Dedicated to my Mother and my Father, 
whom I owe a lot more than I can ever be able to repay for their love, care, 
support and patience.

And

To my wife, Radja and daughters, Maroua-Nadjlaa, Madjda and Yusra with 
loving affection.
CONTENTS

List of figures.................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................. v
Abbreviations...................................................................................................................... viii
Abstract................................................................................................................................. ix

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1

PART ONE: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS
OF ALGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER ONE: THEORIES REVIEW
  1.1 Introduction................................................................................................................ 12
  1.2 The Decision Making Model...................................................................................... 13
  1.3 The Dependency Approach...................................................................................... 17
  1.4 The Psychologistic Approach.................................................................................... 18
  1.5 Rosenau Pre-theory................................................................................................. 21
  1.6 Implications............................................................................................................... 23
  1.7 The Domestic Environment..................................................................................... 25
      1.7.1 The influence of economics............................................................................. 25
      1.7.2 The influence of ideology............................................................................... 30
      1.7.3 The influence of religion................................................................................ 33
  1.8 Role of Institutions.................................................................................................. 35
      1.8.1 The Presidency............................................................................................... 36
      1.8.2 The Foreign Ministry....................................................................................... 39
      1.8.3 The Military..................................................................................................... 41
      1.8.4 The Party (FLN)............................................................................................ 45
  1.9 The External Environment........................................................................................ 47
  1.10 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER TWO: PRINCIPLES OF ALGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................59
2.2 Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.......................................................61
2.3 National independence.............................................................................68
2.4 Conclusion...............................................................................................74

CHAPTER THREE: THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF ALGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
PRIOR TO 1979

3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................79
3.2 Mashreq: "The unity in the struggle".......................................................80
3.3 Maghreb: "Securing the borders".............................................................93
3.4 Africa: "For the decolonisation of the continent"...................................103
3.5 France: "The consolidation of independence"........................................111
3.6 The Soviet Union: "The indispensable ally"............................................120
3.7 The United States: "The necessary balance"............................................125
3.8 Conclusion...............................................................................................130

PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF ALGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1979

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ARAB WORLD

4.1 Introduction...............................................................................................139
4.2 Maghreb: "The predominance of the Western Sahara question"............140
4.2.1 Morocco (First phase): "Continuity of tension".................................140
4.2.2 Tunisia: "A new era".............................................................................150
4.2.3 Libya: "The end of an alliance"............................................................156
4.2.4 Morocco (Second phase): "Towards reconciliation"............................164
4.3 Mashreq: "Pragmatism and moderation"................................................168
4.3.1 Boumediene’s legacy............................................................................168
4.3.2 Readjusting Algeria’s Arab policy.......................................................173
4.4 Conclusion...............................................................................................180
CHAPTER FIVE: ALGERIA AND FRANCE

5.1 Introduction......................................................................................188
5.2 Attempts at reconciliation...............................................................189
5.3 Obstacles to reconciliation...............................................................200
5.4 The aftermath of October 1988..........................................................205
5.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................219

CHAPTER SIX: THE SUPERPOWERS AND NON-ALIGNMENT

6.1 Introduction.........................................................................................228
6.2 The United States...............................................................................229
6.2.1 Western Sahara: “The impeding factor”................................229
6.2.2 The ephemeral rapprochement............................................241
6.3 The Soviet Union: “Status quo”..........................................................247
6.4 The non-aligned movement: “Retreat from radicalism”.......................251
6.5 Conclusion..........................................................................................257

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion.............................................................................................266
Recommendations..............................................................................275

APPENDICES

Appendix One: Extracts from the Programme of Tripoli........................................277
Appendix Two: Proclamation du 1er novembre 1954.............................................280
Appendix Three: Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs structures.........................284
Appendix Four: Extracts from Evian Accords......................................................286
Appendix Five: Text of the decision of the OAU Implementation

Committee on Western Sahara, Nairobi, Kenya
(24 August 1981)....................................................................................295
Appendix Six: Selected resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly of Heads of States and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (6-12 June 1983) ................................................................. 298

Appendix Seven: Traité de Fraternité et de Concorde ............................................. 299

Appendix Eight: Traité instituant une union entre le
Royaume du Maroc et la Jamahirya Arabe
Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste ........................................................................ 302

Appendix Nine: Décret présidentiel no 85-54, mai 1989,
portant ratification du traité constitutif de
l'Union du Maghreb Arabe ........................................................................ 308

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 314
PRESENTATIONS ...................................................................................................... 328
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Algeria's external environment 1962-1978....................................................48
2.2 Schematic description of Algeria's external environment post 1978.............50
2.3 The making of Algeria's foreign policy...........................................................52
Acknowledgements

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Martin S. Alexander who has supervised my research. His comments, guidance and encouraging criticism throughout the preparation of this work have provided invaluable help without which it would not have been completed.

I am grateful to the Algerian government for providing me with the opportunity and the financial support to come to the United Kingdom in pursuit of my doctoral degree. I am also grateful to the assistance provided by the Department of Politics and Contemporary History (University of Salford), the European Studies Research Institute (University of Salford) throughout the period of this research.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Youcef Bouandel (University of Lincolnshire and Humberside), Professor Yahia Zoubir (American Graduate School of International Management) and Dr. Ahmed Aghrout (University of Salford), for their advice and valuable comments on certain aspects of this thesis.

I also wish to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to all those people who gave me the opportunity to interview them, namely, Dr. Belaid Benali, Political Counsellor in the Algerian Embassy, Washington, Dr. Abdelhamid Brahimi, former Prime Minister of the Algerian government and Mr. Khemar Mohamed, former Chef de Cabinet of Algeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also wish to thank those who asked to remain anonymous.

I am indebted to my wife, Radja, for her moral support, love, patience and encouragement throughout the period of this research. Thanking her is the least I can do in expression of my love and deep gratitude. I also express my gratitude to my mother, father, brother and sisters for their encouragement.

My thanks are also due to, Dr. Chafik Allaoui, Dr. Mustapha Heddi (Manchester Metropolitan University) and Mr. Hassan Lounis (European Studies
Research Institute) for their encouragement and help whenever needed.

Finally, thanks are due to the library staff in The University of Salford for their valuable help in obtaining documents and information required during this research.

I wish that this thesis could do justice to everything that all these people have had to offer.
Abbreviations

**ALN:** Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army)

**ANP:** Armée Nationale Populaire (People's National Army)

**FIS:** Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)

**FLN:** Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)

**FNLA:** Frente Nacional de Liberatação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola)

**FRELIMO:** Frente de Liberatação de Moçambique (National Liberation Front of Mozambique)

**FROLINAT:** Front de Libération National du Tchad (National Liberation Front of Chad)

**GDF:** Gaz de France (French Gas company)

**HCE:** Haut Comité d'Etat (High State Council)

**HCS:** Haut Conseil de Sécurité (High Security Council)

**MPLA:** Movimento Popular de Liberatação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

**POLISARIO:** Frente Popular para la liberación de Saguiet el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro)

**SADR:** Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

**SONATRACH:** Société Nationale du Transport et de la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (National Hydrocarbons Processing and Marketing Company)

**UMA:** Union du Maghreb Arabe (Arab Maghreb Union)
Abstract

This study analyses Algeria's foreign policy under the leadership of President Chadli Bendjedid from February 1979 until January 1992. Its aim is to investigate the extent of continuity and/or change in Algeria's foreign policy during this period. The central finding of this thesis is that "change within continuity" best describes what characterised Algeria's foreign policy under the post-1979 leadership.

This thesis is divided into two parts. The First Part is composed of four chapters. Chapter One relates theoretical approaches. It examines whether or not there is a satisfactory approach that can be applied for our case study. In the same chapter, the making of Algeria's foreign policy is scrutinised through the identification and typological analysis of the key factors in the conceptualisation and implementation of Algeria's foreign policy. It also uncovers who makes Algerian foreign policy. Chapter Two identifies the guiding principles behind the formulation of Algeria's foreign policy. In this chapter, reference to the FLN's past diplomatic activities is reviewed as it serves to provide a significant understanding of the context within which the fundamental principles of the policy pursued by contemporary Algeria were shaped, defined and set as the official framework for Algeria's foreign policy. Chapter Three deals with Algeria's foreign policy behaviour from 1962 to the end of 1978. A clear understanding of post-1979 Algerian foreign policy needs to rest on a review of how Algeria's foreign policy was determined and implemented in the years preceding this period and what were the dominant issues of the country's foreign policy at the time of Bendjedid's appointment.

The Second Part comprises three chapters. It considers Bendjedid's leadership by exploring a number of issues/areas that came to be the focus of his government's external policy. Chapter Four relates to Algeria's policy towards its proximate neighbouring countries --Morocco-Tunisia- Libya-- and the more distant
Mashreq. This chapter suggests that the Western Sahara remained the central thrust of Algeria's Maghreb policy, just as it had been in the last years of Houari Boumediene's tenure (1975-1978). It also spells out the end of Algeria's radicalism in the Mashreq. *Chapter Five* concerns the Franco-Algerian relationship. It emphasizes that towards France, Algeria has followed several successive policies which alternated between change and continuity. *Chapter Six* focuses on Algeria's policy towards the two superpowers and its role within the non-aligned movement. It argues that continuity has dominated Algeria's policy towards the former while substantive change came about in regard to its role towards the latter.

Finally, the thesis concludes by indicating an agenda of areas where further research is recommended.
INTRODUCTION
**Introduction**

Right from independence in July 1962, Algerian leaders wanted to project their country's diplomacy well beyond its proximate geographical neighbours. The essential catalyst of this self-assurance, even assertiveness, in foreign policy was the successful war for national liberation from France. Indeed, the revolutionary élan inherited from this period continued to influence Algeria's independent diplomacy for nearly two decades. Under both the ideologically militant regime¹ of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-65) and the subsequent pragmatic revolutionary regime of Colonel Houari Boumediene (1965-78), Algeria's diplomacy had been able to enhance its capabilities and to assist the nation to regain its place among its peers in the concert of nations, especially in Third World politics after the success of the non-aligned summit held in Algiers, in 1973.

More than this, given the country's history, ideology and geopolitical location, the post-independence leaders regarded their nation as ideally suited to be projected as a model to be emulated by other Third World countries.² Accordingly the country embarked on an ambitious and wide-ranging diplomacy and became committed to multiple international political causes and economic issues.

Thus, when Colonel Chadli Bendjedid assumed power in 1979 in the wake of Boumediene's death, Algeria as an international player was already actively involved in world affairs. The diplomatic activism that characterised this policy centred around major questions such as non-alignment in the global struggle
between the two super powers (the USA and USSR), promotion of revolutionary independence movements and wars of national liberation directed at overthrowing colonialism and imperialism, advocacy of African, Arab and Maghreb unity, and unconditional support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel. In addition the new President, Bendjadjid, was to inherit the framework of a foreign policy whose basic tenets were already set by his predecessors.

From the outset, the new regime's *leitmotiv* was continuity with Boumediene's policies. Indeed, despite his moderate nature, Bendjadjid declared his adherence to the international causes previously championed by Algeria and pledged to continue on the same path. In his first official speech to the nation on 13 March 1979 he stated that "Algeria will always remain attached to its international commitments" and added that "we will continue on the path set by the late President Boumediene, by our adherence to non-alignment, support to the liberation movements, people's right for self determination and to work for the promotion of a better world based on peace and justice".

However, from a retrospective viewpoint it now seems apparent that the favourable domestic and international environment in which Ben Bella and, in particular, Boumediene conducted the state's affairs, was gradually and dramatically changing. After 1979, the new leader had to operate in a quite different context.

At the international level, Bendjadjid had to deal with a global political environment less favourable for traditional Algerian foreign policy. The Group of
INTRODUCTION

77, for example, saw its proposal for a new international economic order conclusively buried after the set back of the Cancun summit in Mexico in 1981. The plunge in the price of oil and other basic raw materials adversely affected the southern coalition, one of the favourite axes of Algeria's foreign policy. The non-aligned movement, on the other hand, unable to accommodate itself with or adjust to the new international situation, lost its strength.

Domestically, if Boumediene was the unchallenged leader of the government, the army and the party -- the last two being the sources of power in Algeria -- the same was not the case for his successor. Bendjadid was regarded as a moderate and initially had no clan affiliation. In fact, the designation of the new President was itself made in a context of fierce competition for power between two influential members of the state apparatus, namely Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, known as a liberal and Colonel Mohamed Salah Yahyaoui, the Head of the FLN who enjoyed the support of both left-wing radicals and Islamic activists.

As a matter of fact, Bendjadid's appointment came rather as a result of the Army's decision to pass over both rivals and opt instead for a neutral figure from its own ranks. In fact it seemed at least formally that Bendjadid had to share power more widely than had his predecessor.

In addition, the ongoing economic decline and the dramatic drop in the oil price, a principal source of Algeria's national revenue, accentuated the social discontent perceptible from the mid-1980s and evidenced by incidents such as the
demonstrations of autumn 1986 in Setif (East Algeria). This wave of discontent assumed a more violent form in October 1988 with mass riots and popular demonstrations, destabilising the Algerian state to its very foundations. The result was that the slow process of reforms which was going on from the early 1980s came under pressure to proceed faster by the end of the decade when the country adopted a new constitution in February 1989, transforming radically the political life of contemporary Algeria.\(^5\)

However, despite the changing international and domestic circumstances and the moderate nature of Bendjadjid's regime,\(^6\) as far as foreign policy was concerned, the Algerian leadership had officially continued to claim -- certainly up to 1988 -- its strong attachment to ensuring continuity in the pursuit of traditional foreign policy. This assertion of continuity applied in terms of principles, conduct and policy issues.

Therefore, the research presented in this thesis endeavours to investigate the validity of this claim for essential continuity. It does so by focusing on the extent to which there was a continuity and/or change in Algeria's foreign policy over the period under consideration. Its main hypothesis is that the change in the presidency -- the president being a major actor in the making of Algeria's foreign policy-- will most likely produce modifications in the formulation and implementation of the state's foreign policy. Additionally, other interacting internal and external factors will also trigger such a change, though with varying degrees of influence.
INTRODUCTION

The choice of this topic was determined by the fact that there appears to be no comprehensive study readily available on the theme. So far only one major work has been devoted to Algeria's foreign policy as a whole, and even this covers only events down to 1978. In most of the analyses that can be found which deal with Algeria's post-1979 evolution, the emphasis has been placed not on foreign relations but instead on analysing the country's domestic politics, particularly the process of economic reforms initiated by Bendjedid's government as early as 1980.

In contrast, when reference is made to Algeria's foreign policy, it is often too general to explain and assess satisfactorily its evolution during this phase. Moreover, these studies have characteristically centred their investigations on narrowly-focused issues, limited in time and scope, such as Algeria and relations with the Arab Maghreb Union or Algeria and its relations with France.

Thus, by failing to provide an overall picture of Algeria's foreign policy, on the one hand, and without assessing the linkages with the previous phases on the other, existing scholarship neither conveyed a comprehensive examination of the period in question nor a comparative perspective in order to single out whether there was change or/and continuity. In addition, these studies featured a total absence of explicit reference to the various factors which determined and influenced the making of Algeria's foreign policy.

Up to the time of writing this thesis, the only attempts which came close to my own research were Nicole Grimaud's article entitled "La diplomatie sous Chadli
ou la politique du possible\textsuperscript{10} and Robert Mortimer's work on "Algerian Foreign Policy in Transition".\textsuperscript{11} Given that little had been written on the subject within the time frame under review here, and that no work similar to this one had been undertaken, there is no scope to present a literature review of a traditional type.

What it is important to emphasise, however, is that in contrast to existing literature, the originality of this academic contribution lies in its attempt to study Algeria's post-1979 foreign policy with a view to investigating its degree of change and/or continuity. The methodology adopted for this study is a combination of historical, analytical, descriptive and comparative approaches which seem appropriate to the requirements of this research. This is justified by the fact that this research spans a long period of time in which certain issues require descriptive and analytical assessment, and more importantly a comparative perspective, being in this context the pivotal analytic tool that can be used to illustrate the changing/continuing patterns in Algeria's foreign policy.

This research is not an official study. As will be apparent from the bibliography, it draws upon what government publications are available. These are Algerian historical documents, contemporary political programmes, national and international press reports, speeches and interviews with Algerian officials.

It should be mentioned that the conduct of this research encountered numerous obstacles and limitations that lay outside the author's control. Indeed, for some foreign observers, it might appear quite easy for an Algerian to overcome the constraints which handicap anyone attempting to work on this subject. I must,
however, admit that despite being Algerian and having the linguistic advantage (Arabic and French), I came across formidable constraints in my attempts to gain access to non-official documents or to obtain relevant information from appropriate actors and institutions involved in the making of Algeria's foreign policy. In many cases the reason behind this can be explained by the secretive character inherent in the Algerian governing culture, the innate "closed" nature of Algerian officialdom since 1962, censorship, a lack of any custom or ambience of openness in respect to documentation and absence of freedom of information.\(^{12}\)

In addition to this, the research and the collection of relevant data happened to coincide with Algeria experiencing a highly politically unstable period since 1992. This made this process a difficult task. Unsurprisingly, under such volatile circumstances, many official actors and institutions approached by the author have been unwilling to help. Mistrust and fear of being exposed to retribution underlay this uncooperative attitude.

Consequently, obtaining interviews from Algerian officials proved not to be the exception. Most of the Algerian officials asked for interviews have declined my request. As for the few interviews which were carried out, Algerian officials avoided answering precise questions and tended to confirm only what was already published or what the author had already enough from other sources. Moreover, a cross-examination of the information gathered from this process with other material revealed that most of the interviewees tended to interpret events not only from their own perspective but also according to their past political stake, ideological convictions and "clan" affiliation. For these reasons this study has
sought to avoid a heavy reliance on interviews and/or oral history.\textsuperscript{13}

As mentioned earlier, the basic aim of this research is to analyse the extent of continuity and/or change of Algeria's foreign policy under the new post-1979 leadership. This thesis, therefore, will be divided into two parts and a final conclusion. The first part, composed of three chapters, not only reviews theoretical issues but also sets the background for the analysis of Algeria's foreign policy from 1979-1992. The first chapter's objective is to review the contending theoretical models for the study of the foreign policy of Third World countries. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the validity of each model's claim in explaining the making, formulation and implementation of foreign policy in this category of states. It will be argued that each model has its merits and its limitation and that there is no entirely appropriate or convincing model or framework which can be applied for the analysis of the foreign policy of such categories of states, and hence the validity of undertaking this case study.

Seeking to remedy this situation, the same chapter identifies and analyses the most important determinants that played a significant influence on Algeria's foreign policy. It will be argued that these determinants constitute a serious alternative for the analysis of this specific study. It will also uncover who makes Algerian foreign policy. This will be followed in chapter two by the examination of the principles of Algeria's foreign policy which became the official general framework, for the Algerian policy makers, in the conduct of the country's conduct and quest for its objectives in both national and international affairs.
In conjunction with the previous chapter, the next one deals with the major issues of Algeria’s foreign policy behaviour up to 1978, regarded as the era which gave substance and specificity to those principles. Together the last two chapters will set the background against which Bendjedid’s era will be evaluated.

In order to assess the extent of attachment by the new leadership to its commitment to respect his predecessors’ line of conduct in the arenas of international relations, the second part considers Bendjedid’s era (1979-1992) by exploring a number of issues/areas that came to be the focus of the country’s diplomatic activities. Accordingly, this part comprises three chapters. The first one tackles Algeria’s Arab policy with both its two segments, that is to say, its policy towards its proximate neighbouring countries -- Morocco-Tunisia and Libya -- and the more distant Mashreq.

Taking into account the importance and the complex nature of the Franco-Algerian relationship, chapter five will be devoted to how this relationship developed. The final chapter will investigate the traits that have dominated Algeria’s relations vis-à-vis the superpowers (the USA and the former USSR) and the non-aligned movement. The conclusion will consist of a summary of the findings, along with a number of recommendations for future academic research.
Notes and references

1. Both Ben Bella's and Boumediene's regimes fit in the definition given by Joe D. Hagan in his work "Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring". For Hagan leaders of militant regimes "perceive the international system to be an inherently hostile one in which interaction between adversaries...Adversaries are viewed as having unlimited goals in that they directly state and pose a threat across a wide variety of substantive and regional issues...". As for the pragmatic regimes Hagan argues that leaders in this type of regime "perceive the international system to be a threatening environment. However preoccupied with such threats, these pragmatic leaders have relatively restrained and complex views of those threats as posed to their state. Adversaries are seen to have limited goals and constrained capabilities such that they do not pose an immediate threat to the state's survival. This makes "room for diplomacy" in which bargaining, compromise and even some limited forms of cooperation are in each state's interest...". For more details see Joe D. Hagan " Domestic Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring", in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan and Martin W. Sampson III(eds), Foreign Policy Restructuring (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 149.


3. First official speech by President Chadli Bendjedid to the nation on 13 March 1979, published in R évolution Africaine, 14-20 March 1979. See also The FLN's Congress Resolution on Algeria's Foreign Policy, "au service de la liberté et de la paix", Ibid., 24-30 January 1979.

4. Ibid.


6. The definition of Hagan regarding moderate regimes is also valid for the regime of Bendjedid. For Hagan "leaders of these regimes do not see the international environment as inherently hostile or dramatically threatening to their state's
security, well being, or international status... Thus moderate leaders tend to be restrained and flexible in their own foreign policy behaviour", see Hagan, op. cit., p. 148.


12. The same thing can be said about most of the Third World states. See, for example, Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 21-22.

PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE
Chapter One

Theories Review

1.1 Introduction

Most of the theories of foreign policy are generally oriented towards the study of well-structured political entities and this means, in the main, the developed countries. This may be explained by the absence in most developing or emerging countries of traditions or well-established patterns in their foreign policy, as well as by the weakness of their political structures.

After studying the foreign policy of developing countries, Paul Seabury concludes:

Blessed are the weak states, for they can blow up the world and even acquit themselves like teenagers before the bar of history, which condemns only the mature. Big states, being the ones with responsibility, are for this reason less free.

He goes on:

Revolutionary leaders, like women, have a privilege of changing their minds; more specifically, they can behave like gay divorcees. Taking the sweet air of freedom, courted by many, they can make lack of commitment a virtue, and the freedom and pleasures of the moment, which this condition makes possible.

Such findings would discourage any attempt to analyse or embark on the analysis of foreign policy making among developing states. Some scholars have even gone as far as to question the utility of studying their foreign policy at all, suggesting that attention might be more profitably focused on their domestic problems. This could explain to a certain extent the poverty of the literature.
dealing with their foreign policy. What modest attempts there have been seem
generally devoted to current affairs or historical events.

Nevertheless, the pattern of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990 has demonstrated
that these kinds of states can significantly affect the international arena whether
positively or negatively. The Gulf crises (1980-88, 1990-1), the Falklands war
(1982) and the settlement of the Iranian-USA crisis brought about by Teheran's

Therefore, there are some good reasons why foreign policy analysis of
these countries should be undertaken by academics without any presupposition.
To take a cue from Christopher Clapham: "All [referring to states] should be
treated as inhabitants of the same world". 2

It is not our intention in this chapter to explore all of the theories already
existing in the field, neither it is to add confusion. 3 The intention is rather to shed
some light on the approaches to the study of foreign policy according to their
influence on the field, and the consideration of the categories of the states with
which we are dealing. This initial step allows us to determine whether or not there
is a satisfactory approach that can be applied for our case study.

1.2 The Decision-Making Model

This model starts from the assumption, as Richard Snyder and others have
contended, that "the nation-state is going to be the significant unit of action for
many years to come" 4, and thus strategies of action and commitment of resources
will continue to be decided at the national level. Consequently, action in international relations can be best understood by focusing on the decision of the basic actors, and a strategic focus for research is the point at which the inputs are transformed into outputs, through the decision making process.

Therefore, rather than concentrating primarily on ends or forms of foreign policy, Snyder and his colleagues are concerned with the process of foreign policy itself. In fact they define decision-making as "a process that results in the selection, from a socially defined, limited number of problematical alternatives, of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by decision makers". This selection or choice process is determined by those variables which can explain how and why the actors in the international system behave as they do, and by those which embrace a wide range of concepts and disciplines (such as economics, psychology and political science). In seeking to isolate and identify some crucial variables that determine responses to concrete situations they proposed three internal clusters of variables:

1- Spheres of competence or "the totality of those activities of the decision maker relevant to the achievement of the organisational objective", including problems of role structures, role relations, formal and informal, legitimacy;

2- Communication and information which refer to the nature, quality, quantity, processing, and flow of information;

3- Motivations which are defined as "the psychological state of actor(s), its objectives to answer the "why" question: "Why does the actor act, that is, why is
a decision made? Why does action take the particular form that it does in a particular situation? Why do patterns of action evolve from decision-making? 9

Though the key concepts and assumptions generated by this approach are deceptively simple, it can be argued that the decision-making approach has been more important than any other to the development of foreign policy analysis. 10 The continued impact and pervasive influence of this approach is principally due to the advantages which it offered: 11

1- The study proposed comparable categories for the collection of data, thus making comparative foreign policy research feasible.

2- The authors explored in depth the psychological environment or the perceptual orientation of the foreign policy elite.

3- They provided in rigorous conceptual terms an analysis of the decision-making process.

4- Given the importance the authors attached to methodological-conceptual issues, they avoided such problems as reification of the state. As they themselves affirmed “we need to rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction, the “state”. It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers -those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the states”. 12

Despite its merit it is nonetheless apparent, however, that this approach must suffer from multiple limitations, especially when trying to apply it to the
analysis of the foreign policy of developing states, since it seems to be designed for the analysis of policy making in complex organisations. These would typically possess a well structured and well organised decisional unit and high level of political institutionalisation, ready access to information and a sophisticated, well-established, formal developed bureaucracy. None of these attributes apply in almost all developing countries.

Moreover, the decision-making approach has no specification regarding the division of the determinants of foreign policy of developing countries into internal and external ones. Yet it is precisely these that appear to play an important role in influencing the decision makers in the developing countries.

Another "limitation" on the decision making approach lies in its focus on single and often isolated decisions (particularly those connected to major foreign policy crises). Furthermore, the approach has restricted analytical utility in comparative studies of the internal and external politics of developing states. Indeed, the approach is based on the assumption that the behaviour of developed and developing states equally follow a rational actor model of decision-making. This implies that all states seek to enhance their power, and that all states are motivated by security factors. But it does not account for specific features and impulses that may be particular to the developing countries, such as modernisation, a low level of institutionalisation at home, and dependency status in the global stratification system abroad.¹³
1.3 The Dependency Approach

In their attempts to explain the weakness of developing countries, the advocates of the dependency approach exclude any prospect of independent foreign policy on the part of these countries. Referring to their peripheral role within the capitalist system, they regard it as shaped and confined rigorously by the external geopolitical environment. Accordingly, the foreign policies of developing countries are seen as lacking autonomy. Affected by external stimuli, they react to initiatives and situations created by external forces. For Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki the basic propositions of this theory are:\textsuperscript{14}

1- Present problems of Third World underdevelopment and development cannot be studied in isolation from their historical and global context. In a nutshell, Third World underdevelopment and development are part of a global dynamic: the process of change in a world-wide capitalist system.

2- Although internal structure and process do play a role in Third World societies, most important changes in these societies are ultimately determined by external forces. This reveals the inability of Third World societies to exert much control over their own destinies, let alone over the larger world system. The use of the term “dependence” to describe this situation is amply justified both in practice and in theory.

3- The influence of the world-wide (capitalist) system is no longer exerted through an impersonal market but through an important non state actor which takes the form of the multinational company.
4- Many local groups are consciously or unconsciously dependent on the existing system and hence unlikely to challenge it. These groups include landowners, the growing state bureaucracies, and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.

Though this dependency approach could be relevant as far as developing countries are concerned, it should however be noted that it suffers from certain limitations. Bahgat Korany and his colleague found it deficient for two reasons. First, it is much more concerned with general patterns of national underdevelopment and development than with the systematic analysis of a particular dependent country's foreign policy. Second, the approach addresses the linkage of external forces and foreign policy in terms that are too general, and it lumps together the different parts of the Third World as if specific variations among different regions did not exist. In this context there is also an overemphasis on the external factors as compared with the internal ones, making the former the key for explanation of the developing states' foreign policy behaviour.

1.4 The Psychologistic Approach

Being one of the most frequently used approaches in the analysis of the foreign policy of the developing countries, this approach describes foreign policy as a function of the impulses and idiosyncrasies of a single leader. According to this view “foreign policy is perceived not as an activity designed to achieve national or societal goals” but, as E.Shils wrote in 1962, as “a policy of public
relations whose objectives are to improve the image of the state, enhance the popularity of the leader, and divert attention from domestic troubles to illusory external victories.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite its impact on scholars dealing with the foreign policy of developing countries, there are at least three criticisms to be emphasized.

First, it makes foreign policy appear to be an erratic, irrational activity that will implicitly therefore be incapable of subjection to systematic analysis.

Second, it ignores the context (domestic, regional and global) within which foreign policy is formulated.

Third, it ignores the fact that because of their interest in political survival, most leaders downplay eccentricities that run counter to dominant attitudes, public mood, and political realities.

Despite these shortcomings one cannot neglect the idiosyncratic characteristic in analysing foreign policy in developing countries. Indeed, the typical difficulties facing these states during the first years of their independence, weak structures, economic problems and an absence of political traditions all, tend to reinforce the role of the leader.

Dealing with the foreign policy of African states, Olajide Aluko confirmed this view when he noted:
In many cases the Presidents or Heads of state, in Africa have greater control than their first world counterparts over the foreign relations of their countries. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Being new within the international system, most African states are still to carve out for themselves established areas of interest in the international arena. Consequently there is nothing like the traditional patterns of external behaviour as one finds in the older established states. Furthermore, there are no serious domestic institutional restraints on the behaviour of the African rulers. As a result of this, the African Presidents or Heads of states are extremely powerful.\(^\text{18}\)

Another scholar, Robert I. Rothstein, in his article "Foreign policy and development policy: from non-alignment to international class war", stresses that:

Most of the less developed countries have very small foreign affairs bureaucracies, few embassies abroad and very few alternative sources of information...there are, finally, very few interest groups with a large stake in foreign affairs, and very little public interest in what happens outside the immediate environment...the result is highly personalised foreign policy. When the dominant leader is particularly popular, and his rule unchallenged, the distinction between personal views and state policies may disappear.\(^\text{19}\)

As stated above, one cannot rule out the idiosyncratic nature of the foreign policy in many developing states. However, applying this approach as unique to an analysis of developing countries' foreign policy would exclude any effort to locate and investigate other factors that determine these states' actions in the international arena. In his works on Indonesia, Franklin B. Weinstein pointed out this problem:

Most of the writing on foreign policy in the less developed countries stresses either the importance of idiosyncratic sources of policy or the identification of a number of relatively long term factors which influence the formation of policy. These studies are helpful in many ways, but in one important respect they are unsatisfying. They do not give us a clear picture of how foreign policy relates to the political and economic problems that constitute the essence of being a less developed country.\(^\text{20}\)
Moreover, the approach tends to underestimate the role that personalities play in policy making in the most developed states. Christopher Hill argues that: "Even in pluralistic societies, foreign policy is an area of great executive freedom for presidents, prime ministers and foreign secretaries".21

1.5 Rosenau Pre-theory

Another attempt to inquire into the nature of foreign policy analysis was carried out by James Rosenau. In his pre-theory, Rosenau identified five sets of variables which he considered as decisive in the explanation of foreign policy:22

1- The idiosyncratic: it includes all aspects unique to the decision-maker: his values, talents and prior experience that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behaviour from those of every other decision-maker.

2- Role: it pertains to the external behaviour of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual characteristics of the role occupants.

3- Governmental: it refers to those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance foreign policy choices made by the decision-makers.

4- Societal: This includes the nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour.

5- Systemic: This includes any nonhuman aspects of a society's external
environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence
the choices made by its officials.

After identifying these sets of variables, Rosenau went on to assess the
relative influence of the variables by ranking them according to the size of the
country (large, small), economic development (developed, developing) and the
political system (open, closed). To these dimensions was added the degree of
penetration.\textsuperscript{23}

Although Rosenau's pre-theories are a valuable contribution to the
scholarship of foreign policy analysis, it remains difficult to operationalise its
cluster of variables when dealing with specific states. The specification of the
variables appears confusing and sometimes overlapping, as it seems difficult to
determine clearly into which set of variables the data properly fit; and in addition
to the failure of explaining how the different variables interact with each other, the
distinction between the decision-maker's values and others and those stemming
from the roles they occupy proves hard to ascertain, especially in the case of the
new states where there is a significant lack of data on "role" variables. With regard
to these states, while the categories of economic development and political
accountability appear to be analytically sound, size and degree of penetration are
misleading.\textsuperscript{24}
1.6 Implications

It appears from the approaches outlined above that there is no entirely appropriate or convincing one which can be systematically applied for the analysis of the foreign policy of such categories of states. To surmount these shortcomings, some scholars have used the "determinants" analytical framework as an alternative, thus making from the factors found in both the internal and external environments the key to the analysis of these countries' foreign policy. Even if factors may differ within the developing countries, the factors outlined below are considered as the most common.

The Domestic Environment:

A) Cultural and psychological factors: ideology, tradition, ethnic and religious division, the indigenous value system, historical experience and colonial heritage.

B) Socioeconomic factors: geography, modernisation and economic growth, natural resources, population growth, food insecurity, poverty and the economic system.

C) Political factors: nation building, the low level of institutionalisation, the socialisation process, the recruitment pattern of elites, domestic pressure and interest groups, bureaucracy, national security and interest, military capability and elite, political stability, political parties and public opinion, the decision-making process, the personality of the decision maker and his background.
The External Environment:

A) External political and economic pressures such as the cold war, neo-colonialism and multinational companies, international conflict patterns, international organisations and law.

B) The state’s external commitments: its alliances, treaties and trading.29

As a result, students who have analysed the foreign policy making of Algeria have used such a framework work in their investigation. Nicole Grimaud, Bruno Etienne, Abdelhamid Derradji, Abdelmadjid Benamia are all, to a great extent, agreed that the making of Algeria’s foreign policy is shaped by the combination of external and domestic factors.30 There was, however, no agreement between these scholars on a common set of factors since each study focused on what it considered to be the most relevant ones.

Given this situation, it would seem a rather difficult task for this study to provide a comprehensive review of all the determinants. Indeed, like many developing countries, Algeria’s foreign policy has been influenced by different factors: the operative ones include the colonial legacy and its implications, the nature of the political system and its structure, economic and ideological orientations, religion, national interest, geographic position and external pressures. But, accepting that the task of identifying factors determining the foreign policy of any state is not simple, the focus of the next section will be on
those factors that played a significant influence on Algerian foreign policy making either as enhancing or constraining agents of influence.

1.7 The domestic environment

Since Algeria is a relatively new state that gained its sovereignty after a long period of colonisation, the conduct of its foreign policy has been deeply affected by its internal situation. We will therefore start with the domestic environment in identifying those variables emanating from within the territorial boundary of the state that influence the decision makers.

1.7.1 The influence of economics

Upon its independence from France in 1962, Algeria inherited a completely disarticulated and dependent economy. Its limited function to serve the interest of the "pieds-noirs" minority colon community and the French metropole had not previously permitted the development of a strong and integrated nationwide economy. It was only in 1959, in an attempt to curtail the war of independence, that the colonial administration launched an emergency plan (Plan de Constantine), which was never fully achieved, resulting in only limited modernisation by the close of the French era.

Moreover, the mass exodus in 1962-63 of the European settlers representing the big landlords, the greedy entrepreneurs, highly skilled workers, doctors, and administrators and all other professionals led to a serious degree of
paralysis of the economy during the early years that followed independence.

The alarming speech of President Ahmed Ben Bella before the National Assembly in 1962, illustrates the dramatic situation of the Algerian economy at that time. According to Ben Bella, some 4,500,000 Algerians were destitute. Only about 10 per cent of the available labour force was employed full time. Industrial enterprises were working at 15 to 20 per cent of their capacities; hundreds of thousands of acres of the best farm land rested fallow, or had been inadequately cultivated. In big cities, such as Algiers and Oran, about half of the stores were closed and shuttered, their owners having left for France.  

Facing the challenge to spur urgent development, the new national leadership implemented an economic strategy based on the rejection of the liberal model. This economic choice represented the implementation and giving of momentum to the economic guidance outlined a few months before Algeria secured its independence in the 1962 Tripoli Programme, the first ideological document of the FLN's leadership (Front de Libération National).

This document called for complete agrarian reform and for radical measures of nationalisation in all sectors of the economy. It stated that:

Algeria's economy is colonial, dominated by France, and entirely in foreign hands ....Algeria's economy is unbalanced and disjointed.... The modern dynamic sector is capitalist in character. It is truly an outpost of the economy of France....Against the foreign domination and economic liberalism.... In newly independent countries, resorting to the methods of classic liberalism will prevent a real transformation of the society, aggravates anarchy in the market,
increases economic dependence....Towards a policy of planning with the
democratic participation of the workers in the economic authority.....Our
country leaves its economy in the hands of foreign monopolies and wait for
them to modernize us.32

Indeed, shortly after attaining independence, the Algerian government
undertook the first step towards the realisation of the socialist option. In October
1962 it nationalised all landholding left by pieds noirs and organised vacant
properties and legitimised workers' self-management committees by a presidential
decree in 1963. On the other hand the state's companies, such as Sonatrach
(Société National de Transport et de commerçialisation des Hydros Carbures and
SNS (Société National de Sidérurgie), were created in 1964 to lighten foreign
corporate domination of these key sectors.

However, the perpetual political dissensions within the leadership and
social difficulties which faced Ben Bella's regime during the early years of
independence ended up in his overthrow, in June 1965, by his Minister of
Defence, Colonel Houari Boumediene. But unlike his predecessor, the new
President maintained the socialist model and implemented a more coherent
economic policy. Inspired by the theory of Industries Industrialisantes
(industrialising industries) of the French economist Professor G. Destanne de
Bennis, Algeria launched into a vast economic programme of industrialisation.

To meet the financial cost of its economic development, according to its
economic and political objectives, with less external pressure which would,
eventually, be linked to any foreign assistance, Algeria had to rely on its own
resources. In this context, during the first years of Boumediene's presidency top priority was given to the recovery of national resources from foreign control. Thus, the 1965-1971 period witnessed an intensive series of nationalisations. The government took over banks and insurance companies in 1965, and a major portion of mining sectors in 1966 as well as the interests of Anglo-American oil companies (Esso and Shell in August 1967, Sincler in April 1969, Amid in April, Philip's Petroleum in June 1970 and Mobil Oil in November of the same year). One year later, Algeria decided, unilaterally, to increase its shares to 51 percent in foreign companies operating in the hydrocarbon sector and the entire nationalisation of all national gas deposit and pipelines. The last measure had two major effects. First, it provided the Algerian economy with an important source of revenue permitting a colossal industrial investment. Second, it deeply affected its foreign relations, especially with France.

However, the economic policy followed during the late 1960s and early 1970s was unlikely to persist after Boumediene's death in late 1978. The critical assessment of Boumediene's economic strategy by the new team in power motivated President Chadli Bendjadid to set up new priorities. Contrary, to what his predecessor's policy had emphasized, the economic strategy shifted emphasis to light industries, decentralisation of state economic enterprises, agriculture, housing and greater tolerance of the private sector. All these measures paved the way for more liberal measures and the introduction of free market principles after 1988.33
It is evident, after this brief examination of the main features of the periodisation into which one can structure the history of Algeria's economic orientations, following independence, that like any newly independent country, development and control of the national economy was crucial from the outset to all Algerian leaders. Indeed, gaining economic control was a complementary action to be pursued alongside other ways of giving meaning to, and reinforcement of, national independence.

As a consequence, the economy became the most influential factor in the making and implementation of state policy both at domestic and international level. "To have an efficacious foreign policy, it is first of all indispensable to have a healthy economy, as the task of development will lead us to a well defined foreign policy not only with regard to the struggle for freedom but also for just causes in the world". 34 By saying this, Boumediene sought to illustrate the degree of intimacy in the relationship between economic policy and foreign policy.

Moreover, the interpretation of the Algerian leaders, and their convictions that the country's underdevelopment resulted from capitalist domination, further motivated the implementation of an external policy. It also profoundly affected these leaders' internal economic visions. From Ben Bella to Bendjadjid, the leaders of Algeria have tirelessly promoted and called for a policy of Third World mobilisation to restructure the international economic
It is, however, appropriate to mention that despite the fact that Algeria was promoting and advocating the adoption by developing states of a radical policy in their economic relations with the developed countries, and reject the established international economic order, development considerations such as the lack of advanced technology and financial liquidity had, nevertheless, constrained the Algerian government into behaving pragmatically. Thus in practice, its leaders proved to be flexible whenever the national economic interest was involved. Between 1973 and 1979, for example, the percentage of Algeria's trade with the West rose from 87.1 per cent to 88 per cent, while the percentage with the Eastern bloc declined from 6.2 per cent to 4.75 per cent.35

1.7.2 The influence of ideology

It was during the revolution of 1954-1962 that the conception of Algerian contemporary ideology was formulated. Nevertheless, differences in the ideological orientations and in the politico-cultural background existed among the revolutionary elites. These differences, apparent since the early days of the war of independence, impelled the FLN's leadership to avoid the promotion or imposition of a well-defined ideology. The raising of ideological issues to a position of primacy would have compromised the military insurrection's objectives. Priority was, therefore, given from the start to the consolidation of the political elite's unity by assigning less importance to the ideological debate.
within the FLN. Arab nationalism and Islam have, however, been the principal elements used by the FLN as tools for national mobilisation and for the attainment of Arab and Islamic World solidarity. 36

It was only when independence was imminent that the FLN began to use and develop a progressive political stance in its official publications. And that stance specifically manifested itself in the form of a socialist ideology. In this context, the Tripoli Programme in 1962 was the first doctrinal document indicating the future ideological orientations of independent Algeria.

Though without referring, explicitly, to the socialist ideology as such, or offering much by way of a future of ideology to be implemented in independent Algeria, the programme -- whose elaboration was assigned to the most leftist elements in Ben Bella's entourage -- reflected a strong commitment to socialist ideology. 37

The socialist option became more precise and officially recognised as the new state's political ideology in the 1963 Constitution of the Republic of Algeria and was reinforced in 1964 by the adoption of the Algiers Charter -- a socialist doctrinal document par excellence. This option was reiterated in both National Charters of 1976 and the 1986 version (1976 enriched) and was made irreversible in the 1976 Constitution. This last document stated that: "Socialism is the ideology of the Algerian state; any constitution will not be against the republican form of the government, the religion of the state nor Algeria's
socialist option”. The socialist option was, however, dropped by the time of the framing of the 1989 Constitution which abolished the single party system.

It is important to emphasize that the socialism practised by Algeria for more than two decades possessed its own specificity. It was more the expression of revolutionary nationalism in the quest of a new, modern and fair society than the scientific and economically-driven socialism of doctrinaire Marxian theory. “Socialism in Algeria does not proceed from any materialist metaphysics and has no connection with any dogmatic conceptions foreign to our genius. The building of socialism in Algeria is identified with the full development of the Islamic values which are the basic constituents in the personality of the Algerian people”. This was the formulation stressed in the 1976 Charter, as it singled out the particularity of the Algerian brand of socialism.

Therefore, without neglecting the cultural and religious values of their country's society, the Algerian leadership attempted, by the adoption of this ideology, to confirm their total rejection of the pre-established “capitalist-colonial” system. This latter, in the minds of the Algerian political leadership, would have maintained Algeria in the orbit of France and other capitalist countries.

Thus, the involvement of Algeria's diplomacy in a wide range of international issues, such as the support of liberation and opposition
movements sharing common ideological perceptions, went hand in hand with the sympathy developed towards other socialist countries. These latter regimes were considered as natural allies, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. This Algerian socialist orientation reveals the importance of the ideological factor over the shape of Algeria's foreign policy.

It should be indicated, again, that like the economic factor, the socialist orientation has never hindered Algeria's cooperation and relations with states possessing a different political system or contrasting ideological orientations. On this point John P. Entelis has argued that: "Foreign policy statements as recorded by Algerian leaders in their official documents and texts are all aimed at improving the national sphere and having Algerians gain mastery of their own destiny. The same leaders, however, continue to stress the principal character of their foreign policy, reflecting the fundamental dualities of Algeria's global orientation --a mixture of reality and idealism, flexibility and intransigence, pragmatism and ideology." 40

1.7.3 The influence of religion

Throughout the duration of the era of colonisation, Islam constituted a serious impediment which the French administration could never overcome. Despite the intensive French policy of "de-islamisation" and acculturation of the autochthon population, religion remained an important factor of cohesion and played a significant role in the evolution of the national consciousness. The
attachment of the ordinary Algerian to the Islamic religion was illustrated in the first proclamation of the FLN in 1 November 1954. Among the revolutionary objectives, the declaration cited the "restoration of sovereignty within the framework of the principles of Islam". \(^{41}\)

At the coming of independence, despite the socialist orientations and the opposition of some leftists who advocated a total separation between religion and the state during the first constitutional debate, Islam became the state's official religion under article four of the 1963 constitution. \(^{42}\) This reference to Islam was reproduced in both the 1976 and the 1989 constitutions.

Moreover, since 1962 Islam became an integrated part of the state's socialist ideology. Religious affairs were, therefore, institutionalised at the highest level of the government. A Minister for Religious Affairs constituted the state's official spokesman on religious practise. One of the Ministry's objectives was to ensure that Islamic symbols and appeals are not confiscated by autonomous forces, hostile to the state's policies. This does not mean that the state succeeded in the elimination of Islamic opponents, for the conflicts between religious groups and authorities have never been eradicated in contemporary Algeria. This latent confrontation became more dramatic in the early 1990s, taking the form of an open armed conflict.

At the international level, Islam was also regarded by the Algerian rulers as a complementary instrument of resistance to imperialism. Bruno Etienne
noted that: "Algeria is a Muslim country. The role attributed to religion, however, is to mobilise the society in order to resist colonialism and neocolonialism". 

Nevertheless, except during a few Islamic conferences, the Algerian reference to Islam as such was discreet and low key. It has rarely influenced the making or implementation of the new nation's foreign policy. The controversial speech of Boumediene in the Islamic conference, held in Lahore, in 1974 in which he declared that: "starving people do not consume the Qu’ran's verses" is highly illustrative. More than that, the Palestinian question, which most of the Islamic states regarded as an Islamic issue, was given a broader dimension by the Algerian leader. For the latter, it was above all a struggle for independence.

1.8 Role of institutions

The state's institutions are the main instruments that directly affect foreign policy making. An effective assessment of the impact of the various determinants on any state's foreign policy requires, therefore, that some attention must be paid to the role of the various institutions in the formulation and implementation of the policy. In the case of Algeria one can identify three categories. The first one has its role and powers defined by the constitution (the Presidency). The second derives its role from its institutional nature (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). A final category concerns those institutions which
have a political weight in the established political system (the Army and the FLN).

1.8.1. The Presidency

After a period of dissension among the Algerian leaders over the legitimacy of the state's control, the National Assembly -- itself elected only a few days earlier -- appointed the President of Algeria in September 1962. This was Ahmed Ben Bella, a politician leader backed by Colonel Houari Boumediene, then chief of the Army General Staff. This designation, however, did not put an end to the elite infighting.

To assert his institutional position, President Ben Bella introduced, in 1963, a constitution that considerably strengthened the personal power of the President. The President became constitutionally head of state and Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces. He became entirely responsible for the designation of all high civil and military officials, and had almost no legislative control to exert any brake on his authority. He could dissolve the National Assembly, but the Assembly could not dislodge the President, whose mandate could come to an end only through death or voluntary resignation.

On the other hand, under the Constitution's article 42 the President was guaranteed the exclusive right of the making and the conduct of both internal and external policy. This article stated
The President of the Republic defines the policy of the government and directs it. He conducts and coordinates the internal and external policy of the Nation in conformity with the will of the people, given form through the party and expressed by the National Assembly.\(^4\)

However, the increase in Ben Bella's personal power, combined with economic and intra-elite divisions, led to his overthrow in a bloodless coup d'état, on 19 June 1965, by Boumediene, then Minister of Defence.

Though Boumediene accused his predecessor of personalising and monopolising power, the thirteen subsequent years of his presidency did not witness a decrease in the President's influence. Indeed, Boumediene abolished the National Assembly and the powerful Political Bureau and established new political institutions, the Council of the Revolution (*Conseil de la Révolution*) which became the real policy-making body; and the Council of Ministers, an executive body that ran the day-to-day affairs of the country.

In addition to his control over these two institutions, Boumediene maintained his position as Minister of Defence, which allowed him to play the major role within the Algerian political system. Furthermore, the President's reorganisation of the political system in 1976 did not change the characteristics of the essential distribution of power. Despite establishing and defining the prerogatives of the legislative, executive and the judicial institutions, the President's powers were not as a result weakened. In fact, the 1976 Constitution extended the President's prerogatives even more than the
1963 Constitution had done. Under article 111 the President, for example, became the guarantor of the Constitution, supreme commander of the armed forces, President of the Supreme Court and President of the Superior Security Council. Moreover he determines the nation's domestic and foreign policy and therefore appoints and recalls Algerian ambassadors, receives foreign ambassadors and concludes and ratifies international treaties. The President makes appointments to high military and civil posts, confers state decorations and grants pardons. He may issue decrees and take important national questions directly to the electorate through a referendum. He presides over the Council of Ministers and over joint-meetings between the party and government organs. 45

The end of the Boumediene era and the succession of Colonel Chadli Bendjadid at the turn of 1978-79 did not alter the established decision-making pattern. The FLN's manoeuvre to curtail the powers of the President by the creation of two powerful structures, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau as the highest policy making body in the country fell short of what the Party hoped for.

Indeed, in the extraordinary FLN congress of 1980, Bendjadid succeeded in changing the Party's political structure. As the FLN's Secretary General, he was empowered to select the members of the party's Political Bureau rather than merely proposing them. He was also given a free hand in
making other changes in the party which he considered necessary. By his latest move Bendjadid achieved two important goals. First, he consolidated his political position and the authority of his office. Second, he kept using the Central Committee and the Political Bureau as institutional legitimizer, and thirdly, he gave the impression that he was less authoritarian than Boumediene.

On the whole the President has undoubtedly been the strongest source of power since Algeria gained independence. The concentration of power around him has never been altered since 1962. On the contrary, the presidential centre has repeatedly played the dominant role in both domestic and external affairs. Although from time to time the President may associate some of his trusted and close advisors with the reaching of certain decisions, it was his personal view that had, most of the time, prevailed.

1.8.2 The Foreign Ministry

Despite the predominant role of the presidential centre in Algeria's foreign policy making, the Foreign Minister's influence has been appreciable, especially during Boumediene's era. This, however, was much more the result of personal connections and affinities enjoyed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, with the President than it was a consequence of his administrative position as head of the ministry. Being one of the closest to Boumediene during the war of independence, and among the architects of the
1965 coup, Bouteflika became one of the most trusted politicians in Boumediene's team. This ensured that he became the most influential Foreign Minister in the history of Algeria's external policy.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, the preoccupation of Boumediene with policy making on the domestic front enhanced further the ministry's power of initiative in external relations. In this era, the Minister proposed the solutions, assumed the approval of the President and implemented the policies in the latter's name.

This pattern remained as such until 1971-1972. At that time Boumediene became increasingly involved personally in Algeria's foreign affairs. This change was especially noticeable after the success of the 1973 non-aligned summit held in Algiers. This alteration did not, however, seriously diminish the influence of Bouteflika, who preserved his active and influential role until Boumediene's death in 1978.

In addition, the presence of experienced diplomats who gained international respect in the early days of the war of independence for their diplomatic competence contributed actively to the role played by the foreign ministry as an institution during this era. Mhamed Yazid, Redha Malek, Abd El Hamid Mehri, Saad Edine Nouiouat, Omar Oussadik and Saad Dahleb were among the pioneers in the group of the Algerian diplomats which had been involved in the FLN's diplomatic affairs from the early days of the war of independence in the mid-1950s.
CHAPTER 1

However, an important turning point occurred in the 1980s. Then the eviction of Bouteflika from his privileged position as Foreign Minister, which he had occupied for 15 years, reduced the role of the Ministry from a relatively active body enjoying extensive freedom of initiative, into a subordinate institution whose decisions had to be approved by the presidential institution. For instance, the resumption of Algeria's diplomatic relations with Morocco in 1987 illustrated the instrumental role played by the presidency despite the reticence towards re-establishing formal relations with Rabat shown at that time by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 47

Even more marked an indicator of change was the way that the views of the President's personal advisers and trusted collaborators would prevail over those of the Ministers. An example was the powerful General, Larbi Belkheir, then Secretary General of the presidential office, who played an instrumental role in most of the issues that concerned Algeria's relations with both France and Morocco throughout the 1980s. 48

1.8.3 The Military

The involvement of the ANP (Armée Nationale Populaire) in the state's affairs dates back to the early days of the revolution. During this period there was no separation between the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) and other revolutionary institutions of the FLN. The politico-military aspects of the revolution and the political background of its commander made the ALN an
important institution which had to be constantly involved in the decisional process.\textsuperscript{49}

This historical importance became stronger on the eve of independence when the Army, unlike the FLN, was able to overcome its internal divisions and to emerge as the only revolutionary institution capable of influencing the political events of the early days of the new state. The Army's determination not to restrain itself only to its classical role of providing defence and security against threats of an external kind became evident when it gave its full support for Ahmed Ben Bella in his claim on the state's presidency, despite the opposition of many political leaders.

The desire on the part of the military institution to become more involved in Algeria's domestic political affairs was perceptible in 1965, when it took overt command of the direction of the state. In fact, and ironically, among the reasons behind the 1965 coup d'état were Ben Bella's manoeuvres to reduce the army's temptations to flirt with political power. In alluding to Ben Bella's attempts to foster army factionalism, Boumediene argued that:

By stealthy methods of diversion and division, a large number of reactionary and exploitative elements within the political and administrative machinery of the country sow disorder and trouble in order to raise up the people against their leaders and the revolutionary forces among them (the Army).\textsuperscript{50}

In another statement he stressed that: "Ben Bella wanted to raise up some of us against others in order to climb onto the top of the heap".\textsuperscript{51}
Thus, in contrast to Ben Bella's era, during which suspicion and mistrust had dominated the relationship between the President and the military men, Boumediene, with his military background, was able to fashion the military institution into the backbone of his regime. This support was consolidated further by the late 1960s when Boumediene succeeded in engineering the removal of hostile ex-ALN officers. Indeed, following the coup in June 1965, the military became directly involved in the management of the state's policy. This power was exercised through the Council of the Revolution which represented the highest decision-making body and counted 22 officers out of its 26 members.

This pattern of military centrality in domestic politics was not altered by Boumediene's death in 1978. Once again, the army used all its influence to maintain its position at the top of the state's hierarchy. It succeeded, in a peaceful transition, in bringing about the appointment from its rank of a Colonel to replace the deceased President. This successor, Bendjadid, directed the country for a further thirteen years without radically altering the established system. Indeed, apart from a few changes that affected the military personnel by the appointment of some new commanding officers who were largely believed to be more professional and loyal to the President, the military institution continued to play its traditional decisional role within the state's apparatuses.
However, if it is easy to assess the degree of the Army's involvement at the internal level, it is more complex when it comes to discerning and identifying practical role in terms of foreign policy-making. Of course, there was scope for the Army to wield an indirect influence. This can be corroborated by the observation of the following:

1- The military domination of the Revolutionary Council, the highest decision-making body, throughout the 1965-1978 period.

2- The presidential function has continuously been in the hands of an army officer, except for the first three years of independence.

3- The tenure of the Foreign Affairs' Ministry for 13 years by Bouteflika, a former officer and close friend of President Boumediene.

4- The presence, within the presidency, of officers assuming the function of the presidential advisers during both Boumediene's and Bendjadid's presidency, especially after the appointment of the then Lieutenant-Colonel Larbi Belkheir as Director of the Presidential Cabinet, in 1982, and Secretary General to the Presidency the following year. Illustratively, a matter of fact, Belkheir had direct involvement on issues related to Algeria's relation with both France and Morocco.54

4- The supremacy of the military opinions/decisions on issues of national security. In the case of the Western Sahara, for example, the opinion of the
army's senior officers had been decisive in Boumediene's decision to make a tough stand against Morocco's claim over this territory. This issue became also one of the top priorities of Algeria's military intelligence service.

5- The effects of arms purchases on foreign policy.

1.8.4 The Party (FLN)

As a logical consequence of the revolution, the Tripoli Programme established the FLN as the single party of the new political system. For the Algerian leadership, the single party was the only feasible mechanism for restoring order in an underdeveloped nation and achieving the socialist option. In August 1962 Ben Bella remarked that:

The single party is, in practice, the National Liberation Front (FLN). As was the case in the struggle for liberation, everything must take place within it. United, we have obtained our independence and united we must proceed towards an even greater goal: the creation of the socialist country. 55

However, the factionalism that even during the war of liberation had characterised the leadership of the party, over political positions in the state's hierarchy and the lack of a well defined political doctrine, made the FLN unable to maintain its cohesion and effective power. Despite constitutional guarantees reinforcing its political supremacy, the FLN was never able to emerge as a powerful political institution or a unitary actor after the accession of Algeria to independence.
Therefore, the quality of the FLN leadership declined, and individual party officials seemed in many cases more intent on promoting their personal interest than in building up the party as an effective peacetime political organisation. Moreover, with the involvement of the army in the state's affairs and the growing role of the technocrats, the FLN's influence became increasingly negligible. The party had neither the influence to formulate policy nor to execute it. Most of the time, party elites simply had no power. Their role was rather to propagate others' policy, defend others' candidates and to make sure which leader to follow.

Indeed, throughout the post-independence era the FLN was an instrument employed mainly by the presidential centre in rallying public opinion and in mobilising the masses to legitimise the President's political actions. This practice was constantly and most noticeably used during Bendjadjid's era. His manipulation of the party's organ, the Political Bureau and Central Committee, reduced the FLN -- which was supposed to be the highest institutional decisional body -- into a passive bureaucracy.

Therefore, one cannot talk about party influence in Algeria's foreign policy. The only examples of "involvement" in the foreign affairs of the state were limited to formal and rather sterile contact with the other states' political parties or liberation movements.
1.9 The external environment

In general the external environment consists of a varied collection of inputs into foreign policy decision-making. In her doctoral research on Algeria's foreign policy, Nicole Grimaud defined the external environment of Algeria as follows:

1- The imposed environment: this consists of France, USSR, USA, Great Britain, the EEC and (West) Germany.

2- The fraternal environment: this consists of the Arab World (Mashreq and Maghreb).

3- The desired environment: this consists of the Third World and non-aligned countries.

In another way, Bruno Etienne divided the external environment into six axes according to their degree of importance in Algeria's foreign policy. These axes are the international environment, the Third World, Africa, the Islamic World, the Arab World and the Maghreb (see figure 2.1).

While this reflected the period up to the end of the 1970s, Algeria's external environment did, however, undergo some alterations. The realities of the international environment in the 1980s such as the rise of Reaganism and, Thatcherism, the fall in oil prices, the demise of Third Worldism strategies and
Figure 2.1. External Environment of Algeria's foreign policy, 1962-1978
later, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, influenced the way the Algerian government perceived its external environment. As the empirical analysis suggests, the traditional external environment in which Algerian external policy evolved, down to 1978, assumed another configuration. This changing international environment influenced the Algerian government to adapt its external policy accordingly. Thus, Algeria's external environment took the following new configuration (see figure 2.2 and map).

The proximate environment: First, it consists of the Arab World (Maghreb and Mashreq) which has remained unchanged, with special attention being at this time (1980-1992) directed towards the Maghreb region because of the newly-advocated policy of good neighbourhood (*bon voisinage*) and dialogue in settling issues that then remained unresolved, such as the Western Sahara and border disputes. Second, the new feature in this environment is the inclusion of France, resulting from the desire of each state to set aside their past differences and its corollary that witnessed an intensification of relations based on mutual common interests.

The distant environment: While this environment has not been altered, it did, however, provide the arena for a tilt in Algeria's external policy priorities exemplified by the non-aligned world reducing in importance, the attempts at Algeria's improving the relationship with the USA, and preserving the status-quo in relation to the USSR.
Figure 2.2: Schematic Description of Algeria’s external environment

ALGERIA

Proximate Environment

Distant Environment

Maghreb

Mashreq

France

USA

USSR

Non-Aligned World
External environment of Algeria's foreign policy, post 1978.
1.10 Conclusion

To recapitulate, the making of Algeria's foreign policy was shaped by the combination of a set of factors whose influence varied over time, according to their importance for Algeria's national interest. This was to have profound implications for the way the country's external policy was to be conducted. Consequently, it becomes clear why, for example, considerable attention was given by Algerian 1970s to the setting up of a New International Economic Order. And it also indicates why Algeria had developed close economic ties with countries considered as partners in its economic development, despite the existence in certain contexts of different or apparently incompatible ideological orientations.

Turning to the institutional mechanism of foreign policy formulation, it can be argued that Algeria's foreign policy, like most of the external policies of the Third World countries, was fashioned in an environment where the head of state enjoyed wider prerogatives and attributions than in "First World" or developed states. Whereas the bureaucratic machinery in charge was in place (the Foreign Ministry), its influence remained insignificant, with the exception of the individual predominant role of Bouteflika as Minister of Foreign Affairs, which stemmed from past loyalty and clanship. The military institution, in practice, proved to be the most important actor in a state theoretically and officially run by the FLN (see figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: The making of Algeria's foreign policy
Notes and references


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., pp. 124-37.


19. Robert I. Rothstein, "foreign policy and development policy: from non-alignment to international class war", *International Affairs*, vol. 52, no.4, October 1976, p.599.


29. For further details on variables that influence foreign policy behaviour, see Clapham, op. cit. and Rosenau The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 386-401.


32. Translated by Joestan, op. cit., pp. 213-214; see Appendix 1.

33. For a good account of Algeria's economic reforms during Bendjadjid's era, see Emma Murphy, "The initiation of Economic Liberalization in Algeria, 1979-1989",

34. Boumediene speech in *Discours du Président*, (Algiers: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, 1979)


36. For this reason France had tried to portray the FLN to the rest of the Western countries as a pro-Egyptian subversive movement.

37. For more details see the Tripoli Programme, in Joestan, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-228


44. *Constitution de la République Algérienne* 1963.


46. By the mid 1970's the power became concentrated in the hands of the Oudjda Group. This group was made up of military officers who served under Boumediene, during the war of independence, while he was commander of the Algerian liberation forces in the Moroccan town of Oudjda(*base de l'ouest*) close

47. Author’s interview with Mohamed Khemar, former head of Algeria’s Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Cabinet, 4 February 1999.

48. Author’s interview with Abdelhamid Brahimi, former Prime Minister of Algeria, 16 August 1998.


51. Ibid.


54. Interview, Mohamed Khemar, 4 February 1999.


60. See Appendix 3.
Chapter Two

Principles of Algeria's foreign policy

2.1 Introduction

The principles of Algeria's foreign policy predate the creation of the independent state. They are the outcome of both the political and the military struggle that the Algerian nationalist movement had pursued in defiance of the colonial rule of France. This particular episode in Algeria's history was to affect profoundly the choice of the state's principles, and by extension, the leaders' vision of the international environment and their making of an independent external policy. From 1962 the heritage of the revolution remained strong as a frame of reference.

Therefore, reference to pre-independence Algeria, and especially to the early diplomacy of the FLN, is essential in order to provide us with a significant understanding of the context within which the fundamental principles of the policy pursued by contemporary Algeria were shaped, defined and set as the official framework for Algeria's external relations. Indeed, during the course of the war of independence the FLN had not confined itself to the strictly military struggle. It had, in parallel, conducted intense diplomatic activity to ensure the internationalisation of the Algerian question which was regarded by France as a strictly internal affair. This was because France had, 1848, divided Algeria into three domestic départements, with deputies and senators sent to the National
Assembly in Paris and Algeria included constitutionally as a part of the French métropole.

Thus, right from the early days of the insurrection in November 1954, the FLN incorporated diplomatic action as a priority in its strategy of struggle. It equipped itself with a genuine diplomatic machinery which had for its principal mission the promotion abroad of the indigenous Algerian cause and the demystification of the France's international propaganda. To this end, the internationalisation of the Algerian question was among the first objectives assigned to the revolution by the FLN's 1 November 1954 proclamation. In parallel to "the internal action", the declaration anticipated an "external action in order to make the Algerian problem into a reality for the whole World".

It was, therefore, in a context of an anti-colonial struggle that the FLN representatives made their "intrusion" into the international arena. Anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and the quest for financial aid, arms and moral support from the international community, especially from the United Nations and the emerging non-aligned movement after the 1955 Bandung Conference, were going to be the backbone of the FLN's international activities.

As will be discussed, the effect after 1962 was an independent state with a foreign policy subordinated, in its style and contents, to the revolutionary heritage. Indeed, the driving force that lay behind the FLN's diplomacy was transposed, from 1962, as the official and irreversible framework of Algeria's external policy.
Thus, in addition to the determinants of Algeria's foreign policy that were reviewed in the preceding chapter, this chapter will go further by elucidating the influential role of these inherited principles from the founding revolutionary era of the Algerian state. It will also serve, in a latter stage, as a scoresheet for the assessment of the degree of continuity and changes that might have affected Algeria's foreign policy in the post-1979 era, since the succeeding regime belonged to this same tradition and had the same political background or heritage.

2.2 Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism

Algeria's rejection of imperialism and colonialism is deeply associated with the history of the nationalist movement. The use of the terms anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, in the political literature of the nationalist movement, goes back to the late 1930s. During this particular period reference to this political terminology was far from being the manifestation of a socialist or a communist political ideology -- contrary to what France sought at that time to pretend. It was rather a radical form of expression used by the nationalist movement to illustrate their fury against the colonial rulers.

By the outbreak of the revolution in 1954 this growing nationalist feeling directed towards France became more conspicuous. It was gradually extended to target most of the Western powers, particularly the USA which remained indifferent to the FLN's appeals for help and support. Indeed, the conflict between a military power, enjoying the political and material support of NATO on the one hand, and a nationalist movement relying on the solidarity of the anti-colonial
states of the Afro-Asian group, the emergent non-aligned movement and to a lesser extent the socialist bloc, on the other, was undoubtedly going to have its repercussions on the immediate and the future orientation of the Algerian revolutionary leaders. This effect became perceptible from the late 1950s, when the FLN's hopes for Western diplomatic support were dashed by the West's obstinacy in sheltering behind an official silence towards the Algerian issue. This silence was an attitude which the FLN interpreted as a form of tacit complicity in the French efforts to suppress the insurrection. On this point, the FLN's journal *EL Moudjahid* stressed:

> It is the massive support granted by the government of the United States to France in Algeria that makes the Algerian people move away from the West... It is the West and particularly the United States accountable for the war of reconquest conducted by France in Algeria. The anti-colonialism directed towards France is also aimed at the West, and if there has been a gap between the Algerian people and France, another one is being created between the Algerian people and the West.⁴

Thus, the prudence which characterised the FLN's attitude towards the West during the initial phase of the revolution (1954-58) slowly shifted into a radicalisation. From about 1958 onwards, the revolutionary leaders did not hesitate to insert revolutionary action within the global international anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle. This was clearly stated by the FLN:

> The struggle of the Algerian people is not an isolated struggle, neither it is unique in its kind; it is only a part of a universal struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia against the European colonialism. The war conducted by France is in its turn only one phase from the struggle organised by different imperialists to maintain their political and economic supremacy in the colonised countries.⁵

As a result, by the eve of Algerian independence the principles of what
would become Algeria's foreign policy were already predetermined by the war-time orientations. The willingness to pursue an external policy clearly and consciously orientated towards anti-imperialism was officially indicated by the first document (the 1962 Tripoli Programme) that defined the future directions of Algeria in all spheres, political, social cultural and economic. In the part reserved to the foreign policy of the new state, the Programme emphasized:

The big lesson of our war of liberation is this: faced by the irresistible pressure of the peoples, the rivalries among imperialist states reduced and were replaced by a solidarity ... Our struggle evoked a favourable response among the masses in these countries, but was exposed to the hostility of their governments. In its war effort, France has enjoyed the material and moral support of all the Western states and particularly of the United States of America. Our determination to push the Revolution forward will encounter more obstacles. This should in no case prevent us from exerting maximum effort to preserve in our anti-imperialist activity... Therefore, Algeria's policy, within the neutralist bloc, should be oriented towards alliances with countries that have succeeded in consolidating their independence and that have shaken off the grip of imperialism.6

Moreover, the revolutionary status acquired by Algeria in its fight for independence, combined with the personal political ambitions of the country's first President, Ben Bella to become a great revolutionary Third World leader, motivated, more than ever before, the implementation of a radical policy towards what were regarded as "colonialist and imperialist Western states". In his first speech before the United Nations, at the time of Algeria's admission to the organisation, Ben Bella unambiguously underlined, the country's future basic principles: "the liquidation of colonialism in both its classic and disguised form will be the credo of our political and diplomatic line of action".7 Moreover, the choice of the socialist path, as the official ideology of the state, accentuated further the devotion to an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial oriented foreign policy. In all
ideological documents elaborated after 1962, the themes of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism were emphasized as the irrevocable principle of Algeria’s foreign policy. In another sense it became institutionalised. This was clearly underlined in the 1964 National Charter. From its socialist approach and analysis of the international relations, the charter went on in the same vein as the Programme of Tripoli. It stressed:

The cornerstone of Algeria’s foreign policy is to make the Algerian revolution a centre of a revolutionary attraction in the Maghreb, the Arab world and in Africa and it has to conduct a firm struggle against the imperialism and the Zionism and to preserve the initiative that tends to the formation of a vast anti-imperialist alliance composed of the entire Asian, African, and Latin American states.8

Therefore, determined to position Algeria in the forefront of the grouping of revolutionary states, Ben Bella’s government became, soon after independence, extensively involved in what was perceived as a struggle for just causes: against “colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism”. Its international activism was, however, mostly directed to the African Continent.

Thus, during the three years of Ben Bella’s presidency from 1962 to 1965, Algiers became the capital of many African liberation movements, providing financial assistance and military training.9 Most progressive leaders visited Algeria, among them President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Ernesto “Che” Guevara of Cuba, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Tchoe Yong Guen of North Korea and the Yugoslavian President Marshal Josip Broz Tito. In 1964 Ben Bella spent most of his time visiting foreign countries and entertaining chiefs of states, the majority of whom were from socialist and African states. In 1965 he devoted the greatest part of his time to the organisation of the Afro-Asian
Conference which was however, cancelled, after Boumediene's coup d'état in June 1965.  

Although Boumediene's coup d'état put an end to the personal international ambitions of Ben Bella and his excessive extravagance and pretensions in the conduct of the state's external policy, the fundamentals of Algeria's foreign policy remained unaltered. Less than one month after the coup, the new President reiterated Algeria's adherence to its traditional principles:

Algeria sends a fraternal homage to the heroic people in Palestine and South Africa, who struggle bravely to put an end to colonial domination and racial segregation. It [Algeria] assures liberation movements of its total and indestructible support and of its political and material support against the growing aggressiveness of the imperialism and its threat over all small nations.  

The support for the liberation movements was even extended to include liberation movements from Asia and Latin America and much more attention was given to the Palestinian resistance against the state of Israel. In fact, Algeria's support of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) was given the broader dimension of an anti-imperialist and an anti-colonialist struggle. For Algeria's new leader it was, above all, a struggle against a foreign occupier. As observed by Boumediene:

The colonialism and the international imperialism have build up a base in this zone [Palestine]. They [colonialists and imperialists] intend to protect their interest... It is definitely a colonial affair: the Anglo-Saxons and their ally posses strategic, military and economic interests which are at the origin of the Israeli base ... The struggle is engaged against colonialism and imperialism ...Here is the true problem which is not understood by either the Western press or some Western progressives who consider Israel as an Arab victim and try to depict the present-day struggle if it were of a religious essence and racist! We reply to these, that our struggle is not what they imagine.
Nonetheless, the problematical economic and social situation within Algeria at the domestic level obliged the new regime to adopt a low-profile international policy. For more than five years, in the mid-1960 and early 1970s, the regime dedicated most of its strength to the consolidation of its legitimacy, the establishment of the state institutions and the recuperation of national resources.

This temporary shift in the political priorities did not eradicate Algeria's underlying international anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stands and participation in conferences. During this period Algeria took part in many international events. It attended the Arab and African summits in late 1965. In December 1965 it severed its diplomatic relations with Britain, thereby complying with the OAU's (Organisation of African Unity) decisions over the Rhodesian problem and with the Federal Republic of Germany the following year, for Germany's recognition of Israel. In June 1967, despite the animosity between Boumediene and Abdel Nasser, Algeria severed its diplomatic relations with Washington. It suspended the oil and gas trade with Britain and nationalised American companies such as Exxon and Mobil.

However, it was not until after recovering most of the national resources that the country started to implement an ambitious external policy. This time it did so with a new strategy around the same principle, namely: the struggle against the "imperialist international economic system". Algerian politicians believed that this system and its structural underpinnings were at the root of the Third World's underdevelopment. From Algeria's point of view, the prevailing international economic system no longer conformed with the reality of the new international
Thus influenced by its own aspirations for national development, Algeria concentrated most of its diplomatic efforts, during the early and late 1970s, on the building up of a homogeneous Third World coalition. The vast international grouping of the non-aligned movement constituted for Algiers the best instrument to promote its new thesis. In this perspective, Algeria hosted the 1973 non-aligned conference, under the slogan "poor in the world unify yourself". The summit succeeded in bringing together most of the non-aligned countries to agree on a common strategy for the issues then forming the dominant international economic order. As spelled out by Boumediene in 1974 during the non-aligned summit in Algiers: "we have constantly underlined in Algiers that if the politics could separate us [Third World countries] the economics could only unify us". This approach had, indeed, produced a positive effect on the North/South dialogue. The declaration issued in 1974 by the UN on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order illustrated the success of the Algerian diplomatic strategy.

Moreover, ideological documents elaborated under Boumediene’s regime and which reflected the state’s orientations down to 1988, made the principles of the two "antis" into a pillar of Algeria foreign policy. Section 5 from the 1976 Charter stated:
Algeria works for the reinforcement of solidarity against imperialism and colonialism, the old and new one ... The solidarity of Algeria with the Third World countries, in their liberation struggle, results from the supreme ideals of the Algerian revolution, those of freedom, independence and struggle against the imperialism....

2.3 National Independence

National independence is another important principle which finds its root in the history of the Algerian national movement. Indeed, throughout the period of colonisation the French administration firmly opposed the nationalist movement in any explicit reference to or use of the expression "National Independence". The bloody repression, in May 1945, for example, of a peaceful demonstration at Setif celebrating the victory of the Allies and calling for Algeria's independence, illustrated France's determination to reject any political claim which might undermine its colonial status.

However, Algerian nationalism could not be eradicated and the aspiration for national independence was repeatedly inserted in the political programmes of most of the nationalist tendencies. The unrelentingly oppressive French policy shattered the hope of most of the nationalist leaders -- even the moderate ones such as Ferhat Abbas -- for a political or a negotiated solution. As a result, the movement's policy, and direction, gradually shifted towards radicalisation and opted for the violent alternative to achieve its demands. This fact was clearly summarised by the nationalist leaders in their first official declaration announcing the founding of the FLN, as well as the start of the insurrection, which stressed:
Our struggle is directed only against the colonialism, the only enemy and blind, which has time and again refused to grant the least freedom by the means of a peaceful struggle... Our political programme is national independence through the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state within the frame of Islamic principles.\textsuperscript{18}

Therefore, national independence became the primordial political and military objective for the FLN leadership. Moreover, by giving primacy to the winning of national independence, the FLN leaders succeeded in mobilising the majority of the population and rallying most of the nationalist tendencies under its leadership. During the seven years of the revolutionary struggle, the political cohesion of the liberation movement and the mobilisation of the masses was built up around the common objective: national independence.

Although Algeria achieved its independence, in July 1962, after more than seven years of oppression and bloodshed which had damaged France's reputation as the land of the "Rights of Man",\textsuperscript{19} the general feeling among the nationalist elites was that "the total destruction of colonialism" as stipulated by the 1 November 1954 Declaration, was not yet fully achieved, as long as the country remained dependent upon France and, by extension, upon other capitalist states. Indeed, the Evian Agreement of March 1962 (the negotiating framework for Algerian independence) secured for France a large measure of enduring economic, social and military privileges. Through its clauses,\textsuperscript{20} Evian perpetuated a part of the colonial order and restricted the meaning of independence to that of a situation of limited sovereignty or co-sovereignty.

Thus, from the beginning, Algeria's leadership felt the necessity of carrying out a national policy, with both its dimensions (domestic and external), within the
framework of national independence. It was most of all perceived as a continuous process to bring about the systematic comprehensive decolonisation of the country. Boumediene's definition of national independence arguably constituted the most appropriate to be cited here. Not only it did reflect the President's belief, but it is also the perception shared by most of the revolutionary elite who dominated the conduct of the country's destiny. For the Algerian leader:

The national independence is the factor to oppose [the ability] for all foreign powers, whatever it is and whatever its position is, to influence our [Algeria's] decisions or our policy. For our country national independence means, therefore, the refusal of any interference in our affairs and any attempt to influence our policy and decisions whether at the internal or external level. National independence represents for our state, our people and our revolution one of the most cherished ideals which we must consolidate and safeguards.21

In short, national independence from Algeria's perspective, especially its external dimension, meant independence in decisions, independence of action and an absolute rejection of any foreign powers' domination.22

The conception of an external policy based on the rejection of any kind of subordination, was, in practice, not a new characteristic of the Algerian leadership's diplomacy. From the outbreak of the revolution the FLN had in fact implemented a cautious, independent policy to ensure the authenticity of the revolutionary movement and to avoid being associated with any of the antagonistic blocs. This concern was summarised in the final document, issued by the FLN, in August 1956, after a historic meeting of the revolution's leadership.23 The document, known as the Platform of the Soummam Congress, distinctively situated its position with respect to the dominant international environment and emphasized the movement towards independence:
Our position in respect to the cold war question is to benefit from the balance of power... We must protect the absolute independence of our movement ... Our main enemy is French colonialism... Our movement is independent from the influence of any foreign power be it Cairo, London, Moscow or Washington... Our connection with the politicians of our friends has never been anything other than contact of friends and not instruments [of foreign powers].

However, it should be recorded that if, during the revolution, the FLN developed a close relationship with the Eastern bloc and appeared on many occasions critical towards its Western counterpart, this attitude was motivated by the FLN's diplomatic strategy of gaining the maximum support for its cause, rather than by ideological considerations. The FLN's journal, *El Moudjahid*, was, in this context, very explicit at the beginning of 1958 when it stated:

The Algerian people want the friendship of all peoples, without any exclusion, provided that it is frank and disinterested; the war of extermination which they have endured daily, for three years, does not permit it to be selective in its choices of friends. More than that, the elementary principles of self-defence obliged it to practise the old adage which says: "the friends of our enemies are our enemies" and to condemn, publicly, the powers which insist on supporting the French policy whatever the bloc they belong to.

And in another reference to the FLN's future foreign policy orientations the same journal specified:

Our external policy is a policy of peace and independence, inspired by the principles of a peaceful coexistence, cooperation and friendship with the people. Based on those principles we are and will at all times be ready to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all nations in the world. In the mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the non-interference in internal affairs, the equality and reciprocity of advantages as well as the peaceful coexistence, we will insure the development of our economic, and cultural relations with all nations and first with those who have at the very outset supported our revolutions.

It was, therefore, with this vision, and the wish to protect the revolutionary legacy from the slightest foreign influence, that the post-independence leaders of Algeria conceived and implemented the country's external policy. The policy of
non-alignment, espoused since the nation acquired independence, remains the most concrete form expressing the attachment of Algeria to the principle of independence. The 1976 national charter defined Algerian non-alignment in the following terms:

The non-alignment is the expression of our will to possess our independence vis-à-vis all foreign powers. It [non-alignment] reflects the determination of the Revolution to be free from any foreign constraint. It determines its domestic and external policy, according to the interests of our people and the noble ideals which guide its action at the international sphere. The non-alignment is a constant political line of Algeria. This policy is at the external level the most appropriate expression of the policy of national independence.\(^{27}\)

Indeed, animated by this orientation, the new republic engaged in what one can call a "second war of national independence". In this context, full control and sovereignty over the recuperation of national resources and the control of Algeria's economic destiny was the first step in this process. It was through the economic development that Algeria's leaders viewed the accomplishment of the country's "real national independence". The subsequent measures of nationalisation which affected foreign companies since the coming of independence were all meant to be acts of national independence. To justify the Algerian nationalisation of the hydrocarbon industries Boumediene argued: "We have wanted the 51 percent of the shares (of the foreign companies) to control our destiny by ourselves. But we have never forgotten the French interests.... There is between us and them only 2 percent and those are the 2 percent of independence".\(^{28}\)

On the other hand the policy of diversification in foreign economic partners,
and the strategy of cooperation which was initiated since gaining political independence, was also driven by Algeria's determination to avoid any form of external pressures. But if the conversion of the Algerian Liberation Army to a modernised professional army had turned Algeria into a major Soviet arms purchaser, this did not, as some Western observers feared, displace the decision-making centre from Algiers to Moscow. Nor did it make Algeria a strategic base of the Red Army. Apart from the limited authorised technical visits of the Russian fleet in the major ports of the country (Annaba-Algiers-Oran), there has been no indication or evidence of other military facilities conceded by Algeria to third parties. This closer cooperation resulted, above all, from the combination of different factors which are worth underlining here:

1. US-Algerian relations have never been able to recover from the negative impact of Ben Bella's visit to Cuba in 1962. The image of Algeria as "another Cuba" weakened, for years thereafter, the prospect of any kind of military cooperation.

2. The continual American financial and military assistance to Morocco was regarded by Algiers as a direct support of the monarchy's claim over Algerian territory and the Western Sahara. It served also as evidence of the "imperialist" American policy directed to the undermining of the Algerian revolution.

3. The American and the French refusal to satisfy, in 1963, an Algerian request to acquire military equipment for the ANP had left Algeria with no other alternative than a turn to Moscow.

Although the Soviet Union helped most to build up the Algerian army, this
privileged military cooperation did not prevent Algeria from diversifying the sources of its arms purchases and the training and education of its military personnel. The French, German, British and even the Americans later on, were all, and still are, involved in the development of the Algerian armed forces.

Furthermore, by developing strong economic ties with the West, Algeria greatly reduced the risk of falling into a position of some "satellite" states which would have prevented any prospect of an independent national external policy. Thus, without undermining the fundamental principle of national independence, and contrary to the behaviour practised by many other non-aligned states, Algeria knew how to embrace to its own advantage the prevailing divisive international antagonism and exploit competition in the Western bloc, and between East and West.31

2.4 Conclusion

The examination of the underlying principles of Algeria's external relations has established that the making and the implementation of Algeria's foreign policy was, above all -- though not exclusively -- largely derived from the nationalists' "revolutionary" convictions and belief, and their vision of the international affairs as they related to Algeria's domestic and foreign concerns.

In short, the years of the war of independence had developed among the Algerian leaders an acute and highly developed revolutionary enthusiasm which theoretically became the chief characteristic of Algeria's external behaviour. This has meant the pursuit of a militant foreign policy and commitment to international
issues, substantially linked to, and affected by, the ideology of the Algerian revolution. It was, thus, against this background that Algeria's leaders established the main axes of the state's external policy and selected its guiding line towards the various areas and issues which faced post-1962 Algeria as a nation-state.

Having defined the principles of Algeria's foreign policy and its effect on the making and implementation of the state's external policy, the next chapter will examine, Algeria's foreign policy up to the end of Boumediene's regime in late 1978. The main focus will be on the pattern that characterised Algeria's external behaviour since its inception, namely its relations with the Arab World, Africa, France and the two superpowers. This will set the background necessary for the identification of the possible changes that Algeria's foreign policy has undergone since 1979.
Notes and references

1. The first document proclaiming the start of Algeria’s revolution and announcing the founding of the FLN. See Appendix 2.

2. There may be a slight difference between the two terms, but in the case of Algeria they are usually used both without distinction to identify colonial powers in particular and the West in general.


9. Among the various liberation movements that had Algerian support one can mention the ANC (African National Congress), the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), the SWAPO (South West African People Organisation) the FLNA (Angolian Front for National Liberation) and many others.

10. Ottaway, op. cit., p.89.

11. Quoted in Grimaud, op., cit., p.94


13. On 3-4 December 1965 an extraordinary meeting of the OAU’s Council of Ministers was held in Addis Ababa to discuss the Rhodesian problem, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority regime of Ian Smith. he
Council called that "the member States of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom if it (UK) does not crush the rebellion and restore law and order and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in southern Rhodesia by the 15th December 1965".


15. Quoted in N. Grimaud, op. cit., p.52


20. Clauses related to the Economic and the military co-operation were the most unfavourable for the independent state. France secured a total monopoly in the sector of hydrocarbons with the following provision: "French interests will be assured in particular by: the exercise, in accordance with the regulations of the Saharian petroleum code, such as it exists at present, of the rights attached to mining titles granted by France; Preference being given, in the case of equal offers, in the granting of new mining titles, to French companies, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided for in the Algerian legislation". For the military question it was stipulated: "Algeria shall lease to France the use of the Mers-el-Kebir base for a fifteen year period, which may be renewed by agreement between the two countries; Algeria shall also grant to France the use of a number of military airfields, the terrains, sites and installations necessary to her". See Appendix 4.


23. The first important meeting held by the FLN's leaders during the revolution.


26. Ibid.


28. Interview of Boumediene for Témoignage Chrétien, 10 June 1971.

29. After addressing the General Assembly, on 9 October 1962, on the occasion of Algeria's admission to the United Nations, President Ben Bella was officially received by President J. F. Kennedy, on 15 October 1962. The following day Ben Bella flew to Havana where he was received by President Fidel Castro. At the end of the twenty four hour state visit to Cuba, Ben Bella joined Castro in a communiqué which condemned the US policy and stressed the "essentially identical points of view" of the two Presidents and called for "the immediate necessity of evacuating troops and dismantling foreign military bases".


31. Alex Mussard, "Impression d'Algérie", l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes, no. 110, Summer 976, p.56.

32. The Algerian policy towards the non-aligned movement will not be included. This is in order to avoid repeating what has already been mentioned in the present and previous chapter (One and Two).
PART TWO
CHAPTER THREE
Chapter Three

The main priorities of independent Algeria's foreign policy prior to 1979.

3.1 Introduction

Any attempt to assess the evolution of Algeria's external policy under the regime of Bendjadjid, must, if only by way of introduction, take note of the implementation of Algeria's external behaviour during the first two decades of independence. This chapter will not, however, review this era deeply, for such an endeavour would be a separate piece of research in itself. Thus, without losing sight of the main theme of our inquiry, this chapter will introduce the prominent issues which dominated Algeria's foreign policy from 1962-1978.

As we have tried to point out in previous chapters, the vision and desire of Algeria's leadership to assume a directing role in world politics was influenced by two sets of factors, namely, the diplomatic activity of the FLN during the war for independence and the requirements of state-building in independent Algeria. In this respect, Algeria's leaders defined the legitimate role of their external policy in a wider geographical context. In other words, Algeria's relations were not only confined to its proximate environment (Maghreb-Middle East-Africa) but were multidimensional, to include relations with the non-aligned movement, regional and international organisations, communist and capitalist countries and liberation movements throughout the world. In this chapter we will examine its relations with
the Arab World (Maghreb/ Mashreq), Africa, France and the super powers (USA and USSR).

3.2 Mashreq: “The Unity in the Struggle”

The outbreak of the Algerian revolution in 1954 was the precursor of Algeria's revival in 1962 as an independent state, after 130 years of an imposed colonial isolation. It was from Cairo that the “Voice of Arab” broadcast the news of the outbreak of the revolution. It was there, too, that the External Delegation of the Algerian Revolution established its headquarters and coordinated the FLN's international activities.

Moreover, at a time where many doubted whether success would result from the FLN's insurrection, all Arab states responded positively to the Algerian military uprising. Besides the material contribution, the diplomatic support of the Arab world in international forums (UN-Afro-Asian Group) was a determinant factor for the success of Algeria's revolution. They Arab states were also among the first states to recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).

In August 1962, one month after its independence, Algeria became officially a member state of the Arab League. This return came, however, at a time when inter-Arab relations were festering as a result of the contest over Arab leadership which overlaid and amplified the ideological antagonism between two segments of the Arab family: the so called “liberated” and “non-liberated” Arab nations.
But, aware of those divergencies, Algeria -- which was ideologically close to the "liberated" group -- opted for the implementation of a prudent and neutral Arab policy. To reflect Algeria's willingness to carry out a cautious Arab policy based on a unionist approach, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Khmisti, outlined Algeria's Arab policy:

Inside the Arab world our policy is based on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs... Because we are Arabs and this world is Arab, whether it is good or bad, we are part of it. It is, however, in the interest of Algeria to see all the Arabs agreed... Algeria has decided to do whatever it can to unite the Arabs and to participate in all positive and effective initiatives to liberate Palestine.¹

If this approach preserved Algeria from a direct involvement in the Arab disputes, it did not, however, prevent the development of an unbalanced Algerian pro-Cairo oriented policy. Soon after Algeria's independence, it became clear that the Algiers-Cairo axis was taking the form of a strategic alliance in the region. This was in fact a policy to be expected in view of the preceding Egyptian support for the Algerian revolution and the close friendship between Nasser and Ben Bella which went back to 1954. Furthermore, Algeria's need for international assistance, to overcome the multiple problems provoked by the exodus to France of the European settlers in 1962-63, presented another opportunity for Cairo to enhance its influence and presence in Algeria. The aid subsequently supplied by Egypt ranged from education and health, to military and political assistance.²

As a result, Pan-Arabism occupied the central axis of Ben Bella's Arab policy. His commitment to this issue can be gauged by the different comments he repeatedly made about it. In 1962, he did not hesitate to point out that: "the
achievement of Arab unity relies on a powerful Egypt with its Nasserian factor”. ³ Ben Bella added, while Nasser was visiting Algeria in May 1963, that: “There will soon be a fourth [Yemen] and a fifth star on the UAR’s flag, the one of Algeria”.⁴

Yet, although Nasser found in Ben Bella an enthusiastic partner in the cause of Pan-Arabism, an ally to counter the Riyadh-Rabat-Tunis axis in the Maghreb and a supporter of his dispute against the “reactionary” regimes in the Mashreq, the two leaders had never agreed on how Arab unity could be achieved. While Algeria advocated a Maghreban unity as a first step towards wider Arab unity, Egypt pressed for comprehensive Arab unity straight away.

Moreover, Algeria did not want to restrict the unity to a limited geographical area (the Arab world) as sought by Nasser or the Ba’ath party of Syria and Iraq. Algeria perceived Arab unity as a first phase which would pave the way for the unity of all revolutionary and socialist countries in the Third World. As stated by El Moudjahid in January 1962:

One of the last Arab states to free itself from imperialist guardianship, Algeria has, thus, to assume in the context of 1962 all the content of the Arab revolution and more because its revolution has opened the way for the African revolution and it ensures the junction with the American revolution... History has given us [Algerians] a special place in the Arab world where we are, and we want to be, an integral part of it. This solidarity is part of a global one, which has been developed between us and the people of Africa and Latin America, engaged in a total struggle of emancipation. It is here where the historical importance of our revolution reveals itself.⁵

However, the privileged relations between Algeria and Egypt did not last for much longer. The coup d’état of June 1965 was a turning point in Algeria’s Arab policy in general and in its relationship with Egypt in particular. The negative
reaction of Nasser to the removal of his "friend" Ben Bella created a tense atmosphere between Cairo and Algiers. The tension between the two states reached a point of rupture when Nasser dispatched Marshal Addel Hakim to Algiers to ask Boumediene to hand Ben Bella over to Egypt. This move was bitterly attacked by Algiers, which viewed it as an interference in Algeria's internal affairs. The explosion of a bomb in Algiers at a conference site where the first Afro-Asian conference was scheduled to take place provided Algeria with an ideal opportunity to curtail the Egyptian influence. Indeed, after holding Egypt responsible for this incident, Algeria ordered the expulsion, for security reasons, of most of the Egyptian technical and political assistants and military advisors who were serving in Algeria.

In addition to the alteration in the bilateral relations between the two countries, Algeria also sought to distance itself from any Arab unity crystallizing under Nasser's auspices. On different occasions the Algerian authorities openly emphasized the weakness and the lack of consistency in the Egyptian approach. This was the case when Boumediene stressed: "It would be illusory to think that the unification of these (Arab) countries is for tomorrow. We do not believe in the virtues of unions and fusions sealed in haste".

Instead, Boumediene's attention in the Mashreq turned to the Palestinian question. This rapidly became the priority issue for the regime's Arab policy in general and the Mashreq in particular, for many years to come. The new government in Algiers was also persuaded that the Palestinian cause was the only issue that could triumph over ideological disputes between Arab states and
enhance their unity.

Thus, contrary to Ben Bella who had not given much attention to the Palestinian issue -- monopolised by Nasser -- the new President fashioned this question into a chief priority in Algeria's Arab policy as well as an essential instrument for the realisation of Arab unity.\(^6\)

The Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of June 1967 soon reflected Algeria's adjustment of its Arab policy. From the early days preceding the military confrontation, Algeria dropped its divergences with Nasser and responded by giving complete backing to Nasser and the countries of the front. One day after Nasser's decision to close the Straits of Tiran, on 22 May 1967, Algeria dispatched its army's Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Taher Zebiri, to visit Egypt and Syria. There he assessed the military situation and also expressed Algeria's willingness to make a military contribution. The positive response of Nasser to the Algerian offer was confirmed, two days later, by the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram*.

Although Algeria was not directly involved in a military confrontation, on the eve of the conflict, President Boumediene addressed the nation and declared:

> Although we are geographically situated at thousands of kilometres from Palestine.... In the name of all the Algerian people, Algeria and the revolutionary regime of the country proclaim that the battle for the liberation of Palestine is ours.\(^7\)

And on the day that hostilities erupted, President Boumediene announced that "Algeria was in a state of war with the Zionist state". In this context, troops were immediately dispatched to Egypt via Tunisia and Libya. On 5 June, 48 MIG jet
fighters were sent to Egypt, followed by two other flights on 7 June. Furthermore, harsh economic measures were taken against the USA and UK, qualified by the Algerian officials as the "enemies of the Arab nation". British and American companies operating in Algeria were nationalised.

In the meantime Algeria undertook an intense bout of diplomatic activity to consolidate the unity of the Arab nation. It intervened to try to reconcile Nasser and the Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. It also recommended -- without success however -- the use of Arab oil as a weapon against Israel and its allies.

On the other hand, Algeria strongly denounced the passivity of the UN and the position taken by other socialist countries in regard to the conflict. As stressed by President Boumediene: "To be fair, no one is allowed tomorrow to hide behind the pretext of neutrality; being neutral means taking no position. In other words, this also means approving the aggression".

However, after six days of confrontations, a cease fire was mediated by the UN and accepted by all of the antagonists (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, PLO and Israel). This situation came as a big surprise to the authorities in Algiers. It was described as "unjustifiable, shameful and unacceptable" by the Algerian President. It provoked a total dissatisfaction among the Algerian people and their leaders. The announcement of the cease fire was, indeed, followed by a huge anti-Egyptian popular demonstration in the streets of Algiers. The President of Algeria, who rejected the cease fire, called on the Arab nation not to capitulate and advocated the widening of the struggle. This according to Boumediene, would have
- the liquidation of the British and American interests in the region [military bases and oil facilities].

- the suspension of extraction of oil for one year to undermine severely the industries of imperialist states.

- the withdrawal of Arab financial assets from Western banks. Parallel to this, Algeria suggested an active diplomatic action for the mobilisation of Third World countries.

In this respect Boumediene, accompanied with his close aides, Colonel Tahar Zebiri and Cherif Belkacem, conducted a diplomatic tour to several Arab capitals on 5 July 1967. The purpose of his visit was to persuade the Arab leadership to resume the war. The negative response of Egypt and Jordan and the new military equilibrium in favour of Israel made the Algerian proposition ephemeral however.

As a result, relations between the Arab nations were repositioned in their prewar context -- that of progressives versus conservative states. This time, however, the situation was changed by the presence of a defeated and discredited Nasser who was henceforth motivated by a search for peace with Israel.

Thus, for the first time since the post-Suez crisis, Nasser lost his role as a legitimate representative of the Arab cause. Boumediene, who took a radical position in relation to the cease fire, "felt himself invested, within the progressive
world, with the responsibilities that Nasser had abandoned". Opposition to all forms of compromise and the advocacy of a guerrilla war of national liberation were going to be the constant policy of Algeria in the post-1967 period. Accordingly, Algeria rejected the UN's Resolution 242, endorsed by the Arabs (other than Syria and the PLO). From Algeria's point of view, the Resolution 242/67 was very ambiguous. It neglected the fundamental right of the Palestinians for an independent state and it also referred to the Palestinian people as refugees. This was clearly underlined by Boumediene:

We have then (1967) rejected the UN's resolution because we were convinced, and we are as ever, that the application of this resolution means the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, the recognition of Zionism, capitulation and the refusal to carry on the struggle.15

As a result, in August 1970, it withdrew its troops stationed in the Suez Canal area as a protest against Egypt's approval of the US Secretary of State, William Rogers' cease fire plan of June 1970. This was followed, in 1971, by the rupture of Algerian diplomatic relations with Amman, after the destruction of Palestinian guerilla bases in Jordan by King Hussein's troops.

Thus, the Algerian government's support for the Palestinian struggle remained uncompromisingly militant. Its eagerness to be part of the Arab World in its fight against Israel was demonstrated once again by its active involvement in the war of October 1973. One month before the war Boumediene, who was informed by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat of the Egyptian war preparations, stated that: "If war were to erupt against the enemy we will be ready".16

Though no official estimate of the Algerian contribution in the October war
has been disclosed yet, it was undoubtedly very substantial. All the available references agreed that $200 million were donated by Algeria to the countries engaged on the battle front. Other than that, Algerian aid included more than four thousand men from the army contingents, forty to sixty jet fighters, fifty armoured vehicles and three million tonnes of oil. To underline the intensity of Algeria's commitment, Boumediene declared: "not only is our hand in the fire but our whole body is in the hell -- the hell which our brothers of the Middle East are enduring".¹⁷

On the diplomatic front, beyond the traditional messages of support addressed by the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika to his Egyptian and Syrian counterparts, Algeria's President Boumediene addressed the President of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), President Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, asking him to urge the African leaders "to manifest in concrete terms their solidarity and support to the legitimate fight of Egypt and the other Arab states".¹⁸ Similar messages were sent to the Presidents of Zaïre, Cameroon and Guinea-Bissau. The Algerian initiative led to a severe blow against Israel's diplomatic presence in Africa. Most of the African states, except Rhodesia and South Africa, severed their diplomatic relations with Israel as a gesture of solidarity with the Arab cause. Messages were also addressed to the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim and to the Presidents of the socialist countries. Moreover, Boumediene visited Moscow on 14 and 15 October 1973 for talks with the Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny. At the end of the meeting a communiqué was issued, stating that "a detailed exchange of views had taken place regarding the situation in the Middle
East caused by the imperialist aggression" and that the two sides "had reaffirmed their determination to assist in every way the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel". In addition to this, Algeria's President negotiated with the Soviets during the same visit an arms deal worth $200 million, destined for the Arab front. Algeria also dispatched its Foreign Minister to the USA in a joint Arab action to protest against the American decision to set up an airlift to the benefit of Israel.

If in 1967 some Arab states were reticent about the use of oil against Israel's allies, in 1973 a common agreement was reached to introduce this strategic weapon to deter Israel's supporters. On 17 October 1973, following Algeria's request, the Arab oil producers banded together in the OAPEC (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) gathered in Kuwait and took the decision to raise the price of oil and to reduce the production by 5 per cent a month. Saudi Arabia cut its deliveries by 10 per cent to the USA and the Netherlands. On 28 October 1973 Saudi Arabia's oil supply to the USA was totally cut off. Iraq nationalised parts of some foreign companies and Algeria cut off the supply to the Netherlands, Israel's main champion in Europe.

However, nine days after Egypt's military offensive, the military situation reversed itself in favour of Israel. The Israeli army counter-attacked, crossed the Suez Canal and surrounded the 3rd corps of the Egyptian army. On the Syrian front it repulsed a joint Arab attack (Syrian-Jordanian-Moroccan-Saudi-Iraqi units) on the Golan Heights. Egypt, which had liberated some of its territory lost during the Six-Day War, was left with no other alternative than to preserve its military
achievement. It thus complied on 23 October with the UN's Resolution 338 -- proposed to the UN Security Council by the USA and the USSR -- requiring the cease fire, implementation of the 1967 Resolution 242 and peace talks under appropriate auspices.

In contrast to the 1967 war, Algeria's reaction came in moderate terms. The necessity not to jeopardize the fragile Arab unity and the semi-military Egyptian success on the Sinai front, obliged the Algerian authorities to adopt a moderate posture. The communiqué issued by the Revolutionary Council, on 30 October 1973, underlined this concern:

As the military, economic and political fronts are indissociable, it becomes clear that the Arab world must remain vigilant and united for the sake of Egypt, Syria and Palestine. This should remain until each one has achieved its natural objectives. At these critical moments, Algeria remains with Egypt, Syria and the Palestine until they recover their national territories.21

Consequently, Algeria which was hitherto thought to be a radical state, found itself in the camp opposed to Libya and Iraq and used all its diplomatic influence to undermine the attempts by these two states to form a "rejectionist" front.

However, this tactical moderation should not be interpreted as a reversal of Algeria's initial strategic position over the main issue [occupied territory and Palestine] in the Arab-Israeli dispute. To emphasise that he rejected any such allegations, President Boumediene replied:

I know that there are some who have called the summit [an Arab summit held in Algiers after the war] a conference of capitulation... We do not need to recall our positions because we do respect the blood of martyrs... In 1967 some treated
Algeria as extremist because it said no to the collapse... Today the situation differs. There has been a battle and there has been no collapse whether in Syria or Egypt... We have accepted the conference for the sake of serving and preserving the Arab unity.22

Though Algeria, indirectly, approved the cease fire and its implication (the 242/67 resolution), its commitment to the Palestinian cause remained unaltered. Aware that the Palestinian claims could be easily sacrificed by a political compromise which could suit the Egyptian, the Syrian and the Jordanian interests, such as the withdrawal of Israel from the territories captured in 1967, Algeria was opposed to any peace plan which might undermine the Palestinians' rights. During two Arab summits held in Algiers on 26 November 1973 and on 13 February 1974, Algeria reasserted its unconditional support for the Palestinian right for struggle until the recovery of its territory. The final declaration of the first Arab summit, largely influenced by Algeria, emphasized that "the cease fire is not peace" and that "no peace can be achieved without the total retreat of Israel from the Arab occupied territories and the reestablishment of Palestinian rights".23 Concerning the Geneva peace conference, Algeria expressed its position as follows:

We have adopted the language of battle because it is here the solid link of the Arab's solidarity. As for the so-called peace conference, it is a secondary thing. If the brothers in Egypt, Syria and Palestine decide to go for this conference to assess the possibilities of a peace; it concerns them; the important thing is to define the objectives. However, the conference [Arab conference] has specified the conditions of peace: the immediate evacuation of all the Arab territories including Jerusalem, whose internationalisation we do not accept, and the preservation of the Palestinian rights according to the conception of the Palestinian resistance.... Any solidarity has to be linked to the fulfilment of those two conditions. Otherwise, there will be no real peace.24

Thus, the Algerian government position was circumspect: it accepted the principle of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it continued to
stress that this must not be achieved at the expense of Palestinian rights.

In doing so, Algeria emerged with the image of the moderate "brother", emphasizing unity for struggle and prudence in regard to the tactical approach. It also came to the conclusion that, despite the role and the influence it was enjoying within the Arab world, it could not act according to its aspirations on events of which it was not the master. In Boumediene's words, "Algerians cannot be Egyptians more than the Egyptians, Syrians more than the Syrians, let alone Palestinians more than the Palestinians".

What were the motives for this moderation? Was the Algerian government motivated solely by Algeria's interest in maintaining Arab unity?

It is important to emphasise here that the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 took place while Algeria was undergoing the most important phase of its national development, namely, the first and the second four-year development plans of 1970-3 and 1974-77. A hard-line policy would certainly jeopardize Algeria's quest to acquire mature developed Western technologies. Indeed, diplomatic relations between Algeria and the USA were reestablished in late 1974 and trade between the two countries increased considerably. This occurred despite a strong Algerian opposition to the American involvement in the Vietnam War and its continuing support for Israel. Another economic reason was the willingness of Algeria to secure the unity of the Organisation of the Arab Oil Producing Countries. By tempering its position Algeria came closer to the conservative Arab-oil producer states of the Gulf seen by Algiers as a potential ally in the Algerian strategy of
a New International Economic Order.

Nevertheless, Algeria's support for the Palestinian liberation movement was irreversible, despite the shift of the regime's attention after 1975 to the crisis next to its south western borders following the joint Moroccan and Mauritanian military seizure of the ex-Spanish Sahara in November 1975. The importance of the Palestinian question, and Algeria's commitment to this issue was reiterated in 1976 by the National Charter:

We say that the liberation of Palestine is at the centre of our conscience and our preoccupations. Our total commitment to the Palestinian people, and to the other Arab peoples whose territories are occupied, constitute for us more than a duty of solidarity, but an act which is part of our own liberation. It is the reason for which the engagement is taken without reservation and has included the sacrifice of our lives.25

In addition the Charter emphasized the retention of Algeria's unvarying vision for the attainment of Arab unity:

Algeria works ceaselessly for Arab unity and believes in the possibility of its accomplishment... the concept of unity assumes a vital importance for the Arab future... the Maghreb is an integral part of the Arab world. The realisation of its unity will strengthen the course of unity in the Arab World and will accelerate its appearance elsewhere... Moreover, beyond the interests of the states, it is necessary to construct a Maghreb for the people.26

3.3 Maghreb: “Securing the borders”

If the interest in Maghreb unity was widespread among all the nationalist movements of the Maghreb, during the phase of the anti-colonial struggle, this
objective had never been an easy task to achieve. Instead, once the political independence of the region was completed by the independence of Algeria in 1962, the countries of the Maghreb found themselves swept along by cycles which alternated from rupture to concord and vice versa. Its origins lay, above all, in the divergent nature of the political systems that were embraced immediately after the acquisition of independence by each state. This incompatibility of the political systems was aggravated by the questioning by Morocco and Tunisia of Algeria's territorial integrity. Both states refused to recognise the Algerian frontiers as previously set by the French colonial administration.

In fact, the latent border dispute did not wait long to erupt into a military confrontation. Only a few months after Algeria gained its independence, the Moroccan army crossed the Algerian border in the south west and occupied part of the disputed territories. This resulted in a brief war (la guerre des sables), between Algeria and Morocco. The military confrontation went on until 30 October 1963, when President Ben Bella and King Hassan II held a summit meeting, in Bamako, Mali. The summit was mediated by President Mobibo Keita of Mali and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, under the auspices of the OAU. The two parties agreed on “an effective cease fire from 2 November 1963, the creation of no man’s land on the disputed territories which will be under the control of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian and Malian officers and the disputing parties [Algeria and Morocco] and asked the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the African OAU to set up a special commission of referees to examine the border dispute”.27
Despite the fact that the OAU succeeded in bringing about an end to the fighting -- an action which was regarded as a major success -- the border disputes in the Maghreb and, particularly, between Algeria and Morocco were not definitely buried. They remained, for years, the main source of the "Moroccan-Algerian cold war".

Nevertheless, both regimes benefited from the conflict. The "war of sands" allowed President Ben Bella as well as King Hassan to strengthen their fragile regimes. In Algeria the armed opposition of Hocine Aït Ahmed, in the Kabilye region, ceased its activity to join the action occurring on the southern front. For King Hassan, his strong Leftist opposition lost its popularity. Its support for Algeria during the war gave more credit to previous claims by Hassan that the UNFP (Union National des Forces Populaires) was manipulated by foreign countries.28 Thus, the distrust of the neighbour, as we will see, was going to characterise the bilateral relations of the newly independent states for decades to come.

Despite the "war of sands", Algeria favoured a policy of reconciliation. It deployed all its efforts for the appeasement of the post-independence tension and for the improvement of its bilateral relations with all states of the region, and especially with Morocco. Accordingly, on 12 May 1965, Ben Bella met his counterpart King Hassan in Algeria. In the two hours long meeting the two heads of state agreed to an examination of the contentious issue of the frontier. They also discussed the Algerian proposals for the development of joint economic projects.29 Nine months before, during the Arab summit held in Alexandria, Egypt, from 5-11 September 1964, Algeria gave its agreement in principle for an equal
division between both states of the disputed land.

By the time of President Boumediene's takeover in June 1965, the tension between Algeria and its western and eastern neighbours seemed to have subsided. All sides appeared to have accepted the status-quo. But for the new team in Algiers the question of the border issue was of vital importance. The priority was to bring all neighbouring countries to recognise the Algerian frontiers. Its main objective was to secure by peaceful means the state's territorial integrity, without relinquishing one centimetre of its territories. In fact among the accusations brought later against Ben Bella, by the new regime, was his willingness to cede part of the contested areas to put an end to the disagreements.

Thus, from 1965, Algeria engaged in lengthy "diplomatic battles" which lasted almost ten years. Of a greater significance was the state visit of Boumediene to Morocco from 11-16 January 1969. This meeting ended with signature of a 20-year Treaty of Fraternity, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation. This breakthrough opened a new era in the relations between Algeria and Morocco and was the precursor for the settlement of the latent border conflict. Indeed, four months later, on 27 May 1970, King Hassan met President Boumediene in Tlemcene, Algeria. The summit between the two heads of states was concluded by the signature of another treaty. This time Morocco, implicitly, recognised the territorial integrity of Algeria. This was clearly indicated in the final joint communiqué which was issued following the summit:
The two parties are convinced that the development of their relations and the edification of the Arab Maghreb are essentially based on the mutual respect of their sovereignty and of their politics, the territorial integrity, the intangibility of their borders and of the safeguard of their territories.  

The détente between the two states culminated in June 1972 with the signing of two conventions during the summit of the OAU in Rabat: the first one was to “define the Algerian-Moroccan borders”, and thereby, recognise the de facto Algerian borders inherited from France. The second one called for “the joint exploitation of the mineral reserves of Gar Djebilet”.  At the end of the summit Boumediene and King Hassan issued a common statement in which they declared:

By the conclusion and signing of the convention defining the Algerian-Moroccan frontier and the convention for cooperation in the development of the Gar Djebilet mine, we intend to establish a permanent peace for centuries to come, to hasten the coming of an era of harmony and cooperation for future generations, and thus to express the deep aspirations of our people for unity, prosperity and happiness.

Did Hassan abandon his territorial claim in return for an Algerian "green light" shown to his annexationist plan for the Spanish Sahara -- a mineral rich territory bordering on Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania -- as was widely speculated? It is still not easy to give a clear answer. What is, however, certain is that Boumediene did assure Hassan of “his total solidarity in the struggle he [King Hassan ] conducts to restore his sovereignty over the territories that were under the colonial domination” and that “Algeria had no intentions in the Sahara”.  It is also known that both parties, in addition to Mauritania, had agreed to coordinate their positions to press Spain for the decolonisation of the Sahara at the summit held during early 1970 at Nouadhibou. But the vagueness of the final communiqué indicated that there was no clear position from all parties over

the future of the territory after its decolonisation. Whatever the agreement was, the issue of the Spanish Sahara plunged the relations between both states from late 1974 onwards into bitter bilateral hostility once more, and became the central issue again in Algerian-Moroccan relations.

Indeed, after Spain's unilateral decision, on 21 August 1974, to implement a referendum, under the auspices of the UN in 1975, in order to determine the future of the Spanish Sahara, relations between Algeria and Morocco became caught afresh in a spiral of tension. Morocco with its long claim to sovereignty over the Spanish Sahara, did not welcome the Spanish announcement. Accordingly, Hassan mounted a rapid diplomatic campaign to delay the implementation of the prospects of a UN-sponsored referendum. His intention was to gain the maximum time in order to explore all the possible options (military, legal, consensus) to achieve Morocco's expansionist objective. As a first step Morocco succeeded in the autumn of 1974 to rally Mauritania to its camp, Mauritania, even though Mauritania was previously pushing rival claims of its own. In a secret deal the two parties agreed on the partition of the Sahara after the Spanish withdrew. Meanwhile, Algeria's position remained ambiguous. It was not until July 1975 that Algeria repudiated the Moroccan-Mauritanian plan and favoured the right of the Sahrawi people for self-determination.

Despite the fact that Algeria prescribed its position on the basis of the OAU's principle -- which states that the borders inherited from the colonial era should be accepted --, as well as from the international principle of the right-of people for self-determination, its own national security also motivated its decision.
From an endorsement of the Moroccan thesis, Algeria saw an action that would create a precedent for other territorial claims in the region. Of particular concern for Algeria was some of its own territory which Hassan included as part of Greater Morocco. For Algeria, the fact that Hassan had not ratified the 1972 accord (finally ratified in 1993), afforded a disturbing measure of proof that the Moroccan ruler's expansionist vision over part of the Algerian territories had not been dropped.

A few months later Hassan announced that he would lead a civilian march (the Green March) to liberate the Sahara. Indeed, on 6 November 1975, 350,000 to 400,000 unarmed civilians crossed the Sahara borders. The monarch's intentions were to press Spain to negotiate the transfer of the Sahara to Morocco.

In this context, on 14 November 1975, Spain secretly reached an agreement with Morocco and Mauritania on shared administration of the Sahara until the end of February 1976, when the Spanish would withdraw. However, a few weeks later Moroccan and Mauritanian troops moved into the Sahara to replace the Spanish.

Algeria's response to what it viewed as a tripartite conspiracy and a threat to its own security was as rapid as it was firm. It vigorously condemned firmly the Moroccan-Mauritanian "act of aggression" and accused Spain of capitulation. In a note sent by the Algerian government to the United Nations, Algeria considered the tripartite accord as "null et non avenue". In his turn Algeria's delegate at the UN, Abdelatif Rahal, observed:
The Algerian government has always prescribed its action within the framework of the United Nations.... It will refuse, therefore, to approve whatever solution decided out of this Organisation and denounces any bilateral or multilateral agreement concluded in contradiction of its decisions.42

Moreover, Algeria made it clear to Morocco and Mauritania that it would use all its efforts to undermine their objectives in the Sahara. As a result, all parties -- particularly Morocco and Algeria -- exchanged propaganda, alerted their armed forces and fortified their frontiers. In March 1976 when Algeria recognised the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic), Rabat and Nouakchott immediately severed diplomatic relations with Algiers in retaliation, announcing that they would do the same with all others states that followed Algeria's example.

Henceforth, Algeria provided the guerilla fighters of the Polisario (Frente Popular para la liberación de Saguier el Hamra y Rio de Oro) with refuge, as well as with military, logistical and diplomatic support. In so doing, Moroccan-Algerian relations remained locked in a state of non-military but prolonged antagonism.43

Up to the early 1980s no determined effort was made by the two states to find a compromise or at least to insulate one area of rivalry from the overall relations. Indeed, events in the Western Sahara set back previous reconciliatory steps achieved by Algeria and Morocco, and caused a long and deep mutual hostility.

Of equal importance for Algeria was its border with its Tunisian neighbour. Here, too, since 1962, Algeria's priority was to obtain a firm border agreement with Tunis. Tunisia's claim over Algerian territories dated back to 1961, when Algeria was still under French control. But, in the absence of diplomatic relations between
the two states\textsuperscript{44} from 1963-1966, the dispute remained pending. It even worsened when oil was discovered under the border in 1964.

The normalisation in bilateral relations between Algeria and Tunisia came after the visit of the personal envoy of President Habib Bourguiba to Algeria in April 1966. During this visit, the question of borders was at the centre of issues taken up by the two parties. On his return to Tunis on 1 May 1966, Tunisian envoy Slim Monjdi stressed that: “Clouds which had hovered above Algerian-Tunisian relations were dissipating”.\textsuperscript{45} Accordingly, bilateral activity between the two states accelerated, and ambassadors were exchanged in September and October 1966.

Contrary to the Moroccan intransigence towards the borders' question, the flexibility of Tunisia's regime, as well as its interest in an economic concession from a “wealthy” Algeria, enabled the two parties to move rapidly towards a final settlement.

Less than four months after the resumption of diplomatic relations between Algiers and Tunis, a joint Algerian-Tunisian military commission met, in January 1967, at El Borma (Tunisia), to discuss the future demarcation lines between the two states' borders. Following another meeting held on 16 April 1968, the joint Algerian-Tunisian commission signed an important technical agreement. This defined the limits of the two states' borders. An agreement was also reached on the future joint exploitation of oil resources astride the Algerian-Tunisian border.

Two years later Algeria accomplished its objective. Indeed, with the signature of a 20-year Treaty of Fraternity, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation
on 6 January 1970, Algeria's borders with Tunisia were finally secured. This treaty, though similar in language to that signed by Algeria and Morocco a year earlier in Ifrane, also approved the 1968 technical agreement of the joint military commission, and explicitly put an end to the Algerian-Tunisian border disputes. It stipulated that:

The present accord, signed without reserve, constitutes a final settlement of all the border questions between Algeria and Tunisia. It solemnly, engages, the highest contracting parties to respect their common and definitive frontiers.46

The settlement of the border question between Algeria and Tunisia accelerated bilateral activities between the two states. On 20 April 1972 Boumediene made a long-week visit to Tunisia. This was the first visit at this level between the two states since Algeria's independence in 1962. It was also the first direct contact between the two Presidents. At the end of this visit a common communiqué was issued. It emphasized "the satisfaction of both parties regarding the continual reinforcement of the bilateral relations and their willingness to enhance, further, the cooperation at all levels".47 One month later this visit was reciprocated by Bourguiba on 22 May 1972.

However, the pro-Moroccan position of Tunisia towards the question of the Western Sahara, caused Algeria considerable concern and affected relations between the two states. While Algiers was expecting support from its eastern neighbour, or at least its neutrality, President Bourguiba irritated Algeria by his pro-Moroccan declaration in autumn 1975 when he stated: "I personally advised King Hassan and President Mokhtar Ould Dada (Mauritania) neither to implement a referendum nor to establish an independent state in the Sahara which will be
under the influence of Spain or another Maghreban state". It was also notable that, during October 1975, Bourguiba repeatedly criticized Algeria over its pro-referendum position. The most revealing indication of Algeria’s dissatisfaction with Bourguiba can be gauged from the comments made by the Algerian Press Service: "[The] Judgements [are] anti-Algerian with a tone of old unsatisfied enmity. And without realising that if nourished from the same oil he drops, fire will spread in the region, then Tunisia cannot escape it".

Thus, the positive evolution of bilateral relations between Algiers and Tunis became subject to the influence of the dispute in the Western Sahara. Given this question’s extreme importance for Algeria, and the marked role it came to play in the making of the nation’s external relations, especially from 1975 to 1979, relations between the two states entered a phase of relative immobility or stagnation.

Although both states continued to exchange emissaries until Boumediene’s death, Algeria continued to judge -- though it did not officially proclaim-- the utility of improving its relations with Tunis on the basis of Bourguiba’s position towards the question of the Western Sahara. The message addressed by Boumediene on 10 December 1977 illustrated this attitude: “The region of the Maghreb is at a historic turn which invites all of us to rise to the level of the responsibilities which are ours. And we will, therefore, open wide doors for all people.”

3.4 Africa: “For the decolonisation of the continent”

Struggle against colonialism and promotion of liberation movements were
perhaps the most striking features of Algeria's African policy. Since its independence, the Algerian government considered the fight against remaining colonial powers in Africa as one of its "natural" and "historic" responsibilities. The implementation of an active anti-colonial policy became therefore the priority cornerstone of Algeria's leadership in the arena of African politics.

Indeed, Algeria's eagerness to pursue an active policy in support of the liberation of African states under foreign domination was remarkably spelled out by Ben Bella during the first African gathering to form the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963. In his first speech before the African leaders Ben Bella described the motives of his participation in Addis Ababa as follows:

I have not come here because of any special interest in African Charters. My primary objective is to support the liberation of those parts of Africa not yet liberated. If the conference does not share my concern, I will refuse to be signatory to any Charter.51

He added with great emotion in his second speech:

Thus, some African brothers accepted to die a little so that Algeria was able to achieve its independence. We must all agree to die a little or even completely for the liberation of the people still under colonial domination, so that African unity will not be an empty word.52

Ben Bella's stirring clarion call did assist the success of this African meeting and the unanimity of the African states towards at least some decisions taken should partly be credited to the first Algerian President.53

It should be noted, however, that Algeria's willingness to be at the vanguard of the African states in the struggle for the liberation of the African continent was
well ahead of the creation of the OAU. During the war of national liberation, the ALN already had close contact with some other African liberation movements. Among the first movements of these to benefit from Algeria's aid was the Angolan nationalist party, the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Liberatação de Angola), led by Holden Roberto, some of whose commandos trained in the ALN camps in Tunisia.54 Once its independence was achieved Algeria became, in Amilcar Cabral's terms, "La Meque des révolutionnaires".

Indeed, Ben Bella's anti-colonialism in Africa was not limited to revolutionary pronouncements. Under his presidency Algeria took concrete steps by backing most of the African liberation movements financially and militarily.55 Although documentary evidence of the extent of this aid is still unpublished, it has been disclosed that arms which were used by the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberatação de Angola) in its military offensive against the enclave of Cabinda were shipped from Algeria. Also the two FRELIMO (Frente de Liberatação de Moçambique) units which were responsible for the inception of the armed insurrection in Mozambique were trained in Algeria. Ben Bella himself acknowledged, in September 1963, on the occasion of "Africa day" that Algeria was training 1,000 guerillas from colonial territories in Africa. Algeria also provided a location for the offices of most of the African liberation movements.

Moreover, on the basis of its own ideological perception which considered conservative regimes as an instrument of colonial powers, Algeria extended its support to left-wing African movements such as the UPC (Union des Populations Camerounaises), the SAWABA of Niger, the FROLINAT (Front de Libération
National du Tchad) and the opponents of the Tshombe regime in Congo (Zaïre). As Ben Bella remarked in reference to Algeria's involvement in Congo: "imperialists had sent arms; we shall continue to send arms".56

The overthrow of Ben Bella on 19 June 1965 just a few days before the Afro-Asian conference (scheduled for 29 June 1965) provoked an immense dissatisfaction in the African continent. All revolutionary regimes in Africa condemned the coup. Indeed, this action which came on the eve of such an important event, caused a widespread concern about the new regime's political orientations and its commitment to pursue an anti-colonial policy.

Nevertheless, the ousting of Ben Bella did not alter the fundamental orientation of Algeria's African policy. It was rather the style of its conduct which was affected. The African policy of the new regime became, in reality, less noisy but in some cases more revolutionary. A few months after the coup the Algerian government indicated its dedication to revolutionary African issues. On 18 December 1965 Algeria severed its diplomatic relations with Britain in conformity with the OAU's Council of Minister's recommendation that followed the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia.57 However, from 1966 to late 1968 the interest of Algeria in African affairs witnessed a relative decline because of the new regime's concentration on domestic issues, as well as on the situation in the Middle East.

The return of Algeria to the African scene was inaugurated by the organisation of the fifth summit of the OAU in Algiers from 13-16 September 1968.
During this gathering Algeria as the host country used all its influence to appease disputes between the different states of the OAU. In this context it brought about a reconciliation between Guinea and Senegal. It also succeeded in bringing about a common African position towards the crisis in Nigeria. As a result the OAU pronounced against the war in Nigeria and supported its Federal government against the secession of Biafra. In reference to Algeria's support for the Federal government of Nigeria President Yakubu Gowon declared: "Algeria's support is the most important we have had from a member state of the OAU and from the Arab World."

Moreover, the liquidation of colonialism and racist regimes in Africa was one of the dominant issues of Algeria's diplomatic activities within international organisations. At the UN it used its position as a member of the Security Council to campaign in 1969 for the tightening of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and condemned the apartheid regime of South Africa and its occupation of Namibia. Algeria was also among the three African countries designated by the OAU to defend the African position towards the Rhodesian problem in the UN's Security Council. In addition it was appointed a member of the Security Council's Committee for the control of the UN's economic sanctions against the outlaw regime in Salisbury.

Furthermore, Algeria was the main instigator of the active diplomatic campaign led by the Afro-group within the UN which succeeded in expelling Salazar's Portugal from the World Health Organisation and the Economic Commission for Africa and of South Africa from the Economic Commission for
When Arab states sought the diplomatic support of Africa against Israel after the Six-Day War, Algeria with its revolutionary credentials was at the forefront of Arab governments in advancing this “mission”. To achieve its objective, Algeria developed a simple approach. While most Arab states emphasized the racial and the religious aspect of the Arab-Israeli dispute, Algeria preferred to present this conflict -- as it always did -- in terms of an anti-colonial struggle. For Algeria there was no difference between a Palestinian fighting for the recovery of his land and an African striving for independence. This analogy was also drawn between apartheid in South Africa and Zionism in Palestine. In sum, the thesis developed by Algeria in its quest for African support was colonialism= racism= Zionism.61

However, the Algerian diplomatic campaign to enrol the African continent for the Arab cause did not produce tangible results. Its action encountered by the resistance of the pro-Israeli states in Africa which regarded the Arab-Israeli conflict of no real concern to Africa (Somalia's call for an emergency meeting of the OAU in 1967 was disregarded by non-Arab members for example). It is worth noting that up to early 1973 twenty seven states out of forty one members of the OAU maintained diplomatic relations and significant economic cooperation with the state of Israel.

The conference of the non-aligned movement held in Algiers (5-9 September 1973), however, provided Algeria with an ideal opportunity to sensitise
further the African leaders to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and to call for concrete African solidarity with the Arab states. As a result, Algeria was most successful in convincing many states to sever their diplomatic relations with Israel. The principal consequence of these ruptures was an additional international isolation for Israel, particularly in the UN. Indeed, at the end of 1973, fewer than half of the UN's member states maintained diplomatic relations with Israel.

Moreover, in November 1973 the OAU's Council of Ministers, which met in Addis Ababa (19-22 November 1973) on Algeria's request, adopted a resolution on the Middle East largely influenced by Algeria. In this resolution the OAU invited "all members of the OAU and all friendly states to impose a total economic embargo, particularly an oil embargo, against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and the racist regime of South Rhodesia". It also set a framework for Arab-African economic cooperation. The success achieved during this meeting was regarded by Algeria's Foreign Minister as "an historic turning point".

A few days later, Algeria grasped the opportunity of the sixth Arab Summit held in Algiers on 26 November 1973 to pressure the other Arab oil-producing states to impose an embargo on South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. It was also instrumental in getting the Arab states to approve for the creation of special financial institutions for the development of Africa.

Although Algeria played a significant role in the rapprochement between African and Arab states, the basis of this new understanding can also be attributed to two other important factors. First, there was disillusionment of Africa
with the Western powers in its confrontation with lingering colonialism and white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. This was particularly the case of France, the United States, West Germany and Japan all of which had cordial relations with Portugal and tolerated the Rhodesian regime. Second, there was the pledge of the Arab states to assist financially the African states to overcome their economic problems.

With the issue of the Western Sahara shifting to the top of Algeria's external priorities in late 1975, Africa was the privileged sphere for Algeria's diplomacy. The OAU was, in this context, a key international forum for Algeria's diplomatic campaign for the implementation of a referendum in the Sahara.

The active pace of Algerian diplomacy seen in Africa since 1962 was, thus, geared to spreading recognition and support for Polisario in Africa. The anti-colonial nature of this conflict was, in this respect, going to be the core of Algeria's diplomatic action, as articulated by Algeria's delegate before the OAU's Council of Ministers in its session of March 1976:

*We African states are responsible before the Sahrawi people who struggle not only for their right to a state but also for the right of life ... The problem is neither between Algeria and Morocco nor between Algeria and Mauritania, but a problem of all member states of the OAU for the defence and implementation of principles contained in the charter of the organisation.*

However, with the spirit of anti-colonial African solidarity beginning to fade away, the growing ideological differences among the member states of the African Organisation and the multiplication of crises in the continent, Algeria failed to mobilise Africa for an emergency summit meeting of the OAU to discuss the crisis
shaking the North West of the African continent.

Nonetheless, a few months before Boumediene's death, Algeria's diplomatic efforts culminated in a semi-diplomatic success. Indeed, helped by the newly-independent communist states and newly-socialist-oriented states, it succeeded in persuading the OAU's Summit, held in Khartoum in July 1978, to designate an ad-hoc committee to examine all the aspects of the conflict in the Western Sahara.

3.5 France: “The Consolidation of independence”

If the pre-independence arrangement of March 1962, between the GPRA and France, symbolised in itself a triumph of the FLN over the colonial power, it was, in many respects, an additional sacrifice that Algeria had paid for its independence. In fact, the negotiated settlement for Algeria's independence linked the vote on self-determination in Algeria to an exclusive cooperation with France. For instance, the formal document states:

The vote on self determination will enable the electors to make known whether they wish that Algeria should be independent and, in that case, whether they wish France and Algeria to cooperate under the conditions defined by the present Declaration.68

Therefore, despite the fact that France was compelled to relinquish its hold on Algeria, under the provisions of the Evian Agreement it secured a privileged status in the newly-independent state. In other terms, the Evian Agreement covered President de Gaulle's intention of securing for France another form of control over the economy of Algeria and, by extension, over its political destiny.
However, given the revolutionary nature of the political and economic direction of post-independent Algeria (discussed in the previous chapter), the review of the Evian Agreement, if not its total abrogation was one of the main priorities of Algeria’s government. This ambition was already prescribed by the Tripoli Programme which was formulated by the FLN two months after the signing of the Evian Agreement.

But given the multitude of economic and social problems inherited by Algeria upon its independence, this task seemed rather difficult to achieve. The major dilemma besetting the Algerian leaders, at that time, was how to reduce dependency from France without undermining the much-needed French economic aid and assistance. According to the Evian Agreement, France's aid was to be maintained over a period of three years. The French government had, before Algeria won independence, been allocating to Algeria $800 million annually for the budget.69

The high level of dependence of Algeria upon France at all levels thus incited the Algerian government to adopt a gradual and pragmatic policy in order to minimize the imperial ties. It was not until March 1963 that the Algerian government took the first step that contradicted the Evian terms. France's nuclear tests of March 1963 conducted in the Algerian Sahara provided Ben Bella's government with an ideal opportunity to initiate the process which would nullify, in the long term, the Evian Accord. On 22 March 1963, the government announced the nationalisation of all French holdings. In the agrarian sector about 1.2 million hectares of vacant agricultural land (properties left unoccupied by the
departing European settlers), representing one third of the country's cultivable land, were transferred to administrative committees and 150,000 hectares were seized from the remaining European settlers. On October 1963, the Algerian government expanded its policy of nationalisation to cover all remaining agricultural lands owned by French settlers.

Despite the "illegal" character of those measures, relations between the two states did not reach a deadlock. At first France's reaction was stiff. It demanded immediate talks on the issue of all French properties seized since independence. However, confronted with strong opposition from Algeria, France dropped its demands. Instead it used the weapon of economic aid to retaliate. In this respect, $50 million were deducted from the total financial aid which Algeria obtained in 1964.

There is no doubt that Algeria's leverage was particularly strengthened by the special position it occupied in de Gaulle's foreign policy. For the French President, Algeria was not just a former possession of vital economic interest. It was also regarded as the key to the success of France's policy in the Third World. This was clearly stated by the French Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, Jean de Broglie, before the French National Assembly in November 1964:

> Algeria has taken the lead in the assembly of poor nations pitted against the rich [nations]...Certainly in maintaining its policy of cooperation with Algeria, France defends certain interests and tries to counterbalance the tendency to slide towards communism. But Algeria is also, and above all, the narrow door through which we penetrate into the Third World. A quarrel between France and another North African country is only a bilateral tension. But a dispute with Algeria would go way beyond the bounds of French-Algerian relations and would risk ruining the efforts of our
diplomacy throughout the Third World ... It is Algeria that opened for us the road to the Middle East and whose support is useful for us in Latin America.70

Thus, Algeria knew how to extract leverage from this special position in its relations with France. In a short period of time it was able to amend, unilaterally, numerous provisions of the Evian Agreement to the inconvenience of France.

However, the most important stake for both sides concerned the oil and gas industries. Oil exports from Algeria to France formed a third of France’s total oil requirement, while two thirds of the oil production in Algeria was carried out by French companies. This was so because of the concession and priority granted to France in the Evian Accord.

Therefore, the recovery of national control over the hydrocarbon sector became an overriding primordial objective for the Algerian government, since it would reinforce its political independence as well as secure an important source of finance desperately needed for its economic development.

However, lacking an efficient Algerian corporation which would be able to assume control of the country’s energy resources should it be nationalised, Algeria opted for the strategy of negotiation as a first step in its battle for the recovery of energy resources. The primary objective of Algeria at this stage was to come to some sort of agreement which insured a maximum financial benefit from French companies as well as to expand its participation in the exploitation of oil and gas.

In this respect, in May 1964 Algeria and France entered a long cycle of
negotiations. Both the issue of royalties paid by the French companies to the Algerian government and the participation of Algeria in the exploitation of hydrocarbons were at the centre of this negotiation. After one year of difficult discussions, both parties agreed upon a new fifteen year - accord in July 1965. This agreement increased French companies' royalties and introduced new rules for the marketing of oil and its exploitation in Algeria. According to Abdelaziz Bouteflika this accord was "an original, even revolutionary, conception of relations between two countries with different social systems, levels of economic development, and political orientations". Indeed, this agreement was far more advantageous to Algeria in contrast to what was prescribed in the Evian Accord. It enabled Algeria to gain direct participation within every level of the oil industry; royalties were substantially increased and Algeria was granted the upper hand in the marketing of gas.

Despite this achievement the "hydrocarbon battle" was not yet over. From 1967 Algeria began to move gradually towards the recovery of its total energy resources by resorting to radical means. The first practical action which signalled Algeria's intentions came after the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Following the allegations of the Egyptian military high command that British and American planes had participated in the bombing of Egyptian positions, Algeria placed all American firms that held minority interests in various Algerian ventures under state control. This was followed in August 1967 by the nationalisation of all British and American oil companies operating in the Algerian Sahara. Among the nationalised companies was the Royal Dutch (Shell owned ), Shell(Algeria),
Unilever (Algeria), Exxon and Mobil oil. Although these corporations did not have a monopoly over the oil industry in Algeria, the wave of nationalisation provided the Algerian company (Sonatrach) with an ideal opportunity to develop the technical expertise needed for the ultimate showdown with France.

_A priori_, with the hydrocarbon “battle” on the horizon, Algeria felt the necessity for some international support before taking the offensive. In April 1969 Algeria joined OPEC which, with its growing strength, could prove helpful in Algeria’s bid to revise its treaty with France. Indeed, as Algeria’s battle with the French oil companies escalated, the 20th conference of OPEC held in Algiers on 24 June 1970 expressed its total support for the “well founded” Algerian demands. OPEC declared itself ready to “fully and actively support any appropriate measures taken by the Algerian government to safeguard its legitimate interests”.73

The failure of France to respond positively to the Algerian request for an increase of oil prices during two other rounds of negotiations which took place in November 1969 and July 1970 and its determination to procrastinate over any conclusive results provided Algeria with a good pretext. On 24 February 1971, Algeria announced the nationalisation of the assets of French companies operating in Algeria. The government took control of 51 per cent of every petroleum exploration and production facility and 100 per cent of all natural gas and oil pipelines and transport facilities.

After failing to reach an agreement on the question of compensation for the
nationalised French companies in April 1970, France reacted by launching an international appeal for the boycott of Algeria's oil and gas and threatened to sue any foreign corporation buying Algerian oil.

Although by its action France was able to secure for its companies a higher compensation compared with what was initially proposed by Algeria, it did not, prevent Algeria from completing, successfully, one of the most important phases in its "battle" for the control of its subsoil resources, as well as in the consolidation of its national independence. As expressed by Boumediene:

We must explain here one historical fact. In 1962 the Algerian war of liberation was terminated by the Evian Agreements. These accords were not to the advantage of our country... No one at this time believed that those accords would last ... It was therefore necessary to re-orient the revolution of 1 November 1954 to its normal path in order to achieve its noble objectives. Thus, the biggest battle of the socialist revolution was the battle over the oil... We have conducted our war of liberation to its end. Today we pursue our economic revolution, especially in the field of hydrocarbons, in order to make the Algerian people the owner of this wealth.

In the aftermath of the 1971 oil nationalisation no tangible attempts were made by the two states to achieve a reconciliation . In contrast to that of de Gaulle, the government of President Georges Pompidou became remarkably reluctant to apply the Gaullist principle of "privileged" relations with Algeria. In June 1971 the French President pointed out: "We will not give Algeria priority in our relations but neither will we exclude it from the number of states with which we cooperate closely". Furthermore, the prospect of a rapprochement between Algiers and Paris was seriously undermined by the wave of racist attacks against the Algerian immigrant community and their properties in France in September 1973.
Perhaps no single opportunity was more important for the improvement of relations between Algeria and France than the visit -- highly publicised by both countries -- to Algeria by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in April 1974. However, this "historic" visit, the first top level exchange between the two countries since 1962, which was supposed to inaugurate a new era of mutual understanding, failed to achieve its objective. If anything, relations between the two states went from bad to worse. It was assumed at that time that one of the causes behind this failure was Giscard's indifference towards Algeria's genuine proposals to establish an exemplary bilateral relationship between the two states.

Whatever the reasons behind Giscard's failure to "animate"or breathe a new life into relations between the two countries, the French position towards the conflict in the Western Sahara made an Algerian-French rapprochement almost impossible. Indeed, France's attitude towards the Western Sahara issue leant towards the Moroccan claims. In November 1975, President Boumediene publicly voiced his dissatisfaction with the French position and accused Paris of backing Morocco by providing arms and military advisers: "Paris accelerates its arms supply to Morocco. We consider this as an unfriendly act". Moreover, in February 1976, the Giscard d'Estaing did not hesitate to express his support for the Madrid treaty and his opposition to the proliferation of "micro states", i.e., the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara.

The evolution of the conflict in the Sahara corroborated Algeria's accusations. French air force Jaguar aircraft sorties against Polisario during 1977 and 1978, in support of Mauritanian troops, were bitter blows to Algeria and
amounted to personal affronts to Boumediene. These latest events were perceived by Algiers as concrete evidence supporting the assumption it had developed since the beginning of the conflict in the Western Sahara. For Algeria “France had abandoned its policy of national independence to become the facade of Washington's policy. It had, for a principal mission, the protection of the southern flank of Europe, that is to say, the most neighbouring lands, North Africa”.79 This policy, according to Algiers, sought as its ultimate goal “the entanglement of Algeria [in war with Morocco] because of the way the revolutionary option chosen by his enfant terrible of the Maghreb was prospering, constituting a direct threat to plans elaborated by Washington and its ally in Europe”.80

Boumediene's death in December 1978 occurred, however, just as Algeria and France seemed to have found the necessary minimum basis for reconciliation. In February 1978 Giscard reflected his intention to seek reconciliation with Algeria by pointing out during an interview that the Evian Accords were anachronistic. This declaration was shortly followed by a formal call from Paris to Algiers for a common reevaluation of the bilateral relations. Boumediene prudently responded: “The page is certainly turned but not erased”.81 The relationship also benefited from the end of France's direct involvement in the Western Sahara, following the overthrow of Mauritania's President Ould Daddah. This was not overlooked in Algiers. In his way back from Moscow, on 14 November, Boumediene sent his last message before his death to the French President, while flying over French territory, in which he expressed his optimism and indicated Algeria's willingness
3.6 The Soviet Union: “The indispensable ally”

The Soviets' support for the FLN during the Algerian war was limited -- not as fulsome as from an "anti-imperialist" state -- because of the USSR's concern to preserve good relations with de Gaulle's France. In 1962, however, following Algeria's independence, Moscow reacted promptly by offering aid and technical assistance to the young state.

The first Soviet step towards a rapprochement with Algeria was taken one year after Algerian independence. In September 1963 the USSR announced the granting of a long term loan of $100 million in purchasing credits to the Algerian government. This cooperation was given its main impetus by Algeria's urgent need of military munitions. Indeed, after the visit of Boumediene, then Algeria's Minister of Defence, to Moscow in order to negotiate the purchase of Soviets arms in late September 1963, shipments of all sorts of military equipment (Migs, Tanks, heavy artillery, small arms) begun to arrive to Algeria in October of the same year. This was the beginning of a process which was to make Moscow the main provider of Algeria with military equipment.

As previously noted, this attitude was not really inspired by ideological motivations. It was, above all, a case of Moscow capitalizing on the revolutionary prestige of Algeria. In the eyes of the communist leaders, close cooperation with
Algeria would increase Moscow's anti-imperialist standing and reputation in Africa and among the non-aligned movement. Moreover, the deepening schism between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union created a competitive aid-giving between the two communist states, from which Algeria benefited. A further consideration which had, probably, affected the Kremlin's interest in Algeria was its eagerness to obtain basing facilities in Algeria in order to increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean and enhance the Soviet fleet's operational capabilities.

An important development in Algerian-Soviet cooperation took place after the visit of Ben Bella to the Soviet Union in spring 1964. During his stay the Algerian President was received as a hero of a socialist country, awarded the Lenin peace prize and decorated with the gold medal of Hero of the Soviet Union. Algeria was also proclaimed by the Soviet Premier as a Socialist nation. At the end of this visit Moscow announced an increase of its loans to Algeria by an additional $127.6 million, allocated to the construction of a steel factory in eastern Algeria. In addition, the assistance of the Soviet Union was extended to hydrocarbon and textile industries.82 Thus, before Boumediene took office in June 1965, Algeria and the USSR were already engaged in a vast programme of military and economic cooperation.

Although the Soviet Union did not welcome the removal of Ben Bella, and his replacement by a well-known anticommunist person,83 the new government moved quickly to assure Moscow of its intention to preserve the progressive nature of the Algerian regime in conformity with the policy followed by Ben Bella's
Within days of the coup, Boumediene dispatched the former Algerian Ambassador to the USSR, Mohamed Sedik Benyahia, to ease the anxiety of the Soviet leaders. For Algeria such an initiative was necessary since it was by now largely dependent on Soviets' arms.85

Algeria's interest in maintaining close ties with the USSR was expressed further, in December 1965, when Boumediene's first visit abroad was made to Moscow. Judging from the final communiqué, Boumediene achieved the primary objective of his visit, that of assuring the continuation of Soviet economic and military aid.86 The Soviets pledged to continue and even expand their aid programme. It was after this visit that the deliveries of Soviet weapons were resumed and cooperation on economic and technical levels increased the volume. Trade between the two states expanded from $12 million in 1966 to $55 millions in 1967. In 1972 Algeria was ranked the second biggest African trade partner of the USSR after Egypt.

As Algeria's interest in international affairs gradually increased, Algeria's relations with the Soviet Union became subject to the influence of three fundamental variables: the degree of Soviet support for the Arab cause, the Soviet contribution to stabilising relations between Algeria and the West, and Soviet efforts to hamper the emergence of a non-aligned coalition.87 Although the last two did come, occasionally, into play, they were of lesser significance than the first.

It was principally the Soviet Union's hesitation to support the Arabs fully
in the war of 1973 that affected Algerian-Soviet relations negatively. Indeed, the Soviets' need to avoid compromising their detente with the USA led Moscow to proffer only limited support for the Arabs. The continuing Soviet reluctance to provide the Arabs with much needed support was brought home at first hand to Algeria's President when he travelled to Moscow in October 1973. He was compelled by the Soviet Union to pay in cash the price of arms ($200 millions) which he negotiated for the Arabs. This behaviour was openly criticised by Boumediene when he said: "The fact that Israel is nearly a part of America and the Arab are not and will not be a part of the USSR, means that the USA has been more daring than the Soviet Union".88

This is not to imply that relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. Even when relations between the two states reached a critical stage such as in 1973, Algeria never considered dispensing with its ties to the USSR. Seen in the overall context of Algeria's foreign policy, relations with the Soviet Union were essential. Not only did they give Algeria more manouevrability between the superpowers, but also more opportunity to pursue its own interests actively in world politics. But one thing is sure. From that time onwards Algeria's perception of the Soviet Union as a "leader of the anti-imperialist world" was altered. It rather preferred to apply the adage "Do not mistake your enemy" for its future relations with the Soviet Union.89

Thus, despite the "coldness" in relations between Moscow and Algiers following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the improvement in bilateral relations between the two states was not long in coming. The first sign of this improvement was indicated in June 1975, after a Soviet military delegation, lead by Minister of
Defence, Marshal Gretchko, visited Algiers for political and military talks. Moreover, the Soviet Union's decision in Angola to give its support for the MPLA, in 1975, brought about the prospect of a new rapprochement between the two states. Algeria, which had been among the first African states to support the MPLA, did not hesitate -- in an unusual move-- to allow Soviet planes to use the airport of Algiers during the air lift for Angola.90

On the other side, as the tension between Algeria and Morocco grew in autumn 1975, the rapprochement with the Soviet Union became of vital importance for Algeria. This time it was, however, largely centred on military cooperation. With almost 90 per cent of Algeria's armed forces equipped by the USSR, Moscow became almost the quasi- exclusive supplier of military equipment to Algeria.

It is, however, unclear whether the Soviets tried or did exert a strategic or political influence on Algeria in return for its military cooperation. If it tried , all the available facts suggest that Moscow failed in its attempt. Even if at the UN both states' positions coincided for most of the time ,this was more a reflection of Soviet alignment with the Third World than Third World imitation of the Soviets. In Richard Parker's words "if anyone is leading in this relationship, it is the Algerians, not the Soviets".91

When Boumediene died on 27 December 1978, the USSR's message of condolence to Algeria not only illustrated how close the two states were, but also revealed Soviet worries about the future political orientations of Algeria and, by
extension, its future relations with the Soviet Union. It stressed that Boumediene “was a great friend of the Soviet Union” and that the “Algerian Constitution affirmed the Socialist orientation in the country's development”.92

3.7 The United States: “The necessary balance”

Algeria obtained its independence when the President of the USA was one of the rare American politicians who supported the Algerian cause. Indeed, in July 1957, John F. Kennedy, as Senator and member of the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, openly called for Algeria’s independence in a speech he delivered before the United States Senate. Most American officials at the time were angered by the speech, fearing its implication for US-French relations.93 This position secured the American President a considerable sympathy and respect among the Algerian nationalists who regarded Kennedy, after the acquisition of independence, as an encouraging factor likely to facilitate a rapprochement between the two states.

However, a few months after independence in 1962, the prospects for friendly relations between Algeria and the United States were compromised. This was a result of the visit of Algeria’s President to Cuba, ruled since 1959 by one of America’s most detested adversaries, Fidel Castro, in October 1962. Ben Bella’s first trip abroad which took him to Washington, after his appearance at the United Nations on the occasion of Algeria’s admission to the UN, ended with a visit to Havana. Earlier in September 1962 both Washington and Havana had invited Ben Bella to make a state visit after the ceremony of Algeria’s admission
to the UN. The question of whether or not Ben Bella should accept the invitation of the USA was debated at the first meeting of Algeria's Council of Ministers. The meeting decided, on the suggestion of Rabah Bitat, that Ben Bella should visit Cuba after Washington, to illustrate Algeria's commitment to the socialist ideology.

Thus, after being warmly received by Kennedy in Washington in October 1962, Ben Bella flew directly to Havana. To make things worse Ben Bella joined Castro in a declaration calling for the withdrawal of the United States from Guantanamo naval base. This statement, which came on the eve of what was to become the Cuban-missile crisis, was perceived by Washington as a sign of Algerian radicalism. Indeed, this action provoked the outrage of many political circles in the USA. From that time on Algeria became no more than another Cuba, and plans for a substantial aid programme, which Kennedy's administration was considering in favour of the new country, were dropped.

The Algerian government's "false start" in its relationship with the USA was further aggravated by Ben Bella's persistence in attacking US international policy such as its interventions in Congo and in the Dominican Republic, its position towards the Vietnam War and its support for Israel.

During the following year more incidents occurred to cause the Algerian-American relations to fester. In March 1963 when Algeria nationalised all vacant properties, most of which were left by French settlers, a few American citizens were affected. The polemic which resulted between the USA and Algeria over the compensation of American proprietors became an important issue of contention
in Algeria-US relations in the following years.

Another set back to the Algerian-American relationship was provoked in the autumn of 1963 by the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict. Although the United States officially proclaimed its neutrality in regard to the conflict, Algeria believed that the war was the result of an American-Moroccan conspiracy to undermine Algeria's socialist orientation. It suspected that the creditable Moroccan performance could be at least partly explained by American assistance, including the transport of Moroccan troops to the front.94

The multiplications of incidents between Algeria and the USA in a short period of time, combined with Ben Bella's criticisms of America's imperialism on one hand and the Algerian-Soviet rapprochement on the other, prompted the State Department to designate Algeria, in a report published in April 1964, as a "cold war danger point" in Africa. It also stressed its concern over "the pro-Communist influences in important opinion-making positions".95 Moreover, in accordance with the Hukenlooper Amendment of January 1962,96 American aid to Algeria was completely abandoned by the US administration, in late spring 1965.

Contrary to the Soviet Union's reaction to the coup of June 1965, the USA was not the least alarmed by the overthrow of Ben Bella. This event was received with satisfaction in the USA as in all other Western countries. Many Western observers speculated that Boumediene -- who was known for his attachment to Algeria's basic cultural and religious background -- would be more favourable to
the West than his predecessor. United States diplomats in Algeria were openly
exultant about the downfall of Ben Bella.97

However, Boumediene's first visit abroad to the USSR and the violent anti-
American tone in the Algerian media, particularly towards its policy in Vietnam,
quickly altered the image of the new regime in the USA. Relations between the
two states continued to deteriorate to the point that, by January 1967, the
Ambassador of the United States to Algeria, John D. Jernegan, wrote a letter to
the Algerian newspaper *El Moudjahid* in which he protested about the anti-
American criticisms in the media. The editor of the newspaper, who interpreted the
letter as an American attempt to influence Algeria's revolutionary option, replied
to the Ambassador as follows:

> The position of Algeria... is that of total support to people currently in the grip of
imperialism. Above all it is not Algeria that has chosen that the United States...
place itself with such fine consistency in precisely the camp with which those
peoples... find themselves confronted in a holy struggle.98

The Arab-Israeli war that same year contributed further to the degradation
of relations between the two states.99 Three days after the war broke out, Algiers
broke off its diplomatic relations with the USA and put under state control all
American oil companies operating in Algeria such as Sinclair, Esso, Getty, Mobil
and Phillips.

After a period of coolness in relations, following the Arab-Israeli war of
1967, Algeria's interest in the American market and technology, as part of its
national development, inspired the government of Algeria to seek a new
rapprochement with the USA. Henceforth, the nature of relations between Algeria
and the USA became guided by the pragmatic economic self-interest of both states, despite the ideological and foreign policy differences. In fact, it was only after the rupture in Algerian-US diplomatic relations (1967-1974) that the economic cooperation between the two states increased. For example US trade with Algeria reached almost $64 million. This was nearly double that of 1967, estimated at $33 million, and placed the USA in the position of being Algeria's most important trading partner after France and West Germany.\textsuperscript{100}

Beyond 1968, trade and economic agreements between the two states continued to expand, especially in the field of gas and hydrocarbons. The most important agreement in this sector was reached in mid-1969 between Sonatrach and the American company El Paso Natural Gas for the annual delivery of 10 billion cubic metres of Algerian liquefied gas to the United States over a period of 25 years. This deal, which was finally approved by the US government in October 1969, cleared the way for many other agreements to come,\textsuperscript{101} and for the prospect of a new phase in relations between the two states. Indeed, during the UN's General Assembly session in autumn 1969, just one day after the signature of the Sonatrach-El Paso accord, Algeria's Foreign Minister Bouteflika met the US Secretary of State Rogers to discuss US-Algerian relations. As a result, Algeria agreed to review and settle its dispute with the US companies affected by the nationalisation of 1967.

This positive evolution in the Algerian-American relationship persisted throughout the post-1970 era. Indeed, with the prospect of a long-term mutual economic interest developing between the two states, both governments felt the
need to resume diplomatic relations. These were therefore re-established in November 1974.

During the years that followed, cooperation was expanded to other fields such as education and light industries, despite the continuous opposition of Algeria and its violent criticisms of US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, Vietnam and Latin America. According to Europe Outremer, in 1977 the US purchases of Algerian oil and gas represented 56.7 per cent of Algeria's total sales and in 1978, 49.6 per cent of Algerian gas and oil output reached the USA. In comparison Algeria's trade with the USSR amounted only to 3 per cent during the same year.

The Algerian-American rapprochement of the mid-1970's brought Algeria sharp condemnations from its fellow nations in the "anti-imperialist world". Some called Algerian officials "managers of international capitalism" and others called Algeria "the most neo-colonised country". To defend his country's pragmatic policy, Boumediene told the Christian Science Monitor:

We are among those who believe that the countries of the Third World can remain independent of the great powers and maintain fruitful trade relations with them. The Soviet Union has trade relations with the USA. As does the People's Republic of China with Japan. In recent times the Americans have conducted themselves correctly as trading partners. We sell hydrocarbons; they are buyers. Everyone gets something out of it. Washington is not asking us to change our foreign policy. We seized our independence with arms in our hands, and we are not ready to succumb willingly to a new political or economic hegemony from any great power.

3.8 Conclusion

On the whole, it appears that Algeria's external policy from 1962 to 1978
remained largely unchanged as far as the issues/areas were concerned such as Palestine in the Arab World, border disputes in the Maghreb, liberation movements in Africa, consolidation of national independence towards France and maintaining a balanced relationship vis-à-vis the two super powers.

Although there was a change in the leadership in June 1965, the content and the principles behind Algeria's foreign policy remained unaltered. The crux of Algerian external policy was to give substance to the newly-gained independence and to enable Algeria to assert itself on the international stage. Maintaining a fine balance between radicalism and pragmatism was, however, the predominant feature of the emergent nation's external policy during this phase.

In the many foreign policy determinants that had an influence on policy-making those of the FLN, the Army and Ideology were of lesser importance than economics, the personal role of the Foreign Minister and the preeminent role of the presidential centre.
Notes and references


2. Egypt's political and security advisers were the closest to Ben Bella.


13. Coordinator of the FLN's Executive Secretariat.


20. According to Grimaud this information was confirmed by President Essadat after Boumediene's death in 1978.


28. On 17 July 1963, about 130 militants of the UNFP were arrested and accused of an alleged conspiracy against King Hassan. One month later the Moroccan Ministry of Justice accused foreign countries of helping financially the UNFP to undermine the monarchy. This alleged conspiracy is known in Morocco as the "Algerian Aggression". For ample details, see Roger Le Tourneau, "Chronique Politique Maroc", *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1963, p. 233.

29. For many Algerian political observers one of the reasons behind Ben Bella's overthrow by the military was his agreement to relinquish some of the disputed territories.

30. From 1963 to 1969 the situation in the borders remained precarious. In May 1966, following Algeria's nationalisation of Gara-Djebilet iron mine- situated in the territory disputed by Morocco and Algeria-, movements of troops on both sides of the borders increased the risks of another military conflict. Moreover, in March 1967, King Hassan accused Algeria of arming itself in preparation for a war against his country. He also called the UN to constitute a special commission for the supervision of the disarmament of Algeria and Morocco.

31. This treaty counted eight articles. Among the most important was the one which engaged the two parties "not to join any pact or any coalition against each
other” and the other which “compelled the two parties to submit all the suspended questions between them to the bilateral commissions which will have for a mission to find the adequate solutions in the framework of the relations of both states”.

32. Hadef, op. cit., p. 179.

33. One of the largest iron deposits in the world.

34. EL Moudjahid, 16 June 1972.


37. It is possible that at that time Algeria was still expecting a Moroccan ratification of the Ifran accord. Therefore, it opted for the policy of “wait and see” before making its decision officially known.

38. In mid-October 1975 a report from the UN’s Visiting Commission to the Sahara and an opinion of the International Court of Justice were published. Both documents strongly recommended the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the territory.

39. Greater Morocco corresponds to the area ruled by Elmorvids dynasty in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It covered Morocco, Spanish, Sahara, Mali and parts of western Algeria.


42. Abdelatif Rahal’s intervention before the fourth commission of the UN on 20 November 1975.

43. In July 1978 the Polisario provoked the overthrow of Ould Dada’s regime. The new Mauritanian government entered into a ceasefire arrangement with the Polisario and subsequently pulled out from the Western Sahara. Morocco seized this opportunity to take over the entire Western Sahara.

44. In 1963 Tunis severed its diplomatic relations with Algiers over an alleged support by the government of Ben Bella for the Tunisian opposition.


52. Ibid.

53. Such as the decision to establish the African Liberation Committee. Algeria's mission in the committee was to coordinate and collect military aid from the OAU members.


55. See the previous chapter for an idea on liberation movements supported by Algeria.


57. Algeria was one of the few African states to comply with the OAU's decision. The other states were: Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Mauritania and Tanzania.


60. The committee was composed of seven members: The four superpowers(USA, France, UK and USSR) Algeria for Africa, India for Asia and Paraguay for Latin America.

62. Such as Togo on 21 September, Zaire on 4 October. Moreover, after the eruption of hostilities between Israel and Egypt on 6 October 1973 most of the OAU's members severed their diplomatic relations with Israel except Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius and Swaziland.


66. Extract of the speech delivered by Algeria's Trade Minister, Mr. A. Yaker, before the OAU's Council of Minister, El Moudjahid, 1 March 1976.


70. Le Monde, 7 November 1964.

71. Abdelaziz Bouteflika's speech after the signing of the agreement, El-Moudjahid, 30 July 1965.

72. For full details of this accord, see Le Monde, 30 July 1965.


74. Algeria agreed to pay $54 million as a compensation to the French, to guarantee the 7 million tons of crude a year at a price of around $2.75 a barrel and to allow them to share in the development of the Saharan oil fields on economically viable terms.

76. Interview of President Pompidou for the French television, 24 June 1971, reported in *Le Monde* in 26 June 1971.


78. See Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replies to Algeria's accusations, in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 586, 2-8 February 1976.


83. Boumediene became known for his anti-communism in the first congress of the FLN in 1964. During this meeting the debate on Algiers Charter turned to a war of ideas between communists and nationalists. Boumediene was among those who opposed the Marxist-oriented Charter as presented by Ben Bella's team.

84. Only communist China expressed its support for the Council of Revolution.


95. This is partly true since the influence exerted on Ben Bella by his French and Algerian Communist advisers had even worried some political circles in Algeria. The decision of Boumediene's regime to arrest and expel foreign Communists from Algeria was a direct consequence of this concern.


97. Ottaway, op. cit., p.231

98. Ibid, p. 238.


100. Quandt, op. cit., p.121.

101. In December 1971 it was the turn of Commonwealth Oil Company to reach an agreement with Sonatrach for the import of 360 million tons of oil. This was followed in 1972 by another contract between Sonatrach and Escogas Inc. for the delivery to the USA of $ 3.6 billion worth of liquefied gas. And during the same year another agreement was signed between the Algerian company Sonatrach and Distrigas of Boston for the delivery of 308 billion cubic feet of Algerian liquefied gas.


CHAPTER FOUR
Chapter Four

The Arab world: continuity and change

4.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter showed that from 1962 the Algerian government devoted increased attention to Algeria's relations with the Arab world (Maghreb-Mashreq). For the post-independence leaders (Ben Bella and Boumediene) it was "natural" for Algeria to assert itself among its peers in the Arab world after 130 years of isolation imposed by the colonial administration. It was also noted that the active involvement of Algeria in the various crises and confrontations between the Arab states and Israel, as well as its unconditional support for the Palestinian cause, was not dictated merely by a typical Arab sense of solidarity. The involvement was above all a reflection of Algeria's strong commitment to what it perceived as a geographically wide-ranging revolutionary struggle against colonial domination. Meanwhile, in the Maghreb the Western Sahara conflict was the predominant issue after 1975 which, by straining Algerian-Moroccan relations, had negative effects on the prospects of improved intra-Maghreb relations.

Given this background, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether Algeria's policy towards the Arab world had undergone a change or continued to reflect the same posture under the new post-1979 leadership, namely that of President Chadli Bendjedid.
4.2 Maghreb: "The predominance of the Western Sahara Question"

4.2.1 Morocco (first phase): continuity of tension

It was earlier suggested that the Western Sahara was at the core of the negative evolution of intra-Maghreb relations after 1975. This holds true particularly for Algeria and Morocco, because both states made this issue an essential factor in their external policy both at the regional and international level. The 1975-79 phase also revealed that neither Algeria nor Morocco favoured a military confrontation, although at some time risks of war between both states were imminent. Instead, the battle turned into a diplomatic competition with both states attempting to gain maximum support from the international community for their own claim.

In practice, beneath the posturing and aggressive rhetoric, both President Boumediene and King Hassan II showed a significant amount of flexibility to resolve the crisis through dialogue. The last attempts in this sense took place a few months before Boumediene's death when Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, then Boumediene's adviser, engaged in talks with Moroccan officials and personalities. This initiative was followed by another secret meeting between Bouteflika, Algeria's Foreign Minister, and Hassan's adviser, Redha Gueduira, in Geneva on 2 July 1978. During the second meeting both parties agreed on a summit-meeting between Boumediene and Hassan. However, the sudden death of Boumediene in December prevented the prearranged meeting from taking place. Nevertheless, had this meeting occurred the outcome would not have upset the
status quo. At that time both leaders were not ready to compromise on an issue that had become a "national cause" in the sight of the leadership and the two nations' public opinion.

One month after Boumediene's death the FLN's Congress (27-30 January 1979) unambiguously reiterated Algeria's position towards the Western Sahara dispute. In a clear message to its Moroccan neighbour, the Congress resolution on Algeria's foreign policy stressed:

Reiterating that the question of the Western Sahara is a problem of decolonisation and national liberation of people whose territory was invaded .... [the Congress] proclaims its unbreakable solidarity with the people of Western Sahara, its vanguard, the Polisario Front, and its combatants as well as the support of the Algerian people for its fair cause until it can exercise its right for self-determination, the achievement of its legitimate rights for national sovereignty and independence of its territory.³

Morocco, on the other hand, maintained its intransigent policy and displayed no positive signs towards the new authorities in Algiers. Not only did it persist with its claim that the Western Sahara conflict was an issue between Algeria and Morocco but it also continued to deny the existence of the Sahrawi people and their right to self-determination. The Polisario guerrillas were presented as mercenaries manipulated by Algeria.

Furthermore in the summer of 1979, Morocco escalated the conflict in the Sahara by moving its troops to the southern part of the Western Sahara occupying Tiris Al Gharbiya -- an area restored to the Polisario by Mauritania following a peace agreement between the two parties under the auspices of Algeria on 8 August 1979.⁴ This move was bitterly condemned by Algeria whose
new Foreign Minister, Mohamed Sedik Benyahia, compared it to Israel's annexation of the Arab territories.\(^5\) It was also perceived by Algiers as evidence of Morocco's firm determination to pursue its Saharan venture, as well as an act of defiance against the OAU's recommendation of July 1979 for the implementation of a referendum in the Western Sahara.\(^6\) Commenting on Morocco's action, President Bendjadid noted:

By engaging his armed forces in an adventure whose consequences for peace, security, and stability of the whole region are unpredictable, the government of Morocco is challenging all Africa...Rabat justified its aggression in the Southern part of the Western Sahara by the "right of preemption" ... It is this "right" used by Pretoria to occupy Namibia... The authorities of Rabat are behaving in the same manner as the Zionists for whom the policy of vital space justifies every new aggression.\(^7\)

Similarly, Hassan's aggressive policy was also demonstrated by his support for the Aosorio -- a Sahrawi movement which constituted a rival to the Polisario Front -- to conduct terrorist action inside Algeria.\(^8\)

Thus, it was evident during the early days of Bendjadid's presidency that Algeria and Morocco would still be very much at odds over the Western Sahara. For the new regime in Algiers this meant the continuation of the strategy of war of attrition, as well as maintaining the diplomatic campaign against Rabat which had been initiated in 1975.

Indeed, immediately after the Moroccan invasion of Tris Al Gharbia, Polisario guerrillas redoubled their military activities inside the occupied Sahara. The later part of 1979 witnessed the beginning of an intense military campaign which aimed at inflicting the maximum damage on the Royal troops.
Attacks on the Moroccan cities of Lebouirate on 24 August 1979, Smara two months later and the siege of the Royal troops at Ouarkziz in March 1980 were the bloodiest for the Royal troops. Other military operations took place the following year and these too, inflicted heavy losses on the Moroccan armed forces especially at Boukraa, Rais Iakhil in January 1981 and at Guelta Zemmur in March and October 1981.

To contain this military pressure, Rabat engaged in a new strategy in the Western Sahara. For Hassan it had become clear that the control of the entire Western Sahara and the elimination of the Polisario guerrillas were almost impossible to achieve. Thus, instead of pursuing a costly military campaign, Morocco committed itself to the construction of a 2,500 kilometres-long sophisticated sand-and-stone wall designed to protect the rich parts of the Western Sahara known as "Le triangle utile". This wall stretches from the southern tip of the Zini mountains to Smara and Bou Craa and ends at the Atlantic coast next to the settlement of Boudjadour. Its installations ranged from observation and artillery posts and sandbanks, mine fields and barbed wire to radar devices and electric sensors.

Parallel to the military pressure inside the Western Sahara, Algeria maintained its diplomatic battle against Morocco in order to ensure maximum support for the Polisario and to constrain Hassan to accept the principle of a referendum in the Western Sahara. The OUA continued to be the most promising international avenue for Algeria to achieve its objective.
Indeed, having initially secured the support of the OAU’s ad-hoc committee for the implementation of a referendum in the Sahara, Algeria’s diplomatic objective was to put more pressure on the Moroccan government by pressing for the admission of the SADR into the OAU. The first step in this process was initiated at the OAU summit held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in July 1980. During this summit, Algeria with the help of the African pro-Sahrawi lobby, was able to secure the support of 26 states entitling the SADR to a full membership in the OAU. But with Morocco arguing that the admission of a non-independent state required the interpretation of the charter -- a procedure that needed the approval of two-thirds of the OAU member states -- Algeria’s attempt did not succeed.

One year later, the Western Sahara issue was reintroduced on the agenda of the OAU summit held in Nairobi in 1981. This time Hassan, who personally attended the summit, surprised everyone by proposing a “supervised” referendum in the Western Sahara. He declared:“We have decided to initiate a procedure for a supervised referendum which in its modalities would reflect the objectives of the last recommendations of the ad-hoc committee”.  

Although the Moroccan proposal was welcomed by Algeria, the idea of a “supervised” referendum, as proposed by Hassan, was rebuffed by the Algerian delegation. Algeria and the Polisario wanted the referendum to be held under UN auspices and only after the withdrawal of the Moroccan administration. However, with Algeria and its African allies pressing for a referendum for self-determination as stipulated by the terms of the OAU’s ad-hoc committee, the conference rejected the Moroccan formula. Instead the conference called for the implementation of a
CHAPTER 4

referendum under the OAU and UN auspices. It also established an implementation committee composed of seven African states\textsuperscript{13} to ensure, with the collaboration of the interested parties, the implementation of the ad-hoc committee’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{14} The implementation committee was given one month to carry out these decisions.

In August 1981 Algeria seemed to have fulfilled its diplomatic objective. The Implementation Committee met in Nairobi and issued its decision on the referendum.\textsuperscript{15} It called for a general and a free referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara, with the eligible electorates being all Sahrawi inhabitants listed in the Spanish census of 1974 along with those others who had since attained the age of 18 and above. The Committee also urged the antagonists to agree on a cease-fire through negotiations under its auspices.\textsuperscript{16}

Although Hassan accepted the decision of the Implementation Committee, his unexpected shift on this issue was rather a diplomatic diversion which was designed merely to reduce domestic tensions building up around his throne, and most importantly to reduce the ongoing military operations of the Polisario. In addition to this short-term objective, Morocco’s long-term aim was to seek more time until it could complete the construction of the wall which would reduce the effectiveness of the Polisario, and if necessary impose its own solution to the conflict.

By November 1981 it was clear that what Hassan had in mind was no more than an exercise of a reaffirmation that the Western Sahara is part of Morocco.
Hassan's perception of a referendum was clearly stressed in a broadcast speech in which he declared:

A King is granted many powers, but he does not have the right to take an action which would exclude a Moroccan citizen from the Moroccan community. Thus, in accepting the referendum, Morocco cannot deviate from Islamic constitutional law, and the Sovereign cannot ask his citizens whether or not they would like to remain Moroccan.17

It was therefore clear that with Morocco's interpretation of a referendum in the Western Sahara, the prospect of a breakthrough in the quality of Algerian-Moroccan relations remained as weak as ever. Hassan's lack of interest in a genuine settlement was later illustrated when he failed to attend the session of the implementation committee on 8-9 February 1982. He also described the OAU conference as a "picnic" party.18 Moreover, Morocco's attitude towards the Western Sahara provoked sharp divisions between the member states of the OAU, resulting in the cancellation of its summit conference scheduled on 5 August 1982 in Tripoli (Libya).19

Despite the tense atmosphere between Rabat and Algiers, Algeria did not discard the idea of a summit meeting between Bendjidad and Hassan which King Fahd of Saudi Arabia offered to arrange during his visit to Algiers and Rabat in late 1982. At this stage Algeria might have hoped that a "dialogue" with Morocco could contribute to end the deadlock in the Western Sahara. It also wanted to demonstrate to the international community -- which was still suspecting Algeria of being the main obstacle to the stability of the Maghreb -- its willingness to contribute peacefully to the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Thus, in February 1983, Bendjidad met his Moroccan counterpart near the Algerian-
Moroccan frontier. During this five hours-long meeting many bilateral issues were discussed but no agreement was reached on the Sahrawi question.

The essence of the impasse was the wide gap in their respective stances. Both states maintained their traditional position. King Hassan argued that the OAU perception of a referendum for self-determination had no future. He thus asked the Algerian President to press the Polisario to meet pro-Moroccan Sahrawi to discuss the idea of a "Saharan entity" which would retain only the Moroccan flag and stamp. He also suggested two levels of negotiation to discuss his proposition; one between the Sahrawis (pro-Moroccan and the Polisario) and the other between Algeria and Morocco.20

In his turn the Algerian President replied that it was not possible for Algeria to abandon the idea of an independent Saharan state. He recommended, instead, a solution within a Maghreban framework. It was also reported that he hinted that Algeria was ready to make economic concessions in that framework, such as a gas pipeline from Algeria across Morocco to Spain, a joint exploitation of the Bu Craa phosphate deposits in the northern Sahara and the export of Algerian iron through Moroccan ports.21 The apparent failure of the two states to reach an agreement on this key substantive issue led to the continuation of Polisario military attacks against Moroccan forces.

Although the Algerian-Moroccan summit did not end the deadlock of the Western Sahara issue, it had, however, had a positive influence over the future evolution of Algerian-Moroccan relations. The summit was followed one month
later (March 1983) by a partial reopening of both states borders. Algerian residents in Morocco and Moroccan residents in Algeria were allowed to circulate freely between the two countries. In May of the same year the two governments concluded an agreement to resume civil aviation links between Algiers and Rabat by the two national air lines.

According to Yahia Zoubir, the meeting between Bendjedid and Hassan also unveiled one important aspect related to the perception of Algeria's leadership on how to resolve the dispute with Morocco. It signalled the beginning of divergence within the Algerian administration between those favourable making concessions to Morocco at the expense of the Sahrawi and those who remained inflexible. It was also suggested that Bendjedid himself was very much in favour of Morocco and was opposed to a Moroccan military defeat. Reportedly, the Algerian military was intent on either intervening directly against Morocco or allowing an all-out offensive by Polisario forces with substantial Algerian support in order to break the deadlock and to prevent Morocco from achieving a fait accompli in the territory. Bendjedid had, apparently, succeeded in preventing such a decision by the Algerian military high-command.

The issue of the Western Sahara was once again addressed by the OAU when the organisation held its summit at Addis Ababa in June 1983. Despite Morocco's attempts to block the debate on this question, the summit passed another Algerian-sponsored resolution which named the Polisario and Morocco as the antagonists and urged them to engage in direct negotiations for a cease-fire. It also called for the implementation of a fair referendum within six
months. Morocco, however, continued to oppose the idea of direct negotiation with the Polisario, thereby preventing the implementation of the African resolutions. One month later, Hassan emphasized the consistency of his position by stating that "nothing would compel him to give the Sahara to a group of mercenaries."

By 1984 Morocco's policy of temporisation seemed to have partially paid off. Most of its troops based in the Sahara were dug in along the defence line and this new tactical deployment did noticeably reduce the effectiveness of the Sahrawi guerillas. Moreover, on 14 August 1984 Hassan was able to neutralise the Libyan flow of arms and financial support to the Polisario by entering an unholy alliance (discussed later) with Libya's leader Colonel Muamer Qadafi.

But if Rabat succeeded in maintaining the "status quo", it did not prevent Algerian diplomacy from going all out to secure the admission of the SADR to the Pan-african Organisation late in 1984, thereby completing the isolation of Morocco within Africa. It is worth noting that whereas in previous African summits Algeria preferred not to jeopardise the unity of the OAU over this particular issue, at Addis Ababa it used all its diplomatic influence to secure full membership for the SADR within the African organisation.

Furthermore, Morocco's persistence in delaying the implementation of the OAU resolutions made it difficult even for the moderate African regimes to maintain their objection to the Sahrawi admission. Nigeria's recognition of the
SADR obtained by Algeria days earlier proved decisive in this context for the OAU's recognition of the new state. Only Zaïre -- which owed Morocco a debt for its military support at the time of the insurrection in its southern province of Shaba in 1977/1978 -- joined Morocco when it withdrew from the OAU after it failed to stir the other conservative regimes to form an anti-Algerian front.28

4.2.2 Tunisia: “a new era”

For years Algerian-Tunisian relations had been relatively cool and negative. As suggested in the previous chapter, it was the alignment of Bourguiba with Morocco over the Western Sahara issue that revived suspicion and distrust between Algiers and Tunis as well as halted the positive evolution of relations between the two states which had briefly been witnessed at the beginning of the 1970s.

However, after the designation of Bendjeadid as President in 1979 the Algerian-Tunisian relationship took on a more positive dimension. This evolution was facilitated by the new Algerian policy/approach of "bon voisinage positif" -- good neighbourliness -- to inter-Maghreb relations in the Maghreb in general, its interest in isolating Morocco at the sub-regional level in particular, and its intention to contain Libya's drive for leadership in North Africa.

Yet, the control of the Boumediennist group over key decision-making positions made it difficult for the new Algerian leadership to reverse the preceding strategies overnight. The most startling evidence of the influence of this group was their approval for a commando attack on a Tunisian town, Gafsa, without the
knowledge of the new head of the state. Although this attack was initially conceived before Boumediene's death in 1978, there was connivance by some of his advisers in its later stage. The participation of Algeria in this affair was disclosed by Qadafi when he acknowledged that

It is unjust to say that we were responsible for the affair. The real instigator was Boumediene, who asked for my help. He is dead but his collaborators who organised it are alive and with us ... One day, in January 1978, Boumediene returned from Tunisia in a furious mood, having had an altercation with then Prime Minister Hadi Nouira, and the Defence Minister, Abdulah Ferhat. I believe they refused to condemn the intervention of the French Jaguar in the Western Sahara...

Thereupon Boumediene telephoned me and asked for our collaboration in a plan to shake up Tunisia and overthrow Nouira.29

Although Tunisia's investigations proved the involvement of Algeria, Tunis refrained from denouncing Algeria publicly.30 Libya was the only party blamed in this affair. The Tunisian motives for covering up the Algerian role are not, in practice difficult to trace; another serious tension with Algeria would have weakened further Tunisia's security at the time when this was already subject to constant Libyan threats over the implementation of the Djerba agreement.31 In addition, the coming to power in Algiers of a reputed moderate in succession to Boumediene might have given the Tunisian authorities renewed hope of improving relations with Algeria. Perhaps Tunis had sufficient reasons to conclude that Gafsa was a conspiracy between the "radicals" in the Algerian government and Libya, who were opposed to any rapprochement between Algiers and Tunis at the expense of Tripoli.

Bendjadjid's efforts to re-establish good relations with Tunisia and...
eagerness to dispel the effect -- though minor -- of Gafsa on the Algerian-Tunisian relations were the reasons behind his trip to Tunis in April 1980. It was during this visit that Bendjfadid informed his Tunisian counterpart that the Gafsa attack was carried out without his knowledge.32

The lifting of the Tunisian travel ban on Algerian tourists in the summer of 1980, following Bendjfadid's visit, suggested that both states accepted the terms of the new relationship. On the Algerian side it was clear that this involved non-interference in Tunisia's internal affairs.

Another important move towards more normalisation between Algeria and Tunisia was discernible from the mission of the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali, to Algeria in September 1981. This visit was concluded by the creation of a joint high commission, which met one month later. The joint-commission meeting resulted in a series of accords, such as the creation of a joint bank "Banque de Coopération du Maghreb Arab" and the creation of four common academic institutions.33 In addition, Tunisia was promised a share in the future project of the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline transporting Algerian gas to Italy -- an important source of revenue for Tunis in view of its lack of economic resources.

But even during this period of détente, it did not appear that Tunis was ready to alter its position vis-à-vis the Sahrawi question. Indeed, in August 1981 and June 1982 the Tunisian government irritated Algeria, once more, by making pro-Moroccan official statements over this question. Tunisian behaviour became even more provocative towards Algeria when it withdrew its delegation from the
African summit over the SADR's admission to the OAU. On the other hand, the Tunisian-American rapprochement of 1982, coinciding with that of Rabat-Washington, alarmed Algiers. The Algerian government suspected Tunisia of coordinating with Morocco to increase the US involvement in the Maghreb. The visit of the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali, to Washington in April 1982, and the US agreement to sell military equipment to Tunis, had given Algeria good grounds for its suspicion. The mounting tension between the two states resulted in the partial closure of their common border in the summer of 1982.

However, the tension of 1982 did not necessarily result in a relapse of Algerian-Tunisian relations back to their pre-1979 context. On the contrary, considerations arising from the Algerian desire to achieve its regional goals acted as an important factor in dissipating the continuing tension with Tunis. In addition, the gradual worsening of Algerian-Libyan relations over regional and international issues triggered a rapid reconciliation between Algeria and Tunisia. A rivalry with Tunisia would certainly have plunged Algeria into an unprecedented sub-regional isolation, particularly after the failure of the Bendj’adid-Hassan summit of February 1983 to bring about an Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement.

Geopolitical realities forced Bendj’adid’s regime to seek a means to preserve its influence in the area. The Algerian attitude was perhaps best symbolised when Bendj’adid joined Bourguiba in Tunis to sign a Treaty of Fraternity and Concord on 18 March 1983. This treaty, valid for twenty-two years, reaffirmed the principle of “bon voisinage” in the Maghreb that had been the leitmotiv of Bendj’adid since his accession to power. The treaty engaged the two
states to safeguard peace and security; to abstain from using force against one another and prohibit hostile groups from using each others' territories for activities that could harm the security of the other partner. It also prohibited both parties from entering any political or military pact that could threaten the security, the territorial integrity and the independence of the other signatory. The treaty also invited other states to gain membership provided they accepted the terms of the accord. 35

Following the signing of this treaty, economic cooperation vastly increased between the two partners. The most tangible form of this cooperation was the realisation of the Transmed pipeline whose achievement had been hampered for years by political and nationalistic considerations from both sides. The pipeline was inaugurated and started operation when Presidents Bendjadjid, Bourguiba and Pertini of Italy met at Cape Bon (Tunisia) on 18 March 1983. Under this agreement Algeria was to supply the Société Tunisienne d'Electricité et du Gaz (STEG) with 250 million cubic metres of gas annually. Tunisia was also granted rental on the pipeline as it crossed its territory. 36

Thus, cooperation in economic matters and practical endeavours did much to dispel the distrust lingering from Boumediene's era. One result of the rapprochement between the two states was the noticeable change in Tunisia's posture regarding the Western Sahara dispute. Whereas in the past Tunis had adopted a position in favour of Morocco, after May 1983 it ceased to oppose the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence. The Algerian-Tunisian joint communiqué, issued at the end of the Bourguiba visit to Algiers on
29-31 May 1983, underlined this fact by stressing that "the only solution for the fratricidal conflict between Morocco and the Polisario was the recognition of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence".37

On the other hand, Algeria became the regional “protector” of Tunisia’s territorial integrity. Bourguiba himself was reported to have told President Bendjadid that: “Tunisia should not be left alone. I am sure that when I disappear our southern neighbour [Libya] will not leave it in peace. Therefore, I count on you that Tunisia will not find itself on its own”.38

Indeed, when Tunis was militarily threatened by Qadafi in the summer of 1985, Algeria assured Bourguiba of its readiness and determination to protect Tunisia against any outside intervention. Troops were also moved to its eastern border with Libya to deter Qadafi from any military adventure against Tunisia.

Despite the dismissal of the pro-Algerian Mohamed Mzali from office in 1986 and the hand Algeria had in his fleeing to Switzerland -- notwithstanding a Tunisian warrant for his arrest -- Algerian-Tunisian good relations were not affected. On the contrary Tunis was careful not to allow this affair to generate into a hostile attitude towards Algeria. Thus, for example, the new Tunisian Prime Minister, Rachid Sfar, paid an official visit to Algiers in October 1986 to discuss with the Algerian President the question of “economic complementarity”.

After the fall of Bourguiba in 1987 the new regime in Tunis continued to attach a particular attention to its cordial relationship with Algeria. The appointment of the former Ambassador to Algeria, Hedi Beccouche, as Prime
Minister in the first government of the new Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, provided tangible evidence of the mutual confidence and close ties between Algiers and Tunis. To be sure, neither Algeria nor Tunisia had, at that time, a conflict of interest important enough to it, or intractable enough, to interfere with the cordiality of the relationship that had been evolving since Bendjadid's accession to power in 1979.

4.2.3 Libya: "the end of an alliance"

Before the eruption of the Western Sahara dispute in late 1975, Algerian-Libyan relations had been rather uneventful. This stemmed primarily from Libya's own perception of its role in the Arab world. Indeed, ever since Qadafi's assumption of power in 1969, the most colourful aspect of Libya's Arab policy was its efforts to achieve the myth of Arab unity at the expense of most existing governments and boundaries. This fact not only limited the ability of the Libyan leader to find a place among his peers in the Maghreb but also undermined his aspiration for Arab leadership in the whole Arab world.

However, as Boumediene's government sought the support of regional states in its dispute with Morocco over the Western Sahara, Algeria turned pragmatically for assistance to Libya. The absence of strong bonds between a monarchical Morocco and a revolutionary Libyan regime enabled Algeria to enlist Libya on its side. After a series of talks in Algiers and Tripoli, both countries agreed to coordinate their support for the Polisario in its struggle against Morocco in the Western Sahara and to cooperate on other anti-imperialist issues as well.
Libya was, as a consequence, described by President Boumediene as "the natural ally in the struggle against reaction".\textsuperscript{39}

To strengthen further their ties against Morocco, Algeria and Libya concluded in December 1975 an important agreement at Hassi Messaoud, southern Algeria, under which the two states agreed to assist one another in case of an act of external aggression. And in February 1976, Algeria went as far as to commit itself to a merger with Libya.

If Boumediene's regime felt that an alliance with Libya was indispensable for Algeria in its quarrel with Morocco, the appointment of Bendjaddid altered the equation. Unlike Boumediene, Bendjaddid, being far more pragmatic, was therefore less sympathetic to the regime in Libya, and viewed the interventionist politics and military adventurism of Qadafi in Africa with considerable concern. He reportedly warned Qadafi in 1981 that Algeria would not tolerate the Libyan policy of destabilisation against Tunisia, Mali, Niger or the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). He also publicly rejected Qadafi's proposal for a merger with Chad and his intention in 1980-81 to maintain Libyan troops there. "Episodes of this nature are likely to create unrest within the region and invite colonialist-sponsored provocations" stressed the Algerian President.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, Bendjaddid distanced himself publicly from Libya when the Libyan leaders, unexpectedly, visited Algeria to suggest a plan of unity between the two countries. On this occasion the Algerian president was explicit in his refusal of the Libyan offer. He pointed out that: "any proposal for unity should not come from a
single agreement between governments but should take into consideration the aspiration of their respective people and must be based on the prior settlement of the border disputes and on a long process of economic measures to pave the way for this unity". Without these conditions, Bendjadid insisted that "there would be no serious attempt to work for such unity".

The Algerian attitude led to sharp disagreements between Algeria and Libya over a number of regional and international issues. At this stage the Libyan leader was believed to have even threatened the Algerian President with an assassination plot and with reviving Libyan territorial demands. Whether the Libyan threat against the person of the Algerian leader is accurate or not, there is no doubt that Algerian-Libyan relations took a serious turn for the worse despite the mediation conducted by the South Yemeni President, Ali Nasser, when he visited Algiers and Tripoli in mid-1982.

Libya's efforts to unite all the Saharan tribes from Chad to Mauritania in some kind of Trans-Saharan Islamic Republic caused Algeria great anxiety. The Algerian government believed that Qadafi's manoeuvres in the Sahel could motivate separatist aspirations among some of its own tribes in the south. Moreover, a vast Libyan-dominated Saharan entity could not be tolerated by Algeria as it would represent an implicit challenge to Algeria's own ambitions to be the dominant power in its proximate geo-political environment of the Maghreb.

Thus, the Algerian government viewed Qadafi's involvement in the Sahel as a threat and responded to it by paying particular attention to its relations with
the Saharan States. These concerns explain the participation of Algeria in the summit conference of the Saharan states held in Nouakchott in March 1982 which was boycotted by Qadafi. At this summit the Algerian leader addressed a veiled warning to the Libyan leader by stating that “the peoples of this region needed stability”.\textsuperscript{44} Certainly, Libya's increased subversive actions in Sub-Saharan Africa led to the strengthening of relations between Algeria and Mali, Niger and Senegal.

Almost equally important from the Libyan point of view was Algeria's rapprochement with the states of the Sahel. In Qadafi's eyes, the active pace of Algeria's diplomacy in the Sahel was intended to undermine Libya from achieving its regional ambitions. This interpretation was given an added weight by Algeria's improvement of its relationship with France which was equally opposed to Libya's policy in the Sahel, Chad and Africa as a whole.

During the following years Algerian-Libyan relations continued to deteriorate as a result of Algeria's policy of detente in the Maghreb and its moderate policy in the Arab world. When Bendjedid met Hassan in February 1983, Qadafi responded negatively to the Algerian-Moroccan summit by demanding the application of the Djerba agreement with Tunisia and the Hassi Messaoud with Algeria. He even went as far as to threaten Algiers and Tunis with a resort to the use of force in order to achieve the unity of the Maghreb by stating: “there would be an appeal to the Tunisian and Algerian peoples over the heads of their respective leaders”.\textsuperscript{45}

But this quarrel became more acute following the signature in March 1983
of the Treaty of Concord between Algeria and Tunis whose rules of association explicitly excluded those states like Libya and Morocco that rejected the principle of the existing borders. Indeed, the Algerian-Tunisian détente enraged the Libyan leader and provoked him into seeking an alliance with his traditional enemy, King Hassan, when Qadafi travelled to Rabat on 30 June 1983 and bartered away his support for the Polisario as *quid pro quo* for a Moroccan promise to keep out of the embroglio of Chad. It is perhaps significant that Hassan justified Qadafi's involvement in Chad by stating in late 1983 that "there were blood ties between northern Chad and southern Libya".46

The Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement was given another boost on 13 August 1984 when Qadafi and Hassan signed in Oudjda (Morocco) a treaty of union (the Arab-African Union) endorsed, two weeks later, by 99.97 per cent of Moroccans voting in a referendum organised for that purpose. The two states agreed to work for the realisation of common policies, chiefly at the diplomatic, economic, cultural and technical levels. The treaty also stipulated in article 12 that "any aggression against one of the member states would constitute a threat against the other".47 Even the choice of Oudjda -- a Moroccan town bordering Algeria -- for the signing of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty was a deliberate affront to Algeria. Once a safe haven for the FLN guerillas during the war for independence from France and a symbol of fraternity between Algeria and Morocco, now it was a direct threat to the security of Algeria.

The August 1984 treaty between Libya and Morocco completely overturned the regional balance of power. From having to deal with a hostile power to its
west, Algeria also suddenly had to contend with another unfriendly neighbour to its south-east. The Algerian government had, therefore, no other alternative but to condemn the treaty. It also turned down the Libyan-Moroccan proposition to subscribe to it, carried over by Qadafi and Redha Guidera, King's Hassan adviser, when they visited Algiers to assure Bendjadid of the good intentions behind the treaty. Meanwhile the FLN political bureau met on 21 August 1984 and issued a declaration which openly criticised the Libyan-Moroccan treaty: “The policy of axes is not a factor of unity; it contributes to divide what needs to be united”.48

As a result of the Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement, Algeria encouraged the Polisario front to increase its military operations to prove that it could alone support the guerillas in the Western Sahara despite Qadafi's defection. Against this backdrop, the Polisario mounted a series of attacks against Moroccan positions in the Sahara in July, August and October 1984.

Moreover, Algeria concentrated much of its diplomatic energy on trying to discredit the Moroccan-Libyan alliance in the eyes of the African conservative regimes that were already at odds with the Libyan leader over his policy of subversion and agitation in Africa. In many ways, the reconciliation between Morocco and Libya served the Algerian-Sahrawi interest more than Rabat expected. The anti-Qadafi line espoused by Algeria pushed several conservative regimes in the direction of Algeria and helped it to secure the official admission of the SADR into the OAU in its twentieth summit of held at Addis Ababa, in November 1984. This was an example of Algeria using the balance of power theory to promote its interest.
Algeria's rapprochement with Egypt, in 1985, after years of freeze following Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977, also came as a reaction to the Libyan-Moroccan alliance. This rapprochement deterred an imminent planned joint military action by Libya and Morocco against Algeria in 1985. Here again was an example of Algerian realpolitik driving its external relations rather than some dogmatic ideological determinant.

However, after two years of existence, the Libyan-Moroccan treaty collapsed. Having apparently felt secure in the Western Sahara with the defensive walls nearing completion, Morocco ended its connection with Libya in August 1986. The reason invoked by Moroccan officials was the Libyan diatribe against King Hassan after the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to Morocco in July 1986. Another reason which might have encouraged Hassan to end his "marriage of convenience" with Libya was to please his traditional allies in the Arab World as well as in the West, notably Saudi Arabia and the USA, which were the most critical towards the Moroccan-Libyan agreement in 1984.

The collapse of the Oudjda Treaty opened the scope for an improvement in bilateral relations between Algiers and Tripoli. Bendjedid made his first official visit to Libya in December 1986. The primary reason behind this trip was to enlist Libya under Algeria's sphere of influence within the framework of the Treaty of Concord and Fraternity. The Algerian initiative, however, ran up against Qadafi's traditional desire for full-scale political union including the setting up of a joint Presidency, a Ministerial Council and a Parliament which the Algerian President did not reject.
It must be pointed out that the Libyan proposal engendered divisions among Algeria's leadership. While some party officials (such as Messadia of the FLN) appeared to favour a union with Libya, as proposed by Qadafi, others from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (such as Taleb Ibrahimi) resisted the idea. The latter group argued that a merger with Libya would probably offend Tunisia -- and they were correct, for this was indeed what Bourguiba himself made clear to Bendjeadid when he flew to Tunis on 7 July 1987.

The divergence of the two tendencies was later made more explicit in the two published official documents on the issue of unity with Libya. The first document, a resolution emanating from the FLN Central Committee, declared that "the union between Libya and Algeria is imperative and that the population would be soon asked to discuss the draft treaty that the two governments were preparing". It also went as far as to embrace the Libyan proposal for the creation of political institutions between the two states. The second document elaborated by the political bureau was clearly less committal. Instead, it stressed "the need for a methodical procedure and responsible action with a view to building the political and material economic infrastructures required by any unitary endeavour", as well as underlining "the historic function fulfilled by the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord in this regard".

Yet, despite repeated declarations by Qadafi that a union with Algeria would be announced on 1 November 1987, the fusion between the two states did not occur. The easing of the tensions with Morocco combined with the US and Tunisian reticence towards a Libyan-Algerian rapprochement most likely made
Algeria less enthusiastic about a merger with Libya.53

4.2.4 Morocco (second phase): “towards reconciliation ”

Despite the fact that the Algerian-Moroccan relationship continued for years to be significantly influenced by the Western Sahara dispute, it would be quite wrong to suggest that Algeria's policy towards Rabat was left basically unchanged under Bendjadid's leadership. Not in practice that deeply in contradiction with its initial stance over the Sahrawi question, Algeria moved gradually to adopt a policy of détente towards Morocco.

Indeed, in the mid-1980s Bendjadid's regime, perhaps more than ever, was motivated by domestic and external factors to rethink its relationship with Morocco. The reality was that since the appointment of Bendjadid as head of state, much had changed. Domestically the regime was faced by a gradual worsening of the economic situation in the wake of the 1985-86 depression of world oil prices; another prolonged war of attrition against Morocco promised only to further weaken the critical financial situation of the government.54 In addition, the regime of Bendjadid was now more powerful than before. Having secured his control of the state's apparatus -- particularly the FLN and the military institution -- the Algerian leader was in a better position to carry out the regional policy that he favoured. This was a clear example of the combination of the presidency and economics coinciding as primary foreign policy determinants.

Externally, it had become evident to the Algerian leadership that Morocco was not yet ready to compromise on the Sahrawi question. With the last defensive
wall nearly complete, all the signs indicated that Morocco would perpetuate the status quo as Rabat considered that this served its interest. The objective from the Moroccan standpoint was to maintain its occupation, however illegal, of the Sahara and to obtain the recognition of its *fait accompli* by the international community. These facts reinforced the conviction of Bendjadjid and his close advisers that a reconciliation with Morocco could be the first step towards the resolution of the Saharawi question.

In 1987 Saudi Arabia mediated a second summit between Bendjadjid and Hassan. This meeting took place on 4 May 1987 in the presence of King Fahd, himself at a location situated between the Algerian-Moroccan borders (Akid Lotfi). Although there were no immediate signs that the two sides agreed to settle their difference on the Western Sahara question, the meeting served to alleviate the tension between the two countries. Both leaders pledged their willingness to hold future consultations to resolve existing problems.

In many ways, the exchange of Algerian and Moroccan prisoners, held since the two battles of Amgala in 1976, immediately after the meeting of the two heads of state, was a substantive indicator of the process of reconciliation between the two countries. In fact, the countries maintained rather high-level contacts in the month of the Bendjadjid-Hassan meeting even though diplomatic relations between the two states were not resumed.

What is more, with a view to removing any possible opposition to Bendjadjid's reconciliatory approach towards Morocco from the pro-Sahrawi faction
within the Algerian leadership, Hassan unreservedly told the Algerian Foreign Minister, while the latter was paying a visit to Rabat, that “if the Sahrawis decide to integrate with Morocco, they would be most welcome. If they decide to secede, we would be the first ones to open an embassy in their capital”. Hassan made another “concession” in the summer of 1987 by stating that the conflict in Western Sahara was between Morocco and Polisario and not with Algeria. The Moroccan “flexibility” appeared to have been noted in Algiers, and presumably served to emphasise to the Algerian policy-makers that Algerian-Moroccan relations were entering a new era.

The Algerian announcement of its plan to organise an Arab summit conference to coordinate the Arab support for the Palestinian Intifadha accelerated the dynamics of the rapprochement between Algiers and Rabat. Bendjadid, who viewed the participation of Morocco as important to the success of the Arab summit, dispatched two top officials, party chief Mohamed Messadia and his cabinet director, General Larbi Belkheir, to Rabat in March 1988 to request Hassan's commitment to the summit. The King made his approval conditional upon the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the two states. Up until 1988 the Algerian stance on any resumption of diplomatic relations with Morocco was contingent upon direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario. However, subsequent discussions between officials of the two states, in Algiers in the same period, led to the restoration of diplomatic relations on 16 May 1988.

However, it would be too simplistic to suggest that the “removal” of the question of the Western Sahara from the forefront of Algerian-Moroccan relations...
ended Algeria support for the Polisario. As noted above, the Algerian reconciliation with Rabat sought by Bendjadid was just a step towards a solution of the dispute in the Western Sahara. Indeed, the Algerian-Moroccan communique announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two states stressed the necessity for a political settlement of the conflict:

Anxious to promote the success of international efforts undertaken to hasten the process of good offices for a just and definitive solution to the Western Sahara conflict through a free and regular referendum for self-determination held without any constraints whatsoever and with utmost sincerity...have decided to reestablish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.61

Reflecting on this aspect later on, following mounting speculation that Algeria had betrayed the Sahrawi, Bendjadid stated on 19 September 1988:

We have been clear from the start in no way will Algeria ever renounces its fundamental principles regarding just causes and peoples' right to self determination. This was understood by our Moroccan brothers. We believe that the Saharawi question is a just cause.62

Moreover, Bendjadid capitalised on the rapprochement with Rabat to push forward his "Greater Maghreb Arab" agenda, hailed as another step towards a settlement of the Sahrawi question. A priori Algeria had hoped that building a united Maghreb without excluding Morocco could pave the way for a resolution of the Saharan conflict in "the Greater Maghreb context".

It was in this context that less than one month after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Algiers and Rabat, the Algerian President contrived to arrange the first- ever summit between the five leaders of the Maghreb countries to discuss prospects of Maghreb unity in Algeria on 10 June
1988. The meeting agreed to establish an inter-Maghreb commission that convened in July and set up five subcommissions, each chaired by a partner country, to elaborate proposals and identify the means to achieve the unity of the Maghreb. After several working sessions of the commission, the Maghreb leaders met in Marrakech in February 1989 to set up the new UMA (Arab Maghreb Union).\footnote{63}

To be sure, up to 1989 the Algerian approach seemed to be working. While in the past Morocco had never accepted the idea of direct talks with the Polisario, in December 1988 the Moroccan monarch declared to the French media that he was ready to meet with Sahrawi nationalists. He himself met with three Polisario representatives on 4 and 5 January 1989.\footnote{64} Though this meeting did not lead to any breakthrough, it was, nevertheless, regarded at that time as a positive step in the direction of a political resolution of the conflict.

4.3 Mashreq: “pragmatism and moderation”

4.3.1 Boumediene’s legacy

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Algeria’s involvement in the Mashreq steadily declined. The eruption of the Western Sahara crisis combined with domestic preoccupation motivated the government of Boumediene in the last years before his death to adopt a low profile in his Arab policy but with a more radical stance as a response to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in September 1977.

The change that took place in Algeria’s leadership after Boumediene’s
death did not alter this feature, because of pressure from Benyahia, Algeria's Foreign Minister, and the radical officers. After coming to power President Bendjadjid continued to reflect the radical line of Algeria's Arab policy, pursued by his predecessor. A radical attitude was, therefore, maintained when Sadat and Begin concluded the peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979. The Algerian government took the position that the Egyptian action, for whatever purpose, was contrary to the Arab cause and was therefore an act of capitulation. In terms of foreign policy determinants this was a clear case of the presidency being constrained by the radicals and the army.

In November 1980 Algeria boycotted the Arab summit held in Amman after the PLO had decided not to attend, along with Libya, Syria and South Yemen. Simply put, the decision of Algeria not to attend the summit was a matter of principle vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause. Algeria believed that no Arab state had the right to take decisions without the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Algeria also shared the concern of the PLO that the Amman summit might nullify the resolution of the 1974 Rabat summit which recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people or might approve Jordanian King Hussein's plan for the resolution of the Middle East problem that would exclude the PLO.

Consistent with Algeria's view that no peace could be reached in the Middle East without the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, President Bendjadjid attended the two summits of the Arab Steadfastness Front held in Libya in April and September 1981. During these meeting reiterated
CHAPTER 4

Algeria's opposition to any Arab compromise with Israel and its total support for the Palestinians.66

When the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, succeeded in arranging an Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, on 25 November 1981 to discuss the then Saudi Prime Minister, Prince Fahd's plan for peace which implied the recognition of the Israeli state within the limits of its 1967 borders, the Algerian President declined to attend the summit. Algeria viewed this plan as a "Camp David II" since it failed to refer to the PLO.67 During the conference the Algerian delegation, led by its Foreign Minister, manoeuvred with its allies of the Arab Steadfastness Front for the rejection of Fahd's plan. Indeed, the summit which was initially scheduled for three days reached a deadlock and was postponed sine die just four hours after it opened.

Algeria's militant posture was further expressed following Israel's full-scale military invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out the Palestinian guerrillas from that country. Bendjedid reacted immediately by sending messages of support to his Lebanese counterparts, President Gemayel, and the Palestinian leader Arafat, as well as dispatching two senior FLN officials, Messadia and Abdelhamid Mehri, to Syria on 11 June 1982. Several days later Algeria's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, visited Damascus to obtain Syrian approval for Algeria's -- unsuccessful-- initiative to convene an emergency Arab summit to discuss the appropriate measures that the Arabs would take as a response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Subsequently, Ibrahimi attended the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League which took place on 26 June 1982 in Tunis. The gathering was
an opportunity for Algeria to set forth a six-point plan as a framework for a global
Arab action in their confrontation with Israel. In its plan Algeria suggested the
following:\textsuperscript{68}

1- unanimous indignation at the Israeli invasion;
2- the support for the Palestinian and Lebanese combatants;
3- the condemnation of the US support of Israel;
4- the reaffirmation of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people;
5- the revision of Arab relations with other countries on the basis of their position
vis-à-vis the situation in Lebanon;
6- the dispatching of ministerial delegations to the capitals of the members of the
UN Security Council.

However, the Algerian plan was rejected by the Arab League and only its
last point was approved. Consequently the Algerian Foreign Minister led one of
the two delegations set up by the Arab League to Paris, Moscow and Beijing.

At the same time, Algeria sent military equipment valued at $20 million to
be delivered direct to the PLO from Moscow. In addition, several tons of medicines
and arms were sent to the Palestinian guerrillas from Algeria.

In July 1982 east Beirut was taken by Israeli troops and the Palestinian
fighters were forced to evacuate by sea. Although Algeria disapproved of the
withdrawal of the Palestinians from their bases in Lebanon, it agreed, at the PLO’s
request, to receive about 700 of them. Later in September Arafat, the PLO leader,
visited Algeria to ask for more assistance from the Algerian government.

At this point appalling massacres of defenceless Palestinian refugees were perpetrated in two camps at Sabra and Shatila in the Lebanese capital on 17 September 1982. Apparently the perpetrators were Phalangist militias acting in revenge for the assassination of the Lebanese President Bashir Gemayal but with the collaboration of the Israelis. Like all the Arab states, Algeria put the blame on Israel and accused General Ariel Sharon's troops of these massacres.69

To demonstrate its sympathy with the Palestinian people, the Algerian government cancelled the organisation of the festivities that were due to take place in November of that year in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria's war of independence.

As a direct consequence of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the Saudis took the initiative to convene an Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, in September 1982. At this conference the Saudis presented another plan for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict which was, in practice, a refurbishment of the Fahd Plan of the previous year. It implicitly recognised the state of Israel within the 1967 frontier but this time emphasized the Palestinian people's right for self-determination under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative, and the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.70 Although Bendjaddid did not attend the summit, Algeria's delegation endorsed the Arab peace plan at the request of the PLO's leader. Subsequently, Algeria was appointed as a member of the seven Arab countries that visited the capitals of the UN security council's
member-states in November and December 1982 to promote the Arab peace plan.

4.3.2 Readjusting Algeria's Arab Policy

Algeria's attitude at the Arab summit signalled a turning point in its Arab policy driven again by the leader. It was the first time since 1977 that Algeria had demarcated itself "openly" from the radical Arab states - Libya, South Yemen, and Syria - that refused to accept the Saudi-sponsored Arab peace plan. Algeria apparently became convinced that ideological differences between Arab states were detrimental to the Arab cause, in particular to the Palestinian movement which was on the verge of disintegration following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Algeria's shift of policy, inaugurated by its Foreign Minister, was a determinant factor in the rapprochement between Algiers and the moderate Arab countries including Saudi-Arabia. During a visit by King Fahd to Algeria in November 1982, both countries agreed to coordinate their efforts to preserve the unity of the Arabs and "to grant the PLO all assistance it needed to achieve its objectives". The participation of Arafat in these talks undoubtedly reflected these concerns.

Thus, in concert with Saudi Arabia, Algeria became involved from the beginning of 1983 in a policy of mediation between the different factions of the PLO in order to help the Palestinians achieve their unity. This came as a contrast to Libya and Syria which were promoting left-wing organisations within the PLO to challenge Arafat's moderate line and the decisions of the Fez Summit. Algeria's efforts culminated in mid-February 1983 in bringing all the Palestinian factions to
Algiers in order to attend the long-delayed meeting of the PNC (Palestinian National Congress). Bendjdid's speech before the PNC, clearly, illustrated Algeria's interest in the unity of the Palestinian movement. He said:

We think that it is imperative for any revolution to work in a unitary framework whatever the internal disagreements because the strength of any revolution remains in the unity of thought and action... Thus, we proclaim to our militants brothers that the crucial phase which the Palestinian revolution and the Arab nation is undergoing requires, indispensably, the line of unity of thought and action in order to achieve the sacred objective: the liberation of Palestine and the concretisation of the Palestinian right to establish its independent state under the banner of Palestinian Liberation Organisation.72

Moreover, throughout the meeting, Ibrahimi, played a prominent role in mediating between the different Palestinian factions. His main objective was to help the Palestinians reach a consensus as a means of strengthening the unity of the PLO under the leadership of Arafat. The Algerian Foreign Minister himself supported this view. "Algeria" he stressed "works for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the Palestinian and Arab ranks as well as for a Syrian-PLO rapprochement".73

Despite the apparent divisions between the Palestinian movement at the PNC meeting, the conference approved the pursuit of dialogue with Jordan but rejected both US President Ronald Reagan's plan and the Camp David agreements, with their unsatisfactory provisions for an autonomous Palestinian entity. Nevertheless, the consensus achieved at this meeting represented a triumph for the moderate line of Arafat, and was regarded by Algeria as a positive step in the reunification of the Palestinian movement.
However, a disagreement between Arafat and Hafez-al Assad, the Syrian President, in May 1983, once again, threatened, the future of the PLO. Indeed, following a stormy meeting between Arafat and Assad in May 1983, heavy fighting broke out in Lebanon between Syrian-backed dissidents of Fatah, led by Abu Moussa and the troops loyal to Arafat. As a consequence some 4000 of Arafat's men were evacuated from Lebanon to Algeria, Yemen and Egypt.

In an effort to mediate the serious dispute between Syria and the PLO, President Bendjidad travelled to Damascus in June 1983. This attempt was unsuccessful and Abu Mussa's troops went on ejecting the loyal troops of Arafat from their bases in Tripoli (Lebanon). Apparently the Syrian leadership feared that Arafat's rapprochement with Jordan might lead to an agreement between the PLO and this country, whereby King Hussein would have an open mandate to find a negotiated settlement with Israel similar to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement as well as to negotiate the fate of the Palestinians which would leave Syria alone in its confrontation with Israel.\textsuperscript{74} Notwithstanding the fact that Algeria was sympathetic to Syria's preoccupation, it totally rejected the notion of backing the Syrians against the chairman of the PLO. In the words of the Algerian leader, Palestine was "the central issue in the Middle East"\textsuperscript{75} while the Arab occupied territories were "an extension of the Palestinian issue"\textsuperscript{76}

It was, therefore, from this perspective that the Algerian government made additional efforts destined to support the unity of the Palestinian movement. In March 1984, Arafat visited Algiers on three occasions, while President Bendjidad received other influential Palestinian leaders such as Abou Jihad, Naeif
Hawatmeh and George Habbach. Messadia, the FLN's chief, toured the Arab states to seek Arab support for the PLO and its leader Arafat. These attempts were hastened when the pro-Syrian Shiite militia of the Amal Party attempted to dislodge the Palestinians from camps around Beirut in 1985.

It was under these circumstances that Bendjedid called upon all the Palestinian factions in April 1986 to convene in Algeria for another summit-meeting. After one year of difficult mediation between the Palestinian factions, Algeria's efforts finally paid off. In April 1987 the PNC held its summit in Algiers with the presence of most Palestinian factions except the pro-Syrian organisations. The conference was regarded by many observers of Arab affairs as a success for both Arafat and Algeria. Only Egypt expressed its dissatisfaction at the criticisms formulated by the PNC vis-à-vis the Camp David accords.

It was also Algeria's efforts that made possible the convening of the Arab extraordinary summit on the Palestinian Intifadha in Algiers in June 1988. This was followed in November of the same year by another meeting of the PNC in Algiers during which the PLO "abandoned" the policy of armed struggle which had long been at the core of the Palestinian strategy, and adopted by name the 1947 UN's General Assembly Resolution 181, which calls for the partition of Palestine into two states, a Jewish one and an Arab one. The birth of a Palestinian "state" in exile was also proclaimed at this meeting.

Algeria's general tendency towards pursuing a moderate Arab policy was also manifested in the government's decision not to condemn the initiative of the
Lebanese President, Amin Gemeyal, when he tried to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon by direct negotiation with Israel under the auspices of the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, in May 1983. Instead of joining Syria and Libya in their denunciation of Gemeyal's efforts, Algeria's government issued a statement in which it restricted its criticism to the terms to the terms of the Shultz plan. In the eyes of the Algerian leaders, it was essential to avoid interfering in Gemeyal's decision because it would only add more discord and tension to the already decaying political atmosphere in Lebanon. To mark his appreciation towards the Algerian government over its realistic approach, Amin Gemeyal, visited Algeria in November of that year.

The shift in Algeria's Arab policy had also knock-on effects on the attitude of Algiers towards the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. In 1979 Algeria welcomed the fall of the Shah as a defeat of American imperialism in the region. When President Saddam Hussein of Iraq abrogated the 1975 Algiers agreement and ordered his nation's troops to launch a massive military operation against Iran in 1980, Algeria condemned the Iraqi aggression. Moreover, the Algerian government engaged in a lengthy effort of mediation to try to settle the military conflict between Baghdad and Teheran peacefully. But with the complexity surrounding the conflict -- values, interests and the enmity prevailing between the two antagonists -- Algeria's attempts suffered a double set back. Not only did it fail to bring about an end to the conflict but Algeria also lost its mediating delegation when their charter jet was "mysteriously" shot down at about 10 km from the Iranian-Turkish border, inside Iranian territory in the Van region located at 130 Km from Iraq.
As the war went on virtually all the Arab states rallied behind Iraq except for Syria and Libya which strongly supported Iran. At this stage, Algeria refrained from taking a clear-cut position, though indirectly there was a sympathy towards Teheran that can be explained by its attachment to the principle of state sovereignty. Instead, the Algerian leaders urged both parties to resort to peaceful avenues in order to resolve their difference. As a matter of fact, Algeria clearly rejected the slogan of Saddam and his Arab allies that Iraq was leading the battle in defence of the Arab world as a whole against the threat posed by the old Persian expansionism. For Algeria the war between two Islamic nations was irrational as the conflict entailed a severe risk not only to the belligerent parties and the countries of the area but also weakened the struggle of the Arab nation against Israel. The statement expressed by Bendjadid reflected clearly the position of Algeria regarding the Persian Gulf war:

We have expressed our firm conviction that the Islamic world and Iran in particular constitute a strategic extension of the Arab homeland as well as a sizeable asset to the Arab nation in its struggle against the Zionist enemy. I have emphasized many times to the leaders concerned the fact that the Arab-Islamic Algeria rejects any idea of racial alliance.82

With this perception, the Algerian government contributed once again to the efforts of other Arab and Muslim states to bring about a political settlement especially after the escalation of war by the two belligerent parties through attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf. The Algerian peace initiative was taken at the request of Kuwait which, economically, depended on the free flow of oil through the Gulf.83 That was indeed the main purpose of Taleb Ibrahimi’s visit to Teheran, Damascus and Riyadh from 21-24 March 1984. Two months later, Bendjadid received the
Pakistani Foreign Minister whose country was engaged in a mediation between Iran and Iraq. And in early June Rabah Bitat, President of Algeria's National Assembly, and Ahmed Abdelgahni, state secretary, went to Baghdad.

However, in view of Iran's obstinacy in carrying on the war despite Iraq's repeated calls for peace, Algeria began to distance itself, gradually, from Teheran and to adopt a pro-Arab position. Similarly the purchase by Iran of Israeli weapons might have altered the Algerian perception of Iran as a strategic ally of the Arab world against Israel. Thus, in November 1986 Ibrahimi explicitly supported Iraq when he observed: "We Algerians, as part of the Arab world, will never accept the occupation of Arab territories, in particular the occupation by Iran of certain Iraqi territories". One year later, Algeria backed the resolution of the Arab summit of Amman, calling upon Iran for an unconditional cease fire and warning the Iranians of possible retaliation should they persist in the war. This position was reiterated during the Arab summit held in Algeria, in June 1988, as Algeria approved the condemnation of Iran.

As elsewhere in the Arab world, Algeria was faced by a complex situation following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Algerian government, like other members of the Arab League, first criticised Iraq's invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal of its forces. However, after the Saudi decision to call in the American forces, Algeria shifted its position. Though it did not make angry declarations against the coalition, Algeria was not supportive of Saudi Arabia. At the Cairo Extraordinary Summit on 10 August 1990, it abstained on a firm condemnation of Iraq and the sending of a pan-Arab force to Saudi Arabia.
It then argued for maintaining contacts with Baghdad in order to influence Saddam. A senior Algerian diplomat said that “We are against the isolation of Iraq. Iraq needs to be helped”.85

Some weeks later the Algerian government explicitly opposed the intervention of the coalition by stipulating that the involvement of the West in the Gulf was “more grave than the invasion of Kuwait”.86 The Algerian Foreign Minister also declared that “the crisis must be worked out by the Arab and Muslim countries themselves”.87

One should note that Algeria’s position towards the Gulf crisis was chiefly dictated by domestic considerations rather than by any sympathy with the Iraqi regime. If, in the past, public opinion had hardly influenced policy makers’ decisions on foreign issues, the Gulf crisis was an extraordinary example that indicated that public opinion in Algeria could no longer be a neglected factor in the shaping of Algerian external policy. Indeed, throughout the crisis Algeria had to accommodate its position by taking into account the opposition stance, particularly the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which opposed the West’s intervention in the Gulf.88

4.4 Conclusion

From the evidence adduced in this chapter, it appears plain that while the government of Bendjedid did not depart from the fundamental orientations of Algeria’s foreign policy, it was, however, skilfully able to reshape progressively the salient features of Algeria’s Arab policy whilst cloaking the modifications in a
language of continuity. By now radicalism was virtually abandoned in practice for policies of a more pragmatic national interest.

In many respects, the most important arena of Algeria’s diplomacy in this area was the Maghreb. In this context, the Western Sahara problem proved to be, as usual, at the core of Algeria’s diplomacy. As a result, most of the initiatives taken at this level were, in fact, attempts to force Morocco to renounce its claim.

It would be misleading, however, to argue that the flexibility shown by Bendjfadid in dealing with the issue was a sign of weakness or a reversal in Algeria’s initial stances. Algiers no doubt estimated that the military solution could no longer be attainable, not least because of the new military techniques adopted by Morocco in the Western Sahara. Nonetheless, its diplomatic support to the Polisario within the OAU and UN remained consistent with its previous commitment to oppose Morocco’s de facto annexation of the Western Sahara. Perhaps the most important indicator or yardstick of Algeria’s success in this respect was the acceptance “in principle” by Rabat of the UN peace plan in 1990.

In contrast to the Maghreb, the diplomatic activities of Bendjfadid’s government in the Mashreq showed that Algeria had, progressively, shifted towards the adoption of the Arab moderate consensus. It emphasis shifted to one of unity and reconciliation, dialogue and compromise rather than confrontation and isolation.
Notes and references

1. In January 1976 Hassan offered Algeria the choice between all-out war or a negotiated peace. "No peace and no stability in the region without the recognition of the rights of the Sahrawi people whose heroic struggle would always have the support of Algeria" was Algeria's response.


4. Following a coup d'état in Mauritania in July 1978, the Polisario announced a unilateral cease-fire on the Mauritanian front. In August 1979 Mauritania and the Polisario concluded a peace treaty under Algeria's auspices. As a consequence Mauritania dropped its claim over the Western Sahara and recognised the Polisario as the sole representative of the Sahrawi people.


6. In its 16th summit held in Liberia (Monrovia) in July 1979, two-thirds of the OAU- the required majority- adopted the recommendations of ad-hoc committee for the implementation of a referendum in the Western Sahara.


8. According to *The Guardian* of 8 September 1979, Aosorio commandos ambushed one of the ANP's units in East Tindouf. The same information was also reported by the Spanish newspaper *EL Pais* on 8 September 1979.

9. It was reported that during this operation Morocco lost five hundred and fifty two soldiers and most of its armoured tanks. See *Révolution Africaine*, 7-13 September 1979.

10. The attack of the garrison of Guelta Zemour on 13 October 1981 was perhaps the bloodiest for Moroccan forces since the war started. Some two hundred soldiers were killed and other two hundred and thirty were captured by the Polisario. Two Mirage F-1s, an F-5E fighter, a PUMA helicopter and a C-130 transporter were shot down. For more details see *The New York Times*, 15 November 1981 and *Révolution Africaine*, 6-12 November 1981.


13. This committee was composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania.


15. During this meeting Algeria's President was heard by the committee as an "interested party" in the conflict while King Hassan and Mohamed Abdelaziz of the SADR were called up as the two parties in dispute.

16. See Appendix 5.


19. For Hassan's manoeuvres, see the declaration of Algeria's Foreign Ministry spokesman in *El Moudjahid*, 30 November 1982.


22. This measure was announced after a high-level meeting between Algeria's Minister of Home Affairs, Mohamed Yala, and his Moroccan counterpart Driss Basri in Algiers. For a full account of the agreement, see the joint Algerian-Moroccan press communiqué in *Révolution Africaine*, 7-14 April, p. 23.


25. Morocco's proposal to block and suspend the debate on the Western Sahara was rejected by 30 member states. Only 15 countries supported the Moroccan initiative.


28. Morocco was the first member-state to leave the OAU since its founding in 1963.

30. The Tunisian government had, however, sent a file of its final findings to the President Bendjcadid which they questioned the Algerian role.

31. On 12 January 1974 Qadafi convinced Bourguiba to sign a unity pact for the creation of an Arab Islamic Republic. However, the implementation of this agreement never took place. Within days of its signing Tunisian Prime Minister Hadi Nouira, who was opposed to the agreement, was able to convince Bourguiba to dismiss Mohamed Massmoudi, the then Foreign Minister and architect of this rapprochement. Subsequently, the Libyan-Tunisian pact became a dead letter. Since then, Tunisia became a privileged target for Libyan subversive action.


33. For a good account on these issues, see, in particular, Ahmed Aghrout, *South-South Cooperation with Special reference to the Maghreb Countries*, M. Phil. thesis, University of Salford, 1990, pp. 179-211.

34. It has to be emphasized that the subversive actions of Libya against Tunisia were behind Washington decision to develop a close military cooperation with Tunis in the early 1980s. On this point, see I. W. Zartman, “Foreign Relations in North Africa”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 489, January 1987, p. 27.

35. See Appendix 7.


41. *Ibid*.

42. *Ibid*.

44. Quoted in *Révolution Africaine*, April 2-8, 1982.


47. See Appendix 8.


49. This information was revealed to the author by a high-ranking military officer in the Algerian Armed Forces.


51. *Ibid*.

52. *Ibid*.

53. The US disapproval of the project of union between Algeria and Libya was made clear to the Algerian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, by the American Ambassador in Algiers, Craig Johnston, and later to the French government by the US Vice President, George Bush, during his visit to France on 3 October 1987. The US preoccupation was echoed by the *Washington Post* on 7 October 1987: "Given the seriousness and prudence that usually characterised the Algerian leaders in this context, an Algerian-Libyan alliance represents a potential threat to Western interests". In the same context, a spokesman for the US State Department declared that: "Libya should be kept isolated. The Algerians are well aware of our views on this matter". On this issue, see *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1400, 4 November 1987. Meanwhile, in an interview to the author, Algeria's Former Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, revealed that the US had explicitly threatened Algeria over this issue.


58. Ibid., 235.


63. See Appendix 9.

64. Zoubir, op. cit., p. 198-200.


74. In March 1983 Arafat engaged talks with King Hussein regarding the Jordanian-Palestinian representation in an eventual future negotiations with Israel.

75. Interview of President Bendjadjid to the French TV FR3, quoted in Iratni, op. cit., p. 347.

76. Ibid., p. 48.
77. Bendjadjid's appeal the Palestinians was made during the 7th meeting of the Algerian veterans of the war of independence in April 1986.

78. Tahi, op. cit., p. 250.


80. Article 6 of the Treaty of International Boundaries and Good Neighbourliness Between Iraq and Iran stipulated that, in case of a dispute, the parties should first explore the means of direct bilateral negotiations. And "If no agreement is reached, the High Contracting Parties shall have recourse, within a three period, to the good offices of a friendly third state". For further details about this agreement, see International Legal Materials, Current Documents, 16, No. 3 (April 1976), p. 457.


83. In 3 October 1983 the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Saad Al Sabah, declared that: "we will demand from Algeria to help end the war in the Gulf and convince Iran to negotiate with Iraq". See Le Monde, 4 October 1983.


86. Quoted in Mortimer, op. cit., 262.

87. Ibid.

88. The FIS organised a rally at which its leaders called upon the Muslim peoples to prepare to govern themselves so as to liberate all the holy places, Jerusalem included. Moreover, the FIS called on the Algerian government to dispatch volunteers to defend Iraq and to set up military training camp for its militants. For more details on this issue, see Mortimer, op. cit., p. 261-262.

Chapter Five

Algeria and France: “between reconciliation and rupture”

5.1 Introduction

Before 1978 the Franco-Algerian relationship was rather tense. However, developments that took place in the summer of the same year indicated that both states had found a minimum ground for "reconciliation". Of most importance was the end of France’s direct involvement in the Western Sahara after the eviction of the Mauritanian President, Ould Daddah, on 10 July 1978 (see chapter four).

After Boumediene’s death in December 1978, France continued to redefine its position towards the Western Sahara conflict. In February 1979 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the President of France, recognised that the problem of the Western Sahara was a “problem of decolonisation”. Through this position it seemed explicit enough that France was signalling its intention to engage in a “new relationship” with Algiers.

In addition to France’s interest in improving its relationship with Algeria, the new Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid, who was known to be more pragmatic than his predecessor, displayed from the start his willingness to work for the improvement of Algeria’s relations with France. To that effect, the statement uttered by Bendjedid was highly revealing as he pointed out that: “We have never been against the French people. Today we have turned the corner
after one hundred and thirty years of colonialism and eight years of war. Now is
the time to reexamine relations between our two countries".2

Therefore, this chapter sets out to examine the evolution of the Franco-
Algerian relationship from 1979 to 1992. Its basic aim is to identify the main
features of the Franco-Algerian relationship during this phase. These will enable
us to detect the degree of change and continuity of Algeria's policy towards one
of its major partners.

5.2 Attempts at reconciliation

Giscard's declaration over the Western Sahara in February 1979 can be
regarded as a turning point in the relationship between Algiers and Paris since
1975. Indeed, three months after what can be perceived as a positive step from
"Giscardian" France, Jean François-Poncet, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
visited Algiers, in June 1979. There he had talks with his counterpart, Mohamed
Sedik Benyahia and with President Bendjidad. Although no bilateral agreements
on the pending issues (gas prices and repatriation of migrant workers) between
the two states were reached, this contact was the first step in the process of
normalisation between Algeria and Paris which had been lacking since 1975. For
both parties the visit of François-Poncet was, above all, designed to initiate a
dialogue that could bring about the "normalisation" of relations between the two
states.3

To clear the way for further normalisation between the two states, the
Algerian head of diplomacy, Benyahia, returned François-Poncet's visit in January 1980. During this visit the two parties endorsed an important consular agreement (that had been pending since 1974) relating to both Algerian migrant workers and French coopérants. In addition, six joint committees were established to study all the litigious issues (social security, financial questions, migrant labour, French properties in Algeria, transfer of archives, citizenship questions) that still bedevilled the bilateral relations between Algeria and France. It was also agreed that a joint economic commission would be created to develop the cooperation between the two countries in the economic sector.

The commitment and good will of both parties to work for an improved relationship was illustrated nine months later by the significant results reached by the joint committees. In this context, the agreement on the issue of migrant labour was the most important one. In the "exchange of letters", France agreed to renew and extend automatically the certificates of residence of the Algerian workers in France for a period of three to ten years. Moreover, in order to prepare the best conditions for the return of the migrant workers to Algeria, France agreed to initiate a vocational training programme conducted in special centres and within French and Algerian enterprises. The Algerian and the French governments would also offer financial incentives and aid for the creation of small businesses in Algeria. France would take charge of the financial cost of repatriated migrants. Both governments expected the resettlement of 12,000 trained migrant workers a year.
The election of François Mitterrand in May 1981, whose government included several pro-Third World politicians such as the Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, Jean-Pierre Cot, Minister for Overseas Cooperation and Development, and Pierre Mauroy the Prime Minister, opened the way for further normalisation of the relations between Algeria and France. One of Mitterrand's electoral propositions had, in fact, been to establish privileged ties with Algeria within the general framework of France's "new" foreign policy orientations which would support North-South cooperation.6

Moreover, Mitterrand himself had already gained the respect of Algeria when he visited Algiers in his capacity as first secretary of the French Socialist Party in February 1976. During this visit Mitterrand stressed to his Algerian counterparts the need to improve the relationship between Paris and Algiers. This visit also inaugurated the beginning of a reconciliation between the FLN and the Algerian government with the French Socialist Party at a time of tensions between Algeria and Giscard's government.7

As a matter of fact, Mitterrand was, for years, regarded by Algeria as a symbol of repression and as a pro-Zionist. To take but one illustrative representative example, in March 1972, El Moudjahid recalled the role of Mitterrand as Minister of the Interior during the Algerian war of independence when he ruled out any agreement with the "rebels" of the FLN by stating that "the only negotiation is war". The same newspaper considered him a "social Zionist" given his pro-Israeli positions.
Shortly after its election, the socialist government proceeded with a series of measures designed to communicate its readiness and resolve for the normalisation of the relationship between Algeria and France because of Algeria's obvious economic interest. Mitterrand's government recognised the right for migrant workers to organise, halted the repatriation of undocumented Algerians living in France and pledged to provide more security for this migrant community. Moreover, three months later (August 1981), Cheysson, France's Foreign Minister, visited Algiers to discuss with the Algerian government the "relaunch" of bilateral cooperation between the two states. After meeting Bendjadid for more than three hours, he declared that "un coup de passion" was occurring in these relations, thus, suggesting that both countries were at last ready to set aside those negative factors that had previously affected the relationship.

Despite the multiplication of high-level contacts between Algerian and French officials and promising statements from both sides, cooperation between the two countries remained dormant because of the dispute over the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) pricing between Algeria's state-owned company Sonatrach and its French counterpart GDF (Gas de France). For the Algerian government the settlement of this dispute was, indeed, a fundamental prerequisite for the resumption of cooperation with France. This concerns explain the decision of Mitterrand to designate, on 26 August 1981, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney to act as his personal representative in negotiating the gas dispute with Algeria.

The negotiation undertaken at the end of August 1981 by Jeanneney and
Hadj Yala, the Algerian Minister of Finance, failed to end the deadlock. Algeria suggested that GDF’s “unamicable attitude” prevented a settlement of the problem. The issue was, therefore, left for the summit meeting between Bendjedj and Mitterrand in Algiers which was scheduled for the end of November.

It is important to note that since the mid 1970s Algeria started to review its energy policy because the objective of depending mostly on oil revenues to finance the state’s economic development proved difficult to achieve. To find another source for its financial needs, the new Bendjedj government, in acknowledging this reality, opted for a diversification away from the export of oil. The potential for gas export was consequently emphasized as an additional source for revenue.

To achieve its goal, Algeria took concrete initiatives to gain maximum profit from its gas deals. At the beginning of 1980, it informed its clients that the price of gas would be increased to $6.11 per million British thermal unit (mbtu) and that the new price represented “exact parity with (Algerian) Saharan blend crude oil at the beginning of 1980”; a doubling of the price that the French company GDF was paying under the terms of its third contract with Sonatrach signed in 1976. Moreover, Algeria threatened to stop deliveries for its customers if its price demands were not met.

With the refusal of GDF to accept the price set by the Algerian government, the gas problem became a contentious issue in the bilateral relations between
Algeria and France. Despite different rounds of negotiations between Sonatrach and GDF in 1980 and 1981 the dispute remained unsolved. Concurrently, Algeria temporarily interrupted its gas deliveries to GDF under the pretext of "technical reasons".

The Algerian government's determination not to compromise with GDF became even stronger when British Gas and Sonatrach concluded an "interim accord", in December 1980, for a nine-month importation of Algerian gas scheduled to start from 1981. The price would begin with $4.60 per mmbtu rising to $4.80 in June 1981. On 8 April 1981, it was the turn of Belgium's Distrigaz to sign a long-term contract (20 years) with Sonatrach at the price of $4.80 per mbtu.

However, the dispute did not run so deep as to obstruct the process of rapprochement between Algiers and Paris, which had been evolving since the French socialist party had come to power. On 1 December 1981 Mitterrand visited Algiers with the aim of developing a new climate of trust that had been missing hitherto in the relationship. It was, therefore, not surprising to find that the word confiance (trust) was stressed more than once by Mitterrand during his visit to Algiers. Indeed, upon his arrival in Algiers, Mitterrand declared:

France and Algeria are able to overcome the past. They intend to surmount the obstacles and misunderstanding which have long obstructed their comprehension. They can from now on build their rapprochement and friendship on a new basis: it is through trust that strength and diversity of relations between the two nations can sustain dialogue and cooperation between the two states ... It is this trust that I came to demonstrate to Algeria ... Trust in our determination to refuse the logic of confrontation in international relations ... Trust in the Algerian nation in its struggle for development...Trust in our capacity to institute together the example of new
relations which we want to establish between the South and the North.\(^{15}\)

Thus, to convince the Algerian government of his good faith, Mitterrand gave his agreement in principle to accept the price of LNG demanded by the Algerian government during his meeting with Bendjadid.\(^{16}\) Mitterrand was, in fact, clear on this issue when he stated that: "The experts have done their job, the wise men [Yala and Jeanneney] have accomplished their own ... The two heads of state possess all the elements they need for taking decisions. There will be no other procedures".\(^{17}\)

In exchange for that, Algeria was to grant French companies a privileged treatment in terms of trade and investment within the framework of the regulations governing these activities in Algeria.\(^{18}\) Consequently Abdelhamid Brahimi, then Algeria’s Planning Minister, met his French counterpart, Michel Rocard, in Algiers in the autumn of 1981. During this meeting they identified eleven sectors where French investment would be possible. Housing, transport and agriculture were considered the most important areas.\(^{19}\)

After two more months of difficult negotiations between Sonatrach and GDF over the price of LNG, an accord was finally reached on 3 February 1981, whereby GDF agreed to pay the price of \$5.12\ per mbtu, retroactive to January 1980. This was estimated to be approximately 20 per cent over the price paid to other suppliers in the same period.\(^{20}\) The French government decided to bear the burden with GDF by subsidising 13.5 per cent of the price. For France this subsidy was considered as a form of financial assistance to Algeria.\(^{21}\) The
Algerian government, however, regarded the gas accord as a purely commercial contract and a victory in its "Gas battle".

It seems evident, however, that by trying to give the subsidy a form of "aid to development" to Algeria, France was expecting the OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development) to share the burden by making a financial contribution in this context. In fact, in February 1983, the French government attempted to have the subsidy element accepted by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as official French development aid. Despite France's pressure on this organisation (DAC) to make it accept France's proposal, the DAC concluded that the Franco-Algerian gas contract was commercial, and could not be considered as official development assistance. As a consequence of this decision, GDF ended up with the whole bill, despite the initial engagement of the French political authorities to subsidise the price.

In the aftermath of the gas agreement, trade and commercial relations between Algeria and Paris greatly intensified reflecting the improvement in the relationships between the two states. In a short period of time (one year) several economic contracts were reached between the two countries. In June 1982, Brahimi and Rocard met again in Algiers and reviewed sectoral opportunities for French companies. The projects identified for investment amounted to FF15 billions. At the same time, French companies operating in the housing sector were awarded contracts for the construction of 60,000 housing units over a period of three years. This agreement was worth FF8.7 billions. This was followed on
the occasion of Cheysson's visit to Algiers, one week later, by an economic cooperation agreement that defined the guiding principles of cooperation between the two states as well as establishing a joint-committee to supervise cooperation.

In November of the same year Brahimi concluded with the French Minister of External Commerce, Michel Jobert, other contracts related to the sector of transportation. The amount of these contracts was estimated at FF12 billions. They included the Métro D'Alger project, railway construction, renovation of Constantine airport and other infrastructural projects (ports and roads).27

Moreover, during the first three years of Mitterrand's presidency there were no apparent disagreements between Algiers and Paris over foreign policy issues that could have affected the "normalisation" of the relationship between the two states. Indeed, Algeria noted with satisfaction France's support for the principle of global negotiations between the North and South displayed by Mitterrand both at the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Paris in September 1981 and the North-South Conference of Cancun (Mexico) in October of the same year.28 France also showed its solidarity with the Third World by being amongst the countries that signed the Law of the Sea Convention in May 1982.29

In addition, Socialist France was quick to correct Giscard's pro-Moroccan policy over the conflict in the Western Sahara. In the first month of his presidency, Mitterrand advised King Hassan II to accept the principle of a referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara. Indeed, Hassan did accept this recommendation at the OAU's summit held in 1981 in Nairobi.30 Most significantly,
in August 1981 the Quai d'Orsay received for the first time a member of the SADR, which was also allowed, seven months later, to open an office in Paris. And as a counterpart to these moves, the French government demanded that Morocco pay FF 2 billions in arrears for arms already delivered, if arms shipments were to be continued.\(^{31}\)

Although Algeria had, always, opposed foreign interventions in the African continent, it seemed, however, that this was not the case when France intervened in Chad to back the regime of Hissen Habré against both the Libyan troops and the rebels of the GUNT (Transnational Government of National Unity) headed by former President Goukouni Ouddei. Algeria and France also found a common interest in cooperating to neutralise Qadafi's subversive activities in the Sahel and Chad (see chapter four). Algeria had even allowed French fighter-planes to fly over its air space and to refuel on its territory during the "Manta" operation against the Libyan troops in 1983, and credence should be given to Cheysson's revelation on this episode.\(^{32}\)

If Mitterrand's visit to Israel (the first ever by a French President) in 1982 raised doubt and suspicion within the Algerian media about France's Arab policy, the Algerian government seemed, however, to have implicitly endorsed Mitterrand's action. There is every reason to think that the Algerian government avoided commenting on the event since it believed that this trip would not harm the Palestinian cause. Indeed, Mitterrand stressed in his manifesto the right for the Palestinian people to have their own independent state,\(^{33}\) a position reiterated by
Mitterrand in his speech before Israel's Knesset on 4 March 1982.\textsuperscript{34}

In addition, Algiers could not fail to notice that Yasser Arafat's life had been saved twice by the French, despite Mitterrand's refusal to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{35} Algeria and France, eventually, cooperated in an operation for the exchange of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners for Israeli prisoners captured during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in 1982.\textsuperscript{36}

These achievements were sealed by Bendjadid's official visit to France on 7-10 November 1983. Beyond the symbolic character of this trip (the first official visit by an Algerian head of state to France), the presence of Bendjadid in France was also an opportunity for the two governments to conclude other bilateral agreements. In this context, Algeria and France agreed that Algerians born in France could fulfill their military service obligations in either country without this having an effect on their choice of nationality. Algeria also agreed in principle to compensate six French hydraulic firms nationalised by Boumediene's government in the early 1970s. Equally important, the two governments agreed to promote military cooperation. However, the issue of free circulation of Harkis\textsuperscript{37} and the growing problem of children of broken mixed marriages remained unsolved.\textsuperscript{38}

In short, the improvement of the relationship between the two states was reflected by Bendjadid's statement during his visit to France. He stressed that: "The Algerian people inaugurated with the French people a new page [in their history] in all sincerity and all honesty",\textsuperscript{39} and that "both countries should leave
aside the past to history".40

5.3 Obstacles to reconciliation

In contrast to the stable pattern that had dominated the relationship between Algiers and Paris up to the visit of Bendjadid to France in 1983, during the following years, relations between the two states were marked by continuous ups and downs fluctuating between a mood of uneasiness and one of cordiality. There were several reasons for this. Of particular importance was the private trip of Mitterrand to Ifrane (Morocco) in late August 1984, while the Treaty of Oudjda between Morocco and Libya which was to be ratified by the Moroccan people on 1 September 1984.

Although France insisted that Mitterrand's trip was pre-planned and was strictly for personal reasons (holiday), Algeria interpreted Mitterrand's presence in Morocco, at that time, as a blessing to a treaty that was directed against it. Moreover, the agreement reached by Tripoli and Paris a few weeks later (25 September 1984) over the simultaneous evacuation of their respective troops from Chad gave Algeria ample reasons to believe that King Hassan facilitated the French-Libyan arrangement in return for France's commitment not to oppose Morocco's fait accompli in the Western Sahara.41 Algeria also accused France of having dictated the EEC members' vote on the question of the Western Sahara at the UN on May 1984 as well as reinforcing Morocco's military potential through the supply of sensitive military equipment.
With a view to reducing Algeria's growing anxiety towards France, Mitterrand travelled to Algiers on 19 October 1984. There he explained to his counterpart that nothing was being done against Algeria's interests. Though Algeria "pretended to believe this", two months later it renewed its accusation after suspecting France of contributing in the overthrow of the pro-Polisario Mauritanian President, Kohouma Ould Haidallah, by his former Prime Minister, Mouawiyia Sid Ahmed Ould Taya, who was in fact quick to restore diplomatic relations with Rabat.

Thus once again, the issue of the Western Sahara severely tested the Franco-Algerian "coup de passion" which followed the election of Mitterrand in 1981. This was demonstrated when the Algerian government did not hesitate to qualify its relationship with Socialist France as being moins saines (less clear) than during the time of the conservative Giscardians.

To the question of the Western Sahara must be added the problem of immigration. Despite the benevolent measures taken by Mitterrand's government in favour of the immigrants, the aggravation of the economic situation in France, and especially rising French unemployment, combined with France's internal political considerations -- elections campaigns, the rise of the right-wing Front National -- motivated the socialist government to revise its policy in this respect. Deportations justified on the grounds of threat or public order began to rise in 1983. A year later voluntary repatriation assistance was reintroduced and family reunification was made conditional on stringent housing conditions which many
immigrants were unable to meet. These tough measures were aggravated by a racist campaign against the Algerian community as illustrated by the killing of an Algerian by the French police in 1984.

With the return of the right after the Parliamentary elections in 1986, the new Minister of Interior, Charles Pasqua, brought forward legislation which expanded the government's control over immigrants on the ground of threat to public order, and extended the categories of those liable for deportations. A granting of a ten-year residence and work permit was also made subject to restrictions. The French government also introduced a visas' regime on non-European citizens as a response to the wave of terrorist attacks in Paris from 8-17 September 1986. This last measure was perceived as an offence by the states of the Maghreb, particularly Algeria, which immediately reciprocated.

At the same time, the Algerian government was also irritated by the lack of enthusiasm and the reticence shown by French companies to invest in Algeria, despite favourable legislative measures on joint ventures that had been introduced in August 1982. This, indeed, had a further deleterious effect on the Algerian economy, in the light of the fact that Algeria had reckoned with the participation of the French companies for the fulfilment its five-year development plan (1985-89). The Algerian government made its dissatisfaction very plain in this respect during the meeting of the joint economic commission in Paris on 10-12 December 1984. Moreover, from 1985 onwards the commercial deficit in favour of France resurfaced. French exports to Algeria dropped from FF 21.8 to
FF 11.7 billion in 1987 and imports from FF 20.7 billion to FF 8.5 billion during the same period.\footnote{48}

Another source of friction was the price of gas. Indeed, one year before the revision of the 1982 accord -- scheduled for 1986 --, GDF informed its Algerian partner (Sonatrach) of its intention to review the price. The decline of oil prices in 1986 on which Algeria's gas was indexed, provided GDF with a strong argument to put pressure on Sonatrach to review its pricing policy when the two parties entered in negotiations. After strong pressures from GDF, a temporary agreement was reached in March 1986 between the two parties. This agreement dismissed the 1982 formula and indexed the price away from reference to OPEC crude oil prices to market conditions instead. In this context, the price was reduced to $3.81 in the first quarter of 1986 to $3.18 in the second and to $2.40 in the third. The price reached $1.97 per mbtu by November 1987,\footnote{49} a huge financial disaster for Algeria's economy. This forced the economic determinant into foreign policy decision-making.

Another round of negotiations on a new price accord started in mid-1987. With GDF trying to make the temporary agreement of 1986 permanent, and Sonatrach determined to impose a higher price, negotiators could not agree on a common accord. However, as it became clear that Jacques Chirac's conservative government, elected in June 1986, was not going to exert pressure on GDF, the Algerian government resorted to promoting a position in which the sale became indissociable from other political and economic interests the partners had in
Algeria. In September 1987 while on an official visit to Paris, Algeria's Foreign Minister, Taleb Ibrahimi, expressed the importance of gas in the relationship between the two states by stating: "gas forms the nerve of Franco-Algerian cooperation. I believe that both sides have an interest in ensuring that the gas question does not poison a relationship that has other dimensions and prospects".50

Accordingly, Algeria made it clear to the French government that France's investment projects in Algeria would depend on satisfactory results on gas negotiations.51 According to World Gas Report of 6 November 1987, the French company Altshom was hoping for a contract to build a thermal power station in Skikda (North-East Algeria), Airbus Industry wanted to sell aircraft to Air-Algérie and Thomson-CSF air traffic control equipment. Meanwhile, the price-concession obtained by Algeria from Italy in return for a contract permitting investments' contract in Algeria encouraged the Algerian government to put more pressure on the French government.

France's eagerness to maintain its economic interests in Algeria soon caused Chirac government to encourage GDF to accept a compromise solution which would take into account the interests of both parties. Indeed, in January 1988, Chirac hinted that a solution for the dispute over the "technical problem of pricing could be solved within the framework of a policy of cooperation".52

However, the divergence between the different French ministries over gas imports from Algeria delayed the resolution of the problem. While the Ministry of
Industry supported the position of GDF, demanding a price in line with the price France was paying to other countries (USSR, Holland, Norway), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended more flexibility towards Algeria. Apparently, Algeria's mediation to help the release of the French hostages in Lebanon influenced the Quai d'Orsay's position. This can be seen from a statement made during Pasqua's visit to Algeria in June 1987. He revealed to his compatriots in Algiers that: "you should know that in terms of security and the fight against terrorism, France has to rely on the friendship and cooperation of the Algerian leaders".53

With the return of the Socialist Party to government in May 1988 the prospect for a settlement of the gas dispute seemed possible. The issue of gas had, indeed, been at the centre of the discussion between Algeria's Foreign Minister, Ibrahimi and his new French counterpart, Roland Dumas, in France in June 1988. The likelihood of a positive outcome was clearly indicated by Ibrahimi's statement at the end of his visit. He declared: "We are convinced that gas will become again the driving force in the development of economic and commercial relations between Algeria and France".54 Consequently, Dumas called for the "revitalisation" of the relationship between the two states and explicitly suggested that resolving the gas pricing would achieve this objective.55

5.4 The aftermath of October 1988

The transformation in Algeria's domestic politics and more importantly the rise of Islamism, whose prominent manifestation to this point was reflected in the
popular unrest of October 1988, was to affect the relationship between Algiers and Paris. This unrest, and the subsequent developments that Algeria experienced, was to represent a constant cause of major concern in France thereafter, and prompted the French authorities to reconsider their country's relationship vis-à-vis this North African state. The widely-shared conviction among the French decision-makers was that the development of close economic cooperation was the best and most appropriate instrument to deal with the deepening of Algeria's multidimensional crisis in terms of economic, social and political instability. Otherwise, this crisis, it was believed, would have unpredictable consequences on French interests both in Algeria in particular, and the Maghreb in general.  

These concerns were discernible from the silent attitude adopted by the French government during the riots of October. Despite the dramatic evolution of the riots (500 people killed), the French government resorted to the traditional diplomatic rhetoric by simply expressing that it was very closely following the worrying situation in Algeria. When the French government came under the pressure of its public opinion and the opposition, the principle of non-interference in another country (Algeria) was spelt out both by the spokesmen of the Elysée and the Quai d'Orsay. 

In his turn, Dumas argued before the French National Assembly that these events should not affect the bilateral cooperation between Algeria and France. He maintained that relations between the two states were so important and that the French government had to display its solidarity vis-à-vis the Algerian regime.
Failure to do so would not help in solving the problems which were at the roots of popular discontent. In addition, Dumas referred to the popular demand for greater political freedom in Algeria without, however, condemning the Algerian regime.\textsuperscript{59} The French Foreign Minister also proposed, as a gesture of solidarity, the promise to find a solution to the gas dispute within the larger framework of economic and financial cooperation between the two countries.

Another reason which motivated the French government to support Algeria's regime was the uncertainty about who would be in charge of the country's affairs in case of the dismissal of Bendjadjid. His moderation earned him the respect and the friendship of France. The French government might also have feared the return of the military to the forefront of political affairs which would temper Bendjadjid's proposals for political reforms made in his speech to the nation during the popular unrest on 10 October 1988. France's interest in maintaining Bendjadjid in power was clearly underlined by Dumas when he stated "France wished Bendjadjid to be maintained in power after the FLN congress (scheduled for November 27-29 1988)".\textsuperscript{60}

Shortly after the election of Bendjadjid for a third mandate in December 1988, France took concrete initiatives to express its support to Algeria. Negotiations between the two countries over the unsettled gas dispute resumed in the first week of January 1989. The severe financial difficulties of Algeria combined with France's initial undertaking to maintain the stability of Algeria led the two sides to reach a compromise agreement within a short period of time.
Indeed, on 8 January 1989, Sonatrach and GDF agreed to a price just under $2.30mbtu upon arrear payments by GDF (FF 850 million). The two companies also declared their intention to develop joint cooperation projects.

The gas agreement was followed by the signature of a financial accord of FF 7 billion in February 1989. This amount included a FF 3 billion commercial credit line. The other FF 4 billion was a long-term governmental loan to be paid out in two equal portions in 1989 and 1990 in order to finance development projects in Algeria. The amount of this credit was to be shared by France’s public and private financial agencies. Reflecting upon the importance of this financial agreement on the bilateral relations between Algiers and Paris, the French Minister of Finance, Pierre Bérégovoy, stressed that "the accord would permit the restoration of French-Algerian cooperation".

The process of liberalisation initiated by Bendjadid's government through the adoption of a new Constitution in February 1989 was greeted most favourably by France because it signalled the end of the socialist experiment. To display his government’s support to Bendjadid, Mitterrand the French President visited Algiers on 10 March 1989. There he expressed his satisfaction with Algeria's evolution towards pluralism and democracy and promised the Algerian leader that he would examine Algeria's demand for the alleviation of its debt which, to a large extent, was owned by France.

Moreover, events in the Maghreb contributed to the reinvigoration of the Franco-Algerian relationship. The resumption of diplomatic relations between
Algiers and Rabat in late 1988, together with King Hassan's meeting with Polisario delegates in January 1989 and the subsequent signing of the UMA treaty in February 1989 (see chapter four), diluted the importance of the Sahrawi question in Franco-Algerian bilateral relations.

From 1989 to 1991, and especially under the leadership of Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche (September 1989- June 1991) a period opened which saw the effective liberalisation of the Algerian economy, trade and joint economic cooperation expanded. France’s exports to Algeria increased from FF 9.4 billion in 1988 to FF 12.7 billion in 1989 and its imports increased from FF 8.3 billion to FF 9.4 billion during the same period. At the same time Algeria become France's most important trading partner in the Third World (twelfth in the world).

What was it, then, that motivated Hamrouche to make a negative assessment of the Franco-Algerian relationship by stating that "our relations with France were not going well since 1988", especially on the eve of the visit of France's Foreign Minister, Dumas, to Algiers on 24 May 1991? Two reasons might have influenced Hamrouche's statement.

The first and -- perhaps the most plausible explanation -- had to do with the problem of Algeria's rescheduling of its debt towards France. In 1990 Algeria's debt reached $ 27.9 billion while the debt service amounted to $ 8.8 billion. The latter sum almost equalled the county's export revenues during that year. Although this situation created severe financial difficulties, Algeria opposed the rescheduling of its debt since this measure would require the signing of an
economic stabilisation programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Algeria's attitude was justified on the grounds of the principle of national independence. The Algerian government, instead, favoured the rescheduling of its debt with its creditors on a one-to-one basis. The French government, however, which was at that time owed more than a quarter of Algeria's debt, refused the proposal of the Algerian government for a bilateral rescheduling of its debt vis-à-vis France.

Jean Audibert, France's former Ambassador in Algeria, revealed in 1995 that the French Finance Ministry's rejection of Algeria's demand was in response to Algeria's refusal to pay FF 3 - 4 billion due to several French companies. These companies had participated in the implementation of various economic projects in Algeria as part of the 1982 economic cooperation agreement between Algiers and Paris. The payment of their bills was blocked by the Algerian government as a retaliatory measure during the dispute between Sonatrach and GDF in 1986. In fact, their payments were further delayed by the aggravation of the financial crisis in Algeria during the following years.

A second explanation pertains to the Gulf War. The decision of France to participate in the operation "Desert Storm" with the forces of the coalition against Iraq was perceived in Algeria as an absolute betrayal of the substance of both Franco-Algerian cooperation and the wider Franco-Arab relationship. During his visits to France in January and February 1991, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, Algeria's Foreign Minister, had been explicitly critical of France's participation in the Gulf
War which he denounced as submissiveness to the USA.\textsuperscript{72}

As a matter of fact, Algeria may not have been that bitter if France had not adopted a conciliatory position from the start of the crisis. At that time there was even the belief within the Algerian and the French media that Algeria and France were planning a joint mediation between Saddam and the USA in order to avoid the war. Although Algeria’s Foreign Minister denied that the two countries were to engage in a joint-mediation, the fact remains that in 1995 Jean Audibert confirmed that Bendjidad met Mitterrand on 12 September 1990 in Paris. There, both Presidents promised to do everything they could to avoid the war.

The victory of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) in the local and regional municipal elections in June 1990 did not appear to create any panic within the French government, despite its repeated call to end the cultural influence of France in Algeria. Ali Benhadj, the second-most prominent figure in the FIS, had even threatened to “punish” France for its colonial past in Algeria.\textsuperscript{73} The French government believed that the popular mandate for the FIS was viewed in Paris as an expression of popular discontent deriving from Algeria’s economic situation and its democratic deficit rather than a popular adherence to Islamism.\textsuperscript{74}

Nevertheless, France continued to support the Algerian government by giving a “new impulse” to Franco-Algerian economic relations. One month after the enforcement of martial law by the Algerian government following the FIS’ appeal for a campaign of civil disobedience over a new electoral law in June 1991, Pierre Bérégovoy, French Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs, was
dispatched to Algeria in order to assess Algerian economic needs. In this context, old commercial credits amounting to FF 1.3 billion were reopened and so was a credit line of FF 100 million for the creation of joint-ventures. In addition, Bérégovoy promised to speed up the process of Algeria's debt rescheduling by the Crédit Lyonnais.\textsuperscript{75}

On the other hand, France continued to advise that free elections were the only alternative to political instability in Algeria. Until December 1991 this was the repeated and consistent message of the French government to their counterparts in Algiers. In the words of Roland Dumas: “Algeria will find a real balance only when the elections take place. These elections have to be held as soon as possible... It is evident that [France] also has an interest in having an interlocutor whose governmental stability is confirmed”.\textsuperscript{76}

France was also at this time active in trying to promote the European Community's "Redirected Mediterranean Policy" as well as the so-called "Five plus Five" dialogue between the southern EU member states (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Malta) and those of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya) in 1990. History and economics / commerce mean that France has vested interests in the Maghreb region, including Algeria. Consequently, the latter has always perceived France as the most influential EU member state in advancing Algeria's economic interests with the Union.\textsuperscript{77}

The objective of the "Five plus Five" initiative was to establish a global framework of cooperation between the countries involved. In this respect, various
working groups were set up to deal with policy areas such as regional financial institutions, self-sufficiency in food and desertification, debt, migration, protection of cultural heritage, technological development and scientific research, transport and communication, and environment. This initiative was, however, short-lived following the allegation against Libya for its involvement in the Lockerbie air disaster of December 1988 and the deteriorating political situation in Algeria.

Algeria’s first free parliamentary election was finally held in late December 1991. The results of the first round indicated that the FIS was inevitably heading towards a sweeping majority in the second round scheduled for 16 January 1992. From the 231 contested seats, the FIS won 188; an additional 28 seats were, thus, needed to win a total majority. This changed the domestic balance of power between the President and the army to the latter’s advantage.

As a consequence of these results the Algerian military intervened and compelled President Bendjadid to resign on 11 January 1992. On 12 January, the HCS (Haut Conseil de Sécurité d’Etat) took power in order to fill the vacuum created by the exit of Bendjadid. Subsequently, the second round of the elections was cancelled sine die and a HCE (Haut Comité d’Etat) was set up to assume presidential functions.

Confronted with these developments, France resorted to a twin-track policy in dealing with the events in Algeria. First, it had to avoid giving the impression to the Algerian public opinion and the international community that it supported or advocated the interruption of the electoral process. This act would contradict
France's own democratic principle as well as its initial support for pluralist elections in Algeria. Second, at the same time it could not condemn the intervention of the military which had preempted the near certain arrival of a potential undemocratic party in power. Third, France would certainly not have wanted to burn its bridges with the FIS since the idea of a possible take over by the FIS was not discounted at all together by the French government. This idea was in fact supported by the chief of the French secret services who advised the French government not to support the military intervention in Algiers in order to preserve the future of Franco-Algerian relations in case the FIS were to take over.\textsuperscript{80}

It was not surprising, therefore to find that two types of discourses were to characterise France's position towards the Algerian crisis in its early phase (1992-93). The first one represented the line adopted by the Elysée which, without supporting or condemning the preventive coup, addressed severe criticisms at its protagonists. The second one represented the line of the Quai d'Orsay. Though the Quai d'Orsay's position was not as much as in contradiction with the Elysée, its general stance can be perceived as moderate and less critical of the military intervention.

The following quotations from statements made by both Mitterrand and Dumas illustrate France's twin-track policy.

On 14 January 1992 Mitterrand commented on the events in Algeria by stating that:
The process that has been initiated towards the holding of elections in Algeria has been interrupted, and that interruption represents, at the very least, an irregular act since it establishes a state of exception ... the Algerian leaders as early as possible have to pick up the threads of a democratic life and carry it on.81

While Mitterrand was undoubtedly critical towards the Algerian authorities, a week later (21 January) Dumas argued:

It is not France's place to intervene in this affair [Algeria]. The Algerian leaders were faced with a difficult situation. They considered ... that it was the least unsatisfactory solution. We now have to trust them to restore the electoral process when the time comes.82

In the same statement, Dumas referred to France's willingness to take economic measures in favour of Algeria to help it overcome its problems. He stressed that:

France has to express its solidarity with the Algerian people. We have too many things in common to disinterest ourselves in what happens in Algeria and to turn our back on this people and this country, under the pretext that it is experiencing a difficult phase ... If we want to cure the causes [of Algeria's crisis] we have ... to take measures to that end ... assist the [economic] development so that the young people... find a certain satisfaction in living at home rather than in taking refuge in extremist stances.83

Days later (27 January) in an interview to *El Hayat* Mitterrand tied economic aid to Algeria to the restoration of the democratic process. He said:

France is profoundly attached to the continuity and the development of relations [between France and Algeria] as long as the principles it [France] judges as essential, i.e., the respect of progress towards democracy as well as human rights.84

Obviously, Mitterrand's remarks provoked a strong reaction from the Algerian government. In a clear response to the French President, Ghozali denounced France's interference in Algeria's internal affairs by arguing that "There
are some people in France ... who continue to live Algeria's problems as though they were their own because they have not yet accepted our independence.".85

It is interesting to note that the Algerian crisis seemed to have divided the French ruling party into two currents of opinion.86 The first current was in line with the official stance of the French government but sometimes went even as far as to condemn the Algerian military. Examples of such figures include Bernard Kouchner, then French Minister of Health and Humanitarian Action, who declared in late 1992 that: "the current Algerian government was born out of a coup d'état. The progression of Islamism will not be stopped by force".87

The other current was to some extent opposed to the French government's policy. Among its main advocates were Claude Cheysson, George Morins and Pierre Joxe (then Defence Minister). George Morins pointed to four arguments to sustain the position of his group. First, emphasizing the military nature of the coup was to ignore that for the past thirty years every Algerian government had been military-backed. Second, democracy would make no sense if it resulted in the accession to power of a party that had pledged to destroy it. Third, with 3 million voters in favour of the FIS out of 13 million registered, the FIS hardly had a popular mandate to head for a revision of the Constitution towards the implementation of the Shari'a (Islamic law) and, fourth, no one has the right to tell the Algerians that they should have attempted the experiment at all costs.88

The relationship between the two countries reached a critical stage, following Dumas' attempt at suggesting to the Algerian government a "plan" for
the return of stability. Indeed, just a few days after the establishment of the HSC, Pierre de Lafrance, director of the Quai d'Orsay Maghreb- Mashreq Department, was sent to Algiers. The purpose of his visit was to persuade the Algerian government to undertake political measures in order to avoid the deepening of the crisis by recognising the force of political Islam. Lafrance suggested to his Algerian counterparts that they find a political figure who, as head of a state, could have the backing of all political currents including the Islamists. The personality he suggested was Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi. The problem became more acute when Lafrance argued that Iran could help Algeria to find a political solution by finding a way of cooling the ardour of the FIS.

Not only did Algeria reject France's proposition but it also reacted by recalling its Ambassadors from Paris and Teheran. The Iranian Ambassador to Algiers was also expelled. In addition, the Algerian press did not hesitate to speak at one point of a French-Sudanese-Iranian plot against Algeria. The newspaper *El Watan* mentioned contacts between the French secret services and the FIS in Khartoum before the cancellation of the parliamentary elections. *Le Matin* referred to the Spanish newspaper *El País*, which leaked a French working document prepared for the consideration of the Elysée in which the hypothesis of a FIS takeover was accurately analysed.

In many ways, France's position towards the Algerian military intervention in Algeria's electoral process provoked a clear deterioration in the relations between the two states, particularly during the first six months of 1992. This
deterioration was reflected in February that year when the French government reduced its financial assistance to Algeria from around FF 7 billion to FF 5 billion. The amount in question was made up entirely of commercial credits.

Furthermore, during this period there were no high-level contacts between Algiers and Paris apart from a short visit to Paris by Lakhdar Brahimi, Algeria's Foreign Minister, on 4-5 March 1992. Most significantly, it took more than four months for the French authorities to accredit the new Algerian Ambassador to Paris (December 1992). The French government used the pretext of Mitterrand's health problems to justify this delay but there is no doubt that the real reason behind this delay was the ongoing tension between Algiers and Paris.

Though the post-1992 Franco-Algerian relationship goes beyond the scope of this study, it is worth mentioning that three months before the French parliamentary elections (March 1993) some improvement in the relationship was discernible following Dumas' visit to Algiers on 8-9 January 1993. This initiative was apparently encouraged by the new French Ambassador to Algiers, Bernard Kessedjan, who had relatively good relations with the Algerian Prime Minister, Belaid Abdesselam. He was also known to be a non-sympathiser of the FIS.

The declaration by Dumas at the end of his visit to Algiers demonstrated that France was seeking to ease the tension with Algiers. He stated:

I think my visit was useful. More than mere misunderstandings, a shadow existed over the relations between France and Algeria...During my trip to Algiers I had the opportunity to say that during this difficult phase France would stand by the side of Algeria and the Algerians, and that this would be translated into a political backing
of the leaders of today's Algeria, as well as economic and financial support... As regards bilateral political relations, as well as French backing of Algeria on the international scene, things have become normal again.92

Dumas' pledge to help Algeria was given concrete form by the signing in February 1992 of an economic and financial accord between the two countries. Financially this agreement was estimated at FF 6 billion. It included a FF 5 billion commercial credit and a state loan of FF 1 billion for balance of payments aid, as well as the financing of capital equipment purchases.93

5.5 Conclusion

Any considered review of the Franco-Algerian relationship from 1979 to 1992 indicates that Algeria's policy vis-à-vis France throughout Bendjadjid's era was more complex and variegated than it had been during the previous period. It fluctuated between change and continuity according to the circumstances and interests at stake between the two parties. The pragmatic policies of the Presidency were able to accommodate this change and continuity.

As mentioned above, from the early 1980s both states seemed to become ready to make a serious effort to overcome the memory of the past in order to build up a relationship based on understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation. The common economic interests between the two states, and the rapprochement in their respective stances vis-à-vis regional and international issues (Western Sahara, Libya, North-South dialogue and so forth), briefly provided the setting within which bilateral relations progressed towards what could have been a "successful reconciliation". However, this lasted only a short period
of time. The shifting character of France’s foreign policy which became visible in late 1983, particularly towards Morocco, as well as its failure to meet Algeria's expectation on the economic side, made this genuine reconciliation difficult to bring about.

After the popular unrest in Algeria in October 1988, the Franco-Algerian relationship took on another dimension. France, henceforth, became keenly interested in Algeria's internal situation. Its primary objective was to maintain the stability of the Bendjeadid regime and the “success” of the democratic process by providing substantial financial and economic aid.

However, the forced resignation of Bendjeadid (in January 1992) triggered another difficult phase in the Franco-Algerian relationship. At the origin of this situation was French initiative to influence/dictate the Algerian government to implement its “ready made” solutions which the Algerian government (HCE) did not appreciate and regarded as an unwarranted and insensitive interference.
Notes and references


4. For a good account of these measures, see D. Bouatta, "De nouvelles Perspectives", *Révolution Africaine*, 26 September-2 October 1980, pp. 7-9.


16. This information was revealed in an interview to the author by Algeria’s former Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, in London on 16 August 1998.


23. *Ibid*.


25. *Ibid*.


27. *Ibid*.


32. Information revealed by Cheysson to Bonara, *op. cit.*, p. 25. In his book, Abdesselam also hinted to this cooperation. For further details, see Abdesselam, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.


37. The Harkis are Algerian Muslims who were enrolled by the French army during the Algerian war of independence to fight the FLN / ALN. After the Evian Accords some were killed during score-settling in Algeria, whilst most of them fled to France.


42. *Ibid.*


52. *Agence France-Press* (AFP), no 788, 1988, p.42.


60. Quoted by Bonara, *op. cit.*, p. 29.


65. See Mitterrand's speech in MAE, *op. cit.*, March-April 1989, p. 16.


69. Bonara, *op. cit.*, p. 39. This information was also confirmed to the author by Adelhamid Brahimi.


74. See the analysis of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in MAE, *op. cit.*, September-October 1988, p. 72.


78. Ibid., p.234; See also El Moudjahid, 23 September 1991.


82. Ibid., p.67.

83. Ibid.


86. On this point, see Bonara, op. cit., pp. 59-60.


89. Information revealed by Audibert to Bonara, op. cit., p. 61-62. Again confirmed to the author by an officer of the Algerian intelligence service.


91. Bonara, op. cit., p. 69.

CHAPTER SIX
Chapter Six

The superpowers and the non-aligned movement

6.1 Introduction

Though the central thrust of Algeria's foreign policy under the Bendjadjid government was characterised by a greater concern about the proximate environment (i.e. its neighbours and near neighbours in North Africa), interests in the major superpowers and the non-aligned movement had, as it is going to be shown, not been overlooked.

As mentioned earlier, during the Boumediene era Algeria's diplomacy in relations to the superpowers and the non-aligned movement had, to a marked degree, been evolving within the framework of what was perceived as Algeria's "revolutionary" stance in international relations. This resulted in strained political relations with the United States, close military cooperation with the USSR and radical activism within the non-aligned movement.

Therefore, this chapter will review the type of policy followed by Bendjadjid vis-à-vis both superpowers and the non-aligned movement. The purpose is to depict the extent to which these policies marked either a new departure away from the previous phase, or a continuity that was much more adapted to both existing domestic and external realities faced by Algeria's leadership throughout the 1980s.
6.2 The United States

6.2.1 Western Sahara: the impeding factor

Until 1978 the US had officially adopted a “neutral” policy towards the conflict in the Western Sahara, not wishing to become involved in what US policymakers perceived as a regional conflict.¹ In 1977-78, conducting itself in a way consistent with this neutrality, the Carter administration had been reluctant to sell offensive weapons to Morocco that might be used in the Western Sahara. It also tied the provision of any US military assistance to Rabat's willingness to seek a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara conflict.

However, during the first years of Bendjnadid's presidency, there were numerous and ever-present indications that Washington was considering the possibility of altering its decision regarding the sale of arms to Rabat. Such a possibility was illustrated by the meeting on 8 October 1979, between Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brezinski, the National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown to discuss the possibility of supplying Morocco with advanced US weaponry.²

Furthermore, prior to this meeting, the State Department approved the sale to Rabat of six Chinook CH47 helicopters and $2.4 million worth of spare parts for Morocco's F-5 Jets, and C-130 transports in February and March 1979 respectively. And in May of the same year, the State Department also gave its approval for a $ 200 project submitted by the American firm Northrop Page...
Communication for the design of an electronic detection system in order to help Morocco conduct technical surveillance of the movement of Polisario guerillas in the Western Sahara.³

When the US administration's decision to approve the supply of arms to Morocco with arms became imminent, the Algerian President strongly objected to this initiative when he received Ulrich Hayens, the US Ambassador in Algiers on 11 October 1979. Algeria considered the US decision provocative and unfriendly. In this respect, President Bendjadid threatened to help the Polisario intensify its guerilla attacks on Moroccan territory if Washington lifted the ban on arms supply to Morocco. Five days later Washington cautioned Algeria that in this case it would sell a huge amount of sophisticated weaponry to Rabat.⁴

The decision to lift the US restriction on arms supply to King Hassan II was finally taken on 16 October 1979. The Carter administration allowed the sale of counter-insurgency plane OV 10 "Branco" and the Cobra helicopter gunship to Rabat. This decision came, in fact, at a very critical time, characterised by intense confrontation between Morocco and Polisario in the Western Sahara.

It is worth mentioning that the US verdict on this issue was encouraged by a negative assessment made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) regarding the stability of Hassan's regime. According to their assessment, Hassan was losing the war in the Sahara and within a year he would probably lose his throne.⁵ Accordingly, Carter was given three options. The first option considered the supply of Morocco with defensive
weapons but not with military equipment which would be used in the Western Sahara. Apparently this option had no support within the US administration. The second option suggested an increase in the supply of the military equipment previously sold to Morocco. This option had apparently been supported by the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). The third option called for the delivery to Morocco of modern weapons which would be used in the Western Sahara. It was suggested that the US National Security Council and White House Adviser, Brezinski, Defence Secretary, Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported this option. It was the last option that Morocco benefited from. In these dealings, the restrictive clause of the 1960 US-Moroccan security agreement, which formally constrained Morocco from using US arms for non-defensive purposes beyond its recognised boundaries, was simply ignored. One US official explained that "under previous policy the US would not have sold Morocco that kind of arm".

Another important factor which influenced Carter's decision stemmed from the growing US fears about the possibility of losing another traditional partner in the Third World. Washington was particularly sensitive on this issue so soon after the fall of the Shah of Iran, whose destitution raised questions about the capacity of the US to protect its friends. By aiding Hassan, Carter sought to show that the US was determined not to let the Iranian episode repeat itself in Morocco.

Moreover, Morocco had been for years a traditional instrument of US policy in North and North-West Africa. In November 1977, and again in May 1978,
Hassan sent troops to Zaïre to help the Mobutu regime against Angolan-based pro-Soviet rebels in the Shaba region. And during his visit to Washington in November 1978, Hassan committed himself to challenge the Soviet designs in Africa by offering to set up a 20,000 man Pan-African army to supplant the Cuban troops in Angola. He also played an important role in the rapprochement between Cairo and Tel-Aviv in 1977. The US interest in the strategic geographical location of Morocco cannot be overlooked. Clearly, it was not in the interest of the US to lose King Hassan. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Sauders the US believed that "an outright military victory over Morocco by Morocco's adversaries would constitute a serious setback to major US interests in the area".

The US arguments transmitted by Brzezinski to the Algerian leadership, on the occasion of his visit to Algiers on 1 November 1979, failed to persuade the Algerian government that the US was eager to see a peaceful settlement in the Western Sahara. This was supported by the fact that the US supply of arms to Rabat came just a few months after the signing of the peace treaty between Mauritania and the Polisario (see chapter four). Algeria instead perceived the US initiative as a threat to its national security as well as to the security of the whole Maghreb region. It also considered that the US interest was rather to strengthen Hassan's military potential, thereby making him less disposed to seek a peaceful avenue to end the conflict.

These perceptions convinced the Algerian government under the new
leadership of Bendjedid to maintain the line of his predecessor towards what it believed to be a resurgence of US "imperialism". As a consequence of the US decision, Algeria espoused an anti-US stance publicly. Algeria, for instance, expressed its ardent support for the new Iranian government after the fall of the Shah. In addition, while it did not officially criticise the seizure of US diplomats by the Iranian students in Teheran on 4 November 1979, it condemned the US threats to Teheran over the crisis.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the rhetoric from Algiers over the US threats to Iran, the Algerian government was from the outset of the crisis one of the favoured intermediaries selected by the Carter administration to act as a third party between the two belligerents. In this context, it was amongst the first governments to receive a note from Washington requesting its help in the crisis.\textsuperscript{15}

However, the infighting for the control of power in Iran made the involvement of a third party at this stage impossible. It was not until the Mullahs gained control over Iran's destiny that the newly elected Majlis (Assembly) formally requested Algeria's mediation to solve the hostage problem.

A number of considerations made Algeria the most suitable choice for mediating the hostage crisis. First, Algeria had been representing the Iranian interests in Washington since the seizure of the US embassy and had done so in such a way as to earn American respect and Iranian gratitude. In addition, it had been associated with the humanitarian as well as diplomatic endeavour that took place from the outset of the dispute. Abdlekrim Gharmaibe, Algeria's Ambassador
in Teheran, was the first diplomat to visit the American hostages. The archbishop of Algiers, Cardinal Duval, was also amongst the three clergymen who had been authorised to hold the 1979 New Year's eve services with American captives.

Algeria's representative to the United Nations, Mohamed Bedjaoui, had also been the co-chairman of the Commission of Inquiry which the UN dispatched to Iran. Most significantly, late in September 1980, Algerian officials had talks with the Iranian Prime Minister Radjai over the consequences of Iran's action, at a meeting at the UN headquarters. During these talks it seemed that the Algerian Ambassador in Washington, Redha Malek, along with the Algerian Ambassador at the UN, Bedjaoui, argued persuasively with the Iranian Prime Minister that the resolution of the hostage crisis would be in the best interests of the Iranian revolution as well as its national security. Rajai got more advice from the Algerian government in Algiers where he made a short stop on his way back home, to express the sympathy of Iran to the victims for the devastating earthquake that struck the El Asnam region (West Algeria) on 10 October 1980.

Moreover, the perception of Algeria by the Iranian regime played a significant part in making Algeria the best candidate for mediation. For Iran, Algeria was a symbol of resistance against repression. In the eyes of its leadership, the war of independence led by the Algerian people against France was in many ways similar to the Iranian revolution against the American-backed Pahlavi regime. The Iranian leaders genuinely believed that they could be best understood by Algerian negotiators who were both experienced diplomats and
products of their own revolution. Equally important, Algeria had from the first
days of the fall of Pahlavi proclaimed itself as a friend and an ally of Komeini's
regime. It also refrained from publicly condemning Iran over the hostage incident.

With regard to the motives that had influenced Algeria's decision to accept
the role of mediator, it must be emphasized that all the information related to this
issue suggests that the humanitarian element was the most significant determinant
in Algeria's decision. Indeed, most of the statements emanating from people
(American and Algerian) involved in this mediation pointed to this fact. In an
interview with the *New York Times*, Sliman Hoffman, then chairman of the foreign
policy commission of the FLN and a close aide of Bendjadid, stated that:

The role of Algeria in the hostage crisis was purely humanitarian and we had no
expectations from the United States nor any political aims or objectives. We did not
anticipate that after the resolution of the crisis, the bilateral relations of our
countries would consequently improve dramatically.

This humanitarian element in Algeria's intervention was equally noted by the US
chief negotiator the deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, when he
pointed out:

Algeria never asked for any promises on the part of the United States. There was
never any hint of a quid pro quo. Moreover, the Algerians made no request for
compensation; nor would they accept payments for their services.

However, one cannot underestimate the strategic interest which led Algeria
to assume the role of mediator in this dispute. In simplified terms it can be argued
that the Algerian government might have legitimately thought to achieve some of
its own interests in return for its mediating role. Algeria might have expected a
more neutral stance by the US towards the Western Sahara; some support in its long dispute with the EL PASO oil company over the LNG pricing and an improvement of its image as a true non-aligned country, especially in the US and in the West in general.

The success of the Algerian diplomats in mediating the release of the US hostages brought the Algerian government considerable compliments from the US officials and other states. In fact, its negotiating team enhanced the credibility of Algeria's diplomacy worldwide by skilfully handling a delicate and complex crisis. For Warren Christopher "[the Algerian government] has demonstrated an inspiring commitment to human values and had provided the world with the singular example of the art of diplomacy".20

His colleague, Captain Gary Sick, chief Assistant to the National Security Advisor during the crisis, stressed that "the Algerian team was everything one could hope mediators to be: discreet, intelligent, perceptive, persistent, sceptical and inexhaustible".21

A priori the prominent role of Algeria in ending the hostages' crisis promised that relations between the two states would certainly improve. As a matter of fact, US officials believed that Algeria's involvement in mediation was a "strong and determinant signal of its interest in genuine friendship with the United States".22 They also believed that, through the friendship of Algeria, the US relations with other Third World countries would likewise improve. A State Department official stressed that "to the extent that Algerians even understand us
a little better, it can have an important spill over effect in the Third World”.  

However, the expectations of most observers fell short. The Reagan administration’s decision to approve the sale of 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco, just three days after the release of the hostages, signalled to the Algerian leadership that the US support of Hassan was ultimately more important than improving its relations with Algiers. To make things worse, Reagan did not even conceive of linking arms sales to Morocco’s readiness to settle the Western Sahara conflict peacefully. A US congressman had in fact, confirmed at a hearing in March 1981 that “this administration [the Reagan administration] does not intend to make its decision explicitly conditional on Moroccan attempts to show progress towards a peaceful negotiated settlement”.  

Even though the Algerian government did not publicly condemn the US decision, it considered the arms sale a “slap in the face” The timing of the US decision made the Algerian regime believe that the Reagan administration was deliberately adopting an anti-Algerian position. Despite the explanation of Alexander Haig, the new Republican Secretary of State, a retired general and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to the Algerian Ambassador in Washington that the US decision was in no “way directed against Algeria” but to alert “Moscow and the world at large to the revival of American will”, the Algerian government concluded that the US was intending to alert Algeria rather than the Soviet Union. In fact, the US support for Rabat was also an extension of the Reagan administration’s fierce ideological hostility to the Libyan regime. The
support of the Polisario by Qadafi might have convinced the authorities in the Washington that the Libyan-Polisario connection could threaten the US interest in the region. Most significantly, US officials in the Reagan administration stressed that Qadafi "was doing Moscow's work by destabilising the countries of Western and Northern Africa, including Morocco and Tunisia". Algeria's fears were reinforced by the Reagan administration's increasing desire for close military cooperation with Morocco, especially in the light of the humiliating defeat of Moroccan troops by the Polisario at Guelta Zemmour in October 1981 (see chapter four). Indeed, the Moroccan defeat was severe and prompted a request for more advanced weaponry. Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Francis West, toured the Western Sahara in early November 1981 in order to assess Morocco's military needs. To that end he promised to supply Morocco with more advanced weaponry (said to include training for Moroccan pilots and electronic counter measures to help Moroccan Jets to evade the SAM-6 missiles) and provide "search-and-destroy commando tactics" training to the Moroccan forces. The US promises were, in fact, regarded by Algiers as another piece of compelling evidence of the US support for King Hassan's policy in the Western Sahara. Subsequently Algeria publicly attacked West's visit to Morocco and the Western Sahara. Algeria also communicated privately to Washington its concern over West's precedent-setting gesture of support to the King.

Algeria was also alarmed by the US-Moroccan agreement over landing rights for the US Rapid Deployment Forces that both countries negotiated in 1982-
1983. Algeria believed that the agreement contained secret clauses committing the US to provide Morocco with a security umbrella. Notwithstanding American reassurances, Algeria's government was not convinced that the American-Moroccan agreement was not directed against it, or that the US had, as it claimed, "no need or intention of establishing bases in North Africa".

These perceptions of threats against their country, encouraged the group of radicals within the army and the FLN to push President Bendjaddid and his Foreign Minister, Benyahia, to revise economic agreements with the USA in favour of socialist France in particular. It might also be argued that the highly publicised trans-shipment of military equipment by the Algerian government to Nicaragua, in July 1981, was intentional. The Algerian leaders might explicitly have used their connection with Nicaragua to send a signal to Washington demonstrating Algeria's "capabilities of nuisance" in a Central America, a zone of major interest to the USA.

However, the progressive shift of Algeria towards more economic liberalisation, its policy of conciliation in the Maghreb and its moderation in Arab affairs, helped to put Algerian-American relations back on the road of détente and greater cooperation, though only gradually. Indeed, after a period of mutual acrimony, the Reagan administration seemed to develop a positive appreciation of the moderation of Bendjaddid's regime and his intention to improve the relationship of his country with the United States. Most significantly, in May 1983, General Vernon Walters, the US Ambassador-at-large and former US defence
attaché to Paris, visited Algiers in order to request Algeria's help to break the deadlock in Lebanon. And in September of the same year the US assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence W. Eagleburger, expressed in Algiers his admiration for the Algerian leader, Bendjadjid, for his role in promoting constructive developments in the Maghreb.34

Moreover the Algerian government was pleased by the comment of the US representative to the United Nations, when he declared while visiting Rabat in early September 1983, that "the US government was taking no position vis-à-vis the sovereignty over the Western Sahara but favoured a political solution of the conflict on the basis of the resolution adopted by the OAU's summit in Nairobi"35. In the eyes of the Algerian authorities, this statement was a de facto recognition of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and for direct negotiation between Morocco and the Polisario.36

Another serious indication of the United States' willingness to improve ties with Algeria came in April 1983, when Washington designated Algeria eligible to purchase American defence services as well as to obtain military training from the US. Apparently through its decision, the Reagan administration sought to help Algeria reduce its military dependence on Moscow. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Peter Constable, "Washington was aware of the Algerian leadership's desire to balance their military relationship with the Soviets" and that "the US was trying to encourage this trend".37

This new era of détente was crystallised in a visit to Algiers by George
Bush, then US Vice-President, on 13-14 September 1983. Despite the importance of this visit (the first visit ever made to independent Algeria by such an elected US high official) the Algerian government seemed cautious and did not want to give the impression that Algeria was departing from its principles of positive non-alignment. Indeed, from the outset, the Algerian media stressed that Bush was the guest of the Algerian National Assembly, therefore not directly committing the Algerian government. Significant enough was the fact that a junior state official was charged to reply to the speech made by Bush before the National Assembly.

6.2.2 The ephemeral rapprochement

The signing of the Oudjda Treaty in 1984 between Morocco and Libya represented a major set back for US North African policy. Partly as a result of this Treaty the United States became keenly interested in playing Algeria’s North African power game. Over a short period of time the USA moved closer than ever before to Algiers. In this respect, the visit to Algiers of a top-level American military delegation led by General Burns, then the Under-Secretary of Defence, on 29 September-2 October 1984, was highly significant. More important, Washington designated Algeria eligible to acquire US military hardware on 10 April 1985. One week later (17-23 April 1985) Bendjadid became the first Algerian President to pay a week-long state visit to Washington.

The Algerian government made it clear that Bendjdid’s trip to Washington did not signify a reversal of its commitment to non-alignment. However, this did not
prevent certain governments, and Morocco in particular, from calling into question the very principles behind Algeria's foreign policy.44

Yet, whether under Ben Bella, Boumediene or Bendjadid, the Algerian government had always been very cautious when dealing with both superpowers. It made sure at all times it did not give the impression to other Third World countries that Algeria was shifting towards the West or the East, which could be seen as a betrayal of its commitment to the non-aligned movement's principles. It was in this respect that Algeria's Foreign Minister insisted, during the visit of the Algerian President to Washington, that "Algeria remains committed to its declared political principles".45 President Bendjadid's trip to Latin America, especially Cuba less than one month (8-16 May 1985) after his visit to Washington was highly significant and indicative of Algeria's continuing quest for "equilibrium".

Despite an overemphasis in the US media on Algeria's interest in acquiring US military equipment, it should be mentioned, however, that the purpose of the visit of Bendjadid was not confined to the future of military cooperation between Algiers and Washington.46 In fact, one of Bendjadid's objectives was to convince the Reagan administration to play a positive role in finding a solution to the Western Sahara conflict.47 The Moroccan-Libyan Treaty gave the Algerian policymakers a "moral lever" whereby they could favourably influence the US attitude towards the Western Sahara conflict. This was especially true since some State Department officials, along with some influential members of the Congress, came to realise that the policy of exclusive support to Morocco had failed to achieve its
goals.\textsuperscript{48}

To persuade the Reagan administration, the Algerian government used general contentions to demonstrate to the US that the latter’s interest could be better served if it cooperated with Algeria. One of the arguments used in this respect was that Algeria alone had the power to prevent acts of destabilisation in the Maghreb region. The Algerian leader played upon the US perceptions about Libya, as well as about the uncertain course of the post-Bourguiba political succession in Tunisia.\textsuperscript{49} The Algerian President also stressed his opposition to Qadafi’s policy. Bendjedid pointed out that “Algeria was opposed to a situation of agitation in North Africa”. He also made it clear that “he did not agree with the ways and methods of the Libyan leader” and “did not want to allow him to destabilise the region”\textsuperscript{50}, but also maintained that “Algeria was categorically opposed to any foreign intervention in Libya to get a rid of Qadafi”.\textsuperscript{51}

Bendjedid’s visit to Washington had, undoubtedly, contributed to the improvement of Algeria’s image in the US and helped to open a dialogue between the two states.\textsuperscript{52} But it had not succeeded in its more immediate objective of isolating Rabat from its main source of military and financial assistance, nor brought about a radical shift in the US position towards the Western Sahara problem. The only visible concrete result that was an agreement to establish a joint economic commission to develop further trade and economic cooperation between the two states. Both parties also agreed to conclude a future accord on cultural exchanges.\textsuperscript{53}
However, the two states continued to disagree on some international issues, especially on those that related to the Maghreb region. Indeed, following the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters on 1 October 1986, the Algerian government summoned the US Ambassador in Algiers to explain the Reagan administration's implicit support of the Israeli action. But more damaging to Algerian-American relations was the publication of a leaked piece of information in November 1985 by *The Washington Post* about a CIA plan to destabilise Libya. The newspaper revealed that the Reagan's administration had approved the CIA plan and that it intended to lure the Libyan leader "into some foreign adventure or terrorist exploit that would give a growing number of Qadafi opponents in the Libyan military a chance to seize power, or such foreign adventure as might give one of Qadafi's neighbours, such as Algeria or Egypt, a justification for responding to Qadafi militarily".

The *Washington Post* revelation only hastened a rapprochement between Algeria and Libya. The Algerian government rejected the newspaper's allegations and reaffirmed its "indefectible solidarity with the Libyan regime". More significant, Bendjedid met with Qadafi in the Algerian border town of In Aminas in January 1986. And when the United States bombed the Libyan capital, Tripoli, on 16 April 1986, Algeria responded immediately by denouncing the US action and called upon an extraordinary Arab summit to discuss the US aggression against Libya.

Another constraint on the Algerian-American relationship had been the US
decision to increase its military cooperation with Morocco, following the collapse in 1986 of the Oudjda Treaty. The visit made that year by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger to Rabat was perceived by Algeria as another US signal of its intention to increase its military cooperation with Morocco. Algeria responded furiously to this visit by arguing that increased US-Moroccan cooperation would trigger tension in the Maghreb region.  

To the satisfaction of Algeria, the détente in the Maghreb in the late 1980s motivated the US administration to adopt a more neutral stance towards the conflict in the Western Sahara. Its willingness to contribute towards finding a peaceful solution to the conflict was shown by its endorsement of the UN Secretary General Javier Peres De Cuellar's peace plan in August 1988 and the UN Security Council Resolutions 621 of September 1988, 658 of June 1990 and 690 of April 1991.

Yet the US never lost sight of its privileged relationship with King Hassan. Despite its initial commitment to a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict, the US refrained from using its influence on Morocco to convince the King to cooperate fully with the UN. As Morocco was the only Maghreb country to have participated in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, alongside the Coalition, the US passivity towards Hassan can be seen as a reward for his open support.

Moreover, the lingering US perception of Algeria as a Soviet client was to some extent behind the failure of the two states to establish a constructive relationship. Despite the growing moderation of Algeria's foreign policy under the
pragmatic Bendjadid, the American policy makers continued to detect in Algeria an autocratic regime that was a potential threat to US friends in the Maghreb region namely, Morocco and Tunisia. The point was made clear by Robert Mortimer who stated that:

In other parts of the world the United States has come to accept the role of what might be called a regional stabiliser. India, which like Algeria is a leader in the non-aligned movement, has often criticised American foreign policy, but the United States has gradually accepted its independence as an asset. In North Africa, however, the US policy-makers have remained wary of Algerian leadership, in part because of its socialist orientation, in part because Morocco and Tunisia appear to be more reliable regional partners.

Nonetheless, this perception did not discourage the US from supporting the Algerian regime during the riots that shook Algeria in October 1988. In fact the major preoccupation of Washington during this crisis was the survival of Bedjadid’s regime. Apparently, the first preoccupation of the US was to help the Algerian government to overcome the crisis. In this respect, there were no more than a few public or private comments in the United States about the manner in which the Algerian authorities dealt with the situation. Thereafter, the US made clear its support for Bendjadid’s political and economic liberalisation. And in late 1988 the US Department of Agriculture provided $750 million in credit for the purchase of US wheat and other agricultural products. Moreover, in 1989, the US did not hesitate to request Algeria’s mediation to secure the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

When the military intervened in January 1992 to cancel the second round
of the Algerian parliamentary elections, the US adopted a subtle position. In reality, like most of the Western countries, Washington was faced with a complex issue. In this context, Washington's initial official reaction was one of concern, but without condemning the military intervention. In fact officials felt that the cancellation of the parliamentary election was in conformity with the Algerian constitution. But the widespread speculations about the Algerian regime's capacity to control the crisis made the US revise its initial attitude to that of "wait and see", thereby avoiding any implicit or explicit support for either side.

6.3 The Soviet Union: "Status quo"

Except for the short period of Ben Bella's regime that witnessed a close political identification of Algeria with the USSR, under Boumediene, Algeria astutely managed to keep both superpowers at an equal distance. It could also be argued that, up to 1979, Algeria had been able to use its relationship with the Soviet Union as a "security umbrella" to advance both its national and international interests.

On taking office Bendjedid promised that Algeria would maintain its traditional relationship with the Soviet Union in the framework of Algeria's non-aligned policy. But it was doubtful if that was quite a satisfactory statement from a reputed "liberal" President whose appointment had, in fact, been resented by Moscow. The Soviet Union would certainly have preferred the designation of a candidate from the left, such as Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui.
However, because of the military dependence of Algeria on the Soviet Union, it would not have been easy for any Algerian leader, whatever his political orientations, to cut Algiers totally off from Moscow, particularly at a time of high political tensions with Morocco over the Western Sahara conflict. It was not, therefore, surprising that like his predecessor, Bendjedid's first official visit abroad, after Africa and the Arab world, was paid to the Soviet Union. Moreover in December 1979 the Algerian government abstained from condemning the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan at the UN, and dissociated itself from a similar resolution emanating from the Islamic Conference Organisation. The Algerian position dismayed Washington.

But if the Algerian position towards the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan had appeared from the Western perspective as an alignment of Algeria with the Soviet Union, from the Algerian perspective this decision was motivated by both Algeria's interests in further reinforcing Moscow's support in its regional dispute with Morocco and in securing the continuing flow of the Soviet arms. Certainly, the Algerian leadership viewed their decision as a limited sacrifice that would not rebound negatively on their country's autonomy in international relations.

In this connection, it should be noted that the USSR's position towards the Western Sahara had never been as supportive as Algeria might have expected, despite the ideological affinities between the two states. The Soviet Union had promptly agreed to meet Algeria's request for military assistance at the start of the conflict. Yet as the war went on, Moscow adopted a careful attitude dictated by its
own direct interest in the phosphate and fisheries potential of Morocco. In addition to its economic interest, Moscow never overlooked the possibility of the disappearance of the Moroccan monarch. By avoiding cutting itself off from Rabat, Moscow was undoubtedly keen to keep a foothold in this potentially unstable country in order to benefit from any revolutionary takeover.

Thus, the Soviets' position towards the Western Sahara problem had never gone beyond the support of the UN and OAU resolutions for a referendum in the Western Sahara, which Morocco itself accepted in principle. Neither Moscow nor its Eastern ally recognised the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic proclaimed by the Polisario in February 1976. Even though most of the military equipment of the Polisario guerilla army was of Soviet manufacture, they were provided indirectly to the Polisario by other parties (Algeria-Cuba-Libya). Obviously, the Soviets' opportunistic policy irritated the Algerian leadership from the beginning of the conflict; nevertheless they were reluctant to criticise Moscow, being compelled to remain circumspect in order to maintain their own receipt of Soviet military assistance.

Whatever the importance of Algeria's regional security on its relations with Moscow, the role that Moscow could play in the Arab-Israeli conflict was not underestimated by Algeria's policy-makers. In the eyes of the Algerian leadership Moscow continued to represent a potential ally of the Arab states. Indeed, despite Algeria's dissatisfaction at the reluctance of the Soviet Union to provide support for the Arabs, comparable to the assistance that the United States was giving to
Israel (see previous chapter), the deterioration in relations between Cairo and Moscow, following President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, led the USSR to be more attentive to Egypt's enemies.

Thus, in the wake of the signing of the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the United States and Israel on 30 November 1981, Algeria, Libya and Syria agreed to the development of qualitative relations with the Soviet Union and called on all the Arab states to review their relationship with Washington. In addition, in June 1984, Algeria attempted to reactivate the defunct Organisation of Solidarity between the Afro-Asian people which was a former instrument used by Moscow for the mobilisation of the Third World against Western interests.

When Algeria sought to diversify its sources for the acquisition of military equipment and improve its relationship with the USA, the Algerian officials were very anxious to stress the balanced nature of their policy towards both superpowers. In this respect, a few months after his visit to Washington, Bendjadid brushed aside suggestions that Algeria was shifting towards the West. In his speech before the FLN central committee Bendjadid argued that:

We [the Algerian leadership] make a distinction between the brother and the friend and the simple partner. If we call for cooperation with all sides, this does not mean that we put everybody in the same level, because we judge friendship in its true value and give to it its true significance.

Most significantly, the same day of Bendjadid's visit to Washington, General Khaled Nezzar, then Deputy-Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, flew to Moscow.
If officially the purpose of this visit was to discuss military cooperation between Algiers and Moscow, it was, nonetheless, also aimed at reassuring the Soviet partner of Algeria’s commitment to its traditional relationship with the Soviet Union. For similar considerations Bendjadid reactivated Algeria’s relations with countries of the Eastern bloc. After his return from Washington, Bendjadid received General Jaruzelski of Poland, visited Hungary and received President Honecker of the Democratic Republic of Germany. And in 1986 he paid another trip to Moscow.

In retrospect, it is easy to see that Bendjadid’s decision not to alter Algeria’s relations with the USSR was a tactical one chiefly based on his country’s regional security requirements (the dispute with Morocco) but not much more. From 1978-1987, the Soviet Union remained Algeria’s foremost military supplier, despite Bendjadid’s effort at diversifying the sources of procurement of military equipment. During the same period, Algeria acquired an estimated $5 billion of Soviet-made armaments. Moreover, once the Algerian government realised that its order for the US F-16 jet fighters was not going to be given a clear-cut decision by Washington, Algeria turned to its traditional military supplier, the USSR. In 1985 and 1989 respectively, requests were made for the purchase of MIG 29 and Sukkoi 24 aircraft and destined to preserve Algeria’s air power superiority over Morocco.77

6.4 The non-aligned movement: “retreat from radicalism”

One of the most active attributes of Algeria’s diplomacy, under the leadership of Boumediene, was the promotion of a Third World coalition as a
unified front to influence world affairs. The Algerian policy-makers believed that the Third World had to act as a homogenous bloc if it was to have any impact in international issues.\(^7\) It was indeed in accordance with this perception that Algeria committed itself, alongside other progressive countries, to direct the non-aligned movement towards a more militant approach to international affairs, particularly on economic issues. This commitment would place Algeria at the centre of all initiatives aimed at establishing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the mid-1970s.

Notwithstanding its reliance on a coalition which was far from being a united bloc, Algeria had been successful in having some of its economic proposals attract the support of the non-aligned countries. This was notably evident from the endorsement in 1974 by a special session of the UN General Assembly of a Declaration and Action Programme on the Establishment of a NIEO, largely inspired by the Algerian doctrine on the reform of the international economic and monetary system.

Indeed, both the UN General Assembly's Declaration, as well as the Programme of Action, emphasized most of Algeria's recommendations put forward by Boumediene in his speech to the Assembly, namely: 1) increased sovereignty over natural resources; 2) the right to nationalisation according to national law; and 3) a proposal for linking commodity export prices of Least Developed Countries to the price of imported goods from the industrialised world.\(^7\)

As a consequence, Algeria found itself at the forefront of the Southern
coalition in the succeeding rounds of negotiations and political manoeuvres with the Northern developed countries in order to take practical measures to implement the NIEO. The principal objective of Algeria was to maintain the cohesion of the southern coalition in face of the pressures mounted from developed countries, particularly the US, to convene a conference entirely restricted to the energy problem. Initially, because of the perceived seriousness of the commodity threat, the growing Northern interest in the Southern market, coupled with the tremendous power of the oil producers, the developed countries, particularly those in Europe, were willing to enter into negotiations with the South on the issue of a NIEO.

The US, however, undermined this process. In the view of the US policy-makers the developed countries' market economies should not make impetuous bargains with the South based on what Washington analysts saw as being merely a temporarily unfavourable situation. They believed that the only threat to the Western economies could come from the oil-producing states. Thus, despite Algeria's key role in maintaining the mobilisation of the Southern front and its effort at linking the energy issue to other Third World demands, the late 1970s revealed the limits of the task the Algerian diplomacy set out to achieve. One example was the Conference on International Economic Cooperation which met from 1975 to 1977. This linked Northern interest in an energy dialogue with OPEC to the desires of the G77 (the developing countries group) for negotiations on other raw materials, finance and development as well as energy. The conference was finally called off after the Paris meeting reached deadlock, and unable to agree on the
key issues of oil price and supply and international monetary reform. After the death of Boumediene, the new leadership signalled that it had no intention of departing from Algeria's commitment to restructure the established rules of the world political economy. Indicatively, in September 1979 at the summit of the non-aligned movement held in Havana, Bendjadid attempted once more to revitalize the bargaining power of the Third World coalition. The Algerian President proposed a global negotiation on international economic cooperation, development, monetary and financial issues, primary commodities and energy, under UN auspices. The Algerian proposal received the support of the summit for which Algeria, as a chairman of the G-77, had prepared a blueprint. In addition a committee, chaired by the Algerian diplomat, Driss Djazairi, was set up at the UN for the preparation of a global negotiation conference scheduled for 1981.

However, the special session of the UN General Assembly called by the non-aligned movement to prepare the modalities and the agenda for the global negotiation conference led nowhere. As a consequence, the North-South dialogue conference which was scheduled for September 1981 was postponed sine die. And in 1981 the Western countries made it clear that they were not prepared to engage in such an important negotiation within the UN General Assembly where the Third World has a decisive voting majority.

Algeria's progressive shift towards a greater focus on regional policy, combined with pressures from the developing countries for more pragmatism to deal with their urgent economic problems, prompted the Presidency to revise its
strategy within the non-aligned movement. This was best illustrated by the proposal made by Algeria at the non-aligned summit conference held in India, in March 1983. During this summit Algeria proposed a strategy based on two phases: the first stage would consist in launching negotiations in January 1984 with a selected agenda of emergency problems to be discussed. The second step, spanning over three years, would concern long-term questions relevant to the reform of the world economic order. Though this proposal was less radical in its content and approach to negotiations, even with this watered-down initiative Algeria failed to rally the summit behind a common declaration. Instead the summit opted for a softer bargaining strategy based on India's proposal.

Algeria's retreat from its non-aligned activism was also perceptible in its unwillingness to be a member of the preparatory bureau for the preparation of the seventh summit of the non-aligned movement held in New Delhi in 1983, whereas it had always been involved throughout the 1970s. Most significantly, in 1986 Algeria withdrew from the non-aligned countries' Coordinating Group in the field of transnational corporations and foreign investment which had been unwaveringly critical towards the activities of multinationals in less developed countries.

Furthermore, the Algerian delegation at the UN Seventh Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva in 1987, made no reference to the NIEO, while it still argued for South-South cooperation. When referring to the North-South dialogue, it ceased to present it in a conflictual perspective and stressed cooperative concepts such as "international cooperation", "interdependence" and
"joint-responsibility" which were all-but non-existent in its previous policy positions. This shift towards greater realism in its global relationship was prompted by Algeria's own economic needs.

In addition, in the context of ideological divisions and rivalries within the non-aligned movement as highlighted by the divergence between Castro and Tito over the conception of the non-aligned movement, and the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco, Libya and Egypt, Libya and Chad, Uganda and Tanzania, Vietnam and Cambodia, Zaire and Angola and the Iraq-Iran war, the new Algerian leadership opted for moderation to attenuate dissensions inside the movement. Return to the basic principles of non-alignment and rejection of foreign intervention in the affairs of other countries constituted, then, the two issues for which the Algerian government began to cal.87

This new image of moderation was particularly emphasized by Bendjadid at the September 1979 Havana summit by supporting Tito's conception of the meaning of non-alignment as opposed to that of Castro over the natural ally thesis. By this move, shifting away from Boumediene's correlation of non-alignment with militant anti-imperialism, Bendjadid took a big step towards a classical definition of non-alignment as a policy of equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Another substantive indicator of this shift was also underlined by concrete diplomatic action in April 1982 when Bendjadid visited Yugoslavia, China and India. The obvious purpose of these visits was undoubtedly to reestablish a more balanced non-aligned posture, as well as to abandon the
Algiers-Hanoi-Havana axis forged by Boumediene in the 1970s.  

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined Algeria's relations with both superpowers and the non-aligned movement. With respect to the US, it has been shown that Algeria's assumption that the US could play a constructive role towards the Western Sahara problems was the main factor behind its attempts to improve the climate of its political relationship with Washington. But the US reluctance to alienate Morocco continued to represent the main obstacle towards achieving a comprehensive rapprochement between the two countries.

On the other hand, besides Bendjidad's successful effort at improving Algeria's relationship with the United States, Algerian policy-makers were also keen to dispel many of the misapprehensions regarding this rapprochement. The Algerian government pronouncements and acts following Bendjidad's visit to Washington (17-23 April 1985) tended to suggest that the direction of Algeria's evident foreign policy had been left basically unchanged. This attitude stemmed from Algeria's obvious desire to maintain its image of a non-aligned country. It is conceivable that this was also designed to reassure part of the Algerian elite which was reluctant to support Bendjidad's gradual tilt towards the West.

Even though Algeria's relationship with the US had relatively improved under Bendjidad's leadership, it would, however, be lacking perspective to argue that this indicates a major shift in Algeria's policy towards the US. For one thing
the Algerian-US improvement resulted more out of a contingent factor and immediate contextual necessity -- as underscored by the Oudjda Treaty -- rather than as a product of any long-term considerations.

Concerning the Soviet Union it is quite evident that the Bendjadjid government did not try to underplay the significance of Algeria's Soviet connection. The bilateral relations between the two countries continued to be steered by Algeria's near-absolute dependency on the Soviets for military equipment. In fact, this had been in continuation of a policy initiated earlier by Boumediene. Hence, the task before Bendjadjid's government had been merely to reiterate the normal basis of the Algerian-Soviet relationship.

Whilst continuity remained the dominant feature of Algeria's foreign policy towards the superpowers, there had, on the other hand, been clear modifications instigated by Bendjadjid in regard to Algeria's role within the non-aligned movement. The changing external environment -- both proximate and distant -- prompted the Algerian policy-makers into a process of constant readjustment of Algeria's policy within the non-aligned movement. Gradually, Algeria's policy within the non-aligned movement had to become less that of an animator, reflecting the increased importance of regional issues (Maghreb) in the 1980s at the expense of global ones (Third World) which it championed previously during the 1970s.
Notes and references


4. El Pais, 13 October 1979


6. Ibid.


10. Carlos and Yahia, op. cit., p. 36.


12. In Algeria Zbigniew Brzezinski explained to the Algerian leadership that "the US was anxious to improve political and economic relations with Algeria" and that "it was not the intention of the US to back a Moroccan military victory in the Western Sahara". He also maintained that "neither Morocco nor the Polisario could win a military victory" implying that the US would favour a diplomatic solution for the conflict. In addition, he stated that "his visit to Algeria was intended to display Washington interest in the non-aligned movement". For more details, see The New York Times, 1 November 1979.

14. It had to be emphasized that even if Algeria refrained from denouncing the Iranian students action, it had, nonetheless, formulated negative opinions about the incident. See Boussetta Allouch, *Small States and International Mediation*, op. cit., p. 302.


24. This was now 1981 and a Republican "new dawn" for America -- more assertive in defence and foreign policy. Indeed, the Reagan administration's approach to the problem of Western Sahara was essentially motivated by its commitment to support "its friend against their foes". See Robert E. Osgood, "The revitalization of Containment", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60. no.3, 1982, pp. 465-502 and David Anderson "America in Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60. no. 3, p. 677.


31. The US reassurance to Algeria were made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Peter Constable. See “Speech by deputy assistant Secretary of State Peter Constable for Georgetown University’s Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies’ Symposium on North Africa Today”, 23 April 1982, p. 4.


34. Le Monde, 15 September 1983.


36. Ibid.

37. See Speech of Peter Constable, op. cit, p. 4.

38. Iratni, op. cit., p. 314

39. In his speech , Bush characterised Algeria as a “leader of the non-aligned movement and the North-South dialogue”. He also argued that “he saw no incompatibility between the interests of both Algeria and the USA in world where nations are truly independent and prosperous”. Moreover, he indicated the willingness of the USA to cooperate with Algeria “on the common agenda facing mankind” For more details, see El Moudjahid, 14 September 1983; also “Vice President Bush visits North Africa and Europe”, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 83, no. 2080, November 1983, pp. 121-13.

40. For a good account of the US perceptions and fears of the Moroccan-Libyan alliance see, Richard B. Parker, “Appointment in Oudjda”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 63,


42. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Algeria, no. 4, 1985, p. 5.

43. Apparently Algeria was interested in the purchase of the F-16 Falcon Fighters. In a report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services, it was stated that “such a sale to Algeria would be a major qualitative leap—especially in light of the fact that Morocco is not only outnumbered in the air three-to-one, but was armed with the less sophisticated F-5 as its main fighters. The presence of approximately 50 Mig 25 Foxbat Fighters in the Libyan inventory—albeit in stockage—argues for consideration of the sale of F-16s to Algeria. But any sale to Algeria must take Morocco’s concerns into account. Ideally any major sale of military equipment to Algeria would be preceded by a resolution of the current conflict over the Western Sahara”, Report of the Delegation to North Africa, Iberia and Yugoslavia of the Committee on Armed Services. House of Representatives, 19th Congress, first session, August 2-16, 1985, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 16. However, Algeria’s request had never been met.


46. For more details about the objectives of this visit, see interview of President Bendjidad for The Washington Post, Révolution Africain, 18-24 April 1985.


49. Ibid, op. cit., p. 397.


52. According to the Algerian Information Agency (APS), "American officials appreciated Algerian intentions for what they were, and not for what insincere and ill-intentioned intermediaries have made them to be", *El Moudjahid*, 23 April 1985.


56. It has to emphasized that disagreement between Algeria and the US over Libya affected the Algerian-American relationship for quite a long time. When Algeria- for tactical reason (see chapter four) -tried to enlist Qadafi into the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord, and later to establish a Union with Libya, the Reagan administration was explicitly opposed to the Algerian attempts. In an interview to *The Washington Post* in February 1988 Bendjadid addressed disguised critics to the US policy towards Libya. He stated that "the US policy was misguided and counterproductive". He also argued that "a web of regional commitments would more effectively constrain Qadafi than sanctions and military attacks". "The United States bombed Libya but Libya is still there" added the Algerian President. On this issue, see Francis Ghilès, "Algeria forges a fragile Maghreb union", *Financial Times*, 16 February 1988.


58. The Libyan Secretary of the General People's Congress for Foreign Liaison indicated that "Algeria was not connected with what *The Washington Post* published neither directly nor indirectly", *FIBIS*, 18 November 1985, p. Q 2.


62. *Ibid*.

63. Mortimer, *op. cit.*, p.169

64. *Ibid*, p.171.

66. Ibid.


70. Ibid.


72. For a good analysis on the USSR policy towards the Western Sahara, see Yahia Zoubir, "Soviet Policy Toward the Western Sahara Conflict", *Africa Today*, vol.34, no. 3, autumn, and "L'URSS dans le Grand Maghreb: une stratégie équilibrée et une approche pragmatique", in Bassma Kodmani Darwish, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-356


74. For full details on this agreement, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Memorandum of Understanding", http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il.html.


76. President Bendjadjid's speech to the Central Committee in *Le Monde*, 4 May 1985.

77. Ibid., p. 428; see also Daniel Volman, "The role of foreign military assistance in the Western Sahara war" in Y. Zoubir and D. Volman (ed), *International dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict*, (Westport: Praeger, 1983), p. 159.


81. *Ibid.*.


85. For more details, see *Révolution Africaine*, 4-10 mars 1983, p.29.


89. During the visit of Bendjedid to the US popular demonstration took to the street of Algiers chanting “*Hlima (Algeria’s first lady) fi l’marikan wa sha’ab al-kesba’a fi l’ghiran*”! “Hlima visits the US while the people of the Casbah are living in slums”. Some observers suggested at the time that this was orchestrated by some radical elements in the political establishment affiliated to the left-wing party PAGS (*Parti d’Avant-Garde Socialiste*).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions and Recommendations

1 Conclusions

This research has endeavoured to cast light upon Algeria's foreign policy from 1979-1992. Its primary objective was to investigate the extent of continuity and/or change in this policy in the post-1979 era. Chapter one reviewed the major contending theoretical models to the study of foreign policy, particularly in relation to the categories of states with which we are dealing (Third World countries). One of the main points transpiring from this chapter is that there is no entirely appropriate or convincing model that can systematically be applied to the study of these states. Therefore, this casts doubt on to how far any single methodology or framing model can in itself be helpful for the analysis of our case study.

It was also revealed that the "determinants" analytical framework has been widely used by scholars as an alternative for the study of Third World countries' foreign policy. Factors found in both the internal and the external environment appeared to be the key to the analysis of these countries' foreign policy. However, with the diversity of factors and their variation from one state to another, scholars have been left with the task of finding out for themselves, through detailed empirical work, what kinds of factors they need to be examining when they are studying the foreign policy of a specific or particular Third World state.

Based on the above findings, particular attention was directed towards the identification, typology and analysis of key factors in the conception and the
implementation of Algeria's foreign policy. By establishing the link between the influential factors found within Algeria's domestic environment and its foreign policy implementation, it seems demonstrable that Algeria's foreign policy has been influenced preponderantly by the power of the Presidency and by economic pragmatism. Naturally, as a newly independent state, Algeria confronted its leaders with the challenge of building a viable and a modern state. In this process, foreign policy became intimately linked with the task of achieving national goals.

The discussion of the roles of the institutional structures involved in the making of Algeria's foreign policy brings to the fore the prominence of the presidential centre. In other words, foreign policy tended to be the unfettered preserve and privileged domain of the leader (ironically echoing somewhat the situation in Gaullist France, the previous colonial master so much of whose imprint and influence the post-independence Algerian leadership was keen to repudiate). However, when the foreign ministry performed its institutional role, it did so because of the special relationship between the President and the Minister in charge.

The eviction of Bouteflika from his position as Foreign Minister in 1979 reduced the role of the Foreign Ministry to that of a subordinated institution depending largely upon the presidential centre. The case of Bouteflika is just one example but it is an eloquent indication that "real" power in post-independence Algeria is concentrated amongst a few individuals which gravitated around powerful groups. After the clan de Oudjda who dominated key political institutions during the Boumediene years, there followed another group which centred around
President Bendjadid and his Chef de Cabinet, General Larbi Belkheir.

Equally important has been the role of the military institution in a state theoretically and officially run by the FLN. In addition to its purely military function, the form of the Algerian revolution (a revolution within a simultaneous war of national liberation) combined with the historical-political background of the ALN's leadership allowed the military to be an integral part of Algeria's post-independence decision-making process. The military presence within the highest institutions of the state, including the Presidency, the Council of Revolution (1962-1978), and the FLN's supreme political institutions (Political Bureau and the Central Committee) ensured that the military institution became a direct participant in decision-making related to all aspects of national issues.

In foreign policy matters it seems, however, that the military did not exercise a direct influence. This is not to suggest that the Army was kept away from foreign affairs and it would be absurd to argue that it was not closely involved with national security issues. But simply put, the formal channel for communication and "linkage" between foreign policy matters in general seemed to have been the heads of state -- Boumediene and Bendjadid -- who as former military officer certainly had a shrewd awareness of the military perceptions of external issues. And one hardly need mention the continuous presence within the Presidency of military officers who assumed the function of the Presidents' personal advisers as well as the influence and constraining effects that arms purchases from foreign national suppliers have on Algeria's foreign policy orientation.
The examination of the underlying principles of Algeria's foreign policy, in chapter two, has established that in addition to the afore-mentioned relationship between state building and foreign policy, much of post-colonial Algeria's vision and behavioural response to the international environment was to be affected for decades after 1962, by the colonial legacy and the struggle for independence. This particular phase developed an acute and highly developed revolutionary enthusiasm among the Algerian leaders, which theoretically became the chief characteristic of Algeria's external behaviour.

In many respects, the same ideological sets of beliefs that had proved effective against the colonial power were to be the *leitmotiv* of Algeria's foreign policy, at least in the rhetorical sense. If anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and national independence were to have a certain effect on the dynamics of independent Algeria's foreign policy, this rhetoric was no more than a mere veneer to a much more pragmatic policy and reality.

Indeed, the examination of the 1962-1978 era, in chapter three, while it revealed that during this phase Algeria's external policy relied rhetorically upon its "revolutionary" ideological tenets, demonstrates that when it came to national interest, pragmatism prevailed. As it has been noted with respect to national development, as the main focus of Boumediene's regime in the early 1970s, Algeria's strategic economic interest took precedence over ideological commitment. The nature of Algeria's interaction with the superpowers, as well as its opposition to the desire of Libya and Iraq for a "rejectionist" front in 1973, are illustrative.
Bearing in mind our main research question, the focus of the ensuing chapters concerned the evolution of Algeria's foreign policy in the post-1979 era. The central finding of these chapters strongly suggests a conclusion that "change within continuity" best describes what characterised Algeria's foreign policy.

Specifically, chapter four argued that within the Maghreb region the Western Sahara issue proved to be, after 1978, just as in the last years of Boumediene's tenure, the central thrust of Algeria's Maghreb policy. However, this era also featured important changes in regard to the strategy adopted by the Algerian government to achieve its objective. Chronologically, the post-1978 era represents two distinctive phases. During the immediate post-1978 period, down to 1985, the major objective of Algeria's foreign policy was to break the status quo in the Western Sahara by maintaining the policy of "indirect confrontation" initiated in 1975. Its strategy consisted of asserting both diplomatic pressure within the OAU in particular, and military operations in the Sahara -- through the Polisario -- with the intention to press Rabat towards a negotiated settlement. Algeria's posture during the various summits of the OAU, and the large-scale Polisario military operations, provide ample evidence of use of this dual strategy to pursue its objective.

In addition, the Algerian government also moved to isolate Morocco within its sub-regional environment. It was to this end that the normalisation of relations with Tunisia came about and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord in March 1983, from which Morocco was excluded. The most important implication of this treaty was the recognition by Tunis of the right of the
Sahrawis people for self-determination which at the time constituted an important departure from Tunisia's previous stance on this issue.

However, this phase also revealed that in contrast to the 1975-1982 era, the Western Sahara issue was not given priority by the Algerian government in its relations with Libya. Indeed, despite the common antipathy for Rabat and the importance of Qadafi. This was because the Libyan leader's support to the Polisario, the government of Bendj'adid sought to distance itself from Qadafi whose interventionist policy ran counter to Algeria's interest in the region, and could compromise the efforts of Algeria to establish a fresh image of a moderate on the international diplomatic stage.

After, 1986 and despite the success of Algeria's diplomacy designed to isolate Morocco in the Maghreb and the OAU, a number of internal and external factors combined. These factors led to a clear readjustment in Algeria's strategy over the issue of the Western Sahara. The first causal factors were directly linked to the changing domestic situation in Algeria. On the hand, Algeria could not sustain a prolonged war of attrition against Morocco in the context of the critical economic situation in the wake of the oil price collapse in 1985-1986. On the other, the regime of Bendjadid was more powerful than before because he had been able to secure the appointment of supporters to key position in the state apparatus, therefore putting himself in a better situation to carry out a regional policy of his choice. The second contributing factor to this readjustment was the success of the Moroccan army in acquiring new defence techniques. These effectively reduced the military capacities of the Polisario, thereby in turn...
attenuating Algeria's military option to oppose Rabat's annexation of the territory.

This, however, must not be construed to mean the end of Algeria's support for the Polisario. Though it was the case that Algiers estimated that the strategy of confrontation had proved not fully appropriate and could no longer achieve its objective, one can argue that Bendjeadid's government was largely successful in accurately assessing the changing circumstances. Indeed Bendjeadid reoriented his approach and manoeuvred accordingly to reach the same goal, namely, the implementation of a joint OAU/UN-sponsored referendum in the Western Sahara. Unquestionably, however, the most important contribution to Algeria's success lay in Hassan's change of attitude when he decided to meet the Polisario representatives in January 1988 and accept "in principle" the 1990 UN peace plan.

In the Mashreq it has, however, been evident that the Algerian government was no longer driven to pursue its radical policy. Indeed, except for a short period of time (1979-1982) where continuity had prevailed, Algeria appeared to have rapidly shifted its Arab policy to bring it more in line with the realities affecting the region. Though traditional support for the Palestinian movement remained as strong as ever, the new leadership progressively distanced itself from the previous policies by emphasising unity and reconciliation, dialogue and compromise rather than confrontation and isolation.

In chapter five, the finding that emerged is that towards France, Algeria has not followed one constant policy but several successive policies. These
alternated between change and continuity, according to the circumstances of the time and the interests at stake between the two countries. In addition, the evolution of the Franco-Algerian relationship during this era suggests that France has had a dominant touch in determining the success or failure of any undertaking that Algeria attempted vis-à-vis France. The relationship has remained, in short, an asymmetric one, even after Algerian independence.

From the early 1980s, both Algeria and France seemed to be ready to make a serious effort to overcome the legacy of the past in order to build up a relationship based on understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation. The shared economic interests between the two states and the rapprochement in their respective stances vis-à-vis regional and international issues provided, for a short period of time (1981-1983), the setting within which bilateral relations progressed resulting, in an important shift in Algeria's policy towards its former coloniser. The most significant example in this respect, was Algeria's decision to allow French fighter-planes to fly over its air space and to refuel on its territory during the "Manta" operation against the Libyan troops in Chad in 1983.

Nevertheless, by 1984, the steady improvement in the relationship lost momentum resulting into a period of status quo similar, in many respects, to the period that have prevailed in the last years of Boumediene's rule. Three reasons were at the root of this situation. First, France undertook a readjustment of its Maghreb policy with a visible tilt towards Morocco. Second, the introduction of a set of new immigration laws and directives which were not in conformity with Mitterrand's previous engagements on this issue. Finally, France's "U-turn" in its
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

initial attempts to help the development of Algeria's economy. One could point out that France has, in this respect, failed to measure up to Algeria's expectations.

From 1988 to January 1992 the policy of Paris towards Algiers was driven by its own traditional foreign policy objective -- that is to protect its position and influence in Algeria by openly supporting the Bendjadarid regime and helping it to overcome its economic difficulties. However, the forced resignation of Bendjadarid in January 1992, prompted France to adopt a twin track-policy. Though this strategy best suited France's objective at that time, it did, however, provoke another crisis in the Franco-Algerian relationship.

Finally, in chapter six, this study looked at Algeria's relations with both the USA and the former Soviet Union on the one hand and the non-aligned movement on the other. The core of the finding regarding Algeria's policy towards these issues and areas highlighted two main and contrasting characteristics. First, continuity in the former policies in dealing with the two major superpowers and, second, a substantive change in the nature of Algeria's role within the non-aligned movement.

Indeed, whatever the improvement of the Algerian-American relationship in the 1980s, it remains difficult to consider that this was an indication of a fundamental re-alignment in Algeria's policy towards the US. The Algerian-US improvement, as it has been revealed, was a result of a contingent factor and immediate contextual necessity -- the Oudjda Treaty -- rather than any long-term considerations. Similarly, with regard to the Soviet Union, the Bendjadarid
government did not attempt to alter the traditional pattern of the Algerian-Soviet relationship. In many respects, the relationship between the two countries continued to be driven by Algeria's dependency on the Soviet Union for the supply of military equipment, as was the case in preceding years.

Towards the non-aligned movement, however, the changing international environment with the development of Reaganism and Thacherism, led the Algerian policy-makers to effect a clear and significant adjustment in Algeria's role within the non-aligned movement but without deviating from its fundamental principles. That role became one characterised by pragmatism, rather than one driven by ideological considerations. It also reflected the increased importance in the eyes of the Algerian new leadership of regional issues (the Maghreb), at the expense of global ones (the Third World), the central axis of Algeria's foreign policy during the previous decade.

Overall, of all the determinants competing for influence in Algerian foreign policy-making, the power of the Presidency and the influence of economics combined were clearly dominant.

2 Recommendations

It is well-understood that any research is a never-ending process. Further investigation needs to be undertaken in order to scrutinize more closely some of the issues raised in this thesis, or test the value of our findings. Yet, this piece of research may provide a valuable starting point to assist future researchers to define the course of their inquiries. In fact, much of the value of the present study
and its significance must be sought from the perspectives it opens up for future research. In particular, it seems fruitful to conclude by indicating an agenda of areas where further research is recommended – particularly if the problem of data accessibility in Algeria can be overcome:

1. A core area of Algeria's foreign policy has been the issue of the Western Sahara since 1975. An alternative subject could be the study of the impact and implications of the Western Sahara in Algeria's foreign policy since 1975.

2. Another subject worthy of a comprehensive study would involve the implication of the post-1992 domestic unrest on Algeria's foreign policy. Looking at this matter vis-à-vis France or Morocco, for instance, would be one option.

3. Algeria also provides a suitable case study for any research which seeks to investigate the potential role of a small state in conflict resolution.

4. One could also put the focus on Algeria's armament and defence/strategic policies. This could involve the issue of nuclear proliferation and links with the People's Republic of China (PRC) for the transfer of armament technology.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROGRAM OF TRIPOLI. ¹

III. Toward an Independent Foreign Policy

The proper orientation of foreign policy is an important element in the consolidation of our independence and the creation of a national economy.

Algeria is gaining her sovereignty in an international climate in which the relations among various forces will continue to evolve in favour of peoples and to the detriment of imperialism. The momentum of liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the consolidation of independence in former colonies, the growth of democratic forces in imperialist countries, and the progress of the socialist countries speeding the disintegration of imperialism. Many such victories have been recorded in recent years.

This new situation has led imperialism to change and flex its methods by transferring power to restricted bureaucratic and middle-class groups, which it employs for the exploitation of their peoples. Thus it seeks to break up liberation movements and to maintain its strategic and economic interests. The alliance of the imperialist countries with certain governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America makes it temporarily possible for imperialism to slow its own decline. The fact remains that the general tendency of our time is the reduction, not the expansion, of imperialism’s room to manoeuvre.

In the face of the persistence of the dangers that continue to threaten our country, independent Algeria’s foreign policy should be unshakably guided by the principles of the progressing battle against imperialism and colonialism and for support of movements toward unity in the Maghreb, the Rab world, and Africa and for assistance to movements for freedom and to the struggle for peace.

1. The Fight Against Colonialism and Imperialism.

The great lesson of our war of liberation is this: faced by the irresistible pressure of the peoples, the rivalries among imperialist countries diminished and were replaced by a solidarity that was disturbed by only minor factions. Our struggle evoked friendly responses among the masses in these countries but was exposed to the hostility of their governments. In her war effort, France enjoyed the material and moral support of all the Western states and especially of the United States of America. Our determination to push the Revolution

forward will encounter more obstacles. This should in no case prevent us from exerting maximum effort to persevere in our anti-imperialist activity.

The support of socialist countries, which in various ways stood at our side during the war and with which we must now strengthen existing ties, raise real possibilities of disassociation from imperialism. The growth of neutralist sentiment, which we share, evidences that dynamism of the peoples who are fighting to consolidate their independence. The further expansion of this sentiment in each country depends on internal choices and on the degree of economic independence. Therefore Algeria's policy with countries that have succeeded in consolidating their independence and that have shaken off the grip of imperialism.

2. Support for Movements Fighting for Unity

The broadening of the anti-imperialist struggle fosters the dynamism of those political and social forces that, taking the same direction, work for the achievement of unity in the Maghreb, the Arab World, and Africa. The failures of the Conference of Tangier and the Syrian-Egyptian Union and the uncertainties that menace the unity of the Casablanca group compel us to formulate our own principles in this regard.

Aspirations toward unity have a fitting historical perspective. They resent the need of the masses for liberation and their desire to set in motion the greatest possible means to smash every barrier to their advance. To further the unity of the movement it is no longer enough to fall back on subjective factors alone. Unity among discrete countries is colossal task that should be approached in the perspective of common ideological, political, and economic preferences which fulfill the desires of the popular masses.

In the Maghreb and in the Arab world, as in Africa, the divisive tactics of imperialism and the interests and selfishness of the ruling classes are the main stumbling blocks to the achievement of unity, which they often reduce to a demagogic slogan.

The principal task of our party is to help the Maghreb, the Arab world, and Africa to evaluate properly the tremendous demands imposed by the achievement of unity. This work must be carried out at the level of leader groups and the mass organisations so that the obstacles to be overcome shall be concretely handled. On the governmental level, the growth of trade, the initiation of joint economic projects, a concerted foreign policy, and total solidarity in the fight against imperialism are objectives that, leading in the direction of the interests of peoples, will contribute to a sure-footed advance on the road to unity.

3. Support for liberation Movements

By reason of its intensity and its might, the war of liberation has speeded the
process of decolonization, especially in Africa. Independent Algeria will have to furnish full and complete help to other peoples waging similar battles for the freedom of their countries. She owes it to herself to pay special attention to the situation of Angola, South Africa, and the countries of East Africa. Active solidarity against colonialism will enable our country to broaden the battle-front and to strengthen the movement toward unity.

4. The struggle for international Co-operation

International cooperation is essential to the goal of utilizing every material and human resource for the progress in an atmosphere of peace; it is to be achieved through the permanent mobilization of the masses against imperialism.

Stronger ties with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the growth of exchanges in every area with the socialist countries, the establishment of relations with all states on the basis of equality and mutual respect for national sovereignty, and common action with democratic forces, notably in France, will put our country in a position to confront its responsibilities on the international level. In this way Algeria will be able to make a positive tests that are taking place on our own soil and that endanger our independence and our security. In this way, too, it will be able to contribute to the elimination of military alliances and foreign bases.

This foreign policy is the indispensable corollary of the realization of our domestic objectives. It will enable our country to attain the objectives of People’s Democratic Revolution and to participate in the building of a new world.
APPENDIX TWO
PROCLAMATION DU 1er NOVEMBRE 1954.¹

PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN,
MILITANTS DE LA CAUSE NATIONALE,

A vous qui êtes appelés à nous juger (le premier d’une façon général, les seconds tout particulièrement), notre souci en diffusant la présente proclamation est de vous éclairer sur les raisons profondes qui nous ont poussées à agir en vous exposant notre programme, le sens de notre action, le bien fondé de nos vues dont le but demeure l’indépendance national dans le cadre nord-africain. Notre désir aussi est de vous éviter la confusion que pourraient entretenir l’impérialisme et ses agents administratifs et autres politiciens véreux.

Nous considérons avant tout qu’après des décades de lutte, le Mouvement National a atteint sa phase de réalisation. En effet, le but d’un mouvement révolutionnaire étant de créer toutes les conditions d’une action libératrice, nous estimons que, sous ses aspects internes, le peuple est uni derrière le mot d’ordre d’indépendance et d’action et, sous les aspects extérieurs, le climat de détente est favorable pour le règlement des problèmes mineurs, dont le nôtre, avec surtout l’appui diplomatique de nos frères arabo-musulmans. Les événements du Maroc et de Tunisie son à ce sujet significatifs et marquent profondément le processus de lutte de libération de l’Afrique du Nord. A noter dans ce domaine que nous avons depuis fort longtemps été les pionniers de l’unité dans l’action, malheureusement jamais réalisée entre les trois pays.

-L’heure est grave!

Devant cette situation qui risque de devenir irréparable, une équipe de jeunes responsables et militants conscients, ralliant autour d’elle la majorité des éléments encore sains et décidés, a jugé le moment venu de sortir le mouvement national de l’impasses ou l’ont acculé les luttes de personnes et d’influence, pour le lancer aux côtés des frères marocains et tunisiens dans la véritable lutte révolutionnaire.

Nous tenons à cet effet à préciser que nous sommes indépendant des deux clans

qui se disputent le pouvoir. Plaçant l'intérêt national au-dessus de toutes les considérations mesquines et erronées de personnes et de prestige, conformément aux principes révolutionnaires, notre action est dirigée uniquement contre le colonialisme, seul ennemi et aveugle, qui s'est toujours refusé à accordé la moindre liberté par les moyens de lutte pacifique.

Ce sont là, nous pensons, des raisons suffisantes qui font de notre mouvement de rénovation se présente sous l'étiquette de FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE se dégageant ainsi de toutes les compromissions possibles et offrant la possibilité à tous les patriotes algériens de toutes couches sociales, de tous les partis et mouvements purement algériens, de s'intégrer dans la lutte de libération sans aucune autre considération.

Pour préciser, nous retraçons ci-après les grandes lignes de notre programme politique:

BUT: L'indépendance nationale par:

-1°) La restauration de l'Etat algérien souverain démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques.
-2°) Le respect de toutes les libertés fondamentales sans distinction de races et de confessions.

OBJECTIFS INTERIEURS:

-1°) ASSAINISSEMENT POLITIQUE par la remise du mouvement national révolutionnaire dans sa véritable voie et par l'anéantissement de tous les vestiges de corruption et de réformisme, cause de notre régression actuelle.
-2°) RASSEMBLEMENT ET ORGANISATION de toutes les energies saines du peuple algérien pour la liquidation du système colonial.

OBJECTIFS EXTERIEURS:

-Internationalisation du problème algérien.
-Réalisation de l'Unité nord-africaine dans son cadre naturel arabo-musulmans.
-Dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies, affirmation de notre sympathie à l'égard de toutes nations qui appuieraient notre action libératrice.
MOYEN DE LUTTE:

Conformément aux principes révolutionnaires et compte tenu des situations intérieures et extérieures, la continuation de la lutte par tous les moyens jusqu'à la réalisation de notre but.

Pour parvenir à ces fin le FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE aura deux tâches essentielles à mener de front et simultanément: une action interieur tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan de l'action propre, et une action extérieur en vue de faire du problème algérien une réalité pour le monde entier avec l'appui de tous nos alliés naturels.

C'est là une tache écrasante qui nécessite la mobilisations de toutes les énergies et toutes les ressources nationales. Il est vrai la lutte sera longue mais l'issue et certaine.

En dernier lieu afin d'éviter les fausses interprétations et les faux-fuyants, pour prouver notre désir de paix, limiter les pertes en vies humaines et les effusions de sang, nous avançons une plate-forme honorable de discussion aux autorités française si ces dernières sont animées de bonne foi et reconnaissent une fois pour toutes aux peuples qu'elles subjuguent le droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes.

-1°) La reconnaissance de la nationalité algérienne par une déclaration officielle abrogeant les édits, décrets et lois faisant de l'Algérie une terre française en déni de l'histoire, de la géographie, de la langue, de la religion et des moeurs du peuple algérien.
-2°) L'ouverture des négociations avec les porte-parole autorisés du peuple algérien sur les bases de la reconnaissance de la souveraineté algérienne, une et indivisible.
-3°) La création d'un climat de confiance par la libération de tous les détenus politiques, la levée de toutes mesures d'exception et l'arrêt de toute poursuite contre les forces combattantes.

EN CONTRE PARTIE:

-1°) Les intérêts français, culturels et économiques, honnêtement acquis, seront respectés ainsi que les personnes et les familles.
-2°) Tous les Français désirant rester en Algérie auront le choix entre leur nationalité et seront de ce fait considéré comme étranger vis-à-vis des lois en vigueur ou opteront pour la nationalité algérienne et dans ce cas seront considérés comme tels en droits et en devoirs.
-3°) Les liens entre la France et l'Algérie seront définis et feront l'objet d'un accord entre les deux puissances sur la base de l'égalité et du respect de chacun.
Algériens! Nous t’invitons à méditer notre Charte ci-dessus. Ton devoir est de t’y associer pour sauver notre pays et lui rendre sa liberté; le FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE est ton front, sa victoire est la tienne.

Quant à nous, résolus à poursuivre la lutte, sûrs de tes sentiments anti-impérialistes, nous donnons le meilleurs de nous-mêmes à la Patrie.

1 Novembre 1954
LE SECRETARIAT NATIONAL
APPENDIX THREE

6 Technical advisers & 6 Chargés de mission

Minister

Secretary General

3 Assistant Secretaries

Embassies

Consulates

General Directorate: Administration

Personnel Directorate
Finance Directorate
Equipment Directorate
Conferences Directorate

General Directorate: Political Affairs

Africa Directorate
Arab Countries Directorate
Asia & Latin America Directorate
Socialist Countries of Europe Directorate
Europe & North America Directorate
Press & Information Directorate

GAU & Regional Organisations Sub. Direct.
Arab: Arab League Sub. Direct.
Maghreb Sub. Direct.
Arab Countries: Middle East Sub. Direct.
West Asia Sub. Direct.
East Asia Sub. Direct.
South America Sub. Direct.

Socialist: Socialist Countries of Central & Meridian Europe Sub. Direct.
USUR & Organisations of Socialist Countries Sub. Direct.

Europe: EEC Sub. Direct.
Central Meridian & Western Countries of Europe Sub. Direct.

Analysis & Information Sub. Direct.

General Directorate: International Cooperation

Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate
3 Sub-Directorates
Cultural and Social Affairs and Scientific and Technical Cooperation Directorate
3 Sub-Directorates

General Directorate: Consular and Legal Affairs

Consular and Emigration Affairs Directorate
Movement and Exchange Directorate

General Directorate: Protocol

Ceremonies and Official Visits Directorate
Immunities, Privileges and Official Documents Directorate


Source: Nicole, op. cit., p. 336, and modified according to Algeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algiers, SNED, 1980.
APPENDIX FOUR
PREAMBULE

Dans le cadre de la souveraineté algérienne, l'Algérie et la France s'engagent à coopérer pour assurer la continuité des efforts de mise en valeur des richesses du sous-sol saharien.

L'Algérie succède à la France dans ses droits, prérogatives et obligations de puissance publique concédante au Sahara pour l'application de la législation minière et pétrolière, compte tenu des modalités prévues au titre III de la présente déclaration.

L'Algérie et la France s'engagent, chacun en ce qui le concerne, à respecter les principes de coopération ci-dessus enoncés, à observer les titres ci-après:

TITRE I - HYDROCARBURES LIQUIDES ET GAZEUX

A) GARANTIE DES DROITS ACQUIS ET DE LEURS PROLOGENGEMENTS.

1. L'Algérie confirme l'intégralité des droits attachés aux titres minières et transport accordés par la République françaises en application du code pétrolier saharien.

Le présent paragraphe concerne l'ensemble des titres minières et transport délivrés par la France avant l'autodétermination; toutefois, après le cessez le feu, il ne sera pas délivré de nouveaux permis exclusifs de recherche sur des surfaces non encore attribuées, sauf si les zones intéressées on fait l'objet d'un avis de mise à l'enquête publié avant cette date au "Journal officiel" de la République française.

a) Par "titres minières et de transport", il faut entendre essentiellement:

1. Les autorisations de prospection;
2. Les permis exclusifs de recherche, dit permis H;
3. Les autorisations provisoires d'exploiter;

4. Les concessions d’exploitation et de conventions correspondantes;
5. Les approbations de projets d’ouvrage de transport d’hydrocarbures et les autorisations de transport correspondantes.

b) Par “code pétrolier saharien”, il faut entendre l’ensemble des dispositions de toute nature applicables, à la date du cessez-le-feu, à la recherche, à l’exploitation et au transport des hydrocarbures produits dans les départements Oasis et de la Saoura et notamment au transport de ces hydrocarbures jusqu’aux terminaux marins.

2. - Les droits et obligations des détenteurs de titres miniers et de transport visés au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus et des personnes physique ou morales qui leur sont associées dans le cadre de protocoles, accords ou contrats, approuvés par République française, sont ceux définis par le code pétroliers saharien et par les présentes dispositions.

3. - Le droit pour le détenteur de titres miniers et ses associés de transporter ou faire transporter par canalisations, dans des conditions économiques normales, sa production d’hydrocarbures liquides ou gazeuses jusqu’aux points de traitement ou de chargement et d’assurer l’exportation s’exerce, en ce qui concerne la fixation du tracé des canalisations, selon les recommandation de l’organisme.

4. - Le droit du concessionnaire et des associés, dans le cadre de leur organisation commerciale propre ou de celle de leur choix, de vendre et de disposer librement de la production, c’est-à-dire de la céder, de l’échanger ou de l’utiliser en Algérie ou à l’exportation, s’exerce sous réserve de la satisfaction des besoins de la consommation intérieure algérienne et du raffinage sur place.

5. - Les taux de change et les parités monétaire applicable à toutes les opérations commerciales ou financières devront être conformes aux parités officielles reconnues par le Fond monétaire international.

6. - Les dispositions du présent titre sont applicable sans distinction à tous les titulaires de titres miniers ou de transport et à leur associés, quelle que soit la nature juridique, l’origine ou la répartition de leur capital et indépendamment de toute condition de nationalité des personnes ou de leur siège social.

7. - L’Algérie s’abstiendra de toute mesure de nature à rendre plus onéreux ou à faire obstacle à l’exercice des droits ci-dessus garantis, compte tenu des conditions économiques normales. Elles ne portera pas atteinte aux droits et intérêts de actionnaires, porteurs de parts ou créanciers des titulaires de titre miniers ou de transport, de leurs associés ou des entreprises travaillant pour leur compte.

B) Garanties concernant l’avenir (nouveaux titres miniers ou de transport).

8. - Pendant une période de six ans, à compter de la mise en vigueur des dispositions,
l’Algérie accordera la priorité aux sociétés françaises en matière de permis de recherche et d’exploitation, à égalité d’offre concernant les surfaces non encore attribuées ou rendues disponiblable. Le régime applicable sera celui défini par la législation algérienne en vigueur, les sociétés françaises conservant le régime du code pétrolier saharien visé au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus à l’égard des titres miniers couverts par la grantis des droits acquis.

Par “Sociétés françaises”, au sens du présent paragraphe, il faut entendre les sociétés dont le contrôle est effectivement assuré par des personnes morales ou physiques françaises.

9. - L’Algérie s’interdit toute mesure discriminatoire au préjudice des Sociétés françaises et de leurs associés intervenants dans la recherche, l’exploitation ou le transport des hydrocarbures liquides ou gazeux.

10. - Les opérations d’achat et de vente à l’exportation d’hydrocarbures d’origine saharienne destinés directement ou par la voie d’échanges technique à l’approvisionnement de la France et des autres pays de la zone de franc donnent lieu à un règlement en francs français.

Les exportations d’hydrocarbures sahariens hors de la zone franc ouvrent, à concurrence des gains nets en devises en resultant, des droits de tirage en devises au profit de l’Algérie; les accords de coopération monétaire, visés à l’article 11 de la déclaration de principes sur la coopération économique et financière précisent les modalités pratiques d’application de ce principe.

Titre II- Autres substances minérales

11. - L’Algérie confirme l’intégralité de droit attachés aux titres miniers accordés par la République françaises pour les substances minérales autre que les hydrocarbures; le régime de ces titres restera celui de l’ensemble des dispositions applicables à la date du cessez-le-feu.

Le présent paragraphe concerne l’ensemble des titres miniers délivrés par la France avant l’autodetermination; toutefois, après le cessez-le-feu, il ne sera délivré de nouveaux permis exclusifs de recherche sur des surfaces non encore attribuées, sauf si les zones intéressées ont fait l’objet d’un avis de mise à l’enquête publié avant cette date au "journal officiel" de la République française.

12. - Les sociétés françaises pourront prétendre à l’octroi de nouveaux permis de concessions dans les mêmes conditions que les autres sociétés; elles bénéficieront d’un traitement aussi favorable que ces dernières pour l’exercice des droits résultant de ces titres miniers.
DECLARATION DE PRINCIPES RELATIVE AUX QUESTIONS MILITAIRES

ARTICLE PREMIER - L’Algérie concède à la bail à la France l’utilisation de la base aéronavales de Mers-el-Kébir pour une période de 15 ans à compter de l’autodétermination. Ce bail est renouvelable par accord entre les deux pays.

Le caractère algérien du territoire sur lequel est édifiée la base de Mers-el-Kébir est reconnu par la France.

ART. 2. - La base de Mers-el-Kébir est délimitée conformément à la carte annexées à la présente déclaration.

Sur le partout de la base, l’Algérie s’engage à accorder à la France en des points précisés sur la carte annexées et situés dans la communes d’El ancor, Bou Télés et Misserghgin ainsi que dans les îles Habibas et Plane, les installations et facilités nécessaires au fonctionnement de la base.

ART.3. - L’aérodrome de Lartigue et l’établissement de l’Arbal délimités par le périmètre figurant sur la carte annexée à la présente déclaration seront considérés pendant une durée de 3 ans comme faisant partie de la base de Mers-el-Kébir et seront soumis au même régime.

Après la mise en service de l’aérodrome de Bou-Sfer, l’aérodrom de Lartigue pourra être utilisé comme terrain de dégagement, lorsque les circonstance atmosphérique l’exigeront.

La construction de l’aérodrome de Bou-Sfer s’effectuera en une durée de trois années.

ART.4. - La France utilisera pour une durée de 5 ans les site comprenant les instatlations d’In Ekker, Reggane et de l’ensemble de Clom-Béchar-Hammaguir, dont le périmètre et délimité dans le plan annexée, ainsi que les stations techniques de la localisation correspondantes.

Les mesures temporaires que comporte le fonctionnement des installations à l’extérieur de celle-ci, notamment en matière de circulation terrestre et aérienne, seront prises par les services français en accord avec les autorités algérienne.

ART.5. - Des facilités de liaison aérienne seront mises à la disposition de la France dans les conditions suivantes:


* Pendant 5 ans sur les aérodromes de Bône et de Boufarik où la France aura des facilités techniques ainsi que des possibilités d’escale, de ravitaillement et de réparations; les deux
pays s'entendront sur les facilités qui seront ensuite consenties sur ces deux terrains.

ART. 6. - Les installations militaires énumérées ci-dessus ne serviront en aucun cas à des fins offensives.

ART. 7. - Les effectifs de forces françaises seront progressivement réduits à partir du cessez-le-feu.

Cette réduction aura pour effet de ramener les effectifs, dans un délai de 12 mois à compter de l'autodétermination, à 80000 hommes. Le rapatriement de ces effectifs devra avoir été réalisé à l'expiration d'un second délai de 24 mois. Jusqu'à l'expiration de ce dernier délai, des facilités seront mises à la disposition de la France sur les terrains nécessaire au regroupement et à la circulation des forces françaises.

ART. 8. - L'annexe ci-jointe fait partie intégrante de la présente déclaration.

Annexe- En ce qui concerne Mers-el-Kébir.

ARTICLE PREMIER. - Les droits reconnus à la France à Mers-el-Kébir comprennent l'utilisation du sous-sol, des eaux territoriales de la base et de l'espace aérien sur-jacent.

ART. 2. - Seuls les aéronefs militaires français circulent librement dans l'espace aérien de Mers-el-Kébir, dans lequel les autorités françaises assurent le contrôle de la circulation aérienne.

ART. 3. - Dans la base de Mers-el-kebir, les populations civiles sont administrées par les autorités algériennes pour tout ce qui ne concerne pas l'utilisation et le fonctionnement de la base.

Les autorités françaises exercent tous les pouvoirs nécessaires à l'utilisation et au fonctionnement de la base notamment en matière de défense, de sécurité et de maintien de l'ordre, dans la mesure où celui-ci concerne directement la défense et la sécurité.

Elles assurent la police et la circulation de tout engins terrestre, aérien et maritimes. Les missions de gendarmerie sont assurées par les prévôté militaire.

ART. 4. - L'installation de nouveaux habitants sur le territoire de la base pourra faire l'objet des restrictions nécessaires par accord entre les autorités françaises et algériennes.

Si les circonstances l'exigent, l'évacuation de tout ou partie de la population civile pourra être prescrite par les autorités algériennes à la demande de la France.

ART. 5. - Tout individu qui trouble l'ordre, dans la mesure ou il porte atteinte à la défense et à la sécurité de la base, est remis par les autorités françaises aux autorités algériennes.

ART. 6. - La liberté de circulation sur les itinéraires reliant entre elles les installations
situé sur le partout de la base et reliant ces installations à la base de Mers-el-Kebir est assurée en toutes circonstances.

**ART. 7.** - Les autorités françaises peuvent louer et acheter dans la base tous les biens meubles et immeubles qu'elle jugent nécessaires.

**ART. 8.** - Les autorités algériennes prendront, à la requête des autorités françaises, les mesures de requision ou d'expropriation jugées nécessaires à la vie et au fonctionnement de la base. Ces mesures donneront lieu à une indemnité équitable et préalablement fixées, à la charge de la France.

**ART. 9.** - Les autorités algériennes prendront les mesures pour assurer l'approvisionnement de la base en eau et en électricité, en toutes circonstances, ainsi que l'utilisation des services publics.

**ART. 10.** - Les autorités algériennes interdisent à l'extérieur de la base tout activité susceptible de porter atteinte à l'utilisation de cette base et prennent, en liaison avec les autorités françaises, toutes les mesures propres à en assurer la sécurité.

En ce qui concerne les sites:

**ART. 11.** - Dans les sites visés à l'article 4 de la Déclaration des principes, la France maintient le personnel, les installations, et entretient les équipements et matériels techniques qui lui sont nécessaires.

**ART. 12.** - Les autorités françaises peuvent dans les aérodromes de Reggane, Clom-Béchar, In Amguiel, maintenir le personnel, entretenir le stocks, les installations, équipements et matériels techniques qu'elle jugent nécessaires.

**ART. 13.** - Tout individu se trouvant sans titre ou troubiant l'ordre public dans les sites et aérodromes visés ci-dessus et remis au autorités algériennes par les autorités françaises.

Ence qui concerne les facilités aériennes.

**ART. 14.** - La France dispose des radars de Régahaia et de Bouzizi. Ces radars sont utilisés pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne général, tant civile et militaire.

**ART. 15.** - Sur les aérodromes mentionnés au deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 de la Déclaration de principes, les autorités algérienne assurent la sécurité extérieure et prennent éventuellement à l'extérieur les mesures propre à assurer le fonctionnement efficace des installations.

**ART. 16.** - Les aéronefs militaires français utilisent, en se conformant aux règles de la circulation général, l'espace aérien reliant entre eux les aérodromes que la France a le droit d'utiliser.
ART. 17. - Les services météorologiques français et algériens coopèrent en se prêtant mutuellement appuis.

En ce qui concerne les facilités de circulation terrestre:

ART. 18. - Les éléments constitués de forces françaises et tous les matériels, ainsi que les membres isolés de forces, circulent librement par voie terrestre entre tous les points où stationnent ces forces, en utilisant les moyens ferroviaires ou routiers existant en Algérie.

Les déplacements importants se feront avec l’accord des autorités algériennes.

En ce qui concerne les facilités de circulation maritimes:


ART. 20. - L’accès de navires de guerre français à des rades et ports algériens fera l’objet d’accord ultérieurs.

En ce qui concerne les télécommunications:

ART. 21. - La France a le droit d’exploitation exclusive des moyens de télécommunications de la base de Mers-el-Kébîr et des installations françaises situées dans les escales aériens et dans les sites visés à l’article 4 de la Déclaration. Elle traitera directement des attributions de fréquences avec l’Union internationale de télécommunications.

ART. 22. - Les forces françaises pourront utiliser pour leurs liaisons le circuits télégraphique et téléphoniques de l’Algérie, et en particulier le faisceaux hertziens d’infrastructure:
- Oran-Bône avec les relais de Chréa, Setif, Kef-el-Akkal et Bouzizi;
- Oran-Colom-Béchar, avec les relais de Saida, Mecheria, Ain-Sefra.

Des accords ultérieurs fixeront les conditions d’utilisation des installations techniques correspondantes.

En ce qui concerne le statuts des forces en Algérie:

ART. 23. - Sont désignés par l’application du présent statut par le terme Membres de l’armées françaises:

a) Les militaires des trois armées en service en transit ou en permission en Algérie.
b) Le personnel civil employé au titre statutaire ou contractuel, par les forces armées
françaises à l'exclusion des nationaux algériens.
c) Les personnes à la charge des individus ci-dessus visés.

ART. 24. - Les membres des forces françaises entrent en Algérie et en sortent sur
la présentation des seuls pièces suivants:
- Carte d'identité national ou militaire, ou passeport;
- Pour les personnes civiles, carte d'identité et attestation d'appartenance aux forces
françaises.
Ils circulent librement en Algérie.

Art. 25. - Les unités et détachements constitués sont astreints au port de l'uniforme.
La tenue de ville des isoles fera l'objet d'un règlement ultérieur.
Les membres des forces armées en détachement seront autorisés au port d'armes
apparentes.

En ce qui concerne les dispositions judiciaires:

ART. 26. - Les infractions commises par des membres des forces armées, soit en
service ou à l'intérieure des installations françaises, soit ne mettant pas en cause des
intérêt de l'Algérie, notamment en matière de l'ordre public, sont de la compétence des
juridictions militaires françaises. Les autorités françaises peuvent s'assurer de la personne
des auteurs présumés de telle infractions.

ART. 27.- Les personnels de nationalité algérienne, auteurs d'infractions commises
à l'intérieure des installations, sont remis sans délai, en vue de leur jugement, aux autorités
algériennes.

ART. 28. - Toute infraction non visée à l'article 26 ci-dessus est de la compétence
des tribunaux algérien.
Les deux gouvernement peuvent toutefois renoncer à exercer leur droit de
jurisdiction.

ART. 29. - Les membres des forces françaises déferés devant les juridictions
algériennes et dont la détention et jugée nécessaire sont incarcérés dans les locaux
pénitentiaires dépendant de l'autorités militaire française, qui les fait comparaître à la
demande de l'autorité algérienne.

ART. 30. - En cas de flagrant délit, les membres des forces françaises sont
apprêhendés par les autorités algériennes et sont remis sans délai aux autorités françaises
en vue de leur jugement dans la mesure où celles-ci exercent leur jugement sur les
intéressés.

ART. 31. - Les membres des forces françaises poursuivis devant un tribunal
algérien ont droit de garanties de bonne justice consacrées par la Déclaration universelle
des droits de l'homme et la pratique des États démocratiques.

**ART. 32.** - L'État français réparera équitablement les dommages éventuellement causés par les forces armées et les membres de ces forces à l'occasion du service dûment constatés. En cas de contestation, les deux gouvernement auront recours à l'arbitrage.

Sous réserve des dispositions de l'alinéa précédent, les tribunaux algérien connaissent des actions civils dirigées contre les membres des forces armée. Les autorités française prétent leur concours aux autorités algérienne, qui en font la demande, pour assurer l'exécution des décisions des tribunaux algérien en matière civile.

En ce qui concerne les disposition d'ordre économique et financier:

**ART. 33.** - Les forces armées françaises et les membres des ces forces peuvent se procurer les biens et services qui leur sont nécessaires, dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux algériens.

**ART. 34.** - Les autorités françaises peuvent disposer d'un service de Post aux armées et d'une paierie militaire.

**ART. 35.** - Les dispositions fiscales seront réglées par des accords ultérieurs.
TEXT OF THE DECISION OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA AT ITS FIRST MEETING, NAIROBI, KENYA (24 AUGUST 1981).¹

The OAU implementation committee on the Western Sahara ...conscious of the need for all the parties concerned to cooperate for the successful implementation of Resolution AHG/RES. 103 (XVIII), of the eighteenth ordinary session of the assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, so as to attain the objectives laid down in the resolution and make the parties concerned agree on the steps to be taken in the context of that resolution; taking into consideration the need for the UN to participate in the referendum and cease-fire, by virtue of resolution AHG/Res. 103 (XVIII), adopted by eighteenth, ordinary session of the assembly of the OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, in June 1981.

Decides to organise and conduct a general and free referendum in the Western Sahara, establish and maintain the cease-fire, as follow:

(a) Referendum

1. The referendum shall be one of self-determination which will enable the people of the Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on the future of their territory.
2. The referendum shall be held in the Western Sahara (ex-Spanish Sahara) the maps of which were deposited with the UN.
3. All Sahrawis listed in the census conducted in 1974 by the Spanish authorities who have attained the age of 18 or above, shall be eligible to vote in the referendum. In determining the Saharawi refugee population in the neighbouring countries, reference should be made to the records of the UNHCR. In establishing the population of the Western Sahara, account shall be taken of the internationally recognised rate of population growth.
4. The voting shall be by secret ballot on the basis of one person, one vote.
5. The people of the western Sahara shall be given the following choice:

(a) Independence, or

(b) Integration with Morocco

(b) Structural Requirements

1. The referendum shall be organised and conducted by the implementation committee in collaboration with the UN.

2. For a fair and impartial organisation of the referendum, an impartial interim administration, supported civilian, military and police components, shall be set up.

3. The interim administration shall also be assisted by an adequate number of UN peacekeeping force.

(c) Cease-fire

1. The committee urges the parties concerned to agree on a cease-fire through negotiations under the auspices of the implementation committee.

2. All the parties concerned shall undertake to respect the cease-fire and to maintain it after the proclamation of the date fixed by the implementation committee.

3. For the fair conduct of the referendum and strict observance of the cease-fire, troops of the parties to the conflict should be effectively confined to their bases in conformity with the recommendations of the fifth session of the Ad hoc Committee of the Heads of State on Western Sahara held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 9 to 11 September 1980.

4. The peacekeeping forces shall be stationed in the area so as to guarantee the cease-fire.

(D) Financing the implementation of the Decision

The OAU current chairman shall consult the UN in order to determine involvement in the implementation of this decision including its financing.

(E) General principles
1. All the parties undertake to respect the results of the referendum.

2. Neighbouring countries undertake to respect the results of the referendum and to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. The implementation committee shall announce the results of the referendum.

Implementation Committee members: Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea.
APPENDIX SIX
a) Western Sahara

The OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government... Having examined the Report of the Implementation Committee of Heads of States on Western Sahara; recalling the solemn commitment made by His majesty King Hassan II during the 18th Summit to accept the holding of a referendum in the western Sahara to enable the people of that territory to exercise their right to self-determination; recalling with appreciation, His majesty King Hassan's acceptance of the recommendation of the Sixth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on western Sahara contained in Document AHG/103 (XVIII) of 27 June 981:

1. Takes note of the reports of the implementation Committee of heads of state on Western Sahara;
2. Urges the parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bring about a cease-fire to create the necessary condition for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of western Sahara, a referendum without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the OAU and the UN and calls on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the cease-fire;
3. Directs the Implementation Committee to meet as soon as possible, and in collaboration with the parties to the conflict should continue to work out the modalities and all other details relevant to the implementation of the cease-fire and of the referendum in December 1983;
4. Requests the UN, in conjunction with OAU, to produce a peacekeeping force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organisation and conduct of the Referendum;
5. Mandates the Implementation Committee, with the participation of the UN, to take all necessary measures to ensure the referendum;
6. Requests the Implementation Committee to report to the 20th Assembly of heads of State and Government on the result of the Referendum with a view to enabling the 20th Summit to reach a final decision on all aspects of the question of the Western Sahara;
9. Welcomes the constructive attitude of the Sahrawi leaders in making it possible for the 19th Summit to meet by withdrawing from it voluntarily and temporarily.

---

TRAITE DE FRATERNITE ET DE CONCORDE.1

La République Algérienne, Démocratique et Populaire et
La République Tunisienne,

Ayant foi en leur communauté de destin dans le cadre du Grand Maghreb Arabe,
Conscientes de leur appartenance au monde arabe et islamique, au continent africain et
de la nécessité de renforcer les liens de rapprochement et de la solidarité entre les deux
Peuples Frères,

Désireuse de renforcer la stabilité et la sécurité dans la région du Grand Maghreb Arabe
et dans le monde,

Convaincus de contribuer ainsi à la consolidation des relations de voisinage positives et
de coopération fraternelle de l’existantes entre les pays du Grand maghreb Arabe,

Resolues à œuvrer, en commun, pour un développement complémentaire et globale de
leurs deux sociétés répondant ainsi aux aspirations de leurs deux peuples vers le progrès
et la prospérité,

Se fondant sur le traité de fraternité, de bon voisinage et de coopération signé à Tunis le
6 Janvier 1970,

Déterminées à conjuger leurs efforts pour le renforcement de la justice, de la paix, de la
sécurité et de la coexistence pacifique dans le monde et à poursuivre leur action pour le
respect de l’application des principes des Nations- Unies, de l’OUA et de la ligue Arabe,

Convaincus qu’un traité de fraternité et de concorde implique nécessairement le règlement
de tout différend pouvant surgir entre elles par des moyens pacifiques, conformément aux
principes de la Charte de Nations- Unies,

Sont convenues des dispositions suivantes:

1 Source: JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE (23), 4 Juin 1983.
Article 1er

En vue de renforcer entre les deux pays les relations pacifiques, fraternelles de bon voisinage, fondées sur leur appartenance au Grand Maghreb et sur leur communeauté de destin ainsi que sur le respect des principes de la souveraineté national, de l'égalité des droits des peuples et de leur droit à disposer d'eux-mêmes, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à œuvrer continuellement pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité entre elles et, d'une façon générale, entre tous les pays du Grand Maghreb Arabe.

Article 2

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à s'abstenir de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force pour régler les différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles, compte tenu de l'authenticité des liens historiques qui unissent les deux peuples, en vue de préserver une coopération fraternelle et fructueuse et de maintenir entre elles une paix permanente basée sur le respect mutuel de l'intégrité territoriale, de l'inténgibilité de leurs frontières nationales, de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance politique de chacun d'elles.

Elles s'engagent également à résoudre les différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles par la voie de la concertation, de la négociation ou par toute autre voie pacifique.

Article 3

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à n'adhérer à aucune alliance ou coalition de caractère militaire ou politique avec un ou plusieurs états tiers dirigée contre l'indépendance politique, l'intégrité territoriale ou la sécurité de l'autre partie contractante.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à ne tolérer, sur son territoire, aucune initiative ou acte découlant d'une attitude hostile adoptée par un ou plusieurs autres États tiers contre l'une d'elles.

Article 4

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à ne pas tolérer, sur leur territoire, l'organisation et l'activité de regroupement qui attenteraient à la sécurité et à l'intégrité
territoriale de l'autre partie ou tenteraient par violence de changer son régime.

**Article 5**

Chacune des parties contractantes conserve sa pleine liberté d'action pour conclure avec un État tiers, tout accord qui ne seraient pas contraire aux disposition du présent traité.

**Article 6**

Le présent traité demeurera ouvert à l'adhésion, avec l'accord des hautes parties contractantes, aux autres États du Grand Maghreb Arabe qui en accepteraient les dispositions.

**Article 7**

Le présent traité sera valable pour une durée de vingt ans. Il sera ratifié conformément aux procédure constitutionnelles en vigueur dans chacune des hautes parties contractantes. Il entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification.

A l'expiration de la période de vingt ans, le présent traité sera renouvelé par tacite reconduction et pour même durée, a moins que l'une des hautes parties contractantes ne le dénonce par écrit, un an au moins avant la date d'expiration de la période en cours.

Le présent traité établi en deux exemplaire originaux, en langue arabe, les deux texte faisant également foi.

Fait à Tunis, le 4 jumada II 1403 correspondant au 19 mars 1983.

P. La République algérienne démocratique et populaire
Chadli BENDJADID

P. La République tunisienne,
Habib BOURGUIBA
APPENDIX EIGHT
TRAITE INSTITUANT UNE UNION ENTRE LE ROYAUME DU MAROC ET LA JAMAHIRYA ARABE LIBYENNE POPULAIRE ET SOCIALIST. ¹

Le Royaume du Maroc et la Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste, consciente des dangers auxquels se trouvent exposés la Nation Arabe et le Monde musulman en général, et la Palestine et Jérusalem en particulier, du fait de la politique de violence et d’agression pratiquée par les sionistes qui, mus par l’orgueil et aveuglés par leur arrogance et leur superbe, ne cessent de porter atteinte aux valeurs sacrés de l’islame et de violer les droits des musulmans et des Arabes, faisant fi des principes et des idéaux sur lesquels est fondée la communauté international et ne sentant nullement obligés par les résolutions émises par des organisations internationales de tous niveaux, considérant que, pour conjurer ces dangers qui menacent la Nation arabe et le Monde musulman, et en premier lieu la Palestine et Jérusalem, il importe de réaliser l’identité de vue, d’aiguiser et d’assurer le triomphe de la Justice, le sauvegarde des intérêts des Arabes et des musulmans et la défense de leur droit à l’existence et à la dignité,

Convaincus que l’adoption d’une telle conduite constituera un facteur décisif devant permettre à la Nation Arabe et au Monde musulman de retrouver leur grandeur d’antan, d’occuper dans le monde une place digne de leur passé prestigieux et de consacrer leurs efforts à œuvrer pour la promotion de leurs peuples et à le préparer à aborder le vingt et unième siècle armés de tout ce qui pourra leur assurer un rang élevé parmi les peuples développés dans les domaines de la science et de la technique ainsi que dans les autres domaines du progrès humain et de la civilisation,

Tenant compte des obstacles auxquelles se heurte la concrétisation de l’Unité Arabe, comme l’a motré l’échec d’expérience précédentes, et considérant que la sagesse commande de tirer la leçon de cet insuccès, dû au fait d’avoir sous-estimé les difficultés de l’entreprise, et que la meilleure conduite à adopter dans ce domaine consiste à mener une action persévérante et inlassable pour atteindre progressivement le but visé, sans précipitation dans la conception ni improvisation lorsqu’il s’agira de passer à la réalisation,

Consciente plus particulièrement des liens solides existant entre les peuples du Maghreb arabe, unis par la communauté d'origine, la géographie, l'histoire, la religion, la langue, la similitude des modes de vie et des types de civilisation, et prenant en considération l'aspiration ancienne de ces peuples et leurs dirigeants à établir entre eux une union qui renforce leurs rapports fondé sur le voisinage et la communauté de destin et leur permettra d'aller de l'avant dans la voie de la création d'un ensemble intégré qui sera d'un poids non négligeable dans les domaines politiques et économique parmi les peuples du monde développé, et notamment au sein de ceux du bassin méditerranéen qui, abstraction faite de leurs spécificités respectives, se partagent un même héritage de civilisation constitué pour l'essentiel, de valeurs spirituelle et intellectuelles communes,

Desireux de répondre à ces aspirations et de contribuer à leur concrétisation, d'une manière réaliste, afin qu'elle passent du domaine de vœux à celui d'une parfaite réalisation,

Considérant que le meilleur moyen de parvenir à ce but consiste à instituer entre eux une union susceptible de devenir un point de départ en vue de la mise en place de structures plus vaste dont l'objectif sera de servir l'unité des peuples arabes et musulmans et de réaliser leur aspirations,

Considérant que cette union constitue une contribution essentielle à l'unité du Maghreb arabe et partant, un pas historique dans la voie de la réalisation de l'unité de la nation Arabe sont convenus de ce qui suit:

**Article premier**

Sous la dénomination d'union arabo-africaine, il est formé une union d'États entre le Royaume du Maroc et la Jamahiriya Arab Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste.

**Article deux**


**Article trois**

Le rythme de l’alternance est deux ans.

Article quatre

L’Union dispose des conseils suivants:

- un conseil politique
- un conseil de défense
- un conseil économique
- un conseil d’action culturelle et technique

Ces conseils sont, selon les décisions de la Présidence, composés, par parties égales, de délégus de chacun des Etats.

Ces conseils, de nature consultative, ont pour mission, chacun dans son ordre de compétence:
- d’étudier les questions qui lui sont soumises par la Présidence,
- d’en proposer les solutions
- à la demande de la Présidence, de preparer tous projets utiles

Article cinq

L’union est dotée d’une assemblée d’union composées de membres de la chambre des représentants du Royaume du Maroc et du Congrès Général du Peuple de La Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste.

La mission de cette Assemblée est de sommtrer à la Présidence des recommandations en vue de renforcement de l’union et de la réalisation de ses objectifs.

Article six

L’union comporte une commission exécutive formée du conseil des ministres du Royaume du Maroc et de la Commission Populaire Générale de la Jamahiriya Arabe
Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste.

La commission Exécutive, dont le rôle est de suivre les décisions de la Présidence et d'en assurer l'exécution, se réunit à intervalles réguliers, alternativement dans chacun des deux pays.

Article sept

L'union est dotée d'une cour de justice dont la composition est fixée par décision de la Présidence.

Si un différend surgi entre les deux parties contractantes en ce qui concerne l'exécution ou l'interprétation du présent traité, chacune d'elles aura le droit d'en saisir la Cour de l'union pour y statuer.

Les décisions et les avis de la Cour sont definitifs et obligatoires.

Article huit

L'union a pour objet:
- de renforcer les liens de Fraternité entre les deux États et les deux peuples;
- de promouvoir les progrès de la communauté Arabe et de défendre ses droits;
- de participer à la sauvegarde de la paix chaque fois qu'elle est fondée sur la justice de l'équité et empreinte de stabilité et de permanence;
- de mettre en œuvre des politiques communes;
- de contribuer à l'unification du Maghreb Arabe et, partant, à la réalisation de l'unité de la Nation Arabe.

Article neuf

Les politiques communes visée à l'article précédent concernent:
- dans le domaine international, la fraternelle entente entre les deux pays et leur étroite coopération diplomatique;
- dans le domaine de la défense, la sauvegarde de l'indépendence de chacun des deux pays;
- dans le domaine économique, le développement industriel, agricole, commercial et social, au moyen notamment de la création d'entreprises communes et l'élaboration de programmes économiques généraux ou spécifiques;
- dans le domaine culturel, une coopération tendant au développement de
l'instruction à tous les niveaux, à la préservation des valeurs spirituelles et morales fondées sur les sains engagements de l'Islame et à la suvegarde de l'identité nationale Arabe, par le moyen notamment d'échanges d'enseignants et d'étudiants, de la création d'institutions universitaires, culturelles et de recherche communes.

Article dix

L'union dispose d'un budget de fonctionnement et d'un budget de développement.

Article onze

Dans le respect sans réserve de leur souveraineté respective, chacun des deux Etats s'engage à ne point intervenir dans les affaires interieures de l'autre Etats.

Article douze

Toute agression dont l'un des deux Etats serait l'objet constituerait une agression envers l'autre.

Article treize

L'union n'exclut pour aucune des parties contractantes la conclusion d'accord analogues ou similaires que chacune d'elles pourrait conclure avec des Etats tiers.

Avec l'agrément des deux parties contractantes des Etats tiers appartenant à la nation Arabe ou à la Communauté Africaine pourront adhérer au présent traité et devenir membre de l'Union.

Article quatorze

Une commission ad-hoc dont les membres seront désignés par la Présidence presentra des projets d'accords complémentaires tendant à préciser ou à développer les dispositions ci-dessus.

Ces projets seront soumis à la Présidence pour décision.

Article quinze
Les intérêts de chacun des deux États seront représentés dans l'autre par un Ministre ou Secrétaire (Amin) résident

Article seize

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur des son approbation, par la voie de référendum, par le Peuple du Royaume du Maroc et le Peuple de la Jamahiriya Arab Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste, conformément aux procédures applicables dans chacun des deux États.

Fait à Oudjda, le 16 Kaada 1404 (13 août 1984).

Signé: HASSAN II, Roi du Maroc
APPENDIX NINE
Décret présidentiel no 85-54 du mai 1989 portant ratification du traité consiutif de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe, signé à Marrakech le 17 février 1989.1

Le Président de la République,
Vu la Consitution, notamment ses articles 74-1 et 122;
Vu la loi no 89-04 du 1er mars 1989 portant approbation du traité de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe, signé à Marrakech le 17 février 1989 ;
Vu le traité constitutif de l'Union du Maghreb, signé à Marrakech le 17 février 1989;

Décrite:


Art. 2. - Le présent décret sera publié au Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire.

Fait à Alger, le 2 mai 1989.

Chadli BENDJADID.

Au nom de Dieu Clément et Miséricordieux

TRAITE PORTANT CREATION DE L'UNION DU MAGHREB ARABE

Sa Majesté Hassan II, Roi du Maroc,

Son Excellence Monsieur Zine El Abidine Benali, Président de la République Tunisienne.

1 Source: JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE (3 May 1989).
Son Excellence Monsieur Chadli Bendjedid, Président de la République Algérienne Democratique et Populaire,

Le Guide de la Révolution du glorieux premier septembre, le Colonel Moammar El Guaddafi, de la Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire Socialist la Grande,

Son Excellence le colonel Mou’auïya Ould Sidi Ahmed Tayaa, Président du Comité Militaire du Salut National, Chef de l’Etat de la République Islamique de la Mauritanie,

Convaincus de la solidarité des liens fondés sur l’histoire, la religion et la langue communs aux peuple maghrébin;

Répondant aux pronfondes et constantes aspirations de ces peuples et de leurs dirigeants à l’instauration d’une Union renforçant leurs relations et leur donnant les moyens appropriés pour la réalisation progressive d’une plus grande intégration entre eux;

Conscients de l’impact de cette intégration sur l’Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) qui lui permettra de peser de tout son poids pour contribuer efficacement à l’équilibre mondial, au raffermissement des relations internationales et à l’instauration de la sécurité et de la stabilité du Monde;

Fermement déterminés à œuvrer pour que l’Union du Maghreb soit un moyen permettant la concrétisation de l’Unité arabe globale et un point de départ vers une Union plus vaste ouverte à d’autres Etats arabes et africains;

Ont convenu de ce qui suit:

Article 1er

Il est créé, en vertu du présent traité, une Union dénommée l’Union du Maghreb Arabe (U.M.A).

Article 2

L’Union se fixe pour objectifs:
- Renforcer les relations fraternelles unissant les Etats membres et leurs peuples
- Réaliser le progrès et la prosperité de leurs sociéte et défendre leurs droits.
- Participer au maintien de la paix fondée sur la justice et l’équité.
- Adopter une politique commune dans les différents domaines.
- Oeuvrer progressivement à assurer entre les Etats maghrébins la libre circulation des personnes, des services des biens et des capitaux.

Article 3

La politique conjointe mentionnée à l'article précédent vise à la réalisation des objectifs suivants:
- Au plan international: Assurer la concorde entre les Etats membres et instaure une coopération diplomatique étroite fondée sur le dialogue.
- Au plan de la défense : suvegarder l'indépendence de chaque Etat membre.
- Au plan économique: réaliser le développement économique, agricole, commercial et social des Etats membres et prendre, à cet effet, toutes mesures indispensables, et notamment la mise en œuvre de projets communs et l'élaboration, dans ce cadre des programmes importants et spécifiques.
- Au plan culturel: instauré une cooperation visant à développer l'enseignement dans, ses différents niveaux, suvegarder les valeurs spirituelles et morales decoulant des precepts de l'Islam, préserver l'identité nationale arabe et se doter de tous les moyens en vue d'atteindre ces objectifs, notamment par l'échange de professeurs et d'étudiants, la création d'institutions communes spécialisées dans la recherche.

Article 4

L’Union est dotée d’un conseil présidentiel composé des chefs d’Etats membres.
Il est l’organe suprême.
La présidence du conseil est fixée à six (6) mois alternativement entre les Chef d’Etats membres.

Article 5

Le conseil présidentiel de l’Union se réunit en session ordinaire tous les six (6) mois. Il peut, en tant que de besoin, tenir des sessions extraordinaires.

Article 6

Le conseil présidentiel a seul pouvoir de prendre des décisions. Les décisions sont prises
à l'unanimité de ses membres.

Article 7

Les premiers ministres des États membres ou leurs représentants peuvent se réunir en tant que de besoin.

Article 8

L'Union dispose d'un conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères qui assiste aux sessions du conseil présidentiel, examine les travaux que lui soumet le comité de suivi et les commissions ministérielles spécialisées.

Article 9


Article 10

L'Union est dotée de commissions ministérielles spécialisées créées par le conseil présidentiel qui en fixe les missions.

Article 11

L'Union est dotée d'un secrétariat général composé d'un représentant pour chaque État membre. Le secrétariat général exerce ses missions dans l'État qui assume la présidence de la session du conseil des présidents et sous la direction du président de session dont l'État prend en charge.

Article 12

L'Union est dotée d'un conseil consultatif "Choura" composé de dix (10) membres au titre de chaque État, désignés par les organes parlementaires des États membres ou conformément aux systèmes internes de chaque État.
Le conseil consultatif "Choura" se réunit une fois par an en session ordinaire. Il peut se réunir en session extraordinaire à la demande du conseil présidentiel. Le conseil émet son avis sur les projets de décision qui lui sont soumis par le conseil présidentiel. Il peut également faire parvenir au conseil présidentiel toutes les recommandations de nature à renforcer l'action de l'Union et à réaliser ses objectifs. Le conseil élabore son règlement intérieur et le soumet au conseil présidentiel pour approbation.

**Article 13**

L'Union est dotée d'un organe judiciaire composé de magistrats à raison de deux par État. Il est désigné par l'État concerné pour une durée de six (6) années. L'organe judiciaire, renouvelé par moitié tous les trois (3) ans, est présidé parmi les membres pour une durée d'une année. L'organe est compétent pour connaître des litiges relatifs à l'interprétation et à la mise en œuvre du traité et des accords conclus dans le cadre de l'Union que lui soumet le conseil présidentiel ou l'un des États parties au litige, ou conformément aux statuts de l'Union. Les arrêts de cet organe revêtent un caractère obligatoire et définitif. Il émet également des avis consultatifs sur les questions juridiques que lui soumet le conseil présidentiel. L'organe judiciaire élabore son statut et le soumet au conseil présidentiel pour adoption. Ces statuts sont parties intégrantes du traité. Le conseil présidentiel fixe le siège de l'organe et arrête son budget.

**Article 14**

Toute agression contre l'un des États membres est une agression contre les autres États membres.

**Article 15**

Les États membres s'engagent à n'autoriser aucune activité, ni aucune organisation sur leur territoire pouvant porter atteinte à la sécurité, à l'intégrité territoriale et au système politique de chacun des États membres.

**Article 16**
Les Etats membres ont la liberté de conclure tous accord entre eux, ou avec d’autre Etats ou communautés, sous réserve qu’il ne soient pas en contradiction avec les disposition de ce traité.

**Article 17**

Les autres Etats appartenant à la nation Arabe ou à la Communauté Africaine peuvent adhérer au présent traité après accord des Etats membres.

**Article 18**

Les dispositions du resent traité peuvent être ammendées sur proposition de l’un des Etats membres.
L’amendement devient executoire après son adoption par l’ensemble des Etats membres.

**Article 19**

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur après son adoption par les Etats membres selon les modalités en vigueur de chaqun des Etats membres.
Les Etats membres s’engagent à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires à cet effet dans un délai maximal de six (6) mois à compter de la signature du présent traité.

Fait à Marrakech, le vendredi 17 février 1989.

P. La République Algérienne
Démocratique et Populaire,
Chadli BENDJADID.

P. Le Royaume du Maroc,
Hassan II.

P. La Republique Tunisienne,
Zine EL abidine BENALI.

P. La Jamahiriya Arabe
Libyenne Populaire
Socialiste la Grande
Moammar EL GUEDDAFI

P. La République Islamique
de Mauritanie,
Mou’aouia Ould Sidd Ahmed TAYAA.
1 Official Documents and Speeches


US Government Printing Office, *Proposed Arms Sales to Morocco*, Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committees on International Affairs Scientific Affairs on Africa, of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
January 24 and 29, 1980.


*Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire*, 4 juin 1983.

*Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire*, 3 mai 1989.

2 Interviews


3 Books


Caplin, William, *Introduction to International Politics* (Chicago, 1974).


Chubin, Shahram and Sepehr, Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran* (California, 1974).

Clapham, Christopher (ed), *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (London,


Hargreaves, A. G., *Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*
Holl, Otmar (ed), Small States in Europe and Dependence (Wien, 1983).


Korany, Bahgat and Desouki, A. E.(eds), The Foreign Policy of Arab States (London, 1984).


Malley, Robert, The Call from Algeria. Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam (California, 1996).


Padelford, N. and Lincoln, G. The Dynamics of International Politics (New York, 1962).


Rosenau, James, International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969).

Rosenau, James, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London, 1980).


Sydnes, Kristin *The Franco-Algerian Affair: Love and Hate in Natural Gas Trade* (Norway, 1988).


Willis, Michael, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria* (Reading: 1996).


4 Articles


Balta, Paul, “L’ épineux dossier des rapports franco-algériens”, *Revue Française*


Mussard, Alex, "Impression d’Algérie", *l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes*, no. 110, Summer 1976.


Weinstein, F. B., "The Uses of Foreign Policy In Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Less Developed Countries", *World Politics*, vol. 24, 1972.


Zartman, I. W., "Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 2, January 1976.


5 Periodicals and Reports

*Africa News*, vol. 29, no. 9, 6 May 1985

(The) *Economist Intelligence Unit*, *Quarterly Economic Review of Algeria*, no. 4, 1984


6 Theses


### 7 Newspapers and Press Agencies

*Agence France Presse.*

*Algérie Presse Service.*

*Algérie Actualités.*

*AL Nahar.*

*EL Moudjahid.*

*El Hayat.*
El País.
Financial Times.
Jeune Afrique.
Le Monde.
The Economist.
The Guardian.
The Washington Post.
PRESENTATIONS
Presentations

“Enlargement: NATO, EU and Beyond/ The Southern Flank”, presentation to the annual conference organised by the United Services Institute and the Northern Universities Consortium, Manchester Metropolitan University, 5 May 1998.