Douglas cites are 'the spiritual [versus] the material'; the practice of 'formality' at the same time as 'informality'; 'specialized functions' are incompatible with 'general participation'; hierarchy disvalues equality, 'fervour opposes cool judgement...heterodoxy is opposed to orthodoxy'. The dynamics of
the opposing 'cultural bias' are shown in the diagram [above] of opposed cultural bias. Power and the possession of power are at the heart of the dynamics.

Thus, diagonal B-D is 'the diagonal of withdrawal or protest'. Those persons at B are in a 'backwater', but their 'dissent is private, idiosyncratic, but not necessarily unhappy or angry'; they have either withdrawn from the "rat-race", to try to avoid even trying to exert power or have been 'driven out of the running for power'. Those persons at D are 'organized dissenting enclaves, usually indignant against the abuse of power and wealth' and though the enclave engages in 'debate on the principles of governance' which tends to raise the 'metaphysical stakes' and will take it into the areas of philosophy, ethics and the first principles of nature and thought. Douglas adds that these 'spiritual' and metaphysical stakes will be raised 'the more active the confrontation between the establishment and the enclave'\textsuperscript{1217}. Douglas does not offer a 'deterministic theory', because movement is possible between the different divisions. Displaced persons may be isolates, but an isolate may have some success, become an individualist entrepreneur and then his 'passive views may turn into the opportunism of the individualist culture'. A researcher ploughing a lonely furrow for many years may find that her research findings are taken up by the establishment and she is taken along with it into another

\textsuperscript{1217} Ibid. p. 44
sector. 'Historically many enclaves have been formed by disaffected hierarchists'.

Therefore, Douglas' perspective is 'a technique for thinking about culture without indulging in 'subjective bias'. It offers an explanation why 'a bundle of preferences can be coded as either at the spiritual or the material end of the spectrum'. 'Cultural pressure' does not force people to choose one or the other... It does not even assume that people know what they want, but it does assume that they know what they do not [Original emphasis] like, and that they are realistic about their opportunities'. 'Cultural theory can explain how hates get to be standardized'. Douglas' four cultures organize themselves differently as life styles, and in choosing one reject the others. The individualist chooses competition, 'open -network, arty, risky' and the 'freedom to change commitments', and rejects the hierarchical lifestyle of 'formal, established traditions, and established institutions', family and friends. Both reject the enclavist's egalitarianism which rejects the 'formality, pomp, artifice...[of] authoritarian institutions' in favour of 'simplicity, frankness, intimate friendship, and spiritual values'. The isolate rejects all the others and is free, utterly unencumbered by the costs and obligations of colleagues, partnerships, group-memberships, friendships, loyalties and commitments – Douglas admits that 'in another frame of reference, he is alienated'.

Dynamics of opposition focus on the dispute about power, getting it and holding it. The structure of authoritative power, the positive diagonal A-C will be supported by those who believe in 'authority, leadership and domination [and the] appropriate use of force; they are much more liable to worry about subversion, arbitrariness and anarchy...authority is in principle acceptable; in their different ways they are seeking to exert it; violence is disapproved of if it is arbitrary...The cultures on the positive diagonal are always busy classifying and discarding incompetents, deviants, traitors and weaklings. Nobody on the positive diagonal cares too much what happens to the discards'. The accounts of fear of subordinates and historical fear of the mob confirm that this is one of their primary motivations.

The 'negative diagonal B-D will routinely oppose and query the quest for, possession of and use of power of the positive diagonal. Isolates will lack power; enclavists will combine in protest at domination; and at the extremes of both will be found vehement protest. The values of the two diagonals are

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1218 Ibid. p. 46
1219 Ibid. p. 45
1220 Ibid. p. 83-84.
1221 Ibid. p. 46-47 and p. 183.
opposed and Douglas offers the model [Viz. above], after Levi Strauss, of opposed pairs. Douglas suggests the contrast of spiritual' and 'material' where the contrasting groups would have 'spiritual, subtle, pure, refined’ opposed to 'material, gross, impure, vulgar'. Though the 'coding of these values is going on all around them', the diagonal of authority will not use the coding 'to refer to wealth and power but to assess the relative value of work and leisure'. Commercial values will be coded as more "materialist” compared with ethics and art. The diagonal of authority accepts the values of the status quo without question. Douglas is following Bourdieu's analysis of good taste\(^{1222}\) where those with 'economic capital' accept this 'unradical, unpolitical coding' to 'collaborate unproblematically with the social system as it presents itself'.

In contrast the enclave and the isolates disapprove vehemently of 'materialism', but they are 'peripheralized in mainstream society' and will be short of 'economic capital', as defined by Bourdieu, but would find justification or 'legitimacy' for their values in, for instance, advocating human values and condemning their abuse. Allocating blame is the everyday occurrence by which people declare their allegiance to one sector by blaming the other cultures, and Douglas identifies a 'distinctive pattern of blaming. Hierarchy lays blame on weak definition of responsibilities, that is, on inadequate organisation. Individualists blame hierarchists for blocking freedom of action and blame enclavists for attacking their profits. Dissenting groups are essentially organized for moral criticism; their blame tends to be cast against the whole system and the badness of people's hearts [Pace this research]. A community tending to encourage angry "system blame" is moving towards the bottom right-hand corner of the diagram\(^{1223}\), i.e., withdrawal, and collective and principled dissent. This matches Gintis' interpretation of withdrawal of cooperation by strong reciprocators as their response to selfish behaviour by others in a community\(^{1224}\). Though in cultural theory individualism and hierarchy share the same positive diagonal because they both want power and authority, they are also in conflict because of hierarchical bureaucracy and the individualistic market.

The issues at the heart of Douglas’ interpretation are getting or rejecting power, commitment to a culture, and the constraints that each culture places on its members. Power therefore plays its part in defining the negative diagonal, B-D, but in this case the cultures do not have power and neither do they seek it.


\(^{1224}\) Cf Gintis, below
The dissenting enclave has a commitment to ‘austere abstention’ and rejects the ‘good things of life’. However, crucially and ironically, Douglas asserts that, if the enclave could count on the support of the isolates, also on the negative diagonal B-D, they ‘would be powerful indeed’.

But dissenting groups come in a variety of guises and the ‘crux’ in defining cultures is the group’s attitude to power: does a group want to get it and hold it? ‘To classify them in cultural theory terms, their attitude to control, territory, and wealth are decisive factors’. Therefore, a dissenting group that seeks power belongs on the positive diagonal line A-C; such a group seeking power, whatever it may advocate about the virtues of equality, will accept the need for power in its internal workings. The narrative of Abecedary Institute clearly demonstrates a group shifting across to the positive diagonal: the HDDs’ seeking representation to be formally constituted as part of the governance of Abecedary Institute showed them belonging to the positive diagonal A-C. They moved from being a dissenting enclave, and as a group they set themselves up with formal meetings, a Chairman and formal proposals to the Governors. It is uncertain whether or not they appreciated the location of power in the Constitution and in the appointed Governors, and therefore the nature of the revolution they were proposing, though what they proposed was far from being a universal direct participative democracy. In fact, it harked back to the earlier oligarchy of a Heads of Department Group that dominated the institution. Whatever the case, their proposed incursion into the power structure was rejected. The introduction of Heads of Faculty effectively broke them up as a collective unit.

Generally, dissenting groups on the negative diagonal lack leadership, are weakly organized and reject distinctions of ranks and their main worry is members’ defecting and a weakening of commitment in the ranks. Such a group has to maintain group enthusiasm and is likely to have short-term goals with lightly improvised organisation. Its only possible constraints on its members are ‘scorn, ridicule, exhortation’ because it has no political rewards or punishments of any kind and cannot use force because the victim could appeal to an external authority.

Protest is the ideal goal for the dissenting group, but it plays out differently depending on where the group is located on the diagonals. A dissenting enclave, on the negative diagonal, intent on protest alone, offers no rewards to

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1226 Ibid. p. 178.
1227 Ibid. p. 179.
its members and ‘this gives its distinctive moral superiority. Everything it does is disinterested’\textsuperscript{1229}. A politically motivated dissenting group, like the Heads of Department in Abecedary Institute\textsuperscript{1230}, intent on ‘recovering lost territory or political rights’\textsuperscript{1231} belongs on the positive diagonal because however distant, in time and effort, their goals can offer power and wealth when they are won. It therefore has the possibilities of effective organization and ‘incentives for obedience and loyalty’. These are the groups that managers and management gurus seeks to utilize because of the commitment of their members to its culture and effective organisation. However, their place on the positive diagonal, A, makes it clear that they are at odds with, and in opposition to, the established hierarchy at C. Douglas offers a crucial historical example of the highest authority endowing dissenting groups with authority by moving them across to the positive diagonal. In her example, the dissenting groups were the early Christians in the negative enclave, but on his conversion the Emperor Constantine moved them across to A. This example illustrates that support at the highest level of authority is needed and must be sustained to begin and maintain the process of group–based organization. Moreover, it indicates that an equally profound conversion of the highest authority is needed to bring it into being. But the subsequent hierarchical structure of the Roman Church indicates also that power still remained in the imperial hierarchy. By converting dissenting groups to an establishment hierarchy, without devolving power into republican governance, a monarchical hierarchy will logically re-emerge because power has not been devolved.

Since dissenting groups are defined by their opposition to other cultures, it is necessary for a dissenting group bent on achieving power to have both a clearly defined goal and a clearly defined opponent. Protest against injustice on behalf of the victimized are the classic elements that define the culture of the dissident enclave and its opposition to other cultures, especially the positive diagonal where the ‘classifying and discarding [of] incompetents, deviants, traitors and weaklings\textsuperscript{1232}, takes place with little concern. It is amongst the isolates that the dissenting groups find those victims on whose behalf they wish to protest. Alternatively, a dissenting group without a clearly defined aim will lack the motivating forces of power and rewards for its supporters, will have a weak leadership structure, but will have the option of becoming a select highly principled group of people.

\textsuperscript{1229} Ibid. p. 180.
\textsuperscript{1230} Viz. Research Design
\textsuperscript{1232} Ibid. p.183.
It is productive to examine one dissenting group in the University sector, to which Abecedary Institute also belonged, and whose academic learning is highly relevant to this national situation.

Critical Management studies writers sometimes speculate on whether they are this kind of disparate high-minded group, a dissenting enclave, or are a force moving onto the positive diagonal, and so offer suggestions on the early stages of how this might be achieved. Alvesson and Willmott discuss the issue in just these terms, so that the influence of Critical Management Theory is less an issue of the strength of CMT [Critical Management Theory] in intellectual terms than the politics and practice of educational institutions and learning media. They make the point that much management training takes place 'in house', within companies, inculcating staff into the companies' ways of thinking and organizing, while the academics 'restrict our discussion to the content and delivery of management education within educational establishments'. The members of the CMT 'enclave' are described, in terms that Douglas has already generally defined as 'highly committed to education...[they] provide intellectual weight and are less likely to exploit their position to attract private consultancy work...[but] it is probably unrealistic to expect this group to exert a leading or dominant influence in the field of management'. Alvesson and Willmott suggest that CMT's independence from any source of power is their strength: 'CT [Critical Theory] does not claim the support of any particular class or party (or unions) which means that all educational media become primary channels for facilitating change'. Thus working within that system it is possible to 'gain[ing, sic] research and advisory access to decision making centres in society', and provide 'a more grounded illumination and critique of the operation of the "purposive-rational sub-systems" in contemporary society'. In this they identify the potential of CMT's situation as part of a Socratic tradition, referred to elsewhere, of 'teaching as a subversive activity' [Viz. above, for education of 'crap detectors'] and the method recommended is that of "Johnny Appleseed" [John Chapman 1774-c. 1845] – planting seeds here and there till over time many orchards bear fruit. They cite Rosen's recommendation that the 'temptation to undertake lucrative consultancy projects' provides an opportunity for academics to acquire "professional and technical skills, social legitimacy and esteem, access to funding, access to various forums of communication and so on – to develop the praxis concept of

a conscious force for change"\textsuperscript{1235}. Planting the critical 'seed' is to be done by Socratic teaching, appropriately 'dialogue'\textsuperscript{1236}, - like the ideal speech situation - rather than the lecture, with the Habermasian objective of self-reflection and enlightenment, and more actively by not just 'information processing and problem solving but...[being] actively involved in shaping attention and agenda setting: " In their everyday, ordinary questioning of possibilities, alert or ignore others, call forth or disregard particular concerns, spread or narrow the bases of design, criticism, and thus decision making"\textsuperscript{1237}. Essentially teachers, researchers and academics live by the 'word' and characteristically, this rallying call is for more 'words' in the hope that they will translate into 'decision-making' or action. It is not clear who is going to make the decisions, however good the quality of the rationale behind them, nor whether the 'word' will translate into the deed; it does enable a dissenting enclave to preserve its high-minded principles and the illusion that the 'word' is sufficient.

This does, however, mark a tentative transition from the 'dissenting enclave' [sector D] toward the 'weak incorporation' of 'active individualism' [sector A]. Alvesson and Willmott recognise the division amongst their colleagues: 'many management teachers and researchers' hold to the view that their role is to 'present potential and existing managers with the techniques...anticipated...to improve corporate and employee performance and not...to reflect on the political or ethical significance of ownership and managerial control. In effect, the latter issues are marginalized as matters for the consciences of individual managers or for legislation by the State\textsuperscript{1238}. This indicates that there is an implicit recognition that the issue is political and requires political action. It also suggests a tacit recognition that being managed is like being ruled, just as respondents in this case-study record their perception of being an employee and being a ruled subject and talk in terms of character, ethics and politics. As Douglas' theory predicts, Alvesson and Willmott define the CMT group by its opposition to the world of business management and organization and its identification of the 'victim' amongst the employees: 'treatment of human beings as means rather than ends, the conformism associated with cultural ideological control...the manufacture of consumer identities, the "bottom


\textsuperscript{1236} Cf. Text p. 473 line 11 – p. 480 line 19. Unitisation of courses, semesterisation and high staff student ratios have reduced the time for discussions.


\textsuperscript{1238} Ibid. p. 205.
line"...the pursuit of wealth regardless of social costs and ecological consequences...[and] management [being] routinely absorbed in the instrumental quest for corporate expansion and careerist gratification.1239 These are identified as elements in 'the labour market, business, government and political elites', or in Douglas' terms, the 'Conservative Hierarchy', [sector C]. Critical Management Theory in contrast is 'identified with the idealist pursuit of an ethics of community and collective self realization'. What Alvesson and Willmott indicate in their conclusion is that the Habermasian prediction of a long political process is necessary, that there is an element of critical discontent, but while the protest remains at the level of 'the word', the outcome is far from clear. Alvesson and Willmott applaud small gains, like 'increased discretion and improved job satisfaction' and reject comparing these with 'Utopian visions of autonomy, creativity and democracy' because such little victories have relevance to the 'everyday life experiences and struggles of many organizational participants'.1240 They can also refer to Forester's claim that CMT can expose matters that 'politico-economic structures would bury from public view' and raise 'questions that otherwise would be kept out of public discussion'.1241 However, these 'small' steps toward CMT's goal have to be matched against its becoming a 'central theory', as in Fischer's description of CMT's move from being a 'dissenting enclave' to grasping and holding power: 'As long as the political model remains only a theoretical [Original emphasis] challenge to technocracy, the stakes are largely relegated to the intellectual realm. Once it is introduced as a central theory [My emphasis] in the education and training of aspiring managers, however, it begins to take the form of a challenge to existing organizational relations'.1242

In terms of Critical Theory's programme, this statement places two conditions in a progression, the initial realization of delusion leading to the final enlightenment and then the enlightenment's introduction as a 'central theory', without considering the long political process that it is likely to take place if those in power do not wish to give it up.1243 The 'word' alone is never sufficient. Some of the evidence of this research shows that democratic

1240 Ibid. p. 186.
1243 Geuss R. Op. cit. p. 74-75 i.e., 'to abolish an established social institution...deeply rooted in the interests of some social class will...require more than a change...in the form of consciousness of the oppressed; it will require a long course of political action. Until that course of action is brought to a successful conclusion, the institution will continue to exist and exert its baleful influence on even enlightened agents, restricting their freedom and frustrating their desires'
initiatives can be overwhelmed by the strangleholds of established power.\textsuperscript{1244} Evans\textsuperscript{1245} in her account of Cambridge University's fight to preserve its direct democracy records that no support came from their management departments nor any general advice on the management of the university itself, but does record instances of 'career gratification' [Viz. above]. There seems to be the opportunity for research into the effect and implementation of CMT thinking on the management of University Management Studies departments and the contribution of management departments to university and higher education management itself. Dissent, rebellion and non-violent protest can be constructive, like Deetz's suggestion of workers' locking out the management instead of withdrawing from the workplace, but from the opposing perspective it is still rebellion.

A person is not an isolate, if she/he is collaborating with another. The defining factor in being an isolate is 'restriction of choice...the only freedom of action that a person has after paying social dues is personal'.\textsuperscript{1246} Predictably, isolates are to be found amongst the very poor, and, surprisingly, amongst those who are in 'highly esteemed positions', because they are 'heavily fenced in with rules' so that their options are severely restricted. Douglas suggests that the Queen is one such, and likewise membership of the Royal family; since members of the Royal family figure as Chancellors of nearly all the universities, it is possible to suggest that University Chancellors equally are isolates, e.g., 'officially part of the community but marginal'. However, isolates are 'not unwillingly' part of this sector.\textsuperscript{1247}

Often described as 'alienated' or 'don't knows', the isolates are 'potentially the majority of the population'. Their cultural style is not a psychological disposition but a barrier against pressure that shares certain identifiable characteristics: eccentricity of thought, an 'irregular and inconsequential connection' with and a decoupling from the rest of society with missed appointments and deadlines passed off with self-deprecating jokes. Because they expect nothing of other people and nothing of themselves, they accept the uselessness of organizing or persuading others and consequently all pressure is lifted from them, but apathy may set in. 'Their main freedom is one that other people fight for: freedom to believe what they like, whenever

\textsuperscript{1247} Ibid. p. 184.
they like. Douglas' verdict that being 'happy with their undemanding lot, isolates tend to construe the universe benignly'; therefore the Critical Theory task of enlightenment is not likely to be a simple and easy task because 'information simply does not rub off on people who are not going to make use of it'. Persuading them out of isolation is most likely to prove futile; 'better to prevent a large population from being driven against their wishes into the role of uninvolved isolate'.

While the positive diagonal, A-C, the 'active individualism' - 'conservative hierarchy', is straightforward to define, the negative diagonal, B-D, the 'backwater isolation - dissident enclave', is the diagonal that is 'central to issues of governability', and by extension, to manageability, given the way this research's respondents conceive of being managed, as being ruled. Douglas has already suggested that if the isolates and the dissenters could cooperate they would be 'powerful indeed' [Viz. above]. Douglas asserts that 'any great dislocation of institutions could send vast numbers to inhabit' the B-D diagonal. The kind of changes that could bring about this migration are 'deskilling the workforce', rejection and unemployment because of economic depression, and the 'casualization' of labour so that temporary staff outnumber permanent employees. Douglas' verdict is that 'the industrial process that is reducing mutual involvement and responsibility is channeling a large proportion of the community into the isolate quadrant', with a consequent increase to both 'apathy and dissent'. Douglas' gloomy conclusion is that the difficulty for the ideas on the negative diagonal becoming effective is that the nature of the two groups work against each other, so that the question is: Can the dissenting group organize matters without losing isolate members who are opposed to any organization? Her only model is for the highest authority - the Emperor in her example - to convert and bring them into the positive diagonal. Power here was voluntarily given to the enclave. While it does appear to confirm the 'big man' theory of historical development, the Emperor could be changed to the institution of Government itself, which would then be identified as a target for political action. Evans reminds us that the Charters of Oxford and Cambridge Universities are 'royal'. It is only a logical extension to recognise that so are the others, and that they are created by the monarch's
governments, sitting in Parliament, and that those governments are
democratically elected, and that some of those members of Parliament
represent seats in university towns. While this is not a plan, nor a
recommendation, these facts indicate one 'long political process that would
have to be undertaken to change matters according to the analysis of Critical
Theory. This should come as no surprise, for it is after all the process that
created them initially, and that created more of them in the image of the
Thatcher government’s policy that brought about the current situation\textsuperscript{1251}, and
it is the same process whereby the Blair Government left the issue untouched,
while changing the financial structure of the whole sector which affected and
will affect the lives of a generations of students, who make up 47% and soon
to be 50% of the young adult population of the UK.

This simple account illustrates Douglas’ assertion of the potential ‘powerful’
combination of the negative diagonal, their centrality to the issue of
‘governability’, and the ‘political and ethical issues’ that some management
teachers appear to ‘marginalize’, according to Alvesson and Willmott\textsuperscript{1252}.
Douglas’ theory that ‘the cultures are in opposition to each other’ is useful in
accepting the link between the history and culture of the external world and the
internal world of the organisation. Moreover, it points up the impossibility of a
hierarchical structure, of its own accord, introducing empowered egalitarian
task-groups within the same organization, or the impossibility of a hierarchical
structure being happily introduced into an egalitarian culture. The introduction
of task-groups as the basic unit of organization proposes an abdication of
monarchical power. It also interprets the difficulty managements have with
implementing task-group cultures because they eventually, out of a natural
extension of their activity, encroach upon the management’s own hierarchical
power because the task requires it. It interprets why task-groups, after working
in and for hierarchical cultures, become cynical and hostile because the
hierarchical management is still in operation and in power and their hierarchy is
alien to the task-group’s egalitarian values. It explains why there is the
resistance at Cambridge and Oxford to the introduction of hierarchical
organization because it spells the end of the egalitarian culture and all that it
has achieved. The different ‘thought worlds’ or cultures and constitution-
making capacities are in opposition to and are hostile to each other.

\textsuperscript{1251} Cf. The Background: The narrative of the polytechnic heads’ lobbying the Thatcher government in
However the vitality and survival of a culture depends upon the ‘normative debate about how it should conduct its affairs’\textsuperscript{1253}, therefore the life of a culture is adversarial and Douglas advocates that ‘there is nothing wrong with its tendency to polarize’ because the adversarial process of defining a culture ‘develops a distinctive morality’. Therefore Douglas cites the conclusion that “Divided we stand” because culture thrives on opposition.\textsuperscript{1254} She sees strength in deliberation and debate between the cultures because each takes a different stand on power and authority. The issue that is not resolved is the process by which this debate is to take place; Dunn suggests that it lies in the process of deliberative democracy\textsuperscript{1255}.

Evidence of the collaborative deliberation and the effectiveness of cooperative working is found in the work of Herbert Gintis, whose analysis of the nature of cooperation overlaps the academic areas of biology, sociology and economics, largely through evidence gained from studying communities throughout the world and from simulation models of economic practice, like ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Their relevance is the light they shed on collaborative working, decision-making, or, in a word, collegiality, in its proper sense. Gintis is interested in cooperation amongst people as a feature of human existence and its success-rate compared with self-regarding behaviour. This involves him in weighing the success rates of self-regarding behaviour, co-operation and altruism. Self-regarding behaviour is obviously selfishness. Gintis defines altruism as ‘sacrificing one’s own interest in favour of another’s’. The usual explanations of cooperation include ‘enlightened self-interest’ or ‘reciprocal altruism’, a ‘tit-for tat’ exchange of benefits, that occurs in a myriad of species like bees, ants, and packs of hunting dogs, and is transmitted genetically to form their primitive culture. Since Homo sapiens is also an animal, it can be assumed that this applies to humans\textsuperscript{1256}. However, Gintis suggests that these explanations are incomplete, because they do not describe what is uniquely human. These basic explanations for cooperation can apply to other species, like ‘kin altruism’ [repeated interactive co-operation within a family or group\textsuperscript{1257}] or ‘reciprocal altruism’ [‘tit for tat’ exchanges of one act for another

\textsuperscript{1254} Ibid. p. 175, citing Thompson M. and Schwarz M. Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice Brighton: Harvester: Wheatsheaf, 1989.
\textsuperscript{1255} Cf. Dunn.
\textsuperscript{1256} Gintis H. E. Why do we cooperate? Boston Review February/March 1998.
\textsuperscript{1257} Cf. Text p. 455 line6 and – p.455 line 19 – p. 456 line 22; Text p. 103 line 15-p. 104 line 16; Text p. 454 line 33 - p. 456 line 6; Text p. 170 line 16 - p 172 line 7, Text 309 line 8 -12; Text 340 line 16-17; Text p. 352 line24 - p. 353 line 2 7; Text 353 line 24 - p. 353 line 14; Text p. 365 line18 – 366 line 30;
of equal value or calculating the reward or punishment for a behaviour. Textbook economics uses this as the basis of its explanation of the practical rationality of 'Homo economicus', who 'cooperates only when it serves his purpose'\textsuperscript{1258} \textit{...[and does not cooperate]} for instance, when dealing with people who cannot help him, or when he can commit acts of violence without fear of apprehension - 'Homo economicus' is what we would commonly call a sociopath: an individual totally indifferent to the well-being of others\textsuperscript{1259}. Similarly, the dominant view of evolution is the principle of self-interest, as exemplified by Richard Dawkins’s 'The Selfish Gene': ‘We are survival machines - robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes...a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour...Let us try to teach \textit{[original emphasis]} generosity and altruism because we are born selfish’\textsuperscript{1260}. 

\textit{Homo economicus} is a theory, and yet, since Hobbes, it has been presented as plain fact. ‘Teach’ in this statement implies the positive, if not remedial, active impact of culture, but in Dawkins’ interpretation it is only a superficial veneer over a predominant selfishness. The case for the dominance of selfishness as the incontrovertible definition of human nature is very excitedly expressed thus: ‘No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, once sentimentalism has been set aside. What passes for cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation...Scratch an altruist and watch a hypocrite bleed'.\textsuperscript{1261} Like Hume, Bowles and Gintis reject this and recognise that everyone is not a sociopath in the mould of 'Homo economicus', but accept the existence of self-regarding behaviour, while refuting the tautology that self-interest is the only explanation for apparently co-operative behaviour. The usual explanations follow Hobbes, and the circular argument goes that if an act gives a pay-off to the self, it must be selfish, so all acts are selfish. If such self-regarding behaviour produces the higher pay-off, selfishness must be


the more successful strategy. Bowles and Gintis imply that such a high level of rational calculation is unreal. It is more than likely that the self-regarding individual will be unable to calculate the outcomes of different behaviours 'in a world that has become too complex and multi-faceted to be fruitfully evaluated piecemeal through individual rational assessment'\textsuperscript{1262}.

Therefore, Bowles and Gintis speculate on the occurrence of cooperation among human beings and seek an explanation that is unique to humans. Like Hume, Gintis and Bowles successfully refute the complete dominance of selfishness with examples from everyday life as well as extreme disaster, i.e., charitable donations and wartime. What Bowles and Gintis use to break up the circular argument of 'selfishness' is the existence of cooperation which takes place amongst non-family and non-kin and comes at some cost to the individual but benefits the group members. Human beings' 'widespread engagement in non-familial cooperation has no counterpart elsewhere in nature...and account for civilisation as we know it'\textsuperscript{1263}.

Their models and simulations suggest that cooperation requires two elements: people with a cooperative character trait and an appropriate organizational structure, so that when cooperative people are 'common' and the institutional structure of the group is conducive to cooperation, such groups can be more successful than self-regarding behaviour and can 'proliferate'\textsuperscript{1264}.

They also reject the simple explanation of culture in terms of the interaction between genes and the natural environment, like the Naturalist Theory and Zola's 'primary molecule' and the environment. Bowles and Gintis add culture itself as an active element to this formula because culture defines the nature of what is successful. Theories and evidence from the field of gene and cultural evolution are 'deeply destructive of traditional concepts of culture, politics and social policy...[because such theories] view culture as having a life of its own rather than being a static reflection of such social institutions as church, schooling, and state propaganda'. Gintis suggests that politicians of the right and left find this viewpoint disturbing because it suggests a cultural 'dynamic that can be influenced but not countermanded' while some find this liberating because of its potential power to influence the future of human life\textsuperscript{1265}. At the group level, culture defines some of the social institutions and conventions.


\textsuperscript{1265} Gintis H. [1998] op. cit.
There are examples of cooperation in the modern world based on incentives and sanctions supported by peer interactions and third party enforcement\(^{1266}\). Though they are reluctant to translate their ideas to the modern world, because their research is based on 'stateless simple societies', these organizations have dominated the progress of human progress and evolution. Instead they cite the results of game theory where there are no pre-determined social conventions and co-operation is shown to be the successful strategy\(^{1267}\). It is possible that size makes them even more relevant to organisations, and Layard\(^{1268}\), in his advocacy for 'happiness', and the Government's Department of Trade and Industry report equally endorsing high performance work\(^{1269}\), use much the same approach and material evidence.

The DTI account of high performance work indicates that Bowles' and Gintis' ideas have been successfully drawn into the modern world in ways that confirm collective work, collective ownership and culture as a decisive factor when forming successful organisations and social institutions. Though Bowles and Gintis do not refer to David Hume, their speculation reaches the same conclusion about the role of emotions and passions as the motivator for actions and behaviour and the role of social 'conventions'. In Bowles' and Gintis' account of the 'Origins of Human Co-operation', the emotion of shame is the motivator for altruism and co-operation.

'Shame, guilt, empathy and other visceral reactions play a central role in sustaining co-operative relations. The puzzle is that pro-social emotions [i.e., physiologically or psychologically induced co-operation. My Note] are at least prima facie altruistic, benefiting others at a cost to oneself...Shame is a social emotion: a distress that is experienced when one is devalued in the eyes of consociates because of a value that one has violated or a behaviour norm that one has not lived up to\(^{1270}\).

Shame can work positively by remedying a person's ignorance, failure of understanding or appreciation of the future costs and benefits of such actions.

\(^{1266}\) Cf. Mondragon, above.
When a group feels shame, it can motivate increased performance. Bowles and Gintis liken shame to pain which offers the same message: 'whatever you did, undo it if possible and do not do it again'. Bowles and Gintis define the emotions of shame, guilt, empathy and consciousness of social sanctions as 'pro-social' because they prompt both constructive cooperation and the desire to punish violators of the cooperative culture, i.e., Hume's 'sensible knave'. Without such pro-social emotions, the alternative would be that human beings would be socio-paths and society would not exist. Socio-paths are not mentally or intellectually deficient, but their capacity to feel shame, guilt, empathy and remorse is very much reduced. Though socio-paths are only 3% to 4% of the US male population, they account for 20% of the US prisoners and 33% to 80% of chronic criminal offenders. Bowles and Gintis use this evidence to show that pro-social emotions and pro-social acts account for the civil ethos that make daily life possible and form the basis of the civil institutions of liberties, rights and respect for minorities. They acknowledge that there is 'no universally accepted model for how emotions combine with more cognitive processes to affect behaviours', they assert that 'it is uncontroversial that there are many civic minded acts that cannot be explained by self-regarding preferences, such as voting in elections, donations to charity, and giving one's life for another'. It is a point of view that mirrors David Hume's ethics almost exactly because this everyday evidence and that based on their simulations is about empathy, character reading, and a strong sense of fairness and justice. It also centres on character traits and character as the basis for action and reaction.

Co-operation shares with altruism the aspect that it incurs a cost for an individual as a consequence of engaging in a combined activity. But Bowles and Gintis share Hume's view that the standard explanations do not account for acts of altruism where no possible pay-off could be expected. They also draw on anecdotal evidence from everyday life and warfare as corroboration. The general lament for the loss of unity and cooperation that existed in Britain during World War II was and probably still is important evidence of the daily altruism to strangers without prospect of a pay-off, which people experienced.

and performed during those times when everyone was made equal by war. Moreover, the explanations that Bowles and Gintis reject are based on one-to-one exchanges and do not account for situations involving larger numbers, nor do they account for examples of cooperation within large groups, like information sharing and risk-reduction. Therefore they call the alternative, ’Homo recipicans’\(^\text{1274}\), whose principal defining behaviour, they explain is strong reciprocity [original emphasis]:

\begin{quote}
'a predisposition to cooperate...to respond to cooperative behaviour...by maintaining or increasing his level of cooperation and responds to free-riding behaviour...by retaliating against offenders even at a cost to himself, and even when he cannot reasonably expect future personal gains from such retaliation. The strong reciprocator is thus both a conditionally altruistic co-operator and a conditionally altruistic punisher [original emphasis], whose actions benefit the group members at a personal cost.'\(^\text{1275}\).
\end{quote}

It is called ‘strong’ to differentiate it from the reciprocity of ‘tit-for-tat’ altruism\(^\text{1276}\). It is a common motivation that goes beyond the everyday idea of unconditional altruism, because it may involve punishment as well as cooperative benefits and both responses are conditional on others’ behaviour. Many a mythic hero in Western films, like *Shane*, *High Noon*, *The Magnificent Seven*, and Kurosawa’s *Seven Samurai*, comes to take on the burden of just these characteristics as the aspirations and failures of the foundation of the American Dream are played out in these elemental narratives. Strong reciprocators are not unconditional altruists wishing to create utopias for perfect people. They are concerned with people as they are and wish to ‘punish’ those who violate or abuse the cooperation of others. As a motivation, it is not just a group dynamic for maintaining a norm but is based on a sense of fairness and justice and egalitarian sharing\(^\text{1277}\): ‘the notion that all else being

equal, there should be a rough balance of rights and obligations in social exchange\textsuperscript{1278}.

Gintis draws the evidence for his account of his 'character' \textsuperscript{1279} of the 'strong reciprocator' or 'Homo reciprocans' from an impressive body of experimental evidence from simulations, principally "public good" games, constructed to examine voluntary tax-payment and uses of public resources. One of the notions that they have been used to examine is the notion that the resistance of the poor to paying taxes may stem from their perception that the wealthy are not paying their share. How the game is played out suggests that the exploited 'punish' the 'free riders'. Thus, such games concentrate on the problem that Hume called the 'sensible knave'\textsuperscript{1280}.

The set-up for the simulation, an extended version of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" scenario, is that there are 10 players, each with 10 dollars, and 10 rounds of the simulation. In each round, each player can earn a reward of 50 cents, deposited in her/his own "private account" by the administrator, for each dollar that each of the players contributes to the "public account". At the end, a player may keep the contents of her/his "private account". At the end of each round, it is possible for each player to be rewarded with 5 dollars, if everyone cooperates in each round by paying one dollar into the "public account". At the end of the game, total cooperation would result in each player gaining 50 dollars to keep. The possible scenarios are that if one selfish player - 'free-rider' or 'sensible knave' - keeps her/his 10 dollars while the others contribute, she/he will end with 55 dollars, and the others only 45 dollars; if only one player cooperates, she/he finishes with 5 dollars, but the selfish end with 15 dollars. If everyone wants the selfish pay-off and no one contributes, no one wins and each ends, as she/he began, with 10 dollars. The highest pay-off comes from not contributing to the "public account", but that depends upon others' being contributors. Thus, if some cooperate, then selfishly taking a 'free-ride' is the winning strategy. If all are selfish, it is best to follow their example. However, significantly this final result is far, far less than what would have resulted from full cooperation.

These experiments have been played out for decades and the general findings are that there is only a small percentage of people who are wholly self-regarding 'Homo economicus'. Players initially are equally divided between


\textsuperscript{1280} Cf. Hume, above.
cooperative and selfish but as the game progresses they play more selfishly and become almost completely selfish, however the explanation is not that people are selfish. Of the interpretation of these result, those who support the idea of 'Homo economicus' suggest that as the players come to understand the game they appreciate the advantage of the selfish, 'sensible knave' or 'free-rider' strategy and adopt it. However, this interpretation was disproved by a subsequent experiment that repeated the whole game with the same players; again the game began with high levels of public spirited cooperation which decayed as the game progressed. The interpretation for the decline in cooperation as the game progressed was that the publicly oriented contributors wanted to punish the 'sensible knaves' or 'free-riders', and the only way they could do so was by withdrawing their contribution to the "public account".

A follow-up experiment proved that this was indeed the case, by allowing the public-spirited reciprocators to punish the 'sensible knaves' or 'free-riders' directly. As a result the cooperation from the 'free-riders' gradually increased until nearly all contributed. These simulations suggest that people engage in strategies which are in part determined by the culture or the context and so it is possible to increase cooperation. A later version by the same experimenters removed the possibility of strategic punishment by fines in a second phase of the game. It also introduced the influence of relationships, by assigning people to one of ten to eighteen different groups of four person each: partner, stranger, and perfect stranger. Those assigned to the partner group were told that they would be with the same people for all ten periods; those assigned to the stranger group were randomly moved to other groups after each period; those in the perfect stranger group were also randomly moved but told they would never meet the same people more than once. The game was played for 10 periods the first time with punishment and then for a further ten periods without punishment. The results are summarised in the figure below:

1284 Ibid. p.161.
In the *partner* group, cooperation is maintained, despite anonymity, and attains almost total cooperation even for the final period; but when punishment is removed cooperation deteriorates in the same way as previous games [Viz. above]. The comparison with the *stranger* and *perfect stranger* groups reveals that the punishment element is stronger in *partner* situations because players anticipate that punishment will be consistent throughout the game. The prosociality impact of strong reciprocity on cooperation is thus more strongly manifested, the more coherent and permanent the group in question. The outcome of the games can be influenced by changing particular elements, such as establishing social equality or building a relationship between players through pre-game communication, both of which produce higher and more sustained levels of cooperation. So when students were playing opposite other students or Red Cross workers, there was increased cooperation, but this declined when the students were matched against the police. Status was also significant, so that when the role of proposer in the "Ultimatum" game was awarded to the winner of a general knowledge quiz, these proposers offered lower proposals, and the respondents accepted smaller offers. Such findings

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indicate that the slightest shift in social status or social standing will change the level of cooperation. About 25% of all participants in these experiments have been found to be self-interested ‘Homo economicus’. Gintis concludes from these findings that ‘it is often the self-serving behaviour of this minority that, when it goes unpunished, unravels initial generosity and cooperation’\textsuperscript{1287}. This evidence from these simulations suggests that it is the shift of power from the ‘selfish’ to the strong reciprocators, and therefore from one set of egotistical behaviours to cooperative behaviours, that improved cooperation, and consequently greater rewards for all. Without this reinforcement, these game produced few winners but many losers, so that taken as a collective achievement the benefits were mediocre in comparison with the best that would have been made possible by cooperation. Cooperation is reinforced by the factors of permanence and interaction within the group. Underlying such potential superior performance through cooperation is a very strong sense of justice and fairness amongst the contributing reciprocators. “Ultimatum” and “Dictator” games illustrate this clearly. The “Ultimatum” game has only 2 players, a proposer and a respondent. The proposer is given 10 dollars and the instruction to make an offer to the respondent of any amount from that sum, from 1 cent to the total 10 dollars. If the respondent accepts this offer, both may retain whatever they have left. The “ultimatum” is that, if the respondent rejects the proposer’s offer, the original 10 dollars has to be returned and neither receives a reward. The strategy of \textit{Homo economicus} would be to offer the least. The experiment has been conducted in different contexts and with some large sums of money at stake, but the findings show that proposers make offers of a considerable percentage and respondents reject offers that are less than one third of the original sum\textsuperscript{1288}. The proposers’ reason for making generous offers is that they anticipate that any low offer would have been regarded as unfair and therefore proposers would punish the proposers for their injustice by rejecting it. The respondents who rejected low offers gave this same reason for their rejection of low offers. While selfishness explains the reason for the proposer’s ‘fair’ offer, it cannot explain the respondent’s reason for rejecting a low offer as unfair in order to punish the proposers. The respondents could have accepted the low offers, because ‘something is better than nothing’, therefore their rejection was at some cost.

to themselves, but they took that course of action with the intention of punishing unfairness. As a consequence any proposer has to estimate what others consider to be fair.

What is fair is defined by context, and as international studies have shown, proposers and respondents in the same context share the same concept of fairness. Thus, though the amount of the offer might change in different countries, the probability of rejection of an offer remained the same regardless of context. In a variant on this game, the “Dictator”, respondents are offered no choice but to accept, but proposers still make substantial offers despite the fact that they could keep all the cash for themselves.

The evidence also places character and character traits squarely in the centre of any discussion of the functioning of a society or organization. Gintis suggests further conclusions that reinforce the idea that human beings’ initial psychological make-up includes a genetic disposition toward ‘strong reciprocity’, but the strength or intensity of that reciprocity depends upon specific contexts and their cultural values, and the personal background and experiences that an individual brings with them. However, the morality of punishing non-cooperative behaviour - ‘an eye for and eye’ - is not generally supported by culture nor religion. Importantly the ‘tit-for-tat’, reciprocal altruism of the theory of Homo economicus cannot explain away some of these findings. The initial cooperation of players in the public good games is surprising, but even more so is the same initial cooperation when the game is repeated for a second time and everyone knows how it works and there follows the consequent punishment, at their own expense, meted out to some for unfair free-riding.

The same applies to the proposers’ making unnecessarily ‘fair’ offers to respondents in the “Dictator” game, when they could have kept all the cash. All are behaviours that indicate a different ethos from the generally accepted and dominant ideologies of Homo economicus and Hobbes’ ‘natural’ state of man as ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’, because humankind is at ‘Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man’. That produces bureaucracy, and unitises and attacks values, humane and decent, which it does not conceive of as existing and which are not defended, but, in

[1293] Ibid. p. 185.
the manner of *homo reciprocans*, are withdrawn. In an analytical model Gintis demonstrates the alternative behaviour of *homo reciprocans* that cooperation amongst human beings is reinforced where they recognise that greater pay-offs can be gained from co-operation. When groups share resources and risk-taking, and engage in consensus decision-making and adopt common cultural values, the members tend to suppress their differences. This touches upon a serious disadvantage of the group culture in its tendencies to create 'insider-outsider' distinctions, with a strong group-identity creating hostility to outsiders, so that one group's survival is at the expense of others. Bowles and Gintis suggest more heterogeneous groupings and the operation of equal rights and opportunities policies. However, on the basis of the evidence from modern game-theory and simulations alone, they suggest that unselfish co-operation is more successful than self-regarding behaviour. There are different consequences for different levels of 'altruistic behaviour'. Ironically, the limits of 'reciprocal altruism', tit-for-tat, of *Homo economicus* are revealed when group co-operation is most needed for survival. In the face of extinction or disbanding through a major disaster, like war, disease, famine, a group based on tit-for-tat 'reciprocal altruism', is likely to disband. Without the prospect of future rewards and benefits for individual contributions, the motivation for cooperation has gone. So, 'precisely when a group is most in need of pro-social behaviour, co-operation based on reciprocal altruism' [i.e., 'tit-for-tat' exchanges. My Note] will collapse [Original emphasis]. However, if there is a small number of strong reciprocators who make a contribution and 'punish defection' without regard for the probability of future payment, the survival chances of the human group is improved. This is endorsed by the account of the high performance work company that, faced with a cyclical downturn, rejected the text-book economics of *Homo economicus*, and so did not implement staff redundancies but instead retained all staff, introduced staff development and retraining and as a result became a stronger and more profitable company.

Gintis does however suggest that such strong reciprocators are no guarantee of success because, unlike animal groups, 'human tool making capabilities' can tip the balance in favour of either type, so it is possible for the weakest to destroy the strongest. The result depends on the make-up of the group, where

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the strength lies, and the ‘conventions within which they are operating’. Bowles and Gintis suggest that when the weak with a strong sense of reciprocity punish a strong self-regarding defector, it can be constructive. However, a strong reciprocating individual may be assessed by her/his potential constructive contribution and therefore the future reciprocal punishments that such individuals might hand out to the uncooperative; so the self-regarding but weak defectors may strike first: ‘even the strongest man can be killed while sleeping by the weakest, at a low cost to the punisher’ 1298.

Though expressed in terms of a ‘whodunit’ murder, it illustrates the importance of the psychology of character and motive in assessing the politics of a context. The composition of the group is the decisive factor. Therefore, other work involving agent-based simulations shows the decisive relevance of group selection based on ‘culturally transmitted traits’. If the majority of the group are adhering to the norms, the result is that the costs of maintaining the norms and punishing defection are greatly reduced because there is little need for it 1299. In organizational terms, the selection process for staff should include assessment of their capacity and potential for altruism and cooperation. An arrogant, uncooperative individualist, regardless of whatever other traits or brilliance she/he may possess, may destroy the successful group, which she/he joins, and thus seriously undermine the vision, purpose and the full potential level of achievement of the group. The DTI examples of high performance work 1300 include case studies where extensive training in listening and participation was required in order to maintain the effectiveness of the organisation, as well as examples of organisations breaking down through lack of this kind of induction training. This factor demonstrates that creating a structure and expecting people to behave accordingly in such collaborative democratic processes would be misconceived. Skills have to be learnt; and in this case-study it took one group many months to achieve 1301.

Moreover, Bowles and Gintis make the point that such groups are not all clones or ‘brain-washed’ robots. The make-up of the groups is naturally heterogeneous with a mix of co-operative and self-regarding individuals, but a sub-group of self-regarding individuals is very weak in the presence of a strong co-operative core, as is confirmed by experimental work 1302. Whether a person acts selfishly or cooperatively is determined as much by the situation as the

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person. Constructive institutional conventions are essential. Bowles and Gintis come to a similar conclusion to David Hume that society is based on conventions, or as they express it: 'the distinctive capacity of humans to construct institutional environments that limit within-group competition'.

Conventions reduce the differences within the group, foster behaviour that is beneficial to the group and make it therefore more successful. The process can be aided by such practices as sharing and levelling, i.e., reducing the differences in 'material well-being', while including higher rewards for those that are generally and openly recognised as the most successful contributors to the general good. 'Group levelling institutions are thus constructed environments' which, they suggest, give such groups a sense of direction and a competitive advantage. The success of co-operative behaviour is attributable to this capacity for building 'social institutions'. Moreover, because these conventions are culturally defined, positive results can be achieved when such behaviours and institutions do not exist in the first place. The case studies in the high performance work discussion illustrate the fact that it is possible to begin change but no organisation had yet been transformed; their initial constitution was a decisive factor but the role of managements also required a transformation. Declaring an egalitarian policy and engaging in constitutional and organizational design can 'risk irrelevance', if they do not take account of the different characters and motives within the organization. 'The problem of institutional design is not as the classical economists thought, that selfish individuals [could] be induced to interact in ways producing desirable aggregate outcomes, but rather that a mix of motives – selfish, reciprocal, altruistic and spiteful – interact in ways that prevent the selfish from exploiting the generous and hence unravelling cooperation when it is beneficial'.

Bowles and Gintis examine the effectiveness of community governance against a background of the ideas of government of the last two centuries based on laissez-faire, or state intervention, and the belief that either the market or state intervention could manage economics. Competitive markets and legal protection of property and state bureaucracy have followed the Hobbesian idea of controlling and harnessing people's selfish motives and have set aside ideas of civic responsibility. Bowles and Gintis define social capital as 'trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one's community and

punish those who do not', and they value them as the attitudes that have traditionally typified 'community governance'. Their account places them on the side of the relativists for their evidence is taken from accounts of people's behaviour in their daily lives, communities, work groups, rather than how any market or bureaucracy imagines or would like them to behave. The founding characteristic of the social capital or 'community governance', as they prefer to call it, is connection, because it is about what people do, not what they own. A community is 'a group of people who interact frequently and in a multi-faceted way'. They acknowledge that the idea of the potential of 'community governance to remedy the failures of markets and state welfare' has been recognised and well established in sociology: 'In the absence of trust...opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be foregone...[but] norms of social behaviour, including ethical and moral codes [may be] reactions of society to compensate for market failures'. Where communities do exist they compensate positively by offering alternative governance to markets and government directives, largely because they have the vital information to create beneficial forms of exchange that officials and outsiders cannot use. Such successful communities must have ongoing inter-relations between the members of the community that are based on trust, mutual support and concern and a general support for and reinforcement of the community and group values. The basis of their success is that 'their members, but not outsiders, have crucial information about other members, capacities and needs' and this insider information maintains the values, work and behaviour of the community, provides insurance for members against problems and disasters and this is used in a multi lateral way that maintains the community. One important characteristic that Bowles and Gintis report but do not stress is that from their very beginning some co-operatives had the semblance of community governance in their constitutions. They only report the feature but it reaffirms the axiom of Vico and the evidence of high

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1307 Ibid p. 421.
performance work where the founders of the companies set up the co-operative forms of governance from the very beginning and reinforced them\textsuperscript{1311}. Bowles' and Gintis' examples refer to the necessary support of authority to provide 'vertical transmission', i.e., the handing down of modes of conduct from authority figures, e.g., from government legislation for some of the social programmes, from parents or authority figures to initiate a norm or behaviour. This could be translated to high performance work's requirement for the crucial support of management in such change because they imply a reduction in hierarchy. Their evidence is taken from experiments and case studies. Thus, Bowles and Gintis offer the example of the 'information sharing clan' in Japanese firms\textsuperscript{1312} as 'community governance', but, significantly, they also acknowledge that its success is also attributable to the 'limited inequality' between managers and workers. Other examples of the positive effect of 'limited inequality' are drawn from India and Mexico. Equality of income enhances community governance. Whereas Axelrod's 'The Prisoners' Dilemma' demonstrates that co-operation declines as the conflict of interest over pay-offs increases. The conclusion that they draw is that 'extremely unequal societies will be competitively disadvantaged in the future because their structures of privilege and reward limit the capacity of community governance to facilitate the qualitative interactions that underpin the modern economy'\textsuperscript{1313}. Other examples are drawn from across the world. In Chicago, communities show successful 'collective efficacy' against anti-social behaviour and in protecting civic services. There were considerable differences in the success rate of different groups, rich, poor, black, white but ethnic difference was less important in predicting success or failure than being economically disadvantaged\textsuperscript{1314}. In Japan, over more than three decades, fishing co-operatives have elected to share income, pass on information about fishing grounds, and for older generations to educate and train new members. In Kerala poor fishermen devised their own interest-free, unsecured loan scheme to help others and the loans were always repaid. Plywood workers in Oregon

\textsuperscript{1311} Viz above: Vico and Axiom 15: the nascence of institutions, i.e., how they begin is the state to which they return, and Sung J. and Ashton D. op. cit.


own their own companies, use peer monitoring and risk pooling when there is a cyclical downturn in the market. Managers are elected and every worker has to be an owner. The firms have competed successfully with other firms largely because of their high levels of commitment to work, the savings on supervisory management [one firm the moved into co-operative ownership and saved three –quarters of its supervisory staffing budget] and the output per unit of labour and capital is significantly higher than their counterparts. During economic recessions, there are no redundancies because the hardship is shared by all taking cuts in wages and hours.\textsuperscript{1315}

In evaluating the comparative efficiency of the community, state and market, Bowles and Gintis accept the operation of the market because of its superior capacity to make use of specialised private information. Governments can enforce people to comply with large mandatory projects, such as national defence or insurance. Communities have superiority over both where the social interactions or goods and services are complex, like education. Community governance has at its disposal specialised knowledge and discrete information not available to governments, employers, and formal organizations and it is able to use, develop and monitor its members’ contributions and make them accountable for their actions. Unlike markets and governments, communities nurture certain traditional values and rewards that govern a common purpose and activity: ‘trust, solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, respect, vengeance and retribution, among others’\textsuperscript{1316}. The unique features of community governance are the high level and continuity of interactions and the depth of private, specialised knowledge amongst the members, the transparency and openness, the extensive broadcasting of information, and the ability of work teams to monitor and supervise their contributions in positive ways. These features encourage members to behave in beneficial ways because actions and intentions are known and understood. The problem that communities have is exactly that of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’; the communities are altruistic and not self-regarding, but the possibility of the self-interested person exists. Communities devise their own strategies and


Bowles and Gintis suggest their own solution, which is based on game theory and the idea of organising by accepting people as they are and so recognising the altruism of the majority and the individualism and selfishness of others and the group's capacity to enforce its values. Their model suggests that there is an element of 'strong reciprocity' in some members who are prepared, at some cost to themselves, to 'punish' the selfish without being rewarded for their efforts. Moreover, they demonstrate that it can work in large work teams of over one hundred, but allowing for some bystanders, it requires a committed group of strong reciprocators. In many respects it follows the establishment of Humean conventions. It is a model that suggests that successful governance is founded upon mutual monitoring and strongly motivated reciprocal relationships. The strength with which a community can reinforce its values and norms enhances it success but everything depends upon the nature of the norms being enforced. This translates into the vision the community has for itself and its future. Bowles and Gintis endorse its potential by concluding that 'strong reciprocity...allows groups to engage in common practices without the resort to costly and often ineffective hierarchical authority' [My emphasis].

The arguments of the 'marketeers' and the government-interventionists against communities point to the strength of this reinforcement as the source of the community's failure. Critics point to its tendency to make the group homogeneous, and exclude a diversity of talent and skills. It can also be divisive by discriminating against others, based on race, sex, religion, nationality and exclude others from outside the group. They run the danger of being fundamentalist and parochial. Their smaller scale of operation is a disadvantage in some circumstance but can be ideal for others. The defenders suggest the disadvantages can be overcome, for example the dangers of insularity by implementing policies of equal rights and opportunities, and they point to examples where market or government intervention 'have destroyed imperfect but nonetheless valuable community-based systems of governance, suggesting that policy paradigms confined to states and markets may be counter productive'. Laissez-fare market interventions and imposition of forms of governance by government has denied the existence of internationally successful forms of direct democracy in the university sector.

1317 Cf. Hume, above.
Case-study examples show that communities solve their problems in a 'bewildering variety of ways with hundreds of differing membership rules, de facto property rights and decision-making procedures'. The DTI 2005 account of high performance work suggests it as 'transformational', a wholesale culture change, 'an entirely new professional orientation' with strategic, cultural, organizational, developmental and relational implications and 'a serious leadership and management challenge to the UK', 'even [for] those employers who 'may think they match closely to the high performance work approach'. Therefore High performance work is the opposite of employment strategies based on short cycle times, skill minimisation and one right way management based on the mass-production work practices of F. W. Taylor in the early part of the twentieth century. High performance work is associated with 'mass customisation' and individual needs services that can be found in the private and public sectors. In fact, its emphasis on learning, teams, and creative working matches the way in which this research's respondents described some of their team work experiences in this case-study and indicate what this account is making a claim for is that these working practices could be well suited to university organization and management. The aim that Government and the Universities themselves have set for themselves is to be world class. This aim matches the common themes of many of the organizations in the report. These aspirations and claims also match the contributions of the personnel to creativity, problem solving, development, research and empowerment.

With the objective of encouraging their acceptance and introduction, high performance work is presented as a change in practices. Opposition to introducing and implementing this change in management practices is identified in the lack of vision and the support of senior management. High performance work cannot thrive without the support of senior management, because it changes the whole structure and nature of the managerial process. Moreover, the report emphasises that senior management's support must be long term and sustained of necessity; the implication is that its developmental nature makes progress very slow and fragile.

However, managers and managements are so conscious of their position, status and power that after a little personal reflection the change in the power

structure that is implied in high performance work would be immediately apparent. Impediments, like the politics of delay, 'counsels of perfection' and other political stratagems are likely to be deployed to ensure rejection. The most likely and successful opposing tactic would be, and probably has been, a partial acceptance and implementation of those high performance work practices that could be useful in maintaining the existing levels and structures of power, control and domination\textsuperscript{1323}. In this regard, it is illuminating that the report records progress made so far by the ten companies in the sample as a 95\% use of staff appraisal, 93\% of structured induction, and 16\% offer of share options. Appraisal and induction can be discrete 'tick-box' procedures that like book ends mark the passing of time and are also control mechanisms. Cynically, the much wider use of appraisal and induction indicate their potential to support management control rather their intended function of staff development and mutual support and aims\textsuperscript{1324}. The approach requires extensive and sustained retraining for the senior management and employers. Given this scenario, what is implied is the realisation of the re-constitution of the manager's role, and what is likely to stand in the way of its development is more likely to be second tier managers' recognition of the immediate implications of such approaches. This attitude is presented in terms of losing their career, which is again a euphemism for the abolition of the 'order of egoisms' controlling functions and Humean 'pleasure and pride' that they gain from them and from the tradition of enhanced status and their self-interest rather than the general good. In this Abecedary Institute case-study, the glimmer of the introduction of such practices brought a counter-revolution by the second tier of managers, that saw three-year-head-of-faculty posts, which had been discussed as rotational, being made permanent posts for the exclusively internal candidates from that second tier\textsuperscript{1325}.

Despite all managers and managements, there may already exist informally actual and effective team working and autonomy amongst employees in the organization. This will have arisen from the serendipity of good group-dynamics emerging from a particular set of characters\textsuperscript{1326}. It is also part of the nature of the different communities existing within organizations.\textsuperscript{1327}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1326] Cf. Gintis on homo reciprocans.
\item[1327] Viz. above: Mary Douglas and 'Thought Styles'. Cf. Text 309 line 8 -12; Text 340 line 16-17; Text p. 352 line24 - p. 353 line 2 7; Text 353 line 24 – p. 353 line 14. Text p.181 line 5-9 ; Text p. 87 line
\end{footnotes}
evidence in support of high performance working is particular to the companies themselves and their context and industry, but it provides principles for practice that illustrate a belief in employees rather than systems and procedures. The size of the companies in the DTI high performance work collection of case-studies ranged from two of less than 100 employees, through a majority of 250 to 550 employees and one of nearly 3000 but divided into small retail units. All are relevant to a university situation where scales of operation cover similar ranges and the proportion of staff earning £35,000 varied from 14% to 74%.

One case-study in the report on high performance work concerned a company of under 500 employees, a world-leader in the development of intellectual property and innovations, which closely matches the kind of intellectual work in which the university staff engage. Rather than competing on price in manufacturing after their patents have expired, staff develop new ideas and patents. Therefore, success is measured not just by profit but also by the patents successfully registered. Gore-Tex UK is a subsidiary of a US company. Employees are 'associates' and are not 'told what to do', but 'do what is needed to make the whole organization successful'.

'No one can release you to work on a project, because there is no fixed job to be released from...you are not paid to do a job. You are rewarded for your contribution. Your colleagues see you making a success of the business...you are not allocated to a position of authority over others. You achieve leadership by convincing others of the quality of your ideas and your contribution to the goals of the business. This is how it is possible, that 50% of employees, when asked in an independent survey, described themselves as leaders'.

The culture of this company was and is defined by its founder, which confirms again the theory of the persisting determining power of an original constitution and/or authority figure. The uses of 'associates' suggest a measure of shared ownership which this report makes little of but which the models of Mondragon, and Oxford and Cambridge Universities reveal is fundamentally crucial. The
basic characteristic of such forms of governance are that a community should own its success or failure in solving their problems; this may mean owning their own assets or a legislative ownership by having controlling universal voting rights. Communities require a legal or governmental environment favourable to their functioning\textsuperscript{1328}; and a synergy has to be found between community and government; community governance is a complement of effective government.

Community governance succeeds where government or management directives and regulations, or market solutions and contracts cannot deal with the complex, detailed and qualitative nature of activities. Bowles and Gintis recognise that this is becoming ever more the case as assembly lines have been replaced by ‘information intensive work-teams’ offering difficult to measure services. University and college tutors have been called ‘knowledge workers’ before now and might bridle at their department being called an ‘information intensive work team’ or even a ‘high performance work team’. They would recognise in what Bowles and Gintis describe a preferred way of working and appreciate the statement that ‘in an economy based on qualities rather than quantities, the superior governance capabilities of communities are likely to be manifested in increasing reliance on the kinds of multi-lateral monitoring and risk-sharing’\textsuperscript{1329}, exemplified by community governance, and in the consequent levels of success compared with other hierarchical and unequal arrangements.

Monarchy or Republic

This is an age old, universal struggle, and one way in which it can be described is by taking it back to one place where it could be said to have begun, in a story that resonates with ideas that have already been explored. Fittingly, this ceaseless struggle took place in Rome, the Eternal City.

'Human nature is universally imbued with a desire for liberty, and a hatred of servitude', wrote Julius Caesar in his account of the Gallic wars\textsuperscript{1330}. And yet not long after, in 49AD this same Caesar gave to the world a phrase for every irrevocable step or fateful irreversible change. He illegally crossed the Rubicon,


then a little stream dividing the Gallia Province from the Italia Province, with his army, and he declared war on the republic of Rome. This act of force began the events that would end a self-governing, civic republic that had existed for a thousand years - the longest-surviving and most successful republic in history. By crossing the Rubicon stream, with his battle-hardened legions, Julius Caesar demonstrated that violence was the way to overthrow republics. His crossing of the Rubicon brought to an end ancient, citizen freedoms and set in train events 'of primal significance for the history of the West', primarily its struggle with forms of rule focused on the conflict between freedom and totalitarianism. A thousand years later the Renaissance cities of Italy, and the English, French and American Revolutions would all refer to and model themselves upon the history of the Roman Republic. Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, would point to 'the reading of Policy, and Histories of the ancient Greeks and Romans' as 'one of the most frequent causes' of 'Rebellion in particular against Monarchy', and would refer to such rebels as imagining that 'their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men [e.g., 'their Conductors of Armies'], but from the vertue of their popular forme of government'.

The citizens of Rome were proud of the virtues of their republican government, for it was these republican virtues that had created the Roman Empire. The citizens were free; the society meritocratic - emulating or supassing one's ancestors was their driving motivational-force; any citizen could stand for almost any office in the Republic, none was the preserve of the upper classes. 'The Romans knew that had they remained the slaves of a monarch, or a self-perpetuating clique of aristocrats, they would never have succeeded in becoming the dominant world power. "It is almost beyond belief how great the Republic's achievements were once the people had gained their liberty, such was the longing for glory which lit every man's heart." Even the crustiest patrician had to admit this.' Pragmatism not idealism dominated the republican spirit of Rome. Though fraught with conflict, debate, lobbying, difficulty, confusion, and incongruity, it worked. It gave stability. Polybius, a captured Greek General based in Rome, writing toward the end of the Republic, described its constitution as having rejected tyranny but having within its

1331 Note: This was the way all republics ended with a general-monarch in at the head of an army like Guilaino de'Medici, entering Florence in 1512, Napoleon Bonaparte building a bridge for his army from the mainland into the island Republic of Venice..
1335 Ibid. p. 23 citing Polybius Histories 6

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governance elements of the monarchical, aristocratic and democratic that operated within a stable system of checks and balances. It was this organic quality that provided strength and flexibility, and as a model of social organisation its success had overwhelmed all other forms of organisation and rule. Amendment to its governance was made only in the cause of efficiency and the righting of injustice. It promoted development, growth and improvement as each generation tried to top the achievements of their forebears. Rationalisation of governance or 'getting our structures right' were inconceivable options for the Romans. Though the great families and the rich lorded it over the 'great unwashed', they also knew that the people had limitless power. The citizens had to be consulted, persuaded, courted and reasoned with, and those seeking office or proposing actions accepted and worked within that framework of governance. 'The people mattered and they knew they mattered'.

Where power was located, in the people, and the diverse, lengthy, formal and informal debating process, with the people, as the essence of decision-making, by the people, are fundamental ideas that echo through Western thought. As a city in which people lived out the whole of their lives, it had features that could only exist in such circumstances. Thus this citizen-power and citizen-community came with a price to be paid of the snobbery, the fake dynasties that emerged as family-members were annually elected generation after generation, the dominance of wealthy persons, the competitiveness, the controversy and the resistance to change in Roman society and governance, despite all pressures. It was not driven by equality but by competition between people and generations, and none could hold sway for long. It set up a collection of institutions that evolved throughout the Republic but which carried out the functions of a monarch such as to lead, administer, control and build communities with sufficient checks to prevent it falling back into tyranny and monarchy. At its beginning Rome was a city-state of less than 10,000 people. Two principals guided the governance of the Roman Republic: annuality and collegiality. Annuality meant an official could hold office for the term of one

1336 Note: Personal anecdote. Every new Principal of a public HE institution would include in her/his opening address to staff the 'mantra': 'All will be well, if first we get our structures right'. As though they had been programmed at Coombe Lodge, the FE/HE Training centre, like Daleks, and the staff would roll their eyes and know that nothing concrete would happen while this endless gavotte of the ruling clique changing positions and places within their set.

1337 I.e., Magistrates were government officials; there were consuls: supreme head of state; quaestors: financial officials; aediles: administrators of public works including entertainment; praetors: judges and army commanders. Pro-magistrates were officials in particular regions or districts, e.g. pro-consul was a consul or supreme head of state in a province.
year\textsuperscript{1338} and was answerable to the Senate. Collegiality meant that powers were divided so that the same office would be held by at least two men at the same time, each with mutual powers of veto over the other. The principle of annuality would only be set aside in emergencies to appoint dictators, and then only for six months. The role of tribune was almost like that of an accessible god; his person was inviolate, but he had to keep open house, be accessible to and listen to all wherever thy might intercept him and to read the popular graffiti on the walls of public buildings to catch the mood of the populace. He also had to manage a delicate balancing act between the contending interest groups, particularly the aristocracy and the people.

The idea that dominated Rome was that of citizenship - a shared role in, responsibility for, and power over public business, the people's business, in Latin, \textit{res publica} - of the Republic. The citizen had a stake in the Republic, was compelled to soldier for it and suspend work on his farm the while. The citizen's right that was most closely guarded was freedom. The confusion of laws and statues that had evolved as the governance of Rome were not a paper constitution, nor a 'political order'. It was a tradition that asserted that 'to be a citizen was to know that one was free - "and that the Roman people should ever not be free is contrary to all the laws of heaven."'\textsuperscript{1339} Having evolved from a monarchy and having withstood internal attempts to establish tyrannies, the Roman citizens knew the political consequences of liberty and despotism, and republic and autocracy. For these reasons the citizens created laws and customs for the governance of the Republic to act as curbs on power and personal ambition, that could neither be avoided, nor evaded without shame and dishonour. There was a sense of commonality at the centre of Roman virtues. Those seeking high office in the Republic were to use their talents and abilities for the commonwealth - the common good. 'To place personal honour above the interests of the entire community was the behaviour of a barbarian - or worse yet, a king.'\textsuperscript{1340} This did not mean that this was a society of equals. Rome was not an idealised, utopian, social democracy. Citizens were not equals. Rank, status, wealth and class dominated civil society as one might expect of a state but not necessarily of an organisation, but every citizen had the right to stand for and be elected to civic, public office and every officer had to be elected by the citizens. At the base

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\item \textsuperscript{1338} Cf. Exceptions to this rule were, for instance, the two censors who took the census of the citizens, had some judicial powers, were guardians of public morality, supervised the letting of public lands, buildings and contracts and who were elected for eighteen months every five years.
\item \textsuperscript{1339} Holland T. Op. cit. p.75, citing Cicero in the sixth \textit{Philippic} [19]; a statement made only months before the end of the Republic.
\item \textsuperscript{1340} Ibid. p. 5
\end{enumerate}
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were the 'plebs', more accurately the *plebeians sordida* - the great unwashed. 'A city - a free city- was where a man could be most fully a man...To have *civitas* - citizenship - was to be civilised, an assumption still embedded in the English to this day... A citizen defined himself by the fellowship of others. 1341

So the communal life of the city demarcated itself by the patterns of life within it. This same egalitarianism and fraternity existed permanently for all persons including slaves, in the trade associations, the *collegia*. To the patricians the stinking and labyrinthine backstreets of the *collegia* were regarded by the patricians as beneath them, because they despised the need to earn a living and they also suspected that the collegia were also probably nefarious and criminal organisations. The plebs as a mob were dangerous, more dangerous than they themselves knew they were. Patricians might wish to keep distant from the plebs, but the distribution of power meant they were dependent upon gaining their electoral support. The patrician suspicion of the plebs - from the beggar to the skilled artisan and shopkeeper was that they were shirkers and skyvers, up to no good. 'Necessity made every poor man dishonest', according to Roman funerary inscriptions. 1342 This was not the only contemptuous view of the plebs. There was also the view of human nature - reminiscent of The Grand Inquisitor's own contempt - that 'Only a few prefer liberty - the majority seek nothing more than fair masters'. 1343 This embodied the idea that people were not concerned with their human dignity and worth, and wanted nothing more than an easy slavery in a quiet life and 'bread and circuses' rather than debate, controversy, actual power and freedom. However, though given the freedom to choose, the Roman citizens opted for bread and circuses, followed by subjection under a series of notorious and unstable tyrants. One harsh lesson drawn form this was that 'The fruit of too much liberty is slavery'. 1344

The end of the Republic came with equally brutal force at the hands of those who could command force. Its end was a consequence of its Imperial success. As the provinces of republican empire grew more distant, the principle of annuality - annual election - was gradually compromised. Unable to travel back to Rome, Pro-consuls of distant provinces were given longer terms in office and assumed the rights of virtual kingship over those provinces. The large army was also a consequence of Imperial ambition. And so it was that Julius Caesar answer to the order to give up his power and return as a citizen to Rome was

1341 Ibid. p. 11.
1342 Ibid. p. 18
1343 Ibid. Foreword, citing Sallust Histories
1344 Ibid. citing Cicero *The Republic* 1.68 p. 375
his crossing of the Rubicon. What ensued is well known from film and, not least, Shakespeare's plays. Assassination, revenge, shared government and civil war followed till Octavius, transformed himself into the Emperor Augustus. In the midst of the turmoil after Julius Caesar's assassination, the death of Cicero marked the end of the Republican ideal and the idea of freedom, particularly of free speech. Cicero, lawyer, philosopher, politician, once the consul of Rome, the highest office in the Republic, a witness to Caesar's murder, refused the invitation to join the power struggle of Octavius, Lepidus and Mark Anthony. Instead he saw it as the opportunity to restore the Republic and its traditions, but he was condemned to be assassinated. Though Cicero fled, he was overtaken and offered his throat to the assassins in the manner of a gladiator - a gesture he admired. However, it was what happened after his death that had the most resonant significance for the future of the ideals of the republic and of free thought and speech. His hands and head were cut off; Mark Antony's wife, Fulvia, pulled out the tongue and stabbed it with a pin, and finally the head with mutilated tongue and his hands were nailed to the speaker's podium in the Senate and exposed to public view. This barbarism carried out on the principal philosopher and advocate of Republican principles and traditions was the public demonstration of the new facts of life for all under a hierarchical totalitarian tyranny. Whatever the shortcomings and difficulties of republican democracy - however distorted the weighting of the votes by the different factions, - this demonstration marked the end of free thought, free speech and free politics for all, aristocrats and plebs and the democratic elements alike . Cicero was not only dead but symbolically silenced, and the Republican traditions with him.

The story of the Roman Republic, rather than Greek democracy, has provided an enduring model of a successful non-monarchical form of governance. The narrative of the history of Rome and particularly of the fall of the Republic has often provided comparisons with the collapse of republics in the twentieth century and the rise of totalitarian dictators. Livy's history of the Republic of Rome was the inspiration of Renaissance 'civic humanism' and was the model on which the Italian city-states compared themselves. In the city of Siena, in the Palazzo Publico, under a fresco celebrating Roman republican heroes was the inscription: 'Take Rome as your example, if you wish to rule a thousand years; follow the common good, and not selfish ends; and give good counsel like these men'.

1345 Niccolò Machiavelli who worked in the Republic of
Florence's Chancery wrote his 'Discourses on Livy' at about the same time as his more notorious 'The Prince', the latter was printed posthumously after 'The Discourses'. In these Machiavelli adopted the same approach as Livy, that the history of Rome offered 'fine things to take as models, base things rotten, through and through, to avoid'\(^{1346}\). Machiavelli put it thus:

> 'all things of this world in every era have their counterparts in ancient times. This occurs since these actions are carried out by men who have and have always had the same passions, which, of necessity, must give rise to the same results'.\(^{1347}\)

While he admitted that different historical contexts produced different results, he is certain of the passions that are at play in such situations: greed, pride, ferocity, faithlessness and breaches of faith and trust. But he accepted the existence of social conflict and strife. He advocated that these could be channelled to create a healthy and flourishing body politic as long as it was properly constituted and ordered, rather than be suppressed in the interests of one group or clique seeking to maintain a façade of 'domestic tranquillity'.\(^{1348}\)

The accounts of the theories of the search for the basis of action is like Peer Gynt's\(^{1349}\) [1867] peeling an onion as though it were his own identity. As layer after layer of identities and influences come away, he reaches the end and finds that 'It's made of layers – but smaller and smaller'. Bourdieu's and Hume's theories share something of this perception, but Ibsen adds another element in the form of the Button-Moulder who comes finally to melt down Peer in his ladle, so that he may be recycled: 'so far as the spirit is in you, There's always the value you have as metal'. So Ibsen's metaphor suggests there is something more than the influences and identities that life gives to a person and he wears any religious interpretation very lightly with his smelting metaphor, just as '16 grams' – the difference between the weight of a person alive and dead, also avoids the same issue, but indicates there is the mystery of something. It is both an issue to evade and unavoidable because it is a core problem that is hard to resolve. All the theorists have been hung up on the same problem, but all the respondents to this research are able to accept the limitations of systems and practices but return to that unique something in the people who manage them, because they have spent and do spend their lives and careers trying to

understand and second-guess that unique something in each manager and
organiser that produces the conditions under which they exist, and implicitly
come to the conclusion that it is character – however one wishes to devise a
theoretical interpretation of it.
Conclusion

The Text reveals clearly that the people in this situation knew and collectively fully understood what was happening to them, the institution and the students. They were fully aware of trends and strategies and reflected on them with some considerable accuracy. They also accepted the existence of passions in managers and did not accept the claims of objective rationality. The respondents based their comments on the topics of this research on fairness, the politics of being governed, a sense of being in a community participating in its operation, i.e., 'collegiality', and the quality of the experiences and achievements they wished for their students, the institution and themselves. They presented a picture of the public service ethic.

This gave them a developmental perspective because they were engaged in a process-based activity and always will be, with its own cycle and with a tradition. It was and is not a fragmented experience; even students specialised and stayed in one institution. Their experience of the process suggested that the expansion of higher education that occurred would have happened anyway. The closures of the 1980s were followed in less than five years by the rapid expansion of the late 1980s and 1990s.¹ Of the choices between being an instrumental manager with a utopian ideal of how people should behave and being a relativist and developmental, the narrative suggests that the former brings totalitarian destruction and is highly dangerous. The professional approach is developmental; the amateur is rational utopian. It is likely that the decisive factor in the choice between them - the ambition of the manager or the purpose of the organisation - is the passions and character of the particular manager.

The factors that influenced the outcome of the story were there at the very beginning. The short term contract meant the Chief Executive Officer had to make a 'mark' to achieve security; therefore there was haste and little time to be developmental². This also fixed the focus on where an impact might be made, and so directed attention toward services and buildings, which did produce a positive result for all parties³. It was an instrumental managerial exercise that followed the spirit of the times.

¹ Cf. Text p. 84 line 23-31; Cf. Text p. 84 line 22 - 35; Cf. Text p. 251 line 7-20
² Cf. Text p. 593 line 21 - p. 595 line 30; Cf. Text p. 591 line 12 - 592 line 11
Dividing her domain - academic versus management - was false because it set aside the core activity. Moreover, any change done in a hurry creates Bauman’s conditions for totalitarianism. As the time got shorter, so the need for more draconian action increased. The survival motive for management became more intense. Making change by following the latest best-selling guru ignored the lengthy process of staff development and meant that actions were based on how you would want people to be and not as they are, because they were not immediately responsive. The first instinct was to be democratic, and the genuine nature of this cannot be denied, though the text-book strategy has been critically undermined as ‘juvenilé’. However, the constituted dominant power, in the background, was the appointed Governors who took control of the ultimate power of finance into their hands. Few, if any, have recognised this constituted power.

The drive behind the flatter structure became wholly financial and subverted the democratic. The financial aim was a prudent security but also there was a motive to raise the capital to erect new buildings. The democratic ideal was subverted from the beginning. Control was retained at the very top and any change was from the top, rather than bottom up.

Since haste was of the essence the organic developmental from the inside took too long - a lesson learnt by trying it on a large scale for a few months - therefore the alternative was to bring initiatives from outside through recent or new appointment and responding to ideas being mooted in Whitehall. Such staff and ideas could either be gradually blended into the institution or imposed. There was only time for the latter.

The problem also lay with the nature of the institution itself. Though it might have seemed democratic, there was little or no democratic tradition in either the teaching, e.g., seminars, or the management. The one example of a successful democratic practice took at least 6 months with only a small number of staff.

Bringing on developments from inside meant that staff needed experience of democratic discussion and senior management needed to be supportive. Putting people in a room will not solve the problem. Democracy is hard work and the turmoil that existed in the early stages of the ‘matrix’ was indicative of this. The leader of the unitisation of courses - part of the ‘catch-up’ development - was not

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5 Cf. Text p. 342 line 4- p. 343 line 20 ; Cf. Text p. 155 line 4-7
prepared to give the time and effort. Staff were labelled as 'unprofessional' and inadequate. Solutions were imposed. The staff's inconvenient ethical values were sidelined rather than listened to. So more totalitarian conditions were added to that of haste. Deans of Faculty were there as representatives of the management; one of them played a different democratic line and his life was made difficult. The matrix and the centralised unitisation of courses were opposing strategies within the same management and the same Institute. Since the unitisation affected the core activity of the institution and had the appearance of matching what had happened elsewhere, it seemed like modernisation and something to claim in the inventory of effecting managerial change. The new appointments were operating on an agenda of uniformity and control, though their ideology was plurality. Bureaucracy was like a sword over their heads; they brought in systems and controls that were not developed but borrowed or invented without development. Control permeated the whole and the consequence was totalitarian control. After the innovator of academic unitisation left, one respondent talked in terms of survival, while others were aware of the destruction, waste and a loss of collegiality. Unitisation was the heart of the malaise because it spawned a growth of manager-careerists. It also meant less access to managers. In all of this the management itself was not efficient. Its case was not proved and external reports described excessive bureaucracy and serious unhappiness. The respondents knew what they wanted as an alternative: autonomy, control of finances, collegiate decision-making, trust and recognition of their professionalism and an administrative civil service; they wanted powers like the older universities from which some were graduates. With the self perpetuating, appointed

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13 Cf. Text p. 472 line 1-20
Governors the only chance of achieving that change was to recognise the need to apply political pressure. Managerialism serves its own ends; while the purposes of the organisation are sustained by the commitment of the working teams. There is more than one culture.

Mary Douglas's analysis establishes the idea of separate 'cultures' with a perpetual dynamic between them and any change is only a convulsion or spasm in that dynamic when there is a change within a group that has an effect on the details of the relationship with the other culture. The only real change is the one that would come if the enclave and the isolate combined and moved into a position to command power. The fragmented enclave needs to combine over an issue and the differences and anomalies between the constitutions of the different universities seems a good place to start, with all the positive evidence on the side of direct participative democracies.

Experience and experiment demonstrate that cooperation produces situations in which all are or can be winners and that is the potential for greater 'productivity'. The findings of critical theory suggest that the self-regarding egoists wreck the cooperation and 'collegiality' because they prefer the situation where there is a general mediocrity but a very few winners. Of course, not all of the estimated 25% of the self-regarding can be winners, but they prefer to gamble their chances and consequently gamble everyone else's success on their own success. The evidence is that cooperation not only produces success for all but also a greater level and quality of success than any egotistical victory. The mediocrity is reinforced by the actions of the strong reciprocators in withdrawing their cooperation in order to punish the egotistical; however they do keep the main task going and maintain a level of community amongst themselves. The punishing withdrawal of the reciprocators does not prevent the egotistical succeeding. Ironically, it becomes a self-fulfilling false prophecy that seems to add validity to the view that those who do not succeed lack some sense of 'drive', are 'burnt out' and were 'probably not very good in the first place'. The question that is left hanging is "Why do so few managers 'burn out'?" It must be an absolute rarity for any manager to withdraw their sense of reciprocal cooperative public duty and leave because they too are 'burned out'. The speculative conclusions that can be drawn from the experiments in cooperation is a despairing irony. A self-regarding winning strategy - the 'sensible knave' - will secure the winning place for the selfish, but once in the manager's post, the manager's
success depends upon adopting a cooperative strategy in order to secure the cooperation of others. The improbable situation is that the manager has to change to the ‘losing’ strategy, or have a change of character but as the proverb has it, the ‘leopard cannot change his spots’. The self-regarding winner has miscast himself in the role. Because changing his character is so unlikely the result is the characteristic mediocre performance that the simulation games demonstrate, whereby no one gets anywhere near the potential that total cooperation can yield. The political structure produces a certain kind of winner and the result for everyone is mediocrity. What seems to occur, therefore, is that the miscast managers change the role and engage in change strategies and fragmentation that offer a pretence of progress.

In the end after the events of the story the respondents could not perceive any change. Each one, when posed that question, was silent for 30 second and then all replied ‘the buildings’. In the end, the final abiding impression is of waste – of talent, education, commitment, initiative, interest, care, careers of valuable people and of an educational organisation that clearly has more potential but which lacked and lacks the organisational conventions and the distribution of power to the cooperative contributors- homo reciprocans – who could achieve it. In this it is not alone, for it is a narrative that is played out in other institutions of higher education and in too many individual careers. It is a story of the ‘order of egoism’. The only solution is time. Duration limits the time that power is held: the convention that one sits in the seat of power for only a short time. The result would prioritise a vision of cooperation for the public good, which is the measure of all.

The ability to make a decision is regarded as the test of teams and managers; usually the myth is that the manager and the ‘court’ “know best”. Dunn invokes Aristotle’s endorsement of democracy’s ‘principal merit’ in its capacity to make decisions by reaching out and assembling ‘the full breadth of knowledge and awareness of the entire citizen body’16. Aristotle comments on both these issues thus: ‘the mass of people ought to be sovereign, rather than the best but few- [it] is not without difficulty, but has perhaps some truth in it. For it is possible that the many, no one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively...they become one in regard to

character and intelligence. Sinclair's commentary tellingly states that when Aristotle calls man "a political animal" he had in mind all aspects of life in a humane society, all that contributes to the "good life". He goes on to assert, with some authority that, though Aristotle did not give detailed analysis of smaller groups 'it is legitimate to take the general principles governing the larger associations as applicable to the smaller'. Sinclair applies this to 'lesser units', like medicine, education and sport as part of this ethic in the twentieth century state, which 'contribute to the life of the citizens and [that] Aristotle would have regarded them as part of the politeia'. Dunn builds on this principle to suggest that 'deliberation might hope ideally to become a common enquiry...[bringing] into play every element of wisdom present in the citizen body...[and] subject the less wise and more grossly partial elements within the judgement of each citizen to disciplined public scrutiny and mutually accountable criticism.

What this principle brings together is Eagleton's suggestion of revealing domineering ideology through public exposure; and Evans account of Cambridge University's governance being little different from the government of the British nation of which it is a part.

It is from this base that Dunn lays down the principles of deliberative democracy that matches the reflections of the respondents to this research, the processes in team and task groups, high performance work, distributive forms of organisation and many more. It has already been quoted at length but it is worth repeating: 'Deliberative democracy, democracy which embodies and realizes democracy at its best, attempts to prescribe how a community of human beings should wish for its public decisions to be taken...It should take these decisions reflectively, attentively and in good faith. It should take them as decisions about what would be publicly good, and not as calculations of what would be personally advantageous. It should take them non-exclusively; ensuring that all those whom they affect, and all who are sufficiently mature and rational to identify their own interests, can play an active part in determining their outcome. More exactingly still, it should take them in a way in which all can enter, and all who wish to in fact do enter, the deliberation as equals, and hold equal weight within it.'

20 Ibid.. p.178.
Such criteria are and are likely always to remain 'controversial' and Dunn acknowledges Habermas's development of such ideas\textsuperscript{21}. Dunn’s 'order of egoism', which he has defined after Hobbes, is driven by a cycle of power because it yields money and 'the point of money is always power'. Dunn points out that 'Democracy as a form of government is rather less open-ended, considerably more determinate and far less audacious in its explorations' than democratisation. Democracy has the merit of setting 'clear limits to how far you can be controlled by others'\textsuperscript{22}. It is a Humean convention that allows conflict, controversy, debate, and in it there lies better judgement. In education there are very few 'fire-fighting' situations; the map of the academic year and the discipline of the academic task is totally known; all but the absolutely exceptional difficulty can be perceived well in advance. Democracy is a compromise with the 'order of egoism' in national affairs. In organisational terms the democratic models extend from the Roman Republic to the direct participative democracies of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and present practical existing compromises. Both universities in the last few years have voted down attempts to "reform" them in the mould of the 'order of egoism'. Originally, in these constitutions, the egoists would have had to return as citizens to the constituencies that they have ruled or 'chaired' for a couple of years. Moreover, given the specialised knowledge that would therefore be available in their processes, such organisation would have been likely to be more efficient than existing organisational forms, given the 'eerie effectiveness' of Oxbridge and the government's advocacy of the benefits of such organisational practices. In organisational and managerial terms, the issue of retaining power at the top of a hierarchy versus ceding power and autonomy to the team or group is self-evidently the key to democracy, debate, openness, happiness and higher levels of self-realisation, adaptability and productivity. But power has to be given up, and as Habermas, Hume and all declare, this is not done without difficulty and without engaging in politics, because of the passions of the 'order of egoism'. The political will has to be lobbied.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. p. 237.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. p. 179.
External Environment
1. What words would you use to describe the main/primary pressures from the outside world that people experience inside the institution? [e.g., student dissatisfaction, Government reports, competition from other HE institutions, financial pressure arising from Government policy, funding bodies].

Mission and Energy
2. What words would you use to describe the mission of the institution?

Supplementary: Should it be shorter, i.e., less wordy - one sentence?

3. What words would you use to describe the Strategic Structural Change that is being implemented to achieve the institution's mission?

Leadership
4. What are the leadership characteristics that will be required to achieve strategic success within the next five years, e.g., inspirational, benevolent, participative, caring about people, profit-driven, autocratic?

5. How would you characterise the leadership of the institution, e.g., inspiring, autocratic, benevolent, participative, caring about people, profit-driven?

Culture and Ethos
6. Does the institution have a distinct, readily identifiable organisational culture? If so, what words would you use to describe it?

7. What are the primary driving forces behind the institution's culture? What keeps it operating?

8. What do you think are the values that will be required in the future to support strategic change and organisational success?

9. What importance do you attach to communication at a time of change and how is the institution succeeding? E.g., study days, in-house monthly newspaper, etc?

Structure
10. To what extent does the present institutional management give people the authority to accomplish their work effectively?

11. What aspects of the institution's organisation which are crucial to you as a manager are currently centrally controlled in your view?

12. What words would you use to describe the institution's new structure of functional and line management? That is, how the institution is to be organised?
Systems [Policies and Procedures]
13. What kind of systems [areas of policies and procedures] are required for the implementation of the institution's mission and strategy?

14. What words would you use to describe the kinds of organisation-wide systems that are familiar to most lecturers?

Management Practices
15. What words would you use to describe the overall quality of directorate practice in the institution? That is, how well managed is the institution?

Climate [People's perceptions and feelings of how effectively Heads of Department at the local level deal with both tasks and human relations.]
16. How would you describe the day-to-day work climate in the institution?

17. How would you describe the interpersonal relations within your subject area/course team...co-operative, competitive, open, trusting, political, mutually supportive, etc?

Task Requirements and Skills/Abilities
18. What are some of the most important task requirements in the institution at this time? That is, what are the critical tasks that need to be accomplished to implement the changes that are needed?

19. What are the skills and abilities that will distinguish the outstanding performer from his/her average-performing counterpart in the years to come? That is, what are the skills and abilities that will help people to be successful in the institution?

Individual Needs and Values
20. What words would you use to describe the kinds of needs that characterise large segments of the lecturing /head of department population of the institution?

Motivation
21. What is exciting about your job? That is, what makes you want to come to work each day?

22. What are the blocks and hindrances....That is, the barriers that you experience in attempting to do your work the way you believe the job should be done?

Individual and Organisational Performance
23. How do you measure your own performance?... what is your yardstick of success?

24. Is this different in this institution?
   How is your performance measured - what is the institution's yardstick of success?

The Questionnaire
25. What words would you use to describe the questionnaire's
   a) appropriateness.
   and b) comprehensiveness?

Thank you.
Part 1 [Act Two Scene One]

How have your views changed on the topics and questions raised in the first interview?

Review of individual responses to the first interview topics, following the same questions, order and content as Year One:

1. External Environment,
2. Mission and Energy,
3. Leadership,
4. Culture and Ethos,
5. Structure,
6. Systems [Policies and Procedures],
7. Management Practices,
8. Climate,
9. Task Requirements and Skills/Abilities,
10. Individual Needs and Values,
11. Motivation,
12. Individual and Organisational Performance,

Part 2 [Act Two Scene Two]

[Presented to respondents as one topic per page]

1. What should the institution be doing differently?
2. What actions should the management be taking now?
3. What improvements have there been in the last year?
4. What degradation has there been in the last year?
5. What improvements do you suggest? Please specify.
6. What issues now give - or have given satisfaction in the past year?
7. What indications of quality have you noticed in the last year?
8. What are the critical incidents during the past year?
9. What was the key incident that triggered a change in you, or other people?
10. The Questionnaire's effectiveness

Thank you
1. What have been the major **internal changes** and developments of the last three years?  
   Supplementary: Which are negative and which are positive and why?

2. Which have been the most important **external influences**?  
   a. For the institution?  
   b. For you professionally?

3. How have your **views changed** in the last three years?  
   [Have the previous questions identified most of the important new factors in your view?]

**THE PAST**

4. What should the institution have **done differently** in this period?  
   a. What improvements have there been in the last years?  
      [Keep to the top two or three only]  
   b. What degradation has there been in the last years?  
      [Focus on the nub of the issues involved.]

**THE FUTURE**

5. What should the institution **be doing differently**?  
   [Focus on one of two real improvements - what, who, why?]  
   a. What actions should the management be taking now?  
      [Focus on the crucial strategic or internal management issue?]  
   b. What improvements do you suggest?  
      [Please specify.]

6. a. What issues now give - or have given - **satisfaction** in the last years?  
   [Focus on the most significant]  
   b. What improvements in of **indications of quality** have you noticed in the last years?  
   [Focus on those of the greatest significance.]

7. What were the crucial **critical incidents** or the last three years?  
   [Focus on high levels of significance.]  
   a. For the institution?  
   b. What has been the **single critical incident** that triggered a change in you, or other people in the last three years?

8. 'From LEA to independent institution'. When you reflect on all the events of the last years which were the **crucial turning points**  
   a. For **you**?  
   b. And for the institution?  
   c. For the **profession**?

9. In all this how much actual **change** has there been and how much **loss**?  
   [An answer that is both personal and professional would be 'just right'.]

4.0. End comments  **voluntary reactions** and comments.

Thank you