THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTOR:
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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List of Abbreviations

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFP  Agence France Presse
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AU   African Union
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CEE  Central and Eastern European
CFASDP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMR  Critical Maritime Routes
COP  Conference of the Parties
Coreper The Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CTF  Combined Task Force
CTR  Cooperative Threat Reduction
DG   Directorate General
DG EuropeAid Directorate General EuropeAid Cooperation Office
DG Mare Directorate General Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DG Relex Directorate General External Relations
DG Tren Directorate General Transport and Energy
DTRA Defence Threat Reduction Agency
EC   European Community
ECJ  European Court of Justice
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
ECE  European Economic Community
EERA European Energy Research Alliance
EFP  European foreign policy
EPC  European Political Cooperation
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS  European Security Strategy
EU   European Union
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUSC European Union Satellite Centre
EUTM European Union Training Mission
FHQ  Force Headquarter
FPA  Foreign policy analysis
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHG</td>
<td>green-house gasses</td>
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<td>GLOBE</td>
<td>Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRCFSP</td>
<td>High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>HRUFASP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IES</td>
<td>Institute for Environmental Security</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSC</td>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centre</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Joint Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>mutual assured destruction</td>
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<td>MMT</td>
<td>Mission Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<td>MSCHOA</td>
<td>Maritime Security Centre: Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoCo</td>
<td>Political Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery</td>
</tr>
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<td>REIO</td>
<td>Regional Economic Integration Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STCU</td>
<td>Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEEC</td>
<td>Treaty Establishing the European Community</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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WEU  Western European Union
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
Abstract

There is a vibrant discussion in academia about the role of the European Union (EU) in international security. However, this discussion largely concentrates on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), not fully acknowledging the instruments of the European Commission. Also, the majority of publications tend to limit the analysis to more traditional security problems, whilst literature on contemporary security studies often illustrates how the security concept has broadened in the last few decades.

This thesis offers an original framework to studying the EU as a security actor, by adopting the comprehensive approach. Such an approach is important in order to address two aforementioned problems in the literature. First, this thesis does not limit its analysis to the CSDP, but also looks at the role of the European Commission in developing the EU’s international security policy. Second, this thesis goes beyond traditional security problems, by including three diverse case studies: a) climate change, representing the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenge; b) the threat of the proliferation of WMDs, in particular from Russia; and c) piracy off the Somali coast.

This PhD concludes that the EU already plays a significant role as an international security actor; there are two important aspects of this role. Firstly, the analysis has demonstrated that the instruments of the European Commission, such as the Instrument for Stability, significantly complement EU policies undertaken within the framework of the CSDP. Secondly, this study has also demonstrated the importance of including the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges, such as climate change, when analysing the role of the EU as a security actor. Thus, it was important to analyse EU policy in this area, alongside EU policies regarding more traditional security problems. As a result of these findings, this thesis makes an important and original contribution to the European studies literature.
Introduction

'The military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors of security now all jostle for an attention in the crowded market place for security. In the light of such a transformation, it would appear that the separate consideration of the external relations and CFSP processes, both empirically and conceptually, would be at the cost of neglecting study of the factors, that are common to both sets of policies, and can lead to a failure in exploring conceptual frameworks that may accommodate both sets of processes and their contribution to the security of the Union'.

(Whitman 1998a: 240-241)

The international security agenda has indeed become crowded and increasingly complex. The overarching tendency is that the threat of an interstate military conflict has lost its dominating position – the position which was unchallenged until 1980s, and particularly until the end of the bi-polar rivalry. At the same time, other issues have become important matters of international security. These include, but are not limited to, energy security, environmental and climate security, underdevelopment, health and pandemic diseases, population movements and economic security (Dalby 2009; McInnes 2008; Smith 2010; Thomas 2008). Furthermore, more traditional security challenges, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), have evolved and changed character (Busch and Joyner 2009; Howlett 2008; Rogers 2008; Walton and Gray 2007; Wirtz 2007). This complex international security agenda requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach. The military power remains an important, but insufficient, instrument to address security challenges in the contemporary world. Often military instruments constitute only a partial solution; sometimes they are simply inappropriate and counterproductive. The European Union (EU), consisting today of 27 member states and a number of common institutions, has been attempting to develop itself as an actor in international security policy. The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States have created favourable conditions for the EU to take its modest ‘foreign policy and security’ cooperation to the next level at the beginning of the 1990s. It is certainly not a recent ambition of Europe to advance its cooperation in matters going beyond economic policy, but it is only in the last two decades that appropriate frameworks were successfully created. The institutional architecture of EU international security policy is not a finished product; rather, it is a work in progress, with the Lisbon Treaty bringing some important innovations in this respect (Vanhoonacker and Reslow 2010; Whitman and Juncos 2009).
However, does a growing quantity and quality of institutions translate into the more effective EU's role as an international security actor? What specific resources does the EU have to address contemporary security challenges? Is it recognised by other international actors for its efforts?

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the role of the EU as an international security actor. In other words, this thesis aims to investigate the extent to which the EU has developed as an organisation playing a role in international security policy. There are two main reasons why undertaking this exercise is important. Firstly, on many occasions, the EU has expressed the ambition of becoming a global security actor. At the beginning of the 1970s, European states successfully established a modest framework for political cooperation, namely the European Political Cooperation (EPC). They were careful to avoid any association of the EPC with the European Economic Community¹ (EEC). It took more than 20 years for European states to take this political cooperation to the next level, by including it as one of the pillars of the newly-established EU, in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Nuttall 2000; Smith 2002; Smith 2004; Whitman 1998b; 2002). Towards the end of the 1990s, partially as a result of the EU's inability to handle conflicts in the Balkans, the Common Security and Defence Policy² (CSDP) was established as a framework to enhance EU crisis response capacities (Hill and Smith 2005; Howorth 2007; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008).

In the last decade, the most prominent manifestation of this ambition took the form of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Bisop and Andersson 2007; European Council 2003). In this document, approved at the level of heads of states and government working together in the European Council, the EU states that 'Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world' (European Council 2003: 1). Over the last decade, the EU has also progressed with developing certain institutional capacities, to match its ambitions in the area of international security policy. For example, in 1999, the Western European Union (WEU) was incorporated into the EU's institutional structure. This allowed the EU to develop its own, autonomous military capabilities, within the framework of the aforementioned CSDP. Recognising a strong link between development and security, the

¹ While the 'European Economic Community' in this thesis refers to the period before 1993, the 'European Community' refers to the first pillar of the EU between 1993 and 2009.

² The CSDP in this thesis refers to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Lisbon Treaty has changed the name of the ESDP to the CSDP (Council of the European Union 15/04/08).
European Commission developed another important instrument. In 2007, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was replaced with the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is "designed to provide the Union with a new strategic tool to address a number of global security and development challenges" (European Commission 2007b: 3). These and other developments underline the ambition of the EU to become a comprehensive, international security actor. Thus, it is important to examine the extent to which this ambition of the EU has materialised.

Secondly, it is important to examine the role of the EU as an international security actor because there is an important gap in the existing literature. The establishment of the CFSP in 1993, and, even more importantly, the introduction of the CSDP in 1999, opened new possibilities for policies to be implemented at the EU level, within the so-called 'second pillar' of the EU. The three-pillar structure of the EU was introduced by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1993 and formally abandoned in 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty. Nonetheless, the 'pillarisation' of the EU had an important effect on academic debate. It created an assumption among scholars that the international security policy of the EU takes place almost exclusively within what used to be the second pillar of the EU (e.g. Gänzle and Sens 2007; Gärtnert 2003; Hyde-Price 2004; Kaldor et al. 2007; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004; Matlary 2008; Moschini 2008; Salmon 2005). This thesis suggests that, in order to assess the role of the EU as an international security actor in a comprehensive manner, it is important to examine EU institutions and instruments available beyond the CSDP framework. One example of such an instrument is the aforementioned IfS.

When addressing the question of EU international security actorness, those scholars (with some exceptions, e.g. Hintermeier 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008) also tend to focus on more traditional security threats, such as regional military conflicts, and omit the so-called 'non-traditional' security challenges, such as pandemic diseases, extreme poverty and environmental security. There is a significant body of studies examining the role of the EU in these policy areas, but they do not advance our knowledge of the EU as an international security actor (e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 1999; 2006; Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007; Lacasta et al. 2002; McCormick 2001; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Vogler 2005). This relatively narrow approach to the EU’s international security actorness contributes to a gap between the European studies literature, and literature on contemporary security studies. The latter category tends to indicate that the concept of security has broadened and deepened in the last few decades (e.g. Collins 2007; Dannreuther 2007; Smith 2010; Williams 2008). Thus, in order to
take into account this development when studying the EU as an international security actor, it is important to look at both traditional and new security issues.

The theoretical framework

The theoretical framework for this thesis, explained in Chapter 2, integrates the concept of international actorness to study the EU as an international security actor in a comprehensive manner. To this end, it is constructed of three components. Firstly, it engages with discussions on the EU as a *sui generis* actor. Traditionally only states have enjoyed the privilege of being considered actors in international relations (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Dunne and Schmidt 2008; McGrew 2008). In the 1970s, scholars began to acknowledge that international organisations can also be international actors (Keohane and Nye 1971; Lamy 2008). However, this progress did not significantly help with studying the role of the EEC in international politics, due to its somewhat ambiguous character of being more than an intergovernmental organisation, but definitely less than a state. Thus, scholars began developing conceptual tools, which aimed to grasp the unique character of the EEC, and later the EU, as international actors (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Sjöststedt 1977). Subsequently, these tools have started to be integrated to assess the role of the EU as an international security actor in a variety of case studies (Beyer 2008; Dryburgh 2008; Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007; Kaunert 2010; Larsen 2002).

Secondly, the theoretical framework for this thesis elaborates on the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy at the international level. The holistic approach for assessing the EU’s role in international security constitutes the original, conceptual contribution of this thesis, advancing academic discussions on EU security actorness. There are two aspects to studying the EU’s international security actorness in a comprehensive manner; these include: a) the necessity to incorporate both traditional and so-called ‘non traditional’ security challenges into the analysis; and b) the necessity to examine EU policies and instruments beyond the CSDP framework of EU institutional structure. The third component of the theoretical framework establishes criteria for assessing the EU’s international security actorness in the area of international security policy. To this end, this thesis builds on the ‘state of the art’ in literature analysing the EU as a *sui generis* actor, justifying the incorporation of certain criteria and the omission of some others. As already mentioned, there is a rich body of literature, dating back to the 1970s, which has been attempting to grasp the nature of, and assess the
EEC and the EU as international, non-state entities. These criteria for assessing EU actorness underpin the empirical component of this thesis. It is also important to establish how the theoretical framework for this thesis allows to draw conclusions about the level of actorness that the EU has achieved. It is true that selected criteria for evaluating EU security actorness are interconnected, one often depending on the other. Yet, it still needs to be explained and justified how to interpret the outcome where the EU meets a certain criterion for actorness but does not meet the others in a given case study. In order to address this possibility, the actorness criteria are operationalised and three possible levels of EU actorness are identified. It is suggested that the EU may either have a low, a medium or a high level of actorness in each of the case studies constituting the empirical part of this thesis.

How was this thesis constructed?

The starting point for this thesis was the discovery that there is an important gap between two categories of academic literature. The first part of this discovery consisted of conducting the review of the literature in the category of European studies. To this end, three categories of scholarly work have been consulted, including the scholarship on the EU as an international security actor, the EU and human security and the European foreign policy (EFP). This review has allowed to draw some general conclusions about the way in which the question of EU security policy at the international level is approached in academic literature. For example, this review has revealed that, in general, scholars analysing the role of the EU in international security tend to limit their analysis to the CFSP/CSDP framework of European cooperation. Consequently, they often tend to overlook the role of institutions such as the European Commission. For the most part, the review of the literature has revealed that European studies scholars tend to focus on the role of the Council of the European Union and the instruments appropriate for this institution. The review has also revealed that scholars tend to focus on the so-called 'traditional' security problems, such as regional military conflicts. As a result, they tend to omit the so-called 'non-traditional' international security challenges, such as climate change and pandemic diseases.

The second part of this discovery consisted of reviewing literature on contemporary security studies. This review has allowed to draw general conclusions about the way in which the

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3 When the reference is given to the CFSP/CSDP framework, it includes the broader framework of the CFSP and the more specific framework of the CSDP, existing within the CFSP.
question of international security is approached in academic literature. For example, this review has indicated that scholarly work on contemporary security studies tends to underline that whilst traditional security challenges, such as military conflicts and nuclear proliferation, have not disappeared, there is also a number of other problems, such as climate change and HIV/AIDS, which in many parts of the world create more insecurity than conventional security threats (e.g. Dalby 2008; Dannreuther 2007; Dyer 2000; Homer-Dixon 2004; Hough 2004; Kay 2006; McNeill 2003; Terriff et al. 2005). This broader and more comprehensive approach to international security in the contemporary security studies literature, as compared to a narrower approach in European studies literature, contributes to a gap between these two categories of academic literature. Thus, the starting point of this thesis was to address this gap by bringing the two types of academic literature closer together.

In order to achieve this goal, three case studies were selected for investigation in this thesis, representing different types of contemporary international security challenges. When selecting case studies, it was necessary to reflect the fact that the concept of international security has broadened and widened in the last few decades, but also that more traditional security problems have not disappeared. As a result, the combination of 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' security problems was identified. Climate change represents the so-called 'non-traditional' security challenge. It developed as an important issue on the international political agenda a few decades ago and started to be conceptualised in the context of international security and stability a few years ago. The proliferation of WMDs and maritime piracy belong to the category of threats which are more traditional. In fact, maritime piracy is one of the oldest forms of organised crime. This mixture of more traditional and more recent contemporary security problems allows to narrow down a gap between the two aforementioned categories of academic literature.

Introducing a variety of contemporary security challenges constitutes one dimension of the comprehensive approach to studying the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. Another important dimension was introduced as a result of the review of both (aforementioned) categories of academic literature and of studying actual EU policies in three aforementioned areas of international security. After analysing primary and secondary resources addressing EU policy in three selected case studies, and after conducting a series of elite interviews, it became apparent that the EU’s international security policy takes place in the Council, but also in the European Commission. As a result, another dimension of studying
the EU as an international security actor was incorporated in this thesis. This dimension concerns the importance of not excluding, *a priori*, any type of EU policy, solely on the basis that these policies are not typically associated with the EU’s international security policy. For example, when analysing the role of the EU in tackling the problem of maritime piracy off the coast Somalia, it is important to examine the first-ever EU naval operation EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, deployed to protect vulnerable vessels from piratical attacks. However, it is also important to analyse EU long-term development policy in Somalia, which addresses some of the root causes of maritime piracy. It is important to examine this long-term EU policy as a part of the EU’s international *security* actoriness.

In a similar manner, when analysing the role of the EU as an international security actor in the area of preventing the proliferation of WMDs, it is important to analyse the role of EU member states working together in the Council of the European Union; in particular, when they utilise CFSP instruments, such as a joint action. It is also important to analyse the activities of the Council General Secretariat, particularly the office of the Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD. However, it is also important to examine the role of the European Commission, because this institution has played an important role in preventing the proliferation of WMDs from the former Soviet Union, already in the early 1990s. Currently, through its IfS, the Commission develops a range of projects which continue to be directed at Russia and former Soviet Union countries, but are not limited to this geographical area. This broadening of geographical scope reflects the changing nature of proliferation threats and requires closer examination.

To summarise, this thesis was constructed around two discrepancies. The first discrepancy was constituted by a gap within academic literature. This gap stemmed from the fact that the European studies literature tends to approach the question of international security rather narrowly, compared to literature on contemporary security studies. The second discrepancy was constituted by a gap between the European studies literature and empirical findings in the area of EU international security policy. This gap stemmed from the fact that the European studies literature, when addressing the question of EU international security policy, tends to focus mostly on the CFSP and the CSDP, typically omitting EU instruments beyond these frameworks, such as the financial instruments of the European Commission. By addressing these discrepancies, this thesis aims to contribute to scholarly research on European studies, and in particular to literature on the EU as an international security actor.
The methodology

Establishing the methodology for this thesis requires addressing a number of questions. Firstly, this thesis is based on a philosophical assumption that all concepts constituting the every-day vocabulary of an International Relations (IR) scholar, such as states and international security, are socially constructed. Thus, in terms of ontological choices, this thesis adheres to the approach called social constructivism (Adler 2003). What follows is that, naturally, this thesis does not consider social kinds (states, the EU) to be the same as natural kinds (a tree, a river). However, this thesis also does not support the idea that social kinds can be reduced to a mere discourse and that their existence depends entirely on those who constitute them by such a discourse. As a result, this thesis adheres to scientific realism in terms of epistemological choices (Marsh and Mackenstein 2002; Wendt 1999). Scientific realist epistemology acknowledges the fact that the EU, in opposition to a stone, does not exist entirely independently of a shared understanding about its existence. Nonetheless, this approach also understands that there are important material factors which constitute the EU, such as its external borders, a common currency and common institutions. In this sense, the EU as a social kind shares one quality with natural kinds. This quality is self-organisation. It is only a degree of this self-organisation which differentiates the two. Whereas natural kinds are entirely self-organised (they exist solely because of their material structure), social kinds need to be constituted (recognised) by an external structure.

Secondly, this thesis is structured around case study research design (Burnham et al. 2004). In order to the answer research question of this thesis, namely ‘To which extent has the EU developed as an international security actor?’, three case studies were selected. They represent different kinds of contemporary security challenges, ranging from the so-called ‘non-traditional’ ones, to more traditional challenges, requiring the combination of military and non-military responses. Climate change has been conceptualised in terms of international security only a few years ago (Dalby 2009; Floyd 2008; Trombetta 2009); also, it cannot be solved through military means, although it may have ‘hard security’ consequences in some of the most vulnerable regions of the world. The proliferation of WMDs from Russia and the former Soviet Union represents a more traditional security threat. Nuclear deterrence was at the core of Cold-War Strategic Studies. Nowadays, it mainly involves the danger of terrorist organisations acquiring an access to WMD technologies. Finally, piracy off the coast of So-
Mali represents one of the oldest international security challenges, requiring a mixture of military and non-military tools to tackle it.

Thirdly, data for this thesis was collected through the triangulation of documents, secondary sources, and elite interviews (Burnham et al. 2004). Each of these resources played a central role at different stages of developing this thesis. In the first year, mostly the secondary, academic resources were utilised in order to review the literature, develop the theoretical framework and construct the methodology. In the first half of the second year, documents emerged as the most important resources to analyse, together with academic literature on EU policy in the area of three selected case studies. In the second half of the second year, elite interviews were conducted. To this end, two research trips were undertaken to Brussels, in the first half of 2009. They were generously funded by the Scholarship of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies. In addition to interviews conducted in Brussels, a number of interviews were conducted over the phone and by e-mail, with experts and officials based outside of Belgium. Finally, in the third year of developing this thesis, the combination of documents, secondary sources and (most importantly) elite interviews was utilised in the process of writing the empirical component of this thesis.

**Original contribution**

There is at least one major original contribution of this thesis to the European studies literature, but there are also important contributions of individual chapters. Firstly, this thesis offers an original contribution to the European studies literature, by suggesting a novel conceptualisation of the EU as an international security actor. As it has already been briefly discussed, the majority of scholarly research on the EU and international security tends to adopt a limited approach, by focusing almost exclusively on the CFSP/CSDP. This thesis offers a broadened conceptualisation of the EU as an international security actor, by arguing that it is equally important to assess longer-term EU instruments. For example, EU development aid to Somalia can be analysed in the context of the EU’s development policy. However, when discussing EU efforts directed against organised crime off the coast of Somalia, the development policy of the EU plays an integral role of the EU’s international security policy, because it addresses some of the root causes of piracy. This original contribution is important, because the way in which EU international security policy is conceptualised, inevitably affects the conclusions about the level of the EU’s international security actorness.
In addition to this major contribution, this thesis also offers other important contributions to the scholarship in different areas of academic enquiry. For example, in the second chapter, this thesis contributes to academic discussions on how to conceptualise and assess the international actorness of the EU. There is a rich body of literature attempting to evaluate the EEC, and later the EU, as *sui generis* actors (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Sjöstedt 1977); this thesis contributes to this research by developing, and particularly by operationalising, criteria to assess the EU’s level of actorness. As a result, it is suggested that the EU has a low, medium or a high level of international actorness. In addition to these conceptual contributions, the empirical component of this thesis offers an original contribution to studying EU policy in the area of three contemporary security challenges.

The literature on EU policy in the area of the environment and climate change is thriving (e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Groenleer and Van Shaik 2007; Lacasta *et al.* 2002; McCormick 2001; Parker and Karlsson 2010; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Vogler 2005; Wurzel and Connelly 2010). This thesis, through conceptualising climate change as a contemporary security challenge, brings the analysis of EU security actorness closer to scholarly work on contemporary security studies. The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia only emerged as a pressing international issue in 2008. The EU deployed its military operation at the end of 2008. Thus, this thesis offers one of the first comprehensive assessments of EU policy in this area. EU policy on the non-proliferation of WMDs from Russia and the former Soviet Union did not attract a lot of scholarly attention (Denza, 2005), even though this potential threat was at the top of US security policy agenda in the 1990s, and then again attracted international attention in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This thesis offers a comprehensive overview of the most important EU instruments and policies in this area. The figure below summarises original contributions of this thesis.
Figure 1: The original contribution of this thesis

A novel approach to analysing the EU as an international security actor, moving beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework, as well as beyond traditional security challenges.

Contribution to studying the EU as an international actor (Ch. 2).

Contribution to studying the EU and environmental security (Ch. 4).

Contribution to studying the EU and non-prol. of WMDs from Russia (Ch. 5).

Contribution to studying EU response to maritime piracy (Ch. 6).

This thesis has the following structure. In the first chapter, it contains the review of the literature in the area of European studies, particularly on the EU and its foreign/security policy. The purpose of this review is to provide the background for this thesis, by investigating how the question of EU international security actorness is approached in the exiting scholarship. The second chapter establishes the theoretical framework for this thesis, integrating the concept of international actorness to investigate the EU as an international security actor. In particular, it is important to engage with literature on the EU as a sui generis actor, in order to develop methodological tools (criteria of actorness) for assessing EU international security policy. It is also important to operationalise these criteria and to justify the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy at the international level adopted in this thesis. The third chapter explains the methodology for this thesis. In particular, it outlines case study research design and provides the rationale for case studies selected for this thesis.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 form the empirical component of this thesis. They investigate the role of the EU in addressing three contemporary international security challenges. These challenges range from recently securitised to more traditional ones. Chapter 4 investigates EU policy in the area of climate security. Even though there is a range of publications on EU environmental policy, this thesis explains how the EU has been developing a security dimension of its climate change policy. Chapter 5 examines EU policy in the area of non-proliferation of WMDs, with a particular focus on Russia and the former Soviet Union. This area of EU activ-
ity did not attract a lot of scholarly attention, even though Russia contains the largest number of WMDs in the world. This fact raised international concerns in the 1990s and again after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the role of the EU as an actor in the area of organised crime off the coast of Somalia, which has the form of maritime piracy. The analysis of these case studies will allow to draw conclusions about the EU as an international security actor.
1. Review of the literature

This chapter offers an exhaustive review of the literature analysing the role of the EU in international security policy. The purpose of this exercise is to establish the academic background for this thesis, assessing in a comprehensive manner the degree to which the EU has developed as an actor in international security policy. The review conducted in this chapter demonstrates that scholars often tend to approach the question of international security rather narrowly. There are two components of this ‘narrow’ approach. Firstly, a narrow approach to the question of the EU and its role in international security policy concerns the institutions, instruments and policies which are the subject of empirical analysis. For the most part, scholars focus on the CFSP/CSDP framework. In particular, they tend to focus on the emerging military capabilities of the EU and on CSDP operations, often at the expense of analysing the instruments of the European Commission, such as the IfS or development aid. These financial instruments of the EU can be considered to play important security roles, particularly in the longer term, through contributing to the development of stable conditions in vulnerable regions (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005).

This focus on the CFSP more broadly, or just the CSDP, leads to the second aspect of a narrow approach to analysing the EU as an international security actor, which is a focus on the so-called ‘traditional’ security problems, such as international and regional military conflicts. This creates a gap between literature on the EU’s role in international security policy on the one hand, and literature on contemporary security studies on the other hand. This latter category of literature fully acknowledges that the so-called ‘traditional’, military problems have not disappeared. However, this literature also explains the nature of some of the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security problems, such as underdevelopment, environmental degradation, climate change and pandemic diseases, by adopting a broader notion of security (Collins 2007; Dalby 2009; Krause and Williams 1997; McInnes 2008; Smith 2010; Thomas 2008). Among scholars of the EU, there are many researchers who analyse EU policy in these important policy areas (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Lacasta et al. 2002; McCormick 2001). However, whilst making a valuable contribution to research in each of these respective policy areas, this literature does not explicitly contribute to the discussions on the EU as an international security actor.
These two aspects of a narrow approach to analysing the role of the EU in international security policy have important consequences for the conclusions about this role. Most notably, they often lead to conclusions that the EU is not a security actor yet, or that it is an underdeveloped security actor. Kirchner (2006: 952) explains this point: ‘The extent to which the EU can be deemed a security provider depends considerably on the definition of security or, more precisely, on the type of security threat that is envisaged. If non-military threats are added to the traditionally held military ones, as suggested by security governance, then the scope for EU response to such threats can be justifiably extended’. Rieker (2009: 704) reaches a similar conclusion: ‘(...) if one applies a broad approach to security, the set of capabilities that will be considered as important and relevant will differ from an approach that applies a narrow concept of security’. This chapter demonstrates that the scholarship on the EU and international security, for the most part, has not yet fully taken into account developments in literature on contemporary security studies. As a result, it only sporadically analyses the role of the European Commission, mainly in the context of its role in the CFSP (Anderson 2008; Cameron 2007; Howorth 2007; Smith 2002; Tardy 2009). This fact, again, often leads to conclusions that the EU is an underdeveloped security actor, considering constrains inherent in the intergovernmental framework of the CSDP (Eliassen 1998; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004; Matlary 2008).

Considering these important consequences of adopting a narrower notion of security, why do scholars tend to limit their analysis to more traditional security issues and to the CFSP/CSDP institutional framework? The main reason has been the three-pillar structure of the EU, established by the TEU in 1993. In this structure, all the activities of the European Commission conducted within the framework of the EEC since 1957 were defined as the ‘European Community’ (EC) pillar of the newly-established EU. The EPC was incorporated as the second pillar of the EU and developed into the CFSP in Title V of the TEU. Title VI introduced the provisions on cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, constituting the third pillar of the EU (Cini and Borragán 2010; Hill and Smith 2005; Nugent 2010). This arrangement opened new possibilities for policies to be undertaken at the EU level. Yet, it also created the assumption among scholars that the foreign, and especially the security policy of the EU, takes place exclusively within the CFSP framework. This perception was further strengthened when in 1999 the CSDP was introduced as a part of the second pillar. The effect of these institutional developments on academic debate was profound. It became intuitive for scholars to associate EU
international security policy exclusively with the CFSP, and particularly the CSDP. The dominating discourse was that whilst the European Commission was entrusted with the matters of ‘low politics’ (trade, aid), EU member states were conducting common European foreign and security policy within the intergovernmental Council of the European Union.

It must be noted that this approach to studying EU international security actorness is not without its merits. EU member states working together in the Council and during the European Council summits develop priorities for EU international security policy. Council joint actions and decisions are important instruments of member states in pursuing foreign and security policy at the EU level. Finally, CSDP missions constitute an important, military component in a set of EU capabilities in the area of EU international security policy, adding to the EU’s credibility on the international stage. However, the technical and financial instruments of the European Commission must be integrated into the analysis, when assessing the role of the EU in international security policy. These instruments, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), humanitarian aid or the IfS, play a crucial role in contributing to the EU’s security policy at the international level, including its human dimension. In fact, some scholars argue that economic instruments have enabled the EEC to become an important security actor already in the 1980s (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005). The instruments of the European Commission are particularly appropriate for addressing non-traditional security challenges, such as environmental change, poverty and pandemic diseases. However, this thesis demonstrates their important role also in more traditional policy areas, such as the non-proliferation of WMDs and maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia.

This longer-term, preventive dimension of security policy is particularly important in the context of developments in literature on contemporary security studies. This literature acknowledges the dominance of traditional security threats in the political discourse, but also points to the importance of the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security issues. The expert on terrorism Paul Rogers (2008: 172) even observes that ’[t]he 9/11 attacks killed nearly 3,000 people in just one day, but at least that number of children die every day across the South from avoidable intestinal diseases including diarrhoea and dysentery, brought on mainly by impure water supplies’. This perspective points to the relative nature of security perceptions. In this context, former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan (2005) has stated the obvious, when he contrasted the perception of security threats of a New York investor passing Ground Zero on a daily basis, with a Malawian orphan who has lost his parents to AIDS. Furthermore,
the fears of an Indonesian fisherman, who has lost his family to tsunami, are also likely to
differ from security concerns of a villager in Darfur, threatened by bombing raids. This
broader perspective has important consequences for assessing the EU’s role as a security ac­
tor, because “[t]he relative decline of questions of ‘high politics’, the rise of economic di­
plomacy and a wider definition of pre-requisites for security all enhance the international

This chapter discusses three categories of literature. The first category is literature on the EU
as an international security actor. The majority of research in this field tends to have a precise
focus, mainly concentrating on the CFSP/CSDP framework of EU policy-making, even
though scholars often aim to address the broader question of EU security policy (Anderson
2008; Gänzle and Sens 2007; Moschini 2008; Tardy 2009). The majority of research is lim­
ited to discussing CSDP operations and the degree to which member states are able to reach
consensus in the Council. This analysis is important, particularly because the CSDP consti­
tutes a crucial component of the overall EU international security policy. Nonetheless, this
thesis argues that there are other important elements of EU security policy-making which
need to be taken into account, most notably the instruments of the European Commission.
Within this first category of literature discussed in this chapter, there is also a growing body
of research which indeed adopts a broader approach. This literature recognises security chal­
lenges beyond a traditional focus on military problems. This literature also recognises the role
of the European Commission and its instruments, such as the RRM, later replaced by the IfS.

The second category of scholarly work discussed in this review is literature on the EU as an
international actor in the area of human security. This literature aims to discuss the role of the
EU in security policy which goes beyond a focus on states and includes concerns about the
security of individuals. EU policy in human security is a relatively recent topic of academic
enquiry, with a relatively modest number of contributions. Nonetheless, this literature pro­
vides an important background for this thesis, because of its wider approach to international
security, going beyond a traditional focus on states. Yet, the review conducted in this chapter
demonstrates that, in spite of a wider and broader approach to international security, this lit­
erature also tends to focus on the CFSP/CSDP institutional framework of European coopera­
tion. This is rather surprising, because the human dimension of international security is pre­
cisely where the European Commission may potentially play a significant role, through its
long-term, structural cooperation and a variety of financial instruments at its disposal. Nota-
bly, the Commission is one of the largest contributors of humanitarian and development aid. Further, in 2007 it has also acquired the IfS – a security-focused instrument, primarily aiming to enable the EU to deliver support rapidly in crisis situations.

The third category of scholarly research discussed in this chapter is literature on the EFP, or the EU as a global actor. This literature started emerging in the 1990s when the TEU introduced the CFSP, to now constitute one of the broadest sub-fields of European studies. The EFP literature tends to organise its arguments around three pillars of the EU, with economic and ‘foreign and security’ policy issues usually discussed separately. Structuring the argument this way is beneficial in order to draw a general picture of various categories of EU institutions and policies. Yet, it is not without its flaws. Most importantly, organising an argument around the three-pillar EU structure leads to the artificial separation of economic, or ‘low politics’ issues from ‘high politics’ foreign and security issues. This separation does not accurately capture the nature of EU policy-making. Most importantly, it creates an impression that the security policy of the EU takes place exclusively in the Council, through common positions and joint actions. Consequently, the role of the European Commission is dealt with separately, in the context of EU economic policy. However, as this chapter also demonstrates, there is an emerging body of scholarly research on the EFP that adopts a more comprehensive overview of the EU’s security policy. This literature acknowledges the importance of the CFSP framework, but it also looks at the role of the European Commission (or even the EEC during the Cold War) when assessing the EU’s international security actorness. This chapter commences with reviewing literature on the EU as an international security actor.

1.1. Literature on the EU as an international security actor

The first of the three categories of literature analysed in this chapter is research in the area of the EU as an international security actor. This thesis proposes the comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s role in international security policy. Therefore it is important to evaluate the current ‘state of the art’ in this field of research. The major incentive for scholars to get involved in studying the EU as a security actor has been institutional developments within the EU. More precisely, the establishment of the CSDP and the deployment of first CSDP missions attracted scholarly attention, contributing to the fact that the analysis of various aspects of the CSDP constitutes the bulk of scholarly work on the EU’s international security policy (Deighton 2002; Duke 2000; Grevi et al. 2009; Howorth 2007; Menon 2004, 2009). There is a
good reason for this: the speed at which the CSDP has acquired its shape and the number of operations deployed so far (even if many of them are relatively modest) is remarkable and can be surprising. When evaluating the first five years of the CSDP, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HRCFSP) Javier Solana pointed to the following paradox: ‘of all the prerogatives of states, security and defence policy is probably the one which least lends itself to a collective European approach; however, after the single currency, it is in this dimension that the Union has made the most rapid and spectacular progress over the last five years’ (Solana 2004: 5). In 2010, the CSDP is richer by its 10-year experience. Importantly, it serves as a framework to deploy the EU’s first naval operation to combat piracy off the Somali coast (see Chapter 6). It was also codified in the Lisbon Treaty. All these developments call for a thorough academic analysis.

Nonetheless, this thesis argues that, whilst it is an important exercise to analyse the CSDP, research cannot be limited to this single framework when examining the broader question of the EU as an international security actor. The CSDP constitutes an important part of this broader framework and is evaluated in this thesis when analysing the EU’s response to piracy off the Somali coast. Yet, limiting the analysis to the CSDP may lead to the omission of other instruments and policies important in developing the international security policy of the EU. This section commences by discussing research adopting a narrower approach to studying the EU’s international security policy. For the most part, this research does not engage with discussions about security as they take place in literature on contemporary security studies; instead, it tends to limit the analysis to more traditional security challenges and the CSDP framework. Such structured approach to research excludes the possibility for accommodating the European Commission and its role in international security policy. In particular, it often leads to the omission of the EU’s role in dealing with problems such as climate change, pandemic diseases and the poverty-conflicts nexus. When assessing the EU as an international security actor, it is necessary to integrate this broadened and widened international security agenda, including the complex interconnectedness of traditional and non-traditional security problems. Otherwise, the analysis risks of being detached from the broader approach to security prevailing in the scholarship on contemporary security studies. The ‘narrower-approach’ literature is further contrasted with literature on the EU as an international security actor adopting a broader understanding of security. There is a growing body of research attempting
a more comprehensive evaluation of EU’s policies and instruments in the area of international security policy. This category of literature is reviewed in the second part of this section.

1.1.1. Literature on the EU as an international security actor – a narrower approach

The majority of scholarly research assessing the role of the EU in international security policy tends to adopt a relatively narrow approach. This narrow approach is manifested through the fact that scholars focus mainly on the CFSP/CSDP institutional framework, but also that they rarely go beyond traditional (or Realist) types of security problems. There are various strands of this ‘narrow approach’ literature. For example, there is literature adopting an explicitly narrow approach to the concept of security. This means that scholars often do recognise that the concept of security has broadened and widened, but they chose to adopt a more traditional understanding of security when analysing EU policy. There is also literature with an implicitly narrow approach to security, where scholars limit the analysis to the CSDP without any theoretical justifications. Finally, there is the scholarship acknowledging that the concept of security has widened and broadened in the last few decades, but this fact is not fully reflected in the empirical analysis of the EU’s performance on the international stage. In other words, some scholars explain how the nature of security has changed with the end of the Cold War, but they still tend to focus mostly on the military-related aspects of security, such as regional conflicts, in their empirical analysis.

Among scholars who adopt an explicitly narrow approach to security is Hyde-Price (2004). In the context of studying European security he notes that ‘(...) an indiscriminate broadening of the concept of security is intellectually worrying because it means that international security studies looses its disciplinary coherence. It ends up being about everything and nothing’ (2004: 335). The author acknowledges that issues such as AIDS or environmental degradation are important, but he classifies them as public policy rather than security problems. As a result, the author calls for the development of a ‘military dimension of a comprehensive concept of security’ (Hyde-Price 2004: 336). In practical terms this means that, as the cases of Bosnia or Somalia demonstrated, an effective solution to conflicts requires a variety of instruments (military, economic, diplomatic) and a variety of actors (NGOs, international organisations). Yet, the role of the military, according to the author, remains pivotal. The title of Peters’ (2010) volume ‘Constrained Balancing: The EU’s Security Policy’ is rather misleading. Instead of focusing on the EU, the ‘book develops a framework for analyzing the security poli-
cies of states' (Peters 2010: 3). In particular, the author focuses on Britain and Germany and their policies towards the CSDP, in order to test his hypothesis about constrained balancing in Europe after the Cold War.

Sherman and Sussex (2004) in their edited volume ‘European Security after 9/11’ also focus on states. In particular, they analyse the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on transatlantic relations and the policies of France, Germany and the UK. The reason that they chose to primarily look at nation-states is that, according to those researchers, ‘despite forces of globalization and the growth of transnational terrorism, politics still takes place within territorial boundaries of the nation state. (...) The state is reasserting its power in defining what it perceives to be new kinds of threats to its territorial integrity’ (Shearman 2004: 23). In spite of the systemic constraints on international organisations, those scholars nonetheless acknowledge the EU’s progress in the area of counter-terrorism cooperation after 2001. Wyllie (1997) is also sceptical about the possibility for international institutions to acquire competences in international security policy, because ‘the international system remains a competitive and basically anarchic system of states’ (Wyllie 1997: 9). He notes that great powers shape international relations; therefore, ceding security competences on international institutions, such as the UN or the EU ‘has been shown to be ineffective for most states’ (Wyllie 1997: 9). Wyllie does not consider the TEU an important step in developing the EU’s role as an international security actor. According to this author, the ‘EU has no official defence or security functions and under Maastricht any future security role is semi-detached and disputatious’ (Wyllie 1997: 27).

Most of the scholarship approaching the study of the EU’s role in international security policy in a narrow fashion does not adopt an explicitly Realist stance. Instead, many researchers simply analyse the role of the CSDP in order to draw conclusions about the EU’s performance in international security policy. Howorth (2007) is one of the most recognised experts on security and defence policy of the EU. In his book ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’ (2007), the author thoroughly analyses and assesses the CSDP. As such, Howorth’s contribution is valuable. Yet, the first chapter of his volume is entitled ‘Introduction: A New Security Actor on the World Stage’. This would seem to suggest that the chapter intends to discuss the EU as a security actor, and not just one framework of EU security cooperation, i.e. the CSDP. This is not the case, however. Howorth provides a well-informed background on the emergence of the CSDP, but does not elaborate on other instruments of the
EU which play a role in the EU’s international security policy. Similarly, Anderson (2008) in her volume ‘Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity’ focuses exclusively on the CSDP. With regards to the role of the European Commission, the author notes that this institution plays an increasingly insignificant function in the EU’s foreign and security policy and effectively ‘has been relegated to “flanking measures” to support ESDP missions’ (Anderson 2008: 154). As a result, Anderson’s contribution does not elaborate on the role of the Commission’s instruments in addressing the non-traditional security challenges, outside the CSDP framework. The empirical component of this thesis demonstrates that the Commission has been active in addressing non-traditional problems such as environmental security, but also in contributing to the EU’s security policy in the areas such as the non-proliferation of WMDs.

A rather limited approach to the question of European security and the EU as an international security actor is advanced in the volume edited by Tardy (2009), entitled ‘European Security in a Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics’. The editor focuses exclusively on the CSDP, noting that limited resources (such as the decrease of national defence budgets) undermine the EU’s performance. Interestingly, Tardy also notes that the CSDP is not appropriate a framework to tackle security challenges identified by the ESS, such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Yet, the author decides not to move beyond the CSDP framework in order to see whether other EU instruments and policies are more appropriate to tackle some of these security problems. Olsen (2009), in his contribution to Tardy’s volume, discusses the EU’s security policy in Africa; he notes that, based on the Cotonou Agreement, ‘development policy and cooperation programmes are the most powerful instruments when the European Community wants to treat the causes of conflict’ (Olsen 2009: 157). Yet, when defining the focus of his contribution, Olsen points to ‘the initiatives launched within the framework of the CFSP and ESDP’ (Olsen 2009: 154). Development and humanitarian assistance are discussed, but only in the context of CSDP operations. They are not approached as important policies by themselves, when addressing various insecurities in Africa.

The war in Iraq has had a significant impact on academic debates in the area of EU security policy. Longhurst and Zaborowski (2004), in their article ‘The Future of European Security’, look at the nature of European divisions over the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and why Central and Eastern European (CEE) states decided to support Washington in this campaign. Drawing on the post-Cold War political developments in Europe and transatlantic relations,
the researchers present three conclusions: a) the EU becomes increasingly self-reliant in the area of security by, for example, creating its own Rapid Reaction Force (RRF); b) there is no agreement within the EU on how the future relations with Washington should look like, but it is also uncertain to which extent the US will remain interested in Europe; and c) the CFSP must adapt to the way in which EU’s regional responsibilities have changed after the 2004 enlargement. Salmon (2005) also examines European divisions over the war in Iraq in 2003. In this context, the author identifies some important obstacles preventing the EU from developing a common security policy. In his conclusion, the author notes that "[a]part from economic instruments, most other instruments are embryonic. The EU has failed to play the global actor card" (Salmon 2005: 378). Without a doubt, the Iraqi campaign divided EU member states, preventing the EU from speaking with one voice on this issue. However, to what extent did these divisions fundamentally undermine the emergence of the EU as an international security actor? Already in 2003, the European Council adopted the ESS. Also in 2003, eleven days after first US missiles were dropped on Baghdad, the EU launched its first-ever CSDP mission – operation Concordia in Macedonia.

Finally, this section evaluates literature which acknowledges that the concept of security has widened and broadened in the last few decades, but does not fully reflect this fact in the empirical analysis of the EU’s performance on the international stage. This means that scholars tend to explain how the nature of security has changed with the end of the Cold War, but they also tend to focus primarily on the military-related aspects of security. Such an approach contributes to the discrepancy with literature on contemporary security studies, which, for the most part, presents a more comprehensive approach to the question of international security (e.g. Collins 2007; Dannreuther 2007; Williams 2008; Smith 2010).

The volume edited by Gänzle and Sens ‘The changing politics of European security: Europe alone?’ (2007) constitutes an important contribution to studying the role of the EU in international security. The authors elaborate on how the concept of security has changed after the Cold War. Notably, Europe does not have to fear territorial invasion any more. Instead, new threats emerged on the European security agenda, such as intrastate conflicts in the Balkans, terrorism, illegal immigration and energy security (Sens 2007). The volume consists of three parts. The first part discusses developments in the transatlantic (Eastern and Western Europe, Northern America) security environment after the Cold War. The second part examines the development of the EU as an ‘alone’ security actor, by looking at the development of CSDP.
ENP and Russian perceptions of the EU’s growing international security role. The third section analyses the changing nature of transatlantic relations, by looking at NATO, the CSDP-NATO relations and the role of the US and Canada in transatlantic relations. Although these issues are crucial for European security, the volume does not really touch upon the role of the EU as an international security actor in addressing non-traditional security threats, which constitute a significant part of the new security agenda in this post-Cold War environment.

The contribution by Moschini (2008) to an extensive volume ‘Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century’ is peculiar. Moschini’s chapter is entitled ‘The Comprehensive Security Concept of the European Union’ and his ambition is to provide ‘an illustrative description of the innovative approach the European Union (EU) has taken on security and defence in the early 21st century’ (Moschini 2008: 651). Following the introduction, the author introduces the organisational structure of the CSDP, briefly discusses the post-Cold War geo-strategic environment in Europe and elaborates on the ESS. According to Moschini, key elements of the ESS are: inclusiveness, the interdependence of security and development, cooperation and effective multilateralism. Finally, the author elaborates on the recent development of EU military capabilities within the CSDP framework. Quite contrary to what the title of the chapter suggests, the approach adopted by Moschini is not comprehensive. Instead, the analysis is limited to the CSDP and does not include other EU policies and instruments. Mauer (2009), in his rather brief contribution, examines the extent to which the EU has evolved from being a security community to become a security actor. By looking almost exclusively at the CSDP, the author concludes that the EU’s ‘foreign and security policy does provide an umbrella for bringing together the national member states and the EU’s institutions, instruments and resources, thereby contributing to the emergence of a distinctive EU security governance’ (Mauer 2009: 378).

This analysis indicates how a limited approach to the concept of security often leads to a narrow or limited understanding of the EU as an international security actor. Importantly, this limited approach does not take account of the developments in literature on contemporary security studies, thus creating a gap between these two types of literature. On the one hand, scholarly research analysed above tends to focus exclusively on traditional security challenges; on the other hand, literature on contemporary security studies, examined in more detail in the second chapter, acknowledges how the concept of security has broadened and widened in the last few decades. Moreover, such a limited approach means that research is con-
strained to examining the CFSP/CSDP framework, neglecting financial and technical instruments of the European Commission. The empirical component of this thesis demonstrates that these instruments have been playing an important preventive role in addressing both traditional and non-traditional security problems (Anthony 2004). This thesis demonstrates that including the European Commission into the analysis is important, because many of its policies have a security character or security implications. The second part of this section discusses literature which adopts, to some extent, a more comprehensive approach to studying the EU as an international security actor.

1.1.2. Literature on the EU as an international security actor – a more comprehensive approach

In his volume ‘Security in the New Europe’, Cottey (2007) approaches the question of European security from a broader perspective, not limited to the CSDP institutional framework. He discusses both more traditional and the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges, such as global warming and population movements. In this context, the author briefly examines the role of the EU in international climate negotiations, but he does not explicitly link this EU policy with the development of the EU as an international security actor. In his conclusion, Cottey notes that the European foreign and security policy remains essentially intergovernmental, thus making the EU an unsuitable framework for operations requiring fast decision-making. On the other hand, according to Cottey, the EU is much better at long-term ‘complex, multi-faceted political, economic and security relations with other states and regions’ (2007: 100-101). Sebesta (2009), in her article reflecting on EU security policy, reaches similar conclusions. She is sceptical about the possibility of any single nation state, including the US, to become a new global security provider. On the other hand, she notes that ‘because of its economic might, its political stability, and rich tradition in ideas linking peace to justice, the EU is, today, the only international actor which has the material and cultural means to achieve this revolutionary objective’ (Sebesta 2009: 590).

Kirchner’s article ‘The challenge of European Union security governance’ (2006) aims to assess whether the EU is an effective security actor. The author acknowledges how security and defence ‘extend beyond military criteria and comprise economic, political ecological, social and cultural elements (...). [S]ecurity threats have become more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ (Kirchner 2006: 949). To this end, the author discusses some of the EU’s longer-term instruments. When assessing the role of the EU in conflict prevention, the
The author underlines the importance of the European Commission. He notes that the Commission manages a variety of programmes (such as humanitarian aid, discussed in Chapter 6) and the RRM (the predecessor of the IfS). As a result, Kirchner concludes that states have lost monopoly on providing security and have emerged as one type of participants in a cooperative system. Rieker (2009) also adopts a broader understanding of the EU’s international security policy. She observes that ‘the CFSP and ESDP do not cover the full range of EU security policy. For instance, it leaves out important parts such as enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, development policy as well as the parts of Justice and Home Affairs that account for the Union’s counter terrorism policy’ (Rieker 2009: 704). The author concludes that the EU can be considered a security actor because of its growing resources and competences. However, these assets are undermined by underdeveloped organisational skills, particularly the coordination problems between and within EU institutions.

The chapter ‘Reconceptualisation of External Security in the European Union’ by Hintermeier (2008) in the volume ‘Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century’ represents a truly comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s international security role. Firstly, the author provides a thorough conceptual and theoretical background on the comprehensive, international security policy of the EU. For example, he elaborates on the referent objects of EU international security policy, concerning the question ‘who is to be securitised?’ When examining different categories of EU security problems, Hintermeier identifies the following issues: violent conflicts and regional instability; transnational threats (organised crime, terrorism); violation of human rights, bad governance and lack of democracy; global risks and challenges (HIV/AIDS, climate change). In order to address these issues, the EU, according to the author, deploys a variety of security policy instruments, such as political and economic instruments, military means and diplomacy. This thesis adheres to this comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s role in international security. It contributes to the debate by analysing in more detail some of the contemporary security challenges briefly outlined by Hintermeier in his chapter. This, in turn, will help to better understand the nature of EU international security actorness.

As the review of the literature on the EU as an international security actor has demonstrated, the CFSP, and particularly the CSDP, constitute often the only aspect of studying this subfield of European studies. Scholars analyse the degree to which member states are willing to move their competences in the area of military security from national capitals to Brussels.
They also analyse the degree to which events such as the Iraq war undermined EU security cooperation. The actual CSDP operations, mainly in the Western Balkans, also provide rich material for research. This thesis argues that it is an important exercise to examine all these aspects related to the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP. However, it also argues that other EU instruments and policies cannot be neglected on the basis that they are primarily the competence of the European Commission, which traditionally has not been associated with the EU’s security policy. In particular, it is important to take account of the broadened and widened security agenda, in order to evaluate the EU’s role in addressing the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenge. This broader approach is prevailing in the scholarship on security studies, but also in the EU’s own security discourse, for example in the ESS (European Council 2003; 2008). The empirical component of this thesis demonstrates various ways in which the European Commission has been involved in conducting policy with direct or indirect consequences for international security and stability. The following section moves the analysis to one particular area of EU security policy research, concentrated on the concept of human security.

1.2. Literature on EU international actorness in the area of human security

There is an emerging body of literature which aims to assess the role of the EU as an international actor in the area of human security. Human security, as a distinctive conceptualisation of security, was institutionalised in 1994 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its ‘Human Development Report’ (UNDP 1994). It concerns the ‘agenda where the point of reference is the individual person and his or her right to personal security’ (Matlary 2008: 135). Recently, a number of scholars have attempted to investigate the performance of the EU in addressing the human dimension of contemporary security challenges. Considering that the human security approach, as defined by the UNDP, goes beyond military-related threats to security, it would seem natural that also the analysis of the EU’s actorness in this area must be holistic and go beyond the CFSP framework. In fact, the European Commission appears to be better equipped, than EU’s instruments available within the CFSP framework, for providing long-term development assistance, addressing some of the root causes of human insecurity. However, as the review of the literature demonstrates, the scholarship in the area of the EU and human security also tends to adopt a rather narrower understanding of security, focusing mainly on CSDP capabilities.
Matlary (2008), in her article ‘Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security’, focuses exclusively on the CFSP and the CSDP. This rather narrow approach leads the author to conclude: ‘The EU may benefit from calling all its security policy “human security”, but if rhetoric promises more than policy can deliver, the ethical implications are grave’ (Matlary 2008: 143). The pessimistic conclusion about the EU’s role in human security policy is inevitable if the analysis is limited to the framework which was designed to develop EU’s capacities in the area of more conventional, military-related aspects of security. Including the instruments of the European Commission into the analysis could perhaps shed a different light on the EU’s performance.

Glasius and Kaldor (2006) in their edited volume ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe’ distinguish between a narrower and a broader understanding of the human security concept. In a broader sense, human security refers to ‘[v]iolations of the right to food, health and housing’ (Glasius and Kaldor 2006: 7). On the other hand, a narrow approach focuses on threats such as genocide, large-scale torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, war crimes, slavery, disappearances. When applying this distinction into the practice of EU policy, the authors propose that ‘while the holistic category of human security (...) might inform the common, security and development policy of the European Union as a whole, a narrower category of situations that become intolerably insecure, as outlined above, could be one of the criteria for deciding to deploy operational capacities’ (Glasius and Kaldor 2006: 7-8). Contributors to this edited volume chose to adopt a narrower approach to human security; this leads them to mostly consider CSDP instruments and capacities. The role of the European Commission is not elaborated on for the most part of the volume, except for the chapter ‘Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Operations’ (Dwan 2006), which examines coordination between the crisis management capabilities of the Commission and those within the CSDP framework.

Recently, another edited volume approached the question of the EU’s international policy and human security. Martin and Kaldor (2010) in ‘The European Union and Human Security’ attempt to assess ‘the actual practice of the ESDP through a lens of human security’ (Martin and Kaldor 2010: 1). Such formulated purpose of the volume informs its empirical content. More specifically, it prompts contributors to focus on CSDP responses to crisis situations in various parts of the world, but not so much on EU longer-term preventive efforts, such as those developed within the framework of the IfS or development assistance. The exception in this mostly CSDP-focused contribution is a chapter discussing the EU’s response to the Asian
tsunami of 2004 (Glasius 2010), examining the role of the European Commission in this re-

dpect.

Ellner (2008) introduces another perspective on the EU’s human security actoriness, engaging
in the discussion with those researchers who promote the human security approach for the
EU, most notably Mary Kaldor. Ellner argues that security ‘has become so all embracing that
it is at risk of being meaningless and there is little consensus on the principal security agents’
(Ellner 2008: 25). With regards to the EU’s human security approach, the author recognises
that it ‘not only arises from its self-perception as a normative and ethical power, but also
aligns it with the approach of the UN (...)’ (Ellner 2008: 10). However, the author points to
problems with this EU’s approach to international security. Most notably, there is a problem
with the idea of using force to implement ‘development’ goals. Also, EU’s values, which the
EU intends to export through the human security approach, may not be compatible with the
values of communities in other parts of the world. These concerns must certainly be taken into
account by scholars analysing the EU’s human security policy.

This review has demonstrated a prevailing focus on the CSDP, which leads to the omission of
policies and instruments available for the EU beyond this framework. For example, the Euro-
pean Commission itself is the third largest donor of development aid. Combining Commis-
sion’s resources with the contributions of member states makes the EU the largest donor
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). Such a broader approach, including long-term instru-
ments tackling the structural causes of human insecurity, may lead to conclusions that the EU
is more important an actor in the area of human security than it is currently recognised in the
literature. Whereas the scholarship on the EU as an actor in human security is still very mod-
est, literature in the area of the EFP constitutes a well established sub-field of European stud-
ies. The following section looks at how this scholarship approaches the question of the EU as
an international security actor.

1.3. Literature on the European foreign policy

The three-pillar structure of the EU, introduced by the TEU, has had a significant impact on
academic debates in the 1990s and in 2000s. In contrast to the EPC, which constituted a heav-
ily constrained attempt to develop a framework for European political cooperation, the CFSP
emerged as a promise for the autonomous EU’s role in international security policy. As Peter-
sen (1993: 9) reflected in the same year as the TUE came into force, ‘[t]he question to be an-
swered is whether the CFSP represents a qualitative change compared to European Political Cooperation'. This question kept preoccupying research agenda of European studies scholars throughout the 1990s; furthermore, analysing the role of the CFSP/CSDP as the main (or even the only) component of the EU’s security policy has remained influential until today. Already ten years ago, Tonra (2000) reviewed some of the most important works in the area of the EFP and noted that: ‘[it] is a pleasure to report on the health and strength of publication in the field of European foreign policy’ (Tonra 2000: 168).

For the purpose of the argument of this thesis, two dominating characteristics of literature on the EFP are particularly important. Firstly, most of the scholarship on the role of the EU in international security policy does not actually engage with discussions about the concept of security. Instead, scholars tend to identify EU security policy almost exclusively within the activities of the CFSP. In other words, the majority of scholars examining the EFP assume that the international security policy of the EU is whatever member states do within the framework of the CFSP. Furthermore, even if the scholarship does engage with the concept of security, acknowledging how it evolved, these observations are rarely reflected in the empirical analysis of the EU’s international security policy. As a result of this approach, the second characteristic of most works in the EFP is that they tend to organise the argument around the three-pillar structure of the EU. This means that scholars often follow the organisational structure of the EU, by examining separately EU foreign and security (the CFSP pillar) policy and EU economic policy (the Community pillar).

From a legalistic point of view, this approach is not inaccurate. The CFSP pillar did aim to introduce a new quality to the EU’s foreign and security policy and the Community pillar was entrusted with the EU’s economic policy. However, is it the optimal approach in order to better understand the role of the EU as an international security actor? It is possible to observe a recent trend among scholars, who began to approach the question of European security policy in a more comprehensive manner. While they acknowledge that the European Commission is primarily responsible for EU’s financial policies, they also note that some of these policies have consequences for international security and stability. As a result, they go beyond the Community/CFSP and CSDP dichotomy, in order to more thoroughly explore EU’s resources in the area of international security policy. This review commences by discussing the scholarship approaching the question of the EU’s security policy narrowly, looking exclusively at the
CFSP/CSDP framework of cooperation. Then, it is important to examine how scholars have begun to broaden their approach, by going beyond the dominating, three-pillar discourse.

1.3.1. The EFP literature identifying the EU’s international security policy almost exclusively in the CFSP/CSDP framework

One of the first researchers to assess the newly-established CFSP was Petersen (1993), in an edited volume ‘The European Community in World Politics’. He concludes that ‘the Maastricht Treaty introduces an authentic qualitative change in the Community’s handling of foreign and security policy questions’ (Petersen 1993: 27). With regards to the EC, the author observes that whilst it plays an important role in economic policy covered by the Treaty of Rome, it is not involved in the matters of ‘foreign and security policy proper’ (Petersen 1993: 9). Yet, the editors of the volume observe that the EC’s actor capability may increase in relation to the importance of economy and diplomacy in international relations (Nørgaard et al. 1993: 207). Eliassen (1998), in an edited volume ‘Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union’, offers a brief remark about the broadening concept of security, noting that ‘the new security concept gains in relevance as the complexity of our modern society grows’ (Eliassen 1998: 2). However, this theme of a broader approach to security is not further elaborated in the analysis of the EU’s international security policy. Instead, the volume is largely limited to analysing the role of EU member states in the CFSP and the importance of military capabilities for the EU to become an important security actor (Spence and Spence 1998).

The volume ‘A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions for the CFSP’, edited by Peterson and Sjursen (1998), constitutes one of the most important early attempts to assess the EU’s role in international relations. Sjursen (1998), in her contribution, analyses the prospects for the EU’s international security role. She observes that in the 1980s, ‘a broader security agenda emerged, which includes concerns about the environment, economic prosperity and human rights’ (Sjursen 1998: 97). However, she does not actually adopt this broader approach to security in her analysis. Instead, she focuses on policies and instruments concerned with more traditional security problems, by looking at the role of the WEU, the EPC, the CFSP, and actors such as the US and NATO. The possible role of the European Commission in areas defined as a ‘broad security agenda’ is not elaborated on.

Contributions by White (2001) and Ginsberg (2001) both apply very specific theoretical frameworks to analysing the EU’s role in foreign and security policy. White adopts the
framework of the Foreign policy analysis (FPA), recognising three types of the EFP: Community foreign policy, Union foreign policy and national foreign policies. This leads the author to distinguishing the ‘external relations’ of the EC on the one hand, and the CFSP of the other hand. The author acknowledges that military capabilities are not essential for EU policy if a broader notion of security is adopted, but he does not elaborate on the consequences of this fact for the EU’s role in foreign and security policy. Whilst White (2001) puts a strong emphasis on the process of the EFP, Ginsberg (2001) focuses on the political impact of the EU in international relations. To this end, he adopts the model of governmental decision-making developed by Easton (1979). Based on a number of case studies, evaluating EFP’s impact on a target actor or an issue, Ginsberg (2001: 274) concludes that ‘the EU is a complex, partially constructed, sui generis and evolving international actor that has political impact – across a range of degrees – on non members’ foreign policy interests and on many issues of international politics’.

H. Smith (2002) in her volume ‘European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does?’ acknowledges that ‘[s]ecurity, for the Union, includes political stability that in turn involves, among other things, reduction of crime, control of the narcotics trade, migration control, environmental protection and the maintenance of liberal democratic systems’ (Smith 2002: 18). However, already in the next paragraph, she explains that security has been a controversial issue for member states, considering this area at the core of their prerogatives, particularly with regards to a military dimension. As a result, the author focuses mainly on military-related aspects of security. With regards to the European Commission, Smith notes that his institution ‘has only a minimal input in security and defence policy’ (Smith 2002: 109). Similarly, in his book ‘Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy’, M.E. Smith (2004) concentrates on the role of the EPC and CFSP in assessing the EU’s role in foreign and security policy. However, he focuses primarily on analysing the process of institutionalisation of the second-pillar EU cooperation. His major conclusion is that increasing cooperation in the EFP cannot be explained solely by the role of the external environment. Instead, M.E. Smith (2004: 246) points to the importance of ‘a constant, increasingly institutionalized debate about foreign policy cooperation’.

The volume ‘Contemporary European Foreign Policy’ edited by Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White (2004) constitutes an important, theoretically-informed contribution to debates on the EFP. In her chapter on security and defence, Sjursen (2004) elaborates on the concept of secu-
rity more extensively than in her previously-discussed contribution (Sjursen 1998). Notably, he acknowledges the existence of a wide range of new issues on the agenda, such as social and economic inequalities, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, international crime, etc. However, Sjursen does not elaborate on the role that the EU plays or can play in addressing these new challenges. Instead, she assesses the validity of the concept of the EU as a ‘civilian power’, concluding that this concept has important limitations, such as the lack of coherence in the CFSP and the EU’s lack of military capabilities.

Among more recent attempts to evaluate the EU’s role in international relations, including international security policy, the volume ‘International Relations and the European Union’ edited by Hill and Smith (2005) is one of the most comprehensive contributions. In this volume, the examination of theories and institutions is followed by the analysis of a number of issue-areas. With regards to the EU’s role in international security, Howorth (2005) discusses the evolution of the CFSP, including the CSDP, and the EU’s ambition to develop its military capabilities. He also looks at the political dimension, examining, for example, the ESS from 2003. He observes that the ESS recognises a wide array of instruments at the EU’s disposal, including military and diplomatic, but also civilian, commercial and development tools. However, these ‘softer’ security capabilities of the EU are not elaborated on by Howorth in the context of the EU as an international security actor.

Cameron (2007) in his volume ‘An introduction to European foreign policy’ attempts to cover different aspects of the EFP. To this end, he discusses the development of the CSDP framework, transatlantic relations, EU neighbourhood, EU policy in various world regions, and different issues on the EU agenda, such as terrorism. This strategy may have allowed Cameron to provide a useful overview of EU foreign policy for those who are not familiar with the topic, but may have equally proved to be too general for those seeking more in-depth knowledge. With regards to the EU’s international security policy, Cameron recognises the role of the European Commission. Nonetheless, he observes that ‘[t]he Commission was not created to be an actor in foreign and security policy’ (Cameron 2007: 54). Thus, he finds the role of the Commission to be very limited in this respect.

One of the latest contributions on the EFP, the volume ‘The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor’ edited by Laursen (2009), focuses primarily on the role of the CFSP as a framework for conducting common EU foreign policy. The editor in his conclusions, not sur-
prisingly, points to the limitations of EU foreign and security policy, inherent in the intergovernmental character of the CFSP. The role of the European Commission, with its numerous financial instruments, is not discussed. In this context, the chapter by Haastrup (2009) on the EU's security policy in Africa could seem to be challenging the framework established by Laursen. Haastrup in his contribution arguably wants to question the ‘traditional understanding of security and actorness that emphasises the military aspect above other possible means of establishing peace and a safe and sustainable environment’ (2009: 285). However, when analysing the actual EU policy in Africa, he concludes that whilst the EU has been active in providing development aid, ‘security was not an area in which there was any formal or informal cooperation’ (2009: 290). Indeed, development aid is not typically labelled or contextualised as a security policy in EU discourse. It may also not serve specific security objectives. For example, officials from Directorate General (DG) Development of the Commission, when interviewed about the EU’s anti-piracy policy off the Somali coast, have underlined that their department does not aim to address the problem of piracy as such. However, the EU’s financial assistance must be considered when comprehensively assessing the EU’s policy in addressing piracy and other forms of organised crime in Somalia and off its coast, because such assistance addresses important root causes of insecurity in this country.

The above analysis allows to raise the following question: if the concept of security has broadened significantly with the end of the Cold War, like many scholars recognise, why is this fact not reflected in the actual analysis of the EU’s role as an international security actor? The scholarship reviewed in this section, when examining the EU’s role in international security policy, limits the analysis to the framework of the CFSP/CSDP, focusing mainly on the conventional, military-related aspects of security. This often leads to conclusions that the EU is an underdeveloped security actor, because its capabilities are still very limited and member states jealously guard their security-policy prerogatives. Whereas that may be true in the area of military-related aspects of security, there is another category of research on the EFP, which emphasises non-military aspects of the EU’s international security policy. This scholarship, to a varying extent, recognises the security role of the European Commission, and of (what used to be) the Community pillar of the EU. This chapter shall now proceed to examine this growing category of the EFP literature, approaching the study of the EU’s role in international security from a broader perspective.

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1.3.2. The EFP literature recognising the EU’s international security policy beyond the CFSP framework

Already in 1997, Piening (1997), in his volume ‘Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs’, recognises the role of the European Commission in the EU’s foreign and security policy. To this end, he points to numerous associations of the EC with international organisations and regimes. The author notes that this experience, whilst not very spectacular, has ‘served to give the institutions, and particularly the Commission, the experience of being an international player’ (Piening 1997: 44). Some elements of a broader approach to international security can also be recognised in an important volume ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’ by Bretherton and Vogler (2006). Firstly, the authors recognise a variety of economic instruments at the EU’s disposal in pursuing its international security policy, such as the conditionality attached to the EU’s development assistance, or, more recently, the RRM established in 2001 (later replaced with the IfS). Secondly, Bretherton and Vogler recognise that the EU’s role in international security is multidimensional. This means that both the nature of security threats and the EU’s international security policy are not purely military in nature. According to those authors, the EU is well equipped to tackle contemporary security challenges in a more comprehensive manner. However, it needs to better coordinate the instruments of the Commission and those within the CFSP framework.

The volume by Marsh and Mackenstein (2005), ‘The International Relations of the European Union’, is the most original with respect to assessing the EU’s role in international security. It is so, because the authors actually analyse the role of the EC as an international security actor during the Cold War period. Interestingly, they do not limit their analysis to the EPC, but look at the overall EC’s role. The authors explain ‘how a fine blend of purposive action, serendipity and changes in the international system help account for EC’s rise as an influential international security actor (...’ (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 1). For example, they identify a number of external factors which allowed the EEC to develop its profile in international security during the Cold War. Some of these factors include the development of the ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) doctrine, which decreased the importance of ‘hard’ military capabilities, and also the process described by Keohane and Nye as complex interdependence, which allowed non-state actors to become more important in international relations. As a result of these changes, according to Marsh and Mackenstein (2005: 15), ‘by the 1980s the EC had become a major player in international security’. There were two dimensions to this in-
creasingly important EEC’s security role. First, by virtue of its existence, the EEC created a zone of peace in Europe. Second, the EEC’s ‘extensive links with Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the western hemisphere, though primarily economic and humanitarian in nature, also performed invaluable security functions in tying developing countries to the West (...)’ (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 21). With regards to the modern world, the authors conclude that the EU has developed as an important foreign and security actor in a variety of contemporary security challenges, including terrorism, rogue and failed states, the promotion of democracy and development.

K. Smith (2008), in her volume ‘European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World’, delineates a number of foreign policy and security themes, such as human rights, conflict prevention and fight against international crime. This allows the author to look at EU policy in a comprehensive manner. Instead of investigating instruments and competences within individual pillars, Smith takes a holistic approach by looking at all the relevant components of the EU’s policy in addressing the aforementioned issues. These components include the CFSP and the CSDP, but also the financial instruments of the European Commission. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) in their book ‘The Foreign Policy of the European Union’, also present the comprehensive approach to investigating the EU’s international security role. This broadened approach is necessary, because ‘if focusing solely on military security is insufficient. Survival becomes equally dependent on fields such as environmental security and health security’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 22). To this end, the authors look at contemporary challenges facing Europe, such as terrorism, environmental degradation, communicable disease and demographic change. Whereas these issues are not properly constituted as ‘foreign policy’ matters yet, according to the authors, ‘in the future, they may well be the foreign policy and security issues splashed all over CNN’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 249). When investigating EU foreign policy ‘beyond CFSP’, the authors recognise long-term and short-term conflict prevention and crisis management EU policies, such as the IFS of the European Commission. They note that the EU’s long-term involvement constitutes ‘a backbone of EU’s structural foreign policy’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 228). However, the authors also note that the EU, so far, has not committed enough resources to reach its ‘structural foreign policy’ goals.

This review allows to conclude that the way in which scholars approach the question of the EU as an international security actor depends mainly on how they understand the concept of
security. However, this is only a part of the picture. As this review has demonstrated, it is not unusual for scholars to explain how the concept of security has broadened and widened, but then still focus the analysis exclusively on EU policies and instruments within the framework of the CFSP and the CSDP, encompassing mainly traditional security instruments. This observation suggests that, when adopting a broader concept of security, it is necessary to actually apply this concept to empirical analysis, by moving the focus beyond the CSDP and traditional security problems. This task, as the review of the literature has demonstrated, can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, when the starting point of the analysis is the institutional structure of the EU, it is possible to discuss security competences beyond the CFSP framework (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). Secondly, the starting point of the investigation may be actual security problems. Then, it is only logical to look at all different kinds of EU instruments, policies and institutions playing a role in addressing these issues (Smith 2008).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has suggested that the role of the EU in international security policy is often misunderstood. The reason for this is that scholars, in their empirical investigation, frequently miss out on EU policies and instruments existing outside the CFSP framework. Surprisingly, this also tends to be the case when the analysis acknowledges the fact that the concept of security has broadened and widened over the last few decades, moving beyond traditional security threats (Gänzle and Sens 2007; Sjursen 1998; 2004). When the longer-term, structural instruments of the European Commission are not included into the analysis, this can lead to conclusions that the EU is less important a security actor than it in fact is (Eliassen, 1998; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004; Matlary 2008). Consequently, in order to obtain a more accurate understanding of the EU’s role in international security, it is necessary to adopt an approach not discriminating the role of instruments and policies available for the EU beyond the CSDP framework. This chapter has also identified an increasing body of scholarly research which adopts such a more holistic approach, contrasting it with a more limited understanding of the EU’s security apparatus.

In this review, three relevant categories of literature in the area of European studies have been examined. In the first part, this chapter has examined literature on the EU as an international security actor. It has been demonstrated that this research tends to concentrate on the EU’s policy conducted within the framework of the CFSP/CSDP or by individual member states.
This limited approach inevitably leads to the exclusion of longer-term, structural EU instruments. It has also been demonstrated that the majority of scholarship concentrates on more traditional security problems, such as regional conflicts. These challenges remain important, but scholarly work on contemporary security studies, for the most part, presents a more holistic approach to security, by also analysing so called 'non-traditional' security issues. This broader approach, with a few exceptions, is rarely incorporated into scholarly research on the EU's international security policy. Instead, scholars tend to mainly focus on more traditional security problems and the role of the CSDP in addressing them.

In the second part, this chapter has reviewed literature on EU policy in the area of human security. The concept of human security identifies individuals as a referent object of security, shifting the focus away from states. The EU is recognised as one of the most important international actors in the area of development and humanitarian aid, having a wide range of instruments at its disposal (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). However, the existing literature, for the most part, concentrates almost exclusively on EU policies within the institutional framework of the CSDP (and CFSP more broadly), largely omitting the role of the European Commission. This limited approach often affects conclusions about the degree to which the EU has developed as an actor in the area of human security. For example, Matlary (2008) argues that there is a discrepancy between the rhetoric of the EU and its actual actions. It may indeed be the case that the EU promises more than it delivers in certain areas. However, when adopting a more comprehensive approach to EU security, the instruments of the European Commission can be fully taken into consideration, which then may lead to different conclusions about the EU's overall performance in human security policy.

Finally, in the third part, this chapter has reviewed literature in the broad category of the EFP/EU as a global actor. This literature dates back to the early 1990s, but there is also a number of assessments of the role of the EEC in the world dating back to the 1970s (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Galtung 1973; Sjöstedt 1977). It has been demonstrated that also this literature tends to approach the question of EU security policy in a limited fashion. The main reason for this is that the scholarship on the EFP often does not engage with the concept of security and how it has broadened and widened in the last few decades. Instead, scholars tend to develop their arguments around the three-pillar structure of the EU under the TEU, by separating the 'EC' economic policy from the foreign and security policy of the
Council. This may be useful for providing a general picture of EU policy-making, but distorts conclusions about the EU as an international security actor.

The third part of this chapter has also demonstrated that there is a growing body of the EFP literature adopting a more comprehensive approach, which allows for a more accurate assessment of the EU’s role in international security. Importantly, these works demonstrate an understanding of the changing nature of the security concept, and the growing importance of preventive, structural efforts in this respect (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Smith 2008). As a result, this body of scholarly research recognises an important role of the EU’s economic instruments for addressing contemporary insecurities. This thesis further develops this comprehensive approach to analysing EU security policy at the international level, by examining a broad spectrum of EU policies and instruments. This holistic approach is of crucial importance for developing a better understanding of the true nature of EU security actorness in international relations. Thus, the following chapter establishes the theoretical framework for this thesis. Most importantly, it explains the concept of international actorness and how it is integrated into this thesis to study the EU as an international security actor. This includes establishing and operationalising criteria of actorness. In addition, the theoretical framework further explains and justifies the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy at the international level. Of particular importance in this respect is to move the analysis of the EU’s international security policy beyond the CSDP framework and beyond traditional security problems, in order to reflect the reality of a broadened and widened international security agenda.
2. The EU as an international security actor: theoretical framework

The purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical framework for this thesis, building on literature reviewed in the previous chapter. The review of the literature, which has established the academic background for this thesis, has examined three overlapping categories of the European studies scholarship: a) literature on the role of the EU in international security; b) literature on the EU and human security; and c) literature on the EFP. Although scholars adopt different approaches to examining the role of the EU as an actor in international security policy, two common limitations have been identified in the majority of the work analysed. First, it has been demonstrated that scholars tend to limit the analysis of EU international security policy almost exclusively to the CFSP/CSDP framework of EU decision-making, neglecting other instruments at the disposal of the EU. This thesis aims to demonstrate that there are important EU assets in the area of security policy at the international level which help to address contemporary security problems in a long-term, structural manner (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). It is important that these instruments, associated mostly with the competence of the European Commission, are incorporated into the analysis, in order to obtain a more accurate image of the EU’s role in international security policy.

Second, it has also been demonstrated that scholars tend to focus on more traditional security problems when analysing EU security actorness. Thus, they rarely discuss issues which were incorporated into the international security agenda more recently, such as climate change, poverty and pandemic diseases. Although there is a rich body of scholarship analysing EU policy in these policy areas (Bretheron and Vogler 2006; Hout 2007; Lacasta et al. 2002; McCormick 2001; Mold 2007; Parker and Karlsson 2010; Wurzel and Connelly 2010), this literature, in principle, does not contribute to a better understanding of the EU as an international security actor. Instead, it provides a valuable contribution to knowledge in each of the respective policy-areas that it investigates (e.g. the EU’s environmental policy). As a result, there is currently a gap between two categories of literature. On the one hand, the scholarship on EU security policy at the international level approaches the question of security in a narrower fashion, limiting the analysis to more traditional security problems. On the other hand, whilst the scholarship on contemporary security studies acknowledges the importance of more traditional security challenges, it also points to the emergence of other problems on the contemporary security agenda. It is important that the role of the EU in tackling these other chal-
lenges is also analysed, when examining the overall performance of the EU’s security policy at the international level.

Consequently, the theoretical framework for this thesis consists of three main components, divided into four sections. The first component of the theoretical framework, established in the first section of this chapter, discusses the nature of the EU as an actor on the international stage. The review of the literature has revealed that there still are controversies regarding the question whether the EU, as a non-state entity, can be considered an actor in international relations. These discussions are not new. Scholars have been trying to understand the role of the EEC on the international stage since the 1970s. This thesis draws on this scholarship in order to provide the conceptual context for defining the main characteristics of EU actorness. Thus, this chapter commences by demonstrating various approaches to studying the EEC as an actor in this early scholarship. It is suggested that, whilst more general IR literature tends to limit the analysis to mainly identifying the EEC as a non-state, supranational actor, there was another body of scholarship emerging at the time, attempting to actually assess the actorness of the EEC, and later the EU. This latter scholarship led to the development of first theoretical frameworks for analysing the EEC as a *sui generis* actor. Two features of these theoretical frameworks are of particular significance. First, they have been conceptualising the EEC, and later the EU, as *sui generis* entities, neither states nor intergovernmental organisations. Second, even frameworks that were developed in the 1970s for studying the EEC as an actor, are still widely utilised (with modifications) by scholars analysing the role of the EU in the 21st century. This chapter demonstrates how the theoretical framework developed in this thesis builds on the rich body of the scholarship on EEC/EU actorness.

The second component of the theoretical framework, established in the second section of this chapter, integrates the comprehensive approach to studying the EU as an international security actor. To this end, it builds on the literature discussed in the first chapter, particularly on contributions identified to adopt a more holistic approach to EU security policy. In addition, the ‘comprehensive approach’ developed in this thesis builds on contemporary security studies literature, which, for the most part, acknowledges that the concept of security has broadened and widened in the last few decades. As a result, the second component of the theoretical framework justifies that a) in order to obtain a more accurate image of the EU’s role in international security, it is important to include both traditional and more recent security challenges into the analysis; and b) it is equally important to analyse EU policies and instruments
beyond the CFSP framework, in particular the financial instruments of the European Commission.

The third component of the theoretical framework, established in the third and fourth section of this chapter, sets up the specific framework for assessing the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor, further building on scholarly work on EEC/EU actorness. More specifically, in the third section, this chapter establishes four criteria of actorness, i.e.: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. These criteria are applied empirically to examine the EU’s performance in all three case studies representing contemporary security challenges, discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. In the fourth section of this chapter, these criteria of actorness are operationalised. The operationalisation allows to draw conclusions about the level to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. To this end, the fourth section justifies when, as a result of meeting certain criteria, the EU can be considered to possess a low, medium or high level of international security actorness.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. As a starting point for this investigation, the first section addresses the more general question of actorness in international relations, traditionally associated with the nation-state. Subsequently, the chapter proceeds to discuss the case of the EEC as a *sui generis* actor, and how it was conceptualised in the early scholarship. It is important to discuss different conceptualisations and methods of assessing the EEC/EU as an actor, because this thesis integrates these theoretical tools in order to develop the framework for assessing the degree to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. However, before establishing the specific criteria of actorness, the second section of this chapter develops a framework for the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy at the international level. More specifically, it explains why the empirical analysis in this thesis moves beyond traditional security threats and beyond the CSDP framework, when assessing EU international security actorness. In the third section, criteria of actorness are defined and justified; these criteria allow to assess the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. Yet, in order to serve this purpose, they have to be operationalised; this task is performed in the fourth section.
2.1. The EU as an international actor? International actorness beyond the nation-state

The question of actorness in international relations is of crucial importance for this thesis, because the way in which it is conceptualised determines whether the EU can be considered an actor. If states were the only units in international relations which can be conceptualised as actors, then a non-state entity, such as the EU, could not be included into this analysis. As a result, the EU could be at best studied as a sum of 27 nation-states attempting to agree on common policies within intergovernmental bodies of the EU, i.e. the European Council and the Council of the European Union (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). In practice, the analysis would almost exclusively focus on examining the policies of the most powerful states of the EU, i.e. Germany, France and the UK (Hyde-Price 2004; Hoffman 2000; Peters 2010; Sherman and Sussex 2004). There are, for example, Realist scholars who argue that ‘despite forces of globalization and the growth of transnational terrorism, politics still takes place within territorial boundaries of the nation state’ (Sherman 2004: 23). On the other hand, if it is considered that states are not the only actors in international relations, then the conceptual challenge arises with regards to analysing the role of the EU, which is neither a state nor an intergovernmental organisation. A significant body of scholarly work has attempted to conceptualise the EEC, and later the EU, as international actors. Yet, before proceeding to the discussion focused on the EU, this section first addresses the broader question of actorness in international relations.

2.1.1. Actorness in international relations

Traditionally, sovereign states have been considered the main or even for some the only actors in international relations. Yet, two dimensions of this state-centrism must be distinguished. On the one hand, from an empirical perspective, sovereign states are a relatively recent phenomenon, with their origins dating back to the 17th century, and particularly to the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648. On the other hand, from a theoretical perspective, states have been at the centre of analysis of the major approach to international relations, namely Realism. This section first outlines the conceptual characteristics of the nation-state as the main actor in international relations. Then, it identifies important challenges to this state-centric view, and how these challenges have been conceptualised by alternative theoretical approaches to international relations, thus challenging the dominant position of Realism in this respect.
Empirically, the Westphalian Treaties concluded the Thirty Years’ War, recognising that the idea of the united Catholic empire was unachievable and that Protestants and Catholics had to coexist (Mansbach and Rafferty 2008). Conceptually, these treaties mark the first, crucial step in the process of establishing modern statehood. The Westphalian system, which established the ‘normative structure or constitution of the modern world order’ (McGrew 2008: 23), gave birth to three interlinked basic elements of states, i.e. territoriality, sovereignty and autonomy. Territoriality refers to the principle that humankind is organised into communities with fixed borders. Sovereignty refers to the principle that ‘within its borders the state or government has an entitlement to supreme, unqualified, and exclusive political and legal authority’ (McGrew 2008: 23). Autonomy refers to the principle of self-determination, granting states the freedom of political, social and economic activities within their borders. For Realists, states are the fundamental units of political analysis; in other words, this theory is based on a state-centric assumption (Dunne and Schmidt 2008).

This dominant state-centric perspective has started to increasingly come under strain after 1945, when a new, more interdependent world has started to emerge. Keohane and Nye (1971) in the 1970s have identified the main characteristics of this world to be transnationalism and complex interdependence, giving rise to the third generation of liberal institutionalism. Lamy (2008) notes that this new interdependent world has four characteristics: a) increasing linkage between state and non-state actors; b) new international political agenda, blurring the distinction between high and low politics; c) new channels of communication between actors; and d) the diminishing role of the military as the tool of states. One of the most important non-state actors to emerge in this context of transnationalism and complex interdependence was the EEC. Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970: 48) were amongst the first scholars to recognise the EEC’s role in world economy: ‘[I]n the long run the United States’ early nurturing of the E.E.C. [European Economic Community] might well be against its national interests. She has already begun to feel the impact of the Community’s economic strength – an impact which is more likely to grow than decrease’.

Furthermore, the world in the 1970s, according to Marsh and Mackenstein (2005), also created allowing conditions for the EEC to enhance its role as a non-state security actor. Firstly, according to those authors, the very system of liberal institutionalism, as defined by Keohane and Nye, that allowed to identify the EEC as an increasingly important economic power, also allowed the EEC to strengthen its influence in international security policy. Secondly, the
development of the MAD doctrine and other technological advancements drastically sidelined
the role of conventional military capabilities in the Cold War rivalry. Thirdly, the emergence
of new economic centres of power and the relative decline of the US, as evidenced by the
Vietnam War and the collapse of the Breton Woods system, have challenged the bi-polar sys-
tem. Fourthly, of particular significance for the conceptualisation of the EEC as a developing
security actor was the strategy of détente, initiated by Kissinger and Nixon at the beginning of
the 1970s. This new strategy was partially based on the recognition that there are some new
important centres of power, most notably China, Western Europe and Japan. All of these de-
velopments allowed the EEC to enhance its position as a non-state actor on the international
stage; this, in turn, attracted scholars to try to understand the nature of EEC actorness. Yet, the
categorisation of the EEC, and later the EU, as actors has proved to be a challenging task.
Nonetheless, as the scholarship in the next section demonstrates, the EU can be considered an
actor and its actorness can be evaluated.

2.1.2. The EEC and the EU as *sui generis* actors

When approaching the question of the EU’s role in international relations, scholars, according
to White (2004), tend to either focus on agency, structure, or they try to combine both ap-
proaches. The ‘EU as an actor’ approach, according to this author, by focusing on agency,
concentrates on the impact of Europe on world politics. Within this category, important at-
tempts have been undertaken to characterise the role of the EU at the international level.
Some of these attempts include conceptualising the EU as: a) a civilian power (Duchène
1972); b) an international identity (Whitman 1998a); c) an international presence (Allen and
Smith 1990); d) even a superpower in the making which soon will have to be contained (Gal-
tung 1973). Although generating a wealthy amount of empirical data, this approach, according
to White, has two limitations: a) it focuses on outcomes rather than on the process of EU for-
eign policy formulation; and b) it is based on the assumption that the EU is a single actor;
this, according to White, ignores the fact that the EU is a complex organisation with multiple
realities. On the other hand, according this author, structure-driven structuralist approaches,
such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, tend to downplay the role of agency at the expense of
the international system. Approaches such as Europeanisation and social constructivism, as
White (2004) notes, attempt to bring agency and structure together into one framework.
Such a defined conceptual map of the scholarship on the EU’s external relations, as demonstrated in this section, is not entirely accurate. Most notably, the two arguable limitations of the ‘EU as an actor’ approach are problematic. The discussion in this section demonstrates that scholars applying the ‘EU as an actor’ framework are far from ignoring the complexity of EU decision-making processes. Through the careful selection of criteria to assess EU actor-ness, scholars often attempt to capture the *sui generis*, complex nature of EU policy-making. Similarly, this thesis, when building on this scholarship, aims to demonstrate just how complex and multi-dimensional an actor the EU is. Furthermore, the ‘EU as an actor’ approach does not *a priori* have to discriminate the processes at the expense of outcomes. This thesis considers the processes an important part of the analysis. As such, the processes of EU security policy-making constitute an important part of the empirical component of this thesis.

The argument in this section unfolds in the following manner. First, it is demonstrated that the IR literature has recognised the EEC as a new actor in international relations already in the 1970s, but in a rather superficial manner. Second, it is demonstrated that a more thorough approach to understanding EEC actor-ness has emerged at the same time, providing significant tools and concepts for assessing the role of the EEC, and subsequently the EU, as an actor at the international level. In the IR literature, the EEC has become recognised as an actor mainly at the beginning of the 1970s. Pryce (1972: 194) notes that ‘*[u]ntil recently, relatively little attention has been paid to the political aspects of the Community’s external relations (...)*’. However, this early literature, for the most part, does not attempt to develop a specific framework to analyse the nature and the role of this new non-state phenomenon (Calvocoressi 1977). Instead, it tends to focus on the non-state and partially supranational character of the EEC. Reynolds (1971), for example, underlines the fact that the EEC, Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were international actors. He notes: ‘*Not merely does their existence, whether action is being taken or not, very much affect the behaviour both of their members and of other states outside, but they do directly engage in international activity*’ (Reynolds 1971: 30). Although important, the contribution of the IR literature is limited by the unprecedented character of the EEC’s nature of actor-ness. Some scholars have attempted to compare the EEC to other regional organisations, such as NATO, within the broader category of interstate governmental organisations (Frankel 1979). Others, for example Young (1972), have developed a category of ‘mixed actors’, in which ‘*several qualitatively*
different types of actor interact in the absence of any settled pattern of dominance-submission’ (Young 1972: 136).

Whilst this IR literature goes as far as recognising the EEC as an actor and attempting to identify some original characteristics of this organisation, another body of literature, focused primarily on EEC actorness, started to emerge in parallel. This latter literature attempted to actually assess the extent to which the EEC started to emerge as an international actor; to this end, scholars began to develop special conceptual tools. Notably, Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) have developed a framework for assessing the degree of actorness of the EEC and the UN. More specifically, they have developed ‘[t]hree mutually interdependent tests, or rather guide lines, for determining an international organisation’s capacity to act on the global scene’ (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970: 12). More recent literature on EU actorness, for the most part, refers to these ‘tests’ as criteria of actorness. According to Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970), the level of actorness of an international unit can be measured by: a) the degree to which central institutions can undertake autonomous decisions; b) the degree to which the organisation has an impact on inter-state relations; and c) the degree to which member (and to some extent non-member) states consider the organisation important when formulating their foreign policies. These three ‘tests’, more or less, correspond to criteria of actorness which are defined in the more recent scholarship as autonomy, impact and coherence respectively. They are discussed in greater detail in the section of this chapter establishing criteria of actorness applied in this thesis.

Sjøtstedt (1977) has been dissatisfied with the methodology proposed by Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970), arguing that those authors ‘at best tried to solve the problem on an ad hoc basis without any ambition of finding a generally valid specified definition of actor’ (Sjøtstedt 1977: 5). As a result, according to Sjøtstedt (1977), theoretical instruments available for determining the degree of the EEC’s actorness were only few and as such, they were crude. This is why the author, in his book ‘The External Role of the European Community’, develops a complex framework for assessing the degree of actorness in international relations. As a starting point, Sjøtstedt (1977) notes that attempting to establish whether the EEC is or is not an actor is an incorrect exercise. Instead, he suggests that ‘the capacity of being an actor is most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent’ (Sjøtstedt 1977: 14). This thesis incorporates this argument by analysing the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor.
Based on this assumption, Sjöstedt has developed threshold conditions and a list of necessary qualities for an entity to qualify as an international actor. According to this author, any unit, in order to be considered at all an actor, must possess autonomy, which is composed of two components: a) the unit must be discernible from its external environment, thus having a minimal degree of separateness; and b) the unit must also have a minimal degree of cohesion. Once these conditions are met, a unit can be considered to have actor capability. In his analysis, the author assumes as a starting point that the EEC meets these basic conditions. Once the EEC can be considered to be autonomous, the next step in Sjöstedt’s framework is to assess the degree of actor capability. To this end, the author has identified a set of structural prerequisites, which in other words are ‘a set of variable properties’ (Sjöstedt 1977: 16). Again, the more recent literature addresses these prerequisites as criteria of actorness. In Sjöstedt’s typology, they are grouped into three categories: a) basic requirements, such as a set of goals; b) decision-making and monitoring facilities; and c) action-performance instruments, allowing an actor to behave externally. This thesis integrates the structural prerequisites identified by Sjöstedt into a set of criteria of actorness, which are discussed in detail in the third section of this chapter.

The structural prerequisites allowing to determine the degree of actor capability, thus focused on agency, represent, according to Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006), only one side of the agency/structure debate. Those authors, in their important contribution ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, argue that, in order to assess the EU’s actorness, it is important to combine the behavioural criteria with the structural approach, which requires to also take into consideration ‘the perceptions and actions of third parties’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 22). According to those authors, these structural components ‘contribute significantly to the shared understandings that frame the policy environment, shaping practices of Member State governments, EU officials and third parties alike’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 22). However, those authors do not explicitly include ‘recognition’ as a criterion to assess EU actorness. With regards to assessing actor capability, Bretherton and Vogler draw on the structural prerequisites developed by Sjöstedt (1977), but they simplify these prerequisites into four criteria: a) a shared commitment to a set of values; b) domestic legitimation of decision processes regarding external policy; c) the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies (including the consistency and coherence of EU external relations); d) the availability of, and capacity to utilise, policy instruments, such as diplomacy, economic tools and military means.
The scholarship on EU international actorness has been widely utilising these criteria, adapting and modifying them, in order to best suit individual case studies. It is important to examine these applications in greater detail, because they provide an important background for the theoretical framework developed in this thesis; this task is undertaken in the next section.

The present section has started with introducing the concept of actorness in international relations. In particular, it has been demonstrated how a state-centric, Realist view has been challenged in the 1970s by novel approaches, such as transnationalism and complex interdependence. These new approaches aimed to capture the fact that actors other than states have been growing in numbers and importance. Identifying the role of the EEC as an emerging actor has been important for scholars in defining this new reality. Some of the conditions enabling the EEC to develop its position as an international actor have also been outlined. After setting this context, the section has proceeded to discussing the early conceptualisations of the EEC as an actor. It has been suggested that, whereas the general IR literature tended to acknowledge the emerging actorness of the EEC, it was literature focusing more specifically on the external role of the EEC which attempted to advance the concept of actorness, through developing theoretical tools to assess it. Based on the core contributions discussed in this section, scholars have began to further develop and apply these theoretical tools (in the form of criteria of actorness) into their own work, by utilising case study research design. The theoretical framework developed in this chapter integrates findings of this growing body of scholarly work, as is demonstrated in the following section.

2.1.3. Applying criteria of actorness to case study research design

The ‘EU as an actor’ approach has grown in popularity over the last few decades. This fact reflects the quantitative (the number of member states) and the qualitative (the number of policies) growth of the EU. In particular, scholars have been adopting this approach to single or multiple case studies, investigating the EU’s role in various policy areas (Beyer 2008; Dryburgh 2008; Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007; Kaunert 2010; Larsen 2002). When developing their theoretical framework, researchers have particularly drawn on two contributions, discussed in the previous section, namely that by Sjötstedt (1977) and that by Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006). This thesis also draws on the conceptualisation of actorness as developed by those authors. However, it modifies their criteria of actorness, in order to take into
account some important contributions by other scholars. These more recent contributions are discussed in this section.

One of the most important recent contributions to understanding and assessing the EU as an international actor has been that by Jupille and Caporaso (1998), who have defined the EU’s role in external relations as follows: ‘The EU can be thought of as an evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays varying degrees of “actorhood” across issues and time’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1998: 214). This understanding, shared in this thesis, explicitly underlines the complexity and multiple realities of EU decision-making. However, how can such a complex entity be assessed? To this end, the authors propose adopting criteria of actorness which are observable, continuously variable, and abstract. For their case study, analysing the role of the EU in environmental politics, the authors incorporate the following criteria for assessing EU actorness: a) international political and legal recognition; b) authority, which refers to the EU’s legal competence to act in a given subject matter; c) autonomy, which refers to distinctiveness, or independence, from other actors, most notably states; d) cohesion, which captures the degree to which member states can reach consensus on common policies.

This particular framework has proved to be popular among scholars researching EU actorness at the international level. For example, Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007) have adopted it to analyse the role of the EU in establishing the International Criminal Court and in negotiations leading to the signature of the Kyoto Protocol. Those authors have adapted the original framework to investigate not only the extent to which the EU is an international actor, but also to explain why EU actorness emerges and in which circumstances it is more likely to occur. To this end, they propose an ‘institutional perspective that not only focuses on formal rules, but also attends to informal practices and routines based on shared social norms and values’ (Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007: 972). Whilst these additional questions are interesting, they go beyond the scope of this thesis. The aim of this thesis is to assess the degree to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. Consequently, this theoretical framework incorporates criteria of actorness as they are defined by Jupille and Caporaso (1998), although with a few modifications. In addition to recognition and authority, the theoretical framework

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4 Whilst legal (de jure) recognition involves recognition in international law or membership in international organisations, political (de facto) recognition concerns an interaction by a third party with the EU, instead of (or in addition to) EU member states.
for this thesis also adds institutions and resources. On the other hand, autonomy and cohesion, instead of being considered separately, are integrated into the aforementioned four criteria. These modifications are discussed at length in the third section of this chapter, which defines criteria for assessing the EU as an actor in international security policy. In this section, it is of primary importance to demonstrate how criteria of actorness established in this thesis relate to the existing scholarship.

In this context, the conceptualisation of EU actorness developed by Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006) has influenced the framework underpinning many contributions that analyse the EU’s role in various policy areas. For example, Larsen (2002), in his article examining the military dimension of EU actorness, adopts social constructivist ontology, arguing that ‘actorness of a particular social unit is not an essentialist category that is given by certain objective material elements. Rather, the grouping achieves its actorness as a result of its members and its surroundings articulating this grouping as an actor in a particular social field’ (Larsen 2002: 287). He also adopts a social constructivist epistemology, incorporating discourse analysis into his methodology. According to Larsen, a social constructivist approach to actorness focuses on two elements: a) whether and how a unit and its members constitute themselves as an actor; and b) whether and how the outside world constitutes this entity as an actor. It can be argued that Larsen has applied a version of constructivism which is closer to poststructuralism, whilst this thesis adopts a more conventional understanding of this approach (Buzan and Hansen 2009). The methodology for this thesis, established in the third chapter, explains that the element of constitution is of critical importance in the social world. Yet, drawing on Wendt (1999), it is also explained that material factors (the internal structure) cannot be neglected when analysing the international actorness of a unit. As a result, the empirical part of this thesis investigates the internal structure of the EU, but also the extent to which it is recognised by other actors in particular policy areas.

However, in his other contribution, analysing the foreign policy of Denmark within the EU context, Larsen (2003) develops a more ‘complete’ actorness framework. Inspired again by Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006), the author identifies five criteria of actorness: a) a conception of itself as an actor; b) a particular framework of meaning within which an action takes place; c) consistent and concrete policies; d) some kind of administrative/diplomatic apparatus; and e) resources and policy instruments. Dryburgh (2008) finds this framework particularly useful for studying the EU’s policy towards Iran. She notes that ‘[w]hile Brether-
ton and Vogler’s criteria are a useful means of evaluating the actorness of the EU at the institutional level, they present difficulties within individual policy areas (...)’ (Dryburgh 2008: 256). As a consequence, Dryburgh applies a simplified version of Larsen’s criteria of actorness to her case-study analysis; her list of criteria includes: a) articulations of actorness; b) consistent and concrete policies; c) a diplomatic/administrative apparatus; d) resources and policy instruments. In addition, Dryburgh also includes third party perceptions of the EU’s actorness as an important criterion in a social constructivist perspective. According to her, “actorness” must be understood as a social construct between the agents involved, based on shared understandings of the EU as an actor, as having a role to play. The agents involved are both external to the EU, and internal – the Member States’ (Dryburgh 2008: 257). Also for this thesis, the recognition of the EU as an actor constitutes an important criterion for assessing the degree of EU actorness at the international level. In order for the EU to be considered an important actor in a particular security policy area, it must be recognised by other actors. The section of this chapter establishing criteria of actorness, together with the following section operationalising these criteria, addresses the question of recognition at greater length.

Whilst Dryburgh (2008) has attempted to make her framework relatively parsimonious, Beyer (2008) has chosen to ‘go one step further and develop a scheme that is even more differentiated than that of Bretherton and Vogler’ (1999; 2006). In order to analyse EU policy in counterterrorism, Beyer (2008) has developed a scheme consisting of the following components: a) ‘structure’, including coherence, one voice and addressability; b) ‘actor’, including participation in global governance and external recognition in international law; and c) ‘effect’, including the existence of strategies, the capacity to act internally and externally, and intended effects. Many of these elements are integrated into the framework developed in this thesis; they are discussed in detail later in this chapter. The ‘one voice: addressability’ criterion is problematic, however. The EU is a complex actor, defined more accurately as a multi-level governance system rather than a unified polity with a single ‘foreign policy’ centre. Even the Lisbon Treaty is not capable of changing this reality, although member states have attempted to bring more unity to the Union’s external relations, by strengthening the post of the HRCFSP, and renaming it to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRUFASP). Furthermore, the question of addressability is also problematic in the case of nation-states. Henry Kissinger once famously asked about the phone number to Europe. Yet, this question can also be applied to nation-states. For instance, who can the EU call if it wants
to speak to the US on the subject of climate change? It could be the President, but it could equally be Congress.

Interestingly, two tendencies can be observed in literature discussed above. The first tendency is to develop a framework with a complex set of criteria. Sjöstedt (1977) presents a distinctive example of such an approach, with his ten structural prerequisites of actor capability. The contributions by Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006) and Beyer (2008) can also be included into this category. The second tendency is to simplify the framework, in order to make it more suitable for case study research design. The examples in this category include: Kaunert (2010), researching the external role of Europol; Larsen (2003), analysing the foreign policy of Denmark; Dryburgh (2008), analysing EU policy towards Iran; Jupille and Caporaso (1998), investigating EU environmental policy; and Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007), examining the EU’s actorness in the establishment of the International Criminal Court and in negotiation leading to the signature of the Kyoto Protocol. This thesis integrates a more simplified framework to analyse the EU’s actorness, thus following the second of the aforementioned tendencies in literature. More specifically, the framework established in this thesis is composed of four criteria of actorness, including authority, institutions, resources and recognition. These criteria are utilised to assess the degree to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. Yet, this does not mean that other criteria, such as coherence and autonomy, are omitted. The way in which they are integrated into the theoretical component of this thesis is discussed in the third section of this chapter.

However, before explaining and justifying criteria of actorness adopted in this thesis to assess the EU’ role in international security policy, it is first important to address the question of the comprehensive approach to assessing this role. Up until now, this chapter has dealt with the idea of actorness as such. Thus, the next section defines the comprehensive nature of research undertaken for this thesis. As the review of the literature conducted in the first chapter has demonstrated, the majority of scholars either do not address the concept of security when studying EU security policy, or adopt a narrow approach. Furthermore, the scholarship discussed in this section, when applying the concept of actorness to researching the EU’s role in international security, does not elaborate on the concept of security either, with the exception of Kaunert (2010), who explicitly subscribes to a broader approach. Consequently, the next section explains the comprehensive approach to studying EU security actorness at the international level, in order to further justify the sampling of case studies, elaborated on in the next
chapter. In the following section, it is also important to justify the analysis of EU security policies and instruments beyond the CSDP framework. This thesis argues that the inclusion (or not) of the wider range of instruments, most notably those of the European Commission, has significant consequences for conclusions about the degree of EU international security actorness (Kirchner 2006; Rieker 2009).

2.2. The EU as an international security actor: a comprehensive approach

This thesis offers a significant original contribution to the literature by developing the comprehensive approach to researching EU security policy at the international level. As the review of the literature has demonstrated, there is a prevailing tendency among scholars to focus on more traditional security problems when analysing EU international security actorness. This narrow approach contributes to a gap with literature on contemporary security studies, which in addition to traditional, military-related challenges, also acknowledges the so-called 'non-traditional' security issues, such as underdevelopment, environmental degradation, climate change and pandemic diseases (Dalby 2009; Dannreuther 2007; Dyer 2000; Homerdixon 2004; Hough 2004; Kay 2006; Lee 2009; McNeill 2003; Terriff et al. 1999; Thomas 2008; McInnes 2008; Smith 2010). There is a rich body of scholarly work on EU policy in areas such as climate change (Lacasta et al. 2002; McCormick 2001; Parker and Karlsson 2010; Wurzel and Connelly 2010) and development (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hout 2007; Mold 2007). However, whilst making a valuable contribution to research in each of these respective policy areas, this literature does not explicitly contribute to the discussions on the EU as an international security actor. In addition to this narrow approach to the concept of security, and partially stemming from this narrow approach, the review of the literature has further demonstrated that the scholarship on EU security policy at the international level also tends to focus almost exclusively on the CFSP/CSDP framework of the EU’s institutional structure. This thesis argues that, in order to assess EU security actorness in a comprehensive manner, it is necessary to take into account EU policies and instruments beyond this intergovernmental framework. The following two sections discuss these two components of the comprehensive approach framework in more detail.

2.2.1. Moving beyond traditional security threats

There is an important theoretical reason for incorporating a more holistic approach to the concept of security when investigating the role of the EU as an international security actor em-
pirically. It concerns the fact that the scholarship on contemporary security studies has evolved over the last few decades in a way that currently it has come to acknowledge problems such as poverty and climate change in the context of their potential consequences to international and human security. In the early decades of the post-World War II era, especially after the development of nuclear capabilities by a few states around the world, the meaning of security was hardly questioned. In fact, 'the political questions about the nature of security were subsumed by strategic or technical questions relating to nuclear weapons' (Fierke 2007: 15). Buzan (1983; 1991) was one of the first scholars to challenge this situation at the beginning of the 1980s, when he introduced five sectors of security (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), in which interstate military conflict was still a primary, but not the only security threat. Ullman (1983) also attempted to broaden the concept of security within the Cold War context. He went as far as arguing that by concentrating mainly on the military aspects of security, the US government ignored other dangers, and therefore undermined the national security of the US.

However, the most rapid expansion of the concept of security came with the end of the Cold War. Mutimer (2007) has distinguished between three ‘broad churches’ of security, which emerged in the 1990s. First, he has identified ‘Critical Security Studies’, initiated in 1994 with a conference on ‘Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies’ in Toronto and a book which followed entitled ‘Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases’ (Krause and Williams 1997). The aim of these initiatives was to open the debate on security, without excluding a priori any theoretical perspective. The agenda was to challenge the traditional concept of security, by identifying referent objects other than the state, and security challenges other than military conflicts. This reconceptualisation of security also required adopting non-positivist epistemologies, which would take into account ideas, norms and values. Second, Mutimer has recognised the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ of security⁵, which established itself in 1993 with a book ‘Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe’ (Waever et al. 1993), and subsequently in 1998 with a book ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’ (Buzan et al. 1997). The Copenhagen School has attempted to define its role within Critical Security Studies, by aiming to create a framework which would be more homogeneous. Thus, it has evolved around two specific conceptual developments:

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⁵ Many of its ‘founders’ were associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute; consequently, McSweeney (1996) is considered to have coined the ‘Copenhagen School’ label.
Buzan's five sectors of security and Waever's concept of securitisation. The sectors of security, as already mentioned, include military, political, economic, societal and environmental security problems. The concept of securitisation, on the other hand, suggests that security is a speech-act. An issue becomes a matter of security by virtue of pronouncing it as such, not necessarily because it involves a real existential threat (Emmers 2007; Waever 1995; Williams 2003). Third, Mutimer has distinguished the so-called 'Welsh School' of security, which has also attempted to develop a coherent, homogeneous approach. This approach draws on post-Marxist social theory with the emancipation (or progressive change) of an individual as the ultimate test of the theory (Alker 2005; Booth 2005; Jones 2005).

These debates demonstrate that security remains a contested concept. Furthermore, Buzan and Hansen (2009), in their comprehensive review of security studies, have recognised even more 'churches' of security. However, although there are no agreements about what the referent object of security should be or what problems should be considered matters of security, there is a prevailing understanding that the analysis must go beyond states and military problems. This understanding provides the theoretical rationale for adopting a broader and wider (comprehensive) approach when empirically researching EU security policy at the international level. This thesis adopts this comprehensive approach by incorporating both traditional and the so-called 'non-traditional' security challenges into the analysis. The case study selection is further discussed in the chapter establishing the methodology.

2.2.2. Moving beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework

The comprehensive approach to studying EU international security policy entails analysing both traditional and the so-called 'non-traditional' security problems, but also assessing EU policies and instruments beyond the CFSP framework. There is an important empirical reason for this. It concerns the fact that the EU has been attempting to conceptualise security broadly in its discourse, but also that there are important security instruments (or instruments with long-term security consequences) at the EU's disposal, which are primarily the competence of the European Commission. EU concerns relating to the non-military dimension of security, and non-military security instruments, are most prominently expressed in the 2003 ESS. In this document, the EU acknowledges the complex nature of the contemporary security

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6 The name, popularised by Smith (2005), refers to the fact that scholars associated with this distinctive approach, most notably Booth and Jones, were located at the Aberystwyth University.
agenda, including the complex interconnectedness of traditional and non-traditional security problems. For instance, the ESS recognises that 'AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies' (European Council 2003: 2). The document also recognises that problems such as hunger and diseases severely undermine economic growth in developing countries, which can, in turn, lead to violent conflicts. Global warming is mentioned in the context of increasing competition for natural resources. This more encompassing approach to security, also adopted in this thesis, is further developed in another EU strategic document.

Notably, the revised version of the ESS, officially called the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy' (the Implementation Report) (European Council 2008), re-shuffles priorities for the EU's security policy. Climate change has been 'elevated' and figures on the list of 'Global Challenges and Key Threats', along with the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, organised crime and energy security. The document explains that climate change 'has taken on a new urgency' (European Council 2008: 5) and that '[n]atural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth' (European Council 2008: 5). In this respect, the document also refers to the report 'Climate change and International Security', prepared jointly by the HRCFSP and the European Commission (High Representative and European Commission 14/03/08). This is how one Council Secretariat official, who used to work closely with former HRCFSP Javier Solana, explains this broader EU approach to international security: 'It is in the DNA of our organisation to define security problems broadly. In the US, for example, there is too much focus on military solutions. What we try to do is to marry military and non-military responses' (CON08 2009). It is largely understood within the EU that military solutions are not always an appropriate response, even when the problem can include potentially 'hard' security consequences.

As a result of these considerations, the comprehensive approach to security adopted in this thesis involves assessing EU institutions and instruments that are traditionally not associated with EU international security policy. As the review of the literature has demonstrated, when assessing the role of the EU as a security actor, scholars tend to focus exclusively on the intergovernmental cooperation of member states within the Council of the European Union. This cooperation is, of course, of crucial importance for developing policies and strategies for the EU's security role in the world. Nonetheless, institutions such as the European Commis-
sion and its instruments, such as the IfS, increasingly constitute an integral part of EU security policy. This trend may be further strengthened by the European External Action Service (EEAS), introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, as the empirical component of this thesis demonstrates, EU development policy has an important security dimension, by addressing the root causes of some of the contemporary security problems. Therefore, this thesis argues that it is important to incorporate the analysis of the role of the European Commission and some of its financial instruments into the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy at the international level.

To summarise, this thesis integrates the comprehensive approach to studying EU security policy, consisting of two elements. First, it includes the analysis of both traditional and the so-called 'non-traditional' security challenges. Case studies are introduced in greater detail in the chapter establishing the methodology for this thesis. Second, it moves beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework when analysing the resources at the disposal of the EU in the area of international security policy. Up until now, this chapter has discussed the concept of actorness in international relations with a particular focus on the EEC and later the EU. It has been argued that the EU can be considered an actor in international relations, albeit a *sui generis* one. Subsequently, this chapter has defined the comprehensive approach to assessing the extent to which the EU has developed as an actor in international security policy. This comprehensive approach constitutes the original contribution of this thesis to the scholarship on EU security actorness. The empirical component of this thesis fully incorporates this comprehensive approach. However, in order to establish the complete framework for analysing EU actorness, it is first necessary to define and operationalise criteria of actorness adopted in this thesis. The remaining two sections of this chapter fulfill this task. Thus, they build on, and contribute to, the literature on the EU as an actor.

2.3. The EU as an international security actor: establishing criteria for assessment

As this chapter has already demonstrated, there is a rich body of scholarly work attempting to conceptualise and assess the role of the EU as an international actor. This section contributes to this literature by proposing a framework composed of four criteria of actorness, including: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. Although these criteria have been widely discussed in the literature, it is necessary to justify how they are integrated into this thesis, in order to allow assessing the extent to which the EU has developed as a security actor at the
international level. The four criteria of actorness adopted in this thesis are thus introduced in greater detail.

First, authority as a criterion is most comprehensively conceptualised by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). Those authors define authority as the EU’s legal competence to act. This thesis adopts this definition, but it further expands authority to also include the de jure (legal) recognition of the EU. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) include de jure recognition as a part of the overall EU recognition. This thesis, on the other hand, considers legal competence to act and legal recognition as two sides of the same coin, identified as legal authority. The legal recognition involves ‘either diplomatic recognition under international law or formal membership in international organizations’ (Jupille and Caporaso: 215). The empirical component of this thesis demonstrates that although the EU is not formally a member of many international organisations, it is nonetheless often legally recognised by them.

Second, institutions as a separate criterion have been elicited from the overall set of EU resources, due to their importance for EU security policy-making at the international level. According to Peterson and Shackleton (2006: 7) ‘[i]f institutions matter, they matter even more in the European Union than in other political systems.’ There are three main reasons for this. First of all, the extent to which EU institutions, through the policies that they create, impact directly on EU member states and citizens, is unmatched by any other organisation. In addition, EU institutions, in contrast to the secretariats of other international organisations, do not merely manage, but also have competences and resources to create policies and provide direction. Finally, EU institutions provide the link between Europe and the wider international relations, particularly with the network of international organisations.

Third, resources as a criterion have been extensively conceptualised by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), drawing on the work of Sjötstedt (1977). The authors have defined resources as policy instruments, which include diplomacy/negotiations, economic tools and military means. Actorness entails that these instruments are actually utilised; as Larsen (2003: 12) notes, ‘[t]o be an actor in a particular area must be the same as having a policy in this field’. Here, it is important to draw a distinction between actorness and the concept of presence (Alien and Smith 1990; Ginsberg 1999). Whereas actorness requires a purposive decision on the part of an entity, presence is a consequence of being. According to Bretherton and Vogler (2006), presence means to shape the perceptions, expectations, and behaviour of others. This thesis primarily
analyses the purposive action of the EU, by looking at appropriate resources such as financial instruments or military capacities. Thus, it adheres to the concept of actorness more than that of presence.

Fourth, recognition as a criterion adds an important constructivist element to this set of behavioural criteria. The inclusion of recognition reflects the constitutive nature of social kinds. This means that the EU is partially constituted by material forces and partially by shared ideas of others (entities and individuals) about its nature (Wendt 1999). Recognition is integrated as one of the criteria to assess EU actorness in environmental policy by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). Those authors have developed a rather minimalist definition of recognition, where ‘whenever a third party interacts with the Union, rather than, or in addition to, going to one or more EU member state(s), the criterion of recognition has been satisfied’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1998: 216). This thesis integrates this definition, but in addition to looking whether a third party interacts with the EU, it also assesses third party perceptions concerning the question whether ‘the EU is/should be an actor in a specific area’ (Dryburgh 2008: 257).

Coherence, autonomy and impact, as criteria of assessing EU actorness, appear frequently in the literature; thus, it requires further justification why they are not included (separately) into the theoretical framework for this thesis. First, although coherence is not identified as a separate criterion, it is addressed in the empirical part of this thesis. At the very least, some degree of coherence is necessary for the EU to have authority in a given policy area. If the criterion of authority is satisfied, this means that member states have delegated authority to EU institutions. Furthermore, the degree of coherence is directly related to the degree of the recognition of the EU as an actor. It is demonstrated in the empirical component of this thesis that when member states do not act coherently in a given policy area (by, for example, utilising other frameworks than the EU to pursue their objectives), this negatively affects EU recognition. On the other hand, when EU member states have similar preferences and act jointly within the EU framework, the EU has achieved a higher level of recognition for its ability to conduct a unified policy. Thus, even though not analysed separately, the coherence of the EU plays an important role in assessing the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor.

Second, autonomy, according to Jupille and Caporaso (1998), implies a degree of distinctiveness (or independence) of the EU from its member states. Assessing independence defined in
this way is a difficult exercise – a fact that the authors recognise, explaining that ‘[p]art of the
difficulty lies in the pervasive intermingling of levels of political authority’ (1998: 218).
Nonetheless, this criterion is also integrated into the theoretical framework developed in this
distinctiveness. An international organization, to be an actor, should have a distinctive insti­t­
tutional apparatus, even if it is grounded in, or intermingles with, domestic political institu­t­
tions’. One of the criteria of actorness adopted in this thesis is institutions. This criterion per­
forms precisely the task of examining the distinctive institutional apparatus of EU security
policy at the international level. It is operationalised in this thesis as one of the basic criteria
required for the EU to have at least a minimum level of actorness.

Third, the actual impact of EU policy is not included as a criterion to assess EU international
security actorness. In other words, this thesis does not attempt to draw conclusions about the
extent to which the EU has been successful in reaching its objectives with regards to a given
policy issue; this requires justification. K. Smith (2008) admits that the impact of the EU is
one element that she does not cover in her comprehensive volume on EFP, because of the
difficulty of undertaking this exercise. She identifies a number of problems with assessing the
impact of EU policy, such as: a) Why should a researcher attribute a success to EU policy
rather than to domestic factors, the role of other international actors or just luck?; and b) Why
should a researcher define EU policy in a certain policy area as a failure, only because others
simply do not want to follow the EU’s agenda?

Dryburgh (2008) identifies other reasons for excluding ‘impact’ from conceptual tools to
measure the international actorness of the EU. These include: a) the goals of states and inter­
national organisations are often fluid and ambiguous, which makes assessing the actual ‘suc­
cess’ a difficult exercise; and b) states often do not reach their foreign policy objectives, but
their ‘actorness’ is not questioned; rather, it is taken as given solely on the basis that they are
states. This is not to suggest that the effectiveness of EU international security policy should
not be evaluated. Such an examination is an important exercise in order to, for example, learn
about the effectiveness of particular policy instruments. However, it is suggested that the ob­
servable impact of EU international security policy does not determine whether the EU is an
actor.
This section has established four criteria against which the actorness of the EU in international security policy is assessed in this thesis. These include: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. This mixture of behavioural and constructivist criteria provides the structure for the empirical component of this thesis and allows to assess the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor. Furthermore, this section has also explained how coherence and autonomy are integrated into the four main criteria constituting the framework for assessing EU actorness in this thesis. The following, final section, operationalises these criteria. More specifically, it explains and justifies how conclusions are drawn in this thesis, based on the EU meeting, or not meeting, criteria of actorness, when undertaking security policy at the international level.

2.4. Operationalising criteria of actorness

The purpose of this section is to operationalise criteria of actorness integrated into the theoretical framework for this thesis. These criteria include: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. Each of the empirical chapters of this thesis follows a similar structure, consisting of examining EU international security with regards to: a) the extent to which the EU has authority to act, including international legal recognition; b) the nature of institutional arrangements in each policy area; c) the availability of appropriate resources; and d) the extent to which the EU is recognised by other actors in each policy field. Furthermore, the empirical component of this thesis integrates the comprehensive approach to security, also discussed in this chapter. In this final section, it is necessary to explain how conclusions about EU international security actorness will be drawn on the basis of the four criteria of actorness identified in this chapter.

The scholarship on the EU as an actor tends to underline that criteria of actorness are interlinked. Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970: 12) note that their three tests (remotely corresponding to the criteria of autonomy, impact and coherence), ‘are not clear cut and have a close functional relationship with each other: which comes first or is of primary significance is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge’. Jupille and Caporaso (1998: 220), when commenting on their criteria of actorness, observe that ‘these indicators form a coherent ensemble, depending one on another for full meaning’. Similarly, Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007) underline the interconnectedness of the criteria that they have adopted in their research (drawing on the framework of Jupille and Caporaso (1998). This thesis acknowledges that it is impossible to draw
strict lines between different criteria of actorness. For example, the EU may be recognised for a certain policy in a given policy area, but not for another policy in the same area. Equally, it may have resources to tackle one dimension of an international security challenge, but lack resources to approach the same issue more comprehensively.

However, at the same time, it is important to establish the framework for assessing the extent to which the EU can be considered an international security actor. The need for such a framework is obvious when analysing the conclusions that Sjötstedt (1977) reaches with regards to the EEC’s international actorness, based on his complex system of structural prerequisites. The author concludes: ‘Some indicators of an international actor have been clearly manifested, whereas others no doubt are but rare phenomena. It is therefore not easy to explain what kind of an actor the EC is’ (Sjötstedt 1977: 112). Furthermore, the author explains that criteria of actorness do not, in themselves, automatically reveal the true significance of their presence, except for the situation when all of them are fully met. In such a scenario, the EEC could be considered a fully fledged international actor. Consequently, Sjötstedt (1977: 112) notes: ‘The difficulties of evaluation arise when the structural requirements are only partly met and when the EC performs actor behaviour irregularly and only under certain conditions. And this is, unfortunately, the situation confronting the researcher at the present time’. The circumstances for a researcher studying EU actorness more than 20 years later have not changed significantly; the EU remains an entity which displays its actorness in an irregular manner.

For this reason, it is important to reflect on the consequences of a situation where the EU meets one criterion, but does not meet the others, in a given policy area. For example, what if the EU has some resources and conducts a security policy in a given policy area, but is not recognised as an important actor for its efforts? The development of international security actorness by the EU is a relatively recent process; thus, other actors may not recognise EU actions, even if these actions constitute a significant contribution to solving a given international security problem. Consequently, considering criteria of actorness adopted in this thesis, three possible scenarios are now outlined. These scenarios envisage three possible levels of EU security actorness at the international level.

The first scenario concerns a situation where the EU only satisfies the criteria of authority and institutions. This means that the EU does not have resources to conduct policy in a given pol-
icy field and, as a result, is not recognised as an actor. In such a situation, the EU is considered to have acquired a low level of actorness in a given policy issue. In this scenario, the EU has a legal competence to act and possibly is also legally (de jure) recognised. Within the context of the Council of the European Union, this can mean that member states have adopted a joint action or a common position. The legal authority provides enabling conditions for the EU to make use of its resources. This also concerns the instruments of the Commission. The so-called ‘system of comitology’ requires that there is a consensus with member states on the use of financial instruments by the Commission. Furthermore, in order for the EU to have at least a minimum level of actorness, it needs to have institutions appropriate for conducting a policy in a given policy area. If the criteria of authority and institutions are not met, the EU cannot utilise its resources and, as a result, is not recognised as an actor. In other words, these two criteria of actorness provide enabling conditions for the EU to develop a higher level of international actorness.

The second scenario concerns a situation where the EU meets the criteria of authority, institutions and resources. In this scenario, the EU is considered to have acquired a medium level of actorness in a given policy area. This means that the EU has met the initial enabling conditions and, in addition, has utilised the resources at its disposal. Yet, for some reason, it is not recognised as an important actor in this policy area. Of course, different resources are appropriate for different policy areas. For example, climate change may have ‘hard’ security consequences in some regions of the world (conflict over resources, etc.), but does not require military instruments to mitigate and prevent it. In principle, resources that the EU can utilise in international security policy range from economic (e.g. short-to-long-term financial instruments, sanctions) and political to the limited military resources, deployed within the framework of the CSDP.

The third scenario refers to a situation where the EU meets all four criteria of actorness: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. In this situation, the EU is considered to have acquired a high level of actorness in a given policy area. This thesis argues that recognition plays an important role in international relations. Wendt (1998: 113) notes that ‘there are theoretical reasons to doubt that social kinds can always be reduced to their internal structures’. For example, a social kind known as a ‘rogue state’ is only partially ‘made of’ rejection of international norms, i.e. of its internal structure (agency). Partially, ‘rogue states’ are also constituted by their relations to other states and how they are represented by the interna-
tional community (particularly the Great Powers). This leads to a situation in which certain states breach the norms of the international community and are constituted as rogue, while others that also breach norms may not be constituted as such (in this context, Wendt gives the example of Israel). Thus, both an internal structure (agency) and an external structure are important when assessing the level of EU international security actorness.

The following figure summarises all three scenarios for assessing the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Three levels of EU actorness</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low level of actorness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium level of actorness</td>
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<tr>
<td>High level of actorness</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This final section has operationalised the criteria established to assess the degree to which the EU has developed as an actor in international security policy. As a result, it is suggested that three scenarios are possible, in which the EU can be considered to have a low, medium or high level of actorness. It has been acknowledged that it is an inherently difficult exercise, when analysing such a complex entity as the EU, to draw clear-cut boundaries between different criteria. It is also acknowledged that the levels of actorness may in some cases be blurred. This may particularly be the case in a situation where the EU only partially meets a certain criterion. On the other hand, integrating the three scenarios of actorness into the theoretical framework of this thesis helps to address, if only partially, the concerns raised by Sjöstedt (1977), who pointed to the difficulty of drawing conclusions about EU actorness on the basis of his system of structural prerequisites.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has established the theoretical framework for this thesis. To this end, it has addressed the two key concepts underpinning the main research question, i.e. the concept of the EU as an international security actor, and the idea of the comprehensive approach to analysing this actorness. The question of EU actorness at the international level has first been located within the context of the broader question of actorness in international relations. Subse-
quently, the chapter has elaborated on the concept of actorness adopted in this thesis for the purpose of studying the EU’s role in international security policy. Having established that there are no *a priori* difficulties in conceptualising the EU as an actor in international relations, the chapter has then discussed how to approach EU security actorness in a comprehensive manner. The review of the literature conducted in the first chapter has indicated some limitations in the scholarship on EU security policy at the international level. Thus, explaining and justifying the comprehensive approach adopted in the empirical component of this thesis constitutes an important building block of this theoretical framework. In particular, it has been explained that the comprehensive approach consists of two parts, i.e.: a) moving beyond traditional security threats, to also include the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges; and b) moving beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework, to also include the instruments and policies of the European Commission.

Having elaborated on the two key concepts of this thesis, i.e. the EU as an actor and the comprehensive approach to investigating EU actorness in international security policy, this chapter has established a set of criteria which allow to assess the extent to which the EU has developed as a security policy actor at the international level; these criteria include: authority, institutions, resources and recognition. It has also been explained that other criteria which scholars utilise to assess the level of EU actorness, i.e. coherence and autonomy, have been integrated into the four criteria selected for this thesis. These four criteria provide the structure for analysis in each of the three case studies. However, in order to draw conclusions about the level of EU actorness, it has been necessary to operationalise these criteria. As a result, three possible scenarios have been outlined, where the EU can be considered to have acquired a low, medium or high level of actorness in a given policy issue. The following chapter establishes the methodology for this thesis, discussing matters of a more philosophical nature, such as ontology and epistemology, as well as more practical aspects of conducting research for this thesis, such as case study research design, the methods for obtaining data and ethical considerations.
3. The methodology

Up until now, this thesis has established the academic background, by reviewing literature on the EU as an international security actor. It has been demonstrated that scholars often adopt a narrow approach to security, by focusing only on one framework of the EU’s international security policy (the CFSP/CSDP), not acknowledging the policies and instruments of other frameworks and institutions, most notably the European Commission. Such a limited approach leads to conclusions that the EU is less of an international security actor, than it in fact may be, if a more holistic approach is adopted. Thus, the first original contribution of this thesis is that it moves beyond the framework of the CFSP/CSDP, in order to include a broader spectrum of institutions and instruments into the analysis. This thesis has also established the theoretical framework. In particular, it has demonstrated how the concept of international actorness, traditionally associated with states, is adapted to studying the EU as a sui generis, non-state actor. It has also demonstrated how the concept of security has evolved over the last few decades, and how this fact contributes to the comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s international security role adopted in this thesis. This broader approach to studying the EU as an international security actor, more in line with scholarly research on contemporary security studies, offers another original contribution of this thesis.

However, before proceeding to the empirical investigation, it is important to explain and justify the methodology adopted in this thesis. This chapter first addresses methodological issues which are more philosophical and abstract in nature, most notably the questions of ontology and epistemology. Then, building on these considerations, this chapter explains more practical aspects of conducting research for this thesis. More specifically, the structure of this chapter is as follows. In the first section, this chapter explains ontological and epistemological approaches adopted in this thesis. Ontology and epistemology constitute the two most basic categories in social science research, because they ‘shape the approach to theory and the methods which the social scientist utilises’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 17). In the second section, this chapter explains case study research design adopted in this thesis. It also introduces in more detail case studies investigated in chapters 4-6, constituting the empirical component of this thesis. In the third section, this chapter explains the methods of obtaining data for this thesis, which include primary sources, secondary sources and elite interviews. Finally, in the fourth section, this chapter addresses axiological and ethical questions for this thesis.
3.1. **Ontology and epistemology**

The aim of this section is to establish ontological and epistemological approaches for this thesis. According to Marsh and Furlong (2002: 17), ‘*all students of political science should recognise and acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions*’. The reason, according to those authors, why these positions are often implicit rather than explicit in research, is that the questions of ontology and epistemology may seem difficult to understand. This section draws on the work of Marsh and Furlong (2002) and Wendt (1999) in order to justify ontological and epistemological positions adopted in this thesis.

3.1.1. **How the choice of ontology affects the choice of epistemology**

The question of ontology precedes the question of epistemology. This means that in order to elaborate on the choice of epistemology, it is first important to address ontological considerations. Ontology concerns the question ‘*whether there is a “real” world “out there” that is independent of our knowledge of it*’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 18). The positive answer to this question means that a researcher assumes a foundationalist ontological position. This position reflects natural sciences in a sense that it is based on the assumption that social phenomena exist externally, ‘*beyond our reach or influence*’ (Bryman 2001: 17). In such an approach, a state or an international organisation is external to us, just like a stone or a mountain. It is their internal structure or dynamics which primarily make these kinds what they are. On the other hand, if a researcher believes that social reality does not exist independently of our knowledge of it, he or she assumes an anti-foundationalist position.

Adopting one or another ontological position has important consequences for the choice of epistemology, which addresses the question ‘*what we can know about the world and how we can know it*’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19). More specifically, there are two questions related to an epistemological position, i.e.: a) Is it possible to identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena?; and b) If so, how is it possible? (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19).

The answer to the first question depends on the researcher’s ontological position. A researcher adopting an anti-foundationalist stance is sceptical about the existence of an independent world ‘out there’. A researcher assuming such a position, called hermeneutic (to interpret), argues that any attempt to understand the social world objectively is fruitless, because a researcher is also a part of this socially constructed world. Thus, he or she is affected by how
the world is constructed. The best a researcher can hope for in this case is to understand the meaning of behaviour; the establishment of causal relations and therefore explaining the phenomena is not achievable. On the other hand, a foundationalist ontological position potentially may lead to a scientific epistemological approach. The scientific approach allows to explain social phenomena and to establish causal relationships and laws; it is grounded in a rigorous, scientific research, based on a direct observation. This distinction between understanding and explaining constitutes the most common classification of epistemological categories, thoroughly explained by Hollis and Smith (1990).

However, these two positions leave no epistemological solution for a researcher who believes that casual relations in the world can be explained, but who also believes that many structures are unobservable. This thesis adheres to such a standpoint, by adopting social constructivism as an ontological position (Adler 2003; Katzenstein 1996). Wendt (1995) recognises three elements of social structures. Firstly, they are partially defined by a shared understanding, expectations and knowledge. For example, a security community is ‘composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war’ (Wendt 1995: 73). The EU is the most prominent example of a structure of mutual trust. Secondly, material structures exist, but they ‘only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded’ (Wendt 1995: 73). Thirdly, social structures exist in practices and processes. This means that as long as main actors constituting the EU as an international actor behave as if the EU is such an actor (EU member states, institutions, NGOs, academics, other state- and non-state actors), the EU will remain an international actor.

In order to accommodate an ontological position such as social constructivism, Marsh and Furlong (2002) suggest a broader conceptualisation of epistemological choices, including a positivist, an interpretist, and also a realist position. In the narrower distinction discussed above (positivist versus interpretist epistemology), if a researcher agrees that it is possible to identify ‘real’ and ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena, then such a researcher naturally adopts a scientific epistemological position. This is why Marsh and Furlong (2002) indicate the importance of asking the additional question with regards to the choice of epistemology, i.e. how is it possible to identify these ‘real’ and ‘objective’ relations? Two answers are possible. Firstly, a researcher may assume that social and natural worlds are largely similar; this represents a positivist position, already discussed. Such a stance assumes that regular
relationships between social phenomena can be established and that theories may be tested by a direct observation. A direct observation, in this case, is a neutral, independent test of the validity of a theory (Marsh and Furlong 2002). However, there is a possibility for another answer to the above question. A researcher may believe that ‘there are deep structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 20). In terms of epistemology, this approach represents a scientific realist position, which is adopted in this thesis. The following section explains this approach in more detail in the context of studying the EU as an international actor.

3.1.2. Scientific realism and studying the EU as an international actor

Wendt (1999: 47) defines scientific realism as ‘a philosophy of science which assumes that the world exists independently of human beings, that mature scientific theories typically refer to this world, and that they do so even when the objects of science are unobservable’. He refers to scientific realism as a ‘via media’ approach, which is located between positivism and interpretism, to which he refers as post-positivism. The major objection towards scientific realism, as Wendt (1999), notes, is the fact that it deals with unobservable social constructs, which do not exist independently of human beings. These social constructs fundamentally differ from natural kinds. Some of the differences were identified by Bhaskar (1975) and are discussed by Wendt (1999). They include the fact that social kinds are more dependent on space and time than natural kinds are (e.g. the Industrial Revolution, globalisation), and also that the existence of social kinds depends on those who believe they exist. For example, ‘if people stop behaving as if there are witches (even if they still privately believe in them), then there are no witches. Social kinds are a function of believe and action’ (Wendt 1999: 71).

Another important distinction between a natural and a social kind is that the latter has an internal and external structure. This means that social kinds are constituted by social relations, unlike natural kinds, which exist purely by their internal structure.

Taking into account all these differences, how is it then possible to combine social constructivist ontology with scientific realist epistemology, which claims that it is possible to identify ‘real’ and ‘objective’ relations among social kinds? Wendt (1999) has a few propositions in this regard. Firstly, he points to the fact that social concepts are constituted by material forces. For example, the state is constituted by human beings who are thoroughly natural kinds and
can be easily identified and recognised. If human beings did not exist, there would be no state. Similarly, the EU is a social kind, but it also has natural, material forces constituting it, such as human beings living in EU member states, including those working in EU institutions. The international security actoriness of the EU is also a social construct, with – again – identifiable material forces constituting it. Each case study examined in this thesis identifies a number of such material forces which together contribute to the constitution of the EU as an international security actor.

Secondly, Wendt (1999) refers to the role of self-organisation in the process of the constitution of social kinds. He notes that ‘[n]atural kinds are entirely self-organizing, in the sense that they are what they are in virtue solely of their internal structure’ (1999: 73). It would be difficult to deny the existence of a natural kind, precisely because of its self-organising structure, which makes, for example, a dog a dog. Wendt (1999) argues that social kinds, to a varying degree, share this characteristic with natural kinds. He illustrates this point with an empirical and juridical sovereignty of the state. If a group of people controls and administers a certain territory and claims that they constitute a state, at some point this state becomes recognised by others. The fact that this state is a social construct does not change the reality that it will militarily resist those who question its existence and invade its territory. In other words, ‘[t]he fact that a state is constituted by shared ideas does not make this resistance any less objective or real than the more strictly speaking material resistance of natural kinds’ (Wendt 1999: 73).

The self-organisation of social kinds does not change the fact that they still need to be constituted by an external structure. For example, states need to be recognised by other states, and some need to rely on this external recognition more (Luxemburg) than the others (USA). The same holds true for the EU as an international security actor. The previous chapter has indicated that states have traditionally been the only recognised international actors and they still enjoy a privileged position vis-à-vis international organisations. It is therefore important for the EU, in order to have a high level of international security actoriness, to be recognised by other actors as such. This does not change the fact that resources that the EU has at its disposal to address international security challenges (i.e. EU internal structure) play a crucial role in constituting the EU as an international security actor. However, the recognition of the EU (i.e. external structure) by others helps to take this actoriness to a higher level. Similarly, ‘what
makes, say, Germany "Germany" is primarily the agency and discourse of those who call themselves Germans, not the agency or the discourse of outsiders" (Wendt 1999: 74).

Thirdly, Wendt (1999) notes that even though social kinds are dependent on the discourse and ideas of a collectivity constituting them, they are independent from an individual who studies them. This means that '[t]he international system confronts the IR theorist as an objective social fact that is independent of his or her beliefs, and resists an arbitrary interpretation of it' (Wendt 1999: 75). In other words, '[i]ndividuals do not constitute social kinds, collectivities do, and as such social kinds confront the individual as objective social facts' (Wendt 1999: 75).

The goal of this section has been to define ontological and epistemological positions adopted in this thesis. Ontologically, this thesis adheres to a social constructivist approach. Social constructivism, contrary to interpretist approaches, does not deny the 'real' existence of social kinds, even though they are ideational in character. Epistemologically, this thesis adheres to a scientific realist approach, which rejects the idea that the behaviour of social kinds cannot be explained and that all we can achieve is to try to understand the discourses of individuals about these social kinds. Based on research by Wendt (1999), three arguments have been introduced, which justify the possibility of studying causal relationships between social kinds. Following these considerations of a philosophical nature, this chapter now proceeds to discuss case study research design adopted in this thesis. The next section also justifies the sampling strategy for case studies constituting the empirical component of this thesis.

3.2. Case study research design

The aim of this section is to discuss research design for this thesis, which has the form of three in-depth case studies. According to De Vaus (2001: 9), 'the function of research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible'. The author compares the process of developing research design for a research project to that of constructing a building, where materials are being ordered only after it is clear what kind of building is being constructed. The argument of this section consists of two parts. In the first part, this section explains case study research design adopted in this thesis. It also points to some of the limitations of such a design, explaining how this thesis addresses these limitations. In the second part, this section discusses the methodology of selecting three case studies for this thesis. These case studies were sampled such as to allow assess-
ing the EU’s international security actorness in the variety of contemporary security challenges. These challenges range from the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security problems, requiring no military intervention, to more traditional security threats, where a mixed (military and non-military) response is appropriate.

3.2.1. The value of case study research design

Case study constitutes one of the most popular research designs in politics and international relations, including security studies (Bennett and Elman 2007). Although, in principle, it can generate both qualitative and quantitative data, it is mostly associated with qualitative methods. Burnham et al. (2004) identify a number of characteristics of case study research design, which make it a powerful instrument in the methodological toolbox of a researcher. Firstly, ‘in order to have a wider impact than that of merely being a detailed account of a unique case, a strong theoretical dimension is often incorporated into case study research design’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 54). The sampling process of case studies constituting the empirical part of this thesis has had a strong theoretical underpinning. Most importantly, case studies selected for assessing the role of the EU as an international security actor represent different kinds of contemporary security challenges. This means that, in addition to examining more traditional security problems, it is also important to analyse the challenges which were to some degree securitised only recently. In this thesis, the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges are represented by climate change. Secondly, ‘[e]ven in descriptive case studies there must be a focus for the research so that it does not become a haphazard collection of material about the selected case study’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 54). Delineating the scope of the analysis was particularly important for this thesis, considering that selected case studies can easily generate enough data for separate doctoral dissertations. In order to provide the focus for research, the theoretical component of this thesis has defined a set of criteria for analysing the EU’s role as an international security actor. The empirical part of this thesis is structured around these criteria. Such a design allows to collect specific information about each case study without the risk of losing the focus. Thirdly, ‘[c]arefully selected multiple cases will provide a much more robust test of a theory and can specify the conditions under which hypotheses and theories may or may not hold’ (Burnham et al. 2004: 55). This thesis examines three carefully sampled case studies. They are discussed in greater detail in the second part of this section.
Although case studies can constitute a powerful research design, there are also certain risks associated with this research structure. Most notably, 'it is often difficult (indeed, dangerous) to generalize from a specific case' (Gray 2004: 248). Bryman (2001: 50) notes that '[i]t is important to appreciate that case study researchers do not delude themselves that it is possible to identify typical cases that can be used to represent a certain class of objects (...).'

These cautionary remarks are taken into account when drawing general conclusions on the basis of case studies selected for this thesis. On the other hand, the sampling strategy aimed to identify case studies representing different categories of contemporary security problems, in order to allow for a more accurate assessment of the EU as an international security actor. The following part of this section discusses the sampling strategy in more detail.

3.2.2. From non-traditional to traditional security: case studies for this thesis

This thesis assesses the extent to which the EU has developed as an actor in international security policy. This assessment is based on the original approach, analysing the question of the EU's international actoriness in a comprehensive manner. The theoretical component of this thesis has explained that there are two aspects of this comprehensive approach. One relates to the importance of moving beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework when examining EU instruments and policies in the area of international security policy. The other aspect concerns the fact that the concept of security has broadened and widened to include both traditional and the so-called 'non-traditional' security challenges. In this context, it has been explained that in order to assess the EU's security actoriness more accurately, it is important to take account of developments in literature on contemporary security studies. As a result, the empirical component of this thesis contains three different contemporary security challenges, requiring different kinds of response. The figure below indicates the diverse character of case studies for this thesis.

Figure 2: The diversity of case studies sampled for this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'non-traditional' security problems</th>
<th>'traditional' security problems</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate security</td>
<td>Proliferation of WMDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime piracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73
In this thesis, climate change represents a 'non-traditional' security challenge. As a scientific phenomenon it was, for the first time, discussed by a Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius in 1896. Almost 100 years later, in 1988, the international community appreciated the severity of the potential consequences of climate change, by establishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This led to climate change becoming one of the top issues on contemporary political agenda. However, it was only a few years ago that practitioners and academics began speculating on the security consequences of climate change (Dalby 2009; Floyd 2008; Hough 2004; Trombetta 2009). This discussion was significantly stipulated by a few highly-influential scientific reports on climate change and its consequences for international security and stability (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007; WBGU 2007). The non-traditional character of climate change as a security risk stems from the fact that even though it may have 'hard' security consequences (i.e. conflicts over scarce resources, massive migration leading to clashes between populations), there is no 'hard' security response to it. Assuming that human beings contribute to climate change, the only solution to this problem lies in international cooperation (e.g. the reduction of green-house gasses (GHG)) and scientific progress.

The proliferation of WMDs may potentially represent the greatest, existential danger to humanity. This was particularly the case during the Cold War, with the culminating moment of the Cuban Missile Crises. In the post Cold-War period, and particularly after the 9/11 attacks, one of the main concerns is the danger of an unauthorised access to CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) materials. Terrorist organisations acquiring such materials would represent a significant threat to states and societies. However, as in the case of climate change, there is no effective 'hard' security response to this potential threat. The only appropriate action requires international cooperation within various international institutions and regimes, such as the G8 Global Partnership and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in order to safeguard the existing stockpiles of WMDs and systematically reduce their numbers. This thesis focuses primarily on the territories of the former Soviet Union, most notably Russia, possessing the largest stockpile of WMDs, including chemical weapons. Undertaking this task is important, because there have not been many comprehensive assessments analysing EU's activities aiming to prevent the proliferation from Russia. Denza (2005: 293) notes that 'the international effort and the European Union's contribution to that particular exercise in containment deserves greater acknowledgement than it has received'.
Finally, maritime piracy off the Somali coast is considered the most ‘traditional’ and also the ‘hardest’ security challenge in the typology developed in this thesis. In fact, it is one of the oldest international security problems, particularly in Southeast Asia, where ‘pirate traditions go back virtually uninterrupted to the fifth century’ (Murphy 2009: 72). Maritime piracy has also been widely popularised by Hollywood movie productions, yet its contemporary version has little to do with popular images. This is particularly the case with maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, where piratical gangs are best described as organised criminals, hijacking vessels and crews for ransom and contributing to organised crime in Somalia. This has a further spill over effect on international efforts to restore Somalia as a functioning state. Compared to the other two case studies, maritime piracy is also considered the most ‘traditional’ security problem, because an effective response requires the use of military capabilities as part of the comprehensive approach. The piracy off the coast of Somalia constitutes an example of a challenge which must be tackled through a variety of means, including a short-term, military action.

This section has discussed case study research design and the methodology behind selecting case studies for this thesis. It has been suggested that, whilst it is always risky to draw far-reaching conclusions from research based on case study design, there are important ways to strengthen such a design, so it can provide a more solid structure for conducting research. In this context, is has been indicated that it is necessary to incorporate a theoretical dimension to the process of sampling case studies; this section has demonstrated the application of this principle with regards three case studies which have been selected for this thesis. Following considerations about case study research design, this section has explained the strategy for selecting case studies for this thesis. In order to analyse the EU’s international security actor-ness in a comprehensive manner, it has been important to select cases reflecting the diversity of contemporary security challenges. The following section explains methods utilised to collect data for this thesis.

3.3. Methods of obtaining data

The methods selected to collect data for this thesis consist of three main elements: documentary analysis, secondary source analysis and elite interviews. Such a triangulation allows for a more accurate understanding of the processes examined in this thesis. These methods are qualitative. Qualitative methods represent a traditional approach to research in social sciences
and have their origins in sociology and anthropology (Devine 2002). Participant observation is one of the most established qualitative methods, but political scientists, including scholars of international relations, prefer what Devine (2002) defines as intensive interviewing. In this thesis, this method is referred to as elite interviews. The purpose of conducting research interviews for this thesis is to advance an understanding of the EU’s role in international security. To this end, the most appropriate form of interviews are these with open-ended questions, where an interviewee can ‘elaborate on their values and attitudes and account for their actions’ (Devine 2002: 198), rather than fixed surveys, belonging to the quantitative methodological spectrum. Qualitative methods are ‘most appropriately employed where the goal of research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences’ (Devine 2002: 1999). Qualitative methods are usually utilised with a small number of case studies, because they allow for an in-depth analysis of each case. Qualitative methods are also associated with scientific realist epistemology, which is adopted in this thesis. What follows is a more detailed overview of the three main methods of obtaining data for this thesis, i.e. documentary analysis, secondary sources and elite interviews.

With regard to documentary analysis, Burnham et al. (2004) suggest the following classification: a) primary sources – consist of evidence which was part of an analysed event and which was intended for a limited audience; b) secondary sources – consist of material which was made publically available at the time of the event or soon afterwards; and c) tertiary sources – consist of all publically available work, aimed at reconstructing the event. Following this classification, the majority of documents utilised for this thesis consists of secondary sources. Most importantly, they include documents of the Council of the European Union (e.g. joint actions, common positions), the Council General Secretariat (e.g. reports), the European Commission (e.g. communications) and the European Parliament (e.g. reports). All of these documents are publically available on EU websites. Documentary analysis for this thesis also included a number of primary resources, which are not available for public access. They were obtained following research interviews. Finally, this thesis also made the use of tertiary documentary sources, such as the reports of the UK’s House of Lords.

In order to obtain a thorough background and prepare for documentary analysis, appropriate academic resources were consulted. These resources are referred to in this thesis as secondary sources. Analysing secondary sources was particularly important at two stages of writing this thesis. Firstly, it constituted a crucial part of conducting the review of the literature and of
developing the theoretical framework for this thesis. At this stage, of particular importance was scholarly work concerned with the role of the EU in international security and literature on contemporary security studies. Secondly, the secondary source analysis was important for obtaining background knowledge regarding case studies selected for this thesis. In this regard, academic sources were consulted discussing the relationship between climate change and international security, maritime piracy and the non-proliferation of WMDs.

Finally, elite interviews constituted a crucial method of obtaining original data for this thesis. The purpose of conducting research interviews was to corroborate and expand knowledge gained from documentary and secondary sources. External funding (£2.450), in the form of the Scholarship of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies, was secured for conducting two rounds of interviews in Brussels. The first round of interviews took place between 29 March and 17 April 2009. The second round took place between 18 May and 24 June 2009. The majority of Brussels-based interviews were conducted in EU institutions, most notably in the European Commission and the Council General Secretariat. However, a few interviews were also conducted in NGOs, such as think tanks concerned with environmental security. Apart from interviews conducted in Brussels, a number of interviews were conducted over the phone and via e-mail. These included, for example, interviews with non-proliferation experts in the US, Sweden and Germany. An interview was also conducted with a Turkish navy officer involved in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Burnham et al. (2004) identifies a four-step process of conducting elite interviews, i.e.:

a) Decide who you want to see: A number of potential interviewees were identified before conducting the first research trip to Brussels. A sampling strategy called 'snow-ball' was applied to increase the number of potential interviewees. This means that at the end of each interview, an interviewee was asked about other potential interviewees to be approached. This process significantly increased the number of contacts and interviews conducted.

b) Get access and arrange an interview: A three-step process was followed to arrange an interview, i.e. a formal letter, an e-mail and a phone call.

c) Conduct the interview: On average, an interview lasted for about one hour. Within this time, 5-7 main questions were asked. Interviews were semi-structured, which means
that interviewees enjoyed freedom to provide any extra information which they con-
sidered relevant. Interviews were not recorded; instead, notes were taken.

d) Analyse the results: Immediately after conducting an interview, data was typed into
the computer and a code-name was assigned to an interviewee.

The triangulation of methods of acquiring data for this thesis allowed to obtain and verify
knowledge from different sources, thus proving to be an effective approach to conducting
qualitative research. Elite interviews were particularly important in this respect, allowing to
verify knowledge from primary and secondary sources, but also pointing to new directions in
the process of conducting research for this thesis. The following, last section of this chapter
reflects on the role of values in this thesis; it also addresses ethical considerations.

3.4. Axiology and ethics

The final section of this chapter addresses the questions of axiology and ethics in this thesis.
Axiology refers to the role of values that a scholar of security studies must take into consid-
eration; it is discussed in the first part of this section. The second part discusses ethical con-
siderations, particularly related to conducting research which involves other human beings.

3.4.1. The questions of axiology

Considering that this thesis addresses significant problems of international security, it is im-
portant to ask about the role of a security analyst in this process. Dannreuther (2007) and
Eriksson (1999) raise a number of questions in this respect. Dannreuther (2007) points out
that international security is a complex area of study; as a result, the responsibility of a secu-
rity analyst is to be aware of a number of considerations which constitute an indispensible part
of studying this subject. Firstly, there is a question of a security analyst as a scientist: To
which extent are we able to know the truth about what we study? This question has been ad-
dressed in sections concerning ontology and epistemology. A scientific realist approach en-
tails that the social reality can be studied and explained, even though it consists of social
kinds, which are unobservable. Secondly, there is a question of a security analyst as an inter-
nationalist: To which extent, when studying international security, are we ‘conditioned by our
inherited cultural predispositions, traditions and particular processes of socialization?’
(Dannreuther 2007: 6-7). According to the author, a security analyst must recognise that there
are other than Western conceptions of security, but also that there are various conceptions of
security within the Western culture. It is also important that an analyst understands that international security challenges are complex and multidimensional. This thesis has addressed these considerations through the selection of case studies reflecting the diversity of contemporary security challenges. Thirdly, Dannreuther (2007) points to the question of a security analyst as a moralist, noting that ‘the international security policy, as with national or other security policies, is an inherently normative exercise’ (2007: 7). This means that security is just one among competing values and ‘the security analyst should constantly be aware of the essentially normative political challenge of the complex interrelationship between security and other core values which a society deems to be critical to the “good life”’ (Dannreuther 2007: 8). The most important of these competing values are freedom, prosperity and justice. The relationship between security and these other values is complex. For example, an extensive security policy can undermine freedom. On the other hand, the condition of anarchy leads to insecurity, as the case of the failed state of Somalia indicates.

Eriksson (1999) opened the debate concerning another important axiological aspect of studying international security, namely the political responsibility of scholars for broadening and deepening the concept of security. He refers to three different approaches to studying international security, in order to see how they perceive the role of a security analyst. Firstly, those involved in traditional security studies oppose broadening and widening of the security concept, because such an exercise makes the concept of security analytically empty. Secondly, the representatives of the Copenhagen School, through the concept of securitisation, observe how political issues (such as migration) become the matters of security. Thus, political actors bear responsibility for the process of broadening and widening of security. However, Eriksson (1999) notes that, at the same time, Copenhagen School scholars also participate in redefining security. To this end, Buzan’s (1983) contribution ‘People, States and Fear’ is the most significant, proposing a multi-sector approach to security. Thirdly, Critical Security Studies scholars actively promote emancipation as an ultimate goal of security policy, thus engaging in political advocacy.

Eriksson (1999) also assesses how the above approaches to defining the role of a security analyst perceive the securitisation of the environment. To this end, he notes that they all oppose such a move, but for quite different reasons. Firstly, Realists oppose securitisation of the environment because any broadening and widening of the security concept leads to stripping this concept of analytical meaning. Secondly, the Copenhagen School is concerned with securiti-
sation of the environment leading to militarisation, and thus advocates de-securitisation instead (Waever 1995). Thirdly, Critical Security Studies scholars oppose the securitisation of the environment on the basis that this could reinforce the Realist practices of security policy, and also develop a counterproductive ‘enemy’ discourse in the area of environmental policy. The debate initiated by Eriksson took place over ten years ago. Since then, the discussion on environmental security evolved to focus primarily on climate change. Scientific evidence from various sources suggests that climate change may indeed have important consequences for international security and stability. Consequently, this contemporary challenge constitutes an important part of the empirical component of this thesis. The axiological issues link with the question of ethics. The following section addresses ethical considerations, primarily in the context of elite interviews conducted for this thesis.

3.4.2. Ethical considerations

Social science is an area of academic enquiry where ethical considerations tend to play a role less central than in, for example, natural science. Burnham et al. (2004) identifies a number of ethical principles when conducting research in political science; some of them include:

a) Beneficence or the avoidance of harm. No person was harmed in any way when conducting elite interviews for this thesis.

b) Veracity or the avoidance of deception. It was important, when conducting elite interviews, to always explain sufficiently the nature of this research, in order for an interviewee to understand why he or she was approached. No interviewee was deceived or any information hidden from the person at any stage of writing this thesis.

c) Privacy or autonomy (and confidentiality). By default, all elite interviews were encoded and therefore interviewees' real names are not disclosed in this thesis or any other research output.

d) Informed consent. This principle entails a necessity for interviewees to have full information about the study and about the nature of an interview, before it begins. Elite interviews, as opposed to survey research, provide a good opportunity for a researcher to explain the nature of the study to an interviewee, because a number of those approached is limited.
The Research and Graduate College of the University of Salford provides its own, more specific principles of a good research practice. For the purpose of conducting research interviews, the ethical approval was required from the university. It was obtained in 2009 and stated the following: ‘Following your responses to the committee's queries, based on the information you provided, I can confirm that they have no objections on ethical grounds to you project’.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explain the methodology for this thesis. A number of important aspects of conducting research in social science have been discussed, explaining their relevance and importance for this thesis. Firstly, this chapter has addressed important questions of ontology and epistemology. Ontology, it has been noted, refers to the question of what really exists, whereas epistemology refers to the question how we can know anything. This thesis adheres to a social constructivist approach with respect to ontology, which assumes that the social reality is socially constructed. This does not mean that it cannot be studied and explained, however. From an epistemological standpoint, this thesis adheres to scientific realism – an approach which acknowledges that social kinds are different from natural kinds, but at the same time social kinds are possible to study from a perspective of an external observer. Secondly, this chapter has introduced the main characteristics of case study research design, which is adopted in this thesis. Some of the most important limitations of such a design have been discussed, explaining how this thesis addresses and mitigates them. As a part of the methodology for this thesis, it has also been important to explain and justify a sampling strategy behind selecting three case studies, constituting the empirical component of this thesis. It has been explained that three case studies in this thesis represent different kinds of contemporary security challenges, ranging from the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security problems, to more traditional ones. Thirdly, this chapter has explained how qualitative methods were utilised to obtain data for this thesis. To this end, this thesis relies on the triangulation of primary sources, secondary sources and elite interviews. Finally, this chapter has discussed the questions of axiology and ethics, and how they relate to research presented in this thesis.

Up until now, the theoretical component of this thesis has been developed, including the review of the literature on the EU as an international security actor, and the establishment of the theoretical framework. The literature review provides a thorough academic background for research in this thesis. It has also contributed to the development of the theoretical framework,
discussed in the second chapter. This framework integrates scholarly work on understanding and assessing the actorness of the EU in international relations, in order to develop the framework for assessing the EU as an international security actor in this thesis. To this end, four criteria of actorness have been established, providing the structure for the empirical component of this thesis. These criteria have also been operationalised, in order to enable drawing conclusions about the level of EU actorness (low, medium or high). Further, the theoretical component of this thesis has explained and justified the comprehensive approach to assessing the EU's role in international security policy. Such developed theoretical framework, together with the methodology established in this chapter, is applied to the empirical part of this thesis, commencing with the next chapter, discussing the role of the EU in climate security. Then, in Chapter 5, this thesis analyses the role of the EU as an actor in the area of non-proliferation of WMDs, with a specific focus on Russia. Finally, in Chapter 6, the role of the EU in addressing the problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is examined. These three chapters, constituting the empirical part of this thesis, contribute to a better understanding of the role of the EU as an international security actor.
4. The EU and climate security

'The dangers that small islands and their populations face [as a result of climate change] are no less serious than those faced by nations and peoples threatened by guns and bombs. The effects on our populations are as likely to cause massive dislocations of people as past and present wars. The impacts on social cohesion and identity are as likely to cause resentment, hatred and alienation as any current refugee crisis'.

Mr Aisi (Papua New Guinea), on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Small Island Developing States — Fiji, Nauru, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, at the UN Security Council meeting concerned with climate change (UNSC 17/04/07)

This chapter assesses the role of the EU as a security actor in the area of climate change, representing the so-called 'non-traditional' security problems, which nonetheless may have traditional security consequences. These consequences, as indicated by Mr Aisi during the unprecedented UN Security Council meeting concerned with climate change, may have significant bearing on the security of societies in vulnerable regions. The rise of temperatures may also further exacerbate problems such as the shortages of water, leading to radicalisation and conflicts in the regions such as Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The comprehensive approach to examining the EU's security role at the international level must entail the analysis of both traditional and non-traditional security problems, reflecting the broadened and widened international security agenda. This thesis integrates the comprehensive approach, thus offering the original contribution to literature on the EU's international security actorness. As a result, the empirical component of this thesis, as outlined in the chapter establishing the methodology, analyses EU policy in addressing three contemporary security challenges. They range from the non-traditional challenge of climate security, through the more traditional issue of preventing the proliferation of WMDs from Russia, to the problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, requiring the combination of military and non-military instruments. Climate change has emerged on the international security agenda relatively recently, in the last few years. The aforementioned UN Security Council meeting has, to some degree, turned international attention to the potential consequences of climate change to the security and stability of vulnerable regions, such as Pacific islands. The EU has been playing an active role in
introducing climate security agenda to the international community, utilising global, regional and bilateral channels in this respect.

Notably, in 2003, climate change as a security issue was acknowledged for the first time at the highest EU level in the ESS (European Council 2003). Global warming was mentioned in the document, albeit only twice and very briefly. This has changed significantly five years later when the European Council, in December 2008, approved the Implementation Report (European Council 2008). This document addresses climate change in a separate section as one of the ‘Global Challenges and Key Threats’, together with the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, organised crime and energy security. The Implementation Report recognises climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ and calls for further improvements of analysis and early warning capabilities. Before proceeding to the empirical investigation, three important questions shall be addressed, providing the conceptual context and empirical background for research presented in this chapter. These questions include: a) What is ‘climate security’?; b) Does the EU treat climate change as a security issue?; and c) What are the UNFCCC negotiations and what is the status of the EU in these negotiations?

What is climate security?

Security is a highly contested concept (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Mutimer 2007). Furthermore, ‘[l]inking it to environment complicates matters even further, and there is no commonly agreed understanding of how these terms might be linked or even whether they should be’ (Dalby 2009: 46). Nonetheless, there is a long tradition of linking the environment with the questions of security both in academia and, more recently, in the practice of national and international actors. In academia, the discussion on environmental and climate security has been developing rapidly; in fact, this discussion itself became the subject of analysis (Dalby 2009; Floyd 2008; Hough 2004; Trombetta 2009). Most scholars recognise that, even though Cold War strategic debates were focusing mainly on military capabilities of the superpowers, some attempts to link the environment and security took place already in the 1970s (Brown 1977; Falk 1971;) and 1980s (Buzan 1983; Ullman 1983; WCED 1987; Westing 1989). However, as Dannreuther (2007: 59) notes, ‘these views remained marginal until the bipolar militarized structure of the Cold War finally disintegrated’. With the broadening and deepening of security in the 1990s (Buzan and Hansen 2009), it became conceptually easier to talk about the environment in the context of security.
Since the 1990s, there has been a scholarly divide on environmental security between those examining the links between the environment and security primarily through its impact on conflicts (traditional security), and those more recently investigating through the concept of human security (Barnett 2007). The former is represented most adequately by the so-called ‘Toronto Group’ led by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999). While his argument suggests that there is no straightforward connection between environmental change and war, Homer-Dixon argues nonetheless that conflict may occur when a number of conditions are in place, such as scarcity of renewable resources and a bad economic situation. The latter is appropriately represented by the 1994 Human Development Report, which redefined security by concentrating on people and their ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression’, as well as the ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life’ (UNDP 1994: 23). It actually criticised a narrow interpretation of security which focuses merely on territory and external aggression.

The September 2001 terrorist attacks eclipsed the debate on environmental security, but not for long. A few years later, this debate re-emerged, but this time it focused mainly on one aspect: climate change (Trombetta 2009). A number of scientific publications provided an impetus for the debate on climate security; some of the most important include: the Stern Review (Stern 2007), the ‘Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (IPCC 2007), the report ‘Climate Change as a Security Risk’ (WBGU 2007) and ‘The Geopolitics of Climate Change’ (Haldén 2007). Interestingly, Floyd (2008: 61) notes that global warming does not have a unifying effect and ‘“climate security” has simply become integrated into the various approaches of environmental security’. Some of these approaches focus more on the correlation between climate change and conflict (Brown et al. 2007; Lee 2009), while others underline the ‘human security’ dimension (UNDP 2007).

**Does the EU approach climate change as a security issue?**

With the onset of scholarly debates on climate security, increasingly, scholars also started to analyse domestic and international policies to respond to this problem. At the domestic level, US policy has attracted most of the attention (Busby 2008; Campbell and Parthmore 2008; Dabelko 2009; Kimble 2005). The discussion in the US was boosted in 2009 with a report called ‘Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States’ (Karl et al. 2009), commissioned by the US government. At the international level, scholars (Francesco 2007; Penny
2007; Scott 2009; Sindico 2007) have been focusing mostly on the first-ever debate on climate change held by the UNSC in 2007 (UNSC 17/04/07). Other early instances of environmental security analysis are discussed by De Wilde (2008).

Vogler (2002) has examined the early efforts by the EU to develop the security dimension of environmental policy. In order to ‘understand how the EU (and indeed NATO) have approached the question of environmental security’ (2002: 183), he refers in his analysis to the Copenhagen School of security, and particularly to the concept of securitisation. At the time of writing this contribution, environmental security only started to modestly appear on the EU agenda. Thus, the analysis focused primarily on examining the role of the European Commission in the 7th OSCE Economic Forum in 1999. Here, the Commission attempted to define environmental security for the EU. Yet, it was eight years later when the EU started to approach environmental security in a more comprehensive manner, shifting the focus from environmental degradation to climate change.

As already indicated, the ESS from 2003 briefly refers to global warming. Firstly, it is identified as an aggravator of the competition for natural resources and the potential cause of increased migration. Secondly, it is mentioned along with terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs as the kind of development which international law must take into account to preserve the ‘rule-based international order’ (European Council 2003: 9). In 2008, the European Council revised the implementation of the ESS and reconsidered international security priorities for Europe (European Council 2008). In the Implementation Report, climate change is addressed separately as one of the ‘Global Challenges and Key Threats’, together with the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism and organised crime and energy security.

Importantly, the Implementation Report refers to the most comprehensive official EU document on the consequences of climate change for international security. In March 2008, the HRCFSP and the European Commission presented their joint report ‘Climate Change and International Security’ (Joint Report) (High Representative and European Commission 14/03/08). This document lists the potential security problems which may be induced by climate change in the near future. For example, it envisages that the altering of rainfall patterns will reduce the freshwater availability by 20-30 percent in vulnerable regions. Furthermore, food productivity may decrease in least developing countries. Another issue pointed out by the Joint Report is the so-called ‘eco-migration’, which is migration triggered by the shortages
of food and water. Furthermore, the competition over energy resources could be the most profound result of climate change. The document concludes with a number of recommendations, such as the need for strengthening the analysis, research and monitoring capacities as well as reinforcing the EU’s leadership role in multilateral climate change negotiations.

What are the UNFCCC negotiations and what is the position of the EU in these negotiations?

Even though over the last few years EU member states have started utilising the UN General Assembly as the forum to discuss the security dimension of climate change, the main forum for climate talks remains the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC as a document was adopted by UN members in 1992. It was one of the outputs of the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, known as the Earth Summit. The number of delegates was unprecedented, with 172 countries represented at the conference, including 108 delegations at the level of heads of state or government. The ultimate goal of the Convention was defined as the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (UN 1992: 4). The Convention entered into force in 1994 and since then, Parties have begun the ritual of annual meetings, known as the Conferences of the Parties (COPs).

The UNFCCC itself is not legally-binding, but states have opened the possibility to adopt legally binding ‘updates’ within the framework of the UNFCCC. These updates are called the protocols, with the first one adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997. It entered into force in 2005 and obliged participating Parties to reduce their level of GHG emissions within the period of 2008-2012. The US, famously, excluded itself from this commitment. The year 2005 was particularly important for UNFCCC climate change negotiations. It was not only the 11th COP, but also the first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP). Furthermore, this meeting served as an opportunity to start discussing possible developments for the post-2012 period. Official negotiations on a new climate change regime began in 2007, at the COP 13th in Bali, Indonesia. At this meeting, Parties have agreed on the so-called ‘Roadmap’, which assumed that the negotiations would be concluded in 2009, at the COP in Copenhagen. The legal competence of the EU to participate in the UNFCCC negotiations is discussed in greater detail in the first section of this chapter, but the most important aspect of this position can be defined as a shared competence. This means that
both EU member states and the Commission represent the EU. The Commission used to represent the EC, but following the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, it now represents the EU. This legal arrangement, which can indeed be considered rather confusing, is addressed in this chapter.

The role of the EU in the UNFCCC negotiations, but also its role in developing and promoting the security dimension of climate change (mainly within the UN General Assembly), are both analysed in this chapter. The comprehensive approach to studying the EU’s role in international security, adopted in this thesis, must integrate the whole spectrum of contemporary security challenges, moving beyond the traditional security threats. Notably, issues previously eclipsed by nuclear rivalry between major powers and labelled as ‘low politics’, have become recognised for their impact on the security of millions beyond the Western world. This process has been facilitated by the shift away from an exclusive focus on ‘present’ existential threats to a more probabilistic approach, focusing on diffuse risks (McInnes 2008). Climate change in this thesis represents a category of the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security risks.

This chapter, offering the empirical analysis of the EU’s role in addressing this issue, is structured as follows. Firstly, it investigates the legal authority of the EU to develop policies in the area of climate security and international climate negotiations. Of particular importance here is the question of the EU’s de jure recognition within the UNFCCC regime. Secondly, the chapter analyses the role of key EU institutions in: a) the UNFCCC negotiations; and b) developing the security dimension of climate change. Thirdly, this chapter examines EU resources with respect to developing the security dimension of climate change, but also with respect to addressing climate security within the UNFCCC framework. Finally, this chapter investigates the extent to which the EU has been recognised as an actor in the area of climate security policy.

4.1. The EU and climate security: legal authority

This section aims to address questions of the EU’s legal authority in the area of climate change policy. Most importantly, the following issues are discussed in this section: a) To what extent is the EU legally recognised in international negotiations on climate change?; b) What does it mean that climate negotiations are a shared competence of the EU and member states?; and c) What changes does the Lisbon Treaty introduce in this respect? The question of authority is applied primarily to the legal competence of the EU to take part in international climate
negotiations. EU activities concerning the climate security agenda remain largely informal. These activities are coordinated at the EU level by the so-called ‘Steering Group on Climate Change and International Security’ (the Steering Group), which was initiated in 2008 to develop the security dimension of climate change policy within the EU (Zwolski and Kaunert 2010). The Steering Group has been coordinated by a few officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat and involves a number of member states who are particularly interested in EU climate security agenda, including Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The activities of this Steering Group are analysed further in this chapter, because they contribute to the EU’s actoriness in the area of climate security. However, because of their informal character, these activities are not discussed in this section, assessing the authority of the EU to act within the international climate change regime.

4.1.1. International legal recognition

Of primary concern for this section is to investigate the legal nature of the EU’s participation in the UNFCCC negotiations, as the main global forum for climate change talks. In this context, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) note that the EEC has acquired external legal recognition in environmental policy already in 1979, during negotiations on the LRTAP Convention (Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution). Although the Soviet Union was initially against the Commission’s participation in these negotiations, it eventually agreed for the EEC to be recognised as a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). As a result, the Convention contains references to the participation of REIOs, noting it shall be opened for signature also by ‘regional economic integration organizations, constituted by sovereign States members of the Economic Commission for Europe, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered by the present’ (UNECE 1979).

The formula of REIO has allowed the European Commission, representing the EEC, to participate in subsequent environmental negotiations, most notably within the UNFCCC framework. This is how the UNFCCC defines REIO: “‘Regional economic integration organization’ means an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the instruments concerned” (UN 1992: 3). It is noted in article 18 of the UNFCCC
that REIO has the right to vote ‘with a number of votes equal to the number of their member states’, but only if member states refrain from voting. The rights and restrictions regarding the participation of REIOs were further defined in the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. For example, this Convention defined that ‘the organization [REIO] and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligation under the Convention or protocol (...)’ (UNEP 1985: 12). Nowadays, the UNFCCC provides the framework where this legal arrangement can be observed in practice, as EU member states and the Commission have to decide on the division of labour amongst themselves. As the next part of this section explains in more detail, the Lisbon Treaty does not introduce any significant changes in this legal setup.

4.1.2. Legal competence to act

The area of international environmental policy, including international climate change negotiations, remains a shared competence of member states and the EU (formerly the EC). The fact that EU member states can participate in international climate negotiations does not require much explanation. An important question concerns the legal basis for the participation of the EU (formerly the EC) alongside member states. A considerable amount of literature has been published on the competence of the EC to act externally in the area of the environment (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Delreux 2006; Van Schaik and Egenhofer 2005). This section briefly explains the nature of the EU’s legal competence in environmental politics, including the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty.

The EEC has acquired an explicit right to participate in international environmental negotiations already in the Single European Act. This competence, with regards to the EC, was further confirmed in the TEU and the Lisbon Treaty. Articles 174 (4) and 175 of the TEU (European Union 29/12/06) regulated the competence of the EC in this respect. In particular, article 174 (4) has allowed the Community to participate in international negotiations vis-à-vis member states: ‘Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the member states shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organizations’ (European Union 29/12/06: 124). The right of member states to negotiate and conclude agreements on their own was secured in the same article. This legal setting, which confirmed the right of the EC to act in international environmental negotiations, is important. Yet, on what basis did the EEC participate in environmental negotiations prior to acquiring
these explicit powers? This became possible following the judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1970, which introduced the doctrine of ‘parallelism’ between the internal and external competences of the Community (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Delreux 2006). At that time, one of the internal competences of the EEC was transport policy. However, a dispute emerged between the Commission and member states about who should negotiate and conclude an international agreement on the road transport and safety rules for professional drivers. The ECJ ruled that once the EEC acquired competences in an internal policy area, member states were no longer allowed to conclude international agreements which would interfere with internal EEC policy (Delreux 2006).

Following this and subsequent ECJ judgments, the Commission has emerged as one of the international actors in the area of environmental policy, acting on behalf of the ECC, and later the EC. However, this does not mean that the EC has acquired an exclusive competence in the broad area of environmental policy. The division of competences between member states and the Commission has to be decided on a case-by-case basis, with some issues falling under the EC’s exclusive competence (fisheries) and others being shared by the EC and member states (climate change). The UNFCCC contains the following clarification in this respect: ‘The European Economic Community and its member states declare, for the purposes of clarity, that the inclusion of the European Community as well as its member states in the lists in the Annexes to the Convention is without prejudice to the division of competence and responsibilities between the Community and its Member States (...’ (UNFCCC 2009).

The area of climate change policy is too broad and it touches upon too many aspects of domestic politics for EU member states to give up their competences completely. Thus, taking into account the current state of European integration, the shared competence of the European Commission and member states appears to be the only possible solution. In fact, this arrangement reflects the very nature of the EU, where, in many policy areas, both member states (through the Council) and the Commission have competences to act. The case study examining the EU’s role in preventing the proliferation of WMDs demonstrates a similar duality of competences, where the Commission, member states and even the Council Secretariat have resources and competences to conduct a policy. Nonetheless, a shared competence as a legal arrangement has attracted a degree of justified criticism. Van Schaik and Egenhofer (2005) call this situation ‘slightly strange’, pointing to the fact that both EU member states and the Community were ‘members of the same ‘club’’. The Lisbon Treaty, it can be argued,
introduces even more confusion. In this treaty, articles concerning international environmental negotiations merely replace 'the EC' with 'the EU'; thus, under this new legal arrangement, it is not the Community, but the EU which shares the competence in international climate negotiations. According to Van Schaik and Egenhofer (2005: 5), '[t]he new situation seems to be even more schizophrenic with both the club (i.e. the EU) and the club members (i.e. the EU member states) acting as Parties'.

This section investigated the EU's authority, as one of the basic criteria of EU actorness, in the area of the environment and climate change policy. In particular, the discussion in this section has focused on the competence of the EEC, later the EC and currently the EU, to act in international environmental negotiations. It has been explained that even before the EEC acquired explicit competences to negotiate in international environmental negotiations, it had already been performing this role since the 1970s. Furthermore, it has also been explained what kind of legal status the EU has in environmental negotiations at the international level. In this context, the formula o REIO has been introduced. As a result of these considerations, this section concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority in the area of climate security.

4.2. **The EU and climate security: key institutions**

This section sets out to examine the role of EU institutions in developing EU actorness in the area of climate security. In particular, two dimensions of this role are analysed. First, this section examines the role of EU institutions in the actual climate change negotiations, most notably within the UNFCCC framework. As this section demonstrates, EU institutions play a particularly significant role in EU environmental and climate policy, with the European Commission enjoying the exclusive right of proposing legislation. Second, this section investigates the role of EU institutions in developing the security dimension of climate change. As already indicated, the climate security agenda within the EU is being coordinated by the European Commission and the Council Secretariat. It is thus important to shed more light on these institutional arrangements.

4.2.1. **EU institutions and the UNFCCC negotiations**

The institutions of the EU play a significant role in the process of international climate negotiations within the UNFCCC framework. This role, notably, is not limited to representing the
EU at the actual COPs. EU institutions are also crucial for developing EU agenda for negotiations, with the European Commission proposing legislation and thus setting the agenda for the EU’s climate negotiating position. In order to better understand this significant role of EU institutions in EU climate policy, this section examines the role that these institutions played prior to the 2007 COP in Bali, where the EU put forward an ambitious plan to reduce GHG emissions until 2020. The following figure summarises the role of EU institutions in preparations for the COP in Bali in 2007.

Figure 3: The role of EU institutions in preparations for the COP in Bali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 January 2007</td>
<td>The Commission sets the 2 degrees Celsius goal for 2020:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In its Communication, the Commission suggests that the EU should by 2020:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reduce its GHG by 20% (or 30% if a satisfactory agreement is reached).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reduce energy consumption by 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase the share of renewable energy by 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 2007</td>
<td>The Council of the European Union endorses the 20/20/20 by 2020 goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/9 March 2007</td>
<td>The European Council endorses the 20/20/20 by 2020 goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November 2007</td>
<td>European Parliament calls for the EU to play a leading role in negotiations on the post-2012 climate change regime, based on the Commission’s proposal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Commission has an exclusive right to initiate legislative proposals in environmental policy. Thus, in January 2007, it proposed ambitious objectives which later became an official EU position for the UNFCCC negotiations. The proposition of the Commission included the commitment of the EU to reduce its GHG emissions by 20 percent by the year 2020 (European Commission 10/01/07). One year later, in January 2008, the Commission proposed specific legislation to implement this and other ambitious EU targets (European Commission 23/01/08), which member states accepted over the course of 2007. The specific legislative propositions of the Commission proved to be controversial among some EU member states later in 2008, but eventually an agreement was reached in December 2008.

Delreux (2006) notes that even though the Commission has an exclusive right to initiate legislation in the area of environmental policy, in practice this institution is under constant influence from member states and other actors. In the area of climate change negotiations, this fact has become evident in January 2009, when the Commission has published a Communication called ‘Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen’ (European
Commission 28/01/09). One of the main areas of disagreements among member states at that time concerned how much money the EU should commit for adaptation to climate change in developing countries. The issue was controversial, because Europe was in the middle of economic crisis and climate change was not as popular a topic among member states as it was at the time of the COP in Bali in December 2007.

In this context, the Commission, in its first draft of the aforementioned document, proposed some ambitious financial targets for the EU and other developed countries. For example, the Commission estimated that €95 billion will be needed for additional investments in developing countries in 2020. It also envisaged that public financial assistance for developing countries should be ‘stepped up to €5 billion in 2013 and further raised to €10 billion by 2020’. None of these figures appears in the final document (European Commission 28/01/09). An interviewee from one of the environmental think tanks has indicated that one of the reasons for this was that the treasuries of member states have protested against including any specific commitments (NGO2 2009). Another argument for not including the numbers was that the EU should not fully reveal its negotiation position prior to the actual talks.

In addition to proposing legislation, the Commission plays a major role in the process of the UNFCCC negotiations. Even though it shares this competence with member states, the fact that Commission’s officials do not rotate as often as national ones gives the Commission an advantage. DG Environment is staffed with specialists who follow different aspects of all technical issues discussed at COPs and in-between the annual summits. In this regards, DG Environment is supported by other DGs, such as the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG EuropeAid), whose officials do not have a formal mandate to negotiate, but have an extensive knowledge of implementing EU projects in developing countries (COM03 2009). This places the Commission as an institution of crucial importance for EU climate change policy.

Other institutions are also important, however. Notably, Commission’s proposals must be approved by EU member states. This does not happen at a single Council meeting, but rather it is a process and sometimes a long one. Following the initiative of the Commission, the proposal goes to the Council of the European Union. Yet, before reaching a ministerial level, it is first discussed at two lower levels. The first one is the Council Working Group on the Environment, and the second one is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Vogler 1999). In fact, most of the issues are agreed upon before the discussion reaches the level of ministers.
(Hayes-Renshaw 2006). In the case of the 20/20/20 by 2020 proposal from January 2007, the Environmental Council of the European Union accepted the targets on 20 February 2007 (Council of the European Union 20/02/07). Taking into account the importance of the matter, also the heads of state and government endorsed the targets at the European Council summit in March 2007 (Council of the European Union 02/05/07).

The role of the European Parliament has already been strong in the area of the environment under the TEU. In this policy field, the co-decision rule (article 251) was applicable to legislation proposed by the Commission, which means that the Council needed an agreement of the European Parliament to endorse a proposal (European Union 29/12/06). Under the Lisbon Treaty, the same principle applies. Yet, now it is called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and is introduced in article 294 (Council of the European Union 15/04/08). These considerations concerning the role of EU institutions in international climate negotiations are important for understanding the EU’s role in these talks. However, EU institutions have also been involved in developing policy which promotes the idea of linking climate change and international security in a more explicit manner. The following section discusses this aspect of EU institutions.

4.2.2. EU institutions and climate security

The aforementioned Steering Group has primarily been coordinated by the European Commission (DG External Relations (Relex)) and the Council Secretariat. The Lisbon Treaty introduces important changes concerning these institutions, by establishing the EEAS, which will bring together the bureaucracy of DG Relex and a part of the Council Secretariat. This analysis primarily focuses on the role of EU institutions as they have been functioning prior to 1 January 2011, when the changes will take effect. The reason for this is that, at the time of writing, the EU is in the period of transition, thus it is too early to assess the effects of these institutional reorganisations. At the moment, the European Commission and the Council Secretariat are still responsible for coordinating EU agenda on climate security.

Before proceeding to the discussions focused on EU bureaucracies, it is first important to outline the role of the European Council in developing the security dimension of climate change policy within the EU. The European Council can be considered both an engine and an obstacle in this respect. On the one hand, EU member states, working together in the European Council, have requested the HRCFSP Javier Solana and the European Commission to prepare
the Joint Report in June 2007 (Council of the European Union 20/07/07). On the other hand, the same institution was later responsible for lowering the profile of climate security on EU agenda. When the European Council in March 2008 has approved the Joint Report and requested further recommendations (Council of the European Union 20/05/08), it was expected in the Council Secretariat that it would be the December 2008 European Council which would acknowledge the Follow-up Report and keep working on developing EU climate security agenda (CON08 2009). It was thus rather surprising when the French EU Presidency did not include the discussion on the Follow-Up Report in the agenda submitted to the Council in November 2008 (Council of the European Union 07/11/08). Instead, the French Presidency submitted the Follow-up Report to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, which included one paragraph on this issue in its Press Release from its December 2008 meeting: ‘The Council took note of a report containing recommendations from the EU High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy concerning climate change and international security’ (Council of the European Union 18-19/12/08). This contributed to lowering the profile of climate security policy on EU agenda.

Now, the analysis proceeds to examine the role of the Council General Secretariat. Until January 2011, this institution is divided into functional DGs, a horizontal Legal Service, and a number of units subordinate directly to the Secretary General. One of them is the Policy Unit (initially Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit), established under the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. In order to understand the role of the Policy Unit in developing EU climate security agenda, it is important to note that its role (as well as the role of the DG E - External and Political-Military Affairs) in EFP goes beyond purely administrative tasks. In fact, both institutions have played ‘an important conceptual and operational role in preparing, steering and ensuring follow-up of decisions in working groups, the PSC, COREPER and the Council’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 83). The Policy Unit is divided into several Task Forces. Most of them are geographical, but there is also one on the CSDP and one called the Horizontal Security Affairs, Conflict Prevention and Human Rights Task Force. This Task Force deals with challenges that are transnational in nature, such as cyber-terrorism, energy, food security and climate change. The officials of this Task Force meet regularly at plenary sessions with representatives of EU member states and an official from the Commission. This is how one official from the Council Secretariat has described the early stages of developing EU climate security agenda: ‘Sometimes in the Policy Unit we meet to have brainstorming
and this is when we look at new subjects raising on the international agenda. In 2007, we started looking at a correlation between water and security. Very soon we realised that we cannot limit our research to water, but that we have to go one step further and look at the challenge of climate change' (CON03 2009).

These new developments within the Council Secretariat were in line with the agenda of the German Presidency during the first half of 2007, which prioritised climate protection and energy. In order to increase the profile of climate security on EU agenda, in December 2008, the Council Secretariat co-organised one of the side events at the UNFCCC COP in Poznan, called ‘Climate Change & Security – The Next steps’. It brought together officials and experts from the EU, as well as representatives of regions endangered by global warming, such as Micronesia. On a bigger scale, in April 2008, the Council Secretariat co-organised a workshop on conflict prevention and climate change, which took place in the Justus Lipsius building of the Council. On the second day of the event, a roundtable discussion was organised, attended by more than 50 participants.

In addition to the activities of the Council Secretariat, the European Commission has also been attempting to develop the profile of climate security on the international agenda, thus further contributing to EU climate security actorness. Within the Commission, DG Environment is entrusted with drafting environmental policies and it also has the biggest representation at COPs. For example, at the COP in Bali in December 2007, DG Environment was officially represented by 33 officials, compared to just three officials from DG Development or DG Transport and Energy (DG Tren). DG Relex was represented only by one official (UNFCCC 14/12/07). This is how one Commission official explains a relatively low number of DG Relex representatives taking part in COPs: ‘You really need a technical background to participate in the negotiations. We, in DG Relex, are concerned with international security and therefore we cannot add value in the area of the science of climate change’ (COM01 2009). The scientific dimension of climate change may indeed go beyond knowledge and expertise of DG Relex officials. However, when it comes to climate security, this is the place where the policy of the Commission is being developed. DG Relex considers itself a contributor to the debate on climate change, emphasising that, if unchecked, it will have profound consequences to security and stability in the most vulnerable regions. Officials from DG Relex note that there is a strong link between development and security. Consequently, the EU’s response must be comprehensive. To this end, one interviewee explains that EU climate
security approach must be integrated into other kinds of EU policy: ‘It is not about some people holding climate change portfolio, but rather it is about networks where we can lobby to implement appropriate policies; we work in networks, not in solos’ (COM01 2009). This is how this official perceives the contribution of DG Relex to addressing the problem of climate security (COM01 2009):

a) DG Relex works closely with other Commission DGs, disseminating their ideas and policies;

b) DG Relex supports integrating climate change agenda into the external relations of the EU, most notably into its development policy;

c) DG Relex supports the networks which it is a part of;

Furthermore, the European Parliament has also been active in initiating and facilitating debate on climate security. It is important to note that that the European Parliament has got involved in setting the climate security agenda for the EU long before other institutions have done so (Vogler 2002). However, this does not necessarily mean that the European Parliament is more progressive in its understanding of security compared to other EU institutions. The main reason why the European Parliament initiated the debate on climate security already in 1999 is the fact that Tom Spencer was chairing the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy (CFASDP) at the time. Mr Spencer, who was the former President of GLOBE International (Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment), was interested in this particular topic. Currently, he is the Vice-Chairman of the Institute for Environmental Security (IES). In 1999, in his role as the Chairman of the European Parliament’s CFASDP, Mr Spencer was allowed to propose an ‘Own Initiative Report’. He recalls that when he suggested preparing a paper on environmental security, there was a lot of scepticism and disregard towards this topic among MEPs (Spencer 2006). However, eventually, his own ideas were combined with another report on the ‘Role of the Military in Cleaning Up the Environment’ prepared by Maj Britt Theorin. The final product went beyond an exclusive focus on the military and provided a broader outlook on climate change security (European Parliament 14/01/99).

The case of EU actorness in addressing climate change and its security dimension indicates how important institutions are in EU policy-making. As this section has demonstrated, the
role of the European Commission is particularly significant in this respect. Not only does this institution initiates environmental legislation and represents the EU in climate talks vis-à-vis member states, but in recent years it has also been active in developing the climate security agenda for the EU (together with the Council Secretariat). At present, an important question concerns the impact of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS on the climate security agenda within the EU. The fact that DG Relex and the Policy Unit will be moved into one institution provides an opportunity for the EU to further enhance the profile of climate security in relations with third countries and international organisations. This would strengthen EU actorness in this policy area, but at the moment it is too early to draw any conclusions in this respect. Nonetheless, this section has demonstrated that the EU satisfies the criterion of institutions in the area of climate security.

4.3. The EU and climate security: resources

The aim of this section is to examine the major resources at the EU’s disposal in the area of climate security and climate change policy more broadly. As already indicated, this chapter assesses two dimensions of EU actorness in the area of climate security. The first dimension concerns the process where the EU has been developing capacities in response to the potential consequences of climate change to international security. Importantly, they include early warning capabilities, but also a broader understanding of international security, which has led to creating important political frameworks, such as the ESS (European Council 2003; 2008). These political frameworks create enabling conditions to enhance the EU’s actorness in the area of climate security policy (NGO2 2009). In addition to the resources allowing the EU to develop and promote the security dimension of climate change, this section also discusses two other resources, important for climate security policy. The first one concerns EU research in the area of climate change. Without research, it would be impossible for the EU to develop appropriate policies. The second one concerns funding for adaptation to climate change in developing countries, particularly in the context of the 2009 UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen. Provided that studies on the security consequences of climate change are accurate, the adaptation funding will be of critical importance for developing countries to prepare for the changes in their agriculture, economy, access to water, etc. Thus, the outcome of international negotiations in this area is significant for assessing, in a comprehensive manner, EU actorness as a security provider.
4.3.1. Climate security combined resources

This section analyses the resources available for the EU when developing the security dimension of climate change. To this end, it examines three different EU assets, all of which enable and further enhance EU climate security actor-ness at the international level. First, in the area of climate security, an important political asset of the EU is its broad, pro-active approach to international security, which emphasises the complexity of security challenges and the necessity for a comprehensive response to some of the threats. In this approach to international security, reacting to international threats, such as terrorism, represents only one type of a necessary action. Equally important is to pro-actively contribute to the development of the conditions preventing the emergence of security problems in the first place. It is also widely understood, at least in Europe, that even though climate change may have implications for international security, there is no ‘hard security’ response to this challenge. As the UK Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative for Climate Change John Ashton points out, ‘you cannot force your neighbour to change its carbon emissions at the barrel of a gun’ (quoted in Vogel 2009). This means that a different kind of response is necessary. This is where the added value of the EU is considerable, taking into account the variety of resources at its disposal. In order to better understand the kinds of responses necessary, according to one European Commission official, the subject of climate security now needs to be broken down, in order to identify its impact on migration, state failure, radicalisation, rising of the sea levels and the availability of food. The official also admits that ‘at some point we may even lose the phrase ‘climate change’ and that’s fine, as long as appropriate policies to respond to this problem are integrated into other policy areas’ (COM01 2009).

Second, reacting effectively to the consequences of climate change requires early warning capabilities. If the EU aspires to address potential security problems multiplied by climate change, it needs to be able to know as far in advance as possible, what is about to happen in which region of the world. This is why the EU needs to develop early warning capabilities and to adjust those already in existence to take into account the potential consequences of climate change. To this end, the EU aims to employ a wide array of institutions that it has at its disposal, such as the EU Satellite Centre and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission (Council of the European Union 12/12/08). Towards the end of 2009, some early progress in this area has been achieved, such as the satellite monitoring of the Arctic ice-
fields to assess the probability of the emergence of new Arctic routes, or the monitoring of coastline changes (Council of the European Union 25/11/09).

Third, the size of the EU and the range of bilateral contacts between the EU (including both the Commission and member states) and third countries constitute another important asset at the disposal of the EU. Notably, by the end of 2009, the EU has raised the issue of climate security with more than 40 countries, including Australia, USA, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel and Russia (Council of the European Union 25/11/09). This particular asset helps the EU to raise the awareness of the potential security consequences of climate change, and at the same time it contributes to enhancing the recognition of the EU in this policy field.

Fourth, the capacity to mainstream climate change into other policy areas, including international security policy, constitutes another resource of the EU. In this context, when member states requested the HRCFSP and the European Commission to draft the Joint Report, the experts on climate change within DG Relex drafted the document on the part of the Commission. However, after the report was published in March 2008, the issue was transferred to another unit within DG Relex, one dealing with international security policy. One Commission official explains that 'after the report was drafted, an administrative decision was taken to transfer the issue to the security unit; to do it the other way around would have been a major mistake' (COM15 2010). The goal was to introduce problems associated with climate change to officials dealing with international security, in order for them to incorporate this new knowledge into their policy objectives. Furthermore, the EU has been attempting to 'streamline' climate change policy objectives into its external relations. This aspect of EU policy has been explained by a DG Relex official, who notes: 'In Bolivia we spend money on fighting poverty, drug trafficking and on creating a friendly environment for business development. If I go there and tell them to shift that money to combat climate change, they will tell me that, first, they need to make sure that people do not die of poverty. However, what I can do is to emphasise how important climate change is, and to suggest how this challenge can be integrated into other programmes' (COM01 2009). The following section discusses EU research on climate change – an important asset considering the complex nature of the problem.

4.3.2. Climate change research

The research constitutes an important element in the portfolio of EU resources in the area of climate change, including climate security. However, it is important to note that just like
states often rely on specialised institutions for obtaining appropriate information, also the EU draws on the resources from outside of its institutional structure. Thus, when examining the research as one of the EU’s resources, this section primarily refers to the ability of the EU to draw on research conducted by non-EU institutions. The significance of this EU ability has been underlined by one Council Secretariat official: ‘We, in the EU, know nothing about climate change. Of course, we have some scientists of our own. Yet when, for example, we prepare a specialised report, we draw a lot on external resources. We ask different scientific institutions in different countries, such as Canada, to tell us what is going on’ (CON08 2009).

Furthermore, the importance of the resources of EU member states has been also recognised by a Commission official involved in the UNFCCC negotiations, who has noted that ‘most of EU member states are well developed countries, so we can use their think tanks, consultancy, etc.’ (COM03 2009).

In 2007, the European Commission published a Communication entitled ‘A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan): Towards a Low Carbon Future’ (European Commission 22/11/07). The main aim of this plan is to accelerate the development of low carbon technologies in the EU, in order to help the EU to reach its ambitious objectives regarding GHG emission reductions. Notably, the main problem of the EU has been that it lags behind in Research and Development (R&D) spending. For example, while the US Energy Bill proposed $4.4 billion for 2007, $5.3 for 2008 and the same sum for 2009 for energy research, the EU designated €168 million per year for the years 2007-2013 for non-nuclear energy research (EurActive 2009). However, this estimation only includes the contribution from the EU budget and does not include national spending. The Commission has estimated that ‘[i]nvestments dedicated to R&D in non-nuclear SET-Plan priority technologies amounted to €2.38 billion in 2007’ (European Commission 07/10/09). The problem is that research in the EU has been fragmented and thus the funding has not always been used effectively.

To this end, apart from urging additional funding for research in non-carbon technologies, the SET-Plan also aims to foster international cooperation in the area of R&D. The Communication notes that traditional methods of cooperation between research institutes in different countries, such as joint projects, tend not to deliver satisfactory results. With an objective to help to overcome the fragmentation and duplication of resources in national research on climate change and green technologies, the Commission has proposed the creation of the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA). The EERA was launched in October 2008 by 12
European leading research institutes, with the aim ‘to strengthen, expand and optimise EU energy research capabilities through the sharing of world-class national facilities in Europe and the joint realisation of pan-European research programmes’ (EERA 2009). Within this framework, national institutes have combined their annual R&D budgets in order to boost their energy research at the EU level.

Furthermore, DG Research of the European Commission provides funding for research in the area of the environment, including climate change, natural hazards and correlation between the environment and health. The key research project funded by the Commission in the area of climate change has been ‘Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy’ (ADAM). The project was initiated in 2006 and finalised in 2009. DG Research funded it with almost €13 million. ADAM was conducted together by 26 research institutions in Europe and overseas (Hulme et al. 2009). Importantly, the participation of non-EU contractors in EU-funded research projects is encouraged and often required. One official from DG Research, involved in managing projects on climate change, explains that his DG does not play a direct role in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, it influences international climate policy in an indirect way: ‘We have contributed a lot to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC and we will hopefully feed a lot to the Fifth Assessment [to be finalised in 2014]. It is important to note that the EU learns from the IPCC and takes its reports as a basis for action; therefore, we contribute to EU policy-shaping through external channels. Internally we feed into DG Environment, which we call an in-house chain’ (COM 13 2009). The ability of the EU to pull resources in the area of climate research constitutes an important resource in itself. Although funding for energy and climate research in the Commission’s Seventh Research Framework Programme or DG Research budget may be considered insufficient, EU-based and EU-funded research constitutes an important input to the development of international research on climate change.

4.3.3. The Copenhagen summit and funding for developing countries

One of the most significant resources, when considering EU actorness in the area of climate security, is the funding that it can provide for developing countries, for the purposes of adaptation and mitigation. Adaptation refers to a set of measures to reduce the consequences of climate change in the most vulnerable countries and regions. On the other hand, mitigation refers to policies aimed at reducing the concentration of GHG, either by reducing emissions or
by developing the so-called ‘sinks’ (reservoirs capturing the CO2, such as forests). The level of funding for developing countries has been a subject of severe disagreements throughout the period of negotiations on the post-Kyoto climate regime. The 2009 COP in Copenhagen resulted in some important provisions in this respect, which took the form of the so-called ‘Copenhagen Accord’ (UNFCCC 18/12/09). The following questions are addressed in this section: a) Why is the Copenhagen Accord so controversial and disappointing for the EU?; and b) What resources has the EU committed, compared to other actors, as a result of two-year negotiations on the post-Kyoto climate regime?

The Copenhagen Accord is the result of a last-minute agreement between the US and China; the so-called ‘BASIC countries’ (Brazil, India, South Africa and China) gave their support. Eventually, it became the outcome that all Parties have decided to ‘take a note of’ (UNFCCC 25/01/10). Thus, the document is not legally binding. The Accord addresses various categories of action, such as mitigation by developed countries, mitigation by developing countries and funds for ‘the most vulnerable developing countries’ (UNFCCC 18/12/09). The part concerning mitigation by developed countries has been the subject of the most severe criticism by advocates of a strong action on climate change, most notably the EU. Contrary to legally-binding reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord introduces a bottom-up approach, in which Parties unilaterally and voluntarily propose their GHG reduction targets. The second category of actions, i.e. the mitigation policy by developing countries, was a subject of a dispute primarily between the US and China. This was due to the fact that Beijing opposed any kind of external verification and insisted that the China’s progress on mitigation must be measured internally.

Finally, the part of the Copenhagen Accord concerning adaptation and funding for developing countries, has been considered the most successful, because some specific numbers are introduced in the document. In particular, paragraph 8 specifies that for the period 2010-2012, developed countries would provide $30 billion for mitigation and adaptation in ‘the most vulnerable developing countries’ (UNFCCC 18/12/09). Moreover, following this ‘fast-start’ period, developed countries have promised $100 billion every year until 2020 for adaptation to climate change in developing countries. This constitutes an important commitment, but some criticism has already been formulated. Most importantly, it is not mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord where exactly the money will come from; therefore, according to some observers, the pledge ‘will do little good where the funds do not exist – a chronic problem with adapta-
In order to obtain a more accurate image of the EU as an international actor in the area of climate security, it is important to briefly examine what UNFCCC Parties have actually committed to. In the area of funding for developing countries, the EU has committed around $10 billion for the initial 2010-2012 fast-start period, out of $30 billion pledged by Parties to the Copenhagen Accord. According to the Swedish Prime Minister, this sum is the combination of new and old resources (World Resources Institute 2010). Japan, for the same period, has pledged $15 billion; of this sum, $11 billion will come from public money and $4 billion from private resources. However, of its $11 billion, only $1 billion constitutes a new pledge, because Japan had already committed $10 billion under the Cool Earth Partnership (World Resources Institute 2010). It is still unclear what the total commitment of the US is going to be. For 2010, Washington has pledged $1.3 billion and for 2011 $1.7 billion (World Resources Institute 2010). This data suggests that, provided that Parties will fulfill their commitments, the majority of new funding for developing countries, over the years 2010-2012, will come from the EU. This constitutes an important element among the broad range of EU resources in the area of climate security.

This section has examined the resources at the disposal of the EU in the area of climate security. Notably, it has been demonstrated that the EU has a variety of resources at its disposal when developing policy on the security dimension of climate change. The process of an explicit linking of climate change with security is a relatively new policy development within the EU, thus it has been necessary to identify what kind of resources the EU utilises in this respect. Furthermore, this section has demonstrated that the EU is an important actor when it comes to contributing to international research on climate change. The EERA, formed in response to the proposal from the European Commission, significantly enhances EU research capabilities in this area. Finally, the EU remains a leader in international climate negotiations, even though its ambitious proposals were not endorsed at the COP in Copenhagen. In spite of this drawback, the EU has committed itself to ambitious GHG reduction targets, at the level of minimum 20 percent. Additionally, it has also pledged to deliver one-third of funding for developing countries committed by UNFCCC Parties for the years 2010-2012. As a result of this empirical investigation, this section concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of resources.
4.4. The EU and climate security: recognition

The final criterion which needs to be investigated in the context of EU actorness in climate security policy is recognition. To this end, the investigation starts with analysing the extent to which the EU is recognised as an actor, or in fact a leader, in literature on the role of the EU in environmental politics. Following this assessment, the section then focuses on the recognition of the EU as an actor developing a security dimension of climate change at the international level. The process of reconceptualising climate change to evaluate its impact on international security and stability is a relatively recent phenomenon, thus it is important to assess the extent to which the EU has been recognised in this regard. In the third part, this section examines the recognition of the European Commission as an institution of particular importance for the EU within the context of UNFCCC negotiations, but also for developing a more security-oriented approach to climate change. Finally, this section evaluates the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, in order to assess the extent to which the weak outcome of this summit has undermined the recognition of the EU as an international climate policy actor, or even a leader.

4.4.1. Recognition in the academic literature

The review of scholarly research on the EU and international climate talks allows to conclude that, in general, the EU is recognised as an important actor in this policy area (e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Cameron 2007; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Kiliam and Elgström 2010; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 89) note that the role of the EU 'extend beyond participation in particular negotiations to encompass the propagation of environmental norms, the pursuit of sustainable development and, perhaps the most important of all, leadership of attempts to curb the menace of climate change'. Notably, these attempts have been displayed by the EU to the fullest extent within the framework of the UNFCCC negotiations. Although the general trend in literature is to underline an important or even leading role of the EU in international climate policy, scholars also point to some problems associated with the EU's role in this policy area. In particular, the scholarship underlines the often problematic and confusing nature of the EU's dual representation in international climate negotiations. As already discussed in this chapter, both the Commission and member states have prerogatives in this respect; this may lead to the confusion of competences and internal disputes (Van Schaik and Egenhofer 2005).
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 248) acknowledge the EU’s leadership role in international climate policy, noting that ‘[t]o some extent, this compensates for the fact that the EU can deliver less in the traditional foreign policy domain’. If the assumption behind this remark is that there are other international security actors that are more effective, because their ‘traditional foreign policy’ is better developed, this would require further investigation. For example, it would have to be assessed how effective the US has been, using its more traditional foreign policy instruments, in solving international security problems. Some scholars argue that the EU is becoming a truly revolutionary security actor because of its ‘economic might, its political stability, and rich tradition in ideas linking peace to justice’ (Sebesta 2009). In this argument, the EU is considered the only international actor which has material and cultural means to become a truly multilateral and multi-dimensional global security provider, able to tackle highly complex contemporary security challenges in a holistic manner. In this context, the lack of traditional foreign policy instruments does not necessarily undermine the position of the EU as an actor in addressing contemporary security challenges.

Oberthür (2009) observes another arguable weakness of the EU, noting that ‘EU leadership in global environmental and climate governance has fallen short of ensuring the collective goal of environmental sustainability’ (Oberthür 2009: 195). To support his argument, the author refers to scientific findings and reminds that global warming remains the problem. Provided the accuracy of scientific knowledge in the area of climate change, it would indeed be incorrect to claim that the EU has been able to secure a satisfactory global agreement which would prevent the changing of temperatures in the future. This has not been achieved in Kyoto or in Copenhagen. However, it is highly problematic to draw on that basis conclusions about the EU’s actorness in international climate policy. Notably, states have their own national preferences. For example, China considers implementing strong measures against GHG emissions an obstacle to its economic development. Furthermore, the Administration of President Obama seems to be more sympathetic towards addressing climate change than the Administration of his predecessor, but it is far from accepting legally binding agreements, as the Copenhagen summit has demonstrated. The EU has been attempting to influence governments to accept more ambitious commitments, but it cannot force them to do so. One interviewee from the Council Secretariat explains EU’s priorities with regards to influencing other polluting countries to adopt appropriate policies. To this end, he has recognised four categories of countries (CON08 2009):
a) countries that are most progressive and push for ambitious, internationally binding targets;

b) countries that acknowledge the problem of climate change, seem to understand that it is serious, but are focused more on national efforts than on accepting legally-binding commitments;

c) countries arguing that those who caused the problem must now solve it, while developing countries should keep developing their economies;

d) low-emission countries which are the most vulnerable to climate change;

The interviewee has described the goal of the EU as to convince the US to move from the category ‘B’ to category ‘A’, and to convince China along with India to move from category ‘C’ to category ‘B’ (CON08 2009). The fact that the EU, so far, has not been successful in this regard, cannot be considered as a determining factor affecting the international actorness of the EU (or indeed, its leadership role).

4.4.2. Recognition of the EU in the area of climate security

In addition to an active policy within the INFCCC framework, this thesis argues that the EU has also been active in developing the security dimension of climate change. Thus, it is important to investigate the extent to which the EU has been recognised in this area, and to assess the factors which influence the EU’s recognition. Within the UN Security Council, the issue of climate change was discussed for the first (and so far, last) time in 2007. This debate proved to be controversial, as some countries do not consider the UN Security Council an appropriate body to tackle climate change. Notably, China argued: ‘The developing countries believe that the Security Council has neither the professional competence in handling climate change - nor is it the right decision-making place for extensive participation leading up to widely acceptable proposals’ (UNSC 17/04/07). Furthermore, Pakistan, speaking on behalf the ‘Group of 77’ and China, agreed and underlined that other bodies, such as the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, are more appropriate to address climate change (UNSC 17/04/07).

Following this debate, the EU, in cooperation with small island states, has been continuing to work on the possible consequences of climate change for international security. They have
found the UN General Assembly to be a more ‘friendly’ body to discuss the issue. In its 63rd plenary meeting in May 2009, the UN General Assembly requested the UN Secretary General to prepare a ‘comprehensive report’ on the possible security implications of climate change and to present it in September 2009 (UNGA 18/05/09). In this context, the EU has continued to play an important role in the process, as Ban Ki-moon asked the EU to deliver its point of view on the issue (COM14 2009; CON10 2010). The EU’s position was prepared by the European Commission in cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the Swedish EU Presidency. This fact indicates that even though the existence of climate change on the international security agenda is a relatively recent development, the EU has already established itself as a recognised actor in this area.

When analysing EU documents, further conclusions can be drawn about the emerging recognition of the EU in the area of climate security. Most importantly, after the Joint Report was published in 2008, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, in cooperation with a number of member states, have initiated the aforementioned Steering Group. This Steering Group has adopted the so-called ‘Road Map’ for its activities in the area of climate security in 2008 and 2009 (COM14 2009). Three broad categories of actions have been identified to be undertaken:

a) developing dialogue with third countries and international organisations (most notably the UN) in the form of bilateral discussions, as well as conferences and workshops on the security consequences of climate change;

b) launching new studies and scenarios on regional risks;

c) building capabilities at the EU level;

In the context of EU recognition, it is important assess the activities of the Steering Group directed at states and organisations outside of the EU. In this context, it is first important to underline that the ambition of EU officials and member states involved in the Steering Group is for the EU to become a global leader in the area of climate security. For example, the Joint Report from March 2008 contains a section about ‘EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security’ (High Representative and European Commission 14/03/08: 10). Furthermore, the document from December 2009, formally reporting on the activities of the Steering Group to the Council, mentions ‘the EU as a global leader on CCIS [climate change
and international security] and its added value as partner and facilitator’ (Council of the European Union 25/11/09: 5). Up until December 2009, the following activities have been undertaken at the international level by the Steering Group (Council of the European Union 25/11/09). The list is not exhaustive. All of these activities contribute to the recognition of the EU as an actor in the area of climate security:

a) in the context of bilateral relations, the EU has raised the issue of climate security with more than 40 countries, including Australia, USA, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel and Russia;

b) South-East Asia: the EU, together with ASEAN Regional Forum, organised a seminar ‘International Security Implications of Climate-Related Events and Trends’;

c) Mediterranean and Middle East: the EU continues to raise the issue of climate security at all levels;

d) Central Asia: The EU, particularly under the EU Water Initiative (an initiative through which the EU aims to achieve water-related Millennium Development Goals) conducts numerous projects in the region. Water and environment constitute the priorities of the EU-Central Asia Strategy;

e) Latin America: The May 2010 EU-Latin America Summit put sustainable development and social inclusion on top of the agenda;

These early examples indicate that, through a variety of initiatives, the EU has been able to start introducing climate security agenda into relations with other countries and organisations. This also suggests that the EU begins to be recognised as an actor who is legitimate and has capabilities to address the challenge of the security consequences of climate change. One of the key forums for the EU in this regard has been the UN. One official from the Council Secretariat indicates that the EU has had a strong influence over discussions on climate security in the UN General Assembly in 2009. To this end, he notes that the EU has helped to ‘push the debate ahead’ through the activities of EU member states (CON10 2010). Until states are ready to bring the topic of climate change back to the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly is likely going to serve as the primary global forum through which the EU will exercise its influence and further develop its recognition.
4.4.3. Recognition of the Commission as a prominent actor

This chapter has already established that the European Commission plays a prominent role in the EU’s climate security policy. Furthermore, the officials of the Commission have achieved a high level of recognition among other Parties to the UNFCCC negotiations. Here, it is important to investigate reasons for a high level of the Commission’s recognition in international climate negotiations, and in developing the security dimension of climate change. The main reason for a high level of the Commission’s recognition is the fact that, as already indicated in this chapter, international climate change negotiations is the area of a shared competence between the EU, represented by the Commission, and member states. In practice, this means that the Commission is Party to the UNFCCC negotiations. Furthermore, officials working in the Commission do not rotate as frequently as the representatives of member states in the Council. This fact helps external actors to get to know individuals from the Commission, working on specific issue areas.

The main ‘arena’ for the Commission to exercise its actorness in international climate change negotiations, as already mentioned, is the UNFCCC, with the annual COPs. Notably, at the COP in Bali, in December 2007, the Commission was represented by at least 66 officials, including 33 officials from DG Environment. By comparison, Austria was represented by 31 officials and France by 70 officials (UNFCCC 14/12/07). This wide presence of the Commission in international environmental negotiations provides an opportunity for this institution to influence the process and develop its recognition. This significant representation is possible due to the internal restructuring of the Commission. DG Environment has expanded with the aim of having an official from this DG for each aspect of the UNFCCC negotiations. This, again, provides continuity and allows third states to have a ‘familiar face’ to talk to, when approaching the EU (COM03 2009).

In addition, the complex nature of issues discussed during the UNFCCC negotiations helps the Commission to develop its recognition even further, because through many years of experience, Commission’s officials are able to develop a high level of expertise. The scope of negotiations and their complexity have been broadening and deepening each year. Discussions often take place in parallel sessions, for which each Party needs to delegate a representative. Initially, it was the role of the EU Presidency to provide a Lead Negotiator who would negotiate on behalf of the EU in each session. However, eventually it became impossible for a single country, especially a smaller one, to provide experts for each agenda under discussion.
As a result, the Irish EU Presidency introduced the so-called ‘Issue Leaders’ for each session, whose role is to support a Lead Negotiator. This rearrangement has significantly increased the role of the Commission, because it has started representing EU position in sessions either as a Lead Negotiator or an Issue Leader (COM03 2009). This change, according to one Commission official participating in the UNFCCC negotiations, provides more continuity. Whereas in the past Lead Negotiators were changing every six months, now it is possible that the same officials represent the position of the EU for a few years.

In the context of developing the security dimension of climate change, it is important to briefly examine the recognition of the Commission among NGOs. The element of continuity plays an important role in this respect, and recognition is mutual. Importantly, Sherrington (2000) indicates that the political system of the EU, with the formal and informal policy processes, offers ‘windows’ for policy entrepreneurs such as think tanks, allowing them to influence EU policy-making. One official from the European Commission working on climate security policy admits that the role of NGOs is fundamental: ‘The participation of civil society is crucial for the work of the Commission and it is a “black and white” requirement on our part to do this. There is a lot of added value to our work in this process’ (COM14 2009). One of the most active think tanks in this policy area is the IES, established in 2002 in Hague. The empirical research has allowed to establish that some members of this think tank personally know officials from the European Commission who are active in the area of climate security. They meet regularly, for example at the IES conferences. The same element of continuity can be observed in the Council Secretariat, with officials working on climate security being well known within the think-tank community. This fact provides an additional indication of EU recognition in the area of climate security.

4.4.4. EU recognition and the UNFCCC Copenhagen summit in December 2009

Commenting on the outcome of the COP in Copenhagen, some scholars have noted that the leadership role of the EU has been severely undermined by the fact that the Copenhagen Accord was drafted bilaterally by the US and China, without consulting the EU. Furthermore, the EU was not successful in influencing the agenda and convincing key states to accept the legally binding, ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets. In this context, the Washington Post went as far as arguing that the ‘Copenhagen climate deal shows new world order may be led by U.S., China’ (Faiola et al. 2009). According to the authors of the article, after US
President and Chinese Prime Minister have prepared the Copenhagen Accord, ‘[t]he leaders of Europe, Japan and other countries at the summit were largely left to rubber-stamp the deal’ (Faiola et al. 2009). As a result of this arguable EU’s fiasco, Egenhofer and Georgiev (2009) have discouraged EU leaders from attempting to declare the Copenhagen summit a success, because doing so, according to those authors, would prevent them from reflecting what leadership, or at least playing a considerable role, really means.

This thesis does not attempt to argue that the EU has played the role of a leader at the Copenhagen summit. It indeed is desirable for the EU to reflect on its position in international climate change regime and the strategies that the EU may develop for a more effective policy. However when analysing the actorness role of the EU at the summit in Copenhagen, the actual outcomes of this meeting must be analysed. It is obvious that the EU did not manage to achieve its ambitious objective of setting legally-binding emissions reduction targets for all Annex I countries. In fact, it was clear long before the Copenhagen summit that reaching this objective would be impossible (Egenhofer and Georgiev 2009). Nonetheless, why should anyone expect the EU to be an actor so influential as to convince Washington to change its position, which was widely known throughout negotiations? This thesis argues that, albeit the recognition of the EU as an international actor (or even a leader) has been to some degree undermined by the unsuccessful (for the EU, at least) outcome of the Copenhagen summit, long-term recognition will be determined by the EU’s performance when implementing the Copenhagen Accord. To this end, the EU has committed $10 billion out of $30 billion for adaptation to climate change in developing countries, for the initial period 2010-2012.

This section has examined the recognition of the EU in the area of climate security policy. Notably, the empirical investigation allows to conclude that the EU has achieved a high level of recognition in this policy field. It must be noted that even Brussels-based environmental NGOs, scrutinising EU policy in this policy area, underline the important role of the EU. One representative of such an NGO has admitted: ‘We can debate whether the EU is a leader by default or because of a certain plan, but the EU is a leader. It is the only organisation in the world with clear numerical targets and such an ambitious policy’ (NGO1 2009). The development of the security dimension of climate change policy by the EU has been a recent phenomenon. Building on its long-recognised credibility as an advocate of a strong action on climate change, combined with its position as a non-military international security actor, the EU has been able to relatively quickly develop its recognition in climate security policy at the
international level. This, in particular, includes the activities of the EU and its member states within the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. As a result of this empirical investigation, this section concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of recognition.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the extent to which the EU has developed as an international security actor in the area of climate security. In this context, this chapter has assessed two interrelated types of EU policy. In a broader context, this chapter has analysed the actorness of the EU in the UNFCCC negotiations. The outcomes of these negotiations may have a significant bearing on the security and stability of the developing and least-developed countries and regions. In a narrower context, this chapter has analysed the efforts by the EU to develop policy explicitly linking climate change with international security. As a result of this empirical investigation, this chapter concludes that the EU has achieved a high level of actorness in the area of climate security. The following table summarises the findings of this chapter.

Table 2: EU security actorness in the area of climate change: the summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>The EU a) is legally recognised in international climate negotiations; and b) has a legal competence to act through the principle of a shared competence (EU and member states).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, play an important role in developing and conducting EU policy with respect to a) the UNFCCC negotiations; and b) developing and promoting the security dimension of climate change within the EU and externally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The EU has important resources concerning its international climate policy, including: a) the resources allowing it to play a leading role in developing the security dimension of climate change, such as a range of bilateral and multilateral contacts; b) research on climate change; and c) funding for developing countries pledged within the framework of the UNFCCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The EU, traditionally, has not only been recognised, but also considered a leader in international climate policy. The UNFCCC summit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Copenhagen might have undermined this leadership role to some degree, but in a long-term, the recognition of the EU will be determined by the extent to which the EU will keep setting ambitious goals for itself and other developed countries, and whether it will fulfill its financial pledges towards developing countries.

First, this chapter has investigated the authority of the EU to act in international climate negotiations. It has been established that the EEC has been playing a role in multilateral environmental and climate negotiations since the 1970s. Furthermore, the first section of this chapter has explained the shared nature of EU legal competence to act in international climate negotiations. It has been suggested that although sometimes difficult and confusing, the shared competence is the only possible solution for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it has also been established that the Lisbon Treaty does not introduce any substantial changes in this legal setup. Considering the active role of the European Commission in EU international climate policy, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority.

Second, this chapter has examined the main EU institutions in the context of their role in the UNFCCC negotiations, but also in the context of their role in developing the security dimension of climate change. Again, an important role of the Commission has been demonstrated, although it has also been argued that this EU institution is under strong pressure from member states in the process of proposing legislation and developing EU positions on climate change policy. The second section has also examined the role of the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the European Parliament in developing the security dimension of climate change. In particular, it has been underlined that the first two of these institutions play a coordinating role in the Steering Group concerned with developing the climate security agenda for the EU. Thus, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of institutions.

Third, this chapter has identified important resources available for the EU in the area of climate security, both in the context of developing the security dimension of climate change, but also in the broader context of global climate change negotiations. When focusing on climate security, both tangible (e.g. early warning capabilities) and intangible (e.g. a broad EU approach to international security in general) resources have been identified. With regards to the UNFCCC negotiations, it has been established that the EU has pledged the largest portion of
funding for developing countries to assist them with adaptation to climate change. Furthermore, this section has also examined research on climate change as an important asset of the EU. As a result, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of resources.

Fourth, this chapter has established that the EU has achieved a high level of recognition as an international actor (or even a leader) in climate change policy. Nonetheless, this significant recognition has to some extent been affected by the weak outcome of the UNFCCC Copenhagen summit in December 2009, when the EU did not manage to secure its preferred outcome, i.e. legally binding commitments. It is too early to draw conclusions whether it has been a temporary setback for the EU or indeed, the recognition of the EU will keep decreasing in relation to other actors. However, this thesis argues that, in a longer-term, the recognition of the EU will be largely determined by the extent to which the EU will keep setting ambitious goals for itself and other developed countries, and whether it will fulfill its financial pledges towards developing countries. This section has also demonstrated that the EU manages to quickly develop its recognition in the area of a relatively recent policy field of international climate security policy. Thus, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of recognition.

As a result of the empirical investigation conducted in this chapter, it is suggested that the EU has achieved a high level of actorness in the area of climate security policy. This concerns both aspects of this policy. Within the UNFCCC framework, the EU remains an important actor, even though the US and China managed to put the bar lower at the summit in Copenhagen, compared to the more ambitious propositions of the EU. Regardless of this setback for its leadership position, the EU has all the resources necessary to further influence the international climate policy agenda. Furthermore, this chapter has also demonstrated that the EU has already developed as a leading international actor in the area of climate security policy, which is pursued by the EU bilaterally with the third states, but also within the UN framework.
5. The EU and the non-proliferation of WMDs: the case of Russia

"With hundreds of tons of nuclear materials, an unwelcome holdover from the Soviet era, the Russian Federation is the most promising source of illicit fissile materials for Al Qaeda and kindred groups".

(Busch and Holmes 2009: 325)

This chapter assesses the EU's international security actoriness with respect to preventing the proliferation of WMDs from the territories of the former Soviet Union, most notably Russia. Although the threat of nuclear conflict between the West and the East has essentially disappeared together with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the enormous stockpile of insufficiently-protected chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials has emerged as a major security concern. This time it was not the state which was the source threat, but rather unauthorised individuals and non-state actors acquiring an access to poorly-protected Russian CBRN materials, as indicated by Busch and Holmes (2009). As a result, US Congress has launched an enormous programme of financial and technical assistance to Russia, to prevent the spread of sensitive materials. The EU, as the only non-state actor, has undertaken its own efforts in this area. This chapter investigates the EU's contribution to preventing the proliferation of WMDs, primarily from the former Soviet Union, through the range of legal, technical and financial instruments. Thus, this case study has been identified to represent the security concern which can be positioned between a non-traditional security challenge of climate change, and the traditional security problem of organised crime off the coast of Somalia, in the form of maritime piracy. First, the previous chapter has assessed the EU's role as an actor in the area of climate change, identifying some of the most important resources appropriate to tackle this issue, including the combination of the research, financial assistance and diplomacy. Second, the case of Somali piracy, as demonstrated in the final empirical chapter of this thesis, requires the combination of both military and non-military instruments. Preventing the proliferation of WMDs from Russia requires instruments of a civilian nature, including technical, financial and legal assistance, consultation and diplomacy.

For the EU, preventing the proliferation of WMDs appears to be increasingly important. Notably, the ESS (European Council 2003) identifies proliferation to be "potentially the greatest threat". In particular, three challenges associated with WMDs are recognised in this document, i.e.: a) the danger of arms race, particularly in the Middle East; b) biological weapons...
may become more deadly as a result of technological advances; and c) terrorist groups may acquire WMDs. Further, the Implementation Report (European Council 2008) assigns even more urgency to the threat of the proliferation of WMDs. In particular, this document notes that the risk associated with proliferation had increased between 2003 and 2008, pointing to Iran and North Korea in the context of their nuclear programmes. Furthermore, the Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Strategy) (European Council 10/12/03) underlines that the threat of proliferation is taken seriously in Europe, but also that the EU aspires to develop a common policy in this area. To this end, the WMD Strategy states: ‘WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU’s external action. The EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal’ (European Council 10/12/03: 2). Before proceeding to the empirical investigation, three important questions shall be addressed, providing the conceptual context and empirical background for research presented in this chapter. These questions include: a) What are WMDs?; b) What constitutes the proliferation of WMDs?; and c) Why Russia and the former Soviet Union constitutes an important case study in the context of global non-proliferation policy?

What are WMDs?

‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ can be conceptualised in a narrower or a broader manner. In a narrower sense, WMDs refer exclusively to nuclear weapons. Some scholars advocate this narrow understanding on the basis that inclusion of chemical and biological weapons into the category of WMDs weakens the ‘nuclear taboo’ (Pal Singh Sidhu 2008: 363). This thesis follows a more conventional understanding of WMDs which encompasses all three kinds of weapons: nuclear, biological and chemical. This broader understanding has been, for the most part, embraced by the international community; for example, the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1540 adopted in 2004 (UNSC 28/04/04), committed ‘to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery (...)’. In a similar vein, G8 leaders, through the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), committed to ‘prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological
weapons (...)’ (G8 2002). Thus, this chapter uses terms such as WMDs and CBRN materials interchangeably.

What is the proliferation of WMDs?

In the specialist literature, the proliferation of WMDs is considered to have two forms. Firstly, there is vertical proliferation, which concerns ‘the modernization or advancement of existing weapons technologies in countries already possessing nuclear weapons’ (Johnson 2007: 79). Secondly, there is horizontal proliferation, referring to ‘the spread of nuclear materials and/or technologies by private companies or state nuclear programmes to assist nation-states that do not have nuclear programmes or that possess a covert nuclear programme’ (Johnson 2007: 79). The network of Abdul Quadeer Khan is one of the most prominent examples of horizontal proliferation. This definition of horizontal proliferation emphasises the role of those actors that provide nuclear materials and technologies. However, in this category, it is also important to include the process where state- and non-state actors actively seek to acquire nuclear and other WMDs. The most prominent state actors which currently seek to develop nuclear capabilities include Iran and North Korea, with Pyongyang arguably already possessing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Russia and the former Soviet Union has been primarily associated with the threat of non-state actors gaining access to the enormous arsenals of CBRN materials.

Russia and the threat of proliferation

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has emerged as the country with the largest stockpile of CBRN materials in the world, located in the world’s largest number of buildings. This fact, in itself, does not have to be the source of the threat of proliferation. Yet, in the 1990s, ‘Moscow’s ability to exercise adequate command and control and to prevent unauthorised access into its WMD complex became frequently challenged’ (Turpen and Finlay 2009: 304). There were a few important sources of this concern. First, the change of the political system from the one which was closed and heavily infiltrated by KGB, in which nuclear, chemical and biological programmes were developed in secrecy and were unlikely to be penetrated from the outside, to the system relatively more open, with inadequate security measures, was the source of major concern in the Western world. Second, on top of this enormous political transformation, Russia and former Soviet Union countries faced difficult economic conditions throughout the 1990s. This, combined with the fact that CBRN knowl-
edge, materials and weapons are highly marketable, also became an important source of concern, particularly in the context of potential theft coming from the inside, rather than the outside.

Third, about 130,000-150,000 scientists in former Soviet Union countries were considered to possess knowledge which could contribute to developing a nuclear device. Most of them lacked employment and thus the prospect of their migration to countries seeking to develop WMDs became another significant source of concern. In an unprecedented survey concluded in 2003, 20 percent out of 602 Russian physicists, biologists and chemists responded that they would consider working in Iran, North Korea, Syria or Iraq (Ball and Gerber 2004). Fourth, in addition to these concerns associated with nuclear weapons and technologies, Soviet extensive biological weapons programme has become the source of concern, because ‘over the course of decades, the Soviet Union weaponised thousands of tons of viruses, toxins, and bacteria, including anthrax, smallpox, botulimum toxin and the plague’ (Turpen and Finlay 2009: 305). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the expertise associated with these weapons became more available. Moreover, over 60,000 scientists used to work for the Soviet biological complex over the course of the Cold War. These scientists have become an important source of proliferation concern. Ken Alibek, a Soviet-era biological weapons scientist admits that he and his former colleagues have been approached on numerous occasions to share their knowledge (Alibek 2000)

Busch and Holmes (2009) point to an additional problem, which underpins all of these concerns, making them even more serious. Focusing on the human factor, they analyse Russian nuclear security culture. They argue that even the most sophisticated security measures, installed with the support of the US, the EU and other stakeholders cannot be effective if workers managing these systems on a daily basis are not adequately prepared. For example, the authors note that ‘numerous reports have documented guards shutting off security and monitoring systems out of annoyance at frequent false alarms or simply because they found the systems too burdensome for routine use’ (Busch and Holmes 2009: 332-3). This attitude results from, among other factors, decades of arbitrary rule and the habit of mistrusting written rules.

Preventing the threat of proliferation from Russia has gained new urgency after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Already in 2000, the US Department of Energy convened a special Task Force
which aimed to evaluate US non-proliferation programmes in Russia. The Task Force con­cluded: ‘The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the dan­ger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home’ (Baker and Cutler 2000: 1). In response to the 9/11 attacks, G8 countries initiated the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass De­struction, initially focusing their efforts on Russia. The most recent assessments indicate that Russia has now ‘[s]ubstantial security and accounting measures in place for its nuclear weapons and materials’ (Bunn 2010: 31), but potential problems remain, such as an issue of the aforementioned security culture. This chapter aims to assess EU actorness in preventing the proliferation of WMDs from Russia. According to Denza (2005), the EU’s effort in this regard has been slightly overlooked in the literature; she notes: ‘Given the extensive and justi­fied fears expressed in the early 1990s that the break-up of the Soviet Union would lead to a leap in the number of nuclear-weapon states, the international effort and the European Union’s contribution to that particular exercise in containment deserves greater acknowledge­ment than it has received’ (Denza, 2005: 293).

This chapter contributes to filling the gap in scholarly work concerning the EU’s role in preventing the proliferation of WMDs with a focus on the former Soviet Union. The argument in this chapter has the following structure. Firstly, it examines the legal authority of the EU, which includes international legal recognition as well as legal competence to act on non-proliferation matters. Secondly, the chapter looks at key institutions involved in shaping and executing EU non-proliferation policy towards Russia. They range from member states work­ing together in the Council, through the Council Secretariat, to the role of the European Commission. Thirdly, this chapter identifies EU’s instruments utilised to address the problem of non-proliferation. Finally, the chapter discusses the recognition of the EU in the area of non-proliferation assistance to Russia. To this end, a number of non-proliferation experts from various research institutes have been interviewed in order to assess the level of EU recogni­tion as a non-proliferation actor.

5.1. The EU and non-proliferation: legal authority

The purpose of this section is to investigate the legal authority of the EU to act in the area of non-proliferation. Firstly, the place of the EU in international non-proliferation regimes is
examined. This role is often ambiguous, due to the *sui generis* character of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty, by granting the EU with legal personality, has the potential to strengthen the presence of the EU in international regimes, but at the time of writing it is still too early to assess this process. This section demonstrates that although the EU is not formally a member of international organisations and regimes dealing with the threat of proliferation, it has achieved *de jure* recognition within these forums. This argument is demonstrated on the example of three international regimes: a) the NPT and the Review Conferences framework; b) G8 and the Global Partnership framework; c) the UN Security Council and the 1540 Committee framework. The second part of this section scrutinises the EU’s legal competence to act in the area of non-proliferation. It suggests that important legal instruments of the EU exist not only within the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP, but also within the former ‘Community pillar’ of the EU.

5.1.1. International legal recognition

The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is the most important international agreement on non-proliferation and one of the most important international agreements in general. Its goal is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament (UN 22/04/70). The EU’s WMD Strategy states that the NPT ‘*must be preserved in its integrity. It has helped to slow and in some cases reverse the spread of military nuclear capability, but it has not been able to prevent it completely*’ (European Council 10/12/03: 3). Even though the EU is not formally Party to the NPT, it is *de jure* recognised within the NPT regime at different levels.

For example, article III of the NPT states that non-nuclear states must accept safeguards as negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is to verify their compliance with the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty, establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, grants the European Commission with the same prerogatives (i.e. conducting inspections) within the EU. Both institutions cooperate closely and the Commission is recognised as a valuable partner by the IAEA. When celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Commission’s support to the IAEA, the Deputy Director of the IAEA noted that ‘*the European Commission belongs to those who are committed to supporting us in providing the international community with the best possible assurances*’
about the peaceful use of nuclear energy’ (Heinonen 2006). The role of the Commission in this context can be characterised as a ‘middleman’. The declarations of EU member states go first to the Commission, which then submits these declarations to the IAEA. This allows for a uniform implementation of the Additional Protocol within the EU (European Union 2004).

The EU has also been attempting to play an active role in NPT Review Conferences held every five years. According to Schmitt (2005: 7-8), at 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences ‘the Union played an active role, establishing itself as a recognized actor in this field’. For example, already in 1995, the EU prepared for the Conference through adopting a Joint Action opting for the indefinite extension of the NPT (Council of the European Union 08/08/94). This goal, strongly supported by the EU, was achieved even though some divisions among EU member states prevented them from presenting a unified position at the conference itself. For example, the UK and France sided with other nuclear powers recognised by the NPT, whilst Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden joined the so-called G-11 ‘White Angles’ group (Grand 2000). In 2000 and 2005, the EU adopted common positions supporting further strengthening of the NPT regime. In 2005, according to some observers, even though the conference failed to reach a successful outcome, the EU ‘played a more prominent role in the course of the Conference than ever before, but without any outsider noting it’ (Müller 2005: 10). This effect was achieved primarily because divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear EU states did not considerably affect a common EU position throughout the conference (Müller 2005).

The G8 is another forum in which the EU has achieved recognition, albeit it is not a full member of the group. According to one high level Council Secretariat official working in the area of non-proliferation, ‘in the G8 nobody knows what status we have. I don’t know what status we have’ (CON01 2009). The group convened its first meeting in 1975 and was composed of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, the US and Japan. Canada joined the following year. Russia started attending the meetings in 1994 and obtained full membership in 1998. The EU has been participating in G7 (and later G8) meetings since 1977. It is represented by both the President of the European Commission and the rotating EU Presidency; as a result, the EU is sometimes called the ‘ninth member’ (University of Toronto 2009). Yet, the limitations imposed on the EU’s membership are often the source of confusion. For example, the Commission cannot host or chair the summit; it also does not assume the role of G8 rotating Presidency. However, apart from that, it has all the privileges and obligations of the member-
ship. If the Presidency of the EU is held by the country which is also a G8 member, then this country represents the EU and does not have an additional delegation. EU representation is also included in famous ‘G8 family photos’.

Even though the role of the EU in the G8 can sometimes be ambiguous, it is fully recognised as a contributor within the framework of the Global Partnership. G8 leaders pledged $20 billion for cooperation projects in Russia over the years 2002-2012 (G8 2002), as a response to the threat of terrorist actors acquiring access to WMDs in Russia. Former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi announced in 2003 that the EU would contribute €1 billion (European Commission 2007a). The so-called ‘Final Compliance Reports’ provide an interesting indication of EU recognition within the Global Partnership framework. These comprehensive documents are prepared jointly by the G8 Research Centres in Toronto and Moscow. They annually assess the progress of G8 members in fulfilling their commitments in the area of non-proliferation assistance. For example, in 2004, the Report acknowledged the EU’s ‘non-proliferation clause’ initiative, discussed broader later in this chapter. Interestingly, the document referred to Javier Solana as the ‘EU Foreign Policy and Security Policy Chief’ (G8 Information Centre 2004). The Compliance Report covering the period July 2008/June 2009, noted that the EU was ‘well on track to meet its financial commitment to the Global Partnership’, but also that there was no evidence ‘that the EU has taken new Global Partnership projects in this compliance cycle’ (G8 Information Centre 2009: 209).

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in 2004, obligates states to ‘refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems’ (1540 Committee 2004). In practice, Resolution 1540 calls upon states to establish effective export control mechanisms on dual-use items. As such, Resolution 1540 has established a new framework for addressing the threat of proliferation and added to already quite a broad spectrum of international agreements in this area. To oversee the implementation of this resolution, the so-called ‘1540 Committee’ was created, preparing reports every two years.

The EU participates in implementing this resolution, but some EU officials are cautious to underline that the EU adopted the WMD Strategy already in 2003 and that this strategy guides EU policy in the area of non-proliferation. One EU official, working in the area of non-
proliferation, notes that the 1540 Committee serves as a new platform trying to influence the donors, but itself it does not have any funding. He also explains that when people ask him whether everything the EU does in the area of non-proliferation policy is within the framework of Resolution 1540, he denies, because the EU’s WMD Strategy was adopted before the 1540 Committee was established. Consequently, it is the WMD Strategy which guides EU non-proliferation policy. The interviewee concludes that ‘there are a lot of people who want to coordinate, but in reality no one wants to be coordinated and also to give money’ (CON09 2009). Regardless of some scepticism towards the effectiveness of frameworks such as this created by Resolution 1540, the EU participates in implementing this resolution. As a result, it is recognised in the report of the 1540 Committee (1540 Committee 2008).

This empirical overview of the EU’s position within major international non-proliferation frameworks allows to conclude that the EU has achieved de jure (legal) recognition, even though it is not formally a full member of neither of the organisations which have established these frameworks. Notably, the EU is not a full member of the UN or the G8. Yet, it is recognised as a partner within the frameworks established by these institutions, most notably the NPT (including NPT Review Conferences), the Global Partnership and Resolution 1540 framework. The following section examines another dimension of EU legal authority, namely the EU’s legal competence to act.

5.1.2. Legal basis for action

If EU non-proliferation policy was conducted exclusively within the CFSP framework, EU legal instruments would consist exclusively of joint actions and common positions. However, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, the Commission has become a significant contributor to the EU’s non-proliferation policy. Thus, it is important to identify EU legal instruments existing outside of the CFSP framework. This broader approach is without prejudice to the importance of the legal instruments of the Council, most notably joint actions; EU member states have been developing common projects in Russia for over a decade now. Nonetheless, in order to obtain a more holistic image of the EU’s role in non-proliferation policy, it is important to discuss EU legal instruments beyond any single policy framework.

Within the former framework of the EC, article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEEC) introduced five legal instruments, ‘concerned with translating the general principles of the treaties into specific rules’ (Nugent 2003: 238). These instruments in-
clude: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. They can be adopted by the Council, the Council and the European Parliament, and the Commission. A regulation, which has played an important role in developing the EU’s non-proliferation policy, has the following characteristics: a) it contains general and abstract provisions; b) it is fully binding and therefore member states must observe it in full; c) it is directly applicable and therefore member states do not have to ratify it (Nugent 2003).

A regulation as one of the EU’s legal instruments has been utilised to provide Russia with technical and financial assistance already at the beginning of the 1990s. In this respect, the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) was the main instrument of the Commission for providing Russia with assistance and recovery funds, including in the area of nuclear safety and non-proliferation. A legal basis for EU activities in this respect was provided by consecutive Council regulations. The first regulation was adopted already in 1991 and initially was directed at the Soviet Union. Two years later, Council regulation was addressed at the Commonwealth of Independent States and the programme became known as TACIS (Sodupe and Benito 1998). The Council kept prolonging TACIS up until 2006, through its regulations from 1996 and 1999. In 2007, the Council adopted a regulation establishing the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) (Council of the European Union 22/03/07), discussed in more detail in the third section.

These and other instruments of the EU have been important in preventing the proliferation of knowledge and technologies from Russia and other countries of the region. Yet, what the EU has been lacking throughout the 1990s was an overarching political strategy to develop a more systematic, long-term approach. One attempt to overcome this problem was the so-called ‘Common Concept’, adopted by the WEU in 1995, which constitutes the first effort to ‘draft a distinctive European strategic document’ (Biscop 2008: 14). The document attempted to define a new, post-Cold War strategic environment in Europe, identifying some of the new major risks, including the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism and organised crime. With regards to non-proliferation, the document called upon the EU to ‘pursue universal participation in, and compliance with, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation conventions (...)’ (Western European Union 1995: 8).

Even more important than the Common Concept, the ESS identifies the proliferation of WMDs as ‘potentially the greatest threat’ (European Council 2003: 3). Furthermore, the Im-
plementation Report, adopted by the European Council in December 2008, notes that 'the risk [of proliferation] has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure' (European Council 2008: 3). In addition to these frameworks attempting to define European security challenges and objectives, in December 2003, the European Council adopted the WMD Strategy. Through this document, EU member states have established a high-level political framework for EU non-proliferation policy. For example, the WMD Strategy envisaged the establishment of the WMD Monitoring Centre (discussed later in this chapter) as well as the organisation of a ‘six monthly debate on the implementation of the EU Strategy at the External Relations Council’ (European Council 10/12/03: 13). Since 2003, the Council has been publishing Six-monthly Progress Reports. At the time of adopting the WMD Strategy, there were some concerns that the document was adopted merely as a political declaration and not in the form of a joint action, common position or a common strategy, which are EU legal instruments within the CFSP framework. Yet, the fact that the Council keeps regularly publishing Progress Reports indicates the importance that EU member states attach to the WMD Strategy (Great Britain 2005). Another important instrument for EU non-proliferation policy is the non-proliferation clause in the so-called ‘mixed agreements’ between the EU and third countries. The clause was legally established in November 2003 by the Council (Council of the European Union 19/11/03); since then, it has been applied to all new mixed agreements. Also, it has been applied to existing mixed agreements whenever possible, as a part of the implementation of the WMD Strategy.

This section has set out to examine the legal authority of the EU in the area of the non-proliferation of WMDs. Two observations can be drawn on the basis of this analysis. Firstly, although the EU is not a member of the UN, it is nonetheless recognised within various UN regimes, such as the NPT and Resolution 1540. Moreover, the EU is not merely recognised, but also plays an active role in supporting these regimes. Similarly, even though EU membership in G8 raises questions about the nature of this membership, the EU actively participates in, and is recognised within, the G8 Global Partnership. A similar pattern of legal recognition can be observed in the case of the EU’s anti-piracy policy, discussed in the next chapter. Secondly, this section has demonstrated that the EU has a variety of legal instruments in the area of the non-proliferation of WMDs. These instruments do not only include joint actions and common positions, but also, rather less obviously, a regulation, which has been utilised by the EU to develop assistance programmes in former Soviet Union countries. In addition to these
legal instruments, this section has also discussed instruments of a more political nature, such as the ESS and the WMD Strategy. As a result of this empirical analysis, it can be concluded that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority in the area of the non-proliferation of WMDs.

5.2. The EU and non-proliferation: key institutions

The aim of this section is to assess the role of EU institutions in the area of non-proliferation policy. However, before analysing these institutions separately, it is important to discuss the issue of the duality of competences of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat. The complications stemming from this duality may have been resolved by the establishment of the EEAS, but it is too early to make definite conclusions in this regard. The duality refers to the situation where, on the one hand, the European Commission has its own, significant (financial) resources in the area of non-proliferation policy and, on the other hand, the Council Secretariat has its own resources; the resources at the disposal of the Council Secretariat are more modest, however. An additional, significant dimension to this division is the fact that the Council Secretariat considers non-proliferation to be an exclusive competence of EU member states. The HRCFSP’s Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD, Annalisa Giannella, fully expressed these concerns of the Council Secretariat; they shall be quoted in length:

‘As I have said, there are procedures which are different; there are prerogatives which are different in the two pillars; and there are financial resources which are very different. Despite the fact that I believe non-proliferation is mainly a foreign and security policy area, I think there is a tendency to try, through the budgetary procedures and instruments, putting it in a simplistic way, to “communiterise” non-proliferation. If you look at the financial perspectives and at the stability instruments put forward by the Commission, stability instruments basically would work as a Community programme. There would be a sort of framework decision by the Council and then the programme would be managed and all the projects would be prepared and decided by the Commission with very little power in the hands of Member State’ (Great Britain 2005: 38).

In an official discourse, Commission’s officials underline the low profile of their activities: ‘It [Commission’s non-proliferation policy] started at a low level with a few projects handled through regular and standard funds and the means of European Community’ (Great Britain 2005: 47); they also note that it was only after the attacks of 9/11 when ‘the file has taken a
higher profile politically at the EU level' (Great Britain 2005: 47). However, unofficially, some of the Commission’s officials admit that the Commission has proportionally larger financial resources than those of the Council, in the area of non-proliferation and nuclear safety policy. For example, within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership, former Commission President Romano Prodi pledged €1 billion from the EU budget over the years 2002-2012. The officials interviewed for this thesis pointed out that within this sum, Council joint action projects constitute merely 3 percent, while the vast majority is managed by the Commission (COM10 2009).

One Council Secretariat official observes that this duality of competences and resources undermines the recognition of the EU as a non-proliferation actor: ‘It is a disaster that we don’t have a unified representation. Countries such as the US and Russia are fed up with this situation, it is annoying to them’ (CON01 2009). This criticism is indirectly pointed towards the Commission. The Council official further notes: ‘The Commission has its representation in Moscow, but Javier Solana does not. The Commission does not take instructions from us and doesn’t have to report back to us’ (CON01 2009). Again, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced potentially significant changes in this respect. The EEAS, including new EU delegations to third countries, will assist the EU’s HRUFASP. Furthermore, the design of the EEAS is such that it will bring together DG Relex of the European Commission and the bureaucracy of the Council Secretariat (Council of the European Union 03/08/10). Further work needs to establish whether these reforms will indeed bring more institutional consistency to EU non-proliferation policy.

5.2.1. Member states and the Council

Within the Cold-War context, the institutional instruments of European states to conduct a common foreign and security policy were mainly confined to the EPC – an informal framework established in 1970 with the so-called ‘Luxemburg Report’. In this report, six member states of the EEC undertook a very cautious attempt to coordinate their international policies. The framework was informal and non-binding, because the report was not ratified by national legislation (Smith 2002). Yet, this document ‘marked the first successful attempt at foreign policy cooperation by the member states of the European Community’ (Smith 2002: 68). This EPC framework allowed EEC foreign ministers to meet twice a year in a country holding the Presidency, but not in Brussels. The work for the ministers was prepared by the so-called ‘Po-
political Committee’ (PoCo), further divided into working groups. One of these working groups, established in 1981 at the British - Dutch initiative, concerned the policy on the non-proliferation of WMDs (Sauer 2003; Smith 1996). After the TEU introduced the CFSP, this working group was renamed to the Committee on Nuclear Affairs. The early attempts to coordinate European policies in the area of non-proliferation were severely hampered by the fact that France was critical towards the NPT regime, acceding to it only in 1992. In spite of this obstacle, European states managed to agree on a number of declarations supporting the NPT already in the 1980s (Sauer 2003).

The European Council summit in Dublin, in 1990, constitutes an important step towards developing a common European non-proliferation policy. At this summit, the heads of state and government adopted a declaration on nuclear non-proliferation, in which they declared a desire ‘to work actively to secure a successful outcome’ (European Council 25-26/06/90: 23) of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT. In 1992, the EPC was integrated into the newly-established CFSP. At this point, EU member states confirmed that the CFSP shall play a role in non-proliferation policy. Considering the historical context, the intention of the EU was to focus mainly on Russia and the former Soviet Union (European Council 26-27/06/92). Among the new instruments introduced by the TEU were common positions and joint actions. The investigation conducted further in this chapter indicates that EU member states have been utilising these instruments to pursue EU common non-proliferation policy, particularly since the late 1990s. The following section demonstrates that in addition to these intergovernmental, largely informal arrangements, the EU has also started to develop more permanent institutional structures, aiming to introduce more continuity to its non-proliferation policy.

5.2.2. Council General Secretariat

The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union has experienced a significant quantitative (the number of officials) and qualitative (the importance of its work) growth over the decades since it was set in the 1950s. The origins of this institution were modest and initial competences limited mainly to the organisation of conferences and committee servicing (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Nowadays, the Council Secretariat plays an important administrative, but also political role within the EU. Some of the roles of this institution include the organisation of conferences, coordination of Council’s work, ensuring the coherence of Council’s policy and assistance in seeking solutions (Hayes-Renshaw 2006). This last role
becomes particularly important in the context of the current size of the EU and the complexity of the EU’s agenda.

Notably, the Council Secretariat has become home for EU member states to develop more permanent EU institutional structures in the area of non-proliferation policy. Of particular importance in this context has been the appointment of Annalisa Giannella as the HRCFSP’s Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD in October 2003. A small office was created for Ms Giannella and her staff in the Justus Lipsius building. Hierarchically, this Directorate for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is located within the Directorate-General E of the Secretariat, dealing with External and Political-Military Affairs. Importantly, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced changes to this institutional structure. Following prolonged discussions on the composition of the EEAS, EU member states have decided that entities of the Directorate-General E, including the one concerning non-proliferation policy, will be moved to the EEAS. These transfers shall take effect on 1 January 2011 (Council of the European Union 03/08/10).

When former HRCFSP Javier Solana appointed his Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD in 2003, the post-holder was entrusted with the following tasks:

a) contributing to the further development of the EU WMD Strategy;

b) further enhancing the profile of non-proliferation policy in EU’s relations with third countries;

c) contributing to the implementation of the EU SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons) Strategy (since 2005);

d) assisting EU member states in their efforts to coordinate policies in the area of conventional arms exports controls;

e) assisting E3 (Germany, France and the UK) and the HRCFSP in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme (since Autumn 2004);

The institutional merging of non-proliferation bureaucracies from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, as provided for by the arrangements concerning the EEAS, constitutes the most robust attempt to bring more institutional consistency to the EU’s international security policy in this particular policy field. Yet, it is important to recognise that, in the area of non-
proliferation policy, there have been other attempts, developed within the existing institutional structure. Most notably, in 2006, the Council established the so-called ‘WMD Monitoring Centre’, located within the Council Secretariat. This initiative aimed at ‘enhancing effectiveness and consistency without any modification of institutional settings and prerogatives, by establishing a cooperative working method which allows the Council Secretariat/HR, the Commission services and Member States to work together, and ensure better synergy’ (Council of the European Union 12/12/06: 3). In particular, the Centre was entrusted with the following tasks:

a) monitoring the coherent implementation of the WMD Strategy, particularly in the context of rotating EU Presidencies;

b) assuring the coherence among the non-proliferation programmes of EU member states and these of the Commission;

c) supporting relevant Council forums, including working groups, the PSC, Coreper and the Council;

d) supporting and ensuring continuity in political dialogue with third parties;

This overview of responsibilities indicates that the EU has recognised the challenge of assuring institutional consistency in non-proliferation policy long before establishing the EEAS. In fact, the idea to establish the WMD Monitoring Centre was already expressed in the EU’s WMD Strategy, which called for ‘[setting up, as agreed in Thessaloniki, a unit which would function as a monitoring centre, entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the EU Strategy and the collection of information and intelligence, in liaison with the Situation Centre. This monitoring centre would be set up at the Council Secretariat and fully associate the Commission’ (European Council 10/12/03: 13). Yet, it was only in 2006 when the concept paper, providing for the establishment of this informal body, was drafted and adopted by the Council. The Centre proved to be a valuable forum for various parties (including the Council Secretariat and the Commission) to discuss more specific thematic issues, but also to have a more general exchange of information (De Jong et al. 2010). The following section introduces the institutional structure of the Commission with regards to its role in EU non-proliferation policy.
5.2.3. The European Commission

The role of the European Commission in international security policy of the EU is slightly overlooked in research terms. Typically, scholars tend to focus on the CSDP institutional framework, with the Commission analysed mainly in the context of its contribution to this intergovernmental framework of EU cooperation (Anderson 2008; Cameron 2007; Howorth 2007; Smith 2002; Tardy 2009). In the area of non-proliferation policy, as this chapter has already demonstrated, there has been a degree of anxiety within the Council Secretariat over the competences of the Commission in this policy field. Furthermore, scholars tend to discuss the instruments of the Commission, contributing to EU non-proliferation policy, only briefly, if at all (Álvarez-Verdugo 2006; Müller 2007; Overhaus et al. 2004; Portela 2003; 2004). Anthony (2004) constitutes a notable exception, with his comprehensive overview of the EU’s perspective on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative, discussed later in this chapter.

This chapter aims to demonstrate that the European Commission, mainly through its financial instruments, has been an important contributor to EU policy in the area of non-proliferation. Notably, until 2009, the Commission has spent at least €636 million out of €1 billion pledged by former Commission President Romano Prodi in 2003 for the G8 Global Partnership (G8 Information Centre 2009). Throughout the 1990s, the Commission has been utilising TACIS as the main programme to deliver non-proliferation assistance to Russia and the former Soviet Union. In 2006, some of the functions of TACIS in the area of non-proliferation were taken over by the INSC. Furthermore, in 2007, the Commission acquired a new instrument — the IFs, which allows for a more strategic approach to non-proliferation policies. These instruments are discussed at length later in this chapter. Here, it is important to outline the institutional arrangements supporting the Commission’s policy in this respect.

The non-proliferation projects of the Commission have traditionally been developed primarily by DG Relex. Its structure was reorganised following the introduction of the CFSP (Spence 1996), to include the units such as CFSP Operations and Security Policy. The Security Policy unit is composed of officials working in various policy areas related to the CFSP, including the non-proliferation of WMDs. Again, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced important changes to the institutional structure of the Commission. Importantly for the EU’s non-proliferation policy, Directorate ‘A’ (Crisis Platform and Policy Coordination in CFSP, including the Security Policy unit) are going to be moved to the EEAS. The purpose of this reorganisation is to
bring more institutional consistency between the instruments of the Commission and the policies of the Council Secretariat. Indeed, in a longer term, this goal may be achieved. However, a degree of caution is desirable when attempting to draw conclusions about the future effects of the current rearrangements. Notably, Christiansen (2001) notes that, against the low level of expectations, the Council Secretariat and the Commission tend to cooperate surprisingly well in the area of foreign and security policy. On the other hand, he identifies problems when looking at intra-institutional coherence (within institutions), where ‘differing organizational logics of distinct administrative tasks constitute internal tensions which then require substantive institutional resources for their resolution’ (Christiansen 2001: 766). This observation was partially confirmed by the empirical research, when one Council Secretariat official noted that his cooperation with the Commission on a certain policy document was better than that with his colleagues next door (CON08 2009). Thus, it requires further research to assess the impact of the EEAS on the institutional coherence of EU policy in the area of the non-proliferation of WMDs.

The purpose of this section has been to determine the role and nature of EU institutional structure in the area of the EU’s non-proliferation policy. As a starting point, this section has assessed early political developments within the framework of the EPC. It has been demonstrated that these early developments have had an informal character and lacked a more advanced institutional structure, which would provide for more continuity. The common non-proliferation policy was further constrained by French reluctance to support the NPT regime. Subsequently, this section has discussed the institutional arrangements of the Council Secretariat and the Commission, with a particular focus on the challenge of consistency between them. As it has been discussed, important attempts were undertaken by EU member states to strengthen the role of the Council Secretariat in implementing the EU WMD Strategy. At the same time, the Commission has been involved in providing non-proliferation assistance to Russia and the former Soviet Union. In order to bring the instruments and policies of these two institutions closer together, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced some important novelties. In this context, of particular importance is the organisational structure of the EEAS, which has a potential to bring more unity to EU non-proliferation policy. As a result of the empirical analysis, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of institutions.
5.3. **The EU and non-proliferation: resources**

This section aims to discuss the resources at the disposal of the EU in conducting a security policy in the area of non-proliferation. These resources include financial instruments of a more technical nature, but also the instruments of a higher political profile. Both kinds of instruments are important to analyse when adopting the comprehensive approach. Thus, this section starts an empirical investigation with examining a recently established instrument of the European Commission, the IfS. It is demonstrated that this instrument, through its long-term component, allows the EU to develop projects and contribute to international non-proliferation regimes. In the second part, this section investigates an instrument which had played a role in the non-proliferation policy of the EC up until 2006. It is argued that TACIS had considerably contributed to preventing the proliferation of knowledge and nuclear technologies from Russia and Ukraine. The INSC, which replaced TACIS in 2006, is also discussed. Then, this section proceeds to examine the non-proliferation clause which is included to the EU’s mixed agreements. In the last part, this section analyses member states’ efforts to undertake common non-proliferation initiatives within the Council.

5.3.1. **The Instrument for Stability**

The IfS, according to former MEP Angelina Beer, constitutes the first attempt to ‘*define the Grey Zone between the Council’s CFSP, ESDP and the Commission’s development policy, a step that might complete existing programmes and encourage active conflict prevention*’ (Beer 2006: 34). This instrument, building on the RRM, aims to allow the EU to respond rapidly to crisis situations, but also to develop longer-term, preventative projects. Thus, the IfS consists of two major components. The first component, regulated by article 3, concerns the provisions for assisting in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (European Parliament and the Council 24/11/06). This component fulfills the primary aim of the IfS, which is to enhance the capacity of the EU concerning the ‘*response to a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis, a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals, or a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or severely to destabilise the third country or countries concerned*’ (European Parliament and the Council 24/11/06: 3). The second component of the IfS, regulated by article 4, concerns the provisions for providing assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. Three areas have been identified in this context:
a) threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health;

b) risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents;

c) pre- and post-crisis capacity building;

Proportionally, the first component of the IfS constitutes around 75 percent of the budget allocated for the IfS for the years 2007-2013, which is €2.062 billion. Of this sum, around 25 percent is allocated for longer-term projects, of which: a) no more than 7 percent can be allocated to the first area; b) no more than 15 percent can be allocated for the second area; and c) no more than 5 percent can be allocated to the third area. The main reason why the second component has been allocated with considerably lower level of funding is that there already are important geographical instruments for long-term EU involvement, such as the EDF and the Development Co-operation Instrument. On the other hand, the EU lacked an effective crisis response instrument, allowing for a more immediate reaction.

Interestingly, when the IfS was established, the European Commission has decided that a strategy was needed for the long-term component. Thus, in 2007, DG Relex drafted the Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011 (European Commission 2007b) in order to give the EU a better visibility in the world (COM11 2009). The Strategy indicates that €266 million has been allocated for the years 2007-2013 from the IfS budget for non-proliferation policy, constituting 13 percent of the total IfS budget for this period. However, this sum does not include related resources of the Commission, aiming to strengthen nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union, discussed in the next section. Notably, the IfS has become ‘the sole Community instrument that can directly address issues relating to the risks presented by the weaponisation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents’ (European Commission 2007b: 20). This distinctive role of the IfS in the EU’s non-proliferation policy was also underlined in the Commission’s Communication on non-proliferation from 2009: ‘With around 300 million EUR for the period 2007–2013, the Instrument for Stability is a major instrument on non-proliferation seeking to develop a CBRN safety and security culture throughout the world, together with other EU instruments’ (European Commission 26/03/09: 5).

The following table demonstrates specific initiatives of the European Commission programmed for the years 2007-2008 (European Commission 2007c) and 2009-2011 (European
Commission 08/04/09), within the legal framework of article 4 (long-term component) of the IfS. This listing allows to observe how the priorities of the European Commission with regards to its non-proliferation policies have evolved over the last few years, moving beyond a traditional geographical focus on Russia and the former Soviet Union. Some of the figures in this table come from DG EuropeAid (European Commission 2009).

Table 4: The IfS resources for non-proliferation in the years 2007-2011

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<td><strong>Area 1: Redirection of scientists.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Area 1: Regional centres of excellence on CBRN.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What:</strong> To prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise, the Commission supports two scientific centres, one in Russia and one in Ukraine. The centres aim to provide employment for scientists with knowledge and expertise in the area of WMDs. 40 percent of the IfS budget for non-proliferation was committed to this area in the years 2007-2008.</td>
<td><strong>What:</strong> The Commission plans to create CBRN centres of excellence providing training and assistance in the area of export control, illicit trafficking, redirection of scientists and safety and security culture. The goal is to better coordinate various EU instruments on a regional basis as well as strengthen regional networks and create local ownership.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Where:</strong> Former Soviet Union.</td>
<td><strong>Where:</strong> Middle East, South and South-East Asia, parts of Africa.</td>
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<td><strong>Funds:</strong> €23 million.</td>
<td><strong>Funds:</strong> €25-30 million.</td>
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<th><strong>Area 2: Preventing illegal trafficking of CBRN materials.</strong></th>
<th><strong>Area 2: Preventing illegal trafficking of CBRN and deceptive financial practices.</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What:</strong> The Commission exchanges information and knowledge with relevant actors, such as states, regional and international</td>
<td><strong>What:</strong> The Commission intends to cooperate with countries in the area of trafficking of materials and monitoring of financial</td>
</tr>
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organisations, industry and financial sector.

**Where:** Global.

**Funds:** €11.7 million.

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**Area 3: Export control on dual-use goods.**

**What:** The Commission aims to build a 'sustainable capability' for assisting selected partner countries and providing them with expertise. Member states possessing relevant expertise are entrusted with executing this policy and the Commission supports it.

**Where:** Global with a focus on the Balkans, China, United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Ukraine.

**Funds:** €6 million.

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**Area 3: Supporting bio-safety and bio-security.**

**What:** The Commission wants to contribute to the security and safety of laboratories handling infectious agents.

**Where:** Middle East, former Soviet Union, most notably Central Asia, South and South-East Asia. Actions in Africa will be considered.

**Funds:** €14-18 million.

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**Area 4: Responding to biological threats.**

**What:** The Commission wants to strengthen the safety of biological laboratories, including those working in the area of biomedical research.

**Where:** Global, with a focus on 'countries of proliferation concern'.

**Funds:** €6.8 million.

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**Area 4: Export control on dual-use goods.**

**What:** In addition to actions undertaken in the years 2007-2008, the Commission wants to ‘consolidate existing actions, reinforce related training, and move to new countries and regions of concern’.

**Where:** The same countries as previously, plus: Georgia, Malaysia, Moldova, Tunisia and Turkey.

**Funds:** €6-10 million.

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**Area 5: Disposition of CBRN-related ma-**

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**Area 5: Redirection of scientists.**
What: The Commission wants to build on existing projects, developed e.g. within the G8 Global Partnership framework, and to contribute to the destruction of CBRN materials.

Where: ‘Countries and regions of proliferation concern’.

Funds: no data.

What: The Commission underlines the ‘historical value’ of two scientific centres, one in Russia and one in Ukraine. However, according to the Commission, proliferation threat from Russia is now limited and Russia should participate to a greater extent in providing funding of its centre. In this context, the Commission would like to shift its activities towards new regions of concern. Yet, it is acknowledged that the risk of biological proliferation from the former Soviet Union remains a potential threat.

Where: Going beyond the former Soviet Union, most notably Middle East and Asia.

Funds: €27-33 million.

This listing allows for a few observations. Firstly, the Commission aims to shift its geopolitical focus away from the territories of the former Soviet Union. Russia and other countries in the region have received most of the EU’s assistance throughout the 1990s and 2000s. It was a natural development, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and threats associated with this process, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter. At present, the Commission aims to shift its focus and concentrate on other regions, following the geopolitical developments of the early 21st century. Notably, the Commission aims to get involved more in the Middle East and South-East Asia. One indication of this shift is the fact that contributing to the employment of Russian scientists, a landmark programme of EU non-proliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union, was not defined as a top priority in 2009, as compared to 2007. Nonetheless, as figures indicate, this priority will still receive the largest portion of the IfS budget.

Secondly, the Commission aims to make EU non-proliferation policy less centralised. To this end, it has introduced the idea of non-proliferation ‘centres of excellence’, which entails creating regional networks bringing together as many actors as possible in order to develop a sense of regional project ownership. In developing the centres of excellence in a non-proliferation
policy area, the Commission relies on the expertise of the JRC. Thirdly, even though the Commission finds it necessary to shift its geographical focus to new ‘countries of proliferation concern’, it remains worried about biological proliferation in the former Soviet Union. In the Indicative Programme for 2009-2011, it is noted that this threat still exists in the former Soviet Union, particularly in its ‘other parts’. However, biological weapons in Russia itself remain a concern for the EU in the context of its extensive biological programmes during the Cold War and Russia’s secrecy surrounding its biological weapons stockpiles (Alibek 2000).

Fourthly, both documents are relatively vague with regards to biological proliferation and the disposition of CBRN-related materials. This second area is not even mentioned in the Indicative Programme for 2009-2011. The reason why the disposition of CBRN-related materials is not given more attention may be the fact that the destruction of chemical weapons is very expensive. In addition to this financial factor, there is much secrecy surrounding this process, which contributes to the concern within the Commission that Russia may use EU funding to develop new lethal technologies. Similarly, Russia is not willing to discuss its past biological programmes. For this reason, it is difficult to develop detailed policies in this area.

The overall budget of around €266 million assigned to non-proliferation in the years 2007-2013 may seem an insignificant contribution, but a few considerations must be taken into account. First, the IfS is just one EU instrument which addresses the challenge of the proliferation of WMDs, adding to other instruments of the Commission and those of the Council. Second, the value of the IfS is not only in funding that it provides, but also in the code of conduct and good governance that the EU aims to promote through projects that it develops and contributes to, such as the regional centres of excellence on CBRN. Third, the Commission, in a commonly held view, is not associated with EU international security policy in general, and particularly in such sensitive areas as the non-proliferation of WMDs. Thus, the fact that non-proliferation was identified as the main priority for the long-term component of the IfS, is significant in this context.

5.3.2. TACIS/INSC

Most of the non-proliferation experts interviewed for this thesis agree that TACIS has played an important role in addressing non-proliferation and nuclear safety efforts in the former Soviet Union throughout the 1990s. Some have even observed that after the Cold War, it was the EC which was a more important contributor of assistance to Russia than individual EU mem-
ber states (WMDExp1 2009). Globally, the US has been the most significant actor in the area of non-proliferation, providing most of the assistance. In particular, US Senate has established a framework called the CTR programme. It was established in 1991 by the legislation sponsored by senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, in order to assist the dismantling of WMDs in the former Soviet Union as well as to secure nuclear and chemical facilities. The CTR activities have been managed by the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

The EC has been the only non-state actor providing non-proliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union (Höhl et al. 2003). To this end, the Community has developed TACIS in 1991, whose role was defined as follows: ‘The programme aims at developing the local skills and know-how required for the acceleration of the economic reform process in the NIS through the provision of advice, know-how and practical experience necessary for the effective functioning and management of the market-based economy and related democratic institutional structures’ (Commission of the European Communities 28/07/93: 6).

TACIS was launched in 1991, but its implementation had to be delayed due to political turbulences in the Baltic States and Russia. The financing memoranda were signed only a few days before the Soviet Union ceased to exist. In 1992 it was agreed that the Community’s assistance would be adapted to the new geopolitical environment (Sodupe et al. 1998). Already in 1991, nuclear safety was given a high profile in the EEC’s relations with Russia, constituting the largest component of the EEC’s assistance in the area of energy. The focus at that time was on providing training and to develop studies analysing Soviet nuclear installations (Commission of the European Communities 28/07/93). The nature of TACIS required the EU to cooperate primarily with non-military officials, mostly those working in civil nuclear infrastructure. The main focus of the US government, on the other hand, was on working with Russian military establishment. One expert has observed that by complementing US efforts, the EU inevitably lowered its profile, because TACIS projects were implemented mainly through the JRC; thus, they were not well publicised (WMDExp1 2009).

A project of particular significance, which the EC has been supporting right from the beginning, is the redirection of scientists through co-financing the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Russia, and later also the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU). The idea behind these initiatives is to employ scientists possessing knowledge related to WMDs and missile delivery systems, so they could use this knowledge and skills for
peaceful purposes. The ISTC was created in 1992 by the US, Japan, the European Commission and Russia. The STCU was created in 1994 by Ukraine, Canada, Sweden and the US. The Commission joined in 1998 (European Commission 27/12/01). The table below indicates how important these two institutions have been in preventing the proliferation of WMDs. It covers the period from 1994 to 2003.

Table 5: ISTC and STCU statistics covering the years 1994-2003
(Source: European Commission 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ISTC</th>
<th>STCU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total budget from all</td>
<td>$441 million</td>
<td>$64 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding by the</td>
<td>€77 million</td>
<td>€12 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>1.628</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of scientists</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data indicates that more than 60,000 scientists have been supported through the centres in Russia and Ukraine. More than $500 million has been invested in their activities. Of this sum, the Commission has committed almost €90 million, which constitutes the second largest contribution after that of the US. According to Höhl et al. (2003), it does not come as a surprise that the EU has decided to support this particular initiative, considering the international nature of this programme and also the JRC’s expertise in the area of nuclear technologies. Höhl et. al. (2003: 13) note: ‘the Commission, with its technical expertise, financial flexibility and back-up from nuclear research centres (which can help evaluate incoming research proposals), was an ideal partner for this endeavour’. One of the problems with evaluating the value of ISTC/STCU activities is that it is impossible to estimate how many proliferation acts they have prevented. Nonetheless, the Abdul Quadeer Khan network proved that there is always a need for CBRN experts, thus the centres in Russia and Ukraine must be considered of crucial importance in international and EU non-proliferation policy.

The TACIS programme expired in 2006. Subsequently, some of its tasks were assigned to two new instruments of the European Commission: the IfS and the INSC. The IfS has already been discussed in the context of its non-proliferation focus. On the other hand, the component of TACIS concerned with nuclear safety projects is further developed through the INSC, es-
tablished in 2007. This instrument serves the EU to ‘finance measures to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries’ (Council of the European Union 22/03/07: 1). Over the period of 1991-2006, the Commission has allocated €1.3 billion from the TACIS budget for nuclear safety projects in the former Soviet Union (European Commission 04/07/07). The INSC Indicative Programme for 2007-2009 has identified a number of priorities to be tackled through this new nuclear safety instrument, designating €217 million for this purpose. Most of the projects continue to focus on the former Soviet Union, but as is the case with the IfS, the Commission aims to broaden its geographical scope. Thus, over time, the majority of the EU’s nuclear safety assistance will shift from Russia to the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. What is also innovative in the INSC, as compared to TACIS, is the new model of assistance which the Commission aims to implement. Under this new model, the EU will expect third countries to participate in programmes more actively, including sharing the costs. These co-financed initiatives will be given priority by the Commission (European Commission 04/07/07).

These two programmes, TACIS and the INSC, constitute an important EU contribution to the global non-proliferation regime. Yet, TACIS has attracted a degree of criticism, particularly throughout the 1990s. One of the major ones was that the Commission was developing too many studies and providing too much training, but not enough money to implement them (Sodupe and Benito 1998). This criticism is justified, but TACIS was never intended to be a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It had a limited scope and largely focused on the ‘intellectual’ form of aid. However, apart from transferring technical knowledge, the EU has also ‘hoped for a political multiplier effect from its aid, to alter the legal, institutional and cognitive frameworks in the NIS’ (Holden 2009: 94). Another criticism directed towards TACIS was the lack of transparency and centralised decision-making. In order to address this criticism, the Commission has reorganised the structure of TACIS in the years 2000/2001. As a result of this reconfiguration, DG Relex was entrusted with preparing the strategy and indicative programmes for TACIS projects, and DG EuropeAid was responsible for the implementation (European Commission 04/07/07).

These first two parts of the section discussing the resources available for the EU in the area of non-proliferation policy have focused on financial instruments of the European Commission. Firstly, the IfS has been discussed, with the majority of its long-term funding allocated to
non-proliferation priorities. Subsequently, this section has discussed more nuclear safety-oriented instruments, i.e. TACIS and the INSC. Both the IfS and the INSC contribute to the spectrum of EU non-proliferation instruments, but this project-oriented approach is not the only way in which the EU aims to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. The following section analyses the instrument called the non-proliferation clause in mixed-agreements.

5.3.3. Non-proliferation clause

The non-proliferation clause was introduced by the Council in 2003 (Council of the European Union 19/11/03), with the purpose of mainstreaming non-proliferation policy into EU’s relations with third countries. Since 2003, the non-proliferation clause has been inserted into all mixed agreements. It has also been inserted into existing agreements when they have been revised. The clause can be considered an alternative to the project-based approach, which has been pursued by the Commission since the early 1990s. In fact, according to one official from the Council Secretariat, the EU should focus primarily on long-term policies, such as the non-proliferation clause, instead of relying on projects. Furthermore, this official has notes: ‘When I talk to Americans, they perceive our actions mainly in terms of projects which they can insert into the 1540 Committee framework. I believe this is the misconception of our efforts, because we want to focus on policies and not just projects’ (CON09 2009).

The non-proliferation clause consists of two parts. The first section commits parties (the EU and third party) to fully comply with their existing obligations. Although these obligations are not explicitly mentioned, it is understood that they encompass: the NPT, including the Additional Protocol and IAEA Safeguards, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and UN Security Council resolutions, most notably Resolution 1540. The second section encourages Parties to join any other relevant international non-proliferation frameworks and also to establish an effective system of export control (Council of the European Union 19/01/09).

One of the first countries that were requested to accept the non-proliferation clause as a part of its Association Agreement with the EU was Syria. Negotiations with Syria, which were conducted in the context of creating the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, preceded the introduction of the clause by the Council. However, anticipating that the non-proliferation clause would be adopted, the Commission began to include the topic of non-proliferation in its talks with Syria. In December 2003, EU member states received an update on negotiations
with Syria, but concluded that the non-proliferation element was not strong enough. Thus, the Commission was entrusted with continuing negotiations, which were concluded in December 2004; the final agreement was not signed, however (Quille 2007). Syria claimed that it was concerned with Israel’s nuclear capabilities and that it needed ‘to keep some sort of deterrence in the form of chemical and biological capabilities’ (Aliboni 2004: 3) As a result, Syria has agreed only to accept the first section of the non-proliferation clause, whereas EU member states insisted that Syria also accepts the second section. This would mean that Syria would have to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (Quille 2007). The case of Syria demonstrates how quickly the EU has started to include the non-proliferation clause in its negotiations with third countries. In this particular case, it happened even before the Council officially adopted the clause as an EU instrument.

The non-proliferation clause has been included to all new and renewed mixed agreements with third countries since it was established in 2003. The question arises, what kind of steps the EU can take if a country breaches the clause. The Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD Annalisa Giannella explains that the mechanism of the non-proliferation clause entails more than merely signing an agreement and then finding out at some point that other party has breached it. Instead, Ms Giannella argues that the EU needs to stay involved after an agreement is achieved. She notes: ‘We have to work with this country and see what they need in order to comply with the clause’ (Great Britain 2005: 34). However, such monitoring is costly. Ms Giannella underlines in this respect that the CFSP budget is very limited and only a fraction of it is allocated to EU non-proliferation policy. This, in turn, may affect the extent to which the non-proliferation clause can be effectively utilised in preventing the proliferation of WMDs.

5.3.4. Joint Action Programme

The Council of the European Union has been active in developing its profile in the area of non-proliferation since the late 1990s. In 1999, the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing the European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation (Joint Action Programme) (Council of the European Union 23/12/99). This programme has identified three objectives for the EU’s non-proliferation assistance to Russia:
a) to help Russia dismantling and transforming its WMD-related equipment in a safe, secure and environmentally sound manner;

b) to enhance EU participation in CTR activities in Russia;

c) to enhance the coordination of various EU programmes in Russia;

The reason why the Council adopted this Joint Action Programme in 1999 is that in the same year, the European Council agreed on a Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia (European Council 04/06/99). It was the first time that this EU instrument was utilised by member states working together in the European Council. The Common Strategy on Russia has underlined the 'critical importance to European security of EU-Russia co-operation and of Russia's development as a stable, democratic and prosperous country' (Marsh and Mackenzie 2005: 195). Since the adoption of the Joint Action Programme, the Council has become active in contributing to various non-proliferation projects in Russia, further utilising joint actions as a primary instrument. For example, in 2004, the Council has agreed to contribute €8 million to projects enhancing the physical protection of Russian nuclear facilities (Council of the European Union 25/11/04). Furthermore, in 2007, the Council has committed €3 million for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia (Council of the European Union 22/03/07).

These figures are modest compared to the overall costs of projects towards which they have contributed, thus the primary focus of the Council is to contribute to already existing projects, developed bilaterally between EU member states and Russia. For example, Germany has been active in providing assistance to Russia in the area of physical protection of nuclear facilities. Therefore, the Joint Action from 2004 entrusted Germany with the technical implementation of the EU's commitment 'in the framework of its bilateral programme in this area' (Council of the European Union 25/11/04: 57). Similarly, the UK has been active in supporting the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. Thus, this country was entrusted with the implementation of the aforementioned Joint Action from 2007 (Council of the European Union 22/03/07). A high-level Council Secretariat official confirms that the EU often contributes to existing bilateral projects: 'In the CFSP we have to be flexible. Sometimes within the EU, there is no idea on how to approach a certain non-proliferation task. In such a case, EU member states get together and decide on resources to be deployed. Yet, sometimes there al-
ready is a country with scientific know-how or with a bilateral relationship with Russia and it asks the EU for support’ (CON01 2009).

According to Höhl et al. (2003), joint member state-EU initiatives have a number of benefits, such as: a) bilateral projects supported by the EU gain greater visibility; b) they tend to be more stable in a long term; c) smaller member states can also participate, which otherwise would be too costly for them; and d) some of the projects cannot be undertaken by the European Commission, because they are military in nature. In such cases, they can be launched within the framework of the CFSP, implemented by a member state and then the Commission can get involved with extra funding. Council projects represent only a small portion of overall EU non-proliferation assistance to Russia. This is mainly due to the fact that the CFSP budget is relatively modest, compared to the resources available to the European Commission. However, the CFSP budget is set to grow steadily. In 2003 it was €43 million, in 2004 and 2005 €62 million; in 2006 the budget almost doubled with €102 million. Over the years 2007-2013, the CFSP budget is going to amount to about €250 million a year, still growing (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2008).

This section has identified four resources of the EU in the area of non-proliferation. These resources vary considerably, ranging from financial instruments focused on providing technical and financial assistance to prevent the proliferation of CBRN knowledge and technologies, to the non-proliferation clause, which aims to obligate third countries to comply with their obligations under international non-proliferation regimes. Furthermore, this section has also identified the efforts of member states to undertake common initiatives within the Council. These initiatives have been so far indeed very modest, compared to individual programmes of EU member states or the projects of the European Commission. However, this analysis allows to conclude that the EU satisfies the criterion of resources in the area of non-proliferation. Interestingly, this conclusion is not drawn on the basis of the modest resources allocated by member states within the Joint Action Programme. Instead, this conclusion is mainly based on the involvement of the European Commission in providing technical and financial assistance focused on non-proliferation, but also on the importance that the EU attaches to the non-proliferation clause.
5.4. The EU and non-proliferation: recognition

The final section of this chapter sets to analyse the extent to which the EU is recognised as an actor in the area of non-proliferation, with a specific focus on Russia. To this end, this section is structured around factors affecting the level of EU recognition. Some of these factors refer to EU internal politics, such as already discussed duality of competences between the Commission and the Council, which has negatively affected the recognition of the EU as an actor. Other factors have more to do with the external environment, for example Russian politics or the role of international non-proliferation frameworks, which allow EU member states to get involved in developing projects in Russia outside the EU framework. These external factors also affect negatively the extent to which the EU is recognised as a non-proliferation actor. This section examines all of these factors in more detail, providing an explanation for an overall low level of recognition that the EU has achieved in the area of its non-proliferation policy.

5.4.1. Internal factors undermining EU recognition

An extensive EU bureaucracy is considered one of the key factors undermining EU recognition in non-proliferation policy. In this context, one non-proliferation expert interviewed for this thesis recalled one of his own research interviews: ‘I was told by one senior German foreign policy official that it takes about a month to launch a €6 million non-proliferation project between Germany and Russia, whilst it takes about a year to launch a €1 million project with Russia if the EU is involved’ (WMDExp4 2009). Another non-proliferation expert shared a similar example: ‘If the UK runs a project worth €70 million and the Commission contributes €3 million, the paper-work for spending €70 million and €3 million is similar’ (WMDExp1 2009). The complicated procedure concerning travel arrangements adds to these problems. The same interviewee has noted that if a Commission official works with another country on non-proliferation, this person has to travel to this country quite often and has to be flexible in this respect. The problem is, according to this interviewee, that the Commission has certain rules which make it necessary to plan and report all the trips one year in advance.

Marc Deffrennes from the European Commission has underlined these difficulties, pointing to the ‘heavy procedures, heavy bureaucracy’ and the fact that there is a long time span ‘between a decision-making process to run a programme or a project, the start of implementation, and the end of implementation’ (Great Britain 2005: 55). Another expert, from Canada,
has confirmed these observations, pointing out that the EU is not effective with short-term non-proliferation projects, because it lacks flexibility. As a result, something which needs to be done ‘now’ is the problem for the EU (WMDExp5 2009). This lack of flexibility and a long-term focus undermine the EU’s visibility as an actor, because ‘with longer-term projects, it is more difficult to observe the outcomes, the outcomes are fuzzier. It is hard to say exactly what has been done or prevented in quantitative terms’ (WMDExp5 2009).

In addition to this challenge of extensive bureaucracy, there is an old problem of coordination of non-proliferation policies among EU member states, stemming largely from their lack of experience of working together in this policy field. An important factor that has been undermining EU common policy on non-proliferation is that the UE is composed of states with different nuclear circumstances and traditions. On the one side of the spectrum there are nuclear states, i.e. France and the UK. On the opposite side of the spectrum, since the 1995 enlargement, there are neutral states, calling for nuclear disarmament. It has not been uncommon that Nordic countries were opposing the UK and France in the process of various international negotiations. In addition, French nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996 only exacerbated these divisions (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008).

5.4.2. Russian policy and attitudes

In addition to internal EU problems, there are also significant external factors which negatively affect the recognition of the EU as a non-proliferation actor. For example, non-proliferation experts as well as EU officials point to the fact that the political climate in Russia has changed over the last decade. Russian leadership has become more assertive and the country is better off economically, compared to its situation in the 1990s. As a result, Moscow is less eager to cooperate on its military programmes. An additional factor, undermining the recognition of the EU as a non-proliferation actor in Russia, is the fact that Moscow appears to have a hierarchy of partners with whom it prefers to cooperate in the non-proliferation area. Based on a number of interviews with experts from Europe and the US, it has been established that the list of preferred partners looks as follows:

a) The US; working with Washington on non-proliferation matters validates Russian position as an important actor on the world scene (WMDExp1 2009). Furthermore, Washington is perceived to have the largest resources at its disposal.
b) EU member states; working with individual states is a preferred option for Moscow, because the work tends to be more flexible, discussions take place at the working level and are not highly politicised (WMDExp1 2009). For example, Germany has been the biggest European partner of Russia in the non-proliferation area since the end of the Cold War. This is how one expert explains this close relationship: ‘Germany has excellent relations with Russia based on historical connections. Many German officials went to school with their Russian partners, they speak Russian, so it is easier for them to work together’ (WMDExp4 2009). One example when this Russian-German good working relations manifested themselves was during a dispute between the US and Russia over how to proceed with developing the physical protection of the nuclear Bochvar Institute in Moscow. According to one American non-proliferation expert, Washington insisted that the highest security installations should be established in the closest possible proximity to the building, because Americans believed that a potential threat would come from the inside rather than the outside. Russians, on the other hand, insisted that the highest security should be installed further away from the Institute, because a threat could most probably come from the outside. Then, according to the American interviewee, German specialists came with their own suggestions, which in fact were in line with the Russian approach, insisting on the security installations further away of the Institute. Moscow happily concluded that finally there was a partner who understood their point of view (WMDExp2 2009).

c) The EU is only on the third position of preferred partners, because it is considered less flexible than individual member states and generally more complicated to work with. As one interviewee phrased it, for Russia, the best partners are those which can provide the biggest amount of money faster than others (WMDExp5 2009). Additionally, according to another American non-proliferation expert, Russia prefers to cooperate with actors possessing nuclear capabilities, because Russian military establishment does not trust that non-nuclear actors can fully appreciate all the aspects related to possessing such capabilities (WMDExp3 2009).

Regardless of these considerations, one Council Secretariat official has noted that one should not exaggerate the extent to which Russia disregards the role of the EU in the area of non-proliferation. He has pointed out that Moscow needs EU funding, even though Russian leaders do not like to admit it; if Moscow did publicly admit that it needs the EU, according to this
interviewee, that would be ‘the first time ever that they openly say that they rely on EU assistance’ (CON09 2009).

5.4.3. Diverging priorities

In addition to EU internal problems and Russian policies and perceptions, the EU’s recognition as an actor in the area of non-proliferation appears to be affected by diverging project priorities. Marc Deffrennes from the European Commission admits: ‘Working with Russians is very hard (...) It is as difficult today as it was at that time [1992] because they have their own priorities’ (Great Britain 2005: 56). According to Commission officials interviewed for this thesis, Moscow would like the EU to become more involved in chemical weapons destruction and in nuclear submarine dismantlement. Russia is obliged to destroy its chemical arsenal until 2012 and it would like greater EU assistance in reaching this target. Furthermore, Moscow claims that its nuclear submarines are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and the EU should become more involved in helping to dismantle these submarines. The Commission officials, on the other hand, admit that they do not perceive the danger of submarine terrorism as an urgent threat. Additionally, the Commission is not very eager to finance the destruction of chemical weapons (COM10 2009). There are a number of reasons for this.

Firstly, these projects are very expensive. Secondly, the culture of secrecy surrounding all military activities in Russia prevents the European Commission from scrutinising the implementation of projects. The Commission officials admit: ‘The Commission would not like to be accused in 20 years that it has financed a generation of new chemical or nuclear weapons which Russia can develop secretly. The same stands for submarines. We have no instruments to assure that money would be spent properly’ (COM10 2009). Instead, the Commission would prefer to focus on its own priorities. These include projects related to nuclear safety, where the Commission has developed extensive expertise. It would also like to continue supporting projects contributing to the redirection of nuclear scientists, preventing the proliferation of sensitive knowledge. An additional advantage for the EU from this particular activity is a free exchange of scientific information. It allows the EU to have first-hand information about some of the developments in Russia. Commission officials admit that this is especially important in the area of bio-security and bio-safety, because officially the EU is not allowed to know anything about these programmes. John Mattiussi (2006), a former Commission official working in the area of non-proliferation, admits: ‘The Soviet Union maintained a large
and sophisticated bio research programme – what happened to the materials/expertise? We do not know. Russia refuses to discuss past programmes’ (Mattiussi 2006: 2).

5.4.4. The role of other frameworks

There is one more important factor undermining the recognition of the EU as a security policy actor in the area of non-proliferation. It concerns the number of other frameworks, through which states channel their non-proliferation policies. The G8 Global Partnership constitutes one significant example. It brings together countries, including EU member states, to cooperate on non-proliferation projects, initially focused on Russia. One American non-proliferation expert admits in this context: ‘The G8 has emerged as a primary way of dealing with non-proliferation and I consider this to be the primary forum. I am aware that the EU is also committing some funding, but the involvement of EU member states is more significant in this regard’ (WMDExp2 2009).

Another expert from the US is less sympathetic towards the non-proliferation efforts of the EU, noting: ‘The EU has never played a very important role; for example, TACIS programme has been only scratching the surface of problems. Additionally, it wasn’t managed efficiently. The question is why the EU tries to play the role in non-proliferation, when there are many international frameworks already in place’ (WMDExp3 2009). An expert from Sweden does not agree that TACIS and the EU did not play an important role in non-proliferation. In fact, he observes that after the Cold War it was actually the EC that was more important a contributor of non-proliferation assistance to Russia than individual EU member states (WMDExp1 2009). However, he does agree that later, especially since the G8 summit in Canada in 2002 launching the Global Partnership, EU member states have started initiating their own projects and the momentum had passed to individual member states. This observation is also confirmed by an expert from Canada, who notes that whilst in the 1990s the EU had played an important role because it ‘filled up a big hole’, after 2002, the EU’s involvement has become relatively smaller compared to the commitments of some of EU member states and other countries (WMDExp5 2009).

This section has analysed the extent to which the EU is recognised as an actor in non-proliferation policy. Notably, it has been demonstrated that the EU does not enjoy a high level of recognition in this policy area. A number of reasons for this fact have been identified, some of them concerning internal problems, and some others related to external circumstances. Cur-
rently, there are no indicators allowing to suggest that the EU’s recognition may increase in the foreseeable future. To increase the EU’s profile in non-proliferation policy, EU member states would have to take their cooperation in this policy field to the next level, by substantially enhancing the quality and quantity of their common efforts channelled through the Council of the European Union. Additionally, much will depend on the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty reforms; in particular, the recognition of the EU may be affected by the extent to which Catherine Ashton considers non-proliferation an important EU priority, reflecting EU perception of threats expressed in the ESS (European Council 2003; 2008). One early assessment of Ms Ashton’s non-proliferation objectives indicates that ‘she may possess the right skill set to make an impact in terms of the EU’s most important role as a force for WMD non-proliferation efforts; namely its ability to be a multilateral, momentum-increasing, and capacity-building entity that seeks long-term solutions’ (Bergenäs 2010). At the moment, it is too early to examine Ms Ashton’s policies and their impact on the recognition of the EU as a non-proliferation security policy actor.

Conclusion

This section has assessed the role of the EU as a security actor in the area of non-proliferation, particularly focusing on EU policy directed at the country with the largest arsenal of CBRN materials. It concludes that the EU has achieved a medium level of international security actorness in this policy field, because although it satisfies the criteria of authority, institutions and resources, it is not recognised as an important non-proliferation actor. The following table summarises the findings of this chapter.

Table 6: EU security actorness in the area of non-proliferation: the summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>The EU a) has achieved legal recognition within international non-proliferation regimes, such as the NPT, G8 Global Partnership and Committee 1540, even though it is not the member of the UN; and b) has a range of legal instruments enabling the Commission to develop its financial and technical assistance programmes, but also providing a more strategic guidance for the EU with respect to its non-proliferation policy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Of particular importance for the EU’s non-proliferation policy are</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the Commission, through its technical and financial programmes, and the Council Secretariat, through the office of the Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD. The EEAS will aim to introduce more consistency to the EU’s non-proliferation policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU has important resources concerning its non-proliferation policy, including: a) the financial and technical instruments of the European Commission, most notably TACIS, the INSC and the IfS; b) the non-proliferation clause, which has been included into all mixed agreements since 2003; c) joint-action initiatives, which remain relatively modest, however.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU does not satisfy the criterion of recognition in the non-proliferation policy field; there are a number of reasons for this, including: a) institutional fragmentation; b) complicated bureaucratic procedures; c) the number of multilateral framework outside the EU which EU member states utilise when conducing their non-proliferation policies; d) Russia’s own priorities, favouring Washington and individual EU member states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, this chapter has analysed the authority of the EU to develop non-proliferation policies. It has been established that the EU as a whole and the European Commission are recognised in a variety of international regimes, even though they are not full members of the institutions and forums that establish these regimes (the UN, the G8). Subsequently, it has been demonstrated that the EU has a wide range of legal instruments allowing it to develop appropriate policies in a comprehensive manner. Notably, member states have utilised regulation as a legal instrument allowing the EC to contribute to international non-proliferation efforts in Russia at the crucial time following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, a number of political framework-documents have been discussed; they provide the EU with a more strategic guidance with regards to its non-proliferation policies. As a result, it is concluded that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority.

Second, this chapter has assessed EU institutions important for conducting non-proliferation policies. It has been suggested that the major challenge for the EU in this respect has been to
assure institutional consistency between the policies of the Council Secretariat and projects undertaken by the European Commission through its financial instruments. This challenge of consistency may have been resolved successfully by the Lisbon Treaty, establishing the EEAS. This new EU body will bring together the bureaucracies from the Council Secretariat and the Commission responsible for non-proliferation policy. It is important that consistency of EU policies is assured. Yet, it is also important to note that the reason why this problem has emerged in the first place is that EU institutions have been playing an increasingly important role in the area of non-proliferation. Notably, the Commission has been active in this policy area already in the 1990s and the Council Secretariat has increased its profile after 2003. As a result, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of institutions.

Third, this chapter has examined EU resources with regards to non-proliferation policy. Notably, it has been demonstrated that the EU has a wide range of resources at its disposal, although they are more modest than resources committed by the US or individual EU member states. Concerning the financial instruments, the European Commission has played an important role particularly in the 1990s, when it was contributing to non-proliferation projects undertaken in the former Soviet Union. Currently, the Commission still commits resources to this geographical region (for example, it still supports the redirection of scientists), but at the same time it shifts its focus to some new regions of concern, particularly the Middle East, South and South-East Asia and parts of Africa. In addition to these financial instruments, the non-proliferation clause integrated into mixed agreements has been an important instrument of the EU, helping to streamline the EU’s non-proliferation policy into its relations with third countries. As a result, the criterion of resources can be considered to be satisfied, although a more unified policy of EU member states may considerably increase the resources available, particularly in the context of Council joint action initiatives.

Fourth, this chapter has indicated that the EU is not recognised as an important actor in the area of non-proliferation. A number of factors affecting negatively the EU’s recognition have been analysed. They include issues such as an extensive and complicated bureaucracy and diverging preferences of EU member states, largely based on their status with regards to the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, they also include factors such as Russian politics and preferences, particularly with regards to partners that Moscow perceives as the most valuable; Washington is on the top of the list. Additionally, the number of international non-
proliferation frameworks severely undermines the EU’s recognition. Often, EU member states prefer to utilise these other frameworks to pursue their non-proliferation objectives.

Table 7: The EU has achieved a medium level of actorness in the area of preventing the proliferation of WMDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

As a result of this assessment, this chapter concludes that the EU has achieved a medium level of actorness in the area of non-proliferation of WMDs. It is also suggested that there is little prospect for the EU to increase its international profile in this policy field in the foreseeable future. However, in spite of the fact that the EU is not highly recognised, it has been demonstrated that the EU has developed considerable instruments to advance its non-proliferation policy. Interestingly, they are largely concentrated within the European Commission, including the expertise of the JRC or the valuable experience that the Commission has achieved by working with Russia on non-proliferation since 1991. In this context, it is possible to identify a similarity with the case study analysed in the previous section, concerning climate security, where the European Commission has also been playing an important role through its long-developed technical expertise.
6. The role of the EU in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia

'You can’t ignore the pirates anymore. They’re getting more and more muscle. They used to invest their money in just boats and going out to sea, but now they’re building up their military side'.

Mohamed Aden, Somali clan leader, quoted in Gettleman (2010)

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the security actorness of the EU in the area of organised crime, with a specific focus on maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. Traditionally regarded as cash-hungry bandits, Somali pirates, arguably, increasingly become an important political force in Somalia – the country torn by violence perpetuated by conflicted warlords and radical Islamist insurgents. Instead of ‘investing’ their profits merely in boats and sea-hunting, pirates enhance their military capabilities. Thus, as suggested by Mr Aden, they are becoming a new actor in a domestic conflict. For enormous ransoms that they receive in return for hijacked ships with crews, pirates buy armaments, but also the support of local political forces. The international community, including the EU, has responded to this security problem through the combination of military and non-military instruments. Considering that this particular instance of piracy originates from one of the world’s poorest and most failed states, longer-term measures, aiming to improve the systemic conditions in Somalia, are important. Yet, in order to provide an immediate protection for maritime transport in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, a number of actors have deployed military task forces. Thus, as elaborated in the chapter establishing the methodology for this thesis, this case study represents the most traditional security challenge, compared to those analysed in the two previous empirical chapters. Neither climate change nor preventing the proliferation of WMDs from Russia requires the deployment of military capabilities. Instead, as this thesis has demonstrated, they require mostly financial and technical resources, underpinned by skilful diplomatic efforts. By integrating a security challenge which indeed requires the deployment of military capacities, the empirical component of this thesis reflects the comprehensive approach to analysing EU security policy at the international level, as established in the theoretical framework for this thesis.

There is a rich body of scholarly work on contemporary piracy (Burnett 2002; Chalk 2008; Murphy 2007; 2009; Nakamura 2009; Vego 2009). Some important recommendations on how to best tackle piracy have been formulated, ranging from tackling the short-term as well as the
long-term dimension of this problem. Vego (2009) argues that, ultimately, the problem of piracy could be resolved only by going ashore. In this scenario, in addition to destroying gangs at sea, it is also of crucial importance to destroy the pirate leadership, their basing areas and their supporting structures. Moreover, experts point to enhancing coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities through training, technical support, and deploying appropriate surveillance assets (Chalk 2008). For example, in Southeast Asia, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) created the Information Sharing Centre, aiming to enhance capacities of states in the region to tackle piracy of their coasts. A similar instrument is currently being developed for countries around the Gulf of Aden, under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This arrangement is discussed later in this chapter.

Finally, the scholarship on contemporary piracy underlines the importance of long-term, structural solutions. Vego (2009: 178) notes: ‘The military action alone cannot resolve the problem of piracy. It must be only a part of a much broader and comprehensive series of actions. The main causes of piracy are predominantly political, economic, and social’. The question of how to improve the situation in Somalia, so piracy can be curbed at its roots, is much more problematic. For example, the US has withdrawn from any direct involvement in Somali affairs after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ tragedy in 1993, leading Washington to limit its strategy mainly to containing terrorist organisations through different state- and non-state actors in the region7. However, the EU, as this chapter demonstrates, is an actor involved at different levels in tackling piracy and other forms of crime in Somalia. The EU’s involvement includes deploying the largest task force to provide the protection for vessels, but also the largest and most comprehensive financial assistance with humanitarian, development and security dimensions. Before proceeding to the empirical investigation, two important questions shall be addressed, providing the conceptual context and empirical background for research presented in this chapter. These questions include: a) What is maritime piracy and why is it such a complex problem off the coast of Somalia?; and b) Why is there such an increase of piratical activities off the coast of Somalia?

7 Although the US has exhibited no willingness to intervene in Somalia, Washington has been heavily involved in offshore maritime patrols in the Gulf Aden for both counter-terrorism - CTF-150 – and counter-piracy purposes – CTF-151.
What is maritime piracy and why is it such a complex problem off the coast of Somalia?

There is no single definition of piracy. This means that ‘the classification of violent maritime incidents can become a matter of dispute and confusion’ (Great Britain 2006: 11). One of the most recognised experts on contemporary piracy, Martin Murphy, defines the problem as ‘unlawful depredation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily, involving robbery’ (Murphy 2009: 7). Maritime piracy has also been addressed extensively by the international law, which is discussed later in this chapter. In terms of geography, modern piracy is not limited to the coast of Somalia. In particular, South-East Asia has traditionally been a favourable ground for piratical activities, where ‘pirate traditions go back virtually uninterrupted to the fifth century’ (Murphy 2009: 72). The 2008 Implementation Report, defines piracy as a ‘new dimension of organised crime’, noting that ‘[p]iracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months’ (European Council 2008: 8).

In Somalia, pirates are beginning to emerge as an important political force. Their dirty money does not just sponsor organised criminal ventures, such as arms trade, but the stronger pirates become, the more local warlords rely on their support in containing raging Islamist insurgents. Amongst the latter, the most dangerous and powerful is the al-Qaeda-linked group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (al-Shabaab), recognised as a terrorist organisation by the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 (United States 2010). In 2010, al-Shabaab conducted a number of deadly strikes, including a bomb attack in Kampala (over 76 killed) (Smith 2010) and shooting in a Mogadishu hotel (over 30 killed) (Tran 2010). Traditionally, Somali Islamists have been considered to oppose piracy just as the international community does (mainly for religious reasons). Yet, it is not at all certain that, if pirates engage in the Somali civil war on a bigger scale, they will actually support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against Islamist radicals. When Islamist insurgents captured an offshore town Xarardheere in May 2010, they officially brought in Shariah law, prohibiting the unholy acts of piracy. However, eventually, al-Shabaab and Hizbu Islam, another insurgency group, appear to have accepted a share of the pirates’ ransom profits (Gettleman 2010). This may lead, as a worst case scenario, to the ‘beginning of the West’s worst Somali nightmare, with two of the country’s biggest growth industries - piracy and Islamist radicalism - joining hands’ (Gettleman 2010).
In addition to this relatively new political dimension, Somali pirates have traditionally been associated with organised crime, thriving within the environment of lawless Somalia. In this context, Lehr and Lehmann (2007: 3) note: ‘The magnitude of Somalia’s pirate problem now seems to be comparable with that in South-east Asian waters: in both regions, we are basically confronted by a flourishing organised crime or a veritable “piracy industry”, as compared with mere “maritime mugging” elsewhere’. A distinctive characteristic of Somali pirates is that they do not merely steal commercial vessels or their cargo. Instead, they exploit the lack of law enforcement in their home country by kidnapping crewmembers in exchange for ransom – a strategy that is much more profitable (Blanchard et al. 2009). On average, one pirate can earn between $6,000 and $10,000 for a $1 million ransom (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008). This constitutes an equivalent of a two to three-year salary earned from legal activities. However, it must also be noted that those recruited tend to be uneducated. Thus, they only have a minimal chance of finding a legitimate source of income at this level. Although $10,000 constitutes a substantial gain for a Somali pirate, it is only a fraction of a typical ransom. Where does the rest of money go? In order to secure their activities on land, pirates need the support of local political forces (warlords). Therefore, a large proportion of money often goes to those individuals with their own illegal ventures, such as human trafficking and mining (Murphy 2009).

Piracy off the coast of Somalia emerged as a security problem at the beginning of the 1990s, following the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu. While there have been a number of high-profile piratical attacks since then (including the attack on US-operated cruise liner Seabourn Spirit in 2005), in 2008 the problem expanded and became an ever more urgent security threat (Burnett 2003; Lehr and Lehmann 2007; Lennox 2008; Murphy 2007; 2009). Despite international mobilisation, the number of attacks off the coast of Somalia increased in 2009 as compared to 2008 (ICC-IMB 2009). In the first quarter of 2010, Somali pirates were responsible for 35 out of 67 piratical incidents worldwide. This indicates a modest drop as compared to the same period in 2009. The report of the ICC International Maritime Bureau attributes this decrease to the role of international actors fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia: ‘This marked reduction can be attributed to the continued presence and success of the navies in the Gulf of Aden along with the robust anti piracy measures adopted by the merchant navy fleet’ (ICC-IMB 2010a). However, at the same time Somali pirates become more active further away from their own coast (ICC-IMB 2010b).
Why is there such an increase of piratical activities off the coast of Somalia?

In order to understand why Somalia has become a save-heaven for organised groups hijacking vessels with crews for ransom, it is important to understand the difficult situation in this country. Somalia remains a thoroughly failed state, torn by violence on a daily basis (Hesse 2010; Ibrahim 2010; Menkhaus 2007; 2009). It has no central government possessing control over the territory of the country, or even Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. This condition of permanent insecurity contributes to Somalia’s disastrous humanitarian situation. In fact, arguably, there is no single state of Somalia to speak of; instead, there are three autonomous regions existing in parallel within the internationally recognised borders of Somalia. This partition of Somalia is the result of a civil war which erupted after the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991. In the north-west of the country, the Somali National Movement successfully established the so-called ‘Somaliland’, which has remained de facto independent since 1991 (Bryden 2004). Another nationalist movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, was active around the same time in the north-eastern part of the country; this is where semi-autonomous Puntland was established (Møller 2009). The central and southern part of Somalia officially remains under the authority of the TFG. This is also the most violent part of the country. These conditions of instability and the lack of law enforcement have contributed to Somalia (and particularly its coast) developing into a favourable ground for piratical groups to operate. The EU, the US and other international actors support the TFG with the hope that it will eventually extend its authority over Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia.

This chapter examines the EU’s actorness in addressing the complex problem of Somali piracy directly, but also through the long-term, indirect involvement. In the first section, the chapter explains the legal authority of the EU in the area of addressing the problem of maritime piracy off the Somali coast. In particular, this section assesses the international legal recognition of the EU as an actor and the legal basis for the EU’s short- and long-term involvement. The second section examines the variety of EU institutions involved in addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia. To this end, the chapter discusses CSDP institutions, responsible mostly for conducting EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, and the European Commission, involved in addressing the root causes of organised crime in Somalia, but also supporting more immediate measures. Thirdly, it is important to examine what kind of resources the EU actually contributes to address the piracy problem off the Somali coast, but also, more generally, to bring peace and security to Somalia. In this respect, the chapter examines EUNAVFOR ‘Ata-
lanta’, the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme and the EU’s security and development aid to Somalia. Finally, this chapter analyses the extent to which EU efforts to counter maritime piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have been recognised.

6.1. **The EU and maritime piracy: legal authority**

The aim of this section is to assess the legal authority of the EU to undertake measures against piracy off the Somali coast, as the form of organised crime. In the first part, this section discusses the EU’s international legal recognition. The previous chapter has demonstrated that in the case of the EU and the non-proliferation of WMDs, even though the EU as an organisation is not a member of the UN, it is recognised within the UN system at different levels. A similar situation can be observed in the case of EU policy against maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. Although the EU is not a member of the UN Security Council, this UN body has recognised EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ in its Resolutions. Similarly, the European Commission actively participates in the work of the IMO in spite of the fact that the EU is not a member of the IMO. In the second part, this section addresses the question of EU legal competence to act in the following types of policy: a) EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’; b) the CMR programme; and c) development and security aid to Somalia.

6.1.1. **International legal recognition**

The EU has responded to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia in the legal context of the requests of the UN Security Council. This UN body has condemned piracy off the Somali coast and encouraged states and ‘relevant regional organisations’ (UNSC 02/06/09) to deter piracy in this region. In order to allow for a more effective pursuit of suspected pirates, the UN Security Council has created an exception to the provisions of the international law. The Convention on the High Seas from 1958 defines piracy as ‘illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation’ (UN 29/04/58: 5) committed on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of any state. The Convention also makes explicit that ‘[t]he right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own country or of a third State’ (UN 29/04/58: 7). These provisions reflect the principle of sovereignty associated with modern statehood, as established by the Peace Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 (Buzan and Hansen 2009; McGrew 2008). This principle, while guarding the right of states to non-interference, proved to be problematic in the case of the fight against maritime piracy. The case of piracy off the coast of Somalia is particularly challenging, because this country is incapable of ad-
dressing the problem which originates from its own land. Murphy (2009) observes that nowadays, most of piratical attacks occur within territorial waters. Yet, some states are unwilling to tackle this problem unless it threatens their own interests. Some other states, such as Somalia, are incapable of undertaking a necessary action.

The UN Security Council, after long negotiations, recognised this problem. Resolution 1816 from June 2008 allowed navy ships of third states to pursue pirates into the territorial waters of Somalia and to use *all necessary means* to repress piracy (UNSC 02/06/09). Important restrictions were imposed, however (Guilfoyle 2008). For example, Resolution 1816 was initially passed for six months. Also, the right to enter Somali territorial waters was granted only to states recognised by the TFG as ‘cooperating’. Nonetheless, Resolution 1816 constitutes an important step forward. The provisions of Resolution 1816 were prolonged until the end of 2010 by Resolution 1846 (UNSC 02/12/08) and 1897 (UNSC 30/11/09) respectively.

The UN Security Council, through its resolutions, has been encouraging international actors to deploy military assets off the coast of Somalia. The EU became particularly recognised in this context. For example, in Resolution 1838 the EU was *commended* for setting up a coordination unit supporting the surveillance off the Somali coast (UNSC 07/10/08). In Resolution 1846, the UN Security Council welcomed the efforts of international and regional organisations, including NATO and *in particular* the decision of the EU to launch EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ (UNSC 02/12/08). The figure bellow summarises UN Security Council Resolutions from 2008, addressing the problem of piracy off the Somali coast.

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8 Before launching EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, the EU established EUNAVCO with the goal to support EU Member States, which decided to deploy military assets off the coast of Somalia (Council of the European Union 19/09/08).

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Apart from the UN Security Council, also states in the region of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden have recognised the EU in the context of its anti-piracy measures. For example, an agreement was concluded between the EU and the Republic of Djibouti, concerning the presence of EU military forces on the territory of Djibouti (The EU and the Republic of Djibouti 03/02/10). Similarly, in the exchange of letters between Kenya and the EU, the former agreed to conditions proposed by the EU regarding the detention of suspected pirates on Kenyan territory (The EU and the Government of Kenya 25/03/09).

The prosecution of suspected pirates has been a contentious issue for states and organisations deterring piracy off the coast of Somalia. The reason for this is that, on the one hand, Somalia does not have the capacity to prosecute and, on the other hand, actors involved in fighting piracy in this region are reluctant to transfer suspects to their home countries. Thus, international actors have been trying to secure agreements with states in the region, allowing the prosecution and detention of suspected pirates in these states. The EU successfully achieved this goal in March 2009, when it reached an agreement with Kenya (The EU and the Government of Kenya 25/03/09). In June 2009, one EU official observed that, at that time, NATO still did not have a similar agreement, which made the EU a more attractive framework for states to get involved in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia (MILSTAFF1 2009). Consider-
ering that EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is the first naval operation of the EU, the above analysis indicates a significant degree of legal recognition by the UN Security Council and states in the region. The legal recognition constitutes one dimension of the EU’s legal authority. The second part of this chapter examines the legal basis for EU policies.

6.1.2. Legal basis for action

With regards to the legal competence of the EU to act against piracy off the coast of Somalia, three sources of law are important to consider. Concerning a short-term response, the Joint Action from 10 November 2008 constitutes the legal basis for EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’. It states that ‘[t]he European Union (EU) shall conduct a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008)’ (Council of the European Union 12/11/08: 35). The purpose of the EU’s operation has been defined as twofold: to protect vessels of the World Food Programme delivering aid to Somalia and to protect ‘vulnerable vessels’ cruising off the coast of Somalia. In December 2008, the Council adopted a Common Position approving the Operation Plan and the Rules of Engagement (Council of the European Union 09/12/08) for ‘Atalanta’. In the meantime, the PSC has begun to exercise political control over the operation, on the legal basis of the aforementioned Joint Action.

Concerning a medium-term response, the IfS provides the legal basis for the CMR programme. The IfS has already been discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. In this chapter, it is important to outline some of the features of the IfS relevant for addressing the safety and security of maritime transport. Regulation establishing the IfS, in its long-term component (article 4), identifies the areas where the European Commission is entrusted to provide financial and technical assistance. One of such areas is ‘threats to international transport, energy operations and critical infrastructure, including passenger and freight traffic and energy distribution’ (European Parliament and the Council 24/11/06: 4). This regulation also emphasises the trans-regional character of the Commission’s involvement. The CMR is an example of a trans-regional initiative, because it contributes to IMO projects involving various states in the region of the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Within the context of this legal framework, the CMR was defined as one of the programmes in the Indicative Programme for the IfS, covering the years 2009-2011 (European Commission 08/04/09).

EU long-term involvement in Somalia is not directly related to the problem of piracy. Nonetheless, it aims to increase the security in this country through various kinds of assistance.
Consequently, it tackles the root causes of organised crime, including piracy. With regards to EU development assistance, two categories of law can be identified. The first category of law (EU law) is broader and includes the TEEC (Intergovernmental Conference 25/03/57). Articles 131 and 136 of this treaty provided the basis for the creation of the EDF, delivering assistance to the colonies of member states. Since 1959, the EDF has been programmed in cycles covering a few years period. It also broadened its geographical scope to include African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The latest cycle (10th EDF) covers the years 2008-2013 and is discussed in the third section of this chapter.

The second category of law (international law) is more specific, as it applies to the special case of Somalia. Of particular importance here is the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou in 2000 and revised five years later in Luxemburg (European Commission 2006). This agreement regulates the assistance of the EU to ACP countries. The case of Somalia is distinctive in this context, because the country does not have working institutions which could sign the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. However, the document envisaged such a situation. To this end, article 93(6) explains that if the state cannot ratify an agreement with the EU because it lacks appropriate institutions, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers may ‘accord special support’ to this country (European Commission 2006: 61). The ACP-EC Council of Ministers consists of ‘on the one hand, the members of the Council of the European Union and members of the Commission of the European Communities and, on the other, a member of the government of each ACP State’ (European Commission 2006: 17). The ACP-EC Council of Ministers has assumed such a supporting role in the case of EU assistance to Somalia in 2008, when it has allocated €215.8 million to this country for the years 2008-2013 (ACP-EC Council of Ministers 19/11/08).

This section has analysed the authority of the EU in the area of fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia, but also with respect to addressing the root causes of insecurity in the region. To this end, it has been demonstrated that the EU has achieved de jure recognition not only within the framework of the UN Security Council, but also in its relations with states such as Kenya and Djibouti. Furthermore, this analysis has demonstrated that the EU has a wide range of legal instruments to tackle the problem of organised crime off the coast of Somalia, including legal instruments for long-term involvement. As a result of this examination, this section concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority.
6.2. The EU and maritime piracy: key institutions

Appropriate institutions, together with legal authority, constitute basic conditions which allow the EU to develop its international actorness. This section examines major EU institutions which are involved in tackling the problem of piracy off the Somali coast. They are grouped into two categories. First, there are institutions operating within the framework of the CSDP, concerned with conducting EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’. They include: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Operational Headquarter (OHQ) and also the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC). Second, there is the European Commission, addressing the problem of Somali piracy directly through its IfS, but also involved in longer-term tackling of the root causes of organised crime and insecurity in Somalia. Of particular importance are the following DGs: DG Tren, DG Relex, DG EuropeAid, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare) and DG Development.

6.2.1. CSDP Institutions

The CSDP is a relatively recent institutional framework of the EU. The impetus for its development came from St Malo in France, where in 1998 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac declared that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’ (Great Britain 2002). What followed, were three important European Council Summits: in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Feira (June 2000), which filled the CSDP with substance, including setting the Helsinki Headline Goal. The goal was for the EU to establish the European RRF, capable of deploying 50-60 thousand persons within 60 days for at least one year. This goal was later upgraded through the new Headline Goal 2010, which has introduced the idea of smaller and more flexible battle groups (Nugent 2010). The Lisbon Treaty is the first EU treaty which codifies the CSDP. It is noted in the treaty that ‘[t]he common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets’ (Council of the European Union 15/04/08: 51). With regards to CSDP decision-making, the treaty states: ‘Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State’ (Council of the European Union 15/04/08: 167).
This section outlines the role of CSDP institutions after the decision in the Council is adopted. In this respect, it focuses on EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, initiated by the Council in November 2008.

The PSC is the most important preparatory body of the Council, playing a crucial role in the CSDP institutional structure. It is composed of political directors from the foreign ministries of member states. It meets at least twice a week, but more often if necessary (Howorth 2007). The PSC worked on an interim basis from 2000 to 2001, when it was transformed into a permanent body. However, the roots of this EU body, as mentioned in the previous chapter, date back to the 1970s and the creation of the PoCo (Hayes-Renshaw 2006). The role of the PSC was defined in article 25 of the Treaty of Nice and amended in the Lisbon Treaty, which states: ‘Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative’ (Council of the European Union 15/04/08: 48). However, the competences of the PSC go beyond monitoring and advisory roles. The Lisbon Treaty also specifies that ‘The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation’ (Council of the European Union 15/04/08: 49).

For EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, the Council, in its Joint Action launching EU military operation (Council of the European Union 12/11/08), has authorised the PSC to assume a number of responsibilities, most notably to exercise ‘political control and strategic direction’. The first decision of the PSC was to appoint Antonios Papaioannou as the EU Force Commander for ‘Atalanta’ (Political and Security Committee 27/11/08), a few months later replaced by Captain Garat Caramé (Political and Security Committee 24/07/09). Among other decisions of the PSC were the acceptance of Norwegian and Croatian contributions to EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, and the appointment of the new Operational Commander for ‘Atalanta’ Major General Buster Howe in May 2010, who replaced Rear Admiral Peter Hudson (Political and Security Committee 10/06/10).
The EUMC is the highest military body of the EU. It is entrusted with advising and providing recommendations of military nature to the PSC. The EUMC is composed of member states’ Chiefs of Defence, but regular meetings are attended by member states’ Military Representatives. The EUMC plays a central role whenever the Council decides on a CSDP military operation. When such a decision is taken, the EUMC is expected to deliver a consensual advice to the PSC on how the operation should be conducted. Howorth (2007) notes strong commonalities between the role of the EUMC and the role of the NATO Military Committee. He identifies the EUMC as key in ‘drawing up and evaluating strategic military options, overseeing the elaboration of an operational plan and monitoring operations throughout the mission’ (Howorth 2007: 74). One of the EUMC’s roles with respect to EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is to maintain ongoing coordination with the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Djibouti and with the EU OHQ in Northwood. In June 2009, the then EUMC Chairman Gen Henri Bentegeat, along with the military representatives of the two 2009 EU Presidencies, visited Djibouti. They formed the ‘EU military’ type of troika. The purpose of this visit was to discuss the conduct of ‘Atalanta’ with the Force Commander, Captain Garat Caramé (EUMC 2009).

The EUMS, composed of senior officers from EU member states, is the main supporting body of the EUMC. According to former EUMC Chair Gen Henri Bentegeat, ‘all documents, concepts, military advices and matters discussed during the meetings of the EUMC are generally initiated and staffed by the EUMS’ (Bentegeat 2009: 7). Within the EU’s institutional structure, the EUMS is one of the Council’s General Directorates; it works under the political guidance of the PSC and the military guidance of the EUMC (Howorth 2007). The EUMS is led by the Director General and it is further divided into various Directorates and Cells, such as the Intelligence Directorate (providing intelligence data) and the Civilian-Military Cell (conducting civil-military planning). Some of the activities of the EUMS with regard to planning and executing EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ include (Leakey 2009):

a) The EUMS Mission Monitoring Team (EUMS MMT) ‘Somalia Anti-Piracy’ was established; its role was to support the OHQ in Northwood when it was assuming the command of the operation in November 2008.

b) The EUMS MMT helped the EUMC and the OHQ with processing of various planning documents up to the launch of the operation.
c) The EUMS MMT also provided input to drafting the November 2008 Joint Action launching the military mission.

d) The EUMS MMT remains involved in the operation; it advises the EUMC and supports the OHQ, in particular with regard to the interaction with third states taking part in fighting piracy in the region.

The OHQ is at the heart of any operation involving the deployment of military capacities. NATO has its OHQ at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. The EU does not have comparable capacities in this regard, but three options are available for CSDP missions nonetheless. Firstly, in January 2007 the EU has established the so-called ‘EU Operations Centre’ within the EUMS. It was activated in June 2007, during the second military exercise of the EU, called ‘Milex 2007’ (Council of the European Union 08/06/07). For the purpose of this exercise, the EU FHQ was located in Sweden. The idea was to train the staff of the Operations Centre to coordinate its actions with the FHQ. As already mentioned, the EU FHQ for ‘Atalanta’ is located in Djibouti. The EU Operations Centre was particularly designed for short-notice, limited-size operations, requiring civilian-military coordination. The second option for the EU is to utilise one of the five national headquarters. These include: a) the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; b) the UK OHQ in Northwood; c) the German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; d) the Italian OHQ in Rome; and e) the Greek OHQ in Larissa. Thirdly, under the so-called ‘Berlin Plus agreement’, the EU can also use the NATO’s OHQ in Mons.

One official representing the European shipping industry, closely following EU anti-piracy efforts, indicates that the choice of Northwood as the EU’s OHQ for EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ was not accidental. He notes that, initially, the UK was reluctant to support the EU’s autonomous anti-piracy military mission. Eventually, the country was convinced by locating the OHQ in Northwood (ShipInd 2009). In fact, it shall be noted that the OHQ in Northwood (full name: the Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood) is a part of the NATO Military Command Structure; the OHQ in Northwood, apart from serving the EU, also
allows day-to-day tactical control for NATO’s anti-piracy Operation Ocean Shield, the successor of the Operation Allied Predator⁹.

The EUSC, located in Spain, was created in 1991 and originally served the purposes of the WEU. It was transformed into an EU agency in 2002. The mission of the EUSC is to support the CSDP through ‘providing products resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data (...)’ (EU Satellite Centre Website). One can notice just how important up-to-date maps are for conducting military operations when visiting EUMS building in Brussels. In one of the rooms there is a large map of the Somali coast on the wall. The director of the EUSC Frank Asbeck notes: ‘[f]or EUNAVFOR Somalia, several locations and ports have been analysed in response to tasking about pirate activity, as well as possible sea points of disembarkation in the adjacent areas’ (Asbeck 2009: 22).

Drawing on the above analysis, it could be concluded that the institutional structure of the CSDP is remarkable, considering how recent developments in this intergovernmental area of European integration are. Indeed, it is an indication of a significant progress that the EU has developed institutions allowing it to conduct limited-scale, yet autonomous military operations. However, Howorth (2007) identifies a number of constrains on this CSDP institutional structure. First, he points to the inter-agency competition (or turf wars) between the Council and the Commission, especially in the area of civilian crisis management, where inter-institutional coherence is essential. The Lisbon Treaty aims to address this problem by combining the post of the EU’s HRCFSP with the vice-President of the European Commission. This led to the establishment of the HRUASP in December 2009. Second, the CSDP remains thoroughly intergovernmental, which creates tensions between member states recognising the need for a better central coordination on the one hand, but hesitating to cease control over issues of military security on the other hand. This leads to the third constraint – the long time for processing initiatives, which in the end must represent the lowest denominator of often divergent preferences of member states. In this context, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) provide an example of the laborious process of creating the EU Operations Centre. The need for an EU planning cell or headquarters was recognised in 2003 by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg. However, the timing for such an initiative was unfortunate, because

⁹ The Operation Ocean Shield commenced 17 August 2009. It constitutes NATO’s input to international efforts concerning fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia. Although NATO and the EU exchange information on a regular basis, the missions by both organisations operate separately.
Europe was divided over the US invasion of Iraq. Eventually, a delicate compromise was achieved between France, Germany and the UK, and presented to other member states. It led to the establishment of the Civilian-Military Cell within the EUMS, which has the capacity to establish the Operations Centre when necessary. The following section investigates the role of different DGs of the European Commission in developing medium- to long-term policy.

6.2.2. The European Commission

The previous section has introduced key institutions involved in the conduct of the EU’s first naval operation, directed against organised crime off the coast of Somalia. These institutions are of critical importance, allowing the EU to deploy military capabilities protecting vulnerable vessels in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Nonetheless, naval operations alone are insufficient to tackle the problem of piracy in a long term, and particularly to address the main root causes of organised crime and violence in Somalia. To this end, other kinds of policy are more appropriate, most notably those aiming to tackle the structural problems of the failed state of Somalia. The European Commission plays a particularly important role in this respect, with its development aid instruments. However, this institution is also involved in shorter-term, non-military policies, directed particularly at the problem of piracy.

DG Tren plays an important role in developing EU actorness in the area of countering piracy off the Somali coast. One of the main activities of this DG is to represent a common position of the EU within the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (UN Contact Group) (COM02 2009). This UN body was established in January 2009 as a response to UN Security Council Resolution 1851. It is the main international platform aiming to ‘facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among states and organisations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia’ (UNSC 09/02/09). The UN Contact Group was created by 24 states and five regional and international organisations. One of them is the EU, represented by the European Commission. The UN Contact Group is divided into four working groups dealing with various aspects related to countering piracy and piratical attacks. The Commission participates in Working Groups 1 and 3. The first Working Group addresses ‘activities related to military and operational coordination and information-sharing and the establishment of the regional coordination centre’ (UNSC 09/02/09). The third Working Group aims ‘to strengthen shipping self-awareness and other capabilities’ (UNSC 09/02/09). An important achievement of the Working Group 3 was to agree on the Best Management Practices to Deter
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia (ICS-ISF 2009). The purpose of this document is ‘to assist companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks (…)’ (ICS-ISF 2009). An interviewee from DG Tren explains that one of his roles is to convince EU member states to comply with these Practices (COM02 2009).

DG Relex can be considered to play three roles with respect to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. They can be defined as:

a) Coordination: One DG Relex official observes that the main role of this DG in the area of maritime piracy is the coordination of work between activities of the Commission and these of the Council (COM07 2009). This official also admits that, because piracy off the coast of Somalia is an ongoing problem, coordinating different EU actions can sometimes be challenging.

b) Contribution: Within the framework of the IfS, the Commission has developed the CMR programme. This programme aims to contribute to international efforts to strengthen regional capacities of states in the Gulf of Aden. The involvement of the Commission in this area is examined in the next section.

c) Facilitation: The Commission aims to facilitate the exchange of information and experience among actors fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and those from South-East Asia, where the Commission supported the creation of ReCAAP (Ho 2009). To this end, the Commission organised a workshop in March 2009. The purpose of this workshop was to allow the representatives of these two regions to exchange their experiences in addressing maritime piracy. One Commission official notes that ‘the biggest success of this meeting was that Asian representatives, where the CMR programme was initially implemented, invited representatives from African states, to train them and show the best ways to tackle piracy’ (COM07 2009). The Commission financed this exchange.

DG Development is not involved in a direct response to the problem of piracy. However, this thesis argues that long-term development assistance must be taken into account when analysing the international security policy of the EU, whenever such assistance contributes to building stable conditions and establishing the rule of law. Such long-term, structural involvement
is particularly important in the case of Somalia and its numerous security problems, including organised crime. DG Development is in charge of conducting relations with ACP countries, as well as with Indian Ocean countries (including Somalia). For the years 2008-2013, the EU has allocated €215 million for Somalia, within the framework of the 10th EDF. This assistance is discussed in greater detail in the next section. Here, it is also important to note that once the aid is programmed, it then becomes the responsibility of DG EuropeAid to deliver it. The same holds true for initiatives of DG Relex within the framework of the IfS: DG EuropeAid is responsible for implementing the CMR.

This section has outlined major EU institutions involved in addressing the problem of piracy, as the form of organised crime, off the coast of Somalia. It has been pointed out that whereas CSDP institutions are engaged in military aspects of EU policy, the European Commission contributes to EU actorness through civilian efforts, including long-term development aid to Somalia. Such long-term involvement aims to, among other objectives, tackle the root causes of organised crime in this country, most notably the lack of law and poverty. At the same time, DG Tren and DG Relex engage in activities focused directly on tackling piracy, through involvement in international forums, most notably the IMO. As a result of the empirical analysis conducted in this section, this chapter concludes that the criterion of institutions is satisfied.

6.3. The EU and maritime piracy: resources

As it was already emphasised, maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is a complex problem, undermining the efforts of the international community to assist Somalia in developing into a stable, free of violence country. On the one hand, piracy perpetuates organised crime in Somalia, but on the other hand it is itself a product of the lack of law enforcement in this part of the Horn of Africa. As a result, the involvement of international actors, aiming to address the problem of organised crime in Somalia in a long term, needs to be comprehensive, including military and non-military resources, and operating in different time-frames. In a short term, it is important to contain the activities of organised piratical groups in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. To this end, the UN Security Council called upon the international community to deploy military assets to the region off the coast of Somalia (USNC 02/06/09; 07/10/08; 02/12/08; 16/12/08). The EU was one of the international actors to respond to this request. At the same time, the EU got involved in what can be described as a medium-term
initiative, strengthening the capacities of states in the region to handle piracy more effectively. Finally, the EU is the biggest donor of development aid to Somalia, aiming to improve the conditions in this country, thus tackling many of the root causes of piracy, other forms of organised crime and violence. This section assesses these three types of EU policies, by examining the resources at the EU’s disposal.

6.3.1. EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’

EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ constitutes the flagship EU’s response to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. It is also the first EU naval mission. It was launched by the Council of the European Union in November 2008 with the goal of protecting the World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels. EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ consists of two major components. The first component includes warships, surveillance planes and other military capabilities of EU member states, commanded by the Operational Commander in Northwood and the Force Commander in Djibouti. The second component includes a web-based platform called the Maritime Security Centre: Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). This platform, established by the EU in cooperation with the shipping industry, contributes to the security of maritime transport in the Gulf of Aden, through the constant monitoring of registered vessels. In addition, it also allows actors involved in fighting piracy off the Somali coast to coordinate their efforts in a real time.

The total number of EU military units involved in EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ has changed over the course of the operation. The table below indicates some of the capabilities deployed by EU member states.

Table 8: EU military capacities deployed for EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ (Source: Council Website A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveillance aircraft</th>
<th>Number: 3</th>
<th>P3-A (Spanish), P3-C (German), Atlantique 2 (French)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval ships</td>
<td>Number: 11</td>
<td>Canarias (Spanish), Bremen and Karlsruhe (German), La Fayette, Améthyste, Germinal and Floreal (French), Evertsen (Dutch), HS Adrias (Greek), Louise Marie (Belgian), Fridtjof Nansen (Norwegian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The EU also offers vulnerable vessels, upon their request, the protection of the so-called ‘independent vessels protection detachments’. In June 2009, there were six of them available in the region. The EU’s budget for the operation within the first year (December 2008 – December 2009) was established at €8.3 million. This sum covered expenses related to the functioning of the OHQ in Northwood and the FHQ in Djibouti. It was collected from EU member states, proportionally to their gross domestic product (GDP). The actual costs of deployments are covered by individual member states taking part in the operation (Council Website B).

EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is the largest anti-piracy task force deployed in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. However, it would be both inaccurate and counterproductive to conclude that the EU is capable of deploying more military capabilities than, for example, NATO (NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield consists of three to five vessels). It would be inaccurate, because the EU, contrary to NATO, does not have its own military capabilities. Instead, for its CSDP operations, the EU relies on ad hoc contributions from member states. It would also be counterproductive, because effective counter-piracy measures rely on close cooperation, not competition. To this end, some scholars criticise the deployment of parallel NATO and EU missions. Seibert (2009) calls them ‘no more than a maritime beauty contest’, pointing out that the two missions ‘needlessly duplicate already expensive efforts’. Yet both the EU and NATO aim to demonstrate that they work closely together. One Turkish navy officer directly involved in fighting piracy off the Somali coast observes: ‘The operations conducted by the EU, NATO or Coalition Forces are very well coordinated. Exchanging intelligence and region coverage are well organised by the three headquarters’ (NAVY1 2010).

The military capabilities provided by EU member states constitute just one, albeit the most visible, dimension of EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’. Another important resource, allowing the EU to develop its actorness in the area of organised crime off the coast of Somalia, is MSCHOA. One EUMS official explains that the rationale for creating this web-based platform is to convince ship-owners and insurers that the Gulf of Aden is safe for transport. Otherwise, he points out, maritime transit in this region would become too expensive. He also admits that MSCHOA is ‘unprecedented for any military operation in history’ (MILSTAFF1 2009). The website has three sections:
a) An unprotected section, providing general information about EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, including yachting guidelines.

b) A password-protected section, explaining how those cruising through the Gulf of Aden can protect themselves, i.e. what to do if an attack occurs. To this end, the website ‘offers ship owners, ships Masters and agents the facility to register their details securely with MSCHOA, update positions of their vessels and receive information and guidance designed to reduce the risk of pirate attacks’ (MSCHOA 2009). In 2009, there were over 4,500 registered users.

c) An additional-security section, allowing live communication among states and organisations involved in fighting piracy in the region of the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Some of the international actors that have been using the chat-room include: EUNAVFOR OHQ and FHQ, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, China, NATO, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Seychelles. An official from the EUMS admits that ‘it is remarkable that our partners really use it’ (MILSTAFF1 2009).

The popularity of this platform is indeed an indication of the EU’s recognition as a facilitator of the exchange of information among actors fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia. Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) for the Combined Maritime Forces, Cdr Alistair Clark, envisaged in June 2009 that MERCURY (the technical name of the chat-room) was about to become ‘the main means of disseminating unclassified information’ (Clark 2009). Both aspects of EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, the military and electronic, constitute an important step for the EU to develop a military dimension of its international security actorness in the area of organised crime. The military operation adds a navy component to the EU’s experience of working within the framework of the CSDP. Rear Admiral Philip Jones of the UK Ministry of Defence, when examined by the House of Lords, has underlined the novelty of ‘Atalanta’: ‘It is the first ever EU maritime operation conducted under ESDP. I am the first ever UK commander of an EU operation under ESDP, so there are two very significant firsts there, and I think that the range of other navies that we are dealing with in the area has been an absolute first’ (Great Britain 2010: 1). The MSCHOA, on the other hand, demonstrates how Internet technologies can be utilised when responding to contemporary security challenges, such as organised crime. Admiral Jones has noted that the website ‘has been one of the unexpected
and very significant successes of the operation, where almost all of the shipping companies that transit through the Gulf of Aden register' (Great Britain 2010: 3).

6.3.2. Critical Maritime Routes programme

One of the areas where the Commission can get involved, through the IfS, is 'threats to international transport, energy operations and critical infrastructure, including passenger and freight traffic and energy distribution' (European Parliament and the Council 24/11/06: 4). This competence enables the Commission to get involved in addressing the problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. The CMR has been developed for this purpose, aiming to finance transnational initiatives enhancing the security of maritime transit, such as the sharing of information amongst states in vulnerable regions. The European Commission, in its IfS Multi-Annual Indicative Program 2009-2011, defines the CMR as following: 'This program will seek to address a number of risks and threats posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea in a comprehensive and integrated way by bringing together the appropriate legal frameworks, institutional arrangements and operational measures, including capacity building to improve the exchange of information' (European Commission 09/12/09: 43).

Although the main geographical focus of the CMR programme is the Horn of Africa, a limited support is also envisaged for combating piracy in South-East Asia. Thus, in order to learn more about desirable responses to piracy in South-East Asia, the Commission arranged a series of high-level expert missions to the Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (COM11 2009). The purpose of these missions was 'to identify, select and recruit experts from EU member states who would help to prepare the specific projects in the regions' (COM11 2009). In spring 2008, as a result of the sharp increase of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean, the Commission decided that it was also necessary to deploy a similar fact-finding mission to countries around Somalia. A set of visits were conducted to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Somalia was not included, at the time, due to its lack of institutional capacities to actively engage in the fight against piracy.

Commission-sponsored projects are developed multilaterally under the auspices of the IMO. Of notable importance, in this regard, was the IMO meeting in Djibouti, in January 2009, which the Commission participated in as an observer. One major outcome of this meeting was the so-called 'Code of Conduct' (Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden), together
with the Resolution on Enhancing Training in the Region (IMO 2009). One of the priorities identified in the Code of Conduct was to enhance the sharing of information among the states of the region. To this end, the establishment of the ‘information exchange centres’ was envisaged in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. The European Commission decided to contribute to setting up the centre in Yemen. The centres do not seem to have become operational at the time of writing. An official from DG EuropeAid of the European Commission explains that, at the very minimum, information sharing centres in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden should mirror those already in place in South-East Asia, established by the aforementioned ReCAAP (COM09 2009).

The Resolution on Enhancing Training in the Region, another important outcome of the Djibouti meeting in 2009, requests the Secretary-General of the IMO to establish a training centre in Djibouti, which will allow a uniform implementation of the Code of Conduct. The European Commission subsequently decided to support this project financially. For the period of 2009-2011 the Commission assigned between €14 and €18 million for the implementation of the CMR program.

6.3.3. Security and development aid to Somalia

When talking to EU officials, it appears that addressing the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia is very important for the EU as a part of its comprehensive approach. However, what are these root causes, precisely? The answer depends on who is asked. For example, a minister from the TFG, at the UN General Assembly informal meeting on piracy in May 2010, has noted: ‘The consequential results of overfishing, the dumping of wastes in the Somali territorial waters, and subsequently the demonization of our fishermen, have generated a bitter resentment from the people. This resentment coupled with the collapse of the Somali central government has led to, among other things, piracy’ (UN 14/05/10). Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping as important root causes of piracy off the Somali coast remains a popular argument, even among some officials of the European Commission (COM05 2009). However, the majority of interviewees have noted that, whereas initially this argument may have been valid, nothing justifies the scale of piratical attacks that have developed in recent years. In fact, the activity of Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean may have indirectly contributed to further illegal fishing, particularly with regard to the by-catch. As a result of the piracy threat, most scientific expeditions in 2009 to the Indian Ocean were cancelled. Often those scientists
travel on fishing boats to monitor the stock and fishermen’s compliance with fishing rules. In recent years, many of those oceanographic scientists were replaced with armed guards (New Scientist 2010).

Regardless of the degree to which illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping contributed to piracy off the Somali coast, almost all experts and EU officials agree that the failed state of Somalia constitutes the main root-cause of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Extreme poverty, the lack of law enforcement and corrupt officials (warlords) make any anti-piracy task force only a partial solution. In order to address the problem over the long-term, structural conditions in Somalia need to improve. However, this is easier said than done; this task seems next to impossible in the post-2006 climate of constant violence and humanitarian disaster. Nonetheless, the EU remains the largest donor of official development assistance to Somalia, committed to improving political, economic and security conditions in this country. With regards to the political situation in Somalia, the EU, together with other international actors, continues to support the TFG as the only authority in Somalia considered legitimate by the international community. In order to enhance security in Somalia, the EU contributes financially to the peace-keeping mission of the African Union (AU), to the Rule of Law Program of the UNDP, and recently it has also started its own training program in Uganda for Somali security forces.

EU development aid to Somalia is guided by the framework prepared jointly by the UN Development Group and the World Bank, upon the request of the TFG. Their work on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for Somalia began in 2005, and resulted in a five-volume document called the Reconstruction and Development Programme for Somalia (RDP). The RDP identifies a number of priority needs for Somalia, which were grouped into three broad pillars: a) deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance; b) investing in people through improved social services; and c) creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce poverty (United Nations and World Bank 2008). The EU has incorporated these pillars into its own development strategy for Somalia for the years 2008-2013. Overall, the EU’s long-term engagement in Somalia can be grouped into five categories: a) EU humanitarian aid; b) EU development aid; c) EU support for the UNDP’s Rule of Law programme; d) EU support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); and e) EU training mission in Uganda.
EU humanitarian aid to Somalia is managed by the Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission (ECHO). It was established in 1992 and now is one of the world’s most important providers of humanitarian assistance to the victims of natural disasters and armed conflict. In Somalia, conditions for delivering humanitarian aid are extremely difficult, with 37 aid workers killed in 2008; this is 66 percent of all aid workers killed worldwide (Sullivan 2009). At the same time, Somalia is in a state of a constant humanitarian disaster, with 225 out of 1000 children not reaching the age of five. The European Commission increased its humanitarian assistance from €12 million in 2007 to €45.8 million in 2008 (Council of the European Union 02/10). In 2010, the Commission has allocated €35 million for the victims of conflict and natural disasters in Somalia (European Commission 27/07/10), but also €15 million for Somalis in Kenya, the location for the world’s biggest refugee camp (European Commission 02/08/10). By comparison, in 2010 (until September) the US has contributed to Somalia $28 million in humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2010).

EU development aid, as opposed to humanitarian assistance, contributes to long-term development projects, aimed at changing the structural conditions in the country. It is constructed around three main focal sectors, reflecting three pillars identified in the RDP. The focal sectors, identified in the EU’s Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the Period 2008-2013, include:

a) Governance: promoting security, supporting reconciliation, strengthening the governance, supporting Somali non-state actors.

b) Education: strengthening and expanding capacity of administrations at all levels, teaching force, access to education and participation of disadvantaged adults.

c) Economic Development and Food Security: developing the framework for private sector-led growth, supporting for the main productive sectors, supporting sustainable management of natural resources, supporting food security and livelihood recovery.

The total budget for the long-term EU’s development assistance to Somalia for the years 2008-2013 is €215 million (European Union 2008). The humanitarian and development involvement in the failed state of Somalia must be taken into account when assessing comprehensively the EU’s approach to improving security in this country, including organised crime off the Somali coast. However, the EU is also involved in providing more security-focused assistance.
Firstly, the EU contributes to the Rule of Law and Security Programme of the UNDP (UNDP 2009). This initiative aims to improve the security situation in Somalia through projects such as: a) Judiciary/Access to justice - building mobile courts, training professionals, establishing the Women Lawyers’ Association in Somalia; b) Law enforcement - providing training for the police, increasing access for women and children to justice; c) Community safety - building on the experience of similar projects in Haiti, Colombia and El Salvador, this project supports local communities in organising Local Safety Committees and in developing Community Safety Plans. The EU has been focusing on supporting the development of police force in Somalia, committing in total €43 million over the last few years (Council of the European Union 02/10).

Secondly, the EU supports AMISOM, the AU’s peace-keeping mission in Somalia, launched by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007, and authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC 21/02/07). The mission, supported by the EU, the US and other international donors right from the beginning, aims to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, after they removed the ICU from power in December 2006. Considering that many defeated Islamist fighters initiated the guerrilla war in Somalia, AU ministers decided that the existence of the TFG could only be secured by an external peace-keeping mission. AMISOM, although critical for the security of Somali government, has limited resources. At the same time, al-Shabaab has increased its pressure, trying, for example, to capture the Presidential Palace in May 2010. AU ministers, as a result of Kampala attacks in July 2010, attempted to broaden the mandate of the mission, to include peace-enforcement, but such a move was blocked by the UN (Kasasira and Muyita 2010). Since 2007, the EU has committed over €100 million for the support of AMISOM. Most notably, the EU pledged €60 million at the International Donor Conference on Somalia, hosted by the European Commission in April 2009, and co-organised by the UN and the AU (European Commission 23/04/09).

Thirdly, in addition to supporting security in Somalia through other international frameworks, the EU has launched its own mission in April 2010, aiming to train 2000 Somali forces in Uganda. EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia intends to contribute to the security situation in Somalia ‘as part of a wider international effort and encompassing inter alia the vetting of trainees, the monitoring and mentoring of the forces once back in Mogadishu and the funding and payment of the salaries of the soldiers’ (Council of the European Union 07/04/10). The success of this mission, which has the potential to enhance the quality of the Somali army,
will depend on the stability of wages being paid to those who are being trained. In April 2010 media outlets revealed that many Somali soldiers, trained with the support of US funding in Djibouti, deserted (Associated Press and Smith 2010). While some of them returned to their families, others joined al-Shabaab and now are involved in fighting the TFG and AMISOM forces.

Ultimately, the only long-term solution to piracy off the coast of Somalia is the more stable and secure state of Somalia. This section has demonstrated that the EU remains very active in providing long-term assistance to Somalia. The Commission provides aid, some of which is purely humanitarian in nature, but also some of which is more security-oriented. Yet, it remains difficult to assess the effectiveness of EU involvement. This is due to the fact that Somalia remains a thoroughly failed state, torn by permanent fights between various clans, as well as between Islamist insurgents and forces supporting the TFG. As a result, it remains almost impossible to assess any progress in this country. For example, Somalia has been unable to deliver data for the UNDP in order to rank the country in the Human Development Index. Over the long-term perspective, security and development in Somalia will depend on the ability of the parties to the conflict to reach some sort of agreement, as happened in 2004, when the Transitional Federal Institutions were created. Until then, the EU, through a variety of instruments at its disposal, needs to remain a leading international actor facilitating progress towards this goal. As a result of the investigation conducted in this section, this chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of resources.

6.4. The EU and maritime piracy: recognition

The aim of this section is to analyse the extent to which the EU has been recognised for its efforts of addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is important to remind that ‘Atalanta’ constitutes the first naval operation of the EU, which, as such, is generally not considered an actor with significant autonomous military capabilities. In fact, as already noted, the EU does not have its own military capacities; instead, for its operations, it relies exclusively on the contributions of member states, with the exception of the limited Brussels-based headquarter capability (EU Operations Centre). With this caveat, this section evaluates the extent to which EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ has been recognised within the first two years of its operation. In particular, different catego-
ries of actors have been sampled to examine their perceptions of ‘Atalanta’; these include: a) EU officials; b) media; c) Somali activists; d) other actors fighting piracy in the region.

EU officials, in general, tend to agree that EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is rather strongly recognised for its anti-piracy efforts. One official from the Unit Africa of the Council Secretariat observes: ‘Our naval operation is widely known in the region [Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden]. I would say that we are the most prominent actor there’ (CON02 2009). Another official, from DG MARE of the European Commission, notes that ‘Atalanta’ is strongly recognised because, for example, it has a system of fast exchange of information with the vessels of other actors involved in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia. The official also notes that ‘Atalanta’ is more welcome in the region than the involvement of the US, because with the involvement of the EU ‘there is no “war on terror” rhetoric associated with the operation; it is perceived as a policing mission’ (COM06 2009).

Media outlets tend to increasingly recognise that even though navy ships taking part in fighting piracy off the Somali coast belong to EU member states, they in fact are part of the mission conducted by the EU. One official from the EUMS notes that journalists sometimes come to NATO headquarters in Brussels, trying to enquire about operations which in fact are conducted by the EU. He also observes that it is not unusual to see a press release, for example in Spain, indicating that the Spanish warship captured Somali pirates; then, ‘only in the tenth paragraph, you may find out that the warship was part of the EU task force’ (MILSTAFF1 2009). The analysis of a number of news articles covering the topic of the fight against piracy off the Somali coast suggests that the construction of these articles partially depends on where the piece originates from. For example, Agence France Presse (AFP) in Brussels demonstrates a high level of recognition of EU efforts. It tends to recognise EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ right at the beginning of a news story: ‘European Union warships have captured seven suspected pirates’ (AFP 2009a) or ‘EU ship saves two off Somalia after 37 days at sea’ (AFP 2009b). On the other hand, the same press agency, when writing from Paris, tends to underline the role of French navy in its new titles: ‘French navy hands over Somali pirates to Puntland’ (AFP 2009c). The fact that French involvement constitutes a part of a broader EU mission is only mentioned in the article once.

As a part of research conducted for this thesis, the founder and president of Somali think tank based in Nairobi, Abdullahi M. Aden, has been interviewed about international fight against
piracy off the coast of Somalia. In the context of EU recognition, he notes that those who are involved in his think tank are perfectly aware of the EU’s military operation. In particular, he notes: ‘Already in November 2008, we heard that the EU’s mission against Somali piracy is directed towards the coast of Somalia. We knew that it was a deployment by the EU and not individual countries. We also knew that the European naval operation off the coast of Somalia was led by the UK and it was based on UN Resolution 1838’ (Interview with Abdullahi M. Aden, November 2009, Nairobi).

Furthermore, for this thesis, a Turkish navy officer, directly involved in fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, has also been interviewed. In particular, he was asked about his perception of the EU’s operation. His response is quoted in length: ‘Operation ATALANTA is well visible in the area from the points of deterring and disrupting piracy. Every operation conducted by the EU, NATO or Coalition Forces are very well coordinated. Exchanging intelligence and region coverage are well organised by three headquarters. (...) As far as I have observed, all EU countries which have the capability to send naval forces, either frigates or marine patrolling aircrafts to operate in this region, do their best to contribute to this operation’ (NAVY1 2010).

Perhaps the highest level of recognition the EU has achieved among other actors involved in counteracting piracy off the Somali coast, including both state- and non-state actors. This recognition is mainly facilitated through MSCHOA, constituting an important part of EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’. One of the functions of this electronic platform is to provide a secure chat-room for states and international organisations which have deployed military capacities off the coast of Somalia. This is how one EU official, involved in conducting EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, explains the role of this chat-room: ‘It is a secure but unclassified facility and we have there Russians, NATO, Chinese, Indians, and all the other partners communicating with each other on a minute-to-minute basis’ (MILSTAFF1 2009). Indeed, the fact that other states and organisations take advantage of this EU-facilitated instrument, in order to coordinate their decisions, is important. It indicates a high level of the recognition of the EU as an international security actor, or even a leading security actor in this particular case.

This section has demonstrated that EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ has achieved a high degree of recognition among various groups of actors. There are a few reasons for this significant recognition, including: a) the establishment of MSCHOA - a web-based facility which proved to

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be popular among other actors active in the region, such as NATO and the CMF; b) the fact that EU mission constitutes one of the biggest deployments countering piracy off the coast of Somalia; and c) the fact that the EU is active in promoting the visibility of its mission. For example, it has launched a website exclusively dedicated to EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’. However, there is one limitation to the EU’s recognition, concerning the role of the EU (and other international actors) in addressing the root causes of organised crime and violence in Somalia. Notably, neither the EU, nor the US or any other actor, has achieved a high level of international recognition for addressing the problems of the failed Somali state, such as constant violence and extreme poverty. The US has been particularly criticised in this respect for its anti-terrorism agenda in Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007). Bruton (2009) from the Council on Foreign Relations indicates that ‘the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the country’. The international community, including the EU, has not as yet found an effective solution which would contribute to developing Somalia into a stable country. Importantly, the reason for this is the extent to which Somalia can be considered a failed state, with constant violence perpetuated by an ongoing struggle of Islamist insurgents to assume the power in Mogadishu. As a consequence, some commentators even conclude that ‘perhaps the world should begin to admit that Somalia – as it is currently constructed – is beyond repair’ (Tannock 2009; see also Bruton 2009). Regardless of these limitations, the EU remains the biggest donor of security, development and humanitarian assistance to Somalia, which may be the only effective way to tackle the problem of piracy in a long term. The empirical investigation conducted in this section demonstrates that the EU is recognised for its anti-piracy efforts, thus it satisfies the criterion of recognition.

Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the role of the EU as an international security actor in the area of addressing the problem of piracy, as the form organised crime off the coast of Somalia. As a result of this empirical investigation, this chapter concludes that the EU has achieved a high level of international security actorness in the area of fighting piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The following table summarises the findings of this chapter.
Table 9: EU security actorlessness in the area of addressing the problem of piracy off the Somali coast: the summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>The EU has been recognised by consecutive UN resolutions for deploying military capacities off the coast of Somalia. The EU is also legally recognised by countries such as Kenya and Djibouti in the form of bilateral agreements. In addition, the EU has a wide range of legal instruments to address the problem of piracy in a short, but also in a long term, through tackling the root causes of insecurity in the region.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Two types of institutions have been identified as important: a) for planning and executing EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, the institutional setup of the CSDP has been assessed, ranging from high-level political bodies such as the PSC, to the headquarters; and b) for developing regional capacities, but also for addressing the root causes of insecurities in Somalia, relevant DGs of the European Commission have been examined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Three categories of resources have been identified: a) in a short term, EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ - a military mission launched within the framework of the CSDP; b) in a medium term, the CMR programme, aiming to improve the security of maritime transport by enhancing regional capacities (e.g. information sharing), in the Gulf of Aden; and c) in a long term, EU financial assistance of a humanitarian, development and security nature, addressing the problem of the failed state of Somalia – one of the major root causes of piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The EU’s anti-piracy efforts have achieved a high level of recognition. In particular, EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is recognised by other state- and non-state actors involved in addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This high level of recognition is partially facilitated through the EU’s web-based platform, allowing different actors to coordinate their anti-piracy efforts in a real time. Yet, this high level of recognition in the area of engaging pirates and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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protecting vulnerable vessels must be viewed in the context of the low level of the recognition of the international community, including the EU, for addressing the security problems inside Somalia.

First, this chapter has examined the EU's authority. It has been established that even though the EU as an institution is not a member of the UN, it nonetheless has been recognised by the UN Security Council in its consecutive resolutions. The *de jure* recognition of the EU as an actor is also confirmed by a number of bilateral agreements between the EU and countries in the region of the Gulf of Aden, such as Djibouti and Yemen. Furthermore, the first section has established that the EU has a wide range of legal instruments to address the problem of piracy in a short, but also in a long term, through tackling the root causes of insecurity in the region. Thus, it is concluded that the EU satisfies the criterion of authority.

Second, this chapter has examined two types of EU institutions. In the context of planning and executing EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, the institutional setup of the CSDP has been assessed, ranging from high-level bodies of political importance, such as the PSC, to the headquarters, necessary for any mission involving the deployment of military capacities. It has been noted that this institutional setup is rather remarkable, considering its recent development, but also some limitations have been identified. Furthermore, the second part of this section has examined relevant DGs of the European Commission, which addresses the problem of piracy in a medium term through the CMR programme, but is also an international leader in addressing the root causes of insecurities in Somalia. This empirical investigation allows to conclude that the EU satisfies the criterion of institutions.

Third, this chapter has examined EU resources. This assessment has been conducted in a comprehensive manner, by including all the instruments at the EU's disposal, which are considered important for improving security inside Somalia and off its coast. Thus, this chapter has evaluated three types of EU policy. Starting with the most immediate and visible response, this chapter has examined EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ – a military mission launched within the framework of the CSDP, upon the requests of the UN Security Council. Notably, ‘Atalanta’ constitutes a flagship EU response to maritime piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. In addition to this military response, the EU is involved in non-military, multilateral efforts to help states in the region to enhance their own capabilities. Most impor-
tant in this respect is the CMR programme, launched within the framework of the IfS. Initially focused on the Malacca Straits, the CMR aims to improve the security of maritime transport, by enhancing regional capacities (e.g. information sharing), to address problems such as piracy. Finally, it was also important to assess EU policy with respect to the problem of Somali failed state, as a root-cause of piracy and other forms of organised crime in the region. The EU’s assistance ranges from humanitarian aid to longer-term development aid, aiming to improve structural conditions in the country. It also includes significant security assistance, notably the support for AMISOM and the UNDP’s Rule of Law and Security Programme. As a result of this analysis, the chapter concludes that the EU satisfies the criterion of resources.

Fourth, this chapter has also indicated that EU anti-piracy efforts have achieved a high level of recognition. In this context, EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is particularly recognised by other state- and non-state actors involved in addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This has been achieved partially through the success of MSCHOA, which allows EU partners to coordinate their anti-piracy efforts in a real time. Furthermore, the interviews with a Turkish navy officer and the president of the Somali think tank in Nairobi have enabled to establish that EU mission is also recognised among actors in the region. However, this high level of recognition in the area of engaging pirates and protecting vulnerable vessels must be viewed in the context of the low level of the recognition of the international community, including the EU, for addressing the security problems inside Somalia. At the moment, the situation in this failed state does not display a prospect for improvement in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the empirical investigation conducted in the final section of this chapter has demonstrated that EU’s efforts concerning addressing the problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia satisfy the criterion of recognition.

Table 10: The EU has achieved a high level of actorness in the area of addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of actorness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a result, this chapter concludes that the EU has achieved a high level of international security actorness in the area of addressing the problem of piracy off the Somali coast. This is remarkable, considering that EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is the first naval operation of the EU. Mainly through this mission, the EU has established itself as an important actor patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the EU remains the largest donor of assistance to Somalia, attempting to improve the security conditions in this violence-driven country. Although it has not been particularly recognised for its efforts, this chapter has demonstrated that the EU’s response to the security situation in Somalia and off its coast is quite comprehensive; therefore, in many respects, it is designed according to best practice advice by piracy experts (Chalk 2008; Vego 2009).
Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to assess the role of the EU as an international security actor in a comprehensive manner. This has led to a number of aims which have been addressed in the theoretical component of this thesis. Firstly, it has been necessary to address the question of the EU as an international actor: Is it possible for a non-state entity, such as the EU, to be considered an international actor? It has been argued that there are no conceptual difficulties in studying the EU as an actor if a set of criteria for assessing such actorness is defined. These criteria have been grounded in literature on the EU as a *sui generis* international actor. Furthermore, they have been operationalised in order to allow drawing conclusions about the level of the EU’s international security actorness. It has been suggested that the EU could have a low, medium or high level of actorness. Secondly, it has been necessary to justify the comprehensive approach to security adopted in this thesis. To this end, the theoretical part has integrated the conceptualisation of security as it is approached in scholarly research on contemporary security studies. It has also been argued that the comprehensive approach entails studying EU instruments and policies beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework. For example, the empirical component of this thesis has demonstrated a significant role of the European Commission and some of its medium and long-term instruments.

These aims have served the purpose of addressing the main research question of this thesis, which is: To which extent has the EU developed as an international security actor? In order to address this question in a way which is congruent with the theoretical framework for this thesis, the empirical component has been structured around criteria for assessing international actorness of an entity such as the EU. These criteria have included: legal authority, institutions, resources and recognition. Furthermore, the empirical analysis of EU policy has not been limited to the instruments and resources available within the framework of the CFSP/CSDP. Whereas this EU policy framework plays a key role in the EU’s international security policy, it has been demonstrated that the European Commission also has its own instruments, important for addressing some of the contemporary security challenges. In order to address the problem of a gap between the approach to security in the European studies literature, and literature on contemporary security studies, a varied sample of contemporary security challenges have been introduced into the empirical part of this thesis. These case studies include:
a) The EU and climate change as one of the so-called 'non-traditional' security issues. It has been noted that there already is a wide array of studies on the EU and climate change policy. However, these contributions, while valuable in explaining various aspects of EU environmental policy, do not explicitly contribute to a better understanding of the EU as an international security actor. Moreover, the EU recently began to develop a separate policy, aiming to address specifically the security dimension of climate change. This recent development has not been acknowledged in the literature yet.

b) The EU and the danger of the proliferation of WMDs, particularly from Russia and the former Soviet Union. There was a considerable threat of an unauthorised access to the large stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons in this geographical region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The EU, together with the US and other international actors, played an important role in preventing this danger from materialising. The 9/11 attacks, again, raised the concerns of terrorist groups gaining access to WMD stockpiles in Russia. The EU is one of the international actors which got involved in addressing this challenge.

c) The EU and piracy off the coast of Somalia is considered in this thesis the most-traditional security problem, due to the type of solution that it requires. Whereas the previous two cases require exclusively political, economic and diplomatic resources, the problem of piracy actually requires a limited military response as a part of the solution. The EU was one of the first international actors to respond to the calls by the UN Security Council. It remains involved in fighting piracy in a short term, through its military mission, but is also active in addressing the root causes of piracy and other forms of organised crime, through long-term development and security aid to Somalia.

The examination of the EU’s role in addressing each of these challenges consisted of content analysis and research interviews. The interviews were, for the most part, conducted in Brussels, in 2009. However, a number of interviews were conducted over the phone and via e-mail. A separate funding was secured for conducting two trips to Brussels – the University Association for Contemporary European Studies granted research conducted for this thesis with a generous Scholarship.
The results of the case study analysis

The comprehensive approach to analysing the role of the EU as an international security actor allows to obtain a more accurate image of this role. This section first outlines the findings of individual case studies. In the second part, it refers back to criteria of actorness, in order to draw more general conclusions, based on the analysis of all three case studies.

Each of the three case studies selected for this thesis constitutes a separate contribution to studying the role of the EU as an international security actor. Firstly, the case study examining EU actorness in the area of climate security has highlighted the EU’s role in developing the international security dimension of climate change. It was not until a few years ago that state- and non-state actors began conceptualising climate change in the context of international security. This thesis has demonstrated that the EU has an ambition to become an international leader in this emerging policy area. The case study has also discussed EU’s efforts to tackle climate change through securing an ambitious international agreement within the UNFCCC framework. The EU was not successful in reaching this goal at the summit in Copenhagen in 2009 – the fact which to some extent affected the recognition of the EU as an international leader in climate negotiations. Nonetheless, the EU remains an important actor in this area. As a result of the Copenhagen summit agreement, the EU pledged one-third of the sum committed by Parties for financing adaptation to climate change in developing countries in the years 2010-2012.

Secondly, the case study concerning preventing the proliferation of WMDs from Russia and the former Soviet Union has demonstrated that even though the EU is not highly recognised as an actor in this area, there are some significant (even surprising) developments taking place at the EU level. Most notably, the European Commission continues to play an important role in EU non-proliferation policy, through utilising a variety of instruments. In the 1990s, the policy of the Commission was focused exclusively on the former Soviet Union and was delivered through TACIS programme. In 2007, two new instruments replaced TACIS. One of these new instruments, the IfS, identified non-proliferation as one of the key security priorities for the European Commission. As a result, even though the policies of the EU (including the Commission and the Council) became overshadowed by the activities of individual EU member states working within international frameworks outside the EU, the Commission continues to develop the non-proliferation policy of the EU. Interestingly, this policy begins to move
beyond the geographical area of the former Soviet Union; the Commission extends its activities to the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.

Thirdly, the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia has examined EU efforts to counter this threat in a short, medium and a long term. In a short term, this thesis has discussed the first-ever EU naval operation, deployed to protect vulnerable vessels in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Apart from being the first naval mission of the EU, EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is also an operation which has achieved a high level of recognition. Perhaps, it is the most widely recognised CSDP operation deployed up to date. In a medium term, the European Commission participates in implementing the Djibouti Code of Conduct. To this end, the Commission utilises its IFs. In a long term, the Commission has been active in providing various forms of aid to Somalia. EU assistance ranges from humanitarian relief to long-term projects aiming to enhance development and security in Somalia. These activities address some of the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia and other forms of organised crime. This case study has particularly indicated the importance of assessing the security actoriness of the EU in a comprehensive manner. This means that, in addition to analysing the most immediate EU response, i.e. the CSDP mission ‘Atalanta’, it is also important to investigate longer-term EU actions, even though the link between these actions and fighting piracy is indirect and often remote.

All three case studies represent different kinds of contemporary security challenges. Thus, they require different policies when developing an appropriate response. However, at least two similarities can be observed in a way that the EU aims to respond to these challenges. Firstly, in all three case studies, the EU attempts to develop its policies within a broader, multilateral framework. In the area of climate security, the EU has been primarily active within the UNFCCC framework and within the UN General Assembly, with regards to developing a security dimension of climate change. With regard to non-proliferation, the EU has been primarily active within the G8 Global Partnership framework. Other frameworks, such as the Committee 1540 are also important for guiding EU activities. Finally, with regard to addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, the EU has been developing its responses within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions (in a short term), within the IMO framework (in a medium term) and within the framework of the Joint Needs Assessment for Somalia (in a long term).
Secondly, in all three case studies, EU financial instruments and technical assistance are playing a central role. In the case of climate security, funding for adaptation to climate change in developing countries has been at the core of EU response. In the case of non-proliferation with a particular focus on Russia, the EU has been channelling its assistance through TACIS, the IfS and the INSC, in addition to financial and technical contributions of EU member states. In the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the EU has deployed a mixture of military and financial instruments, with CMR programme and the EU’s development aid at the core of the EU’s longer-term policy. This thesis suggests that although harder to assess, a medium and long-term approach is crucial to systematically tackle most of the contemporary international security challenges.

In the context of criteria of actorness identified in the theoretical component of this thesis, the following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of empirical research. Firstly, the EU has authority to undertake actions at the international level in the area of security policy. For example, the EU in general, and the European Commission in particular, have achieved de jure recognition even in contexts where they are not formally a member of a particular international organisation or a regime. All of the case studies examined in this thesis indicate this fact. For example, although the EU as an institution is not a member of the UN, it has been recognised by the UN Security Council when addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Similarly, even though the EU is not Party to the NPT, the Commission has been recognised as a valuable partner by the IAEA. The Commission is also recognised within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership.

Secondly, even though the EU is sometimes criticised for its extensive bureaucracy, its institutions contribute to the development of EU actorness in the area of international security. In this respect, two EU institutions play key roles: the Council of the European Union (including its General Secretariat) and the European Commission. Whilst it does not come as a surprise that EU member states work within the Council on the EU’s common foreign and security policy, this thesis has also highlighted the role of the Commission in this policy area. Traditionally, this institution has been associated exclusively with economic policy. This thesis contributes to academic debate by demonstrating the role of the Commission in international security policy of the EU. Importantly, this includes the so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges, as well as more traditional ones, such as the proliferation of WMDs.
Thirdly, the EU has a growing number of short- and long-term resources, allowing it to address contemporary security challenges from different angles. The case of piracy off the coast of Somalia is most instructive in this respect. In order to address the problem of piracy, the EU has deployed its first-ever naval operation, within the framework of the CSDP. However, limiting the analysis of EU policy to EUNAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ would lead to the omission of other EU policies. Most notably, it would exclude the medium and long-term involvement of the European Commission. In a medium term, the Commission has launched its CMR programme, within the framework of the IfS. This instrument, which replaced the RRM in 2007, allows the Commission to address a range of contemporary security challenges. EU contribution aims to enhance capacities of states in the region to be able to tackle maritime piracy more effectively. In a long term, the Commission has been involved in addressing some of the root causes of organised crime in Somalia, by providing development and security aid to this country.

Fourthly, the EU tends to be recognised as an international actor, once it gets involved in a certain security policy area. This thesis has demonstrated a high level of EU recognition in the area of climate security and piracy off the Somali coast. In both of these cases, the EU is recognised and considered an important, if not the leading actor. This finding is particularly interesting in the case of maritime piracy, because addressing this challenge involves deploying military capabilities. Even though the EU has not developed as a powerful military actor, its military mission off the coast of Somalia is recognised in the region and among other actors involved in fighting piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. With regard to the third case study, the EU is not highly recognised as an actor in the area of non-proliferation. A number of reasons for this fact have been identified in Chapter 5. One of the most important ones are the existence of other frameworks, allowing EU and non-EU states to work together on implementing projects in Russia and other states in the region. Another reason is that the non-proliferation of WMDs is perceived as a policy area reserved primarily for nation-states.

Global picture

How do the findings of this thesis relate to broader developments in international security policy? At this point of European integration in the area of international security policy, EU member states do not manifest a desire for the EU to replace other regional security organisa-
tions, most notably the OSCE and NATO. It is certain that a number of EU member states would firmly oppose such a goal. Instead, the EU develops its international security capabilities only in addition to its more prominently developed economic policies. In fact, this strong economic dimension of European integration is one of the reasons that the international security policy of the EU so heavily relies on financial instruments. As a result, some scholars (e.g. Drozdiak 2010) have been arguing that, in order for the West to tackle contemporary security challenges effectively, it is necessary to merge the 'hard power' of NATO and the 'soft power' of the EU. This idea is not new, but neither EU member states nor the US seem to be interested in such defined transatlantic burden-sharing. For the EU, to rely on NATO in 'hard security', would mean to abandon its CSDP, or to transform it into something reminiscent the European Security and Defence Identity from the 1990s. There does not seem to be such desire, particularly after launching EUNAVFOR 'Atalanta', which in Brussels is considered a spectacular success of the CSDP. Whitman (2004) suggests another kind of division of labour, structured around the area of involvement. According to this author, whereas the EU is more comfortable operating closer to its borders, 'NATO has evolved into a "wider-European" pluralistic security community embracing states across the Eurasian landmass in a network of structured relations' (Whitman 2004: 448). It is too early to assess the viability of this observation, but the CSDP operation in Congo and now off the coast of Somalia suggests that the EU may be in the process of enlarging its 'security comfort zone'.

Regardless of the range of CSDP operations, the EU remains a unique international security actor. On the one hand, there is no strong desire among EU member states for the EU to match the capabilities of NATO in the area of 'hard security'. The EU was created for entirely different purposes than NATO. On the other hand, the EU has some 'hard security' capabilities, which will probably continue to grow steadily, judging by the growing CFSP budget. On top of its modest military capabilities, the EU has considerable economic and financial security instruments – an asset which other regional security organisations do not have.

An important question is whether this unique character of EU international security actorness is well suited to effectively tackle contemporary security challenges. This thesis has demonstrated that the EU has the potential to address not only the challenges which require predominantly financial response, such as climate change, but also the challenges requiring a mixed military and non-military response. The extent to which EU efforts can be effective depends on a variety of factors, such as coherence among EU member states and the nature of
the security problem. For example, Russia remains a difficult partner for the EU, particularly in the area of ‘hard security’ and WMDs. Similarly, the US and China remain difficult partners in discussions on climate change. This undermines the effectiveness of EU efforts. Nonetheless, this is precisely the reality in which the EU has to operate.

It is often argued that the EU would be more effective a security actor if its policy was backed by more robust military capabilities (Bailes 2008; Menon 2009). This argument is difficult to sustain. Firstly, developing such military capabilities would undermine a strong normative dimension of the EU as a ‘force for good’. This unique normative dimension to EU international security policy, even if modest, contributes to the credibility of the EU on the international stage. In other words, there is a danger that, to paraphrase Robert Kagan (2003), if the EU acquires a better hammer, more international problems will start looking like nails. Secondly, there already are international security actors with very well developed ‘hard security’ capabilities, yet they struggle to effectively address some of the contemporary security challenges, (such as the threat of the proliferation of WMDs), just like the EU does. Thus, provided that there is enough political will, the EU will remain a unique international security actor. Its success will largely depend on the ability to align its short-, medium- and long-term policies and instruments.

Limitations of the study
This thesis has demonstrated that the EU can be an important international security actor. It has legal authority, necessary institutions and increasingly also economic and military resources. However, as the first decade of the 21st century demonstrated, there may be obstacles for the EU to display its international security actorness. Most notably, such actorness is unlikely to occur when EU member states have diverging initial preferences with regard to the matter in question. In all case studies selected for this thesis, EU member states have had largely overlapping preferences. There was a general agreement among EU member states that the EU should undertake some kind of action in the area of all three contemporary security challenges discussed in this thesis. Whenever differences occurred, member states managed to eventually reach consensus. On the other hand, there are examples of international policy events, when the EU was not able to act as an actor. Most notably, the EU was divided with regards to the US military campaign in Iraq in 2003. Some EU member states were utterly against the invasion, whilst others supported it, and even joined US efforts.
However, there are two caveats with regards to this particular event. Firstly, it would be inaccurate to draw too far-reaching conclusions about the EU’s inability to be a security actor as a result of disagreements over Iraqi campaign. Already in December 2003 the EU adopted its first-ever security strategy, and the same year it launched its first CSDP mission - operation Concordia in Macedonia (Menon 2004). Whitman (2006: 113) actually calls ‘remarkable’ the fact that ‘the status quo in the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy remained largely unaffected by the war in Iraq’. Secondly, the ‘default’ pro-American stance of some EU countries should not be taken for granted. In Central and Eastern Europe, it may shift as a result of the process of Europeanisation of foreign policies of these countries (Pomorska 2007). Furthermore, such a pro-American stance may decline if the US Administration continues to demonstrate a rather ambivalent stance towards Europe (Demes et al. 2009; Joyner 2009; Shapiro and Witney 2009; Stelzenmüller 2010). In addition to these observations, Longhurst and Zaborowski (2004: 391) note that Iraqi experience was so traumatic for Europe, that it ‘may have marked the first and the last occurrence of the old and new Europe divide’.

**Further research**

This thesis has emphasised the significance of moving beyond the CFSP/CSDP framework when analysing the role of the EU in international security. In particular, it has pointed to the importance of assessing the instruments of the European Commission. Here is an interesting opportunity for further research. In order for the EU to perform as an effective security actor, all its instruments need to be aligned towards achieving a given policy goal. Thus, it requires further research to which extent EU instruments and policies are indeed aligned in case studies representing contemporary security challenges. Specifically, it requires further investigation how the EU utilises its long-term, medium-term and short-term instruments in single case studies. Only by developing a coherent approach to using all kinds of instruments, can the EU fully explore the potential of these instruments. This ‘coherence’ issue, according to Smith (2004), represents the ‘unfinished business’ of the EU, where ‘while there often may be agreement on external policy ends, choosing the institutional means for achieving those ends still provokes uncertainty, controversy, bureaucratic intrigue turf battles and ideological debates’ (Smith 2004: 209) To develop a better cohesion, Biscop (2009) and Howorth (2010) argue that the EU needs a ‘grand strategy’.
This thesis has pointed at the European Commission as a rather unexpected pillar of EU international security policy. In recent years, the Commission acquired a number of important financial instruments, which allow this institution to advance its profile on the international stage. These include, most notably, the IfS, which allows the Commission to deploy an immediate assistance in a situation of a crisis or an emerging crisis. It also allows the Commission to get involved in longer-term security projects in the area of the non-proliferation of WMDs and countering a variety of other threats, including terrorism. This thesis has also pointed to the importance of the INSC as a preventive effort of the Commission to address non-proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union and beyond. As a result, scholars may be interested in further researching this role of the European Commission in various case studies representing both traditional and the so-called 'non-traditional' contemporary security challenges.

Finally, each of the case studies examined in this thesis provides an opportunity for follow-up research. Firstly, this thesis established that the EU recently began to develop a security dimension of climate change policy. It is a recent development, thus it will be interesting to investigate how this new security priority of the EU will be approached within the new institutional security structure, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. More broadly, it will be interesting to investigate what position climate change and other non-traditional security issues will acquire on the security agenda of the EU over the next few years. Secondly, in recent years, EU non-proliferation policy began to shift away from Russia and the former Soviet Union. This shift offers an interesting opportunity for research, to see what new geographical priorities for EU non-proliferation policy will be, and also how the approach of the EU will be different from its approach in the 1990s towards the former Soviet Union. Finally, the case of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia raises questions about the long-term success of EU financial involvement, consisting of humanitarian, development and security assistance. There seems to be a degree of success with regards to tackling the problem of maritime piracy, as indicated by data from 2010. However, there is a broader question whether the EU will be willing and able to tackle, more decisively, the problem of raising violence in Somalia. So far, none of the international actors was able to address this issue successfully.
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