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ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of terrorism in the Middle East historically has involved violent confrontation not only between governments and politically disaffected groups and movements but also between ethnically and ideologically differentiated communities. More recently governments both within and without the region have had to reckon with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which under certain conditions has led to terrorist acts motivated by strict religious prescription.

Terrorism carried on by adherents of a religious sect in response to divine ordinance is not new in the region; the assassin movement, springing from a branch of Isma'ili Shi'ism, thrived from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. Members of this group, the fedai, believed that the killing of the unrighteous was a holy act meriting salvation. This study focusses on the Shi'a of Lebanon; it analyses their resurgence as a consequence of the clash between the confessionalism of the modern Lebanese political system and their own traditional feudal organisation, and seeks to establish the linkage between their perception of religious prescription and current terrorism in the Middle East which, it is argued, is employed to obtain sectarian objectives.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Shi'a Revivalism

The twentieth century has seen the Arab World enter the modern world dominated by Western political and economic culture; by the early 1970s disillusionment had spread throughout the Middle East as political, economic and social aspirations remained unfulfilled within the social and political systems adopted around the region. Foreign models were increasingly rejected, but in so doing the Muslims of the Middle East were not rejecting modernisation as such, but rather the way it was carried out and the westernisation usually synonymous with it. Thus, Islamic responses were prompted by both cultural and political factors, a reaction to the Muslims' growing discontent and frustration and reflected their search for indigenous social and political changes and solutions to their problems. Since Islam views religion and politics as inseparable, it naturally offered the most convenient answers. Thus, Islamic revivalism may be said to constitute a "fall back ideology" to recapture the alienated, the disoriented, and the angry; in this sense Islam provides both an escape from alienation and a framework for political action.[1]
Declining legitimacy and economic mismanagement tend to produce opposition to governments which frequently respond by using coercion. The excessive use of force against opponents alienates many of the productive elements of society and may drive them to revolutionary action.

One of the great ironies of the radicalism now attributed to the Shi'a tradition is that traditionally Shi'a Islam has been the religion of the dispossessed in Islam. It has equally traditionally been used to maintain political passivity in that its traditions promise not only a heavenly reward, but also a millenarianism which offers the hope of eventual earthly rectification of material injustice. Shi'a Islam arose from the early dynastic struggles of Islam and represented those who lost when Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin - and, to the Shi'a, the rightful inheritor of the Prophet's authority - was murdered. An account of this is provided in Chapters Two and Four.

The Shi'a preserved their vision of the true Islamic polity, however, by creating the concept of the Imamate - a chain of authority passing through the generations, despite assassinations and repression, to preserve true legitimacy. Eventually, the line was broken when the last Imam vanished - different sects disagree about the
precise chronology and the persons involved. However, the hidden Imam will eventually return to lead the Shi'a community to both justice and revenge. It is evident that Shi'a Islam provides the perfect vehicle for political passivity, but with the promise of intense revivalism, once the hidden Imam returns.[2]

Although Sunni Islam has a similar tradition in its belief in Mahdism, it lacks the same doctrinal coherence. Furthermore, Shi'a Islam also provides for a much more coherent chain of authority through the gradation of the Culama - those recognised as proficient in religious matters and competent to comment on Islamic law, doctrine and principles - into a hierarchy. Such a structure, the Marja'iyyat does not exist in Sunni Islam, so that it is far more difficult to articulate authoritative political statements, with the backing of religious opinion. The Marja'iyyat structure is not the equivalent of a Christian clergy, with all its overtones of authority and coercion, for individuals can still choose within the generally defined structure which Maraj (religious leader) to follow. It is, however, far more cohesive than its Sunni equivalent.[3] It also provides a far better base for politicisation than does its Sunni counterpart.
Given these structures, it is possible to understand why Shi'a Islam was so successful in overthrowing the Shah of Iran in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini, during his years of exile in Iraq at Najaf after 1963, was able to create a powerful movement within Iran which not only condemned the Shah's regime for secularism and pro-Westernism, but also offered an alternative structure through the Marja'iyyat and a leader who could easily be conflated into the hidden Imam. In fact such a connection was never made explicit and many among the Ayatollah's supporters reject it totally - Qomi and Shariat - Madari in Iran; Khu'i in Iraq. Nonetheless, the Khomeini faction in Iran has been very successful in creating a vast wave of opinion to support the assumption that Khomeini was, virtually, the hidden Imam. It is a sentiment that has been powerfully reinforced by the Gulf War and Iran's apparent success in its conduct.

Lebanon and the Shi'a Within

Until the 1970s, Lebanon enjoyed a unique political and economic environment in the Middle East. Its parliamentary system, based on the French Basic Laws of 1875, endowed the country with stability, freedom, and prosperity. The Lebanese political environment consisted of:

1. A particular "mosaic" society;
2. An authoritarian and hierarchic family structure;
3. Religious institutions that are politically influential;

4. Power dispersed in religious sects, regional groupings, economic pressure groups, and ideologically-oriented political movements;

5. A distinct entrepreneurial ability that has produced both a small class of merchant "princes" and a large, stable petty bourgeoisie;

6. A cult leadership, historically the result of feudalism, which has produced factions of notables, each with a local clientele.[4]

The most unusual characteristic of the political process in Lebanon is confessionalism, the separation of all public institutions and disbursement of all governmental resources on a sectarian basis. The balance of power among the 17 religious sects in Lebanon was maintained by this confessionalism instituted under the original constitution of 1926. At the time of Lebanon's independence from France in 1943, the concept of confessionalism was rejuvenated by Lebanon's first institutional manifestation, the National Pact (Al-Nitaq Al-Watani). This pact was an informal agreement between President Bechara al-Khoury, a Maronite Christian, and Prime Minister Riad Sulh, a Muslim Sunni; it set the tone for the domestic and foreign policy of the state.
Consequently, the Lebanese state since its inception has dispersed resources and employed personnel strictly on a sectarian basis. Positions in the governmental structure under the pact were allocated by a six-to-five ratio in favour of the Maronite Christian, based on the 1932 population census. The six-to-five ratio has been retained and continues to determine the internal political structure of the state, notwithstanding the civil war and demographic changes that have taken place in Lebanon since 1932. Alterations to the confessional ratio have persistently been resisted by Maronite Christians for fear of losing political advantage. The non-Maronite sectarian groups frequently call for a national census and point to the woefully inadequate population statistics. Table 1 presents the census and recent official estimates of population in Lebanon.

Demographic changes in Lebanon were not properly reflected in the 1932 census. The non-Maronites' contemporary claim of woeful inadequacy of the 1932 confessional distribution may be substantiated by the problems reflected in Table 1: 1) inequitable distribution of resources mainly caused by drastic sectarian demographic changes, such as the recent and unparalleled population growth of the Shi'a, presently the largest sect in Lebanon; 2) the unreliability of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1974 (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian</strong></td>
<td>355,668</td>
<td>392,544</td>
<td>544,822</td>
<td>700,154</td>
<td>769,558</td>
<td>1.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catholic</strong></td>
<td>42,426</td>
<td>45,999</td>
<td>61,956</td>
<td>81,764</td>
<td>87,788</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maronites</strong></td>
<td>199,182</td>
<td>226,378</td>
<td>318,201</td>
<td>377,544</td>
<td>423,708</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek Catholic</strong></td>
<td>5,964</td>
<td>14,218</td>
<td>14,622</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syrian Catholic</strong></td>
<td>12,651</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>5,911</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>12,651</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>5,911</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Catholic</strong></td>
<td>12,651</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>5,911</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek Orthodox</strong></td>
<td>81,409</td>
<td>76,522</td>
<td>106,658</td>
<td>130,858</td>
<td>148,927</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armenian Orthodox</strong></td>
<td>25,462</td>
<td>58,007</td>
<td>67,139</td>
<td>63,679</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protestant</strong></td>
<td>6,712</td>
<td>12,641</td>
<td>14,365</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Druze</strong></td>
<td>43,633</td>
<td>53,047</td>
<td>71,711</td>
<td>88,131</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim</strong></td>
<td>273,366</td>
<td>383,180</td>
<td>541,647</td>
<td>691,883</td>
<td>928,937</td>
<td>1.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suni</strong></td>
<td>124,786</td>
<td>175,925</td>
<td>222,594</td>
<td>271,734</td>
<td>285,698</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shi'a</strong></td>
<td>104,947</td>
<td>154,208</td>
<td>300,698</td>
<td>397,107</td>
<td>613,605</td>
<td>1.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>17,001</td>
<td>18,354</td>
<td>23,041</td>
<td>29,633</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jew: Bahai</strong></td>
<td>9,819</td>
<td>6,596</td>
<td>12,677</td>
<td>13,876</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population of Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>798</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population of Lebanon (without alien and Lebanese abroad)</strong></td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>3.584</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: 1922 and 1932 are official census figures, cited in Himadeh (1936); Estimates: Hourani (1946); Tabbareh (1954 and 1956)
the estimated statistics. The statistics provide room for discrepancy and selectivity, as shown in Table 2.

### Table 2
Evaluative Presentation of the Lebanese Population 1953-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method Utilized</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>1,416,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Doxiadis Mission</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>1,445,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>IRFED Mission</td>
<td>Projections &amp; Sampling</td>
<td>1,626,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>2,151,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Mazure Mission</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>1,940,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Ministry of Plans</td>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>2,179,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>2,367,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>UNESCOB</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>2,614,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ministry of Plans</td>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>2,126,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Courbage &amp; Fargues</td>
<td>Adjustment</td>
<td>2,265,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3) the inclusion of non-resident Lebanese living abroad and their descendants in the governmental estimates; and
4) the extent of Lebanese emigration in recent years, which has mostly affected the Maronites and depleted the human resources the Maronites need to maintain numerical superiority.

The unpopular Lebanese confessional allocations dictate that there must be six Christian members of the government for each five non-Christian. This division as drawn in Table 3 is also translated into parliamentary representation, with the Maronite Christians having 30 representatives, Druze 6 and both Muslim groups, Sunni and Shi'a, 39.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term in Office</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  GO  GC  AO  AC</td>
<td>P  S  SH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-51</td>
<td>18  6  3  2  0  0</td>
<td>11  10  4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-53</td>
<td>23  8  5  3  1  1</td>
<td>16  14  5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-57</td>
<td>13  5  3  1  1  0</td>
<td>9   8   3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-60</td>
<td>20  7  4  3  1  0</td>
<td>14  12  4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-72</td>
<td>30 11  6  4  1  1</td>
<td>20  19  6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M-Maronite; GO-Greek Orthodox; GC-Greek Catholic; AO-Armenian Orthodox; AC-Armenian Catholic; P-Protestant; S-Sunni; SH-Shi'a; D-Druze.


This structure also determines the allocation of senior governmental positions; the President is a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a Muslim.

Lebanon's difficulties with confessionalism may be seen in the frequent turnover of Lebanese cabinets. In its first 30 years of independence, Lebanon had 43 different governments, each averaging only 9.1 months in office, reflecting the inherent instability and divisions of the Lebanese political institutions.

One direct consequence of this frequent turnover of cabinets is the expansion of presidential powers at the expense of the cabinet and parliament combined. In practice, however, the President has assumed freedom of
action by making use of certain powers granted to him originally by the French (who, not unreasonably, assumed that they could always control his election). These powers included the right to promulgate "urgent" legislation by decree, to veto bills, to dissolve parliament and to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and the cabinet.[5] In consequence, it has always been the President, not the parliament, that brought down governments. The President also has the ability to persuade the parliament to alter the constitution to allow him a second term, and the parliament generally is too divided and dependent to resist effectively. This is one of the reasons that opposition has occasionally taken to the streets. "Instead of being a figurehead, the President is a participating umpire; instead of being a government, the cabinet is the battleground for notables, and instead of being a legislative body, the parliament is a sounding board for local leaders."[6]

An even more significant consequence of confessionalism is the unwillingness of national leaders to pool resources in the national interest. Leaders did not work as a team; there was no such thing as a majority opinion. The state carried out different individual acts, but no coherent programmes. National consensus existed only in the negative sense of mutual rivalry and suspicion, and
the awareness of each group that fulfilment of his own desires must mean the negation of another's.

Confessionalism, the legalisation of sectarianism, not only affected the governmental process, but also supported the formalisation of relations among sects in Lebanon. Private social organisations and governmental agencies provided services and employment on a sectarian basis. Hospitals, clinics, charity organisations, sports clubs, cultural clubs and youth service organisations recruited from and served a clientele defined in sectarian terms. Even the schools took on a sectarian character as they were predominantly Muslim or Christian. The government subsidised these sectarian agencies and schools at the expense of governmental alternatives.

The formalisation of relations among sects forces individuals, in an effort to attain satisfactory public services, to manipulate formal confessional quotas through personal networks of friends and relatives. Thus, they create a web of inter- and intra-sectarian relations that are based mainly on sectarian and kin ties, and are conducted as patron-client-type relations. Such is the root of the power of the traditional Lebanese Shi'a political leadership.
The Shi'a za'im, the patron in these relationships, traditionally receives blind political support from sect members in his area. Individuals obtain tangible economic and social favours in exchange for such loyalty. These patron-client relations, within which people satisfy their needs and find security, tend to lessen class distinctions and intensify the sectarian aspects of Lebanon. Class conflict, thus, tends to be transposed into sectarian differences. The patron-client relations, however, are restrictive to client and patron alike. Clients are restricted in that the only avenue open to them to obtain jobs and other services is through their za'im. Restricted opportunities, coupled with the influence of familial, religious and cultural ties, restrain the mobility of the Shi'a, and particularly their youth. Such constraints have increased the sect's geo-cultural immobility, to be discussed in Chapter Four. The concentration of the Shi'a in less-developed regions, one of the aspects of their geo-cultural immobility, is shown in Table 4 below.

The patron's authority and political influence is also restricted by confessional allocations and quotas to his immediate area or to his sect. In such a position, his political subsistence requires him to maintain a sufficient number of followers and sect members within his zone of influence in order to remain a member of the
### TABLE 4
Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon 1950 and 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Districts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rachaya</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahleh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>Zaghatra</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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Lebanese ruling body. To enhance his authority, the patron needs to preserve the status quo and governmental stability. This requires him to integrate consensually with elites of other sects, thus becoming a protector of confessionalism. By fulfilling these conditions, most Shi'a leaders, unlike the leaders of other Lebanese sects, become permanent fixtures in the confessional institution.

Shi'a youth, as a result of having their ambitions persistently inhibited by the confessional system and the conservatism of their sect's traditional leaders, became discontented with the status quo by the early 1970s. Their growing frustration with their economic position, and their exclusion from active political participation spurred the progressive Shi'a to seek refuge in religion and experiment with non-traditional means of participation, via religious political movements.

Shi'a Religious and Sectarian Political Movements: The emergence of Islamic and Shi'a sectarian political organisations may be attributed to three Lebanese Shi'a features: 1) the Shi'a political leadership's unwillingness to address contemporary and progressive sectarian needs; 2) the Shi'a's predisposition to find in Islam an alternative to deficient political conditions; and 3) the existence of a catalyst - a charismatic
religious leadership. These political movements were compounded by one external influence, a naturalised charismatic Lebanese religious leader, Imam Mousa el-Sadr.

Imam Mousa el-Sadr was born in Qum in Iran in 1928 and educated in Tehran, the son of Ayatollah Sadr el-Din el-Sadr, an Iraqi revolutionary Shi'a who fled to Iran and helped in the foundation of the Shi'a's biggest theological centre in Qum. Imam Mousa is also a cousin and brother-in-law to Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir el-Sadr, who was executed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980 for the instigation of a Shi'a uprising. He is the grandson of Ayatollah Hussein Qummi, an opposition leader to Shah Reza's regime in Iran. He came to Lebanon shortly after the Shah of Iran deprived him of his Iranian nationality in 1957. By the age of 31, he became the Mufti (religious judge) of Tyre, a coastal city in south Lebanon - a most unusual feat. President Chehab of Lebanon granted him Lebanese nationality by special presidential decree; soon after, his status in the Shi'a community became recognised. Of those contending for the leadership of the Shi'a community, the most important was no doubt Mousa el-Sadr.[7]

By the late 1960s, Sayyid (a title identifying a descendant of Ali) Mousa el-Sadr became Imam Mousa el-
Sadr, a title also setting him apart from other clerics. The new title of Imam endowed him with sectarian political authority and entitled him to the obedience of his followers. As an Imam he first set out to improve their socio-economic conditions and put together a coalition of educated civil servants, professionals and men with new money. He sought as he put it to change "the psychological outlook" of the Shi'a community and also provided an alternative to the parties of the left and the rule of feudal families. His first institutional creation was the Higher Shi'a Council to present the corporate demands of the Shi'ites in front of the state machinery. This was a break with Sunni establishment, constituting an attempt to establish Shi'a's freedom of manoeuvre; further it was an effort blessed and aided by the Maronite elites.[8]

Elected in 1969 as the chairman of the newly-formed Shi'a Supreme Council, Imam Mousa el-Sadr became the leading Lebanese Shi'a cleric. Shi'ism, under his leadership, the religion of lament, was undergoing transformation into a faith of activism.[9] A religious leader, a social and political reformer, a rebel, and a rejectionist, Mousa el-Sadr succeeded in providing the Shi'a with an alternative to traditional political leadership.
As a reaction to confessionalism, and in an effort to address all Lebanese minorities' relative privation, Mousa el-Sadr formed in 1974 with Gregoire Haddad, the Catholic archbishop, a broad-based movement Harakat el-Mahrumeen (Movement of the Deprived). Originally it was a multi-sectarian political action movement aimed at mobilising the Lebanese poor to lobby the Lebanese parliament and regime collectively. The intentions of the movement, as the following excerpts from its charter, quoted by N. Ayubi in the *Middle East Journal* in 1981, indicate, were to work within the political system:

"The Mahrumeen movement does not work for the good of a particular sect or party. Its principles are the prosperity of all people, and its battle is for the sake of all. It distinguishes between religious commitment and sectarian fanaticism that impedes the nation's path to progress. It likewise sees in its progressive religious programme the guarantee for eliminating the taint of fanatic sectarianism from religion ... it works to set up sound foundations for change and to set up the forces to aid in carrying out the process of change ... it is a movement of all the people, it embraces their needs, it devises solutions, it acts quickly to implement these, it fights on the side of the deprived to the end. It is a movement towards a better world."[10]

By 1976, the Lebanese civil war affected inter-sectarian cooperation by draining Harakat el-Mahrumeen of all non-Shi'a members. The movement, now a Shi'a sectarian organisation, won the overwhelming support of dispossessed Shi'a throughout the country:
"The Shi'a progress of self-contempt and political quiescence was led by the charismatic mullah as far as one man could take it - Mousa el-Sadr walked between rainbows. He had given political activism the sanction of religious symbols; he linked to the larger Shi'a world lonely people who had felt isolated and cast adrift."[11]

Through the mechanism of Harakat el-Mahrumeen, Mousa el-Sadr also prevailed in displaying many well-established Shi'a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly exposing their exploitation of their own sect in pursuit of personal gains. As a result, many Shi'a leaders forfeited much of their influence and legitimacy, including the Speaker for more than 21 years, Sabri Hamadeh.

A - Harakat el-Mahrumeen

Harakat el-Mahrumeen, the first Lebanese Shi'a sectarian movement, became a political alternative to an unpopular and ineffective Shi'a traditional leadership. Its objectives as set in its original charter were to struggle peacefully and relentlessly until the social grievances of the Shi'a (and other deprived Lebanese) were satisfactorily addressed by the government.

In time, however, Imam Mousa's hope of changing the political conditions through peaceful means began to fade in the face of the strength and solidarity of the
traditional political leadership rooted in confessional institutions. He realised, as he said, "...there is no alternative for us except revolution and weapons."[12] In this militant mode, he eloquently echoed Imam Ali's famous words at a rally in Bourj-el-Barajnet, a suburb of Beirut, "Arms are the adornment of man, and a symbol of manhood."[13] And he continued from then, onwards, "we are the avengers ... we are a people who revolt against any kind of oppression."[14] The Imam warned his opponents that he would urge his followers to attack and occupy the palaces and the mansions of the rich and powerful if the grievances of the poor and oppressed were left unheeded. His frustration and disposition to bear arms led to the creation of an armed militia in support of Harakat el-Mahrumeen, known by the acronym Amal (Hope), under which name Harakat el-Mahrumeen subsequently came to be identified.

By 1975, civil war raged in Lebanon; during the conflict, Amal played a major role by providing the Shi'a and their territories with protection. Chaos emerged as other ethnic, political and sectarian militia joined the fray under the auspices of invading Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian forces, which in effect prevented the government from restoring order. Consequently, Amal's leadership's wish to put an end to the fighting obliged it to assist the national and confessional government in its attempt
to re-establish peace. Since this time, Amal has steered a relatively moderate and steady course. Unlike the Iranian revolution, Amal retained its nationalist identity, working within the Lebanese political system. Amal's behaviour in the continuing civil unrest confirms it as a movement that stands for the re-imposition of governmental authority throughout Lebanon, the disarming of all militia and parliamentary organisations, and the reform of the political system so that political office is allocated by merit rather than by the government. Amal has, in effect, participated in Lebanese political developments on two levels; first, as a guardian of the Shi'a community, not reluctant to use political violence to pursue its interests and protect constituency and secondly, as a populist movement, ever more aggressive as the representative of Shi'a interests in Lebanon's multisectarian political system.[15]

Although Amal did not follow the Iranian revolutionary pattern by seeking to overthrow the Lebanese confessional government, it maintained, until recently, close ties with the Islamic revolutionaries of Iran. The success of the Islamic Revolution has been a major source of pride and inspiration to the Shi'a everywhere. The dual nationalities of the founder and charismatic leader of Amal, Imam Mousa el-Sadr, revived and nurtured the Lebanese-Iranian Shi'a attachment. Once the Iranian
Revolution established a government, Imam Mousa el-Sadr became the channel for even better relations. Thus, the Imam blessed, encouraged, and even consummated the Lebanese-Iranian Shi'a marriage of convenience. This interdependence follows the pattern of every other Lebanese sectarian community in that each sect has an external sponsor to strengthen, support and insure its position.

The solidarity with Iran and Amal's internal cohesiveness was embodied and maintained by the charisma of Imam Mousa, as evidenced by developments following the disappearance of the Imam in 1978. In his absence, the Lebanese Shi'a's inter- and intra-national unity began to decline. The consequent emergence of competitive, Iran-backed splinter groups from Amal's main political stream buttresses this observation. One such offspring is the organisation of Islamic Amal, formed by Hussein Moussavi in Ba'albeck.

B - Islamic Amal

The disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr created a leadership vacuum in the Beq'a region of Lebanon and an apparent opportunity for Sayyid Hussein to fill. His subsequent initiative in 1982 to assume the regional leadership of Ba'albeck may be attributed, among other reasons, to his being a Sayyid, a descendant of the
blessed house of Ali. The authority of Asyad (plural of Sayyid) families is accepted in the general field of morals as trustworthy. Sayyid Moussavi, a schoolteacher in Ba'albeck, capitalised on the growing dissatisfaction in his region with Amal's apparent moderation, based on its willingness to work patiently within the Lebanese political system. In short, the Sayyid's birthright and personal ambitions, the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr, the success of the Iranian Revolution, and the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their resources at his disposition in Ba'albeck, made possible the formation of Islamic Amal.

Islamic Amal is a regional Shi'a sectarian organisation which emphasises its Islamic identity and rejects the authority of confessional institutions and the legitimacy of the present Lebanese constitutional government. Its influence is limited to the Beq'a Valley from which it derives its membership, estimated at around 700 lightly-equipped elements, the primary components of which are Sayyid Moussavi's friends and relatives. In 1983, Sayyid Moussavi forged a link with Hizbollah (the Party of God), an extremist, more militant Islamic movement, closely allied to Iran.

C - Hizbollah

There is no doubt that the example of the Iranian
revolution's success provided a powerful spur to Islamic revivalism - whether Sunni or Shi'a - throughout the Middle East. However, the most potent effects have been confined to the Shi'a world, particularly to Lebanon. It is here that the link between Shi'a revivalism and terrorism is most acute - partly because the majority Shi'a movement, Amal, has in the end been unable to force complete withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon, as well as being unable to force a change in the confessional structure of the country, and because of the gratuitous Israeli intervention in Lebanese politics in 1982, followed by the European and American multinational force. Not only did Amal show itself incapable of dealing with what was perceived to be the wider menace; Iran was prepared to aid Shi'a groups to confront what the government in Tehran believed to be its real enemy - the United States. The result is that the radicals of Hizbollah have sought more extreme doctrines, as enunciated through Sheikh Fadlallah and as organised by Hussein Moussavi within the movement.

Hizbollah, however, is committed to the rule of Islam. In its appeal to all Muslims and the downtrodden of the world, its manifesto in 1985 declared:

"... We in Lebanon are not a closed organisation, a party, nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are a nation tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a
strong ideological and political bond, namely Islam..."[16]

Lebanon, in the view of a leading Hizbollah cleric, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin, is an impure realm that has to be cleansed and in which the Shi'a state that found its fulfilment in Iran should be duplicated by Hizbollah as a step towards a world central Islamic republic. In addition to liberty from imperialism, Hizbollah's objectives include Israel's obliteration, Phalange (Maronite militia) submission, and the consolidation of international liberation movements.

Hizbollah in Lebanon found in Imam Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah what the Shi'a had found in Imam Mousa el-Sadr a decade earlier. After his disappearance, Imam Fadlallah built up his own following in Bourj-El-Abed, a suburb of Beirut, and became a central figure in the Shi'a community. He is considered to be the most important figure in the Islamic political movement today. Born in Lebanon in 1934, Imam Fadlallah studied in Iraq under Ayatollah Abu-Qasim Khaw'i. A theologian and a scholar, he is the author of many publications, such as Al-Islam Wa-Muntiq Al-Quwa (Islam and the Theory of Power), and Al-Hiwar Fi-Al-Quran (Dialogue in the Quran). The current influence and popularity of the Imam extends far beyond the Lebanese Shi'a. In 1986 he identified himself as:
"... a person who lives to fulfil my duties as a human being, as a Muslim, and as a citizen, in order to raise the standards of the people who nobody cares for to higher levels. Consequently I believe that every human being should consider all his resources as a trust from God for others..."[17]

He voiced strong opposition to confessionalism and sectarianism, and he claimed to stand for ethical behaviour in politics, urging all Muslims to bring Islam in their politics by seeking to convert enemies into friends. By providing the Lebanese Shi'a with an alternative to the parties of the left and the rule of the feudal families, Imam Mousa el-Sadr sowed the seed of the Shi'a resurgence in Lebanon, the fruit of which are the zealots of Hizbollah.

**Prelude to the Study of Shi'a: Religious Resurgence and Terrorism**

The result of the religious resurgence of the Shi'a in Lebanon is religious terrorism. This form of terrorism differs from that of the IRA, FLN, Red Brigade, ANC, PLO and others. For such groups the context of the struggle in which terrorism is encapsulated is a nationalist one, structured around a concept of territorial nationalism in which a national community is entitled to unique control of a territory to which it lays historical claims and on which it seeks to create its own state.
Religious terrorism, however, is practised by elements of a religious sect or organisation, and grows out of religious conviction and commitment to communicate a divine message. Such activities are not of recent date; it could be said the their precursor was the Assassin movement, the Hashishiyin - a branch of Isma'ili Shi'ism, which thrived from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. There was profound contradiction in contemporary interpretations of the significance and the role of the movement within the Middle East. For their victims, the Assassins were criminal fanatics, engaged in a murderous conspiracy against religion and society. For the Isma'ilies, they were a corps d'elite in the war against the enemies of the Imam; by striking down oppressors and usurpers, they gave the ultimate proof of their faith and loyalty, and earned immediate and eternal bliss. Group membership was composed of Fedai (devoted one) who killed at the command of his religious leader. The Fedai believed that killing the unrighteous purified the soul and secured salvation.

Religious zealotry like that of the Assassins is currently embodied in Hizbollah in Lebanon and other groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas within the region. Their fanaticism may be seen behind the bombing of the American barracks and embassy in Lebanon, the assassination of President Sadat in Egypt, and the
explosion of the Pan-Am airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland. Such acts are committed by groups bound together by profound religious beliefs.

A potential terrorist is subject to personal, economic, psychological, social and other factors as indicated in Figure 1. His motives dictate his identity. If he consciously undertakes terrorist actions motivated by the wish for media attention as well as equity, liberty, or sympathy for his cause, he is a political terrorist; the inherent malice in terrorist actions taken consciously in the struggle for political power, works out the actor as a political terrorist.

By contrast, if the potential terrorist is pursuing his own salvation by responding to what he perceives as a divine ordinance, he is a religious terrorist. To a Shi'i terrorist, killing the infidel has God's blessing and he is neither unethical nor immoral, let alone criminal, as will be addressed in Chapters Two and Five. Suffice it to say here that the Shi'i religious terrorist is distinguished from a political terrorist by the conviction of spiritual value and purity of the acts he carries out in the pursuit of salvation. The affinity, consciousness and motive-based distinctions shown in Figure 1 below help visualise a political terrorist (Section A) and a religious terrorist (Section B).
FIGURE 1
Section A
Terrorists' Differentiation by Affinity, Consciousness and Motives

A PROSPECTIVE
POLITICAL TERRORIST
CONSCIOUS OF THE MALICIOUSNESS OF HIS ACT

Psychological
Economic Social
Personal Environmental

<— MOTIVATED BY
Political leader
Ethnic Land
Oppression
Privation
Pol. ideology
Pol. Faction

<
>
<>
<>

AFFINITY TO

Support and or Sympathy of National and International Communities

Section B
Terrorists' Differentiation by Affinity, Consciousness and Motives

A PROSPECTIVE
POLITICAL TERRORIST
CONSCIOUS OF THE MALICIOUSNESS OF HIS ACT

Psychological
Economic Social
Personal Environmental

<— MOTIVATED BY
Political leader
Holy Land
Relig. Oppression
Zealotry
Vengeance
Kinship Ties

<
>
<>
<>

AFFINITY TO

PERSONAL SALVATION

Further to clarify these actions which are based on affinity, consciousness, and motive, another diagram follows which separates actors according to the extent of self-imposed control on their violent actions. The stronger the affinity to political or religious motives, the weaker is his self-imposed control and the greater is willingness to sacrifice in the attainment of goals. The extent of the affinity motivating the individual terrorist thus determines the amount of self-control he is willing to exert upon his actions. Actions performed in zones 2 and 4 of Figure 2 are identified as terrorism.

The distinctive characteristics of the three types of violent actors, identified as religious terrorists (located in Zone 2), freedom fighters (in Zones 1 and 3), and political terrorists (Zone 4) are listed in Table 5 below. The distinctive characteristics of these terrorists are attributed to differences in their motives, leadership, ethics, operational codes, recruitment process, rationale, commitment, consciousness of the malice in their acts, objectives, and even in their age and economic stability.
FIGURE 2

Terrorists' Differentiation by Operational Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Motives and Objectives</th>
<th>SELF-IMOSED CONTROL</th>
<th>LACK OF SELF-IMOSED CONTROL</th>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>R FIGHTERS</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS E</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>FOR RELIGIOUS</td>
<td>TERRORISTS L</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>ZONE OF FREEDOM</td>
<td>ZONE OF OPERATIONS G</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>OPERATIONS II R</td>
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<td>R FREEDOM III</td>
<td>IV OPERATIONAL P</td>
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<td>FIGHTERS</td>
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<td>ZONE OF OPERATIONS L</td>
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<td>E</td>
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<tr>
<th>Motivated by</th>
<th>Perceived Religious Duties</th>
<th>Religio/Political Duties/Rights</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maliciousness of his Action</td>
<td>Unconscious of the</td>
<td>Conscious of the</td>
<td>Conscious of the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affinity to</td>
<td>Personal Salvation</td>
<td>Religious/Political Objectives/Goals</td>
<td>Political Goals</td>
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<td>Guided by</td>
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<td>Relig/Pol. Leader</td>
<td>Political Leader</td>
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<td>Moral/Ethical Codes</td>
<td>Unrestrictive of Operations</td>
<td>Restrictive of Operations</td>
<td>Minimal Effect on Operations</td>
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<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>Perceived International Guidelines</td>
<td>Tactical Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruited as</td>
<td>Religious Believer (after) Militant with Relig/Pol. Convolitions</td>
<td>Volunteer (before)</td>
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<td>Religious/Political Movements</td>
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<td>Spiritual or Political</td>
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<td>Effective Limited Effect</td>
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<td>Goals</td>
<td>Intangible and Tangible</td>
<td>Tangible Well Defined</td>
<td>Tangible Flexible</td>
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The ZONE within which the Mode of all violent activities of a person or group fall, is the ZONE of that group shown in Figure 2.

Search for an Approach

Several factors seemed to have led to the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence. As will be shown in Chapter Four, the Shi'a's low geographic mobility, coupled with Lebanon's low cultural pluralism, led to the sect's geo-cultural immobility, which in turn increased their dissatisfaction with political parties and traditional political leadership. The Shi'a sought refuge in the only remaining alternative available to them: religion and religious leadership, which in turn became the catalyst of their religious resurgence.

The geo-cultural immobility of certain religious minorities, such as the Amish, the Bahi, and even the Druze, is self-imposed, a means of preserving their cultural and religious integrity. In the Lebanon, the Shi'a demonstrate a low level of geographical mobility in a nation with limited cultural pluralism. Imposed upon a relatively deprived minority of an open religion such as that of the Shi'a, and combined with dissatisfaction with the political system, this creates a vacuum waiting to be refilled by a charismatic religious leadership.

The developmental changes that might lead a geo-culturally immobilised Shi'i to terrorism are depicted in Figure 3. Among the distinctive features of the Lebanese Shi'a geo-cultural immobility are: inherent socio-
Confessionalism
Feudal Political Leadership
Clandestine Political Parties
Indifferent National Gov.
Weak Shi'a Traditional Political Leadership
Lebanese Shi'a as Minority in Lebanon
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Relative Privation

Shi'a Low Geographic Mobility
Lebanon Low Cultural Pluralism
Charismatic Religious Leadership
Religious Resurgence

Sect Partial Assimilation
Sect Religious Terrorism

demographic characteristics; a distrusted, feudal and self-centric political leadership combined with national and governmental indifference; clandestine political parties and political machinery; and a Lebanese confessional environment covering all the above characteristics with a veil of legitimacy.

As will be postulated in Chapters Four and Five, the opportune presence of a charismatic religious leader helps displace a vacuum. Once in control and through his religious movement, the charismatic leader will trigger religious resurgence defined as the cumulative byproduct of the geo-cultural milieu; dissatisfaction with the political leadership; the presence of a charismatic religious leader; and susceptibility of the Shi'a masses to zealotry and terrorism. Such terrorism as depicted in Figure 4 is a cumulative byproduct of profound religious belief and the existence of competing Islamic and Shi'a sectarian national and international organisations.

It is hoped that this present study will provide an analysis of the specific elements that provoked the revolt of the Shi'a in Lebanon, a revolt partly due to the Lebanese political system of confessionalism, and partly to the Shi'a's own traditional feudal system. It seeks also to investigate the linkage between religious resurgence, emphasising obedience to perceived religious
FIGURE 4
From Religious Resurgence to Religious Terrorism

Confessionalism with Shi'a Economic Inequity in Lebanon

| Crisis Milieu |

Presence of Armed Palestinian Forces Israeli Forces Syrian Forces

| Religious Resurgence |

Lebanese Shia Religious Resurgence

| Presence of one Charismatic Religious Leader |

Lebanese Civil War

Inter-Sectarian Conflict

Selective Recruitment Kinship, Friendship Neighbour

Sectarian Militant Org.

Shi'a Zealotry

Sectarian Nationalism Assimilation of National Politic

Islamic Military Org.

Charismatic Imams

Religious Terrorism by Transnational Islamic Org. and Zealot Org.

set of interdependent variables

teachings and guidelines instead of traditional civil laws, and religious terrorism. At the same time, distinction will be made in fighting for religious freedom and religious terrorism, both of which are possible outcomes of religious resurgence.

References


Chapter II

TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Problems of Definition and Causality

Any discussion of the phenomenon of international terrorism, particularly in the Middle East, is fraught with emotive semantic problems. The central role played by Israel in the apparently chronic crises that have plagued the post-war Middle East, together with the profound sense of guilt still widely felt in Europe and the United States over the genocide against Europe's Jewish communities during the Second World War, makes it virtually impossible to sustain an objective dialogue on the issue of terrorism in the Middle East. The problem has been intensified by the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which has made the West uncomfortably aware of what it perceives as the new menace of Islamic fundamentalism.

Most recently, the simplistic cynicism of American policy on the issue of international terrorism has persuaded most people that there is no point in seeking to understand the twin issues of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the region. This abdication of intellectual responsibility is potentially catastrophic, for neither terrorism nor Islamic fundamentalism sprang fully developed ex nihilo.[1] There are indeed objective
circumstances which explain their existence and provide clues towards more effective solutions to diffuse the violence they cause than the ones currently in vogue. Furthermore, the current dismissive attitude, so popular in leading circles in most Western countries, towards attempts to understand the ideological and political complexity which generates both phenomena in the Middle East, paradoxically worsens the very situation which it is supposed to resolve. As attitudes harden in the West, so they do in the Middle East - particularly amongst those groups on which future hopes hopes of international co-operation must be based.[2]

This intellectual imbalance needs to be redressed by a continuing discussion of the causes of these two phenomena which have come to characterise the Middle East in Western eyes and which the media assume to be linked together. Discussion is not an apologia for either, however, despite implications to the contrary by the more muscular propagandists of a hardline approach in their criticism of those who attempt it.[3] This is particularly true of terrorism, for it continues to play a major role in Western perceptions and in Middle Eastern conflicts, even though it has singularly failed to achieve its objectives.[4] However, insofar as it continues to be used as a weapon, despite its apparent failure, the reasons for its use need to be examined. In
the case of Islamic fundamentalism, the emotive responses of most commentators - even those who are better informed - have so clouded the issue that the profound changes taking place in Middle Eastern society today are woefully misrepresented in most international media.

The present study focuses on three subjects: religion, terrorism, and certain relationships between them. Given the emotive connotations attached to both terrorism and to Islamic fundamentalism, it seems useful to establish precisely what meaning should be attached to each term. In the case of terrorism, this is particularly important, since it is frequently assumed that the term is synonymous with violence and crime.[5] Fundamentalism suffers from the virtually automatic assumption that it is no more than a re-assertion of traditionalist - and thus more primitive - moral values. To this is added the popular conception that it is also inherently violent.

There is a close relationship between violence and terrorism, although suggestions that these links arise solely (or even predominantly) from a philosophical preoccupation with the cathartic effects of violence do not seem to advance the argument very far.[6] In fact, it seems far more likely that the rationale for violence - apart from the outright destruction of symbols and
institutions to which those involved in terrorism are opposed - is that it is the essential means to achieve a desired end. The act of violence, however, is not the crucial consideration; it is the potency of the threat of violence which far more significant, since it is this threat which, ideally, is intended to achieve the change.

Closely associated with the terrorist threat of violence is its designated target. It is in this context that terrorist activity is at its most unique, for its targets do not necessarily have to have any direct relation with which it is concerned. Victims are objectified into categories defined as antagonistic to the terrorists' aims and thus become legitimate targets. Meanwhile, the use of violence does not necessarily imply that terrorists are merely engaged in a particular form of military action. Terrorist activity lacks the essential component inherent in military action of an opponent which is intended to be, and accepts that it is the, direct target for violence. Furthermore, the complex corpus of limitations on military action through internationally recognised rules and principles are specially rejected in terrorist practice, although they may be invoked as a means of defence. However, there are situations, particularly in the Middle East, where such a convenient distinction becomes highly ambiguous and those condemned by their victims as terrorists can often claim
with justification that they are involved in guerrilla warfare or in a struggle for national liberation. After all, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.[7] The point was once nicely made by Colonel Qadhafi, when he told a journalist that, "we support Hizbollah if it calls for martyrdom on Palestinian soil. But if Lebanon is the target, then this is terrorism."[8] For the Colonel, the struggle against Israel was a matter of national liberation and thus legitimate warfare. Actions inside Lebanon, however, would be an attack on the Arab nation - a legitimate and legitimised political entity in his political credo - and thus terrorist in nature.

Terrorism is not mindless; it is a means to an end. It is essentially a political act designed to achieve changes in the political sphere. It is, therefore, the use of violence or threat of use of violence by a group of individuals acting for or in opposition to an established community. Such action is designed to create extreme fear and anxiety - inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims, to coerce that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators. It is a special form of aggression that results from extreme frustration - a form of clandestine, undeclared and unconventional warfare, and coercive intimidation, waged without any humanitarian
rules or restraints. What differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence is its unexpected nature - its element of alarm and shock. This quality makes it far more frightening than other actual physical impact; an act of violence is labelled "terrorist" when its psychological effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result.[9]

The use of terrorism can be either selective or indiscriminate. Selective terrorism is used primarily on government officials or opponents of the terrorist group, such as political leaders, police officials and the military. It is used to demonstrate the strength of the terrorist group, disrupt government control of the population, and embarrass the government by making it seem inept, thus alienating the people from the incumbent authorities. This process of disorientation of the public is a crucial characteristic of the use of terror, for once the population has been alienated and oppressed by the government, it will revolt and create a power vacuum which the terrorist can fill.

Indiscriminate terrorism is directed at victims who have no necessary correlation with the factor inciting the terrorist activity originally. It is referred to as Provocational and Instigational Terrorism (PIT). The use of PIT involves the murder of anyone, civilian or
military - nobody is sacrosanct, regardless of affiliation with the ruling power. Violence is instigated in order to discredit the government by demonstrating its inability to protect the people. In this case, the social structure is disrupted and citizens no longer know what to expect from anyone else and when. The result is a divided society of frightened groups of individuals concerned only with personal survival. Whether selective or indiscriminate, terrorism is widely used to advertise a cause and, most importantly, to gain recognition.

The fact that terrorism and criminality are interrelated seems far more open to dispute, for terrorism is essentially a political act, designed to achieve changes in the political sphere. Terrorist activity, indeed, usually does involve horrendous acts which are construed by national law as criminal, but since terrorism disputes the legitimacy of the institutions which define law, it can justify itself by underlining the illegitimacy of the system of law involved. Terrorists can, in fact, extend the argument into a claim that terrorism is justified by the very fact that the illegitimacy of the legal system prevents essential change being achieved by other means and that the desire of such change justifies the means being used. The same consideration applies to the ambiguity between terrorism and warfare, where actions
defined as criminal acts by one side are justified as acts of national liberation by the other. In the Middle Eastern context, this problem covers a wide range of activities which have been conventionally defined as terrorism. They have involved violent confrontations between ethnically and ideologically differentiated communities, between movements and states, and between states and individuals. Nor is terrorism a new phenomenon in the region. About eight hundred years ago, the Isma'ili Shi'a religious movement - the Assassins - adopted violence largely in a desperate attempt to survive, and the techniques used were as much an admission of the movement's weakness in the overall historical context of the development of Islamic society. This quality too is a crucial factor in modern Middle Eastern terrorism - it is a weapon of the weak, or those who perceive themselves to be weak, in the face of what they consider to be overwhelming institutional strength. It is this perception of weakness that also provides a starting point for Middle Eastern terrorism in the modern age. In fact, modern Middle Eastern terrorism began in the 1930s and now forms part of the wider struggle that was beginning then against colonial structures in the region. It also began over the issue which continues to be central to Middle Eastern conflicts up to the present day - the issue of Zionism. Arab objections over the Balfour declaration and its consequences were not merely
over practical issues of access to land or control of the local economy. They were also specially directed against the growth in influence of a Jewish political ideology that justified immigration and a claim to the territory of Palestine, one that they increasingly saw as a direct threat to the survival of their own community and its presence in the territory under dispute.[10]

The Arab revolt which broke out in 1936 and smouldered on in Palestine for the next three years began the practice of PIT; it involved indiscriminate attacks on Jewish settlements as a result of peasant desperation over Jewish land acquisition and immigration.[11] The revolt itself, however, was much more of a rural guerrilla struggle, merging into the variegated activities of a nationalist confrontation, with strikes and urban violence partnering the guerrilla war in the countryside. It was suppressed with immense loss of life and Palestinian frustration which was to be immeasurably intensified by the 1948 war and the creation of the state of Israel in the face of apparent Arab impotence and the migration of a large part of the indigenous Palestinian population.

The germ of modern terrorism, however, lay in the response of one branch of the Zionist movement, the Irgun Zvai Leumi organisation created by Jabotinski's
Revisionist Movement. *Irgun* specifically seized on the revolt as a justification for indiscriminate attacks on Arab civilians, in opposition to the "self-restraint" line articulated by the Jewish Agency and the *Haganah*. Jabotinski justified such activities by the overriding need to protect "Jewish blood" which had always been sold too cheap in the past; the Arab Revolt, in Revisionist eyes, was merely a new form of pogrom. He also refused to recognise the institutions of the Mandate as being in any way relevant to the security of the Jewish community, which he implied was so weak that the most extreme forms of self-defence were permissible, even desirable. In short, the Revisionist response was terrorist in conception and, as Simha Flapan argues, "... *Irgun* established the pattern of terrorism adopted 30 years later by *Al-Fatah*".[12] However, the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 provides a crucial clue to the underlying causes of Middle Eastern terrorism. Just as *Irgun* assumed that the weak Jewish community needed to be defended by any means against an enemy perceived to be, potentially at least, immeasurably more powerful, so the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has been forced since its creation in 1964 to a similar conclusion.[13] Just as the Zionist movement justified its activities before the end of the Mandate in terms of a struggle for national survival and liberation, so the PLO, with at least equal justification, claims it is engaged in a justified war of
national liberation in which acts defined as terrorist by the West are a legitimate part of the struggle, particularly if they are directed against Israel. Just as the Zionist movement laid exclusive claims to the territory Cis- and Trans-Jordan on grounds of historical rights of occupation, so the Palestinians, with a far more recent memory of territorial control, can make an equally justifiable claim. Although the Arafat wing of the PLO may now have abandoned actions against Western institutions and individuals - although up to 1975, it saw such actions as a legitimate part of the struggle - extremist elements within the overall Palestinian movement continue to use this argument in justification of attacks on apparently unconnected Western targets because of what they see as a Western predilection for Israel and discrimination against legitimate Palestinian demands.

The Popular Response:
The fragmentation and personalisation of political authority in the Middle East coupled with the Palestinian struggle for national recognition and a territorial base have, therefore, been responsible for much of the violence and terrorism that has characterised the region for the past forty years. There have, however, been two other ideological tendencies which, although not synonymous with terrorism, have been connected with the
phenomenon and have also on many occasions catalysed terrorist activity. The first of these reflects a profound ideological dispute which has riven the Palestinian movement since the late 1960s and which has significantly contributed to its divisions and weaknesses.[14] It derives in a large measure from the feeling of alienation within the Arab world that has developed amongst Palestinians since the 1950s with their awareness of the resentment felt by other Arab groups at their presence as refugees.

The dispute over the real purpose of the Palestinian struggle has inevitably been expressed through violence as well as in debate. It has justified the PLO usurping part of the sovereignty of some Arab states - Jordan before 1970 and, thereafter, Lebanon - it has led to direct attacks on governments by factions within the movement and has led to violent clashes within the Palestinian movement itself. Since a mass struggle has failed to appear, the proponents of regional revolution as the the means by which the Palestinian problem can be resolved have, on many occasions, fallen back on political violence and terrorism. Equally, the dispute over the movement's aims within the Palestinian community has led to terrorism practised by one faction against another. The most striking case is that of Sabri Al-Banna, known as Abu-Nidal, who has rejected all questions
of compromise and has attempted to assassinate all Palestinian leaders who are prepared to compromise on the issue. Furthermore, the factionalism and splits within the movement occasioned by the debate have also resulted in the use of terrorist tactics against Israel and the West precisely because the movement has been so profoundly weakened by them.

However, quite apart from the nationalist and revolutionary strands within the movement, there is also an Islamic ideology that justifies the struggle. In a fascinating analysis, Nels Johnson has shown that the simple fact of the Islamic environment in which the Palestinian movement was formed has allowed many of its secular characteristics - struggle against Israel, and anti-imperialism - to acquire specifically religious connotations which reinforce the inherent justice of the struggle itself. The development of the struggle has changed its role - from the Islamic struggle offered by Sheikh Quassim during the Arab Revolt, when the struggle was one of Jihad[16] and Islam the popular idiom, to the post-war period, when Islam can provide the vocabulary of struggle for both Christian and Muslim Palestinians.

Equally, in such a situation, Islam can also justify acts that appear terrorist to the victim, but legitimate acts of liberation to the perpetrator, just as had been the case with the Isma'ili Assassins eight centuries earlier.
This coincidence of Islam and political radicalism also links the Palestinian struggle directly into the most ideological turmoil that has engulfed the Middle East - Islamic fundamentalism.

**Islamic Fundamentalism Versus Reform and Revival**

The failure of the Arab world to resolve the Palestinian question began to lead in the 1970s to a deep sense of revulsion amongst large segments of the Arab population with the secular concepts of territorial nationalism *Wataniya*, and cultural nationalism *Qaumiya*, as enshrined in the defective Middle Eastern nation-state and the ideology of Arab nationalism. The consequent rejection of both ideologies (Chapter Four) as vehicles for the reconstruction of the Arab world led in turn to a revival of interest in Islam as a unifying ideology - the *Umma*, and as an alternative ideology of struggle. Indeed, insofar as Islam was the essential cultural environment and had already been one of the sources of inspiration for the initial indigenous response to European colonialism (the other being the imitation of the European political archetype, the nation-state), it had in reality always formed part of the Middle Eastern ideological armoury. Now, however, it was to take a far more prominent role. The immediate catalyst was the 1967 war, and in its aftermath radical fundamentalist critics turned on the nationalists and on each other. They
argued that Arabs lost the war and got humiliated because they had lost faith in Allah (as discussed in Chapter Three).

The two ideas of Islam as an appropriate ideology struggle and of Islam as the sole legitimation of social and political order came during the 1970s to embody a large element of Muslim and Arab aspirations. In this context the revival of Islam was quite predictable. It is an attempt which seeks to adapt and reform Islamic principles to cope with the political, economic and social problems of the modern world. And it is a revival of indigenous political and cultural values designed to combat the alien values perceived to have originated from Western neo-colonial influence.

However, the connection of the Islamic revival with terrorism is incidental and, compared with its significance in restructuring Middle Eastern society, essentially peripheral. It is important in Western perceptions, because an inevitable component of the revival is confrontation with and rejection of Western values insofar as they have penetrated Middle Eastern society. Given the close interpenetration of the Middle East and the West, particularly in the economic sphere, this confrontation has inevitably extended into the international arena as well. The link with terrorism
develops because Islamic revivalism has expressed this confrontation with particular force in areas where the collapse of political structures has fragmented those segments of the population which act as the vehicle of expression - as is the case with Lebanon and the Shi'a. This fragmented and alienated opposition then makes use of the best weapon available to it, given its political and military weakness - terrorism, through hijacks, kidnappings or bombings.

The fragmentation of political authority and ideological legitimisation and its replacement by Islamic revivalism has been expressed through a series of movements throughout the Islamic world, some of which have now acquired notoriety in the West, the Shi'a religious movements such as Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad. Several movements long predate the current period of revivalism, but the best known - Hizbollah - have sprung to prominence as a result of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Western misconceptions of the revivalist phenomenon have tended to assume that Iran has been the sole source of Islamic fundamentalism and of terrorism connected with it. It is an analysis which is incorrect and which obscures the reality, both of Iran and of the Islamic revival, for at least two separate strands can be identified - Shi'a and Sunni groups - which further subdivide into rejectionist and reformist groups.
The Sunni revivalist movement stems from the original Salafiyyists of the late nineteenth century who had a major influence on twentieth century nationalist movements, particularly in North Africa, Egypt and the Levant. Its best known representative is the Ikhwan Muslimin movement (Muslim Brotherhood) founded in 1928-29 by Hassan Al-Banna in response to his own Salafi education and to the social and political conditions in Egypt. Its purposes were to achieve indigenous control of the economy - at that time largely foreign-controlled - provide moral and material support to the Palestinian movement as it began to confront immigration from Europe into Palestine, and reform social and political structures, first in Egypt and then elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world.\textsuperscript{[17]} But there is also the more extremist Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamiyya (Islamic Liberation Party) and the various rejectionist factions of the Ikhwan-Jihad, who were involved in the assassination of President Sadat, and Takfir Wahija, to mention the two best-known examples in Egypt; or the Mujahidin and Jam'iyyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (the Society of Islamic Youth) in Morocco. There is also, however, a wide range of reformist movements, some of which are really no more than associations - the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Tendance Islamique) in Tunisia, Sheikh Kishk in Egypt, or the so-called "Islamic Marxist" in Egypt and Turkey. Shi'a religious movements, however, are founded on their
history of martyrdom and the tradition of the Shi'a religion itself as the religion of the dispossessed.

**The Concept of the Just War in Islam**

Islam justifies violence in one specific case, the Just War. Islam seeks to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth, and there is no concept of separation of religion and politics as there is in Western thought. Muslims are not to refrain from politics, since they are to submit all aspects of their lives to Allah's will. Jihad or holy war is considered just if fought for justifiable reasons in agreement with the tenets or sanctions of Islam and the moves of society. The theological meaning of the term "Jihad" is exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is the spread of the belief in Allah and making his word supreme over this world. Jihad in the broadest sense does not necessarily mean war or fighting, since exertion in Allah's path may be achieved by peaceful means as well as through violence. The individual's reward for participating in Jihad is the achievement of salvation, since the Jihad is Allah's direct way to paradise.[18]

Islamic jurists have distinguished four different ways in which the believer may fulfil his Jihad obligations: by his heart, his tongue, his hands, and by the sword. Thus the Jihad may be regarded as Islam's instrument for
carrying out its ultimate objective of spreading the divine word of Allah. In the Shi'a legal theory, not only would the failure of a non-Muslim to believe in Allah justify waging Jihad, but also the failure of a Muslim to obey the Imam of his time makes him liable for punishment by a Jihad. One very important point to note is that the Imam is believed to be an infallible ruler and is the only one who can judge when the Jihad should be declared and under what circumstances. The Just War also restricts revolutionary activities, especially terror. The aim of the Just War is punishment, and punishment requires rules and limits. Additionally, its ultimate object is to reconcile the parties so that peace may be restored. The doctrine presupposes that the offending party may have a right to exist after punishment and repentance, that there are universal standards for gauging actions and infractions, and finally that there are differences between what humans can and should do to each other and what God will do.

The concept of the Just War, nonetheless, has influenced the development of international law of war, which states that all combatants are entitled to particular rights and are obliged to accept specific limitations in return. There also exist distinctions between the status of combatants, non-combatants and neutrals. The contemporary version of the Just War doctrine is that
only self-defence justifies coercion, a doctrine that is incorporated in the United Nations Charter. When the view that only self-defence justifies coercion is applied to the question of terrorism, those subjected to colonial or racist governments rationalise that, by definition, they are "victims of aggression"[19], and as a result are not only justified in taking up arms, but also free from the normal moral restraints pertaining to soldiers concerning neutral people and territories. In this sense, the universal concept of Just War is, on occasion, used to justify terrorism.

The Twelvers Sect in Shi'ism:
The Shi'a's practice of Islam is characterised by their emphasis upon the role of Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. The origins of the Shi'a sect will be traced in Chapters Three and Four; here it is sufficient to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that the Shi'a contend that Ali, because of his kinship to the Prophet, was his true successor and the rightful leader of all Muslims. The importance of kinship in the Shi'i faith is further illuminated in their belief that Ali's twelve descendants, known as Imams, have inherited his position and spiritual power, and that "... the twelfth and last Imam is considered to have disappeared in the ninth century but is to return on judgment day."[20] This missing Imam, known as Mahdi, is
in the meantime personified by Mujtahids, learned clerics who have the capacity to interpret events until the return of the hidden Imam.[21]

Over time, the Shi'a broke into separate sects. Our focus will be on one of these, the Twelvers sect, due to its overwhelming majority in Lebanon. The Shi'a sect began as a coalition of followers of Imam Ali Ben Abi Talib who was a prominent political personality of Islam. Imam Ali was described by Johann Jakob Reiske, the great 18th century German Arabist, as a paragon of virtue. One of the early writers on the Twelvers sect was Rocolo Da Monte Croce, who, during his stay in Iraq, associated with members of the Twelvers Shi'a in areas where they constituted a significant portion of the population. He recorded their belief that Ali's rights had been usurped by the Sunnis, and he stated that the Twelvers are less evil (minus mali) than the majority Sunnis.[22]

There are two major groups of Twelvers theologians, the Akhbaris and the Mujtahids. Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, a Western scholar, in 1900 described the differences between the two groups in social, not merely religious, terms, and also portrayed Shi'ism as being utterly alien to the spirit of original Islam. He singles out two elements in support of his views: first, the veneration of the Imams and second, the assumption by the Persian
Mullahs of the role of priests, with the attendant prerogative of interpreting the Quran to the uninitiated. In his view, the entire corpus of Shi'a tradition is designed to buttress the Mullahs' position. In another publication, Les Religions et Les Philosophies Dans L'Asie Centrale (Religions and Philosophies in Central Asia), he depicts Shi'ism as a manifestation of Persian protest against Arab occupation of their land.

Other references about Shi'ism can also be found in the writings of Alfred Von Kremer, who, around 1868, spoke of the "fanatic excesses of the Shi'is and their wild intolerance towards other Mohammedans' Islam."[23] In stark contrast, the French orientalist Carra de Vaux declared some thirty years later that Shi'ism represents "free, liberal thought struggling against the narrow-mindedness of Sunni orthodoxy."[24] Perhaps such statements reveal more about Shi'a authors' preconceptions than about Shi'ism. However, one of the most-studied features of the Twelvers Shi'as is their folk-Islamic popular aspect preserved in the Hussein-Karbala-Ashura-Ta'ziah complex.

Shi'a Ashura in the Month of Muharram:
Ashura is a ten-day period of mourning commemorating the massacre of Imam Hussein, the son of Imam Ali, who was martyred at Karbala (Iraq) in 680 A.D. Narration of this
incident will be provided in Chapter Four. Ashura begins on the tenth day of the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic lunar year. The Lebanese Twelvers Shi'a have kept the folk-Islamic aspect of this tradition alive in their regions. The preservation of Karbala's agonising memories, vivid in Ashura traditional passion plays, has kept the Lebanese Shi'a and the Shi'a worldwide united. The Arab historian Ibn Kathir (774) gives one of the earliest descriptions of the mournful days of Muharram, Ashura. A translation of one of his references is provided by Massaouï:

"On the tenth of Muharram of this year (A.H. 352) the markets are ordered closed. Men and women, wearing coarse woollen hair cloth, go into the markets with their hair uncovered/unveiled, and their hair dishevelled, beating their faces and wailing over Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Talib... The heads and faces of the women and children are bruised and wounded as though by arrows and they appear to be weeping and wailing ... after them come coffins followed by the governor of the city and other notables. All entered the great mosque of Shiraz. There a Mullah mounted the pulpit and recited eulogies, and all wept."[25]

This tradition of extreme drama and passion demonstrates that the memory of Imam Hussein obtained for him a mythical place in the minds of Shi'a followers. Hussein became a sacred hero who, after his tragic death, reached the frontier of eternal values.[26] His mourners made him immortal, and the role of the myth began to manifest itself from within the ritual of mourning, which itself
became a kind of worship.[27] Odes eulogising the Imam are recited annually during the mourning ceremonies. One of these odes, in Massaoui's translation, states:

"The blood of the Prophet Mohammed is flowing: our tears pour plentifully. Let there be infinite curses and blame upon his enemies in the past and the future. Distress yourselves about what befell the children. Now listen to the story of martyrdom and how they deprived Hussein of water, and when he was fighting on the plain of Karbala how they behaved meanly and unjustly. They cut off the head of a descendant of the Prophet in that fiery land. But the Imam lives, his foot in the stirrup and mounted upon his horse. He will not be killed. Then the sinners and the merciless attacked the Prophet's family... Then the soldiers of the Banu Hind moved out with the heads of the descendants of the Chosen Prophet fixed to the points of their lances. The angels in heaven bewailed their deaths and have wept so copiously that their tears flowed like rivers...."[28]

Ashura thus became the impetus for the Shi'a's identification with their political, social and economic grievances. They participate in genuine mourning ceremonies and gatherings enacted annually in Shi'a strongholds such as the city of Nabatiyah in south Lebanon. Ashura odes and the re-enactment of Karbala lead and encourage young Lebanese Shi'a to martyrdom and self-immolation via religious terrorism. The intensity of this commitment within the sect has been a major feature in the Iranian Revolution and Lebanese Shi'a terrorism, commanding world-wide attention. Monotheistic religions have historically been founded on faith and
commitment. Martyrdom has always been the ultimate symbol of devotion, demonstrating the strength of a person's faith and commitment, and martyrdom may be an aspect of religious terrorism.

Individual commitments, in Roger Trigg's view in *Reason and Commitment*, 1973, depend on two distinct elements. They presuppose certain beliefs and also involve a personal dedication to the actions implied by the beliefs. Accordingly, the extent of a person's devotion to a cause suggests the strength of his beliefs and determines the nature of his commitment. Thus the phenomenon of commitment might serve as a means of understanding the fervour that encapsulates religious terrorism. Due to his total identification with his group, the individual becomes totally selfless, ready to perform altruistically horrendous actions to the point of self-sacrifice and meanwhile behave ruthlessly towards the enemy of the group. In other words, the self-assertive behaviour of the group is based on the self-transcending behaviour of its members. This often entails self-sacrifice of personal interests, or even life, in the interest of the group. To put it simply, the egotism of the terrorist group feeds on the altruism of its members. This fundamental factor is embodied in two terrorist organisations in Lebanon: Islamic Amal and Hizbollah.
However, there is no definite consensus on what constitutes organisational commitment because of the divergent definitions presented by different writers. For example, Sheldon in "Investments and Involvements as Mechanisms Producing Commitment to the Organisation" in Administrative Science Quarterly, 1971, defines it as an attitude or orientation towards the organisation which attaches the identity of the person to the organisation. Hall and Nougaim in "An Examination of Maslaw's Need Hierarchy in an Organisational Setting", in Organisational Behaviour and Human Performance, 1968, present it as the process by which the goals of the organisation and those of the individual become increasingly integrated or congruent.

The following typology of organisational commitment (Table 1) was made to represent the various views of some writers. As can be seen, Etzioni appears to be the only writer to link the moral aspect to commitment.

Nevertheless, a few writers have addressed the issue of religious commitment. Wittgenstein is one who makes a distinction between organisational commitment and religious commitment. In Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, 1966, he rejects the role of reason in religious beliefs and religious commitment, for these are based on faith. He
<table>
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<tr>
<th>AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>TYPOLOGY</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>ETZIONI (1961)</td>
<td>Moral Involvement</td>
<td>A positive and high-intensity orientation based on internationalization of organizational goals and values and identification with authority.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calculative Involvement</td>
<td>A lower-intensity relationship based on a rational exchange of benefits and rewards.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alienative Involvement</td>
<td>A negative orientation that is found in exploitative relationships.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANTER (1968)</td>
<td>Continuance Commitment</td>
<td>Dedication to organization's survival brought on by previous personal investments and sacrifices such that leaving would be costly or impossible.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Cohesion Commitment</td>
<td>Attachment to social relationships in an organisation brought on by such techniques as public renunciation or previous social ties or engaging in ceremonies that enhance group cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Commitment</td>
<td>Attachment to organizational norms that shape behaviour in desired directions resulting from requiring member to disavow previous norms publicly and reformulate their self-conception in terms of organizational values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALANCIK and</td>
<td>Organizational Behaviour</td>
<td>Viewed in terms of a strong identification with and involvement in the organization brought on by a variety of factors (attitudinal commitment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAW (1977)</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Viewed in terms of sunk costs invested in the organization that bind the individual irrevocably to the organization (behavioural commitment)</td>
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thus completely rejects the idea of a commitment being right or wrong, justified or unjustified by reason, and any reference to its truth or falsity is seen as misplaced as the reference to the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. He indicates that different religions constitute different forms of societies with different conceptual systems. Since each religion provides its own commitment criteria, it is impossible to stand outside all and adjudicate between them. Tillich, in *The Dynamics of Faith*, 1977, like Wittgenstein, agrees that it is logically impossible for someone to criticise another man's religious commitment when he does not share it.

Despite the above philosophical argument that one cannot judge the validity of others' faith, much of the religious conflict grows out of the religious organisations' attempts to superimpose their own values on others as is the case with the Lebanese Shi'a religious organisations.

References


Chapter III
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Lebanese Civil War and the PLO

The relative failure of the Arab world to resolve the Palestinian problem forces the Palestinian community onto its own resources - limited when compared with those of the opposition - so that terrorism becomes an inevitable concomitant of the struggle and is directed both against Arab states and the West as well as Israel. Indeed, a large part of the bitterness of the Palestinians towards Arab states is a consequence of what is seen in Palestinian eyes as repeated betrayal of their interests by Arab leaders. Ironically, it is a betrayal that is heightened by Palestinian awareness that, even at a popular level, ideological support for their cause is not necessarily reflected in acceptance of Palestinian communities inside other Arab states. And in that betrayal lies a further justification for the weak to use terrorism against their betrayers.[1]

The ideological contradiction over the nature of political legitimacy in the Arab world, however, has more profound effects as well. Although states such as Syria, Iraq and Libya lay claim to an ideology of Arab unity, they suffer from profound disagreements over the specific nature of that unity. In reality however, each state
eventually accords primacy to its own national interest, although that may be clouded in ideological imperatives that become the justification for conflict amongst them. The problem is not confined solely to the issue of ideological contradiction, however, a far more serious problem is that the structure of the state in the Middle East is in itself inherently unstable. Lebanon is the classic example of this Middle Eastern inherent instability. It is here where Middle Eastern terrorism together with Islamic revivalism become paramount.

In September 1970, as a result of the Jordanian civil war, the Fedayeen suffered major defeat and lost Jordan as a base of operations. Hence, the birth of the term Black September. After their expulsion from Jordan, the Fedayeen had to find a new base for terrorist operations. (The word "terrorist" is used here because their operations were directed frequently at civilians.) Countries such as Libya and Iraq did not border Israel and were therefore unsuitable as bases for cross-border military operations against Israel. Both Egypt and Syria were unwilling to allow unrestricted terrorist operations from their territories. Consequently, Lebanon with its fragile state structure became the primary base of operations for the PLO.
Prior to the Jordanian civil war the PLO was already very well established in Lebanon and clashes had begun to occur between Palestinians and Lebanese by the late 1960s. The Lebanese national political leadership feared the increase of Palestinian power in 1968, and the creation of a state within a state as had occurred in Jordan. Anticipating armed conflict with Palestinian guerrillas, the Lebanese government attempted to cut off supplies of arms to the PLO's bases in north Lebanon, the Beq'a Valley, and Beirut's suburbs. By August 1969, the situation had deteriorated to the extent that intermittent fighting occurred between the Lebanese army and Palestinian guerrillas in north Lebanon. The Lebanese government requested the mediation of Egypt's President Nasser. As a result an agreement was signed in November 1969 by the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army and Yasser Arafat. Under this agreement, known as the "Cairo Agreement", the Palestinians were authorised to live and work in Lebanon and to establish committees to watch over Palestinian interests. The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC) was given authority to administer the Palestinian refugee camps. The Fedayeen were permitted free movement in the country; however, the Lebanese military was to have full jurisdiction and authority throughout the country.[2] In essence the Cairo Agreement temporarily lessened the civil conflict and granted authority for PLO operations from Lebanon,
while the Fedayeen were to abide by Lebanese laws. However, the Palestinian guerrillas had more freedom of action within its southern Shi'a regions bordering Israel. Despite the agreement, clashes between armed Palestinians and Lebanese civil and armed forces in north Lebanon and Beirut continued. Additionally, the PLO was unable to restrict Fedayeen attacks from southern Lebanon against the Israelis because other organisations like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were still acting independently. This led to large-scale Israeli retaliations and to renewed strife between the Lebanese and PLO. The Palestinian guerrillas sought support as Muslim brothers from the Lebanese Muslim National Movement against the Lebanese national government which was perceived as being pro-Christian. This alliance gave to an essentially secular struggle for political influence a religious overtone.[3]

The continued strife and conflict between the various factions in Lebanon finally escalated into full-scale warfare in 1975. The country and the government became divided into pro-PLO and anti-PLO factions. The Lebanese army refrained from intervention in the civil strife due to its own political diversity. The army was eventually forced to intervene in an attempt to stop the fighting. However, as feared, the army disintegrated as Muslims and Christians, Rightists and Leftists, deserted the army and
joined the warring factions, which were divided along both political and religious lines. The Christians were generally rightists and were strongly opposed to the Palestinian presence in the country. Various Christian leaders had formed strong militia units which fought against the PLO and the Muslim leftists.[4]

In 1970, President Sulayman Franjiya, as promised, brought the elimination of the "Deuxième Bureau". This military intelligence bureau, which had been in existence since the early 1950s, had been excessively used to silence Lebanese political opposition. Its elimination was in accordance with the Lebanese government's proclaimed efforts for the implementation of more democratic and less authoritarian policies towards civil order.

Lebanon remained neutral during the Six-Day War in October 1973 between the Arabs and Israel, as in 1948, 1956 and 1967. The argument of Lebanon's Christian leadership was that Lebanon's active business sector dictated its provision of needed financial support to the Arab states.

The Palestinian guerrillas based in southern Lebanon increased their attacks on Israel. Consequently, three prominent leaders of the Palestine Resistance Movement
(PRM) were killed in their residences in Beirut by Israeli Mossad commandos on April 10, 1973. New series of clashes developed between the Palestinians and the Lebanese national forces nationwide due to Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government's weak response to Israel's actions. This increased internal conflict damaged the tourist sector and thus Lebanon's national economy, and shattered the already fragile national unity.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisations' need for support and bases in south Lebanon enticed them to arm and train their hosts, the Shi'a and their militia by 1975. The Palestinians' struggle to preserve their bases in southern Shi'a regions, and their attacks on Israel were both characterised as "terrorist", although both were clearly acts of war in situations of foreign occupation.

The Shi'a themselves were already unhappy with the Phalange and even with their national government. They were fighting confessionalism and the Christian leadership under the umbrella of "Harakat-el-Mahroumeen" (the Movement of the Deprived), the Lebanese Shi'a's first sectarian movement, known presently as Amal. The Palestinian cause did not enflame religious tensions and provoke Lebanon's civil war but hastened it. Support for
this observation may be seen in the next chapter and also in the identity of the forces involved in the various phases of the Lebanese unrest, which went through four distinct phases; in each there were significant changes in the role and participation of Lebanese political groups and foreign forces.

The first phase of the civil war, February-May 1975, was dominated by the conflict between radical elements of the Palestinian resistance movement and the Phalangist militia. The conflict was sparked by a series of clashes in April 1975. During the second phase of the war, June-December 1975, the conflict expanded to involve the participation of a coalition of right-wing Christian parties and militias, the Lebanese Front, against a collection of leftist Druze forces, Shi'a and Muslim militias, the National Movement, and radical Palestinian forces, the Rejection Front. The Lebanese Front fought to preserve the existing political order in Lebanon, i.e. confessionalism, while the National Movement and the Rejection Front sought to achieve a comprehensive, structural change in the political system.

Phase three, January-May 1976, introduced yet another new dimension to the Lebanese civil war. It marked the entry of the full-scale military involvement of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Up to this stage, Palestinian
military activity was limited primarily to the participation of the Rejection Front groups, but rightist attacks on Palestinian camps in and around Beirut in January 1976 forced the PLO establishment to join forces with the National Movement. During this period, the rightist forces attempted to carve out a Christian state based on Mount Lebanon. They had full support from other rightists in the Lebanese army who participated in the bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese army disintegrated; large numbers of Muslim and leftist soldiers defected and founded the Lebanese Arab Army to fight alongside the National Movement.

The fourth and final phase of the war, June-October 1976, began with a full-scale Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The conflict then was dominated by a loose Lebanese Front-Syrian forces-Amal alliance against the coalition of Shi'a and Islamic militant organisations, Druze leftist forces, and a now predominantly Palestinian Rejection Front. This signified the drift of Amal's forces away from their previous ally, the Palestinians, and the beginning of their current animosity.

The Lebanese civil war officially ended in October 1976 with the Riyadh Conference at which Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian leaders, under the auspices of the Arab
League, negotiated a peace settlement. The conference brought about a cease-fire among Lebanese groups and an agreement to withdraw and disarm all non-governmental personnel. Despite the end of the civil war, Lebanon's traditional sectarian conflict and Amal-Palestinian animosity continued.

The traditional Maronite ascendancy in Lebanon and the growth of the Shi'a power make it a perfect illustration of the consequences of such ethnic instabilities and competition for control of the state. Admittedly, the Lebanese civil war resulted to a large degree from a conflict over the role of the PLO within the state. The collapse of the Lebanese state since 1982 can be linked directly to the Israeli invasion which was designed to force out the PLO once and for all. Nevertheless, these cataclysmic events were really only catalysts for the collapse of a political structure that was riddled with instability by the intensely personalised nature of the control of power within it.[5]

The Lebanese civil war not only reinstated sectarian animosity and reinflamed the existing secular conflicts, but also nurtured the growth of militant Shi'a, Muslim and Christian organisations. The Lebanese militant Shi'a and Islamic organisations, offspring of Amal, are the
fertile breeders of zealots and the focus of this research.

The Shi'a, indeed, are an aggrieved sect, dispersed, impoverished and occupied with many regional and other divisions reflected in the profusion of small military and political organisations, some linked to Iran, and others to Syrian, Israeli, or Palestinian groupings. The PLO mobilised many of the Shi'a in the south by providing military training and arms to fight the Israelis. The Shi'a, then, became victims of the Palestinians when the alliance began to sour as guerrillas usurped Shi'a lands and as increasing numbers of Shi'a died for the Palestinian cause.

The 1982 Israeli Invasion
Despite their common background and their history of martyrdom (Chapter 4), the Lebanese Shi'a have reacted in different ways to their oppression and frustration. Amal (Hope), the Lebanese defence battalion which consists of the largest Shi'a group in Lebanon was first launched in the late 1960s. This movement marked a crucial turning-point in the emergence of the Shi'a crusade, because for the first time the Shi'a community in Lebanon was being mobilised. Amal's leader, then Imam Mousa As-Sadr (see Chapter Five), took the movement to a further stage by calling for arms. He declared in one of his famous
speeches in Ba'albek: "We do not want sentiments, but action. We are tired of words, feelings, speeches ....... We want our full rights."[6] He was even bolder in another speech: "What does the government expect? What does it expect except rage and revolution? Arms are man's beauty."[7] He was the first modern Shi'a leader to advocate using religion as an idiom of opposition in his public speeches, reminding his followers of the martyrdom of Imam Ali in Karbala (next chapter) to fight oppression. He added: "This revolution did not die in the sands of Karbala, it followed into the life stream of the Islamic world and passed from generation to generation, even to our day."[8]

Imam Mousa did not call for an Islamic republic despite his militant words. He called for equality within a multiconfessional Lebanese state. He was moderate by comparison with the Shi'a militancy in Lebanon today.

Israel invaded south Lebanon in June-August 1982. The subsequent Israeli three-year occupation served as an instigation for the second major turning-point in Lebanon's Islamic revival and sparked a radicalisation and a growing schism among the Shi'a. They also suffered the heaviest casualties and the worst property devastation when the Israelis rolled through southern Lebanon. Further growth of Islamic militancy was also
triggered by the intervention of the United States during this period. Amal, which until this time had not demonstrated the kind of anti-Western attitudes that were a hallmark in Iran, became hostile to the West, most notably the US, only in part because of Washington's ties with Israel.[9]

Several rivals began to appear and challenge Berri, the new leader of Amal, for his moderation and secular orientation. He came under increasing personal pressure, especially among the young who often cynically pointed out that his first wife and children lived in the US and that the Amal leader himself had a green card that could ultimately qualify him for US citizenship. The first challenge sprang from Hussein Musawi, one of Berri's chief lieutenants, who seceded because of a dispute over Berri's reluctance to fight Israel and the Amal chief's willingness to agree with US mediation efforts. This was the beginning of Amal's major rift as explained in Chapter Five.

Musawi and his followers transferred their campaign from Beirut to Ba'albeck, and formed Islamic Amal, one of the main extremist factions. The split served to demonstrate a key development in the Shi'a movement, diverse views among different generations. Berri represented the older Shi'a who were nostalgic for the times of co-existence.
between Christians and Muslims, leftists and rightists. Their identity was Lebanese first, then Shi'a.[10] Berri hoped to restore confessional equilibrium, but the younger generation that had grown during the civil war was far more militant and knew nothing but bitter sectarian rivalry and bloodshed. Lebanon's lamentation was that all Lebanese wanted justice, but the tragedy was that for the Shi'a justice had come to mean revenge. The young Shi'a wanted justice - or revenge - in the name of their slain members before they would consider any genuine national reconciliation. The lust for vengeance and the thirst for revenge became so powerful that they rivalled all other human needs. The young Shi'a were ready to sacrifice their own lives, undergo tremendous hardship, and devote their entire lives to see that vengeance was done.

All these events coincided with the growth of Hizbollah, which by 1983 became the militant group to watch in Lebanon. An increasing number of young Shi'a became totally loyal to Hizbollah and many Amal members began openly to call themselves "Hizbollahi", calling for an Islamic republic, ultimately, in Lebanon.

The Israeli occupation clearly demonstrated the divergence of views on goals and tactics within Amal and between Amal and Hizbollah. Amal broke away from its
headquarters in Beirut and resentment against the Palestinians became so strong that many southern Shi'a welcomed the Israelis because the invasion "liberated" them from Palestinian domination. By contrast, other Shi'a grew to resent and rebel against the Israeli presence and their attempts to convert the Shi'a into surrogate agents. Islam became the chief idiom of opposition, and martyrdom in the name of independence and dignity became an honour. [11] This was manifested in several confrontations which took place during an Israeli raid on Ashura ceremonies in memory of Imam Hussein's martyrdom thirteen centuries earlier (Chapters 2 and 4). The ceremonies were held in Nabatiya in 1983, when clashes between the Shi'a and Israel peaked and grew almost weekly. Israel employed an "iron fist" policy which contributed to further polarization of the Shi'a.

The 1983 and 1984 US intervention provoked the militants' wrath and challenged the credibility of moderates like Berri. The pact presented by the Reagan administration of May 1983 between Israel and Lebanon to put an end to the Israeli occupation of the south was perceived by the Muslims as aiding the Israelis and the Christians. During the Chouf war between Maronite and Druze militias Muslim militias were attacked by US warships in response to an appeal from Lebanon's Maronite-dominated government. Consequently, suspicion of the West and
especially of the US by the Lebanese Muslims increased, as did the militant fervour, acquiring strong anti-Western dimensions.

Therefore, Hizbollah openly supported the wave of terrorist attacks aimed at the West that began in 1983. After the bombing of the US Embassy annexe in 1984, the leader of one Hizbollah group, the Hay Mahdi, said in an interview that he had no specific idea who carried out the attack but whoever they were, "they were good Muslims who carried out the work of God."[12] At this stage it was becoming apparent that Hizbollah consisted of diverse elements and factions. To enhance its strength it absorbed many other smaller movements, such as the Lebanese branch of Ad-Dawa (The Call), Islamic Amal (not Amal), and the Hussein Suicide Squad. It also produced its own cells such as the Organisation of the Oppressed of the Earth and the Revolutionary Justice Organisation. Its following differed from area to area within Beirut itself; it largely depended on the appeal of individual religious leaders. "In Beirut alone, the activities in the Basta neighbourhood differed from the branch in Hay Mahdi; the large number of groups and cells within Hizbollah often acted independently."[13] As stated in Chapter Five, Hizbollah is clearly pro-Iranian. Its symbol that is painted on walls and posters on almost every major street in West Beirut is a model of the
emblem of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Their ambulances printed with the name Hizbollah in big red letters often speed through the streets of Beirut. Their slogans denouncing both East and West are identical to the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran:

"We the sons of Hizbollah's nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by the order of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Khomeini .... We have opted for religion, freedom and dignity over humiliation and constant submission to America and its allies and to Zionism and their (Christian) Phalangist allies. We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and the invaders out of it and to take our fate in our own hands."[14]

This coincides with the arguments of the radical and fundamentalist critics that rose in the aftermath of the catalyst of the 1967 war. Fundamentalists argued that the Arabs had lost the war not because they were busy worshipping - as the radical caricature would have it - but because they had lost their faith and bearings. They proved easy prey to Israeli power because they were disconnected from a deeply-held system of beliefs. This argument was similar to the one made by the radical critics. The latter, too, had argued that society needs a system of beliefs, an ideology to guide it. The fundamentalists' contention was that Islam offered that system of belief, that it could do what no imported doctrine could hope to do - mobilise the believers,
instil discipline, and inspire people to make sacrifices and, if necessary, to die.[15]

Islam, however, was not merely to be an ideology of struggle, as Muslim intellectuals in the Salafiyyah movement - Afghani, Rida and Arslan - had demonstrated. Islam was also capable of providing a basis for the organisation of the state. In this respect, Islam was, perhaps, unique amongst the great religions of the world in that, from the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed on, one of its primary functions, in addition to mediating between God and man, was to define the conditions in which human society should organise itself. It had a corpus of law to regulate such an organisation - the Sharc - a body of tradition to inform the political system in the Hadith - the traditional sayings of the Prophet - and the Sunna - the general practice of the Muslim community - and a political structure, sanctioned by the Qur'an - literally the divine word of Allah - to organise the community in the early caliphate. Furthermore, provided that the essential principles were observed - that the ruler would ensure social order for the proper practice of Islam and that the community, in return, would accept his rule - the system was highly flexible and adaptable to novel conditions, especially in Lebanon.
Over the past decade, the political and military developments in Lebanon have led to a more prevailing entrenchment of militant Islam. The major Lebanese militias and Berri's Amal signed a Syrian agreement in 1985 to end the decade of civil strife, but it did not include the militant groups such as Hizbollah and Tawhid. Furthermore, Israel kept a residual presence in the southern border of Lebanon which irritated and further polarized the young, and made the extremism of Hizbollah more appealing than the moderation of Amal. Another factor that added to the fury of the Muslim militants was the way in which the Phalange party of President Jemayel balked at the agreement, which eventually would have required that the Maronites hand over unspecified powers to even the political balance - even though the Lebanese forces - its former military wing - had been party to the accord. This was seen as an indication that the Maronites were not interested in a realistic compromise. Syria had once again to dispatch troops to Beirut; there was an escalation in sectarian fighting and several rounds of car bombings on both sides of the Green Line that divided the capital. Unfortunately, Syrian attempts to control and pacify the Muslim Shi'a were to no avail because of the independent spirit of their movements. The growing power of Lebanon's young Muslim generation to whom Islamic revival appealed and who were the most antagonistic towards traditional and secular leadership,
did not bode well for the eventual restoration of stability.

The first major Middle Eastern achievement of Shi'a Islam was the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The second was the campaign of Hizbollah Shi'a fundamentalists against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, during which the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) lost more than 640 troops. The result compelled the government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres to withdraw unilaterally. For the first time in their history the Israelis left an occupied territory under pressure from an Arab enemy. Hizbollah gained admiration, particularly among the young Shi'a, and came to be seen as the major force that managed to expel a very powerful enemy from Lebanon - something Amal could not do.

Both moderate and militant Lebanese Shi'a perceived the Israeli pull-back as a triumph of Islam. Disillusionment with the excesses of the Iranian Revolution might have caused Islamic revival to wane in some other parts of the region, but the move of the IDF in Lebanon gave it a new impetus. Islamic militancy in Lebanon has continued to grow ever since, as will be explored in Chapters Four and Five.
References


[7] "Hizbollah Manifesto".

[8] "Hizbollah Manifesto".


The Shi'a in Lebanon

The Shi'a have traditionally been underrated in Lebanon. Trod on politically and socially by the mainstream Sunnis and Maronite Christians, the Shi'a had been minor players in Lebanese politics after independence. Historically the leading Shi'a politicians were members of a few elite families who displayed little interest in the mass of poor Shi'a and contributed to their suffering. They were among the biggest exploiters of their fellow Shi'a through monopolies on farm lands and businesses.

There are three Shi'a strongholds in Lebanon - in the south, around Ba'albek in the eastern Beq'a Valley, and the southern suburbs of West Beirut. These regions have been the poorest in the country. Their standard of living, education, and social needs have generally been the lowest. Sunnis and Maronites, and other sects had openly discriminated against the Shi'a. Their current revolt is the result of decades of bitterness and resentment. Their anger has been growing together with their number, especially, after the French Mandate's incorporation of Jabal'Amil and the Beq'a Valley to Lebanon in 1920, the Lebanese Shi'a population rose to
21% of the total population. From third largest sect in 1943, the Shi'a had grown to become by far the largest by 1985. They strove for recognition of their strength even if this meant undertaking suicide operations to win attention and to avenge any perceived injustice.

The Shi'a presence in Lebanon may be traced back to the seventh century when the sect was formed. Their history is more conducive to Islamic revival because of its emphasis on fighting oppression through martyrdom. One of the three revered figures in Shi'a Islam is Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammed and son of the fourth Muslim Caliph, Ali. (Shi'at Ali, as Shi'ism was originally known, means "follower of Ali").

The sect of Shi'a began, shortly after the founding of Islam in the seventh century, as a coalition of followers of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, after the martyrdom of Ali's son, Imam Hussein at Karbala (now an Iraqi city). In 680 A.D. Hussein set out with a small number of followers to defend the right of his family line to lead the growing Islamic empire, controlled then by the new Umayyad dynasty, that had thousands of troops and a very strong military might. Hussein knew of the possibility of defeat and death, but he deemed it more honourable to die for belief than to live with injustice. Badly outnumbered, Hussein's tiny
band was massacred by the military forces of Yazid, the
recognised political head of the major Muslim community
of the day.[1] This incident has come to symbolise the
Shi'i experience, that of a suffering minority group long
oppressed for its beliefs by an unjust and unbelieving
establishment.

Hussein's death is re-enacted every year by the Shi'a
community, much as Jesus' crucifixion is commemorated by
Christians at Easter. For the Shi'a, Hussein is the
symbol of man's struggle against tyranny. "Therefore, it
is the duty of the Shi'a today to carry on Hussein's
struggle by resisting or actively challenging oppressors,
to the point of losing their lives."[2] The Shi'a were
thus organised from inception as a protest against the
Muslim leadership, who had passed over what the Shi'a
consider to be the legitimate rights of Imam Ali and his
descendants. Some of the Shi'a remained in Iraq, and
some fled to Jabal'Amil and Beq'a Valley in the seventh
century after the Karbala incident. From that time
onward," ... the Shi'is of Lebanon were reduced to the
status of dissenters, at first from the Christianity of
the Crusader kingdoms, and then, for long centuries, from
a surrounding orthodoxy dominated by the Sunnis."[3]

The French Mandatory authorities and their allies, the
Maronites were able able to maintain the Shi'a of
Jabal'Amil and the Beq'a Valley under control and in isolation by co-opting the Shi'a feudal leadership. Until the past decade, the sect served to support and protect the interests of its political elites and upper classes. Shi'ism was used to promote unity and solidarity around the existing social structure, maintaining loyalty to their elites.

Independence:
The independence of Lebanon took place on 26 November 1941, when an unwritten agreement was approved between the Christian and Muslim leaders, which was called the National Pact (National Covenant). The pact illustrated definitions of the shares of the various confessional communities in the formal governmental structure, and consisted of basic rules regarding governance of the country and orientation of Lebanon's policy.[4] The pre-eminent position of the Maronites was preserved under the French Mandate by their allocation of presidency and entitlement to membership. The second most powerful position went to the Sunnis, and it allocated the speakership of the parliament to the Shi'a.[5] The pact did unite Lebanon under one flag. However, according to Fouad Ajami," ... two dominant ideas were brought together in the Lebanese polity that the French fashioned and whose independence they granted in 1943: a Maronite concept that stressed Lebanon's Christian identity, and a
Sunni Arab conviction, upheld by the merchants of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, that the country was a piece of a larger world. The impoverished and quiescent Shi'a fit into neither concept. They were Lebanon's hewers of wood and drawers of water."[6]

This covenant fortified the link between religion and politics and served to widen the gap between the various political religious sects.

Nationalism and the Regional Struggle for Power:
In the 1940s, many external entities as well as many Lebanese attempted to incorporate Lebanon into their proposed restructuring of the Middle East. King Abdullah of Jordan clamoured for the reunification of Greater Syria with himself at its head, allowing Lebanon the option to join. Syria agitated for the return of the Lebanese Beq'a Valley lost in 1920, while Iraqi political leaders tried to include all of Lebanon in their Fertile Crescent State with Baghdad as its capital. Meanwhile, some Lebanese political elements, in seeking union with their Arab neighbours aggravated anew the Christian-Muslim tensions.

The differences in attitudes and aspirations towards nationalism between the Western-oriented Maronites and the Arab-oriented Muslims are reflected in the political
awakening which sparked Arab nationalism and also came as a logical sequence to the intellectual awakening. Western-educated Lebanese were the logical liaison officers of modern nationalism, which was a product of late eighteenth-century revolutionary France. However, Muslims hesitated to accept the novel doctrine and when they did, it was mixed with Pan-Islam and tied to the rising aspirations of the masses. As a secular movement with the emphasis on economic values and transcending loyalty to a community, irrespective of religious affiliation within a geographic unity, nationalism clearly conflicted with Islam.[7]

The overriding reality of the Umma - the concept of the single Islamic community occupying a definable territory - was buttressed by the dominant role of Islam as an ideology and a culture, and was further reinforced by the multi-ethnic political structure imposed by colonial powers. At the same time a basic sentiment of patriotism, Wataniya (derived from watan, homeland), became more evident, but its importance varied in response to the vitality of the colonial influence and cultural imperialism. In Egypt, for example, it became a dominant factor during the nineteenth century, so that, by Egyptian independence in 1922 under the Wafd, Egyptian intellectuals were often far more concerned over their country's pharaonic credentials than over its Islamic
inheritance. From that time, however, a third concept began to play an ever-increasing role - the idea of a common cultural and linguistic identity based on Arabic and known as Qaumiya, which reflected a much earlier concept of the tribe (qaum) as a cultural unit.

The development of Qaumiya was the result of two dependent ideological trends. On the one hand, in the 1890s Christian and Muslim Arabs in Syria and Lebanon sought to define an Arab identity, separate from the wider Muslim Umma, and, although culturally linked to it, not dependent on religious legitimisation through Islam. The idea of modifying the concept of the Umma and separating it from religion brought a wave of religious revivalism that was spread throughout Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Thinkers like Al-Afghani, Rashid Rida and Shakib Arsalan, were then all determined to revive Islam as the conscious ideological motivation of the Islamic world. However, meanwhile, they found it increasingly difficult to avoid emphasising the dominant role of Arabic within that world and thus indirectly stimulated the concept of Qaumiya as well as reviving that of the Umma.[8]

The 1958 Crisis:
By the early 1950s, the newly-established military governments in Egypt, Syria and Iraq instituted economic
policies based on the nationalisation of most of their economic sectors. Lebanon adopted the laissez-faire policy and its relative stability attracted Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf capital. Beirut became the only centre for most regional investments.[9]

Urban and predominantly Christian communities were the ones that mainly benefited from the Lebanese economic boom of the 1950s. This led to the dissatisfaction of predominantly rural Muslim communities. This dissatisfaction was reflected in the 1957 presidential election. Kamil Shamoun, a Christian presidential candidate, succeeded in securing a majority of support in the Chamber of Deputies and won the 1957 presidency against the wishes of several Muslim leaders. President Shamoun's election was a major factor in the Muslim leaders' encouragement of a subsequent rural uprising. The Lebanese Muslim leadership's rejection of Shamoun's presidency was further exacerbated by Arab nationalism emanating from Egypt and Syria.

During this period, President Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt encouraged nationalism, even pan-Arab nationalism, and reinforced the dominance of Wataniya in the modern form of territorial nationalism within the Middle East. Its most important area of activity has been the adoption of the Palestinian issue and the confrontation with Israel
as an Arab responsibility. The 1956 Suez conflict between Egypt and Israel served to increase the internal tensions in the region. Syria supported Egypt on the Suez question, and both countries, along with Saudi Arabia, severed their diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain. Iraq and Jordan broke ties with France.[10] While these indigenous political developments were taking place, Lebanon chose to remain neutral.

As a result, Syria severed its economic ties with Lebanon on 13 March 1958, making it seek protection under the Eisenhower doctrine, which promised Lebanon protection in exchange for Lebanese support of American policies in the Middle East. While this stance no doubt was in accord with the views of Lebanese Christians, it was decidedly against the wishes of many of the Muslims, as shown by the sudden surge of violence between 1957-1958 indicated in Table 1.

The Lebanese Christian-Muslim split resulted in the assassination of a Lebanese Christian opposition leader by Muslim rebels on 8 May 1958. This assassination served as a signal for the National Front to begin an armed insurrection.[11]
## TABLE 1

Violence in Lebanon from 1950-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Violence</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protest Demonstrations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths/Domestic Violence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sanctions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Interventions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Shamoun called upon American forces and order was quickly restored. In reality there was little opposition by the Lebanese to the use of American force, but the gap between the two religious groups was not bridged, and this internal conflict has yet to be resolved. Thus, contemporary sectarian political movements of the Shi'a in Lebanon, in the light of the religious overture projected by this historical sketch, are only echoes of past sectarian outcries.

The Leading Events to the Shi'a Political Movements

In recognition of the Shi'a's considerable numerical presence in Lebanon, the National Pact bestowed upon the sect in 1943 the speakership of the parliament. The position of speaker was primarily a symbolic one, deprived of significant political power. This National Pact endowment ranked the Shi'a political power as last among the major Lebanese sectarian groups, a confessional order regarded by many as a leading factor in the contemporary political movements of the Shi'a.

To others, these Shi'a political movements were precipitated by the failure of the Intra Bank. Intra Bank held in 1966 more than 17% of Lebanese total assets, and most of the Shi'a feudal families' liquid assets. Its failure in 1967 deprived the Shi'a's traditional leadership of their primary source of power, thus
breaking up their monopoly over the politics of their sect.

Financial collapse, coupled with perceived confessional inequities, became two determinants in the political movements of the Lebanese Shi'a, the primary behind their activity being their geo-cultural immobility.

Geo-cultural immobility describes a low level of geographic mobility of a specific population in a nation with limited cultural pluralism. Among the distinctive features of the Shi'a geo-cultural immobility, depicted in Figure 1, are: inherent socio-demographic characteristics; a distributed, feudal, and self-centric political leadership, coupled with national and governmental indifference; clandestine political parties and political machinery; and a Lebanese confessional environment covering all the characteristics above with a veil of legitimacy.

The Shi'a were originally concentrated as stated at the beginning of this chapter in two regions: Jabal'Amil and the Beq'a. Lebanese sectarian schisms and confessionalism collectively maintained the Shi'a on their historical reservations. The first of these was Jabal'Amil (Mount Amil), which is part of the Mount Lebanon range that lies in the south, between the Shouf
FIGURE 1

Features of the Shi'a Geo-Cultural Immobility

- Confessionalism in Lebanon
- Indifferent National Gov.
- Lebanese Shi'a Socio-Demographic Characteristics
- Feudal Political Leadership
- Lebanese Shi'a Geo-Cultural Immobility

- Lebanon Low Geographic Mobility
- Low Cultural Pluralism
- Relative Privation
- Political Leadership
- Clandestine Political Parties

and north Galilee. The second area was in the northern reaches of the Beq'a, around the town of Ba'albek and Hirmil. Each of these major groups of Shi'is followed a distinctive path of development. Jabal'Amil was nearly always able to support a steady form of rain-fed agriculture. Its society was settled and became dominated by a handful of large landlords, who exercised strong feudal power over their cultivators. The northern Beq'a was very different; there, settled agriculture was seldom feasible. The driest part of Lebanon, this region could support only a semi-nomadic society. "The Shi'is from there were clans people, living under the same kind of honour code that regulated the life of semi-nomads throughout the great deserts of the Syrian interior...."[12]

The modernisation process spurred by President Chehab's regime in the early 1960s attracted many of the Shi'a to Beirut. The first and only migration of Shi'a families from Jabal'Amil and Ba'albek to the southern suburbs of Beirut became a flood from the late 1950s onwards. By the early 1980s fully one-third of Lebanon's whole Shi'i population was found in Beirut. This large scale rural-to-urban migration accelerated the process of social change within the sect. In addition, in the city, Shi'is from Jabal'Amil and the Beq'a mingled for the first time, and shared many of the same traumatic experiences there.
together. Urbanisation thus helped weave the interests of what were now three distinct areas of Shi'i settlement into something like a single national Shi'i constituency.[13]

The Shi'a's displacement into urban areas may be attributed to several factors. One factor is the Shi'a uprooting induced by the Israeli incursions into south Jabal'Amil. Another factor is the inability of the Shi'i farmer, handicapped by comparatively low-yielding land and traditional farming technology, to compete in an open Lebanese market with other national and international sources. A third factor may be due to the absence of government agricultural subsidies, or even government regional support as indicated by Table 2 below.

The Shi'a regions extended to more than 68% of the Lebanese agricultural land, yet it has always received less than 1.1% of the national budget. Most of the national monuments and historical areas which constitute Lebanon's primary source of income are located in Shi'a regions, yet traditionally they have received less than 8% of the national budget.
TABLE 2

Distribution of Budget Allocations to the Lebanon's Shi'a Over Selective Departments in 1972, in Millions of L.L. Amount and Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Allocation</th>
<th>Budget Percentage</th>
<th>Shi'a Regions' Share Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>157.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Revitalisation</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Tourism Promotion</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Projects</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Improvement</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lebanese budget for 1972 was 980.4 million L.L. ($320m).

Compiled from: Lebanon's Official Budget Documents (1972)

TABLE 3

Indicators of Private Investment in Lebanon by Region: 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Non-Muslim Regions</th>
<th>Shi'a Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Exchanges</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinemas</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacies</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookstores</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol Stations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Schools</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The limited and inequitable governmental investment in the Shi'a regions is paralleled by the lack of investment by the national private sector. Table 3 shows the distribution of various economic indicators such as banking and credit institutions, hotels, hospitals and restaurants between the confessional regions.

A fourth factor which may be implicated in the Shi'a displacement is the minute number of governmental jobs confessionally allocated to or administered by Shi'i. At the beginning of the 1970s, fewer than 5,100 Shi'i, members of the largest sect in Lebanon, held governmental positions out of a total of 24,000 such positions. It is also noteworthy that Shi'a-allocated positions are primarily unskilled and labouring positions, and that only three top administrative positions out of 65 were allocated to the Shi'a. Tables 4 and 5 show this uneven distribution.

Shi'a Feudal Leadership:
The most profound truth of Lebanon, according to Fouad Ajami, is "... as old as the land: the primacy of the religious sect and the clan, and the will of the 'big man' leading a particular sect".[14] In this section we will start by focussing on the effect of this "big man", the "Za'im"[15] who was introduced in Chapter I.
### TABLE 4

Distribution of Lebanese Civil Service Positions by Ministry and Sect, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Shi'i</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Prime Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Council</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Inspection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts of Account</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Disciplinary Council</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Education</td>
<td>6367</td>
<td>3023</td>
<td>2708</td>
<td>12098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Electricity</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economy</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post and Telephone</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>3057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lebanese Civil Service Council (1970)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Non-Christian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M GC/GO</td>
<td>RC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Heads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administr.</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Magistrate P.</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Diplomatic P.</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M = Maronite  
GC = Greek Catholic  
GO = Greek Orthodox  
RC = Roman Catholic  
CP = Christian Protestant  
AC = Armenian Church  
S = Sunni  
SH = Shi'a  
D = Druze  

Compiled from: Michael Hudson (1985, p.320); and Lebanese Ministry of Information
Za'im, in the Arabic sense, is: ... a political leader who possesses the support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests of as many from amongst his clientele.

Shi'a Za'ims, traditionally members of land-owning families, are relics of the Ottoman Empire. They were endowed, until recently, with inherited prestige and political positions by the Lebanese confessional hierarchy. Only a few families comprised the Shi'a's traditional political leadership. Among the names of these Shi'a families that have until recently enjoyed such high regional and sectarian standing, we find those of the As'ad family in south Lebanon, the Haidai in Beq'a and the Hammadeh in Ba'albek. The dominance of these families may be seen by their longevity in the Lebanese parliament. Each deputy from these Shi'a parliamentary families averaged 25 years in the 30-year-old parliament. These families handed down from father to son the Shi'a's allocated confessional positions in Lebanon's parliament. 10 per cent of the Shi'a parliamentary families produced nearly one-fourth of the deputies and occupied more than one-third of all available seats. In some instances, it is one man (Sabri Hammada), or fathers and sons, Al-As'ad, Al-Zayn, brothers-in-law Hammadeh-As'ad who perpetuate family succession. "Nearly all the Shi'a
deputies, with an eye open on their imminent retirement, made strenuous efforts to bequeath their political capital and influence to their children."[16]

A further illustration of the strength of kinship ties, critical to the assessment of the Shi'a and their political leadership is the kinship pattern of Shi'a parliament members shown in Table 6. In the 30 years after independence, from 1941 to 1972, out of a total of 443 deputies, the 29 Shi'a had close family ties.

**TABLE 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinship Ties</th>
<th>Number of Deputies Interrelated with this Type of Kin</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fathers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nephews</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers-in-law</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relatives</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These Shi'a dominant families were the wealthy land-owning aristocrats. Studies of the social classes of the Lebanese parliament show that 47% of the Shi'a deputies were classified as land-owning aristocrats and that fewer than 18% held additional education-produced professions.
In comparison, only 9% of the 414 non-Shi'i deputies were classified as aristocrats, and more than 43% of them held additional education-produced occupations.

This description of the Shi'a Za'ims supports the contention that the Shi'a political machinery is a "feudal institution".

The Shi'i in Confessional Lebanon

A Shi'i usually gave his vote to his traditional political leader in the hope of receiving direct economic advantages, public employment, or support in his dealings with authorities. Thus:

".... The Za'im provides benefits to individuals in need, in return for political support. In the villages a large percentage of individuals receive jobs usually in some government office through a Za'im.... Very frequently they have no other choice."[17]

Through this patron-client relationship, the Shi'a "wants" were addressed by their Za'im without having to enter the political system. Thus, the Lebanese Shi'a's political socialisation, encompassing the continuing cycle of citizenship training and political education from generation to generation, led individuals to seek gains from their Za'ims rather than to organise and collectively impose demands on the system. The Shi'a political socialisation provided for "built-in
before he is the representative of socialism or administrative reform. Liberal democracy is sought through particularistic rather than universalistic channels."[19] Besides, Lebanese electoral laws, in effect, restricted parliamentary nominations in the Shi'a regions to feudal families. Due to this practice, the patron-client relationship between Shi'a Za'im and his followers ensured the stability and perseverance of the Shi'a Za'imism from the days of the Ottoman Empire to present-day Lebanon. Za'imism has persisted until recently, embodied in its political leadership in spite of the end of feudalism in contemporary Lebanon.

Lebanese Shi'a in Political Parties:
The Shi'a representatives hardly introduced any bill in any one legislative session in the parliament and the Shi'a youth, inhibited from active political participation, became discontented with the Lebanese confessional system. Branded as a Shi'i, a youth's opportunities were significantly curtailed. Fewer than 16% of them were admitted to colleges and universities in 1973-74 as shown in Table 7, even though they constituted more than 37% of the national youth. Shi'a youth increasingly perceived confessional inequities by having their education, employment, and ambitions smothered by the conservatism of their sect's traditional leaders and prejudices against them from the rest of society.
restraints" in the form of attitudes, values, and norms that attempt to keep "wants" from overloading the Lebanese political system. The Shi'a political socialisation process contrasts with Almond and Powell's (1969) system theory concept, where political socialisation promotes inputs into the political system. The Shi'a Za'im performed the role of an input inhibition, and the political socialisation of the Shi'a was traditionally limited to their communal socialisation. Shi'ism has its own type of political or communal socialisation which is restricted to only those people who belong to that particular group and differs from that of other sects of the society.[18]

As explained earlier in this chapter, Shi'ism was used to promote solidarity and unity around the existing social structure and to maintain loyalty to their elites. Therefore, a Shi'i voted and campaigned for his Za'im's person or family regardless of the Za'im's beliefs, ideology, goals or programmes, which most often were non-existent. Thus the Shi'a Za'im had a negative effect on the development of programmatic Shi'i politics and Shi'i party involvement.

Za'ims also lacked party affiliation among Shi'a parliamentary deputies accordingly: "... a deputy is the representative of his district, his sect, and his group
A limited number of mobilised Shi'a youth came to face the reality that their interests were being represented by a clique of wealthy landlords and Za'ims who were obstacles to effective power, and that reform within the existing system was chimerical. Such new attitudes and growing discontent with the Shi'a's traditional political leadership were paralleled by a growing involvement in political parties.

The increase in party affiliation was the Shi'a youth's first and primary means to bring about change, rather
than relying on sectarian or religious movements. Unlike those in other sects, Shi'a joined the realm of clandestine and transnational parties which demanded an end to sectarian inequity, social reform, equality, and income redistribution. This new Shi'i initiative and alternative form of political participation was of a radical leftist tone, like the Social National Party (formerly the Syrian National Party), the Communist Party, and the Ba'ath Party, to name a few. Most of these non-sectarian radical parties recruited, besides the newly-converted Shi'a, from various minority sects and autonomous voters. The few socially-mobilised youth were led by radical lawyers, university professors, and students. It is noteworthy that these youth were upper-class members, since no more than 15% of qualified Shi'a youth may attend Lebanese colleges.

The parties which most Shi'a joined were clandestine organisations, operating ineffectively and covertly towards the attainment of transnational and collective goals. Nevertheless, the Shi'a were able to achieve temporarily, in the early 1960s under President Chehab's regime, more equitable employment and representation in government by supplanting some of the old notables, thus reducing sectarian tensions. As a result there was a tangible increase in the number of party representatives nominated for the 1960-64 parliamentary elections.
Despite this increase in political participation, however, the Shi'a were unable to successfully develop and integrate non-traditional, non-clandestine political action groups or parties that could maintain their social and political interests. Other sects, such as the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Druze, have maintained powerful and effective political parties, such as the Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises), the Destour, the National Bloc, and the Progressive Socialist Party. These are sectarian parties operating nationally to ensure their respective constituents' interests.

Beside the Arab-Israeli conflict (discussed in Chapter 3) that added fuel to a long-burning fire, the Lebanese Shi'a's inherent socio-demographic characteristics; their feudal and self-centric political leadership, coupled with their ineffective political parties and political machinery; and Lebanon's confessional and low-cultural pluralistic environment all indicate the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility. This immobility provided the seeds for the crisis milieu necessary for their charismatic religious leader, Imam Mousa el-Sadr, to reinstall in them Shi'ism and its fervour. Chapter Five will assess the relationship between the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility and their active religious resurgence and religious terrorism.
References


[10] Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p.38.


Chapter V

THE SHI'A IN LEBANON: RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE TO TERRORISM

The Susceptibility of the Shi'a to Religious Charisma

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the features deemed responsible for the Shi'a's religious resurgence in Lebanon. As postulated in Chapter I, the geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon induced dissatisfaction with their political leadership, which, in turn, brought about a leadership vacuum which was displaced by the opportune existence of a charismatic religious leader. Once in control and through his religious movement, this charismatic religious leader will trigger religious resurgence. This denouement is depicted in Figure 1.

The Shi'a's religious resurgence in Lebanon is depicted as the cumulative byproduct of their geo-cultural milieu, their dissatisfaction with political leadership, the presence of a charismatic religious leader, and the susceptibility of the Shi'a masses. The primary objective of this chapter is to illuminate the relationship of the above feature and the Shi'a religious resurgence.

Many researchers attribute the contemporary religious mobilisation of the Lebanese Shi'a to confessionalism and
FIGURE 1
From Geo-Cultural Immobility to Religious Resurgence

Confessionalism in Lebanon
Indifferent National Gov.

Lebanese Shi'a in Ineffective Political Parties
Feudal Political Leadership

Lebanese Shi'a Geo-Cultural Immobility
Shi'i Charismatic Religious Leader

Weak Lebanese Shi'a Traditional Political Leadership

Shia Religious Leadership in Lieu of Political Leadership

Increase in Mosques
Shi'a Clergy
Mosque Attendance
Religious Publications
Religious Organisations

Religious Resurgence


------ weak relationship
------ considerable relationship
------ strong relationship
------ occasional relationship

set of interdependent variables
economic inequity, these factors contribute very much to the sect's geo-cultural immobility. Chapter Four illustrated that the Shi'a's chronic privation and political frustration led only to their increased involvement in political parties, not to the formation of religious or sectarian organisations. The opportune presence of Imam Mousa el-Sadr, the Lebanese Shi'a contemporary charismatic religious leader in this particular Shi'a milieu, was necessary and sufficient to compel his religious sectarian political movement into religious resurgence.

The Lebanese Shi'a had been mainly involved with progressive, clandestine, and transnational parties prior to their first sectarian political movement. These clandestine parties were totally ineffective as seen in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, they were instrumental in illuminating to the Shi'a the extent of their privation relative to other Lebanese sects. These radical parties were unable to get enough parliamentarians elected to bring about major changes. The failure of these parties to attract new members in 1964, the first election after they were authorised by ministerial decree, may be seen in Table 1. None of their members was elected out of 18 Shi'a-allocated seats in the 1964 parliamentary elections, and only one Shi'i party member was elected in the 1968 election.
Nevertheless, they were able to divert Shi'a autonomous voters from supporting their traditional sectarian leadership. Also, the traditional leadership's loss of its monetary resources in the Intra Bank failure in 1967 (as explained in the previous chapter) curtailed its power to marshal the remaining mobilised voters' support.

Evidence of the diversion of Shi'a voters away from their traditional leadership during the zenith of these parties was proved by the Lebanese parliamentary elections. Even though the Shi'a population was growing rapidly, its voting participation declined considerably during the 1960-1964 period. This decline in voter participation also reversed the greater annual increase trend in voting participation in Lebanon's socially and economically less-advanced provinces.[1] In the Shi'a regions, voter turnout from 1947 to 1957 increased by at least 5% each election, as opposed to the 1960 and 1964 elections when

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National #</th>
<th>National Percentage</th>
<th>Shi'a #</th>
<th>Shi'a Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56.3</td>
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<td>47.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: Michael Hudson (1985, p.239); Fahis (1979); Landau et al. (1980).
voter participation dropped to a considerably lower level, decreasing by at least 40%.

By the mid-1960s, large groups of Shi'a had moved out of their rural communities where they were held under control by their elites, into urban arenas with the potential for mass political participation. Yet, neither the Shi'a's traditional political leadership, nor the other Lebanese political parties were able to manage and hold in check the sect's rapid urbanisation or to provide the sect with confessional equity. Tangible evidence of the Shi'a's latent but popular discontent is indicated by the extensive decrease in the number of the Shi'a voters electing traditional elites to the parliament. This is illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. As depicted, there was a 50% decrease in votes cast in support of elected traditional elites, most of whom received fewer than 60% of the total votes.

**TABLE 2**

Comparative Presentation of the Shi'a and Mean Percentage of Total Voters Received by Winners in Seven Lebanese Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>Total Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>63.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>59.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The inability of the parties and the leadership to provide the Shi'a with confessional equity led to the sect's dissatisfaction and discontent. Discontent with their political machinery dramatically increased the susceptibility of the sect, by default, to the appeals of religious movements. The Shi'a urban agglomerations, characterised by housing shortages, high level of unemployment, discrimination and a virtual lack of social services, renders the newly-urbanised elements particularly vulnerable to recruitment by charismatic leaders or their agents.[2] Thus movements of purification started not from the pure religion of urban scholars, but from the poor. In the case of Lebanon "the Muslim Shi'a are the poor". These movements are born of economic causes even if they have a religious camouflage. Class resentment, opposition to the state, and the pathos of religious revival could thus combine into an explosive mixture.[3] They unite under the direction of the
prophet, to punish the faithless and to re-establish the ceremonial law and true faith, and by way of recompense, to appropriate the treasure of the faithless. Since gross disparities of wealth and privilege fly in the face of Islamic maxims of communal sharing of wealth, revivalist movements use Islam as a protest ideology to oppose ruling elites with religious sanctions.[4]

Additional support for the sect's susceptibility to the appeals of religious movements also came from religious resurgence in Egypt. Thus, in Egypt the strength of religious organisations such as Ikhwan Muslimin (a Sunni movement), the Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928-29, and Al-Jihad (not Islamic Jihad) which first emerged in 1978 and carried out the assassination of President Sadat. Some of their members were also involved in anti-Christian sabotage; the strength of these organisations is partially due to the failure of the elite to take account of the growing strength of the rural lower-class migrants to urban areas. In Egypt such people have become disillusioned with the lack of response from the political elites and their ideologies and are returning to religious nationalism. Unless the left in Egypt are able to develop "more organisational strength ... the religious movement will continue to expand its influence."[5] Consequently in situations of crisis, Islam assumes a revolutionary character in challenging
the status quo, its ideologies, elites, institutions, and international patterns.

Charismatic Leadership and Religious Movements:
The Lebanese Shi'i became aware of the full extent of his plight and political discontent through the preachings of Imam Mousa el-Sadr. Initially exclusively a religious figure, the Imam was able to expose and inflame the Shi'a's latent political and economic discontentment and to inspire their hopes of overcoming them. By the late 1960s, his charisma was winning the hearts and the minds and mobilising the Lebanese Shi'a everywhere. He identified the sect's confusion and perceived its susceptibility to his appeals. "Generally, the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic, ... such as ... Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, leader of Hizb ad-Dawa in Iraq and Imam Mousa el-Sadr, leader of Amal in Lebanon..."[6]

The opportune presence of such a catalytic religious leader was essential to the organisation of contemporary Shi'a religious-political movements. The Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility provided Imam Mousa el-Sadr with the complementary crisis milieu, with its characteristics of a crisis in legitimacy of elites, ideology and institutions. The geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon also provided the stage for the
rise of Imam Mousa el-Sadr to political prominence. He entered the political fray, viewing with concern the influence of the leftist parties among young Shi'a and the ineptitude of the traditional Zu'uama.

His first intervention was the foundation of the Shi'i Supreme Council (SSC) in November 1967. Much to the chagrin of the Shi'a's traditional political leadership, he used the SSC to advance his popularity. Through his religious preaching and political diatribe, the Imam was able to animate and rally hundreds of thousands of Shi'a behind him. This provided him with the strong base he needed to claim the Lebanese Shi'a political leadership by 1968.

The identification of Imam Mousa el-Sadr in Chapter One as a rebel and a rejectionist was not based only on his genealogy. As a reaction to confessionalism, and in an effort to address all Lebanese minorities' relative privation, the Imam himself led demonstrations, sit-in protests, and hunger strikes. In 1974 he formed with Gregoire Haddad, the Catholic archbishop, a broad-based movement known as Harakat el-Mahroumeen (Movement of the Deprived).
The ease by which the Imam was able to mobilise the Lebanese Shi'a may be explained along the following lines:

"The more segmented a collectivity is from the rest of society and the more viable and extensive the communal ties within it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilise members of the collectivity into an opposition movement."[7]

As we have seen in Chapter One, Mousa el-Sadr prevailed in displacing many well-established Shi'a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly exposing their exploitation of the sect in pursuit of personal gain. As a result, many well-known Shi'a political leaders, such as Sabri Hamadeh, the House Speaker for more than 21 years, as well as Kamal el-Assad and Adel Asseirian, to name a few, forfeited much of their influence and legitimacy. Thus, the Shi'a feudal families' unwillingness to address contemporary and progressive sectarian needs presented the charismatic Imam with the sect's political leadership on a silver platter.

Harakat el-Mahroumeen supplemented Imam Mousa el-Sadr's personal charisma and dedication. Through its ideology, objectives, and goals, the Imam formulated and presented the Shi'a with a set of compelling political principles, and presented the national government with a set of compelling demands, including a fundamental reordering of
priorities. The state, he argued, ought to invest much more in the Shi'i areas to improve their economic infrastructure, employment opportunities, and educational and health services.

From a Sectarian Political Movement to Religious Resurgence

Harakat el-Mahroumeen, one of Imam Mousa's major accomplishments, is the mainspring for the contemporary Shi'a's political movements and the spur of their religious resurgence in Lebanon. Not long after it was in full swing, the doors that were shut in the face of the Shi'a started to open, and their fate changed for the better. Imam el-Sadr's movement stood for the economic and social advancement of the Shi'a and for a greater Shi'a share of political power. Most significantly, the movement organised and politically motivated the Lebanese Shi'a for the first time. Many of the urbanised Shi'a, who had found themselves cast adrift as slum dwellers, found employment in Harakat el-Mahroumeen's militia, Amal. Additionally, the movement was able to penetrate and extract resources from the Shi'a professionals and businessmen for a Shi'a regional building effort. Thus, for the first time, the sect's collective increase in size and power was channelled through the movement towards collective ends.
By 1972, Imam el-Sadr's movement not only allowed people to feel purified and personally better organised by virtue of membership, but provided the Shi'a unemployed with needed jobs. In the 1972 parliamentary election, 18 of the 19 Shi'a parliament deputies nominated by the Imam were elected. The new parliament established the South Lebanon Reconstruction Council, and allocated L.L. 130 million ($40 million) to improve living conditions in Shi'a regions, building schools and hospitals and developing industries.

As funds began to flow from the national government, the rest of the Arab world joined in support. As schools, shops, clinics, hospitals, and industries proliferated in Shi'a regions, so did the popularity of the Imam. By 1968, Imam Mousa el-Sadr posters and graffiti of his speeches glutted Shi'a villages, towns and cities. Tens of thousands of people mustered to attend speeches by Imam Mousa, given most often in mosques in conjunction with Friday-noon prayers. This unprecedented influx of followers and believers to mosques, coupled with the sudden availability of endowments and funds in the coffers of the SSC, led to an increase in mosque building throughout the Shi'a regions. This was paralleled by that of husseiniyyah centres, as shown in Table 4. Husseiniyyahs are structures where Shi'a congregate for sectarian consensus building, funerals, religious
functions during the month of Muharram (see Chapter Two), festivities, and other related activities. As Table 4 shows, the number of mosques and husseiniyyahs more than tripled in the 1965-74 period to a total of nearly 100. Such an increase is an indication of the growth, if not of the depth, of religious feeling throughout the period under review.

TABLE 4

Comparative Distribution of Mosques and Husseiniyyahs in the following Lebanese Shi'a Areas from 1955 to 1974

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatyah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjaeyoun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqa'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sshmoustar</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabi Sheet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeb Jenin</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beirut and Suburbs</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamra</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naba'</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goubayry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj-El-Barajnet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M = Mosque;  H = Husseiniyyah

Compiled from: The Supreme Shi'a Council (SSCNL, 1975)
The sudden surge in mosques and husseiniyyahs increased the demands for Shi'a clerics required to man them; there was a considerable increase in the number of Mullahs, Khatibs, Mujtahids and Imams. These form part of three different categories of Twelvers Shi'a religious specialists. The Mullahs, and a higher rank of the Mullahs, the Khatibs, specialise in history and rituals, whereas the Mujtahids or jurists are trained mainly in religious law. The Mujtahids are divided into four categories - Mufti, Qadi, Faqih, and Ma'dhun - depending on their different training in the Shi'a's two main seminaries in Najaf, Iraq, or in Qom, Iran. A Mujtahid becomes Imam after the publication of his message (thesis).

The growing cast of religious specialists implanted the seeds for new Islamic organisations. In these mosques, husseiniyyahs, and religious organisations, Islamic principles, goals, ideology and laws were preached, attracting into them increasing numbers of Shi'a of all social classes. Furthermore, the publication of religiously sponsored programmes and debates, and the theses of newly-initiated Imams increased the total number of religious publications. Although there is no official tabulation of what is published in Lebanon, the Annual Bibliography of Arabic Books printed in Lebanon provides a guide to Lebanese publications. This
bibliography, an outgrowth of the Arab Cultural Club's annual Arab Bank Fair, provides the data of the 24 bibliographies the club published for the period 1956-1982. The survey indicates that publication of Islamic religious books rose from 1.43% in 1960 to 6.72% in 1970, to 18.22% in 1981. Thus, a growing proportion of the Lebanese public is including Islamic religious studies in their reading.

Paralleling the increase in mosques, husseiniyyahs, religious organisations, and in mosque attendance and religious books, there was a sudden decrease in secular youth entertainment centres, gambling halls and casinos in the Shi'a-predominant regions. In 1965, there were more than 300 secular entertainment centres operating in the Lebanese Shi'a regions. By 1980, this number had dwindled down to fewer than 34, reflecting a change in the Shi'i inclination towards secular activities. Concomitantly, the major decline in the number of operational casinos, gambling halls, and other entertainment centres illuminates an ongoing change in the attitudes and behaviour of the Lebanese Shi'a.

ABC Omnibus, a Lebanese polling institute, polled Lebanese Shi'a in regional surveys in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. After the initial survey they found that the Shi'a were more and more inclined to say that religion is
personally important to them, more inclined to pray and more convinced that religion is the only way to solve the world's problems. Also, the proportion of youth receiving religious training increased tenfold from 1972 to 1984. The perseverance of this trend provided this research with an indicator of the increase in the Shi'a's personal involvements. Thus, and in conclusion, the universal and personal indicators of religious resurgence support the proposition that the Lebanese Shi'a have been undergoing a resurgence since the late 1960s.

The Militant Shi'a and their Organisations:
The study of these organisations presents to us the features deemed responsible for the Shi'a's religious terrorism in Lebanon. Their terrorism is a cumulative byproduct of their belief in Jihad, the presence of competing Islamic and Shi'a sectarian national and international organisations, the recruitment of Shi'a zealots, and the latter's susceptibility to committing acts of terrorism. The interaction of religious resurgence and militant organisations produces religious fanaticism leading to religious terrorism. This denouement is depicted in Figure 4 of Chapter One (p.35).

The militancy of the Shi'a was accelerated by three specific events, which inadvertently contributed to the growth of their military organisations: (i) the first
major Israeli invasion of Lebanon, launched on 11 March 1978, (ii) the disappearance of Imam Mousa El-Sadr during his visit to Libya in August 1978, and (iii) the toppling of the Shah by the Iranian Islamic Revolution in January 1979, which made the West uncomfortably aware of what it perceived as the new menace of Islamic fundamentalism.[8] The Iranian Revolution demonstrated that Islam could be a successful idiom of opposition, capable of "overpowering" the vast arsenal of a conventional army. It is noteworthy that this event was not the original spark for the revivalist movements throughout the region but the climax of the first stage of an already deeply-rooted movement.[9]

These three events and Amal's post-civil war politics facilitated the recruitment of its Shi'a supporters by other Islamic militant organisations. This Shi'a desertion of Amal's ranks may be attributed to its post-civil war support of the national confessional government.[10] In the early 1980s, Amal's leadership accepted and maintained a ministerial position in the national government, even when the Lebanese army invaded its regions and disarmed its militia.

Amal's moderate position in the midst of Lebanon's deadly sectarian conflicts was its poison pill. The Israeli invasion, and Amal's inability to provide protection for
its constituents from the Israeli forces' incursions into the already ravaged Shi'a regions, dramatically weakened Amal's hold over the main stream of its constituency. Coupled with the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr and the substitution of his charismatic religious leadership with a bureaucratic secular one embodied in Nabih Berri, these factors collectively dealt Amal's popularity a fatal blow.

The style of Berri's bureaucratic leadership falls within Dekmejian's patterns of evolution of Islamic organisational leadership, according to which the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic while their successors are bureaucratic types operating within a collective leadership ... among the bureaucratic types is ... Nabih Berri.[11]

As successor of Imam Mousa in the leadership of the Lebanese Shi'a movement, Berri is a secularly-oriented centrist, lawyer and a businessman. Despite the fact that he is committed to the eventual elimination of sectarianism in Lebanese politics, he is suspected of pro-Western inclinations, and his leadership is unacceptable to many Shi'a radicals.

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in January 1979 by the Islamic Revolution dealt Amal the final blow to its
monopoly of political leadership over the Lebanese Shi'a. The Iranian Islamic Revolution enhanced the appeal of Amal's radical dissenters for a similar Islamic system. These radical and aspiring leaders exploited the southern Lebanese Shi'a's widespread suffering under the Israeli forces, alienating them from Amal.

To attract followers and gain popularity, aspiring religious leaders provided the dissatisfied Shi'a with a target for hostility. This rationale is supported by the following hypothesis:

"If a collectivity is disorganised or unorganised along traditional communal lines and not yet organised along associational lines, collective protest is possible when members share common sentiments of oppression and targets for hostility."[12]

In the early 1980s, many of these "religious reformists"[13] openly and strongly blamed the West for the Lebanese Shi'a predicament, in the belief that the West was behind Lebanon's confessionalism, depleted economy, and the Israeli forces' destruction of Lebanon's southern Shi'a regions. Consequently, demonstrations and marches took place in Beirut, Ba'albek, and many southern Lebanese cities against the West. These public marches, assisted and provoked by zealots and Islamic religious organisations, provided these aspiring charismatic
religious reformists with the sought-after "crisis milieu".

This crisis milieu set the stage for radical Shi'a leaders to demonstrate to their followers and the downtrodden of the world their capability of salvaging them from Western dominance. They orchestrated the destruction of the latter's symbols in Lebanon. Spectacular terrorist attacks - PIT discussed in Chapter Two - were carried out against the US Marines, French detachments, and Israeli barracks. Two Muslim fanatics in October 1973 and a third in November, drove trucks loaded with explosives into their objectives. These religious terrorists, through their self-immolation in their perceived Jihad to salvage their nation from Western dominance, also delivered to their Imams an overnight mass popularity.

Imam Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, one of these aspiring charismatic and radical religious figures, exploited the political terror of that movement by breaking off with Amal. Born in a Shi'a village, Ainata, in south Lebanon near the Israeli border, trained in Najaf, Iraq, and presently residing in Bear el-Abed, a suburb of Beirut, Imam Fadlallah is one of the most influential contemporary Lebanese Shi'a clerics. He was able to amass a sufficient number of dissatisfied militant Shi'a
to open a **Hizbollah** "franchise" in Lebanon, (even though he publicly denies being its founder).

**Hizbollah**, as shown in Chapters One and Two, is not the only radical Shi'a group operating in Lebanon, but it is clearly the most significant for this study. At the same time, it is worth giving a brief account of **Ad-Dawa** and **Islamic Jihad**. There is no doubt that the example of the Iranian Revolution's success provided a powerful spur to Islamic revivalism, whether Sunni or Shi'a, throughout the world. However, the most potent effects have been confined to the Shi'a world, particularly to Lebanon. It is here, too, that the link between Shi'a revivalism and terrorism is most acute.

**Islamic Jihad**: It is clear that terrorist activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East benefit from a degree of collusion between different groups. The group **Islamic Jihad** is a radical, ruthless Palestinian group, very violent and innovative. They are very secretive and shadowy. Their leadership and membership are based in the Gaza Strip operating on a classic cell-based network that stretches from the West Bank to Lebanon. They first appeared in the wake of the lorry-bombing of the US and French military headquarters in Beirut in November 1983 and they have constantly demanded the release of seventeen prisoners held in Kuwait after the lorry-
bombing of US and French diplomatic buildings there a year later.\[14\] The most famous operation of provocational and instigational terrorism (PIT) they performed was the hijack to Iran of the Kuwaiti airliner in April 1988, to try to obtain the release from a Kuwaiti jail of their members, jailed for a wave of bomb attacks aimed mainly against the Al-Sabah royal family. A member of the Al-Sabah family was among the passengers caught in the hijack. Some of the prisoners in Kuwait have been identified as members of the Ad-Dawa movement, an Iraqi Shi'a group which carried out terrorist attacks on leaders of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in 1978 and 1979.

Many observers consider that Islamic Jihad does not exist as a separate group, but is a combination of different Shi'a groups acting in concert, probably under Iranian aegis.\[15\]

Ad-Dawa, however, is a far more serious body in which terrorism originally played little part. It arose in the 1970s in Iraq, largely as a result of the growing Sunni dominance in the Iraqi state, in which Sunni Arabs form a small minority while the majority of the population is Shi'a in belief. The Shi'a culama\[16\] in Iraq had been introduced into a political role as a result of the original 1958 revolution. Although much of this had been
sapped in the early years of **Ba'ath** rule after 1968, the twin influences of a dynamic **calim**, Mohammed Baqr el-Sadr and the increasing Sunni control of the state which led to riots in 1974 and 1977 in southern Iraq, created a basis for a renewed politicisation of the Shi'a community and its religious leaders. Several organisations grew out of this confrontation.

One of those that became increasingly clandestine was **Ad-Dawa** which operated closely with **Islamic Jihad** in Lebanon, Ad-Dawa led the Iraqi authorities, after an abortive attempt to control the clergy through turning them into state functionaries, to cut off the leadership of the radical Shi'a movement in Karbala and Najaf by executing Mohammed Al-Sadr in April 1980. In fact, rather like Sheikh Fadlallah and Hizbollah in Lebanon, the relationship between Mohammed Al-Sadr and Ad-Dawa was not direct, for the religious leadership had always tried to avoid direct involvement in political action. Conversely, Ad-Dawa was forced more and more into dependence on terrorism as a means of making the changes it required, for it lacked the essential religious sanctions to ensure the popular support needed to transform the terrorist struggle into a popular assault on the Iraqi regime.\[17\]
From Religious Organisation to Organisations of Zealots: Amal's adoption of the centrist politics of its bureaucratic leadership popularised radical Shi'a and Muslim organisations and increased competitiveness for recruits. One such offspring is Hizbollah, Amal failed to force the complete withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon and to force a change in the confessional structure of the country due to gratuitous Israeli intervention in Lebanese politics in 1982 and subsequently that of the European and American multinational force. However, Hizbollah's success in removing foreign forces from Shi'a regions, via religious terrorism attracted in blocs religious mobilised Shi'a.

Hizbollah, an Islamic international and non-sectarian movement, is more of a political state of mind than a cohesive grouping, Hizbollah in Lebanon consists not only of Muslims with high personal religious involvement, but of young, newly-politicised Lebanese Shi'a with a high religious commitment. The objectives of Lebanese Hizbollah, as identified in Chapter One, are the restructuring of Lebanese Muslim individual and collective life, and the rebuilding of Lebanon's politico-socio-economic system on the foundation of Islam. It is primarily concerned with the struggle for control of the Shi'a community and with the promise of
creating an Islamic republic in the southern part of Lebanon similar to that in Iran.

Hizbollah facilitated and enhanced interactions among the Muslim faithful, clustering believers into religiously-guided and inspired factions. In religion, the distinctions between action, intent and motives are blurred, with motives and intent being equal to or more important than actions towards the attainment of perceived religious aims.

"It is one tack of measure for measure that religious authority conflates intent with act and political authority separates them. Secular authority on the one hand, can and must concern itself only with visible or audible action... Religious authority, on the other hand, looks into and must govern the invisible, silent heart of men."[18]

As stated, religion conflates intent with action. Religious resurgence promotes community among the faithful, herding believers into religious activities.

"Within these activities, the intents and motives of individuals are synergised by their interactions; the minds of ordinary men are likely to be swayed less by appeals to abstract values, virtues, and ideologies than by obligations and conformity to their closest colleagues in face-to-face relationships."[19]

Believers in such religious factions are thus transformed into religious zealots. Accordingly, the pressures of social interaction and personal connection
can modify Muslim believers into zealots, because pressures of the social environment have a power of their own.

This modification of a Muslim believer into a zealot may be identified by distinguishable personality characteristics. Intense commitment tends to produce "premature integrity"[20] in the case of younger converts. They tend to be aggressive in their dealings with unbelievers. Islamic Mutaasib (zealots) display a high degree of activism in the quest to impose their own beliefs and behaviour codes upon society. Closely related is their unforgiving attitude towards those they regard as deviationists, which probably reflects a belief in an unforgiving god. A Muslim zealot is modelled by Dekmejian in *The Psyche of the Mutaasib* as follows:

"Their intolerance stems from the dogmatic content of their creed and their total identification with its strict precepts... The Mutaasib displays a deep distrust of people and institutions to which he ascribes malevolent intentions. He is inclined to divide the world into rigid categories according to clearcut stereotypes... they display the highest sense of idealism and devotion to their cause. Convinced of the absolute truth of the Islamic message and mission, the destruction of the sinful state and society becomes the supreme virtue..."[21]

They adopt an austere lifestyle with rigid discipline (*Tagashshuf*), and they are fully prepared to struggle and sacrifice. They pledge absolute obedience to Allah, the
Prophet, and the charismatic leader of the movement through bayath - the oath. Their behaviour is conditioned by strict conformity to group norms as promulgated by the leader.[22]

These zealots are the ferment and foundation of radical Islamic organisations which in turn, like their founders, have their own distinguishable characteristics. A bottom-up view of Hizbollah expresses an amorphous aggregate of small social cells. These continually-multiplying cells are based on no more than five members, each with the highest religious fervour. The cells are tightly knit, with informal personal and kinship ties just like their international counterpart. Interaction among elements within these homogeneous cells and their new recruits metamorphose the latter into zealots. This transformation is a byproduct of a nurtured affinity for salvation, which in Shi'a terms, may be satisfied by self-immolation which may lead to terrorism. The individual's total identification with his group makes him selfless in more than one sense; it makes him perform comradely, altruistic, heroic actions, to the point of self-sacrifice, and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of the group.[23]

From Zealotry to Religious Terrorism

Hizbollah's new cells are formed from mitosis of its
matured cells of zealots, a cyclical process triggered as new recruits are sought by newly-transformed zealots, and become, in turn, the nucleus for new cells. In this process recruits are sought within generation lines, local residential neighbourhoods, mosques and schools.

Typically, three recruitment mechanisms are employed: kinship, friendship and worship. In seeking new recruits, zealots observe kin, friends and worshippers in neighbourhood mosques. If the prospective candidate observes all of his daily prayers, he may be approached to attend private religious discussions. If, during these discussions, he is identified as a believer in Jihad, a follower of the same Imam, and capable of becoming politically conscious, he is recruited.

The formation of these Lebanese Shi'a secret cells, with rigid recruitment procedures and conspiratorial tendencies, is in response to four apparent features: their commitment to revolutionary change; national and foreign governmental repressions - US, Europe and Israel; Amal's competitiveness with other militant organisations in Lebanon; and their negative perceptions of their society.

This cyclical process is not unique to Hizbollah only. Other Islamic militant organisations in Egypt like Ikhwan
Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) and the Islamic Liberation Party — off-shoot of the Ikhwan (Sunni revivalist movements), as well as Islamic Jihad, all employ similar procedures of recruitment. Accordingly, horizontal networks of "small cliques of equal-status, same generation peers"[24] provide the means both to convey information about the Islamic movement and to apply pressure to join them.

Hizbollah's close ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran has given them access to technical and material support from Iran's Revolutionary Guards stationed in Ba'albek. They are financially supported by radical religious factions in Tehran in the "Bureau for Support of Islamic Liberation Movements Abroad", Hizbollah's leaders also use the 2000-plus Iranian Revolutionary Guards for terrorist training and indoctrination of their followers. In their commando training bases in Ba'albek, Nabi-Sheet, Yanta, and Shaara, many Shi'a graduates are transformed into religious terrorists, Lebanese Shi'a style. This transformation is completed as Hizbollah bases provide them with training in subversion; their living Imam confirms their religious duty to Jihad, and Imam Hussein's death at Karbala illuminates for them the way to redemption and a precedence for martyrdom (see Chapters Two and Four). Upon their graduation, these
properly-indoctrinated zealots are unleashed on their own
to proceed in their Jihad as they deem fit.

It is possible to identify the distinguishable modal
personality profile of the Shi'i religious terrorist. A young Shi'i zealot displays deep distrust, and ascribes
malevolent intentions. By pledging absolute obedience to
Allah, Imam Ali, and his contemporary Imam, a zealot is
convinced of the absolute truth of the Islamic message,
and his only motive in life is reduced to his Jihad. The
destruction of the sinful is his supreme virtue. A young
Shi'i zealot's readiness to struggle is manifested by an
austere life style. At that point, he is ready to
sacrifice his life and the lives of those who are
regarded as infidel, and he embodies the modal
personality of a religious terrorist. Such a modal
personality gives substance to the notion that some of
the contemporary Lebanese Shi'a's violent acts are
motivated by fundamental religious beliefs, undertaken
unconsciously of their maliciousness as religious duties,
guided by religious leaders for the fulfilment of
spiritual gains. Terrorism is used when recourse seems
needed, as Imam Fadlallah said in an interview in early
1985:

"I believe that in all cases violence is like
a surgical operation that the doctor should
only resort to after he has exhausted all
other methods. Every person needs to defend
himself. If a man needs to use violent ways
he must use them."[25]
Thus, terrorism is used to deal with overwhelming force amongst the opposition or the "unfaithful", be it bombs against the US, French or Israeli military units in Lebanon, or when pressure is brought to bear on states through kidnapping or hijacks.[26] Kidnapping is Hizbollah's most efficacious tactic, their major operation was that of Terry Waite in 1987, and still held hostage with John McCarthy (both British) and other American hostages.

In conclusion, to the Shi'i religious terrorist, killing, hijacking, or kidnapping the infidel has God's blessing and is considered to be neither unethical nor immoral, let alone criminal. Thus, the Shi'i religious terrorist's unconsciousness of the maliciousness of his terrorist acts, and his pursuit of his own salvation, and society's purification, distinguishes him from the political terrorist pure and simple. This consciousness and motive-based distinctions are depicted in Figure 1, Section B of Chapter One (p.28).

References


Chapter VI
CONCLUSION

A number of broad conclusions emerge from this enquiry into Shi'a revivalism in Lebanon, indicating that terrorism in Lebanon is not an inarticulate act of protest, a celebration of the cathartic effect of violence, nor merely criminal behaviour. It is, in reality, an attempt by groups that are inherently weak to assert their demands. These demands arise in large measure from competing nationalist visions and from the infirmities of Middle Eastern states. The stimulus for them is primarily to be found in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a cause which has been intensified by the generalised hostility to the West encouraged by the Islamic revivalism that has characterised the area for the past decade.

The study also suggests that a major contributor to the revivalist surge of the Shi'a in Lebanon has been the failure of their secular government and other Middle Eastern governments to recognise the importance of Islam in the socio-economic, political, and cultural fabric of their respective societies, and their arbitrary actions to weaken its role. The most important shortcoming that plagued the Islamic world was the lack of communication between the educated class and the populace. This gap
was most acute in Lebanon between the cleric, the learned man, and the layman. It was even greater between the Shi'a and their elites; they tried to narrow it by returning to the puritanical values and practices of early Islam. As discussed in Chapter Five, however, due to the totalistic nature of Islam, its revival goes far beyond the purely religious realm to encompass economics and politics. Islam in its resurgent form rejects the encapsulation that has been imposed on Christianity in Western secular environments. It means different things to different people, and this applies to politics as well as other areas of social life. To some, Islam may serve as a means for legitimising and preserving the status quo and ideologies, while for others it may provide a vehicle for protest or even a spearhead for revolution.

At this point, confirmation of some of the conclusions both explicit and implicit in the previous chapters is to be found in an enquiry undertaken in the Lebanon itself by the Department of Political Studies of the American University in Beirut in 1988, which sought to test, among various hypotheses the following: incidents of religious terrorism by Lebanese Shi'a zealots, and terrorism that requires self-immolation are higher during the 40-day period following Ashura than during the rest of the Muslim lunar year. (The explanation and definition of Ashura are to be found in Chapter Two). The Shi'a, in
seeking identification with the plight of their Imam Hussein, participate with genuine feeling in the mourning ceremonies and gatherings during Ashura. These moments of passion in Ashura not only revive the painful memories of Imam Hussein's death, but also revive annually commitment to Shi'ism and to the Shi'a community. The re-enactment of the Karbala massacre in Ashura with its drama of self-inflicted pain, makes them more closely aware of their grievances and becomes an impetus to violent action.

Table 1 shows the number of violent acts and acts requiring self-immolation committed by religiously-motivated terrorists. Terrorist acts based on religious motives are attributed to the following terrorist organisations: Islamic Jihad, Al-Fajr al-Islami, Islamic Liberation Organisation, At-Tawhid, Islamic Front, Muslims for the Liberation of South Lebanon, Hizbollah, Islamic Amal, Muslim Martyrs, Al-Fath, Al-Haq, Al-Jihad, Junud Allah, At-Tahrir al-Islami, Al-Hamas, and the Young Muslim Mujahidin. The religious motives of such organisations with known Shi'a affiliation and bases in Lebanese Shi'a regions are inherent in their organisational self-identifying names, their avowed purposes, and the public proclamations that accompany their acts of terrorism. The table also provides a tally of the number of violent activities attributed to or
claimed to have been performed by these groups. It indicates that out of a total of 100 violent acts perpetrated by such terrorist organisations from 1978 to 1987, 56 of them occurred within the 40 days of Ashura. This means that 56% of all Lebanese Shi'a's religious terrorist activity took place in one 40-day period of the year.

### TABLE 1

Comparison of the Annual Number and Percentage of Terrorist Acts Claimed by or Attributed to Terrorist Organisations with Shi'a Affiliation Performed During Each 40-Day Period from the End of Ashura from 1972 to 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Muharram begins on</th>
<th>Ashura</th>
<th>Number of Religious Violent Acts within 40 days after Ashura</th>
<th>Annual Number of Terrorist Acts Committed by Lebanese Shia</th>
<th>Percentage of Incidents within 40 days of Ashura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Feb 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Jan 16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Jan 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Dec 23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Dec 12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Nov 30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Nov 19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Nov 8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Oct 28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Oct 16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Oct 5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Sep 24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Sep 13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Sep 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 56 8 100 56

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
There is also an indication in the table that none of the religiously-motivated terrorist activities occurred prior to 1978. This buttresses the claim made in Chapter Five that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 11 March 1978, the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr on 23 August 1978, and the Iranian Islamic Revolution in January 1979 paved the way for Islamic militant organisations, which in turn recruited Lebanese Shi'a for terrorism. The table also reflects the loss of control by Amal after 1978 and its weakness in policing the areas under its nominal control.

Lebanese Shi'a-style suicidal acts of terrorism based on self-immolation were confined in Aziz Al-Azmeh's study in "The Middle East and Islam: A Ventriloquial Terrorism", University of Exeter, 1987, to those committed by drivers of vehicles loaded with explosives which either detonate upon impact or when the ignition is switched on. The intensity of personal religious commitment displayed by self-immolation is a feature of Hizbollah's membership, "who alone are capable of carrying out suicide bomb attacks"[1], according to Hajatalislam Karmani, a member of the Iranian Islamic Shoura (Parliament) Council.

Table 2 indicates that between 1982 and 1988, seven out of a total of eight suicidal acts of terrorism were attributed to or claimed by Muslim religious
organisations. They too coincide with the 40-day period of Ashura. These data confirm that Shi'a religious terrorist activities, including those based on self-immolation, are higher during the 40 days that follow Ashura, thus establishing the strong link between the religious ceremonies of Ashura and terrorism.

### TABLE 2
Comparison of the Number and Percentage of Suicidal Terrorist Acts Claimed by or Attributed to Terrorist Organisations with Shi'a Affiliation Performed During Each 40-day Period from the End of Ashura from 1982 to 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total#</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Suicidal Terrorist Acts Performed during Muharram Period</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

Tables 1 and 2 identify a pattern distinctive of that of political terrorism by supporting the relationship between religious affinity for salvation and terrorism. The intensity of the Lebanese Shi'a religious terrorism according to Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin, "makes political terrorism such as the PLO's terrorism ... seem like children's games."[2]

Sixty Lebanese Shi'a known to be actively involved with Islamic militant organisations were interviewed in the course of the enquiry made by the Department of Political Studies of the American University in Beirut in 1988.
They were randomly selected from guards manning roadblocks in the various factional territories in Bourj-El-Barajuet, a suburb of Beirut, between 8 and 14 April 1988. Data extracted from the questionnaire were used to test the following hypotheses pertaining to religious terrorism:

(a) Imprisonment of elements of a Lebanese militant Islamic organisation increases the willingness of other elements of that organisation to commit terrorism.

(b) Support for religious terrorism in Lebanon is stronger among Shi'a zealots than other Lebanese Shi'a.

(c) Willingness to commit religious terrorism is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults.

Further hypotheses relating to religious resurgence were examined:

(d) Religious resurgence is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults.

(e) Religious resurgence is stronger among the followers of militant Imams.

Finally, two hypotheses concerning geo-cultural mobility were investigated:

(f) Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more likely to become religious zealots than those
with high geo-cultural mobility.

(g) The Lebanese Shi'a's perception of their geo-cultural immobility increases their religious resurgence.

Table 3 contains the primary data set for this research. It constitutes eight categories of attributes of Hizbollah, well known for their religious fanaticism, and other Islamic militant organisations. The attributes are: age; geo-cultural mobility; imprisonment of family members; marital status; Imam's militancy; religious resurgence; willingness to commit terrorism; and zealotry. These variables are shown in Table 3.

The relationship between Amal and Hizbollah Shi'a elements with family members in jail and their willingness to perform terrorist acts to secure their release is displayed in Table 4. It is an attempt to support hypothesis (a) which states: Imprisonment of elements of a Lebanese Islamic organisation increases the willingness of other elements of that organisation to commit terrorism. The table proves that more than 78% of those respondents whose relatives are imprisoned are willing to carry out terrorist acts to secure their release. Those who do not have close members of the family in jail and are still willing to commit terrorism account for 59.37%. The percentage difference is about
TABLE 3
Coding Systems of Operationalization of Variables

Element's Age
1. High (Youth = respondent 19 years old or younger).
0. Low (Adult = respondent over 19 years old).

Militancy of Lebanese Shi'a Imam
1. High (attributes of Imam 1 [Fadlallah]; 2 [Khomeyni]).
0. Low (attributes of Imam 3 [el-Sadr] and 4 [Khouey]).

Imprisonment of Family Members
1. High (due to family member's presence in jail).
0. Low (due to the lack of any family member in jail).

Geo-Cultural Mobility
1. High (due to residence outside Shi'a regions).
0. Low (if never resided outside Shi'a regions).

Marital Status
1. High (if married or have dependent children).
0. Low (if single).

Religious resurgence
1. High (due to a "yes" answer to question 1).
0. Low (due to a "no" answer to question 1).

Willingness to Commit Terrorism
1. High (due to a "yes" answer to question 2).
0. Low (due to a "no" answer to question 2).

Zealotry
1. High (due to a "yes" answer to questions 8, 9, 10).
0. Low (due to a "no" answer to questions 8, 9, 10).

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

TABLE 4
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Imprisonment of Family Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Family Members in Prison</th>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>40.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing</td>
<td>59.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
12%, which is not extremely large; but nevertheless, the relationship between the two groups is in the predicted direction and serves to support hypothesis (a).

Support for hypothesis (b), which states: Support for religious terrorism in Lebanon is stronger among Shi'a zealots than other Lebanese Shi'a is provided by Table 5. Zealots are fanatics who are ardent in support of their religion. Shi'a zealots are individuals for whom Islam provides profound personal satisfaction, a sense of fulfilment through strong commitment and total dedication to the point of self-sacrifice, and a sense of triumph through destroying those perceived as sinful. A modal personality of a Shi'i zealot is provided by Chapter Five.

About 75% of all the zealots among both Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents are willing to commit terrorist acts, while only 43.18% of the non-zealots would want to commit such acts. The correlation between these two variables is statistically significant. Thus, the outcome offers modest support for hypothesis (b).

The relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents' age and willingness to use terrorism is presented in Table 6, which supports hypothesis (c) which
### TABLE 5
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Zealotry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>Zealot</th>
<th>Not Zealots</th>
<th>Zealots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>56.81%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing</td>
<td>43.18%</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

### TABLE 6
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>Age in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 and under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing</td>
<td>71.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
states: Willingness to commit religious terrorism is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults. A total of 71.42% of Shi'a elements of the age of 19 or less are willing to use terrorism, in comparison to 34.37% of the older cohorts, which suggests that willingness tends to decrease with age.

The Shi'a respondents' age and the extent of their religious commitment are presented in Table 7. It is an attempt to test hypothesis (d) which states: Religious resurgence is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults. We see that a total of 83.87% of the respondents who showed strong personal religious commitments are under the age of 19 in comparison with 75% of the adult cohorts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Age in years 19 and under</th>
<th>Over 19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td>16.12% (5)</td>
<td>24.13% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td>83.87% (26)</td>
<td>75.86% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (31)</td>
<td>100% (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
Hypothesis (e) which states: Religious resurgence of the Lebanese Shi'a is stronger among the followers of militant Imams is strongly supported by Table 8, below. It presents the relationship between the extent of militancy of Shi'a respondents' Imams and the strength of their religious commitment. A total of 62.5% of both Amal and Hizbollah respondents who identified themselves as followers of Imams who, in turn, are more militant like Imam Fadlallah of Hizbollah, indicated a strong religious commitment. Meanwhile, none of those who were followers of less militant Imams indicated religious resurgence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Extent of Imam's Militancy</th>
<th>Less Militant</th>
<th>More Militant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

The relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's respondents' geo-cultural mobility and the strength of their religious commitment is shown in Table 9. It is modestly supportive of hypothesis (f) which states:
Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more likely to become religious zealots than those with higher geo-cultural mobility.

About 39.58% of both Amal's and Hizbollah's elements who listed prior residence outside predominantly Shi'a regions showed a strong personal religious commitment, by contrast to 66.66% of those who never resided outside Shi'a regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Extent of Geo-Cultural Mobility</th>
<th>Less Mobile</th>
<th>More Mobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>60.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td>66.66%</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>39.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

Hypothesis (g) - the last hypothesis of this chapter - states that the Lebanese Shi'a's perception of their geo-cultural immobility increases their religious resurgence. This is supported by Table 10, which presents the relationship between Amal and Hizbollah elements' geo-cultural mobility and the extent of their religious zealotry. More than 43% of those who have previously...
resided outside Lebanese Shi'a regions are identified as zealots, in comparison with 45.45% of those who never lived outside predominantly Shi'a regions. The difference of percentage is not greatly significant, but it is in the predicted direction, and can be considered to be mildly supportive of hypothesis (g).

TABLE 10
Religious Zealotry and Geo-Cultural Mobility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Zealotry</th>
<th>Extent of Geo-Cultural Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a Zealot</td>
<td>54.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zealot</td>
<td>45.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)

To conclude this summary of the enquiry undertaken by the Department of Political Studies of the American University in Beirut, eight specific hypotheses in three groups were tested. The first group covers the effect of Ashura on Lebanese Shi'a terrorist activities and establishes the fact that religious terrorism is strongly linked to religious anniversaries commemorating martyrdom. The date show that most of the Shi'a terrorist activities took place in the 40-day period following Ashura, which is very significant as to the
importance of religious events in some terrorist acts, and gives substance to the concept of religious terrorism introduced earlier in the present writing.

The remaining hypotheses in the group deal with the age effect, religious commitment, imprisonment of family members, and terrorism. These suggest that young zealots and those who have close relatives in jail tend to be more willing to carry out terrorist acts than others.

The data, in general, are in favour of all the hypotheses mentioned. However, not all of the relationships are strong, and some are even not significant statistically, but since the outcome provided by the tables is as predicted, the results are substantively meaningful.

In the second group, the hypotheses concern the effect of age and militant Imams on the extent of Shi'a religious commitment and religious resurgence. They predict that religious resurgence is strongly related to age and the militancy of the Shi'i Imam.

The data support the hypotheses to a considerable degree, and the results of the statistics given by the tables are uniformly in the predicted direction. That is, Lebanese Shi'a youth and followers of militant Imams are more susceptible to religious resurgence.
In the third group, the hypotheses concern the effect of geo-cultural immobility on the extent of Lebanese Shi'a religious commitment and religious resurgence. They expect religious resurgence to be negatively related to the extent of the Shi'i geo-cultural mobility.

The hypotheses are supported in varying degrees by the data, and the pattern of results of the statistics is again in the predicted direction. That is, Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility have a tendency to become religious zealots.

We can conclude that geo-cultural immobility increases the religious resurgence of Lebanon's Shi'a youth, leading them to zealotry. These zealots are usually followers of more militant Imams and are more likely to perform acts of terrorism within the 40-day period of Ashura.

The concepts of religious terrorism and geo-cultural immobility introduced by the present enquiry, its distinction between political and religious terrorism made in Chapter One, as well as the demonstrated relationships between geo-cultural immobility, religious resurgence, and religious terrorism clearly have comparative relevance for other Middle Eastern states facing similar issues. However, no attention has been
paid to the roles of outside powers in this research, in the context of Middle Eastern terrorism. Some authors, like A. Laroui in *La Crise des Intellectuels Arabes* (Crisis of Arab Intellectuals), have insisted on the importance of Soviet support and exploitation of the religious terrorist groups in Lebanon. Laroui claims that there has been considerable input into the struggles of the Middle East by the USSR. However, it is impossible to see Soviet interest as in any way central to the development of the terrorist phenomenon there. The reality is that Middle Eastern terrorism has purely indigenous roots and responds to local realities. The outside world impinges only insofar as it may be a source for material support, or is seen as an integral part of the problem through its support for Israel or for corrupt and reactionary regimes.

If this be true, then it is most unlikely that outside powers can radically alter the situation in Lebanon or throughout the Middle East unless they address the real problem of the region - disparity of wealth and political inequality. However, the primary problem that the West must tackle, if it is to achieve any reduction in terrorism, is that of the Palestinians. It is the West's failure to do anything constructive in this respect that has provided the most powerful spur to terrorism in Lebanon in the 1980s, as established in Chapter Three.
Secondly, Western nations and states will have to learn to live with the uncomfortable facts of Islamic revivalism. Even if there is only one Islamic state, Iran, the implications of revivalism have already begun to affect government policies in a range of Muslim countries where feelings of resentment by revivalist movements are widespread. Just like the Shi'a in Lebanon, they feel that they are not in control of their own destiny. They have a strong desire for independence and autonomy, and a widespread belief that their present ruling elites are dominated by Western powers and ideologies and thus have become alien to their own countries and cultures.

However, there is no evidence that Islamic movements in Lebanon or elsewhere imply a rejection of material development or modernisation altogether. Rather, their opposition is to the socio-economic, political, and indeed cultural and moral contexts within which material development has so far taken place. Thus, the current revivalist movements have been both an outcome and a reaction to the development experience.[3] Also important have been the severe restrictions imposed on political participation and debates by Muslim governments, and active manipulation of Islam as a counter-force to ideas perceived as radical or revolutionary. In the process, Islam has become the only medium for articulating popular grievances. This fact
also means that as long as the grievances of radical Muslim groups remain unanswered, they will find, even under the most repressive conditions, some means - including violent means - to articulate their grievances. Hence, the rise of the Shi'a in Lebanon, where members of the government were predominantly Maronite Christians who never showed any consideration for the needs of the Muslim Shi'a within the country.

Therefore, there will still remain a terrorist residuum. We cannot say how many years it will take for the tradition of using terrorism as a legitimate political weapon, in the absence of any other means of articulating demands, to die away. There will still be many contradictions within the Middle East which will have to find their own resolutions and that, in itself, may well let terrorism persist. Lebanon is the Middle Eastern country where terrorism is most potent and most acute; for that reason it was chosen for the present research. The inference which should be drawn by other states and non-Lebanese political actors is that they should take those technical measures they can to prevent terrorism from spilling over their frontiers, while seeking to understand and release the tensions of Lebanon that stimulate the terrorist response. That, however, will require a massive change in policy in Washington and the abandoning of cynical, self-indulgent and simplistic
policies of military action that merely reinforce the problems they were supposed ostensibly to resolve. Western-Muslim relations, like those between many states, will always be a combination of conflict and co-operation. The challenge for the future is to minimise conflict and maximise co-operation.

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