INTRODUCTION

“Interpreters (…) help the institutions of multilingual societies to function. They support immigration communities in courts, hospitals, police and immigration services. Properly trained, interpreters thus contribute to safeguarding human and democratic rights”

(European Commission, 2005: 11)

In the international context, the fundamental human right of access to justice and due process is laid down in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, designed to complement the UN Charter and of which all European countries are signatories:

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. (United Nations, 1948: art. 7)

Furthermore, the promotion of equality lies at the heart of the European Union (or EU) policy (Marlier, Atkinson, Cantillon & Nolan, 2007) and results in equal access in all areas of information and services, in particular, justice. As a result, the European Union has come to recognise the importance of the increasing need “to safeguard citizens’ rights and hence guarantee a fair trial, also across languages” (European Commission, 2009: 7). This encompasses the right of access to a competent interpreter and translator, which should be safeguarded and upheld when EU member states plan and implement language policy measures regulating for provision of legal interpreting services to non-indigenous language groups.

In the European Convention on Human Rights (or ECHR; Council of Europe, 1953), drafted in 1950 by the then newly formed Council of Europe and which entered into force on 3 September 1953, the relationship between interpreting (and translation) provision and the
upholding of human rights is stipulated in Article 5 (2)\(^1\) and is linked to the right to a fair trial in a democratic society (Article 6).\(^2\) In particular, the latter includes the right to a fair hearing, the right to a public hearing, the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal and the right to a hearing within a reasonable time.

This right is reiterated in Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966) and Article 55 of the Rome Statute (United Nations, 1998) and has been implemented by the member states of the EU under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and The Hague programmes. In particular, the aim of the Treaty of Amsterdam is to create an area of freedom, security and justice within the European Union. An essential element in this context is “reliable communication, for the quality of all decisions and actions depends upon the quality of information and communication on which they are based” (Hertog, 2003: 1). Therefore, reliable legal interpreters and translators (hereafter LITs) are required at all levels of the judicial system.

Since these conventions and treaties were ratified, the EU has stressed the importance of shared training and accreditation systems in promoting mutual trust between (criminal and civil) legal systems of member states and supporting the Principle of Mutuality.\(^3\) In this context, 7 October 2010 is a milestone in the history of legal interpretation and translation in the EU. On this date the Council of Justice Ministers adopted the Directive 2010/64/EU on the Rights to Interpretation and Translation, which the European Parliament had already adopted in June of the same year (European Parliament, 2010). In Article 2 on the Right to Interpretation the fundamental right to a competent legal interpreter is reiterated:

> Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, without delay, with interpretation during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary interim hearings. (European Parliament, 2010: art. 2)

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\(^1\) “Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him” (Council of Europe, 1953: art. 5(2)).

\(^2\) “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (…)” (Council of Europe, 1953: art. 6 (3)a).

\(^3\) Methods of fostering uniform standards for legal interpreting across EU member states were first set out and disseminated by the Grotius I and II projects, *Aequitas* 98/GR/131 (Hertog, 2001) and *Aequalitas* 2001/GRP/015 (Hertog, 2003), and the AGIS project (Hertog and Van Gucht, 2008).
The main aim of this document is to set common minimum standards for LIT across member states. Its basic principle is that interpretation should be provided during the investigative and judicial phases of the proceedings. Furthermore, in Article 5(2) on the quality of the interpretation and translation, Member States are once again encouraged to promote the adequacy of interpretation and translation and efficient access thereto by:

establish[ing] a register or registers of independent translators and interpreters who are appropriately qualified. Once established, such register or registers shall, where appropriate, be made available to legal counsel and relevant authorities. (European Parliament, 2010: art. 5(2))

In this way, common minimum standards for LIT throughout Europe have been discussed in a number of documents drafted by EU institutions, which resulted in recommendations for strategies to improve the quality of interpreting in the legal services. In particular, Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council must be adopted into domestic legislation of member states by 2013. In this regard, a crucial question arises: have these recommendations been translated into national practices across the EU member states?

A relatively small number of studies have examined current practices in relation to the provision of translating and interpreting within the public services in different EU countries. However, the conclusions from both researchers and the recent survey on the ‘status quaeestionis’ (the provision of legal interpreting in the EU) by Hertog & van Gucht (2008) hint at a common problem, i.e. that sufficient legal interpreting skills and structures are not yet in place in a number of Member States, though a process of development to do so is in progress across the EU, albeit with varying degrees of quality and quantity. In other words, the principles laid down by EU and international institutions are there, but they still do not seem to have been implemented in practice.

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4 This mirrors what Sandra Hale states in Recommendation 6 of a national study of interpreter policies, practices and protocols in Australian courts and tribunals, i.e. that “a national register of qualified legal interpreters be established” (Hale, 2011: xv).
5 A comprehensive review of the different national regulations of legal PSI provision across Europe is beyond the scope of this work. For further insight, see ImPLI Final Report (Bordes & Driesen, 2012); see also O’Rourke & Castillo (2009) for the Republic of Ireland, Scotland, and Spain; Perez & Wilson (2009) for Scotland; and, more generally, de Pedro Ricoy (2010), Fowler (2003), Gallai (2012), and Townsley (2007) for the UK.
This kaleidoscope of regulations, guidelines and provisions suggests that whilst some EU countries have implemented examples of good practices, others still seem to be unprepared to tackle the inevitable language challenges in their judicial systems (Hertog & van Gucht, 2008: 189). In most of these Member States there are (a) no enforceable professional codes of conduct; (b) no reliable national registers; (c) no interdisciplinary guidelines and comprehensive policies for best practices in the legal services; and (d) no (or very few) trained legal interpreters who meet high professional standards.

Consequently, language still often represents a barrier for many citizens or minority language speakers involved in legal proceedings. In some jurisdictions court and police ‘interpreters’ (individuals who have no academic or professional PSI qualifications, but have a reasonable grasp of the language) are allowed to work as interpreters in public service settings, such as courtrooms, and this on a regular basis. However, as Berk-Seligson (1990: 204) clearly states, “no amount of oath-swearing can guarantee high quality interpreting from an interpreter who does not have the necessary competency”.

Registering qualified legal interpreters: the case of the NRPSI

Against this background the UK and its (now almost defunct) National Register of Public Service Interpreters (or NRPSI) are a case in point. Of particular relevance to legal interpreting in the UK criminal justice system is the adoption into British Law on 2 October 2000 of the European Convention of Human Rights. As Townsley (2007: 167) states, “the incorporation of the ECHR into British law made the provision of interpretation for non-English speakers in criminal courts a legal requirement.” Further, the National Agreement or NA (first drafted in 2001 and revised in 2007) provided key guidance for all parties to criminal investigations and proceedings on the selection and treatment of interpreters within the criminal justice system. In particular, the NA set out best practice guidelines and stipulates that only competent, reliable and security-vetted interpreters registered with one of the approved registers should be used in criminal proceedings. The adoption of these registers, and in particular of the NRPSI, as primary sources for interpreters was a fundamental step towards the regulation and professionalisation of PSIs in the UK.
The NRPSI, which has existed since 1994, is a central register of qualified and police-vetted PSIs available to public service organisations and agencies in the UK (Townsley, 2007: 166ff) and, as from 1 April 2011 it is a fully independent regulator of the profession and runs purely in the public interest. Like most professional interpreters’ registers (cf. Bancroft, 2005), the NRPSI sets out requirements relating to (a) performance standards, i.e. in terms of accuracy and completeness, and (b) interpreters’ ethical conduct as members of the profession, i.e. in terms of confidentiality and integrity. Interpreters engaged by the NRPSI are not employees but independent individuals who have undergone rigorous training, with accompanying accreditation. They are bound by their service provider’s Code of Practice and are expected to demonstrate a high level of expertise and professionalism at all times.

There is no denying that the NRPSI is far from perfect. While it is endeavouring to meet the unquestionable need for qualified public service interpreters as quickly as possible without jeopardising quality and standards, there are still serious issues related to the status of the profession that have a significant impact on the composition of the workforce in PSI and the quality of the services. In particular, there are few monitoring mechanisms for the PSIs’ professional performance in courtrooms and police stations. Hence, the legal interpreters’ ability to manage delicate situations, to abide by a strict code of conduct and to react to the challenges arising ‘there and then’ is seldom assessed (de Pedro Ricoy, 2010: 100-101). Moreover, the number of languages in which interpreters are tested and thus represented on the NRPSI is still limited and does not match the number of languages spoken in the country (Townsley, 2007: 168). A further obstacle is linked to the shortage of qualified trainers to prepare PSI practitioners (Corsellis, 2001), and training opportunities are still relatively scarce and obtaining a relevant qualification can be both expensive and time consuming.

However, as of 2012, budgetary constraints on UK government spending in the context of the current financial crisis have prompted a move towards outsourcing of LIT in the justice sector (Blunt, 2011; Ministry of Justice, 2012: 8ff.). Despite the principle of non-regression, the NA has been scrapped and the existing National Register of Public Service Interpreting has no role to play in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)’s new Framework Agreement (FWA), thus becoming almost obsolete. The central procurement system through a single commercial entity initiated by the MoJ is characterised by scant or no transparent quality control to check

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6 For more details see Cokely (2000), Mikkelson (2000a), and the special issue of *The Translator* 5(2) (Mason, 1999).
the standard (and neutrality) of interpreting. Most interpreters working in English and Welsh police stations are not required to hold any certification or undergo a rigorous, qualitative testing.

This clearly marks a watershed in what had been to date the provision of legal interpreting in the UK. Firstly, national and EU organisations representing interpreters and translators have already voiced concerns about the change and the consultation process leading up to it. Detractors including EULITA (European Legal Interpreters and Translators Association) and the Professional Interpreters for Justice (PI4J) association,\(^7\) argue that the MoJ procedure and framework are legally flawed. The agency is said to have effectively been awarded a monopoly for all of the criminal justice system language services under which it will function as *de facto* regulator, work provider, disciplinary committee, and assessor, preventing the linguists from being “independent” or “appropriately qualified” (cf. European Parliament, 2010).

Secondly, there is no doubt that legal interpreting services represent significant expenditure for governments. In principle, the desire to reduce costs by outsourcing is understandable. However, previous research (e.g. Bynorth, 2008; Colin & Morris, 1996; Kredens & Morris 2010; Laster & Taylor, 1994) and the statistics on the current system in England and Wales show that the unintentional consequences of outsourcing to private entities – with severe cuts to interpreters’ pay and conditions – are a rapid reduction in the recruitment and retention of qualified professionals and high-standard legal interpreting services, ultimately leading to an increase in (costly) miscarriages of justice.\(^8\) Thus, this issue cannot only be seen as a financial one. While there may be an increasing trend for larger companies to take over public-sector contracts, the issue of legal interpreting and translation should be seen from the angle of fair trial. As the chair of the Law Society’s criminal law committee, Ian Kelcey, stated, “what no one wants to see is a diminution in standards that will affect a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (Baksi, 2011). Moreover, for the benefit of transparency and control the agency which

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\(^7\) On 12 March 2013, representatives from the PI4J met officials from HM Courts and Tribunals Service Interpretation Project to discuss the Language Services contract and current, overarching FWA. About a month before, the Minister of Justice, Helen Grant MP, had brushed off the highly critical House of Commons Justice Committee (2013) report without putting in place measures needed to address the agency’s failings.

\(^8\) For evidence of high-profile miscarriages of justice, see websites such as *The Dutch Interpreter* (2013), *Fair Trials International* (2013), and *Linguist Lounge* (2013). The MoJ have provided estimates of the ancillary costs borne by tax-payers as a consequence of the agency’s failings. According to a report (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2013: 12(1)), the “off-contract spend”, i.e. the cost of HM Courts & Tribunals Service still continuing to engage interpreters directly at the old National Agreement rates and thereby bypassing the agency, is estimated by the MoJ at £4 million.
allocates legal interpreting assignments should not be the same as the one that signs up and examines LITs, otherwise agencies are in a position to set their own quality standards and dictate the rates they pay to freelance interpreters and translators.

Given that the professionalisation of legal interpreting services in England and Wales is proving to be unachievable and, simultaneously, the Directive 2010/64/EU deadline is looming, it is all the more necessary to define the role of an “appropriately qualified”, “independent” professional legal interpreter. In particular, it should be asked if legal interpreters in the UK and elsewhere may be trusted to perform quality work and abide by ethical standards of the profession such as confidentiality, impartiality, reliability and discretion.

(Interpreter-mediated) police interviews

This issue is particularly relevant within the area of investigative interviewing. The police interview is believed to be one of the most common law enforcement activities, as well as one of the most important (Milne & Bull, 2006). Based on a review of empirical findings, Horvath & Meesig (1996) argue that the majority of criminal cases do not involve the use of any physical evidence. Further, even when it is available it is not always used. In the USA real and documentary evidence of crimes makes up about 20% of all evidence presented in courts of law, whereas testimonial evidence accounts for the remaining 80% (Yeschke, 2003). In England and Wales, pre-trial proceedings are also crucial and the police have the power to make investigations and arrests with no need of prosecution.

Therefore, police can be said to play an important role in the criminal justice system by providing the courts with the all-important ‘documentary evidence’ or ‘soft facts’ in the form of written statements, electronic recordings of interviews and corresponding transcripts. In other words, their interviews are aimed at obtaining complete, accurate, relevant and reliable information fairly so as to ensure that this will be admissible in the later stages of the process. The reliance on the product of police interviews has in recent decades attracted significant interest from researchers in the criminology and linguistics fields alike. In particular, the last decade has witnessed a remarkable increase of specialist literature on police interviewing training. The emphasis in interrogative interviewing manuals seems to be on the Enhanced
Cognitive Interview method, which incorporates suitable environmental surroundings and communication techniques such as rapport, conversation and listening skills, and nonverbal behaviour such as gaze, intonation and hesitations (Kapardis, 2003: 87; Dando & Milne, 2009: 10).

Nevertheless, this growing wealth of studies on best-practice police interviewing by police practitioners and academics from disciplines as diverse as cognitive psychology, behavioural science and communication studies, has almost solely focused on a monolingual contexts with native speaker suspects or witnesses (Gibbons, 2004). The lack of police practitioners’ and academic work in bilingual interviews clashes with the reality of today’s multicultural and multilingual societies, in which interpretation is increasingly needed to bridge linguistic and cultural barriers in all the stages of the criminal justice process (Hertog, 2003).

In particular, interpreters’ Codes of Practice in different national contexts often state that police interpreters should ‘just interpret’ (e.g. Laster & Taylor, 1994; Mikkelson, 1998). Pöchhacker (2004: 9) points out that the word interpreter comes from Latin and takes “the sense of ‘expounder’, ‘person explaining what is obscure’”; according to legal authorities, however, its meaning may seem to be closer to that of an IBM punch card interpreter, used to add printing to (punched, but otherwise blank) cards based on what is already punched on each card. In other words, the interpreter is frequently expected to be an invisible machine, someone who can produce literal or word-for-word (and, thus, allegedly ‘accurate’) renditions of the original utterances in a mechanical fashion. This widespread view is coupled with a continuing resistance to the use of interpreters amongst police interviewers, who mainly equate their presence to a loss of control over the interviewing process or the interaction with the non-English interviewees. As a forensic consultant puts it, “it is hard enough working with an interpreter and having to make allowances for cultural and linguistic diversity without having any inaccuracies or misunderstandings creeping in” (Gozna, 2012: 32). This refers not only to a lack of control over content through the interpreter’s renditions, but also the pacing of exchanges and thus the interactional dynamics.

Since the discourse-based ‘Interactional Turn’ initiated by interpreting studies scholars such as Roy (1989) and Wadensjö (1992), a transformation in perceptions of the interpreter’s role has taken place. Many studies have shown that legal interpreters do not render the primary speaker’s utterances ‘verbatim’, but in fact edit them, coordinate the discourse, and even serve as cultural bridge (e.g. Angelelli, 2004; Angermeyer, 2005; Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale, 2004;
Russell, 2000). Thus, a recognition of the legal interpreter as a co-participating member in a triadic interaction is now well established. However, not enough evidence exists to date in the field of interpreted police interviews, police interrogations and confessions (e.g. Ainsworth, 1993; Berk-Seligson, 2002; Fowler, 2003; Krouglov, 1999; Mason, 2004; Ortega Herráez & Foulquié Rubio, 2008).

As a NRPSI-registered legal interpreter working in the UK justice sector, I have noticed that my presence affected the interview in ways that were both subtle and pervasive, sometimes leading to miscommunication, unsuspected by primary participants and possibly undetected by all parties concerned. Individually, although these differences between the original and the target utterances may have each affected the interviewing processes locally, they did not alter the outcome overall. Cumulatively, however, each of the features modified in my renditions seemed to amount to a weight of evidence that, in spite of their treatment as identical events, the two interview events were indeed disparate. In these interactions, I singled out a particularly frequent component for analysis, namely “discourse markers” or “discourse connectives”, which I perceived as “extraneous to the ‘meat and potatoes’ of the sentence – that is, the subject and predicate – for they do not refer to who did what to whom” (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 142-143) and, thus, routinely left out altogether. This ‘disregard’ towards such elements is also not uncommon in monolingual settings; in fact, the same happens during the transformation of interview data through the judicial process as the tape of the original interaction is converted to a written transcript by police clerks (Haworth, 2006).

**Stating the problem**

It has been shown that “in a majority of criminal cases powerful forensic evidence is lacking and information collected from interviews becomes the most important evidence” (Gudjonsson, 1999: 7). However, we still know little about how interpreters use a full range of communicative and social resources to construct understanding in such an under-investigated, specialised institutional setting as a bilingual police interview

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9 Police work involves other types of interpreter-mediated communicative interactions than the interview. These may include procedures carried out on the road as part of alcohol-related driving offences or fingerprinting at the police station. However, this study focuses on police investigative interviews as this offers the possibility of concentrating on key themes.
This work aims to contribute to a better understanding of the police interpreter’s use of discourse markers (hereafter DMs) in a way which unites pragmatic and sociological planes of discourse. Thus, the analysis of naturally occurring data is two-fold. On the one hand, the study attempts to answer the following pragmatics-related questions:

1. Is the police interpreter sensitive to DMs’ role in communication, and if so, is she able to convey them in her interpretation?

2. Are DMs substituted or even omitted? If so, does this divergence prevent the hearer from recovering the overtly intended Interpretation?

3. Do DMs play a central role in ‘maintaining’ their invisibility as predicted by analogy with Blakemore’s (2010) account of DMs in free indirect thought representations? And if so, how often and how effectively?

On the other hand, the objectives include the following questions regarding the interaction in police settings as a whole:

4. Do interpreters remain ‘neutral conduits’ when using DMs? What are the practical and theoretical implications of interpreters’ role shifts within the participative framework (Goffman, 1974, 1981)?

5. To what extent is the speaker’s choice of DMs affected by cognitive constraints on communication and to what extent is it constrained by social factors? More generally, to what extent are these different types of constraints reconciled?

6. What is the impact of DMs in interpreters’ renditions on modern police interviewing techniques? Does this jeopardise the citizen’s legal rights to fair pre-trial proceedings?

The data collected is very rich and complex in nature; the approach adopted to investigate it can be described, firstly, as qualitative, although a general indication of the frequency of certain features is provided. Secondly, my work is characterised by an interdisciplinary perspective which still remains a significant feature of interpreting studies and is reflected in many of the key academic initiatives in the field. In particular, I draw on a combination of different approaches, i.e. Goffman’s (1981) participation framework and Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics.

On the one hand, while it is recognised that pragmatic aspects of interpreting can be investigated from numerous alternative perspectives, it is believed that the cognitive focus of
RT is better placed to examine the (micro-level) inferential processes involved in the Interpretation of DMs, and is therefore better suited to the research aims of this thesis. On the other, I adopt a macro-level analysis informed by interactional sociolinguistics to venture where cognitive pragmatists decline to tread, i.e. the wider, macro-level social context in which interpreting is seen as a socially situated act of communication under the dialogic paradigm (Wadensjö, 2004: 357). In this work, I also use the Cognitive Interview techniques normally applied by police interviewers as a framework to investigate whether they are as effective as in the monolingual setting – predominantly in the English language – or whether they cannot be presumed to work the same way and achieve the same level of efficacy without empirical investigation and scholarly research.

Outline of the thesis

Chapter 1 provides a backdrop to the study by introducing the setting for the analysis, i.e. the police interview. Particular emphasis is placed on the combination of interpersonal, social and cognitive factors and skills to enhance the retrieval of information from memory during an interview, and the language which characterises such exchanges. Police interviewers are shown to be skilled at both listening and questioning and there is a wide range of effective tactics available to them (e.g. the enhanced cognitive interviewing), some of which include rapport building, interviewee-compatible questioning, echo probing, summarising, and memory jogs for personal information. Finally, the last part of the chapter explores how police studies perceive the role of the interpreter.

Chapter 2 provides an overall critical review of literature on legal interpreting practice belonging to the broader domain of liaison or face-to-face interpreting, with a focus on the role of (legal) interpreters and research paradigms. In the investigative interview, it will be highlighted that consecutive interpreting is used almost exclusively and the scope for miscommunication is considerable, and the (legal) consequences are potentially grave. Finally, I restrict the scope to the issue of DMs in legal interpreting, which provide bedrock for the development of the present study.

Chapters 3 and 4 lay out the theoretical framework of the research. Chapter 3 focuses on interactionist approaches to discourse and is divided into two parts. The first half introduces
Goffman’s interactionist approach to human communication, and in particular his notion of ‘participation framework’ in which the speaker may take the role of *animator, author* or *principal*. The second half deals with Wadensjö’s (1992, 1993/2002, 1998) influential dialogic model of interpreting, according to which the dynamics of the interview are altered radically with the addition of an interpreter, transforming the oppositional dyad into a triadic mixture of opposition, cooperation and shifting alignments.

Chapter 4 introduces Relevance Theory (hereafter RT) and Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) relevance-theoretic claim that the term *discourse marker* does not refer to a single semantic class. In particular, I discuss Blakemore’s (2002) and Blass’s (1990) arguments that DMs cannot be analysed as marking connections in discourse, whether these be connections between discourse segments, connections between the propositions expressed by discourse segments, or connections between social acts (*contra* Fraser, 1990; Mann & Thompson, 1987, 1988; Schiffrin, 1987). Instead, the distinction that drives this present work is a distinction between two ways in which linguistically encoded meaning can provide an input to inferential pragmatic processes; on the one hand, an expression may encode a constituent of a conceptual representation which undergoes conceptual computation, and on the other an expression may encode a constraint on the sort of inferential computation (conceptual meaning) a prepositional representation (procedural meaning) may enter into (cf. Blakemore, 2002; Wilson, 2011). On this approach, some expressions which have been classified as DMs by some authors turn out to encode conceptual meaning (e.g. *in contrast*, *in conclusion*, *to take an example*). Others, including the ones I shall focus on, encode procedures; they activate the inferential processes involved in establishing the relevance of the utterance that contains them. In this chapter, I also show how the application of relevance theoretic pragmatics to the analysis of free indirect style (Blakemore, 2010, 2011) has shed light on a key issue in interpreting studies, i.e. how we reconcile the fact that, in practice, interpreters’ renditions are not literal representations of the original with the image of the interpreter that is encapsulated in public authorities’ Codes of Conduct – that is as a passive, invisible “‘non-person’ in a neutral position between the interlocutors” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 147; see also Mikkelsen, 1998).

Chapter 5 describes the methodology adopted to gather and analyse the data in a deductive way. In particular, it presents the procedures which have led to data collection and selection, from ethical and confidentiality issues to the difficulties encountered and how they were
resolved, the events described in the corpus, the system chosen to transcribe and encode the data and the criteria adopted to select the sequences for the analysis. The second part focuses on theoretical issues, making a strong case for the co-existence of discourse-analytic and pragmatics-based studies to analyse interpreter-mediated events.

Chapter 6 contains the fine-grained analysis of the police interpreters’ treatment of procedural DMs and their interactional (and investigative) impact. In particular, it defines and qualifies, with the support of empirical evidence, four categories which are argued to be typical of the interpreter’s behaviour. Examples from the corpus are provided and accompanied by a discussion of how they contribute to the argument put forward in the study, including the hypothesis whereby the ‘voice’ of the interpreter is very much heard, however somewhat disguised by procedural elements such as DMs.

Lastly, chapter 7 summarises the findings, highlighting the way in which the use of the DMs by the interpreters alters the enhanced cognitive interview, regardless of its type, phase or language combination. Further, it addresses the limitations of the study as it has been conducted. The third part explores the implications of these developments at different levels, providing an account of the contributions of the thesis to various areas of inquiry, namely research on interpreting studies (including interpreters’ training and certification aimed at safeguarding the fairness of proceedings), pragmatics, and criminology. Finally, the chapter suggests avenues for future research in the view that “researchers are needed not as bystanders to this rapidly changing social process, but as a relevant, responsible, reliable and integral part of it” (Corsellis, 2006: 350).
CHAPTER 1

The police interview: Techniques and language

Investigative interviewing is one of the most common and important law enforcement activities within a criminal justice system (McGurk, Carr, & McGurk, 1993; Milne & Bull, 2006). The outcomes of investigative interviewing have significant implications for society, as Milne & Bull (1999: 191) aptly put it:

Society cannot afford investigative interviewing to be poor. This affects people’s perceptions of the criminal justice system. The guilty get away, the innocent convicted, justice for children and vulnerable adults is inadequate. Poor interviewing is of no value to anyone; it is a waste of time, resources and money. No one wins. People will not come forward if they have no confidence in the quality of investigators’ interviewing techniques.

The growing interest and the wealth of research on best-practice police interviewing is an encouraging trend. Practitioners from law enforcement circles and academics from cognitive psychology, linguistics, behavioural science and communication studies (e.g. Brown, 1997; Innes, 2010; Renier, 1992) have all made important contributions to the advancement of investigative interviewing.

This chapter starts with an overview of the key techniques deemed appropriate for investigative interviewing, especially the (Enhanced) Cognitive Interview techniques. Further, I will analyse forensic linguistic contributions into the police interpreting discourse. Lastly, 1.3 explores Police Studies and Forensic Linguistics literature on bilingual investigative interviewing.

1.1 Core skills for conducting investigative interviews

Police interviews are formal and they usually take place either at police stations or prisons. The interview starts with writing down the place, date and time of the interview; the names of
the people present are recorded and, in the case of an interview with suspects, the suspect is informed of their rights through the caution (or Miranda rights in the US). The interview itself attempts to reconstruct the ‘second’ reality (the reality of the crime).

The structure of the interview is often narrative (Gibbons, 2003: 142-43). As far as the form is concerned, interviews are often not just a sequence of questions and answers, but they consist of other parts of speech as well. Russell (2002: 114ff.) claims that (a) not all of the officer’s turns are questions as utterances include informing, challenging, agreeing, commenting and encouraging, with both narrative and evaluative moves; and (b) not all of the detained person’s turns are answers. Again, they include informing, challenging, agreeing, commenting, narrative, evaluative, and even questioning moves.

Much attention has been paid to the very agent at the centre of the communicative event, namely the interviewing police officer, in a unique institutional set-up where power asymmetry is the norm. Evans & Webb (1993: 37) assert that the investigative task is the core aspect of policing today and what emerges from that core task is “the key element of the ability to interview”, while according to the Director of the USA National Institute of Justice:

> Information is the lifeblood of criminal investigation and it is the ability of investigators to obtain useful and accurate information from witnesses and victims of crime that is crucial to effective law enforcement. (Stewart, 1985: 1, quoted in Shepherd & Milne, 1999: 124)

McGurk, Carr & McGurk (1993) found that the interviewing of witnesses and suspects were both in the top four of the most frequently conducted tasks in day-to-day policing in the UK. Police officers believed that their three most important investigative duties were taking statements, interviewing witnesses and interviewing suspects. Bucke & Brown (1997: 31) further report that around three-fifths of detained suspects are interrogated.

The models of interviewing in use by UK Police forces over the past twenty-five years arose indirectly as a result of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984\(^\text{10}\) (Home Office, 2011). In response to several high-profile miscarriages of justice involving the

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\(^{10}\) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) Codes of practice provide the core framework of police powers and safeguards around stop and search, arrest, detention, investigation, identification and interviewing detainees. Following a consultation held in November 2011, revised versions of PACE codes C, G and H have now come into effect.
intimidation of suspects and fabrication of confessions, PACE had set out to eliminate such practices by providing regulation of police interview practice, including the legislation of compulsory tape recording of all suspect interviews. Research conducted by Baldwin (1992, 1993) found that in spite of the Act, the lack of coordinated training and assessment of interviewing officers meant that the quality of interviews with both suspects and witnesses continued to be of a poor standard. In particular, he identified weaknesses which included a lack of preparation, repetitiveness, persistent questioning and, in the case of suspects, an assumption of guilt.

Baldwin’s findings led to a national review of investigative interviewing by the Home Office (in consultation with forensic psychologists), resulting in the nation-wide rolling out of the *PACE* model as a basis for training interviewing officers in 1993. A mnemonic for the recommended structure of any interview, *PACE* stands for ‘Plan and Prepare, Engage and Explain, obtain an Account, Closure and Evaluation’. The initial *PACE* training package, designed to outline key techniques deemed appropriate for investigative interviewing, lasted five days, four of which focussed on methods of interviewing suspects, with witness interviews covered in just one day of the course. Part of the training consisted of developing skills in psychologically-informed strategies for interviewing, i.e. Conversation Management (CM) for uncooperative interviewees (generally suspects), as developed by Shepherd (2007), and the Cognitive Interview for cooperative interviewees (generally victims and witnesses), as developed by Fisher & Geiselman (1992). The implementation of *PACE* led to a significant decrease in the number of miscarriages of justice occurring as a result of poorly conducted suspect interviews — but interviews with victims and witnesses remained flawed, on the grounds that many officers assumed that the interviewing of a cooperative and competent adult witness required little specialist skill. Hence, there remained the risk of miscarriages occurring, now on the basis of poorly conducted interviews with victims and witnesses (Savage & Milne, 2007).

Designed to enhance the amount of detail recalled, the Cognitive Interview allows “the interviewee to remember in their own way and at their own pace (...) it utilises unbiased memory enhancing tools or mnemonics in an attempt to retrieve the maximum quality and quantity of information from an interviewee” (Milne, Shaw & Bull, 2007: 69). The original Cognitive Interview consisted of four main instructions to be delivered to the interviewee in whatever combination was thought appropriate:
1. Report everything;
2. Mentally re-instate context;
3. Recall events in a variety of different temporal orders;
4. Change perspective.

The Cognitive Interview was later updated to become the *Enhanced Cognitive Interview* (hereafter ECI), which comprises the original Cognitive Interview elements along with additional techniques designed to address matters of interpersonal communication, including a focus on transferring control to the interviewee (cf. Milne & Bull, 1999). The phases of the ECI are outlined in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Greet and personalise the interviewee and establish rapport</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Explain the aims of the interview</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Focused retrieval; concentrate hard</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Report everything</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Transfer control</td>
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<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Initiate a free report</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Context reinstatement</td>
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<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Questioning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Report everything</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Interviewee-compatible questioning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• OK to say ‘don’t know’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Activate and probe image</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Open and appropriate closed questions</td>
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<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>Varied and extensive retrieval</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change the temporal order</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change perspectives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Focus on all senses</td>
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<td>Phase 6</td>
<td>Investigatively important questions</td>
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<td>Phase 7</td>
<td>Summary</td>
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<td>Phase 8</td>
<td>Closure</td>
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<td>Phase 9</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
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*Table 1.* Phases of the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (based on Milne, 2004: 2).
Around the same time as PEACE, further government guidance had been issued, with the input of child psychologists, on the interviewing of child witnesses in criminal cases. Following similar lines to PEACE, the *Memorandum of Good Practice for Video Interviews with Child Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings* (MEMO), later replaced by *Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using special measures* (or ABE; Ministry of Justice, 2011), also recommended a phased approach to interviewing.

It is from PEACE and ABE that a new package, designed specifically for the interviewing of ‘significant witnesses’, using the ECI model, was developed and rolled out following the Association of Chief Police Officers recommendations in 2002. A significant witness is defined as any witness who (a) has or claims to have witnessed, visually or otherwise, an indictable offence, part of such an offence or events closely connected with it, and (b) stands in a particular relationship to the victim or has a central position in an investigation into an indictable offence (Ministry of Justice, 2011).

What is most significant about this model of interviewing is the emphasis placed on allowing the witness maximum control of the interaction. Traditionally, witnesses would often be interrupted with excessive questioning, which tended to reduce the amount of information obtained and taint the witnesses’ account with the interviewer’s version of events. In other words, “while officers began interviews by asking victims and witnesses (...) for their version of events, this was usually interrupted by the interviewer asking too many questions” (Milne, Shaw & Bull, 2007: 68). It is now acknowledged that the fewer questions asked, and the less the interviewer contributes, the higher the quality of the interview. The emphasis previously placed on obtaining a written statement presented further difficulties, with interviewers obtaining less information when attempting to simultaneously ask questions and convert answers into written form.

Furthermore, the Centrex training material (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2004) identifies four core skills that a police officer should ideally develop:11

- ability to plan and prepare for interviews;
- ability to establish rapport;

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11 The second and the fourth qualities are particularly pertinent to bilingual police interviews in that they involve utterances that must be channelled through interpreters for the purpose of communication and, ultimately, information gathering.
- effective listening; and
- effective questioning.

As we have seen, these skills can also be found in the various phases in the ECI (Milne & Bull, 1999: 40) where verbalisation is called for in the communicative interaction with the interviewee. With uncooperative interviewees, Shepherd (2007: 18) recommends the implementation of Conversation Management to “facilitate maximum spontaneous disclosure and to enable maximum capture of fine-grain detail”. Under CM, mindful behaviour for relationship building is, again, a key element, and thus calls for the interviewer to demonstrate through the words they say and the way they say them that the interviewee, like them: is a human being; has a self-concept; has a sense of self-esteem; and has the same rights, needs, concerns and sensitivities.

St-Yves (2006: 92) asserts the importance of rapport building in police investigative interviewing by stating that “rapport lies at the heart of a good interview. Whereas other techniques can be helpful, rapport can do without these techniques, and the techniques without rapport are unlikely to be effective”. In particular, the author regards building rapport as a balance between what police officers desire and what the interviewee agrees to, or “the invisible wave along which information can flow from the one to the other” (St-Yves, 2006: 88). Lastly, St-Yves (2006: 88) asserts that if “there is a problem with rapport, the information received may be distorted or not received at all” (p. 88).

St-Yves (2006: 88) also suggests the following basic rules to be conducive to successful interviewing alongside building up a rapport: keeping an open mind and remaining objective; paying attention; keeping a professional attitude; and knowing how to conclude. Under “paying attention”, St-Yves emphasises what psychologists call active listening, which is inherently difficult since it “goes against basic human behaviour”. A similar observation is afforded by Coulthard & Johnson (2007: 76): “listening is as important to successful verbal communication as speaking, but it is often overlooked in the institutional encounter”. Lord & Cowan (2011: 73) similarly contend that “being a good listener is the most critical skill in conducting a productive interview”. This underscores the importance of ‘reading between the lines’ in a police interview on the part of the interviewing police officer, and, in a bilingual setting, the interpreter. Gibbon (2003: 23) points out that in contrast with written forms of communication, “the spoken word can survive only in memory, but memory works on the
basis of meaning not wording”. Factors such as the physical environment, ambient noise, seating arrangement, etc., all affect active listening.

Royce (2005) and St-Yves (2006) recommend the following strategies for active listening:

1. Minimal encouragement, visual cues such as facial expressions, head nodding, posture, or auditory backchannel cues,\(^\text{12}\) e.g. OK, I see, yes, uh-huh;
2. Paraphrasing: verbal reformulation or so-called ‘echoing’ or ‘mirroring’;
3. Identification of emotions: verbalise interviewees’ emotions to show empathy, or so-called ‘emotional labelling’;
4. Open questions: avoid yes/no questions. Avoid why and yes, but because they are pejorative and imply defeat;
5. Using I to humanise the interaction;
6. Silence or so-called ‘positive pauses’.

The fourth recommendation is of particular interest within the context of this work as it highlights the need to avoid DMs such as but. This roughly coincides with Cowan & Lord’s (2011: 54) advice on avoiding Why-questions:

\[\text{[Why-prefaced questions] come (…) across as judgemental and sets the interviewer up to be perceived as condemning the interviewee. Not only does asking why imply blame and disapproval, it is likely to cause the interviewee to rationalize or defend his or her actions, to withdraw, or to attack because of feeling threatened.}\]

These recommendations on lexical choices, types of wording and styles of questioning are adopted by police forces conducting ECI in their discourse practices. For example, when dealing with children, questions like ‘Can you describe to/for me?’ were found to elicit substantive responses, whereas questions like ‘Do you know?’ or ‘Can you remember?’ were less likely to do so (Heydon, 2005: 162). Thames Valley Police (English) training material recommends the use of TED to encourage interviewees to give longer answers:

\(^{12}\) The term “backchannel cue”, introduced by Yngve (1970), has been most commonly used to refer to listener responses or feedback (e.g. Gumperz, 1982; Maynard, 1989, 1997; White, 1989).
Tell me.....
I’d like you to explain....
Can you describe.... (Schollum, 2005: 55)

New Zealand Police 2004 guidelines also recommends the use of *How Come* questions instead of *Why* questions when dealing with children and vulnerable witnesses because it is less accusatory (Schollum, 2005).

In conclusion, it is no surprise that the last decade has witnessed a remarkable increase in empirically substantiated, specialist literature on police interviewing training. In particular, the emphasis in manuals seems to be on the ECI method, which incorporates suitable environmental surroundings and communication techniques such as rapport, conversation and listening skills, and nonverbal behaviour such as gaze, intonation and hesitations (Kapardis, 2003: 87; Dando & Milne, 2009: 10). Consider, for instance, the widespread PEACE interviewing model, in which Cognitive Interviewing and Enhanced Cognitive Interviewing have been adopted to maximize the quality and quantity of information obtained during the interview (Mazeika et al., 2010). However, there is also a body of literature that has looked at issues in police interviewing through a linguistic lens.

1.2 **Forensic linguistic perspectives on police interviewing**

As Heydon (2005: 3) states, “linguistic research and opinion has made, and continues to make, a valuable contribution to legal proceedings and contested evidence”. The need for an expert opinion in these cases has introduced many linguists to the field of forensic linguistics (also known as *language and the law*) and there is now a growing body of research in this area commonly referred to as *Forensic Linguistics*.

According to Labov & Fansted (1977: 30), a police interview is “a speech event in which the person, A, extracts information from another person, B, which was contained in B’s biography”. From this definition, it seems plausible to argue that interviews irrespective of
their setting or function are based upon power relationships whereby A controls the structure and content of utterances of person B due to the institutional/social hierarchy they attain.¹³

Up until recently, however, the police interview context was somewhat neglected as an area of study in forensic linguistics, and the recent increase in publications in the area has for the most part focussed on suspect interviews (e.g. Haworth, 2007; Heydon, 2005; Newbury & Johnson, 2006; Stokoe & Edwards, 2008). Owing to the relative scarcity of studies relating directly to witness interviews, the bulk of those presented here relate to suspect interviews. It will be demonstrated, however, how many of the relevant concepts are applicable elsewhere.

Heydon’s (2005) volume analyses thirteen interviews with police officers and suspects held in a rural Australian police station. She analyses her data through a combination of conversation analysis (CA) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). On the basis of this micro-analytic approach she is able to demonstrate that underlying beliefs held by the police institution are manifested discursively. Moreover, her findings reflect those of Wodak’s (1997) analysis of doctor-patient interactions in that suspects were routinely expected to conform to institutional norms with which they had little familiarity, resulting in a conflict of expectations between themselves and interviewing officers.

1.2.1 Turn and topic management

According to the turn-taking model of conversation (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), a question must be followed by an answer. In institutional settings the types of allowable turn are often pre-allocated (Matoesian, 1993); thus, questioning as a mechanism of interactional control is a resource that, for the most part, is only available to powerful participants. According to Drew & Heritage (1992: 49), the question-and-answer sequence gives members of institutions “a measure of control over the introduction of topics and, hence, of the ‘agenda’ for the occasion”.

Interactions in legal contexts such as police interviews and courtroom trials are of such a nature that many turns on the part of the questioner can be said to function as a question, regardless of their syntactic form (Newbury & Johnson, 2006). Different syntactic forms exert

¹³ The issue of power relations in police interviewing will be further discussed in the case of interpreted events in 2.1.
different degrees of constraint on their responses, and questioners in these contexts often make strategic use of their options. Because of the pre-allocation of turn types, a respondent will usually be powerless to refute any propositions contained within questions, or to elaborate when question form calls for a minimal response.

Question form in legal contexts has received much academic attention, and accounts for a significant proportion of the advice given in police interview training that can indeed be described as ‘linguistic’. In particular, it has been suggested that there are two main functions of questions: “a genuine process of elicitation of information (...) [and] to obtain conformation of a particular version of events that the questioner has in mind” (Gibbons 2003: 95). For example, while the appropriate response to a declarative question - such as ‘You were there at midday?’ - would be a minimal confirmation or a denial of the proposition contained within it, a Wh- question like ‘Who was with you?’ requires the interviewee to provide new information, and is thus less constraining (Maley, 1994). Newbury & Johnson (2006: 218) list information-seeking questions according to the amount of information they request, and confirmation-seeking questions in terms of “the extent to which they coerce the participant to agree with the proposition contained in the question”.

Matoesian’s (1993) analysis of a high profile rape trial in the United States takes question form as one of its key areas of focus, particularly the ways in which defence attorneys make strategic use of question form to register impressions about victims’ evidence in the minds of the jury: “as a result of manipulation of syntactic question form, the jury may register not just the facts, but also the presuppositions and blame implicative imputations” (1993: 151). Thus, all the power to construct the telling of events lies with the attorney, “the power to define the situation, to define what counts as reality, in sum the power to make one’s account count” (1993: 156). Because they are able to draw on resources inaccessible to the witness, attorneys can successfully manipulate not only the witness herself, but also more importantly the “overhearing audience” (Heritage, 1985), i.e. the jury.

In line with Royce’s (2005) and St-Yves’s (2006) fourth recommendation, there is a large body of literature dealing with the functions of questions prefaced by various DMs in institutional language, including and (Matsumoto, 1999) and so (Johnson, 2002). In other contexts, so is generally treated as a marker that is employed when hearers are being offered a

14 The definition and use of these elements of language is discussed in chapter 4 and, in relation to the current data, in chapter 6.
turn at talk and/or an opportunity to change the topic (Schiffrin, 1987: 225). However, as Johnson (2002) highlights, Schiffrin and others have neglected to discuss *so* within the specialised context of question and answer sequences.

In police interview contexts, Johnson observes two main functions of *so*-prefaced questions. With adult defendants, she presents evidence to suggest that *so* functions to evaluate and challenge prior utterances, often to narrow the focus on to specific evidential details and to direct the interviewee into reformulations of earlier turns. With child witnesses, on the other hand, *so* is a means by which the discourse is supported and rearranged to form a coherent narrative (2002: 97). As such, as well as contributing to a controlling tone in the interaction, *so* functions, in some environments, as an essentially empowering device. *So*-prefaced questions often simultaneously function as a third-turn strategy to summarise prior talk – that is, as a *formulation* (cf. 1.2.3).

According to MacLeod’s (2010) study of recordings of police interviews with rape complainants, DMs are further used to focus on details perceived to be of investigative value to the police institution, and of evidential value to the judge and jury. Examining the use of *so*, the author reveals how it is often used to focus on details perceived to be of evidential value, and to successfully elicit reformulations from interviewees (cf. also Johnson, 2002). In this context, the details perceived to be of value can be shown to relate to pervasive ideologies surrounding sexual violence, such as the complainant’s behaviour, her capacity for knowledge, and her relationship with the suspect. Similarly, *well* is shown to indicate a challenge to the appropriateness of the interviewee’s previous answer, indicating that it is in some way deficient (cf. Lakoff, 1973a) and thus encourages elaboration or reformulation. In MacLeod’s (2010) data, these challenges to the appropriateness of interviewees’ responses can, again, be shown to relate to prevailing beliefs about rape. By using these markers the officers are said to minimise the importance of other details perceived as salient by the interviewee, often removing them from the account altogether.  

Both DMs *so* and *well* are shown to recurrently contribute to the dialogic nature of the complainant’s account, which often relates to the dominant ‘common sense’ ideological resources surrounding sexual violence.

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15 Furthermore, officers themselves are shown to make use of formulations (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) in order to negotiate and transform the naive account provided by the interviewee into an investigatively and evidentially valuable narrative (cf. 1.2.3).
In an institutional setting like that of the police interview where turn-types are pre-allocated, the interviewer is said to impose restrictions on the maintenance of topics and turns by participants (Heydon, 2002: 82). However, Heydon (2005) states that sometimes suspects initiate new topics by providing “multi-component answers”. This allows the suspect to provide additional information that has not been initially requested by the interviewer when in reality a direct response is required. Frankel (1990) describes this multi-component answer approach as one which not only provides an option as to which portion of the information will be retrieved in the next turn, but one which minimally obligates the interviewer to produce a response to the information provided. An example of this approach is shown in the following extract from Heydon (2005: 101):

48. pio1: What sort of connection do you have with the shop^  
49. SPT1: (ARROW) (1.7) nothin Betty and I we’ve  
(AARROW) (0.2) aw we’ve been together for nine years de facto relationship^//we*  
51. pio1: w’l who’s* Betty  
52. SPT1: (0.5) Fisher^  

The first component of the suspect’s response on turn 49 is a single word (“nothing”) and could have comprised a complete response to the interviewer’s question in turn 48. Instead, linked to this was the suspect-initiated information that expanded upon the first word.

Although there are many other ways in which interviewers can initiate topics over the course of the interview, two devices have been shown to be particularly useful to interviewers when constraining available topics. Firstly, the utterance used by the interviewer at the opening of the interview can describe his/her intention to interview the suspect in relation to the alleged crime in which the suspect has been arrested. An example of this is given below in an extract from Heydon (2005: 112):

22. Pio: right  
23. (1.4) I’m going to interview in relation to (0.3) an indecent act  
24. that (. ) allegedly happened in January this year
(0.) before I do I must inform you that you are not obliged to do or say anything

but anything you say or do may be given in evidence =>

do you understand that

SPT10: yes =>

The second method of topic initiation available to interviewers is the “discoursal indicator” (Thomas, 1989) whereby police interviewers delineate the parameters of the discourse and restrict suspect’s contributions to within those boundaries. For example, by gathering information about the alleged criminal activity, the police interviewer has restricted the topic of the subsequent interview to the particular alleged criminal activity of the suspect (Heydon, 2005: 155).

To sum up, the discursive practices explored here demonstrate that through topic management and constructions of suspect’s events, police interviewers are able to take the floor of power over suspects.

1.2.2 Footing

The primary recipient for (legal) institutional talk is usually the participant who is present, rather than an absent ‘overhearing audience’, i.e. the Crown Prosecution Service, and, potentially, a judge and jury. Goffman’s (1981) notion of footing is thus relevant in this context since it has its basis in participation frameworks, i.e. participants’ alignment, or orientation to, particular roles, either as receivers or producers (authors, animators, and principals) of talk.16

Evidence of interviewers distancing themselves from the role of principal - and thus from responsibility for the content of the utterance, representing themselves as neutral - is often manifested in the attribution of the statement to a third party (Clayman, 1992). In police interviews with suspects, Johnson (2008) observes similar patterns, with officers challenging

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16 Goffman’s (1981) notion of framework will be discussed in more depth in chapter 3.
suspects’ versions by presenting events from the perspective of witnesses present at the time, in the form of reported speech.

The aforementioned study by Heydon (2005) begins with an analysis of the types of footing activated at different phases of the interview. With a focus on producer roles, she notes that the production of scripted utterances such as the reading of a suspect’s rights assigns the roles of principal and author to the police institution rather than the individual officer. This footing is often oriented to by participants, as is evident in such utterances as “I must inform you...”, which indicates that the officer is acting only in the role of animator, uttering the words because of legal requirements. This framework is most frequently activated during the ‘opening’ phase of an interview (cf. 1.1), which is characterised by a number of formulaic utterances scripted by the institution. During the ‘information gathering’ phase, Heydon observes the officers’ preference for suspects to be aligned as principal and author, as well as animator, of their own accounts, noting that it is institutionally preferable to have the account in the suspect’s ‘own words’. As she puts it, “the police interviewer would, ideally, be assigned none of these roles for the duration of the information gathering” (2005: 58). Evidence of officers’ preferences appears in the form of explicit promotion of the footing, such as ‘Would you care to tell me in your own words?’. Similarly, interviewing officers often work to maintain the footing by feigning ignorance of certain facts, “because they want the suspect to answer the question on record, as though the suspect is the owner of the ‘new’ information” (2005: 59). However, this is not always successful, and officers frequently find themselves having to ascribe the roles of principal and author to the police institution or eyewitnesses in order to elicit the required responses.

In Heydon (1997) it was suggested that when police officers make formal utterances during interviews (e.g. acknowledgment of the time of interview), they are taking on the role (Goffman, 1974) of the author and principal on behalf of the police institution and not themselves. This is because interviewers are legally bound to utter certain words not because they personally created the utterance and decided to use it (authorship); rather, those utterances are strict legal requirements of the institution (principal). Thus, the role in which the police officer personally takes is that of an animator and information provider, while the suspect is allocated the role of the respondent. That is, the interviewers on behalf of the institution ask the suspect questions, the turns are initiated by the interviewers (First Pair
Part), and in return the suspectformulates their response (Second Pair Parts; Heydon, 2005: 95).

To conclude, interviewers maintain control over suspects in interviews because of their answer-question format. In cases whereby the suspects deviate from this format, interviewers are still able to formulate sequences, which allow them to maintain the role of the interviewer in the opening and closing sequences.

1.2.3 Formulations

Garfinkel & Sacks (1970: 350) define formulations as points within a conversation where a participant takes the opportunity to “describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterize it, or explicate, or translate, or summarize, or furnish the gist of it”. Thus, formulations provide a resource for participants to reach an agreement on the meaning of what has gone before: “the introduction of a formulation enables co-participants to settle on one of many possible interpretations of what they have been saying” (Heritage & Watson, 1979: 123).

Although rare in ‘ordinary’ conversation, formulations are typical of many types of institutional, audience-directed interaction (Heritage, 1985), and demonstrate the authority a powerful participant has to gloss the meaning of preceding talk.

Dealing with the context of the suspect interview, Johnson (2008) gives particular attention to the ways in which suspects’ narratives are negotiated through the evaluations of the interviewing officers, transforming the initial narrative into something of evidential value. In this way, the end product of the interview is the product of a series of negotiations of meaning, wording, etc. The production of formulations is central to this process: by re-wording a suspect’s account within an institutional frame, interviewers increase the evidential value of the narrative, or rather “recontextualizing practices have the power to transform realities in ways that orient to institutional meanings” (Johnson, 2008: 328). Johnson shows how officers, as well as translating lay accounts into institutionally appropriate ones, necessarily do not ‘take up’ all the elements provided. Instead, they focus on those elements that emphasise the suspect’s involvement and responsibility, from which they negotiate a new version, which the suspect is then encouraged to support.
A further function of formulations in police interviews as well as other types of institutional talk (such as courtroom discourse and news interviews) is the orientation to the abovementioned absent listener or ‘overhearing audience’ (cf. section 1.2.2). That is, rather than being restricted to the interaction, and the interactants immediately present in the interview room, the discourse is relevant to a wider context as it is “performed for a higher authority, a judge and jury” (Johnson, 2008: 330). It is for this reason that the usual ‘receipt objects’ (e.g. good, really?) that would be expected to appear in third-turn position in ordinary conversation are rare in the question-and-answer sequences in such contexts. These receipt objects align the questioner as the primary addressee of the talk. Conversely, third-turn positions in the talk of trials and police interviews are instead typically occupied by utterances which allow questioners to “decline the role of report recipient while maintaining the role of report elicitor” (Heritage, 1985: 100). These allow the overhearing audience to view themselves as the primary addressee. This footing (Goffman, 1981), which places overhearers as the primary recipients of talk, “is managed by the questioner’s withholdings of the many small gestures of alignment and solidarity characteristic in question-answer sequences in conversation” (Heritage, 1985: 100).

An example of formulation of this kind is to be found in my data, namely in interview 4A. After the suspect (L) has described a plastic box, the police officer (P2) asks how high the box is through the interpreter (I2):

Extract 1 (4A: 389-395)

| 389 | P2 | I see so how high then is the plastic box off the ground? |
| 390 | L  | ((Indicates the height of the plastic box from the ground with her hand)) °assim° |
|     |    | like this |
| 391 | P2 | I see so... |
| 392 | I2 | Do chão ao plástico |
|     |    | From the floor to the plastic box |
| 393 | L  | ((Indicates the height of the plastic box again)) do chão ao plástico é assim é |
|     |    | from the floor to the plastic box it’s like this yeah |
In his last utterance, the interviewer verbally describes the interviewee’s gesture. This formulation is directed at the overhearing audience, ostensibly to summarize the gist of preceding talk, but selectively re-presenting the content in the process, and inviting the interviewee to minimally confirm or deny the modified version.

As we have seen in this section, there is a growing wealth of studies by police practitioners and academics from diverse disciplines which shows that the police officer’s competence in investigative interviewing can profoundly impact the outcome of the case. However, these have almost solely focused on monolingual contexts with native speaker suspects or witnesses (Gibbons, 2004). The lack of academic work in interlingual police interviews clashes with the reality of today’s multicultural and multilingual societies, in which interpretation is increasingly needed to bridge linguistic and cultural barriers (Hertog, 2003).

1.3 “Can I ask you to confirm that you will not compress or alter what we say?”: Police studies and the role of the interpreter

When the interviewee does not share the same functioning language as the interviewing police officer, it is necessary for the interpreter to be brought into the process. In England, for instance, officers are given the task of taking the decision to supply an interpreter if they feel that the interviewee’s grasp of English is insufficient for interview (or if the person requests the presence of an interpreter). The initial custody time limit for a detained person is 24 hours. Therefore, if the officers are to spend much of this time searching for an interpreter, or waiting for her arrival before being able to interview the suspect, it is clear that this constitutes an impediment to due process. It must also be considered that the human rights of the detained person may be contravened by calling in an unqualified or inexperienced interpreter. But what is meant by ‘quality’ and ‘experience’ in the authorities’ Codes of Practice?
As mentioned in the Introduction, both courtroom and police interpreters’ Codes of Practice often state that interpreters should ‘just’ interpret. The interpreter is seen as a ‘conduit’ or a ‘machine’, i.e. someone who can produce verbatim renditions of the original utterances.\(^{17}\) For instance, consider Greater Manchester Police’s Terms of Engagement, which regulated the use of police interpreters and translators before the FWA came into force: “The interpreter/translator must interpret and translate only what is being asked and the responses provided without embellishing or removing information provided” (Greater Manchester Police, 2010: 1; my emphasis). Furthermore, Shepherd suggests that police officers should brief interpreters before an interview by asking the following question: “Can I ask you to confirm that you will not compress or alter what we say and will always let us know if there is a problem?” (Shepherd, 2004, quoted in Shepherd, 2007: 172). In Gradewell’s (2006) article on Operation Lund into the deaths of twenty-three workers, the author states that a large number of Mandarin interpreters were called upon to interpret, adding that “if there is no direct translation the interpreter will try to convey the meaning or sense of what has been said, but this risks ambiguity or misunderstanding between the interviewer and the witness” (Gradewell, 2006: 14; my emphasis).

This widespread view is coupled with a continuing resistance to the use of interpreters amongst police interviewers. According to Gibbons (2003) this may be due to a number of reasons: the difficulty to obtain an interpreter or the cost of interpreters; the mediation provides the interviewee with extra thinking time; an interpreter is often interposed between the police and the interviewee, which may distort police perceptions of the aforementioned nonverbal signals; and lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the police may perceive that the effectiveness of the interrogation is reduced as they lose “the control of topic and turns” (Gibbons 2003: 84), especially in a question-heavy narrative.

Confusion appears to surround the police interpreters’ role and experience, both touched upon – albeit very often only briefly and anecdotally – in only a very limited number of works by Police studies and criminology scholars (cf. Rombouts, 2012; Smith, 2010). For instance, Shepherd (2007: 172) claims that “it is certainly the case that many interpreters on their own initiative take on the role of intermediary, and in doing so may make the task of managing the interview very much more difficult”. Therefore, it is the interviewer who has the “task of briefing and managing the interpreting process in the interview” (Shepherd 2007: 173) and

\(^{17}\) In section 2.1 we will discuss this issue within interpreting studies.
even to gauge the experience the individual interpreter has had in the interpreting task. However, Shepherd’s view seems somewhat contradictory when it comes to the issue of accreditation; on one hand, he maintains that professional interpreters must “hold qualifications such as the Diploma in Public Service Interpreting or an equivalent”, but on the other “lack of experience is no justification for rejection” (Shepherd, 2007: 173). Misunderstanding concerning the distinction between fulfilling the role of interpreter and intermediary can also be found in Codes which provide the core framework of police powers, e.g. the PACE Code of Practice (Home Office, 2011: Revised Code C (13)). From this text it emerges that interpreters may act as intermediaries given that:

- an interpreter may speak to one person on the telephone “on the detained person’s behalf” (Connor et al., 2011: 59);
- if an interpreter has been present at the interview, he or she should be given an opportunity to “read the record and certify its accuracy” (Home Office, 2011: Revised Code C (13.7));
- if the custody officer cannot establish communication with a deaf or non-English speaking person charged with an offence, the interpreter is required to “explain the offence and any other information given by the custody officer” (Home Office, 2011: Revised Code C (13.10)).

Simultaneously, according to the Revised Code C a police officer or other police staff may also interpret “if the detainee and the appropriate adult (…) give their agreement in writing or if the interview is audibly recorded or visually recorded” (Home Office, 2011: Revised Code C (13.9)). Again, it is also the interviewer’s responsibility to ensure that “the detained person can understand and be understood” (R v West London Youth Court, ex parte J, 2000 1 All ER 823, quoted in Connor et al., 2011: 109), although it is not specified how.

1.4 Conclusion

Major miscarriages of justice have led to, in many parts of the world, changes in how suspects and witnesses of crime are interviewed, mostly led by applied scientific enquiry from research in psychology and forensic linguistics. This research has enhanced our knowledge of the interview process and led to the amalgamation of an investigative interview approach, known
as the PEACE technique, which has been adopted by law enforcement in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, parts of Europe, and more recently Canada.

Psychology-oriented Police studies and forensic linguistics tend to focus on different aspects of police interpreting. For instance, while police investigative interviewing has recognised the importance of establishing rapport no matter whether dealing with cooperative interviewees in the implementation of ECI or with uncooperative interviewees utilising CM, Fisdal (1988: 3) observed less interest in rapport by other relevant disciplines:

Rapport has been a topic of much discussion among psychologists examining interviews because of their interest in the interview’s outcome. Linguists, on the other hand, have shown relatively little interest in rapport. Their focus has been to describe the linguistic structure of an interaction without taking into account the speaker’s perceptions of the outcome.

More generally, however, it can be said that both disciplines still very much focus on monolingual interviews and do not take into account the presence of a language mediator. Scholars’ simplistic views of (both a passive and active) role of police interpreters can be summarised in the words of an Indian criminologist, whereby interpreters should be “used only in the rarest of rare occasions when there exists no other option” (Vadackumchery, 1999: 99).

This statement on the role of the interpreter, however, highlights one important fact: in a multicultural and multilingual society, language mediation is increasingly more essential for the operation of various public services and social functions. Thus, it may be reasonable to argue that criminal justice in culturally diverse communities - such as those in the UK - would be severely disadvantaged without interpreting services. And this explains why Detective Sergeant Martin Vaughan, an interview advisor who looked at the issues around the use of interpreters during interviews, was able to conclude that “interviewing with interpreters is essential in many investigations, but it is an area which I believe from a training background, we did not pay much attention to” (Welman, 2010: 31).

Yet, if interpreters do initiate such essential contributions to police interviews, what is the relationship between the interpreter (and his or her utterances) and the participants relying on his or her services? How can his or her actual (rather than intended) role be defined? I shall
now explore how these and other questions have been addressed by scholars in the field of legal interpreting - and, in particular, in interlingual police interview discourse.
CHAPTER 2

Legal interpreting as a research focus

In today’s linguistically and culturally diverse societies, demand for public service interpreters (PSIs) has never been greater and this has had a significant impact on a variety of institutional settings, such as police stations, hospitals and courtrooms, “where [they] provide service for laymen and officials, when they speak different languages” (Wadensjö, 1993/2002: 355).

This unquestionable need for the services of PSIs has also led to growing academic interest in the nature and dynamics of PSI interaction and the role of the interpreter (e.g. Berg-Seligson, 1990, 2009; Carr et al., 1997; Mason, 1999; Hale, 2004; Pöllabauer, 2007; Roy, 2000; Wadensjö, 1998). In particular, legal interpreters have been shown to play a pivotal role in facilitating communication within the criminal justice system (Mason & Stewart, 2001; Hertog, 2003; Wadensjö, 1998). They are called upon to interpret in a diversity of settings ranging from police interrogations and client-lawyer consultations to administrative hearings and judicial proceedings in open court, for defendants, victims or witnesses who do not speak the language of the proceedings, thus “shar[ing] in the responsibility of the administration of justice” (Napier, Spencer & Sabolcecc, 2009: 100).

In the context of legal interpreting studies, police interpreting is however a field characterised by a limited body of data-driven, empirical research, mainly owing to the difficulty in gaining access to interpreted police interviews (as shown by my own data collection process; cf. chapter 5). Accordingly, the scope of this chapter is to provide an overall critical review of scholarly work on legal interpreting practice (2), with a focus on the role of (legal) interpreters (2.3.1), research paradigms (2.3.2) and the issue of discourse markers or connectives (2.3.3).
2.1 Legal interpreting: A definition

The last decades have seen a movement of citizens throughout the world, affecting the linguistic and ethnic make-up of societies. As a result, public service interpreting (PSI) - or Community Interpreting (hereafter CI), as it is commonly referred to by researchers - is arguably the most common form of interpreting, enabling “people who are not fluent speakers of the official language(s) of the country to communicate with the providers of public services so as to facilitate full and equal access to legal, health, education, government, and social services” (Mikkelson, 1996: 77).

CI is also known as liaison, ad hoc, dialogue, face-to-face, contact, and cultural interpreting and there is little consensus amongst scholars whether or not these terms are synonymous (Hale, 2007). Some scholars such as Gentile (1997), Mikkelson (2010) or Roberts (1997) have warned against drawing distinctions between types of interpreting and argue that “the traditional labels attached to different types of interpreting are inadequate and may be contributing to the divisiveness we see among interpreters today” (Mikkelson, 2010: 2).

Broadly speaking, CI events may be police interrogations, immigration hearings, classroom interaction, doctor-patient consultations, Job Centre interviews, or social worker-client interviews. The language of the interaction may be spoken or sign language, and the working mode may be simultaneous, consecutive or sight translation. A fairly recent trend is the use of over-the-phone (or remote) interpreting, whereby services are provided via telephone or videolink and neither parties - nor the interpreter - are usually in the same location (Heh & Qian, 1997; Fowler, 2011). At present most remote interpreting is done consecutively, but the simultaneous mode is being increasingly used alongside new developments in technology (Braun & Taylor, 2012).

Legal or forensic interpreting is one specific modality of PSI, which has been defined by Gonzales, Vasquez, & Mikkelson (1991: 25) as an “interpretation that takes place in a legal setting such as a courtroom or an attorney’s office, wherein some proceeding or activity related to law is conducted”. A legal interpreter, therefore, is taken to be “a trained, qualified professional who provides interpreting (...) services to those involved, in whatever capacity, in a legal system in whose language they are not fully competent” (Hertog, 2011: 13). This type of interpreting can be further subdivided according to the setting where it takes place:
immigration, asylum, police (hereafter IAP) or courtroom interpreting (Pöllabauer, 2006: 244).

It is worth pointing out that court interpreting (i.e. judiciary or judicial interpreting) is sometimes broadly used as a synonym for interpreting in legal and “quasi-judicial” settings (Benmaman, 1997: 179; Berk-Seligson, 2000: 214; Pöchhacker, 2004: 14). For instance, Martinsen & Wolch-Rasmussen (2003: 41) state that the legal interpreter’s fundamental role consists in “facilitating a communication within the judicial system”, but fail to mention other aspects of legal interpreting, such as law enforcement.

According to Laster & Taylor (1994: 28) the use of the term court interpreting as an umbrella term “reflects the law’s own regard for the (…) court as the apex of the legal system”. However, this view contradicts studies carried out in Australia (e.g. Martin, 1991), which demonstrate that the courtroom has indeed a more marginal role in the determination of legal rights and obligations than classic legal studies theory allows. A high number of legal proceedings involving second-language speakers are shown to be dealt with in the pre-trial phase, particularly in police and immigration interviews (e.g. Morris, 2008).

Another distinction between courtroom and pre-trial interpreting can be drawn in terms of the interpreting mode adopted. In courts of law, on one hand, interpreting services tend to be provided in the simultaneous mode, although consecutive is the choice for witness or defendant testimony (Gonzales, Vasquez, & Mikkelson, 1991); on the other, interpreted pre-trial proceedings are likely to be in the consecutive mode (Tsuda, 1995).

Despite the differences between court interpreting and other legal interpreting events, there are also a number of similarities. According to a government publication issued by the US Census Bureau, Guidelines on the Use of Interpreters in Survey Interviews (Pan, 2005: 1), community interpreting is defined as “the genre of interpreting used where two or more parties do not share a language in a social encounter and where the interpreter must be present in order to bridge the communication gap” (my emphasis) - in the particular case of legal interpreting, in court hearings and police interviews. This definition leads to a series of assumptions or ‘special requirements’ for legal interpreting. Firstly, unlike conference interpreting, legal interpreting can be taken as a two-language direction process, i.e. the interpreter is required to interpret into and from both the target and source language. Secondly, the interpreter could also be seen as a “cultural mediator” (Kondo & Tebble, 1997:
to facilitate communication between the two parties. Together with language skills, the interpreter should therefore have cultural competence of both target and source culture in order to effectively convey the message.\(^{18}\) In addition, they all share certain “contextual constraints” (Jacobsen, 2009: 158), such as the ad-hoc, institutionalised and triadic nature of the speech event, in a setting involving the interpreter and two or more primary participants, typically a professional with a certain amount of power and a non-professional (usually the second-language speaker) with a small amount of power or no power at all (e.g. Englund Dimitrova, 1997; Jacobsen, 2010; Roy, 2000). Naturally, these and other contextual constraints have an impact on the way meanings are negotiated within the interaction (Jacobsen, 2002; Wadensjö, 1998; cf. also 2.2).

A further common constraint of ‘institutional’ nature is the professional Code of ethics, which “applies to the majority of the skills and practices common to all forms of legal interpreting” (Benmaman, 1997: 189). Despite the existence of Codes of Conduct, legal interpreters are still not entirely seen as reliable and competent professionals, partly due to some negative media coverage (cf. NRPSI in Introduction). Indeed, many of these ‘beliefs’ about interpreters have some empirical foundation. Research on training and provision of legal interpreting services (e.g. Adams, Corsellis & Harmer, 1995; Corsellis, 2005, 2008; Grbić 2001; Mikkelson, 2010; Sandrelli, 2001) shows that many of the deficiencies blamed on interpreters are the result of systemic problems, e.g. the lack of uniform education and testing to develop high levels of professional competence,\(^{19}\) and the failure to further mechanisms for service delivery. Underlying these factors there seems to be the lack in public funding for the provision of legal interpreting services and levels of pay for interpreters (e.g. Perez & Wilson, 2009). This contributes to the ‘Cinderella’ image traditionally attached to all forms of PSI. As Gentile (1997: 117-118) points out, “[PSI] will continue to be regarded as a second rate form of interpreting which is not worthy of specific attention in terms of status, training, remuneration and research.”

\(^{18}\) For instance, in Australia several studies have been conducted which explore the cultural barriers for Aboriginal people in accessing court proceedings (Cooke, 2002; Eades, 2003; Goldflam, 1995; Howard, Quinn, Blokland & Flynn, 1993).

\(^{19}\) The issue of PSI training and the pedagogical issues surrounding it are highly relevant to accreditation systems and have received growing attention by PSI scholars. The stress usually lies on quality, training models, task requirements and skill requirements for PSIs, including linguistic skills and socio-cultural knowledge needed for interpreting (e.g. Hertog & Van Gucht, 2008; Towsley, 2011).
Finally, courtroom and pre-trial interpreting are similar in virtue of taking place within the professional domain of law, which - together with other fields such as medicine - is a “tightly-knit dominant profession” (Abbott, 1988: 72). Legal organisation is maintained and developed through the creation of complex divisions of roles for other subordinated professional categories. Interpreters, as much as courtroom listing officers or ushers, are subordinate professional groups as their tasks are defined by the requirements of the legal profession (Abbott, 1988).

Professional subordination is reiterated through symbolic practices. In the case of legal interpreting, such practices are shown in the judges’, police officials’, barristers’, and solicitors’ casual treatment of interpreters (Fowler, 2003; Laster & Taylor, 1994).²⁰ For instance, the solicitor or police officer may fail to brief the interpreter as required (Shepherd, 2007) and the prosecutors are unwilling to allow the interpreter to study the documentation regarding the case. In this context, it is also worth mentioning the stress related to work environment factors: the personal risk, the adversarial nature of the court, the lack of physical accommodation for the interpreter, the poor acoustics of the interview rooms, etc. (Hale, 2011; National Union of Professional Interpreters and Translators, 2004). Finally, both courtroom and police interpreters’ Codes of Practice often state that interpreters should “just interpret”, and the interpreter is seen as a ‘conduit’ or a ‘machine’, someone who can produce verbatim renditions of the original utterances. As Laster & Taylor (1994: 17) put it:

This is part of an ongoing struggle in which interpreters strive to assert their independent professional identity and lawyers [and other legal professionals] project a “counter-image” of interpreters as mere assistants, with a role and status inferior to that of their own.

Nowadays most scholars (e.g. Colin & Morris, 1996: 99ff; Knapp-Potthoff & Knapp, 1986; Morris, 1995; Roy, 1993/2002) agree that this requirement for literal renditions - or formal equivalence - is untenable (cf. 2.2.1).

Legal interpreting research on this and other related aspects has had profound consequences for interpreter training, accreditation and professionalisation, widening the gap between prescriptive, institutional constraints and the reality of the interpreter-mediated

²⁰This is also confirmed by my personal experience as a legal interpreter.
communication. In the next section, I will analyse the contribution of such academic work, which draws from a growing body of literature within sociology, ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, pragmatics, and cultural studies, amongst others.

2.2 Research issues in legal interpreting

While conference interpreting is a well-established profession drawing on international standards and Codes of Conduct, and much of the research on interpreting has been done within this domain (cf. Gambier & van Doorslaer, 2010; Pöchhacker & Shlesinger, 2002), CI – along with its subset, legal interpreting – arguably ‘came into being’ as an academic and professional discipline only in 1995, with the first Critical Link Conference in Geneva Park, Canada (Hertog & van der Veer, 2006: 11).21 This first major international meeting of CI practitioners, trainers and researchers provided a forum for a stimulating exchange of ideas about community interpreting in legal, health and social service settings (Pöchhacker, 2004: 44).

Since then, interpreting practices in community-based settings have proved to be an attractive topic of research, not least to non-interpreter scholars in fields like discourse studies, linguistics, and sociology. In fact, some of the seminal work conducted in this field – mainly in IAP interpreting (e.g. Barsky, 1994, 1996; Berg-Seligson, 1990; Wadensjö, 1993/2002, 1998) – were not set in the disciplinary context of dialogue interpreting. This phenomenon is not new to translation studies as a whole as they are “subject to dynamic forces resulting from the multi-faceted nature of its object and from the diversity of (inter)disciplinarity lines of approach” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 44).

As previously discussed, most research on legal interpreting in the spoken language interpreting literature focuses on court interpreting (Hale, 2006), with a reasonably large body of works that discusses quality and training, the role of the court interpreter, and linguistic and pragmatic aspects of court interpreting (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Colin & Morris, 1996; Edwards, 1995; Fowler, 1997; Gonzalez, Vasquez, & Mikkelsen, 1991; Kelly, 2000; Mikkelsen, 1998, 2000b; Morris, 1999; Robinson, 1994).

21 Indeed, research in community was carried out prior to the 1990s. However, it is this decade that saw the publication of seminal studies, which defined this type of interpreting as a fully-fledged academic discipline (Carr et al., 1997).
Further, there has been some research and discussion of other aspects of legal interpreting, mainly on immigration/asylum hearings (e.g. Barsky, 1994, 1996; Maley, Candlin, Koster, and Crichton, 1995; Pöllabauer, 2004; Shuy, 1998; Zambrano, 2006). Empirical studies on police interpreting are mainly discussed in journal articles (e.g. Fowler, 2003; Gibbons, 1995; Krouglov, 1999; Mason, 2004; Mpolweni, 2008; Nakane, 2007, 2008, 2009; Ortega Herráez & Foulquié Rubio, 2008; Russell, 2000, 2001, 2002). Berk-Seligson’s (2009) *Coerced Confessions* is the first monograph focusing solely on interpreted police interviews, whereas Wadensjö’s (1998) interdisciplinary, full-length work focuses on both police and medical interviews (cf. next section and chapter). Finally, a number of studies have specifically dealt with issues concerning deaf people’s access to justice via signed language interpreters (e.g. Brennan, 1999; Mathers, 2006; Russell & Hale, 2008) and potential linguistic barriers that deaf people face in the criminal justice system (e.g. McCay & Miller, 2001, 2005; Miller, 2003).

A series of hypotheses have been formulated as to why most legal interpreting research in this field has concentrated on the discourse of the courtroom to the exclusion of other legal settings, such as solicitor-client interviews, tribunals or immigration/refugee hearings and police interviews. One reason may be the widespread (mis)perception of courts as the ‘apex of the legal system’ (cf. 2.1). The reality is that “only a tiny percentage of cases even go to court (…) the day-to-day work of lawyers and [legal] interpreters takes place outside the courtroom” (Laster & Taylor, 1994: xvi). Further, the fact that the need for interpreting in courtroom settings has been recognised for a longer period of time than other types of legal interpreting may also play a role (Hale, 2007; Mikkelson, 2000b). Finally, a factor contributing to the setting up of an unrealistic model of legal interpreting has arguably been the difficulty in gaining access to interpreter-mediated IAP interaction (Hale, 2006; Pöllabauer, 2006).

Methodologically, publications on IAP interpreting have been divided into three broad groups (Pöllabauer, 2006): compilatory or anecdotal publications, which will not be touched upon in this chapter; theoretical research, which seeks to develop a theoretical framework for further research based on literature (e.g. Inghilleri, 2003); and, finally, empirical research, both qualitative and quantitative, which adopts a deductive approach based on a theoretical

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22 Police interrogations have been previously shown to be inherently coercive, a fact recognized by legal scholars and courts alike (Ainsworth, 2008). Berk-Seligson’s (2009) case studies further the understanding of how this coercion is achieved and how linguistic differences are exploited in the process.
framework and hypothesis (Dunsmuir & Williams, 1991). The vast majority of the publications in IAP research adopt a prescriptive, rather than descriptive approach (Pöllabauer, 2006: 230), and this mirrors a shift from ‘descriptive’ to ‘prescriptive’ in CI research as a whole (Mason, 2000: 220).

The past twenty years have seen a shift from more ‘personalised’ accounts to academic publications, both in the “neglected” (Pöllabauer, 2006: 230) IAP and (broader) legal interpreting field. The next sections aim to survey and evaluate some of the main research issues and findings for legal interpreting, both qualitatively and quantitatively. More specifically, I will present the findings from a cross-sectional analysis of the legal interpreting literature, exploring the interpreter’s role descriptions and expectations (2.2.1) as well as prevailing research traditions or “paradigms” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 67) in this field of research (2.2.2), with a focus on the issue of DMs (2.2.3).

2.2.1 The role of legal interpreters: Perceptions and expectations

In contrast with translation studies, academic work in the field of both conference and liaison interpreting has traditionally focused on the individual performing the task (i.e. the interpreter) as opposed to interpreting; this is partly due to their “visibility” (Jacobsen, 2009: 155) or the immediacy of the encounter, which requires the interpreter’s presence at the speech event.

However, conference and community interpreting differ in terms of potential research areas. The stress in conference interpreting research lies on cognitive and neurolinguistic aspects (i.e. issues such as anticipation, memory span, ear-voice span, etc.; cf. Pöchhacker, 2004), whereas research in dialogue and, in particular, legal interpreting has mainly focused on role perceptions and expectations among interpreter users and interpreters themselves (Jacobsen, 2002, 2009; Mason, 2000: 216).

This has been shown to derive from the different characteristics of the two disciplines illustrated in Table 2, which include the two-language direction process and other “contextual constraints” (Jacobsen, 2002: 6):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community interpreting</th>
<th>Conference interpreting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue (typically, but not always, two primary speakers)</td>
<td>Monologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous speech (some speech may be pre-planned)</td>
<td>Pre-planned speech (often scripted source material)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Relatively) short turns</td>
<td>Sustained turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-directional interpreting</td>
<td>Uni-directional interpreting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The characteristics of community and conference interpreting (based on Jacobsen, 2002: 6).

Thus, “whereas community interpreting invites research of interaction (…), conference interpreting invites research of action (on the part of the interpreter)” (Jacobsen, 2009: 156). This is also mirrored in Pöchhacker's (2004: 13) distinction between inter-social versus intra-social settings; whereas the former involve contacts between social entities (business, diplomacy, etc.), the latter involve contacts in multi-ethnic societies (police stations, health institutions, etc.).

The notion of role is mediated from sociology and indicates “a set of more or less normative behavioural expectations associated with a ‘social position’” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 147), which is central in analysing the intra-social settings of legal interpreting.

The role of legal interpreter has been traditionally linked with intermediary functions typical of a ‘messenger’ or ‘negotiator’ right from the beginning (Lang, 1976: 336). Following the professionalisation of the community interpreter in the 1980s and 1990s the issue of role became an integral part of national Codes of Ethics and Practice (notwithstanding the example analysed above). As mentioned in 2.1, the professional role generally prescribes accurate and faithful renditions, thus excluding any discourse initiative on the part of the interpreter and conceptualising her “as a ‘non-person’ in a neutral position between the interlocutors” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 147). This image of a passive and invisible participant, a mere translating “machine” (Knapp-Potthoff & Knapp, 1986: 152) has been problematised by recent scholarship, namely research on hospitals (e.g. Merlini & Favaron, 2003), legal interpreting
(e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2009; Fenton, 1997; Hale, 2004; Martin & Ortega, 2009; Morris, 1995; Pöllabauer, 2004, 2006; Wadensjö, 1998), sign language interpreting (e.g. Metzger, 1999), interpreting in conflict areas and the media (e.g. Straniero Sergio, 2007). By highlighting the linguistic, socio-cultural and interactional pattern of complexity in the actual role behaviour, these authors challenge the notion of literal renditions and argue instead for a redefinition of the legal interpreter as a more visible ‘communication facilitator’ (Roy, 1993/2002, 2000).

Another essential role highlighted in the literature (especially on healthcare interpreting) is that of a cross-cultural bridge, converting one set of social and cultural norms and assumptions to another set (e.g. Drennan & Swartz, 1999; Kaufert & Koolage, 1984). For the legal settings, in particular in IAP contexts, scholars such as Laster & Taylor (1994) and Mikkelson (1998) have highlighted the necessity for the interpreter to make adjustments to promote the interests of the individual client.

A case in point analysed by a number of scholars (Gibbons, 1998; Coulthard & Johnson, 2007; Eades, 1994) is the following example taken from my corpus, in which the police officer (P4) administers a caution for the purpose of advising the suspect of his right to silence.23

Extract 2 (5A: 59-70)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Okay (.) you are under caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>È:: sotto:: al (. ) l’avvertimento ((opens her arms outwards, perplexed))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You are:: under:: the (. ) the caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>You do not have to say anything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Non ha l’obbligo di rispondere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You do not have to reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>But it may harm your defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Ma potrebbe danneggiare la Sua difesa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 This extract will be analysed in further detail in section 6.1.
Here we can observe that the translation is often adapted to the source culture, both syntactically (cf. 66) and lexically (cf. translations of caution and rely on). It is worth bearing in mind that the accuracy of the interpretations is a significant issue for the police interviewers in the caution; if this is not given properly, it may undermine the legality of any subsequent suspect interview (Gibbons, 1994: 133).

The interpreter’s role of an “intercultural agent” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 148) has proven to be a overriding theme in research on interpreting in the asylum process, with particular emphasis on the extent to which she may or should go beyond the task of relaying the primary participants’ utterances and take more active responsibility for the achievement of cross-cultural understanding. The first example is a study by Robert Barsky (Constructing a Productive Other, 1994) of interviews with 56 applicants for refugee status in Canada, highlighting that interpreters needed to empower the claimant in an unfamiliar institutional environment by serving as “intercultural agents”.

In a survey among interpreters serving the Refugee Status Appeals Authority in New Zealand, Fenton (2004) further sought to determine the level of practitioners’ support for Barsky’s (1994) “extreme demands”. The author found that most of the 35 respondents expressed sympathy for the disadvantaged position of the asylum seekers in the face of interviewers’
hostile questioning style; however, they unanimously favoured the “accurate interpreting” norm and preferred to be “as invisible and unobtrusive as possible” (Fenton, 2004: 268).

Taking a more ethnographic as well as a macro-sociological approach, Moira Inghilleri (2003, 2005)’s study of the asylum application system in the United Kingdom is based on Bourdieu’s sociological theory, but also on what Pöchhacker (2004: 77) describes as “Translation Theory” (TT), a well-established paradigm oriented to the textual product with regard to both its structural (intratextual) and its pragmatic dimensions and centred on the notion of translational norms (Toury, 1995). The author claims that there are two distinct concepts of interpreting, namely “linguistic” and “community” interpreting, and that these differing approaches in using interpreters “can lead to substantial confusion about their role both among interpreters themselves and those who use their services” (Inghilleri, 2003: 1).

However, the most extensive discourse-based work on the interpreters’ role performance to date is that of Sonja Pöllabauer (2004, 2005). In her study of first-instance asylum hearings in Graz (Austria), she analyzed a corpus of 20 audio-recorded asylum interviews conducted by three officials with English-speaking applicants from four African countries. Drawing on pragmatics, “Translation Theory”, and critical discourse analysis (CDA), Pöllabauer analysed the three interpreters’ performance according to their role performance (Pöchhacker, 2004: 149), their positioning in the primary parties’ asymmetrical power relation, and their adherence to professional norms. As a result, she finds “highly discrepant behaviour which seems to be determined mainly by the officers’ expectations” (Pöllabauer, 2004: 174-175) and observes that the interpreters, far from being “invisible” and neutral, intervene in a number of ways. Rather than being “intercultural agents”, however, the interpreters frequently position themselves as members of the institutional “team”, thus assuming the role of “auxiliary police officers”. For instance, they were found to adopt the first person plural to refer to the asylum seeker’s interlocutors, omit “irrelevant” information, and engage in “internal rounds of talk” that remained untranslated for the other party. These results are corroborated by Kolb & Pöchhacker (2009) for first-instance asylum proceedings, where they found three types of deviations from the interpreter’s normative role emerge: verbally allying with the adjudicator, acting as co-interviewer, and co-producing the written record.

In the field of court interpreting, studies carried out in the USA (Berk-Seligson, 1990), the Netherlands (Jansen, 1995) and Israel (Morris, 1989, 1999, 2008; Shlesinger, 1991) have particularly served to illustrate the issues connected with the image of the interpreter as a
translating machine by demonstrating how some interpreters are prepared to exercise latitude and modify the source text to convey their perception of meaning or to reduce the impact of their target texts on the hearer. The four studies agree that the main reason for this was the interpreters’ objective of effective communication, but they disagree on the degree of latitude interpreters should exercise. For example, while Morris (1989: 14) and Shlesinger (1991: 153) argue that a degree of latitude is necessary to convey speaker meaning, Berk-Seligson talks of “intrusiveness” and interpreters’ “intrusive behaviour” (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 214).

In his works on legal interpreting in Denmark, Jacobsen (2002, 2009) agrees with Morris (1989) and Shlesinger (1991) on this issue. Applying Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature,24 he found that the interpreters were preoccupied with “building a mental model of speaker meaning and with conveying this mental model to end receivers” (Jacobsen, 2009: 158), despite the legal authorities’ assumption of literalism. In this way, the key component in an interpreter’s performance – i.e. the very fact that her presence is meant to ensure successful interaction – is argued to lead to a more active role on the part of the interpreter than the simple word-matching exercise required by law.

In this area of research an exception is represented by the work of communication scholar and interpreter Cecilia Wadensjö (1995, 1998). Whereas all of the above studies analysed role expectations and perceptions focusing on the interpreter’s role of translating conduit versus active participant, Wadensjö’s (1998) study of police and medical interviews mediated by state-certified Russian-Swedish dialogue interpreters has provided major insights into the interpreter’s role as translator and coordinator. Her full-length work drew mainly on Goffman’s interactional sociolinguistics, and in particular on his concept of footing, used in Wadensjö’s work to describe the primary participants’ and the interpreter’s relationship to each other.25 Thanks to such seminal works as Wadensjö’s, researchers in legal interpreting in the twenty-first century no longer seek to understand if community interpreters are visible and active participants, but rather to what degree and with what consequences (Hale, 2007, 2008; Mikkelsen, 2008).

Hale (2008) states that role definition remains a controversial issue in this setting. The reason, she argues (2008: 100-101), is the profession’s “different levels of development across the

24 Grice’s theory provides a framework for analyzing how hearers infer speakers’ intentions. I shall discuss this in further detail in section 4.2.2.

25 As mentioned in 1.2.2, Goffman’s and Wadensjö’s work will be the focus of the next chapter.
world”, i.e. the lack of common professional standards that could counteract the different role expectations of interpreter users. Moreover, Hale (2008: 101-119) identifies five roles that have either been “openly prescribed” or “deduced” from the performance of interpreters: (1) advocate for the minority language speaker, (2) advocate for the institution or service provider, (3) gatekeeper (controlling the flow of information by introducing, reinforcing and excluding topics), (4) facilitator of communication (responsible for the success of the interaction), and (5) faithful renderer of others’ utterances. Hale (2008: 119) concludes that interpreters need to “consider the consequences of their choices before adopting a role” and that – aware of the possible consequences demonstrated by her examples – role (5) is in fact “the only adequate role” for interpreters working in legal settings. This does not mean, however, that “interpreters must act as mindless machines”, but they should attempt to translate accurately “within human limitations” (2008: 119). Finally, she maintains that the higher the level of their skills, and the better the working conditions in which they operate, the better chance interpreters have to be as accurate as possible.

Consequently, different role perceptions and expectations of interpreter users are said to still complicate interpreter-mediated events, regardless of the setting. According to Hale (2008) the problem may be solved by professionalising interpreters through better working conditions. Hale’s recommendations for which roles are suitable in an interpreting event, however, differ from other scholars’ suggestions. For instance, whereas Leanza (2005) recommends that interpreters adopt all the roles and function not only as interpreters but also as cultural brokers and facilitators of integration, Hale (2008) posits that interpreters should carefully consider the consequences before adopting a particular role.26

In Mason’s (2009) contribution to Interpreting and translating in public service settings: policy, practice, pedagogy, the image of interpreting as interaction proposed by Wadensjö (1992, 1998) is explored further. The final outcome is an approach that veers from the static concept of role to adopt the dynamic notion of positioning. In this descriptive study of interpreted events from different sources (a television documentary on illegal immigration and a variety of interviews), the author describes “the range of moves, both linguistic and paralinguistic” (Mason, 2009: 71) in which the primary participants position and re-position themselves, affecting each other’s positions. The analysis, based on six parameters (including

26 These and other studies (e.g. Pöchhacker, 2002; Morris, 2008) also show the increased focus on quality, a topic which is also linked to the issue of visibility and active participation.
orientation or positioning of each participant with respect to each other, use and translation of contextualisation cues, and gaze) proves that the behaviour of all participants is interrelated, and their “positionings are either accepted and adopted by other participants or rejected and replaces” (Mason, 2009: 71), i.e. they are subject to joint negotiation.²⁷

In conclusion, the topic of the legal interpreters’ role perceptions and expectations still dominate, and the controversy that Lang (1976) first discussed more than 30 years ago is still very much alive today. As Mason (2008: 71) reiterates, we are still far from completely understanding what the actual role and limits of interpreters are, and more research is needed to observe the behaviour of all participants in real-life interpreted situations in order to better understand the nature of interpreted events. My thesis aims to contribute to an area that appears to be under-researched, i.e. real-life, interpreter-mediated police settings.

This notion of role perceptions and expectations in legal interpreting is central to non-linguistic aspects of the interpreted event (Pöchhacker, 2004; Shlesinger & Pöchhacker, 2008). In the following section, I aim to investigate the predominant approaches that have been used to analyse these and other aspects of legal interpreting interaction, such as professionalism, ‘pragmatic’ features and the power dynamics of the interpreting situation.

2.2.2 A question of paradigm

Legal interpreting scholars have embraced the principle of interdisciplinarity to a variable extent. An interdisciplinary approach most certainly characterises the work of Cecilia Wadensjö (1992, 1995, 1998), who “promotes face-to-face interpreting as a field of research in its own right, and suggests directing investigations within this field on the dynamics of interpreter-mediated encounters” (Wadensjö, 1998: 15, emphasis in the original). Her analysis shows that this dialogic interactivity had significant consequences for the role, positioning and overall performance of the interpreter. It is this seminal study which, for most scholars and analysts, still defines what Franz Pöchhacker calls the “dialogic discourse-based interaction (DI)” paradigm (Pöchhacker, 2004: 79), comprising “the basic assumptions,

²⁷ Using the Map Task as a research tool, Turner (2013) takes this issue even further by claiming that meaning can not been interpreted without “grounding” (Clark, 1996), i.e. an active, positive joint action undertaken by all participants.

49
models, values, and standard methods shared by all members” of the CI scientific community (Pöchhacker, 2004: 67; cf. also Angelelli, 2004).

In the 1990s, journals in interpreting studies therefore began to devote many articles and special issues to dialogue-based interpreting research (e.g. Target; Interpreting; Mason, 1999, 2001). Similar groundbreaking work was carried out in the field of sign language interpreting in the 1990s, and towards the end of the decade particularly the work of Roy (1996, 2000) and Metzger (1999). Metzger’s (1999) study on *The Myth of Neutrality* stresses the intrinsically dual role of interpreters as “both participants in the interaction and conveyors of discourse” (1999: 175). Furthermore, Roy’s (1996) qualitative analysis of a videotaped meeting between a university lecturer and her deaf students analysed the dynamics of interactive discourse, with a focus on turn-taking processes. Drawing on conversation and discourse analysis, Roy (2000: 66) showed that “an interpreter’s role is more than to ‘just translate’ or ‘just interpret’”, thus stressing her active participation to the communicative event.

Further influential work within the DI paradigm is that by Robert Barsky (*Constructing a Productive Other*, 1994), discussed in 2.1. His main disciplinary background is comparative literature, yet he adopts a very broad discourse analytical approach – which also encompasses aspects of literary and cultural anthropology – in order to highlight the structural and institutional environments in which such interpreting assignments take place. His much-quoted study has paved the way for an extremely fruitful line of CI research, i.e. critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is often combined with aspects of politeness theory and face-saving and face-threatening strategies (cf. Pöllabauer, 2005; Mason, 2006b).

These first DI paradigm-related studies - such as the ones by Wadensjö and Roy – have therefore “fundamentally questioned the normative character of the traditional literature on CI, looking instead at the actual performances of interpreters in ‘real’ situations” (Valero Garcés, 2006: 90). Since then, more and more researchers are leaning toward an interactive, discourse-orientated approach to legal interpreting. However, this interest in the analysis of the interpreter’s role is not coupled by an analysis of her performance from a linguistic point of view.

Within the DI paradigm, the influence of linguistic pragmatics can be seen in a limited number of contrastive studies that have led researchers in legal interpreting to argue against the myth of literalism and mainly applied Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle (cf. Jacobsen’s

In this respect, it is important to underline which aspect of (socio)pragmatics interpreting scholars are applying when discussing their results. For instance, when referring to the need for interpreters to achieve the ‘pragmatic equivalence’ between the original and the interpreted utterance, a number of scholars have “argued for the need to understand the utterance at the discourse level, rather than at the word or sentence levels” (Hale, 2006: 217) and to achieve a similar reaction in the audience as the original would (Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2002; Hale, 2004; Krouglov, 1999; Mason & Stewart, 2001; Rigney, 1999). This is arguably achieved by looking, firstly, at the underlying ‘pragmatic point’ or intention of the utterance, and then at its force and potential ‘perlocutionary’ effect, as these notions are defined by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969).

Within this theory, the issue of politeness has become central to theoretical frameworks in some legal interpreting research. In particular, it has been associated with the use of indirect speech both in Leech’s (1983) ‘conversational maxim’28 and Brown & Levinson’s (1978, 1987) ‘face-saving’ models. At the heart of the latter model lies Goffman’s (1955, 1967) notion of face, which is seen as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61). Furthermore, they assume not only that speakers are mutually concerned with and attentive to both their and others’ face, but also that face has two aspects, both positive and negative. ‘Negative’ face refers to “social actors’ concerns with avoidance in interaction, or more specifically with having one’s actions unimpeded by others” (Arundale, 2005: 47), while ‘positive’ face represents social actors’ desire to be accepted and liked by others. According to Brown & Levinson, many of the actions (or speech acts) undertaken by speakers with respect to others in everyday interaction - such as complaints, disagreements and requests - threaten or impose on the other social actors’ (or one’s own

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28 Leech (1983) adopts a politeness principle with conversational maxims similar to those formulated by Grice, listing six maxims: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy. In particular, the tact maxim states: “Minimize the expression of beliefs which imply cost to other; maximize the expression of beliefs which imply benefit to other” (Leech, 1983: 132). The first part of this maxim fits in with Brown & Levinson’s (1978, 1987) negative politeness strategy of minimising the imposition, while the second part reflects the positive politeness strategy of attending to the hearer’s interests, wants, and needs.
negative or positive face, and are therefore called ‘face-threatening acts’ (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 67).

In this context, they have also introduced a comprehensive definition of ‘indirectness’ as a set of politeness strategies with the objective of reducing imposition on the hearer and/or leading to the emergence of solidarity between the speaker and the hearer. These strategies include lexical and referential markers, i.e. devices such as hedges, downtoners, diminutives, and DMs (the focus of this work) which rely on their meaning as well as relationships to indirectly approach or present a claim. In particular, hedges are mainly used for negative politeness in face-saving, in which they are used to mitigate the illocutionary force of an utterance or on any of the four Gricean Maxims (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 130). In both cases the motivation for their use is the desire to save face, either the hearer or the speaker’s. For instance, a subgroup of ‘clausal mitigators’ are utterances that begin with but, which are said to attenuate the propositional content of the utterance by providing an explanation of the speaker’s motives for carrying out a face-threatening act.

Legal interpreting research has focused on features such as register, politeness and hedging to analyse “translational shifts” or changes in the ‘sociopragmatic’ force of the interpreted text (Pöchhacker, 2004: 144). Mason & Stewart (2001) focused on the issue of face in the cross-examination of Rosa Lopez from the O. J. Simpson trial. In particular, they look at the way the interpreter both reduces the ‘face-threatening’ force of Lopez’ defensive answers or increases it by her inability to render into English the illocutionary force of the utterances. The following example (Mason & Stewart, 2001: 57) illustrates one such alteration caused by the interpreter’s rendition:

Attorney: So you have not made a reservation?

Interpreter: +++

Witness: No pero no voy a hacerlo no más salir de aquí (xxx) tiempo para salir. (waves arm) No voy a hablar a las diez/ a la una de la mañana...(xxx).

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29 In positive politeness they arguably figure only in expressions of extremes, like marvellous and appalling, which are typical of this form of politeness, ‘safely vague’ because they leave it to the hearer to understand how to interpret them.

30 Nakane (2006, 2008) tackles these shifts in the domain of police interpreting, with particular reference to hedges and politeness. I will discuss her work on the implications of footing on the participation framework in 3.2.2.
(No but I am going to do it as soon as I leave here (xxx) time to leave. I am not going to speak at ten/ at one in the morning…(xxx).

Int: But I will make it as soon as I leave here.

Att: Okay. You have not made a/

Int: I can’t call at 1:00 in the morning because the airlines are closed at that time. I have to wait.

In this case it is argued that the accuracy of the interpreter’s rendition would be enhanced by the addition on the ‘DM’ hardly as in “I’m hardly going to phone at one in the morning…”, supporting Hale’s (1996) definition of pragmatic equivalence according to which additions or omissions of this kind are commonly needed for accuracy.

2.2.3 ‘Discourse markers’ in legal interpreting research

Mason and Stewart’s (2001) study of a cross-examination in an American trial is not the only work which deals with ‘DMs’ as hedges on illocutionary force, based on Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) ‘face-saving’ theory. Conversely, lexical expressions such as well, so, and now, which do not arguably have an independent propositional meaning, are often seen as “essential in conveying pragmatic force” (Eades, 2010: 74).

In 1990, Berk-Seligson published her landmark study of interpreting in US courts (The Bilingual Courtroom), launching in its wake a stream of discourse-oriented research on English-Spanish interpreted-mediated interactions in the courtroom in the United States (Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2002) and in Australia (Hale, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004; Hale & Gibbons, 1999). Interpreters are shown to make a range of linguistic decisions during the interpreting process based on their understanding of courtroom discourse, which influences elements of the interaction, such as turn-taking, pragmatic force, interruptions or clarifications, DMs and politeness. Thus, as an inherent part of the process of interpreting, the interpreter alters the dynamics and therefore impacts on the interaction.

31 Numerous studies on pragmatics have dealt with the Spanish-English language pair, however research involving other languages – e.g. Portuguese, German or Italian in combination with English – with different speech styles can provide valuable results regarding the interpreter’s impact on the outcome of interpreted events (cf. chapter 6).
In particular, Berk-Seligson isolated two powerless speech features, i.e. ‘polite markers’ and ‘hedges’ (Brown & Levison, 1978: 172), such as the following *well* (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 141):

Attorney: What kind of house is that?  
Interpreter: ¿Qué tipo de casa es?  
Defendant: *Es una casa chica.*  
Interpreter: *Well,* it’s a small house.

In her study she presented two different renditions of the original testimony in Spanish which included many hedges in order to elicit responses from mock jurors. One rendition kept the hedges, while the other omitted them. The general result shows that the jurors who listened to the ‘hedged’ rendition were significantly more negative in their evaluation of the witness. However, those mock jurors who spoke Spanish revealed no significant differences between the evaluations of the hedged and unhedged renditions. In the context of court interpreting research, Berk-Seligson’s analysis thus highlights the need to study both the product itself – as is the case, for instance, in discourse-analytical studies on features such as register (e.g. Hale, 1997) or question types (e.g. Wadensjö, 1997) – and the communicative effect of that product in a particular setting.

Berk-Seligson’s study on the pragmatic impact of the legal interpreters’ use (or, rather, omission) of DMs has inspired other significant publications on this issue, in particular: Krouglov’s (1999) study of the way in which an interpreter deals with colloquialisms and hedges, as well as forms of address and other forms of politeness; Hale’s (1999, 2004) analyses of DMs used in courtroom discourse; and Tillmann’s (2009) small-scale experimental study on the pragmatic significance of DMs within the context of asylum hearings.

Krouglov’s (1999) paper is based on the analysis of four short extracts from interviews with Russian witnesses conducted at a police station by English speaking detectives and interpreted by four different interpreters. In line with Berk-Seligson’s work, his findings suggest that interpreters often avoid or change hedges, thus “transforming the source text into a series of neutral utterances” (Krouglov, 1999: 299). For instance, the author gives an example featuring
the Russian *nu* as “intensifier” (*indeed*), which is however translated with the hedge *well*, leaving “open the possibility that the interviewee may appear to the interviewers as less definite and confident about his recollections” (ibid.: 290-1). 32

The results of Hale’s (2004) study into the interpretation of Spanish-speaking witness testimony in Australia contrast with those of Berk-Seligson’s (1990) study. Instead of isolating each feature, Hale (2004) included all of them as a single speech style. She thus proposes that only when these features are found in combination, they have an impact on the evaluations. In summary, “the higher the frequency of powerless features in the speech, the less favourable the evaluation of the witness will be” (Hale, 2006: 216). When the interpreters’ renditions were analysed individually, Hale found that interpreters did not systematically try to copy the speech style of the original utterances, but rather that they would add or omit powerless features arbitrarily. For instance, Hale (2004: 71) shows how *well* is used by lawyers in cross-examination “as a sign of contradiction, marking disagreement”, and can also express the lawyer’s frustration or impatience. The following extract shows the original lawyer’s question and the interpreter’s rendition, where the DM is omitted (ibid.: 72):

**Lawyer:** *Well, you were yelling and screaming at this stage weren’t you?*

**Interpreter:** *Usted estaba gritando y y y ah hablando en voz alta en este momento, ¿no es cierto?*

*[You were screaming and and and uh speaking in a loud voice at this moment, isn’t it right?]*

According to the author, although the interpreter’s version of the question transmits its propositional content, the omission of the DM obscures the fact that lawyer is asking this question to contradict the witness’s previous answer. In Hale’s study of 13 local court hearings in Sydney, *well* was used as a preface in 27 cross-examination questions, but it was interpreted only eight times – i.e., for 70% of its occurrences, it was left out of the interpreted version.

32 Krouglov’s account of the interpreter’s rendition of the DM *nu* is not entirely convincing. Indeed, *well* can also be used to emphatically express assertion of certainty; here, prosodic features would play a significant role.
Hale (1999) also examines how meanings of DMs are interpreted by courtroom interpreters. She finds that lawyers use DMs as argumentative and confrontational devices, expressing challenges and disagreement during cross-examination. Like Knapp and Knapp-Potthoff (1987), Hale observes a tendency on the part of interpreters to omit or mistranslate such particles, with a consequence on role perceptions and expectations. Interpreters may judge DMs as superfluous and thus leave them out or may be prevented by translation difficulties from rendering such linguistic devices. Hale also points out that the ‘illocutionary force’ is likely to be reduced through such losses, potentially prompting a change in the interlocutor’s reaction to the utterance.

Tillmann (2009) offers an insightful discourse-analytical explanation of how a German/English interpreter deals with the transfer of ‘pragmatic’ meaning expressed by German modal particles in five passages of an asylum interview, the impact of their behaviour on role perceptions, and the consequences of interpreters’ choices on the overall interaction. In this adversarial, hierarchical and highly ritualised type of interaction, the use of modal particles, Tillmann explains, is a well-known feature of immigration officials’ questioning technique with the objective of reducing distance and improving rapport. The overall effect of the interpreter’s deletion of modal particles is thus to affect the interview’s overall objective of establishing the applicant’s story of persecution and, above all, the truth/accuracy of their assertions. The interpreter is shown to react to DMs in two ways: either omitting their illocutionary effect or, less frequently, substituting the DMs with expressions that approximate their pragmatic significance (Tillmann, 2009: 159ff).

An exception to this ‘pragmatic’ trend in the analysis of DMs in legal interpreting is represented by the reference work par excellence within the DI paradigm, i.e. Wadensjö’s (1998) Interpreting as Interaction. Like Heydon (2005; cf. 1.2.1), the author describes DMs such as well according to Fraser’s (1988, 1990, 2006) general typology of pragmatic markers, i.e. as elements which “mark topic shift and topic closure” (Wadensjö, 1998: 224).

In Fraser’s view, ‘pragmatic markers’ or discourse structuring elements (DSEs) are a morphologically mixed bag, whose functions form three major groups (cf. Fraser, 1988: 27-31):

1. ‘topic markers’ signalling topic shift or refocusing on the current topic;
2. ‘discourse activity markers’ giving meta-textual information about the ongoing discourse work such as explaining or conceding;

3. ‘message relationship markers’ that signal the relationship of the basic message being conveyed by the current utterance to some prior message.\(^3\)

Focusing on the first group, Wadensjö (1998: 225) argues that DMs such as well are “regularly efficient in monolingual conversations, but in interpreter-mediated talk they seem to be obstacles” as markers of topic shifts or attempts at topic closure.

### 2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the main issues involving police interviews highlighted by a number of scholars working in a variety of research fields. Drawing on this discussion, it is fair to say that there exists a gap in the current literature in terms of detailed analyses of the discursive patterns of monolingual and interpreted police interviews. Within legal interpreting studies, the number of publications specifically devoted to police interpreting appears to be very limited indeed.

It is likely that difficulty in gaining access to the required data is a contributing factor. However, one thing is clear: police and, more generally, legal interpreters are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, they are bound by the authorities’ Codes of Conduct, where “unrealistic institutional demands for “verbatim translation” by ‘invisible’ interpreters” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 162) are expressed. On the other hand, the micro-linguistic constraints almost never allow a rendering ‘equal’ to the original message. At the same time, the interpreter is called upon to coordinate the communication as well as enacting the process of language transferral. Lastly, the interpreter is embedded in that same network of systems and her utterance is a result of her own private and social position within the network. In Rudvin’s (2006: 35) words, the process of interpreting appears to be “constrained by the ephemerality and interconnectedness of only seemingly solid entities of language, text, speaker’s intention, culture and not least the emergence of communicative meaning through the dialogic nature of the interaction”.

\(^3\) I will discuss Fraser’s coherence-based account of pragmatic markers in 4.3.1.
In the light of the authorities’ image of the legal interpreters’ role and awareness that “while competent interpreters greatly contribute to efficient legal processes, incompetent interpreting enhances the risk of a miscarriage of justice” (Colin and Morris, 1996: viii), a number of researchers from different disciplines have taken a closer look at interpreter-mediated interactions in legal settings.

In particular, our review in 2.2.2 shows that legal interpreting research has come a long way fifteen years after Geneva Park, when it was still a rather neglected area within the field of interpreting studies. A collection of empirical works and scholarly analyses in this area are representative of some of the main lines and methods of research in PSI per se (e.g. Berg-Seligson, 1990; Barsky, 1994, 1996; Wadensjö, 1993/2002, 1998).

In methodological terms interdisciplinarity has proved particularly fruitful, with legal interpreting scholars - such as Wadensjö (1992, 1998) - mainly drawing on social science models and frameworks to describe and discuss a wealth of phenomena which have an impact on both provision and use of interpreting services. This appears to derive from the “consecutive mode” of CI (2.2), i.e. the dialogic and bi-directional model, which implies that the meaning conveyed in and by talk is partly a joint product and sense is made in and by a common activity (cf. Jacobsen, 2009: 156). Such studies also demonstrate how the DI paradigm gained momentum in the course of the 1990s and beyond, with such discourse-based empirical studies as Barsky’s (1994) Constructing a Productive Other or Straniero Sergio’s (1999) case study of an interpreted talk show, where the interpreter is seen as co-constructing the interaction by turn-taking initiatives and actively participating in meaning negotiation and topic management.

Despite Wadensjö’s caution about the cognitive bias of pragmatics-based studies on interpreter-mediated interaction, a “shift of focus, from speakers’ activities in context, to their intentions and inner states of mind” (Wadensjö, 1998: 47) has taken place within the dialogic discourse-based interaction or ‘DI Paradigm’. As a result, Wadensjö’s works on dialogue interpreting conceptualised as face-to-face interaction are now quoted alongside seminal studies on the micro-dynamics of interpreting by Berk-Seligson (1990), Mason (1999, 2000, 2001), Roy (1996, 2000), or Hale (1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2004). These include specific works on speech elements known as discourse markers, which are mainly seen as linguistic realisations of negative politeness strategies that emphasise one’s deference to the addressee, and are specifically used to hedge on the utterance’s illocutionary force (Leech, 1983; Brown
& Levinson, 1987: 130). Overall, they have been found to have a significant impact on the interaction. However, as shown by Berk-Seligson’s, Hale’s, Tillmann’s valuable socio-pragmatic contributions (2.2.3), interpreters and interpreter trainers seem to be “overwhelmingly concerned with vocabulary, very little concerned with grammar, and almost completely unaware of pragmatic aspects of speech” (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 53).

Before we explore the use of DMs in police interpreting, broader issues regarding the definition of discourse and the meaning of terminologically and communicatively accurate interpreting – and how it is achieved – need to be explored further, specifically in the complex web of language, culture, power and institution that is an interpreter-mediated police interview. In the following chapter, I will focus on Goffman’s interactionist view of communication and relate the state of the art before delimiting our field of research and focusing on Wadensjö’s dialogic approach to CI.
Chapter 2 explored how the alleged neutrality of the interpreter in institutional contexts has been brought into question by studies on dialogue analysis in institutional contexts, namely hospitals (Merlini & Favaron, 2003), courtrooms (Berk-Seligson, 1990; Morris, 1995; Fenton, 1997; Hale, 2004), and the media (Straniero Sergio, 2007). By shifting their attention from issues regarding faithfulness to the source text and translation strategies to the description and analysis of the dialogical aspects of interaction, these studies give prominence to the active role of the interpreter and his or her effective participation in the interaction.

Approaches which attempted to compensate for this imbalance by focusing on a more systematic analysis of the role of situational context and the dynamics of interactivity in face-to-face communication emerged from theoretical frameworks that had come to the fore in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, Wadensjö’s (1992, 1993/2002, 1998) prominent work draws on Goffman’s (1981) interactional sociolinguistics for a model of the role constellations in interpreter-mediated encounters and takes a descriptive discourse-analytical approach to her data. In other words, her main aim is to establish what happens when interlocutors are face-to-face or in one another’s ‘response presence’.

I will start by providing a broad overview of Goffman’s interactionist approach to human communication (3.1), and in particular his notion of participation framework (3.1.3). Then Wadensjö’s (1992, 1993/2002, 1998) influential work on dialogue interpreting based on Goffman’s theoretical framework (3.2.1) and her impact on legal interpreting scholars (3.2.2) will be analysed. Lastly, section 3.3 aims to summarise the most relevant points covered in this chapter.

3.1 Goffman’s study of social interaction

Ervin Goffman’s (1922-1982) work on interaction analysis aimed to describe how participants behave in normal, everyday interactive encounters and paved the way for a
minute descriptive analysis of the dynamics of discourse at a micro-social level. This, in turn, helped to revive the interpretive sociology, which was proposed by scholars such Simmel, Sapir, Mead, and the Chicago School of sociology and known for its ethnographic and symbolic-interactional approaches (cf. Blount, 1995; Smith, 1999, 2006).

In particular, Georg Simmel discusses in one of his essays how the number of people in groups impacts on the social interaction that takes place within them (Simmel, 1964: 118ff.). He compares a dyad and a triad. The existence of a unit of two is argued to be based on the existence of the individuals involved in it, whereas an aggregation of three people exist as a group even when one person is not present as the member of the group may feel the triad to be present and acting also in their absence. Simmel further argues that “among three elements, each one operates as an intermediary between the other two” (Simmel, 1964: 135) and the two-fold function of a mediator is to unite and to separate.

Simmel’s work had a significant impact on the intellectual climate at the University of Chicago during Goffman’s ‘apprenticeship’. In his publications, Goffman stresses the mutual impact of interactional behaviour on the individual participants belonging to a group and on the group itself, and applies this notion both to stable social gatherings and to situated encounters (e.g. police interviews), where the focus is on face-to-face interaction as a system of activity.

In the next sections, I will analyse Goffman’s description of self in social interactions (with a particular focus on the issue of role), alongside the concept of frames and the organisation of experience.

3.1.1 The notion of self and the nature of social life

Goffman’s micro-sociological analysis in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, published in 1959, provides a detailed account of process and meaning in everyday interaction. Here the author lays out the basic elements of the argument.

In micro-interactions, every person sends two signals, i.e. those they give and those they give off (Goffman, 1959: 2; cf. also Smith, 2006: 2):
The expressiveness of the individual appears to involve two radically different kinds of sign activity: the expression that he gives, and the expression that he gives off.

That which the participant *gives* is usually what we say or our verbal signs;\(^{34}\) that which we *give off* are usually the non-verbal cues, which help to situate and verify what is being said. This study is largely about understanding how these different types of expressiveness are managed, and the types of interaction elements that are important to managing and understanding these types of expressiveness. To that end, Goffman employs “dramaturgical principles” (Lemert & Branaman, 1997: lxiv) which regulate the mode of presentation employed by the actor and its meaning in the broader social context (Goffman, 1959: 240).\(^{35}\) Interaction is seen as a *performance*, shaped by environment and audience and constructed to provide others with impressions that are in line with the actor’s desired aims.

In this framework of ‘dramaturgical sociology’, social interaction is analysed in terms of how people live their lives like actors performing on a stage, and human actions depend upon time, place, and audience. The *self* is thus defined as a sense of who one is or “of what sort of person he is behind the role he is in” (Goffman, 1974: 298), a ‘dramatic’ effect emerging from the immediate scene being presented (cf. Ritzer, 2007). In other words, Goffman (1959) creates a theatrical metaphor to define the *method* in which one human being presents itself to another on the basis on cultural values, norms, and expectations.

Performances (or *presentations of self*) can have disruptions of which actors are aware; however, most run successfully. The actor’s aim is acceptance from the audience through carefully conducted performance; if the actor succeeds, then the audience will view the actor as they want to be viewed. Moreover, the interactant’s performance takes place regardless of the mental state of the individual, as a persona is often assigned to the individual in spite of their lack of faith and knowledge of the performance itself.\(^{36}\) Thus, the individual can be said to develop an identity or persona as a function of interaction with other interactants and

\(^{34}\) Here, Goffman refers to coded behaviour, i.e. the evidence we produce for what we mean, rather than the propositions we express (cf. Grice’s (1989) notion of what is said in 4.2.2).

\(^{35}\) It has been noted (cf. Mey, 1993) that by limiting his analysis to a dramaturgical study, Goffman’s symbolic interactionism situates him well in developing an understanding of micro-sociological function; however, it fails to apply the activities of the everyday world to the larger social world (i.e. larger institutions and processes).

\(^{36}\) The author provides the example of the doctor who gives a placebo to a patient, fully aware of its lack of potency, as a result of the desire of the patient for a more thorough treatment.
through an exchange of information that leads to the development of their identity and behaviour (cf. O’Driscoll, 2009).

Goffman claims that the process of establishing a social identity is intertwined with the concept of front, which is described as “that part of the individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance” (Goffman, 1959: 22). The front – otherwise known as the mask – can therefore be defined as a standardised, generalisable and transferable technique for the performer to control the manner in which the audience perceives them and for others to understand the performer on the basis of projected character traits.

Moreover, in Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical model, a distinction is drawn between the concepts of status and role. A status is similar to a part in a play, and a role serves as a script, ‘supplying’ dialogue and action for the characters. As on stage, individuals in their everyday interactions manage settings, clothing, words, and non-verbal actions to give a particular impression to others. In other words, in order to present a ‘compelling’ front the actor is required to fulfill the responsibilities deriving from their social role and to communicate the characteristics of their role to others; this process is dubbed “dramatic realization” (Goffman 1959: 30) and is founded upon the activities of impression management, i.e. the interlocutors’ strive to maintain the desired impression, or rather the control - or lack thereof - and communication of information through the performance.37 Each individual performance is described as the presentation of self and is characterised by such efforts to create specific impressions in the minds of others.

Goffman explores nature of group dynamics through a discussion of “teams” and the relationship between performance and audience. Teams are defined as groups of individuals who “cooperate” (Goffman, 1959: 79) with each other, although teams of one person are contemplated. Team members must cooperate and share the party line, attempting to achieve joint goals dictated by the group (cf. Smith, 1999, 2006). Such cooperation may therefore manifest itself as unanimity in behaviour or in the assumption of differing roles for each individual, determined by the desired intent in performance.

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37 The importance of impression management is most visible with marginalised people, whose deviance forces them into “discredited” or “discreditable” groups, according to the nature of their stigma (Goffman, 1963: 42).
A basic issue for many performances is to ensure that the audience does not get information that would discredit the team’s performance. To this effect, each actor is required to maintain their front in order to promote the team performance; this is claimed to reduce the possibility of dissent (Goffman, 1959). The individual actor is therefore under great pressure to conform to the desired front in the presence of an audience, as a deviation would destroy the credibility of the group’s performance. In other words, the team must be able to keep its secrets and have its secrets kept.

In this context, Goffman (1959: 80ff.) analyses the types of individuals who learn about a team’s secret and describes the bases and the threats of their privileged positions (however, the latter are never clear-cut). The most interesting conflicts include:

1. the informer, such as a spy or traitor, who pretends to be a member of their team, is allowed backstage, but then joins the audience to disclose information on the performance;
2. the shill, i.e. the opposite of the informer in that they act as though they were ordinary members of the audience, but are in fact members of the performing team;
3. the go-between or mediator, who acts with the permission of both sides, facilitating communication between various teams;\(^{38}\)
4. a non-person, who are present during the interaction, but in some respects do not take the role either of performer or of audience, nor do they pretend to be what they are not (e.g. waiters and the very old).

Finally, there are three basic roles in such a scheme, each centred on whom has access to what information. Roles dealing with manipulation of information and team borders (cf. (1) and (2)), roles dealing with facilitating interactions between two other teams (cf. (3)), and roles which combine what Goffman describes as \textit{front} and \textit{back region} (cf. (4)), i.e. the division between team performance and audience (Goffman, 1959: 107).

Extending the dramaturgical metaphor, the author divides regions into \textit{front stage}, \textit{backstage} and \textit{outside the stage} behaviour, according to the relationship of the audience to the performance. Firstly, as the term implies, \textit{front stage} is where the actor formally performs and adheres to conventions that have meaning for the audience. It is a part of the dramaturgical performance that is consistent and contains generalised ways to explain the situation or role

\(^{38}\) Go-betweens learn many secrets and give the impression of being on both sides, yet they may not be neutral.
the actor is playing to the audience that observes it. The actor knows he or she is being watched and acts accordingly. Goffman (1959) states that the front stage further involves a differentiation between setting and personal front, which are necessary for the actor to have a successful performance. Secondly, group members engage in back stage actions when no audience is present; thus this is where facts suppressed in the front stage or various kinds of informal actions may appear. For example, a waiter in a restaurant may perform one way in front of customers, but might act in a much more casual fashion in the kitchen. Lastly, outside (or off-stage) is where individual actors are not involved in the performance (although they may not be aware of it) and may meet the audience independently of the team performance on the front stage. Specific performances may be given and the audience segmented.

To sum up, while the ‘official stance’ of the team is visible in their front stage presentation, in the back stage “the impression fostered by the presentation is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (Goffman, 1959: 112), indicating a more ‘truthful’ type of performance. In the backstage, the conflict and difference inherent to familiarity are more fully explored, often developing into a secondary type of presentation – according to the (relative) absence of the responsibilities of the team presentation. To be outside the stage involves the inability to gain access to the performance of the team, described as an “audience segregation” in which specific performances are given to specific audiences, allowing the team to devise the front for the demands of each audience (Goffman, 1959: 137).

Though detailed, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life does not provide a comprehensive description of interactive processes. In exploring the construction of presentation amongst interactant and teams, Goffman does not fully explore the importance of ritual or ceremony in the dramaturgy or the construction of character. A reading of these complementary concepts from Goffman’s later work - including Asylum and Interaction Ritual - provides a means to expand the analysis of the interaction of everyday life into the broader experiences of human interaction.

3.1.2 Multiple-role performances

In Asylum, co-interlocutors are said to understand each other as multiple-role performers rather than as people with one single all-dominating identity (Goffman, 1961: 142). The
author further defines the notion of role as in itself consisting of three different aspects, namely normative role, typical role and role performance (Goffman, 1961: 63).

Normative role would be defined by the commonly shared ideas about a certain activity, what people in general think they are or should be doing when acting in a certain role. Instead, the notion of typical role takes into account that the conditions for performing a certain role typically fluctuate from time to time and place to place. This means that individuals develop routines to handle typical situations not foreseen by shared established norms (cf. O’Driscoll, 2009).

In any specific case, there are aspects of the individual’s behaviour which stem neither from normative nor from typical standards, but are to be explained by circumstances in the situation (e.g. other people present, light, noise, physical objects) and by the performer’s personal style while on duty. This is what Goffman identifies for exploration as the individual’s role performance.

In taking on a social role, the individual performers must see to it that they make a credible impression on the role others, i.e. the relevant audience with whom they interact in the role in question (Goffman, 1961: 85); consider, for instance, the typical role other of a doctor is a patient. The moral aspect of role – i.e. ideas about rights and wrongs – is what makes the performing individual identify and become identified as a holder of a certain role.

Role analysis is usually concerned with the range of activities in different social settings in which a certain actor is typically involved (e.g. at work meetings or holiday resorts), but it also concerns the range of activities the actor engages in within the walls of certain establishments (e.g. what nurses do at the hospital); alternatively, the study of a particular role may be limited to a particular type of situation (e.g. the role of nurse in the nursing staff conference). Roles related to such activities can be called activity roles, and they are part of what Goffman (1961) terms a situated activity system, that is “a face-to-face interaction with others for the performance of a single joint activity, a somewhat closed, self-compensating, self-terminating circuit of interdependent actions” (Goffman, 1961: 96).

An important analytical implication of role in Goffman’s definition is that the elementary unit is not the individual, but the individual acting in an obligatory fashion within a system of activity. To explore a social role he suggests that one start by distinguishing what activity is
uniquely performed by individuals acting in this role, compared to the activities performed by the role others.

A situated system of activity thus engages only a part of the individual, and what he or she does or who he or she is at other times and places is not given specific attention. The role others similarly perform other roles at other times and places not necessarily relevant at any other moment. Of basic interest is how the role-holder’s and the role other’s respective actions – differentiated and interdependent – fit together into patterns defining a situated activity system.

Norms of social behaviour are typically brought to attention when people experience them to be transgressed by someone. Garfinkel (1967) effectively demonstrated this through his ‘candid camera’ type of experiments. In a situation where one individual breaks a shared social norm, for instance ignores the order of a queue, other participants may redefine the event as a non-queue situation; alternatively, they may try to make the ‘norm breaker’ understand the established queue order. Nonetheless, transgressions of norms can also be understood as made ‘off-the-record’ and the definition of the situation remains the same without being pointed out explicitly.

The concept of role distance provides a sociological means of dealing with one type in divergence between obligation and actual role performance. In brief, it applies to the case when a conflicting discrepancy occurs between, on the one hand, the self-generated in actual social interaction, and, on the other, the self-associated with a formal status and identity. A general point about role distance, as well as any aspect of role performance, is that the individual’s display of it presupposes his or her action and the immediate audience’s reaction; i.e. mutual confirmation between co-present people. Consider, for instance, the following passage (Goffman, 1961: 105):39

By introducing an unserious style, the individual can project the claim that nothing happening at the moment to him or through him should be taken as a direct reflection of him, but rather of the person-in-situation that he is mimicking. [...] Explanation, apologies, and jokes are all ways in which the individual makes a plea for disqualifying some of the expressive features of the situation as sources of definitions of himself.

39 This is not dissimilar to the pretence approach to irony in Currie (2002, 2004).
Role distance implies that the individual, while deviating from what is regularly seen as typical performance, still acknowledges a certain performance as the *typical* one. In other words, the individual seeks to maintain, on a global level, a particular definition of the situation, while simultaneously making an effort to express the separateness between what a serious performer would do and what they are doing in a non-serious fashion, i.e. acting not as all accepting performers of the role would normally act. For instance, a professional on duty (e.g. a police officer) may occasionally address a role other (e.g. a suspect) not as a typical suspect, but, as e.g. a Londoner or as a daughter. And this may be done without being perceived as contrary to the professional norms of police officers.

Such actions can thus be termed *role distance* with regard to the occupational role. Conversely, the role other may show role distance in relation to the institutionally defined role (as suspect) and agree to establish an alliance based on shared interests, gender, age, sexual orientation, and so forth. Role distance, Goffman emphasises, “is a part (but, of course, only one part) of typical role, and this routinised sociological feature should not escape us merely because ‘role distance’ is not part of the normative framework of role” (Goffman, 1961: 115). If a certain kind of role distance is systematically utilised by professionals (such as interpreters), this can ultimately lead to a redefinition of their professional role.

To sum up, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* represents an inquiry into the nature of everyday interpersonal interaction and the institutions to which interaction mainly applies. Despite an anecdotal methodology, Goffman’s study is characterised by analytical rigour in dealing with an unexplored area of social thought. Therefore, this work provides a strong foundation for the understanding of micro-sociological phenomena – an understanding reinforced by further analysis in his other writings, particularly *Forms of Talk* (1981).

### 3.1.3 Framing experience

A second theoretical strand in Goffman’s work investigates individuals’ involvement in social interaction applying a model he terms *participation framework* (Goffman, 1981; cf. also Burns, 1992: 239ff.).

In the introduction to *Forms of Talk*, Goffman explains the notion of participation framework in the following way: “When a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in perceptual range
of the event will have some sort of participation status relative to it” (Goffman, 1981: 3). Depending on how people understand their own and others’ involvement in a particular encounter, they will adapt their way of interacting, including their ways of speaking and listening. Focusing at the level of utterances, a person’s alignment (as speaker and hearer) to a particular utterance can be referred to as his or her footing.

In Goffman’s writings, hearer is not an indivisible notion. He distinguishes first between the listening ratified and unratiﬁed recipients. Among the latter one would ﬁnd, for instance, eavesdroppers. Among the former, Goffman distinguished between the addressed, the unaddressed, and the bystander’s position in interaction. The notion of speaker, instead, is developed in a different way. Goffman analyses three modes of speaking, i.e. ways of displaying, through talk, aspects of self. The analytical set of positions a speaker may take to his utterance while speaking is referred to as production format.

Another issue discussed by Goffman (1974, 1981) – highly relevant to interpreting studies – is that of individuals’ involvement in talk (and responsibility for its substance and progression) when developing his model of participation framework. Introducing the concept of ﬁgure he examines a speaker’s means of representing himself in talk, i.e. the individual’s opportunities in interaction for involving himself and simultaneously displaying a certain self-reflection and distance from his own words. In an earlier essay, Goffman (1974) discussed ﬁgure as one of four basic terms to describe aspects of an individual’s possible engagement in ordinary talk. The others in the typology were strategist, principal, and animator (Goffman, 1974: 523). In his later modiﬁcation of this model, Goffman (1981) distinguishes more clearly between author, principal, and animator on the one hand, as aspects of self, and ﬁgure, on the other, as a speaker’s communicative means of marking a distinction between self and other.

The analysis of the different entities that can be invoked by a speaker during the interaction are mainly discussed in both “The Frame Analysis of Talk” (one of the ﬁnal chapters in Frame Analysis, 1974) and “Footing” (Goffman, 1981), and they are: (a) the author of the words being spoken; (b) the animator or entity who is actually speaking; (c) a principal or interlocutor ofﬁcially responsible for what is being said (who might, as in the case of a President and press spokesperson, be different from the animator); (d) a ﬁgure or protagonist animated by the speaker, for example a character in a story, though the speaker can animate
himself as a figure and does so when using the pronoun *I*, as stated in the following passage (Goffman, 1981: 147):

As speakers we represent ourselves through the offices of a personal pronoun, typically “I”, and it is thus a figure — a figure in a statement – that serves as the agent, a protagonist in a described scene, a “character” in an anecdote, someone, after all, who belongs to the world that is spoken about, not the world in which the speaking occurs.

The voiced person (or figure) is distanced from the currently speaking self, and, at the same time, involved in the here-and-now situation. By the act of singling out the currently speaking *I* from the others, a speaker marks both a personal involvement and a certain distance. The framing can be performed by a single speaker within a single strip of talk; it is therefore “dialogic” in the Bakhtinian sense (Bakhtin, 1979/1986), rather than dialogue in the conversational sense of a state of talk sustained through the collaborative action of various participants.\(^{40}\)

In this section, I have presented Erving Goffman’s social interactionism, which is to be situated in the linguistic turn of the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly, we have looked at his notion of self and the nature of social life. Choosing a microanalysis as a method of study, Goffman explored the ways in which the situatedness of the speech contributes to the form and meaning of utterances, and the procedures adopted by human beings in their everyday, face-to-face interactions. In particular, I have explored the concept of *discrepant role*, i.e. Goffman’s definition of mediator. Goffman’s concepts of social role are analysed. In his model, what is expressed in official rules, codes and ideas of conduct (*normative role*) is contrasted against how people actually perform while enacting a certain role (*typical role*; cf. Goffman, 1961). *Normative role* is used to define the difference between good and bad performance (for instance, between good and bad interpreting; cf. Wadensjö, 1998: 83); *typical role*, instead, is used to define the limits of a certain role, for instance between ‘interpreter’ and ‘not interpreter’.

Secondly, I have outlined Goffman’s model of *participation framework* (Goffman, 1981) and its dialogical relations in spoken interaction. The main idea is that the organisation of spoken

\(^{40}\) Indeed, Goffman’s account of the different entities was influenced by the work of Volosinov (1973) on reported speech.
interaction ultimately results from participants’ continuous evaluations and re-evaluations of speaker-hearers’ roles or “status of participation”, at the turn-by-turn-level. In particular, his analysis distinguishes different kinds of participant roles to hearers (the participation framework: addressee, overhearer or eavesdropper) and to speakers (the production format: animator, author or principal). The substance and the progression of interaction, and subsequently individuals’ “role performance”, depend on how interlocutors relate to one another at an utterance-to-utterance level, through potentially changing alignments in the ongoing flow of discourse. In particular, these footings can be indicated by the use of cues and markers (i.e. DMs).

Such notions derived from Goffman’s work have had a significant impact on sociological and linguistic studies alike. Firstly, Goffman’s influence is evident in Sack’s (1973/1987, 1989; cf. also Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) empirical data-driven studies of the mechanisms of talk-in-interaction, where he adopts the key ideas of ethnomethodology, i.e. he becomes mainly concerned with the means and methods used by participants in an interaction to create and act within their own social environment. That is why he argued against the common belief that social norms and roles are “statically and objectively given, prior to and independent of the interactants’ verbal (and accompanying non-verbal) behaviour, in which they are merely reflected” (Bublitz, 2006: 891). In contrast, Sack created the conversation analysis (CA) approach as he was convinced that social order is incessantly achieved within social encounters by the participants’ skilful use of language. His aim was to record systematically recurrent patterns of methods and means that participants use jointly and routinely to negotiate social order. Sack’s key notions include turn-taking organisation, topic organisation, opening and closing procedures, self-correction and repair mechanisms, and finally the sequential organisation of conversation with ‘adjacent pair’ as its core concept (cf., for instance, 1.2.1 and 2.2.2).

Goffman’s work has influenced Brown & Levinson’s (1978, 1987) theory of politeness, which examines the ways in which speakers and hearers use conversational implicature to

41 It should be highlighted that although Goffman corroborated the connection between discourse analysis and CA through notions such as footing and frame, his views diverged from CA scholars’ on several issues (cf. Scheff, 2006). In particular, whereas CA uses turn-taking organisation and adjacent pairs to analyse interaction, Goffman created the notion of face as an account for action as well as the motivating basis for interactional organisation. Furthermore, Goffman believes that interaction relies on presuppositions, while CA claims that conversation relies only on the turn-taking system.

71
fulfil the ‘face wants’ of higher-status interlocutors. Such an approach is based on Goffman’s notion of face, which is described as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61) and roughly corresponds to the interlocutors’ self-esteem. Since this notion is seen as universal in any human society, conversational participants will try and preserve their own face and the other interlocutors’ face in a face-to-face interaction. In particular, negative politeness orients to maintaining the negative face of the other through the use of speech strategies that emphasise one’s defence to the hearer; amongst these are the use of conventional indirectness, polite markers and hedges on illocutionary force (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 130; cf. also 2.2.2 for applications in interpreting studies, e.g. by Berk-Seligson and Krouglov).

In the next section, we shall provide an overview of interdisciplinary applications of Goffman’s work in the field of interpreting. In particular, we will look at Wadensjö’s interactional account of face-to-face interactions in more detail (3.2.1) and her influence in the field of legal interpreting (3.2.2).

### 3.2 Applications of Goffman to interpreting studies

As mentioned in chapter 2, Wadensjö’s seminal work (1992, 1993/2002, 1998) is considered to be “the most comprehensive description to date of interpreter behaviour in public service encounters” (Mason, 2006b: 104). Her full-length study on Russian-Swedish interpreter-mediated police and medical interviews (Interpreting as Interaction) draws on Goffman’s sociological theory and suggests that we can understand the task of interpreting much better if we alter our perspective to account for the interactivity of the primary participants, rather than looking only at the interpreter and/or the interpreted message.

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42 Brown and Levinson’s theory is mainly influenced by Goffman’s approach, however they also claim that “Grice’s theory of conversational implicature and the frame work of maxims that give rise to such implicatures is essentially correct” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 3).

43 As shown in 1.2.2, forensic linguistic studies in monolingual contexts have also adopted Goffman’s framework to illustrate both productive and counterproductive police interview strategies and the implications for interview training, notably Heydon’s (2005) study on thirteen interviews with suspects in Australia.
3.2.1 Wadensjö’s work on dialogue interpreting

Wadensjö’s (1992, 1998) empirical study of interaction mediated by state-certified Russian-Swedish dialogue interpreters explores the dialogic nature of this form of communication, as opposed to the monologic, unidirectional nature of conference interpreting. She draws on Bakhtin’s (1979/1986) view of language and mind to understand how dialogue interpreters contribute to the creation of a relationship between primary parties in a triadic interaction. In particular, the author (1998: 42) states that interpreters:

understand themselves not only to be translating between two languages, but also to be performing on others’ behalf various activities, such as persuading, agreeing, lying, questioning, claiming, explaining, comforting, accusing, denying, coordinating interaction, and so forth.

This “communicative pas de trois” (Wadensjö, 1998: 12) is argued to involve an interpreter as a third party in a communication between participants who do not share the same language or power and come from different socio-cultural backgrounds. Socio-cultural differences also qualify these exchanges as instances of intercultural or cross-cultural communication. Indeed, the author (1998: 75) states that, in face-to-face interaction, “interpreters cannot avoid functioning as intercultural mediators through their translation activity”, ready to intervene to avoid cross-cultural miscommunication.

Naturally, contextual constraints on interpreted triadic transactions and their dialogic interactivity have significant consequences for the role, positioning and overall performance of the interpreter. In particular, Wadensjö’s (1992, 1998) analysis has shown that the police interpreter’s task goes beyond translating others’ talk; rather, the translating and coordinating activities are not mutually exclusive, but simultaneously present. Through both activities, police interpreters contribute to establishing a conversational order while furthering interpersonal relationships amongst interactants, minimizing misunderstandings, and enhancing participation.

As the author explains, these “two aspects of interpreting (…) are in practice inseparable, but it is possible and indeed fruitful theoretically to distinguish between them, and use them as analytical concepts” (Wadensjö, 1998: 106). Therefore, Wadensjö identifies a taxonomy aimed at examining an interpreter’s coordinating function, drawn from Goffman’s (1981:
227) behavioural model for speakers in interaction called “participation framework” (cf. 3.1.3).

Applying this framework to her analysis, Wadensjö shows that footing shifts (corresponding to a shift of pronoun and address) are common in interpreted events, identifying the various production and reception roles that participants can adopt and how these fundamentally affect what is communicated and how it is communicated (Wadensjö, 1992: 117-125). A dialogue interpreter’s ability to simultaneously keep in mind production and reception formats - and keep them separate – is said to be “one of her most essential skills” (Wadensjö, 1995: 127). In particular, the triple production format can be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Interpreter as animator</td>
<td>responsible only for the production of speech sounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Interpreter as author</td>
<td>responsible for formulating the utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Interpreter as principal</td>
<td>responsible for the meaning expressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Wadensjö’s triple production format.

The role which is either explicitly stated in or inferred from Interpreters’ Codes of Practice would be that of animator, while the role of modifying the primary speaker’s utterance would be that of an author. When interpreters step out of their animator role altogether and speak on behalf of themselves, they assume the role of a principal, which typically occurs when a need arises to coordinate the discourse in order to ensure effective communication or to avoid miscommunication (e.g. Angelelli, 2004; Angermeyer, 2005; Wadensjö, 1998). Wadensjö adds that, as a rule, when an interpreter assumes the role of a principal, the other participants readily acknowledge that the interpreter takes personal “ownership” of these words (2008: 189).

However, at various stages of the speech event, an interpreter may adopt all of the identified production roles, not just as a result of a free choice, but as a reaction to the principal
participants’ assumptions about his or her ‘appropriate’ role (Wadensjö, 1997). Primary participants may choose to address each other directly, almost as if no other interactant were present. On the other hand, they may address their utterances directly to the interpreter, thus signalling a wish for the interpreter to act as ‘mediator’.

Correspondingly, Wadensjö (1998: 91ff) expanded on this model and developed an analogous taxonomy of *reception formats* for hearers in interaction, i.e. a threefold distinction in terms of listenership which has shown that the interpreter can behave as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. reporter</td>
<td>expected only to repeat what has been uttered (corresponds to animator)</td>
<td>Ex. (relaying an injunction from the interviewer: ‘State your date of birth, please’) “State your date of birth, please.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. recapitulator</td>
<td>expected to give an authorised voice to a prior speaker (corresponds to author)</td>
<td>Ex. (relaying a request from the interviewer: ‘Ask him to state his date of birth, please’) “Please state your date of birth.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| c. responder | addressed so as to make his or her own contribution to discourse (corresponds to author and principal) | Ex. (to a suspect who has addressed them directly) “Please address your remarks to the officer, not to me”.

*Table 4. Wadensjö’s taxonomy of reception formats for hearers.*

While the interpreter’s ‘normative’ roles are that of animator and reporter, Wadensjö stresses not only that interlocutors are multi-role performers, but also that speakership and listenership roles are taken up simultaneously. Further, listening may include overt verbal activity (or *back-channelling*). In this way, the author defines Goffman’s (1981) central notion of *footing* within the participatory framework as a “person’s alignment (as speaker *and* hearer) to a particular utterance” (Wadensjö, 1998: 87). This model provides a thorough account of dynamic shifts in the speaker-hearer roles at an utterance level, helping to reconstruct the organisation of interpreted interaction “through potentially changing alignments in the
ongoing flow of discourse” (Wadensjö, 1998: 86). For instance, a change from animator to author or principal occurs when the interpreter provides a direct response and thus aligns herself as responder (1998: 164ff). This shift might be dictated by the interpreter’s willingness to save the primary party’s face by carrying out ‘remedial work’, i.e. accepting responsibility for a misunderstanding which was not her fault.

Lastly, Wadensjö (1998: 107-8) provides a useful taxonomy of a number of discoursal strategies indicating how interpreters reformulate the original text. She defines the interpreter’s utterances as “renditions” that relate in some way to the immediately proceeding utterance, and identifies the ‘subcategories’ shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Close renditions</td>
<td>Explicitly expressed propositional content equally found in the original utterance, in full accordance with the normative role. (However, they can differ in textual and interactional aspects according to the target language.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expanded renditions</td>
<td>More explicitly expressed propositional content than the original utterance (corresponding to the notion of addition).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reduced renditions</td>
<td>Less explicitly expressed propositional content than the original utterance (similar to the notion of omission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Substituted renditions</td>
<td>A combination of ‘expanded’ and ‘reduced’ renditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Summarized renditions</td>
<td>An utterance that corresponds to two or more original utterances, voiced by either the same or different speakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Two-part/multi-part renditions</td>
<td>Two utterances that correspond to one original utterance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Non-renditions</td>
<td>An utterance that does not correspond (as translation) to an original utterance. Defined according to different ways of coordinating:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Wadensjö points out, the dynamics of the interaction are also subject to negotiation not only by means of linguistic cues, but also through paralinguistic features such as gaze, posture, and gesture (Lang, 1978). For further discussion, see Davitti (2012).
a. Explicit: e.g. requests for clarification, initiatives to influence the direction of the talk, or meta-comments explaining a primary party’s intention;
b. Implicit: e.g. unprompted repetition after an interruption.

8. Zero renditions
The original utterances are left untranslated.


These “renditions” comprise eight subcategories, the last four of which relate to original utterances in other than a one-to-one correlation and show how a rendition can sometimes be close to prior talk, sometimes summarise the original utterance, and sometimes be completely detached from the original.

As we have seen, Wadensjö’s analysis has had a major impact on our understanding of the interpreter’s status and role within a mediated event, concluding that interpreters never function merely as “translation machines” (Wadensjö, 1998, p. 72). Echoing Bakhtin’s (1981) view of language as dialogic, the author’s descriptive study has put forward a dialogic model of interpreting. This posits that participants co-construct the text, as opposed to the monologic view which sees it as a one-way transfer of the speaker’s intentions, with the interpreter as an uninvolved conduit (cf. distinction between “talk as text” and “talk as activity” discussed). Wadensjö (1998) also suggests that the interpreter has two equally important roles, that of translating, and that of coordinating. Thus, “shifts of footing, distribution of responsibility, role expectations, the choice between representing or re-enacting others’ talk, attending to miscommunications” (Mason, 2006b: 104-5) are shown to be everyday features of legal interpreting as an activity.

3.2.2 Wadensjö’s influence on police interpreting research

In the context of interpreted police interviews, a number of scholars have adopted Wadensjö’s (1998) model as a useful analytical tool to explore the nature of the interpretation by looking
at the appropriateness of particular renditions and the interpreter’s shifts in footing, in particular when the interview is run by bilingual police officers.

In her 2009 book, Berk-Seligson builds on this earlier work to carry out her thorough discourse analysis of data from four separate cases of police interrogations of Spanish-speaking suspects in the United States, all of which were conducted not through a professional interpreter, but through bilingual police officers who acted both as interpreters and interviewers. In two cases, the officers were Spanish native speakers, whereas in the other two, the police officers were English native speakers with limited proficiency in Spanish.

Chapter three analyses an interview conducted with an 18-year old Mexican man accused of murder and attempted rape, focusing on the bilingual officer’s frequent change of footing from his role of interpreter to that of interrogator. She notes the police officer’s tendency to “become an active participant in helping the designed interrogator coerce a confession from the suspect” (Berk-Seligson, 2009: 63). In particular, the officer responds to the detainee’s utterances in Spanish rather than to translate them into English, and often uses first person plural (i.e. diganos “tell us”) when translating first person singular (tell me). The author views these footing shifts as a mechanism of coercion, arguing that they enable the officer to place himself in an advocacy footing with respect to the detainee while ignoring his requests for counsel. Berk-Seligson (2009: 64) thus concludes that:

\[
\text{to play the role of interpreter when on really considers him/herself to be in police detective footing, is one way of subverting the Miranda rights.}^{45}\]

It is a way of seducing a suspect into talking. To be a bilingual police officer assigned the role of interpreter (…) is to give oneself a great advantage as a detective, and that is the enhanced ability to manipulate the detainee.

Nakane (2007, 2008, 2009) demonstrates the relevance of Wadensjö’s interdisciplinary approach to addressing problems in interviews held in Australia, in which the suspects’ rights are communicated to them through Japanese-English interpreters. In particular, in her 2007 article she found that even professional accreditation could deal with challenges presented by interpreting the caution, including the following:

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45 The Miranda warning (also referred to as Miranda rights) is administered by the US police officers to criminal suspects in police custody before they are interrogated in order to preserve the admissibility of their statements against them in criminal proceedings.
- The police officers made arbitrary decisions about turn boundaries, leading to omissions in the interpreter’s renditions;
- The police officers showed no awareness that the transposition of a written text such as a caution into interpreted dialogic speech may prove to be difficult;
- The police officers (and interpreters) underestimated the importance of comprehension checks; and
- The police officers considered the cautions as ‘rituals’ rather than ‘real’ communication.

As a result, some of the suspects failed to understand that they were under arrest and thought that their situation was less serious than it actually was, thus failing to seek legal assistance from their embassy.

In 2008 Nakane published a paper on the role of gender and politeness in mediated police interviews involving seven English-Japanese interpreters, four female and three male. Drawing once again on Wadensjö’s (1998) framework, this study explores the complexity of relationships among politeness markers, gender and the interpreter’s role in the translation of the police officer’s utterances into Japanese. The paper suggests that honorifics are gender-linked “to the extent that Japanese women in professional jobs may mark their femininity, status as professionals, high level of education and sophistication through the use of honorifics” (Nakane, 2008: 38).

Lastly, Nakane’s 2009 article explores the issue of police interpreter’s role as an ‘invisible’ mediator through an examination of interactional ‘repairs’ – one of the key aspects of interaction management mechanisms in the tradition of CA – in the abovementioned context of Australian Federal Police interviews mediated by Japanese-English interpreters. While some repair sequences in interpreter-mediated police interviews follow common patterns of monolingual police interviews, there seem to be features of repairs specific to interpreter-mediated discourse. However, Nakane (2009: 2ff.) states that, due to the interpreting of each turn, it is not always possible to ascertain whether it is the primary speaker’s turn or the interpreted version that is the source of ‘trouble’ leading to an interactional repair. Further, the paper demonstrates interpreters’ vulnerability to being identified as ‘troublemakers’ in repair sequences and consequential face-saving strategies. These strategies include modifying the primary speaker’s utterances or providing explanations as to why a need to repair is perceived or why a repair sequence fails to rectify a problem. It is also demonstrated that in engaging in
these types of problem solving activities, interpreters at times shift roles, pushing the boundaries of their professional ethics. The paper argues that, while interpreters are often viewed as operating within a third ‘invisible’ space between interlocutors, this invisibility needs to be questioned. It is thus suggested that the expectation of a neutral, ‘third’ space is unrealistic, and that police interpreters as cultural and linguistic mediators - and social beings - continuously negotiate their identity with their clients while interpreting.

**3.3 Conclusion**

Interpreting scholars have come a long way to challenge the mostly unsubstantiated view on police interpreters’ role and experience expressed by scholars such as Shepherd, who claims that “it is certainly the case that many interpreters on their own initiative take on the role of intermediary, and in doing so may make the task of managing the interview very much more difficult” (Shepherd, 2007: 172; cf. also 1.3). The interviewer’s task is seen as that of “briefing and managing the interpreting process in the interview” (Shepherd, 2007: 173; my emphasis) and even gauging the experience the individual interpreter has had in the interpreting task.

By highlighting the linguistic, socio-cultural and interactional pattern of complexity in the actual role behaviour, dialogue (and, in particular, police) interpreting research inspired by Goffman’s (1974, 1981) analytical frameworks about the nature of social organisation and the dialogic theory of language and interaction challenge the notion of literal renditions, seeking to understand to what degree and with what consequences liaison interpreters are visible and active participants.

As highlighted in 3.1, Goffman significantly contributed to sociology and linguistics alike by analysing forms of talk and developing notions such as self, face, footing, and frame. His studies are mainly characterised by the interaction of concrete data and theoretical development and by the use of the metaphorical concepts of theatre and stage management to highlight the manipulative and moral aspects of social life. The most ‘borrowed’ notion from Goffman’s work is arguably that of footing, defined as the “alignment of an individual to a particular utterance, whether involving a production format, as in the case of a speaker, or solely a participation status, as in the case of a hearer” (Goffman, 1981: 227). Primary
participants adopt different roles and attitudes with regard to each other and to the utterance itself. Furthermore, Goffman (1981: 227) states that primary participants constantly shift footing and that such shifts are “a persistent feature of natural talk”.

Applying this framework to her analysis, Wadensjö’s (1992, 1998) seminal work shows that footing shifts (corresponding to a shift of pronoun and address) are common in interpreted events. She further identifies the various production and reception roles that participants can adopt and shows how these fundamentally affect what is communicated and how it is communicated (Wadensjö, 1992: 117-125). She then proceeds to show that, at various stages of the speech event, an interpreter may adopt all of the identified reception roles, not just as a result of a free choice, but as a reaction to the principal participants’ assumptions about her ‘appropriate’ role (Wadensjö, 1992: 127-134).

In particular, Wadensjö and others (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 2009; Nakane, 2007, 2008, 2009) have shown that the interpreter working in a mediated police interview often ceases to be the ‘animator’, i.e., responsible only for the production of speech sounds, and takes on a role of ‘author’, i.e. the interpreter modifies the source utterance during the rendition, becoming partly responsible for the message (Wadensjö, 1998: 82ff). Furthermore, the interpreter has been shown to become a ‘principal’, showing commitment to and ownership of what is expressed. Thus, the police interpreter plays an important role as a coordinator of others’ talk by virtue of the footing she adopts, a role, Wadensjö (1998: 145) argues, which is “intimately interdependent” with the role as translator. Ultimately, these shifts seem to create a “communicative pas de trois” (Wadensjö, 1998: 12), an interaction among three principals, and not ‘two principals plus robot’.

To summarise, Goffman’s framework of social interaction has been shown to provide a deeper, more complex understanding of the nature of rights and responsibilities within an interpreter-mediated encounter. The common assumption that interpreting is only limited to translating the ‘text’ has been irrevocably challenged: the interpreter is the sole participant in a position to interact directly with all of the interlocutors, therefore he or she might fulfil a crucial role as speech organiser and coordinator. Within the “dialogic discourse-based interaction paradigm” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 79), sociolinguistic analyses thus indicate that the role of interpreters is not as neutral as much of the early literature has either assumed or prescribed (cf. also 2.2.2). The “decisive shift away from prescriptivism” (Mason, 2000: 220) towards descriptive studies in sociological aspects of dialogue and, in particular, legal
interpreting has had profound consequences for interpreter training, accreditation and professionalisation, widening the gap between institutional constraints and the reality of the interpreter-mediated communication, and bringing the interpreter more into focus.

However, legal interpreting research is still “in its infancy” (Hale, 2006: 225), and much remains to be learnt. Methodologies need to be refined, whereas data corpora need to be expanded in terms of size and language combinations. As stated in 3.2, this is true for IAP encounters, which have not received much attention from CI studies as compared to other public service settings. And, within the context of police interpreting, this is particularly true for DMs. In order to analyse these pragmatic elements of speech, a linguistic approach can be seen as particularly fruitful as it “incorporate(s) into our notion of context, in addition to a ‘broad’, framing context of situational and ethnographic information, a ‘narrow’ local element whereby user assumptions are negotiated and re-negotiated continuously” (Mason, 2006a: 366).
We have come a long way since the 1990s when the image of the community interpreter as a “necessary evil” (Herbert, 1952: 4) prevailed. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the sub-discipline of community interpreting in interpreting studies has developed into an applied science in its own right, nourished by the methodological streams of various scientific disciplines. In particular, research inspired by sociology has shown that interpreter-mediated police interviews imply their own conditions and organisational rules, which are ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ for this kind of talk. Within a dialogical theoretical frame, “the meaning of what is said is settled in and by interaction between individuals” (Wadensjö, 1998: 279; my emphasis). In such an ever-changing institutional context, is this the only explanation that can be - and has been - given for utterance comprehension and the way utterances and the participants’ contextual assumptions influence each other in the joint construction of meaning? And what role do DMs play in utterance comprehension?

In an attempt to answer such question, we must first analyse the broader issues concerning the definition of discourse. This chapter begins with a brief introduction to text-analytical theories based on the following assumptions: firstly, a text cannot simply consist of a set of grammatical sentences; and, secondly, the identification of the connections between its segments is a prerequisite for understanding it. Within this framework, discourse connectives or markers are defined in terms of their role in ‘marking’ the hierarchical relationships that exist between the segments of text or discourse. However, section 4.1.2 shows that coherence relations are neither necessary nor sufficient for the well-formedness of a text. As a number of authors (e.g. Blakemore, 2002; Wilson, 1996) working within Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance-theoretic approach to communication have demonstrated, the recognition of coherence relations is not necessary for utterance comprehension. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the cognitive approach to communication taken by RT and draws attention to two aspects of the theory, i.e. the distinction between explicit and implicit content (4.2.2) and the relationship between thoughts and utterances (4.2.3). Lastly, in section 4.3 I
shall discuss the definition of DMs based on the relevance-theoretic notion of procedural encoding developed by Blakemore (1987, 2002). Further, taking the relevance-theoretic account of free indirect thought (hereafter FIT) representations in fiction (Blakemore, 2010, 2011) as a starting point, the notion of (police) interpreting as ‘interlingual interpretive use’ (Gutt, 1991/2000; Setton, 1998, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) is challenged (4.3.2). The result is an account in which interpreting might be perceived to be an ‘unmediated’ representation of a speaker’s thoughts and in which speaker-oriented expressions (such as DMs, as shown in 4.3.3) can be said to contribute to the illusion of ‘absence of mediation’ by encoding constraints on the Interpretation of utterances which represent the speaker’s thought.

4.1 Text linguistics and discourse

Since its beginnings at the Critical Link conference in Canada, the community-based domain of interpreting studies (and, in particular, legal interpreting) has come into closer contact with the mainstream conference interpreting research community, leading towards a growing integration of interpreting studies as a discipline. However, its analytical momentum has not been generated from within the discipline’s existing paradigms, but rather scholars have looked at other theoretical frameworks for relevant models and methods. As underlined in 2.2.2, an obvious source of inspiration for liaison interpreting studies has been linguistics, and in particular text linguistics.

In the 1970s, an interdisciplinary framework labelled cognitive science emerged from the collaboration of academics in such field as varied as linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence and philosophy. Cognitive scientists focused their work on natural language processing and this had a significant influence on text linguistics, and in particular on the work of Robert-Alain de Beaugrande, one of the leading figures of the European tradition in this discipline (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981).

This branch of linguistics sees texts as communication systems and was originally aimed at describing text grammars. However, the application of text linguistics has evolved from this

46 The school of ordinary language philosophy, whose focus was on natural language rather than formal languages studied by the logicians, flourished mainly at Oxford in the 1950s and 1960s under the leadership of J. L. Austin. He developed the theory of speech acts that had a great impact on interpreting studies, as mentioned in 2.2.2.
approach to a point in which text is viewed in much broader terms that go beyond a mere extension of traditional grammar towards an entire text.

4.1.1 Textual well-formedness

Harris (1951) and Longacre (1979) posit that discourse has a “grammatical structure (…) partially expressed in the hierarchical breakdown of discourse into constituent embedded discourses and paragraphs and in the breakdown of paragraphs into constituent embedded paragraphs and sentences” (Longacre, 1979: 115). This structuralist view is based on the assumption that a text cannot simply be made up of a set of grammatical sentences. Consider the following two utterances:

(1) My partner bakes bread at least twice a week using sourdough, which is one of two principal means of biological leavening in bread baking, along with the use of cultivated forms of yeast.

(2) My partner bakes regularly. Miss Lawson is a famous baker and food writer. A particular genre of writing is philosophical writing. Free thought is a philosophical viewpoint, according to which opinions should not be influenced by any exclusive maître à penser. The latter comes from French, known as the language of love.

While we intuitively think that example (1) represents an acceptable text, example (2) may be seen as a collection of unrelated sentences (cf. Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Salkie, 1995).

Most text linguists would agree that text is the natural domain of language, but they still differ in their perspectives of what constitutes and defines a text and its well-formedness; this variance is mainly due to the different methods of observations. Thus, according to Harris (1951), Hovy (1990), Hovy & Maier (1994), Longacre (1979), and Salkie (1995), discourse can be seen as a structural unit and studied by analogy with the sentence. According to this view, discourse analysis is therefore the study of structural properties of discourse; or, in other words, “text and discourse analysis is about how sentences combine to form texts” (Salkie, 1995: 32). If text is treated as a collection of sentences, then its well-formedness can be judged in the same way as we judge that of a sentence.

Given this conception of discourse - understood by analogy to syntactic (and therefore hierarchical) structure - it is not surprising to find that discourse ‘markers’ (or ‘connectives’)
are defined in terms of their role in ‘marking’ these hierarchical relationships that exist between the segments of text or discourse, and the core of these approaches lies in the classifications of such relations, which vary considerably from author to author.  

The view that discourse connectives encode structural relations between text segments is inspired by one of the most influential works on linguistic aspects of discourse, i.e. Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) *Cohesion in English*. Their book is based on the definition of text as a “unit of language in use” (1976: 2; my emphasis). According to this approach, a text is therefore a naturally occurring manifestation of language or “a set of mutually relevant communicative functions, structured in such a way as to achieve an overall rhetorical purpose” (Hatim & Mason, 1990: 32).

However, a number of scholars in text linguistics argue that Halliday & Hasan’s approach to cohesion is not an adequate definition of text and discourse analysis. In particular, one of the most influential claims in both psycholinguistics and computational literature studies - which was developed in response to Halliday & Hasan’s approach - is that textual well-formedness is to be accounted for in terms of *coherence*.

According to most proponents of this approach (e.g. Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981; Knott, 1996; Mann & Thompson, 1987, 1988), discourse is acceptable only if it characterised by set of (binary) *coherence relations* that hold between successive utterances in a discourse or between propositions expressed by text segments, e.g. elaboration, cause-consequence, temporal sequence, and so on. Consider, for example, the following utterance divided into segment (a) and (b):

(3) (a) I was told that I could go to Japan with them. (b) I was really happy.

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47 The actual number of so-called ‘discourse markers’ is still a matter of controversy. For instance, whether *you know* and *I mean* qualify is a moot point: according to Fraser (1999) they do not qualify because they fail to signify how the current discourse is linked to the preceding discourse, however even this criterion is not commonly accepted. We will address the question of whether they comprise a legitimate category (Blakemore, 2002; Schourup, 1999) in section 4.3.1.

48 There are other approaches to coherence, most notably: Reinhart (1980), Givón (1983), Sidner (1983), and Giora (1996a, 1996b)’s approach, according to which *coherence* is defined in terms of the way that the propositions expressed by each text segment are related to a topic; and Samet & Schank (1984)’s theory, according to which *local coherence* must be defined in terms of coherence relations, whereas *global coherence* must be analysed in terms of stereotypic scripts and goals.
According to Mann & Thompson, the hearer will understand the utterance only if he assumes that there is a coherence relation between the two segments. In this case, the hearer will identify a causal relation: there is a causal chain linking the state of affairs or event represented in (3a) to the one represented in (3b). This analysis is based on the assumption that both speaker and hearer of (3) have a set of coherence relations and the speaker must choose one of them in order to produce an ‘acceptable’ text.

An example can be found in Hobbs (1979: 78):

(4) John can open Bill’s safe. He knows the combination.

The intended referent of the pronoun he is ambiguous, i.e. it could either be Bill or John. According to the author, the reference assignment of the pronoun he is a consequence of the search for coherence. Thus, we firstly recognise an elaboration (or explanation) relation based on our previous knowledge and, secondly, we identify the intended referent (John). The hearer is allowed to interpret the utterance ‘correctly’ thanks to textual coherence. In this regard, Mann & Thompson (1987, 1988) are even more explicit by claiming that the speaker of the sequence intentionally communicates a relational proposition which expresses a particular structural relation.49

To sum up, a number of theorists posit that utterance Interpretation is about deriving assumptions about relationships in the discourse and that DMs encode these connections. We will now turn to the assumption which underlies these approaches, i.e. that acceptability and coherence go hand in hand.

4.1.2 Coherence and discourse acceptability

Blakemore (2001: 102) notes that “the success of a theory based on the assumption that the acceptability of discourse depends on coherence relations must be based on a complete taxonomy of coherence relations”. However, she also notes that there is no agreement as to what the set of coherence relations is. For instance, Hovy & Maier (1994) subclassify relations into 70 different types, whereas Mann & Thompson (1987) mention 15 relations.

49 See also Hobbs (1979) and Asher & Lascarides (1995).
(e.g. motivation, reason, sequence, enablement, elaboration, and restatement), and Sanders, Spooren, & Noordman (1993) only four. Scholars further disagree over the definition of relations. For instance, the relation of elaboration is included in all accounts; however, there is no agreement as to its definition.

Apart from this issue, these approaches cannot be a basis for an account for textual well-formedness for two main reasons: their recognition is neither sufficient nor necessary. Firstly, the recognition of coherence relations is not sufficient as it is possible to construct texts which are “unacceptable even though they satisfy formal coherence relations” (Blakemore, 2001: 102). Consider, for instance, the following utterance:

(5) (a) My partner is passionate about baking. (b) He plays the cello beautifully.

Segment (5b) is meant to be an elaboration of segment (5a); however, it would be quite difficult to find a context whereby utterance (5) is acceptable as a ‘text’ according to a coherence perspective. Similarly, utterance (6) taken from Hobbs (1979, as mentioned in Blakemore 2001: 10) would be analysed as an elaboration:

(6) Go down Washington Street. Just follow Washington Street three blocks to Adams Street.

However, as Blass’ (1990) counter-example shows, not every utterance described as an elaboration may be analysed as appropriate:

(7) Go down Washington Street. Just pick up your left foot, place it down in front of your right foot, transfer your weight from right to left foot...

The same applies to restatement relations such as the following utterance from Blakemore (2001: 103), uttered after seeing a mouse on the bedroom floor:

(8) There’s a mouse, a small grey furry rodent.
In Mann & Thompson’s (1988) view, the effect of a restatement is simply that the hearer recognises that a restatement is being made. However this is not an adequate account in order to identify acceptable and unacceptable statements or distinguish the effects of a restatement derived from sequence (9) from those derived from sequence (10):

(9) (a) At the beginning of this piece there is an example of an anacrusis. (b) That is, it begins with an unaccented note which is not part of the first full bar. (Blakemore, 2001: 111)

(10) (a) A well-groomed car reflects its owner. (b) The car you drive says a lot about you. (Noel, 1986: 69, quoted in Mann & Thompson, 1987: 71)

These examples show that an explanatory account as to what renders certain coherence relations appropriate is required. This, in turn, suggests that there is a much more fundamental element to communication than coherence.

Secondly, the recognition of binary coherence relations in communication has been shown not to be necessary. As Blakemore (1987) and Blass (1990) have highlighted, verbal communication is full of ‘acceptable’ utterances which cannot be understood in isolation from the context, but which cannot be said to be part of a coherent text:

(11) [Someone comes in with loads of parcels]
So you’ve spent all your money.

In example (11), taken from Blakemore (1987: 86), the speaker uses the discourse connective so discourse initially. As mentioned before, discourse connectives are examined by coherence theorists as indicators of or explicit guide to a range of coherence relations. However in example (11) there is no preceding text to which the discourse connective is linked; nonetheless, the hearer sees the utterance as acceptable and is able to Interpret it as a conclusion drawn from what she previously saw.

Knott & Dale (1994: 48) state that utterances such as (11) are to be “interpreted as a reaction to a previously existing propositional attitude (…) and this is arguably a kind of discourse context”. Therefore, one may continue to claim that discourse connective so - as used in (11) - encodes coherence relationships if one sees the utterance and its context as elements of a
discourse sequence.\(^{50}\) As Blakemore (1987, 1998) underlines, Knott & Dale (1994)’s account does not provide a satisfactory answer as to why apparently closely related DMs are not equally acceptable in non-linguistic contexts.\(^{51}\)

Example (12) is taken from Blakemore (1992: 5) and represents a sign seen in the London underground station:

(12) Dogs must be carried.

The interpretation of this sign as an indication to passengers with dogs always to carry their pet – rather than a direction to all passengers to carry a dog – depends on the passenger’s ability to access the appropriate contextual assumptions.

Coherence theorists do acknowledge the role of context, but for them, it is restricted to the identification of coherence relations. However, if the identification of coherence relations were necessary for comprehension, then it would seem to follow that only coherent discourses are comprehensible, i.e. we would not be able to understand an utterance without first having identified the coherence relation that connects it to the preceding text. However, this is obviously not the case.\(^{52}\)

In this section, we have seen that scholars like Hobbs (1979), Mann & Thompson (1987, 1988), Asher & Lascarides (1995) and Knott (1996) maintain that textual well-formedness lies in “computable” (Hobbs, 1979: 78) coherence relations between its segments or, in other words, that a discourse is acceptable to the extent that it exhibits such relations. Within this framework, understanding is seen as a consequence for the search for coherence. However we

\(^{50}\) For instance, utterance (11) may be treated as if it were part of the following discourse sequence: “You are carrying plenty of bags full of goods. So you’ve spent all your money.”

\(^{51}\) Blakemore (1987) provides the following utterance, where *so* is deemed appropriate, whereas *therefore* is not: “[Speaker finds a £5 note in his wallet] ?Therefore I didn’t spend all the money”. We will re-assess DMs under a relevance-theoretic perspective in 4.3.1.

\(^{52}\) The same principle applies to examples of *interruptions* (Blakemore, 2002; Blass, 1990), such as:

A: What did you want to say?
B: I must be off now.

Again one may ask whether the cognitive processes involved in accessing and using contextual assumptions in the interpretation of isolated utterances like interruptions – as well as the principles governing those processes – should be different from the ones involved in the interpretation of utterances which are part of a text, such as those in example (1).
have demonstrated that the notion of coherence cannot be described as either necessary or sufficient a condition for textual well-formedness and discourse comprehension. As Wilson (1996) and Blakemore (1997, 2001, 2002) have claimed, this is not to say that we are capable of recognising coherence relations such as restatement, exemplification or elaboration. The fundamental question, however, is: are such relations computed in the course of utterance comprehension? As Sperber Wilson (1986/1995: 244) put it with reference to speech acts and illocutionary force (later extended by Blakemore to cover coherence relations):

It is one thing to invent, for one’s own theoretical purposes, a set of categories to use in classifying the utterances of native speakers. It is quite another to claim that such a classification plays a necessary role in communication and comprehension. To see the one type of investigation as necessarily shedding light on the other is a bit like moving from the observation that tennis players can generally classify strokes as volleys, lobs […] and so on, to the conclusion that they are unable to perform or return a stroke without correctly classifying it.

In other words, if the identification of coherence relations is to be deemed necessary for comprehension, then utterance understanding would not occur unless hearers first identify the coherence relations that connect the speaker’s utterance to the preceding text.

Blakemore’s (1997) examination of temporal sequences and elaboration sequences – such as the ones analysed in examples (3) or (4) – has further demonstrated that if understanding involves identifying the proposition expressed and the speaker’s attitude toward such proposition and deriving cognitive effects, then the identification of coherence relations cannot be a prerequisite for successful comprehension, but rather a derivative phenomenon.

As we shall see in the more detailed account of DMs in 4.3, coherence-based approaches treat DMs such as so and moreover as markers of coherence relations: as Fraser (1990) and Schiffrin (1987) say, they function as ‘discourse glue’. However, as Blakemore (2002) has argued, this sort of approach cannot explain why DMs which are associated with the same coherence relation – for example, but and however, which are said to be associated with contrast – are not intersubstitutable in all contexts. In other words, the coherence approach to discourse cannot explain why discourse markers associated with a particular coherence relation are at once so similar and so different. More generally, if coherence relations are recovered as a result of understanding discourse and are not a prerequisite for discourse
comprehension, then it cannot be the case that a coherence-based approach to discourse can provide the basis for a theory of discourse understanding. This raises the question of how we should explain the role of DMs such as _so_ and _moreover_.

Now, where should we turn to in order to explain the understanding of utterances containing DMs? Is there a theory not construed on coherence relations that can “capture our intuitions about the unity of discourse” (Blakemore, 2002: 167)? In the next section, I will focus on one of the two theoretical frameworks adopted in this thesis, i.e. Relevance Theory (RT), which argues that an account of discourse comprehension “should not be regarded as a by-product of a theory of discourse (...) coherence, but is actually the key to the explanations of our intuitions about coherence” (Blakemore, 2001: 102). More specifically, it is hypothesised that coherence is a consequence of the hearer’s search for an Interpretation that is consistent with Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) Principle of Relevance.

**4.2 Relevance Theory: A cognitive approach to pragmatics**

Most coherence-based accounts are characterised by an externalised view of language (cf. Chomsky, 1986) as they describe discourse as communicative behaviour, independent of and external to the human mind. This view is radically different from that of the relevance theorists, who are not concerned with text or discourse _per se_, “but rather discourse understanding, or more particularly, the mental representations and computations underlying utterance understanding” (Blakemore, 2001: 100-101). In other words, the object of study within a relevance-theoretic perspective is internal to the human mind.

Building on the work of Paul Grice (1961, 1989), Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995, 1987) have proposed a relevance-theoretic model of human communication, which stands opposed to the classical code model whereby information is encoded into a message, transmitted and decoded by another party, with another copy of the code. They argue that utterance Interpretation is not achieved by identifying the semantically encoded meanings of sentences, but involves inferential computations performed over conceptual representations or

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53 Grice’s theory of meaning and communication follows the tradition of ordinary language philosophy (cf. 4.1.1) and has become a “landmark (...) on the path towards the development of a systematic, philosophically inspired pragmatic theory of language use” (Huang, 2007: 3).
propositions - that is, the propositional content of the utterance interpreted taken together with contextual assumptions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995).

The fundamental tenets of RT are contained in a definition of relevance and two principles, one about *cognition* and the other about *communication*, to which I will now turn.

4.2.1 How relevance guides inferential comprehension

The relevance-theoretic inferential account of communication is based on a central assumption about cognitive processes: human cognition is relevance oriented (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995, 1987). This assumption is to be found in what Sperber & Wilson call the Cognitive Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 260):

*Cognitive Principle of Relevance:* Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.

What, then, is relevance? Sperber & Wilson define relevance as “a property of inputs to cognitive processes and analysed in terms of the notions of cognitive effect and processing effort” (Wilson, 2000: 423). Relevance is thus an improvement of one’s overall representation of the world and is seen as a matter of degree, i.e. the degree of relevance of an input to an individual is a trade-off or balance between cognitive effects (reward) and processing effort (cost). This is made clear by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 252) in the following passage:

Relevance of an input to an individual

a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Thus, the more cognitive effects the hearer is able to derive, the more relevant the information. In other words information is relevant for the hearer to the extent that it yields
cognitive effects at low processing effort by interacting with and modifying her existing assumptions about the world.

Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) identified three types of cognitive effect: (a) generating a conclusion drawn from old or new information together, but not from such information taken separately, which is known as contextual implication; (b) strengthening an existing assumption; and (c) contradicting or eliminating an existing assumption. Consider the following example taken from Blakemore (2002: 60-61). A bus driver is about to leave from the bus terminal, when he suddenly sees in the rear window a woman waving a bus pass in her hand, trying to cross the road to get to the terminal. In such context, the bus driver’s overall representation of the world can be improved in three ways, corresponding to the three cognitive effects discussed above. Firstly, given the assumption that a person waving a bus pass intends to catch a bus, the bus driver will derive the new assumption or contextual implication that the woman intends to travel on his bus. Secondly, the bus driver’s ‘old’ (or existing) assumption that the woman is trying to catch his bus by crossing the road may be strengthened by the assumption that she is waving her pass. Thirdly, the bus driver’s existing assumption that the woman’s intention is to catch his bus is contradicted and eliminated when he sees that the woman walks in the opposite direction, after giving her pass to a friend on the street.

Thus, as the cognitive principle of relevance suggests, in processing information people try to maximise cognitive effects; in other words, human attention and processing resources are designed to look for as many cognitive effects as possible for as little effort as possible.\(^\text{54}\)

This, in turn, has an immediate consequence for the theory of communication. For Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 158ff.), communication means ostensive communication, where this is defined as involving both first-order informative intentions and higher-order communicative intentions; the attribution of the latter is yielded by ‘ostensive behaviour’ or ostentation. Ostensive-inferential communication is often ‘triggered’ by an ostensive stimulus, which is used to give rise to the expectation of optimal relevance. In other words, such stimulus is “the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 158).

\(^{54}\) The comparative (rather than quantitative) nature of the trade-off of effect and effort has led some critics to state that RT does not provide a satisfactory account of how to measure this ‘balance’ and how to measure cognitive effect and processing effort against each other (e.g. Bach, 1999; see also Wilson and Sperber’s (2004) counterarguments).
For instance, suppose that the police officer asks an interviewee if he has run to run away from the crime scene, to which request he frowns and indicates the cast on her right leg. This is an example of ostensive behaviour and the officer recognises it as such. In particular, he infers (non-demonstratively) that the interviewee is injured and wishes to rest his case, and finally that he could not have been the one who was fleeing. The suspect has communicated a negative answer and his reasons by giving the officer some evidence of his thoughts (cf. act of indicating the cast). The ostensive nature of such behaviour could be expected to suggest to the officer that he intended to trigger this idea in his mind. The suspect thought that the idea activated, and the manifestly intentional nature of its activation, would be the starting point for an inferential process leading to the discovery of the suspect’s full meaning.\footnote{The suspect could have achieved a similar effect by uttering the following words: “I hurt my right leg”. This would have activated the idea of his being injured (this time by linguistic decoding); further, it would have done so in a manifestly intentional way.}

According to RT, the very act of requesting the hearer’s attention encourages her to believe that the information given will be relevant enough to be worth processing. Hence, every act of communication creates an expectation that a hearer is entitled to have – namely, that the utterance is the most relevant one within the parameters of the speaker’s abilities and preferences. This generalisation about human communicative behaviour is expressed in the second principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 260):

\textit{Communicative Principle of Relevance:} Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

In other words, the speaker communicates that his utterance is the most relevant one compatible with his abilities and preferences and is at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s processing effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 270 ff.). Again it is in his interest to do so, as the less processing effort and the greater the effect, the more relevant the utterance and the more likely it is that the addressee will understand it successfully (Wilson & Sperber, 2000, 2004).

The Communicative Principle of Relevance motivates the following comprehension heuristic which, according to RT, hearers spontaneously follow in utterance Interpretation (Wilson, 2000: 423):
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure:

Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects.

(a) Consider interpretations in order of accessibility.
(b) Stop when your expectation of relevance is satisfied.

The speaker aiming at optimal relevance will try to formulate his utterance in such a way as to minimise processing effort for the hearer, so that the first acceptable interpretation derived by the hearer is the one she intended to convey.\(^{56}\)

In this section, I have analysed the two fundamental principles within RT, i.e. the cognitive and communicative principles. In particular, the latter applies at the level of both explicit and implicit communication; thus, I turn to the definition of these notions in the following section.

4.2.2 The distinction between explicit and implicit content

According to Grice’s (1957, 1969, 1989) theory of communication, a distinction is made between natural meaning (in the world) and non-natural (or linguistic) overall meaning of an utterance. The meaning non-natural or speaker-meaning is claimed to be a matter of expressing and recognising intention (similar to RT; cf. Levinson, 2000) and is divided into what is said and what is implicated, as represented in the following diagram:

\(^{56}\) This does not imply that every act of overt communication is in fact optimally relevant (Sperber, 1994; Wilson, 2000). For instance, speakers can be mistaken about the relevance of the information they communicate or about the hearer’s contextual or processing resources.
According to Grice (1989: 25; see also Carston, 2002: 114ff.), *what is said* is argued to be the conventional meaning of the utterance (excluding conventional implicatures)\(^\text{57}\) and the truth-conditional content of the utterance. On the contrary, *what is* (conversationally) *implicated* is defined in contrast to and derived following the input provided by *what is said*. However, human beings must ‘unpack’ phenomena such as ellipsis, deixis, and lexical ambiguity before they can understand *what is said*. In relevance-theoretic accounts of human communication, it is claimed that Grice did not fully recognise the contribution provided by pragmatics to the truth-conditional propositional content of the sentence uttered. Both Grice and Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) agree that we should distinguish between meaning which is explicitly communicated (*what is said*) and meaning which is part of the implicit content of the utterance (*what is implicated*). However, for Grice the role of the maxims and pragmatic inference is restricted to what is implicated and plays no role in the recovery of what is said. In contrast, Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) and Carston (2002, 2004) argue that the explicit side of communication is far more inferential than Grice envisaged: according to RT, both the explicit side of communication and the implicit side involve making inferences from

\(^{57}\) The notion of *conventional* implicature (the second type of implicatures within Grice’s framework) will be explored within the broader discussion on DMs in 4.3.1.
contextual assumptions on the basis of general pragmatic principles. Thus, Sperber & Wilson develop the notion of *explicature* which is defined in terms of an inferential development of linguistically given incomplete logical forms into propositional forms. In other words, explicatures serve to ‘flesh out’ the incomplete conceptual representations encoded by the utterances and thus yield fully propositional content. Consider, for instance, the following (straightforward) case of disambiguation:\(^{58}\)

(13) He has a mole on his face.

The hearer of utterance (13) will be required to disambiguate or select one meaning out of two (or more) potential meanings provided by the English language system,\(^{59}\) i.e. *mole* as (a) a small cylindrical mammals adapted to a subterranean lifestyle, or *mole* as (b) a benign tumour on human skin, usually with darker pigment. After selecting Interpretation (b) according to the context given, the explicature he derives to complete and enrich the (incomplete) logical form is as follows:

(14) He has a benign tumour with darker pigment on his face.

It is worth highlighting that relevance theorists have defined two subtypes of explicatures. The first subtype is called *higher-* (or *higher-order*) explicature (Wilson & Sperber, 2004) and serves to embed the truth-conditional content of the sentence uttered under higher-level descriptions, including speech act descriptions and evidentials (which are perceived as comments on the embedded propositions; see Ifantidou-Trouki, 2001). The second subtype is called *basic* explicature and is defined as non-higher-level explicature. Consider, for instance, the following utterance:

(15) Frankly, I’ve had enough of you.

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\(^{58}\) See also Asher & Lascarides’ (1995) analysis of coherence-based heuristics for disambiguation in discourse, where the same criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance is shown to explain disambiguation in both isolated utterances and extended texts.

\(^{59}\) It must be stressed that in RT (*contra* Grice and Bach) the recovery of propositional content is not just a matter of disambiguation or reference or deictic resolution. See, for instance, fragmentary utterances (e.g. *Nice dress!* ) and cases where disambiguation and reference assignment do not deliver optimally relevant propositions (e.g. *The park is some distance from my home*, where assigning a reference to *park* and *home* does not lead to a proposition intended).
The use of the sentence adverbial *frankly* here makes clear the reliability of the evidence on which an utterance is based. The higher-level explicature that may be derived is as follows:

(16) The speaker is telling the hearer frankly that he doesn’t stand her anymore.

Unlike explicit content, the *implicit* content or *implicature* within RT is seen as an assumption which can only be derived pragmatically, i.e. via pragmatic inferences (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). Thus, the difference between explicatures and implicatures lies in that the recovery of the former involves both decoding and inference, whereas the latter involves only inference. Furthermore, there are two subtypes of implicatures: *implicated premises* and *implicated conclusions*. Implicated premises are contextual assumptions intended by the speaker and provided by the hearer, whereas implicated conclusions are contextual implications communicated by the speaker. Consider, for example, the following:

(17) Mark: How about going out for a walk?
    John: It’s raining.

In this example, the hearer is required to pragmatically enrich ‘It’s raining’ in order to ensure that she has the proposition that it is raining where both Mark and John are intending to walk (explicature). The implicated premise, instead, is that if it is raining heavily outside, it is not possible to have a walk and the implicated conclusion is that Mark and John cannot have a walk outside. In this way, the implicated conclusion follows deductively from the implicated premise combined with utterances in (17).

It should be emphasised that both explicit and implicit content are a matter of degree. Explicitness depends on a balance of labour between linguistic encoding and pragmatic inference. Since explicit content is contextually determined and involves pragmatic inference, we may also say that it can vary in strength depending on the responsibility that the hearer is given for its recovery (Carston, 2002). At the same time, the strength of an implicature may vary along a continuum ranging from *weak* to *strong* implicatures (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). In particular, weak implicatures are analysed as those implicatures whose recovery is not essential to understand the speaker’s intended meaning, whereas strong
implicatures are those who are essential to utterance comprehension. For instance, the implicatures recovered from John’s utterance in (17) might include:

(18) a. John does not want to walk in the rain.
    b. John wants to stay home.
    c. John is encouraging Mark to admit that he is also unwilling to go out.
    d. John would like them to stay home as their favourite soap opera is on television.

In order to satisfy the expectation of relevance raised by an utterance, the audience must, on the one hand, develop its encoded linguistic meaning into an appropriately explicit propositional content (explicature) and on the other, use contextual assumptions made accessible by the conceptual content of this explicature in the derivation of cognitive effects. These two operations do not take place serially, but are, as Carston (2002) puts it, *mutual adjustment* processes, with hypotheses about context, explicit content and cognitive effects being made, adjusted, and confirmed in parallel, on-line.

To sum up, Grice’s and relevance-theoretic accounts agree that there is a level of semantic representation – or the linguistic meaning of an utterance – which belongs to the domain of semantics. However, relevance theorists posit that (a substantial) part of the notion of *what is said* involves a greater pragmatic intrusion than originally foreseen by Grice. In particular, they put forward the notion of explicature, parallel to the Gricean notion of implicature, which serves to ‘flesh out’ the linguistically given incomplete logical form of an utterance. After constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the explicit content of the utterance (via decoding, disambiguation, and other pragmatic enrichment processes), the hearer is expected to combine the derived explicature with contextual premises for the derivation of the implicated conclusions. Lastly, such parallel, on-line recovery of both explicatures and implicatures engendered by an utterance is guided by the communicative principle of relevance and the first satisfactory Interpretation recovered by the use of such comprehension heuristic is seen as the only satisfactory one.

In contrast with Grice’s maxims, the communicative principle of relevance is thus not a rule which can be followed or deliberately flouted; rather, it is an empirical generalisation about the way we communicate, which is in turn based on the way we process information (cf. Cognitive Principle of Relevance in 4.2.1). In the next section, we aim to further explore this
inferential theory of human communication; in particular, we shall discuss the relationship between thoughts and utterances and the notions of metarepresentation and interpretative resemblance, both of which are highly relevant to the notions of the police interpreter’s role and neutrality.

4.2.3 The relationship between thoughts and utterances

The discussion so far raises the following question: is our utterance comprehension strategy to be seen as a specialised cognitive domain with its own (innately specific) principles? In other words, do we possess a ‘pragmatic’ module in our minds?

One of the most influential theories of mind is the one formulated by Fodor (1983), influenced by Chomsky’s (1986) view of language. The fundamental thesis put forward by Fodor is that the human mind is divided into an undifferentiated central system and a series of specialised cognitive systems or *modules*, which mainly serve to provide input to the central system. In this context, language is seen as a dedicated module (or a cluster of modules) which feed into the central ‘processor’, the latter being responsible for general mental capacities such as problem solving and rational thought formation.\(^\text{60}\)

It has been argued that Fodor’s and Chomsky’s modular view of the mind underlies the distinction between grammatically specified meaning and pragmatic meaning (cf. Blakemore, 2002: 154ff.). According to RT, grammar has a role to play in communicative events, however this role is to deliver “semantic representations which fall short of the complete interpretation intended” (Blakemore, 2001: 101), rather than representations of thoughts communicated by the speaker. Therefore, the contextual assumptions needed to fully Interpret the speaker’s communicative intentions and the computations used to derive this Interpretation sit outside of the realm of language module (or grammar). As Wilson stated in 1995, “there is no more reason to expect discourse to have the same structure as language than there is to expect it to have the same structure as vision”.

The current relevance-theoretic position (Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2004) is that utterance comprehension involves a more modular capacity of ‘mind reading’ – also

\(^{60}\) See Smith (2004) for discussion of differences between Fodor and Chomsky.
known as *theory of mind* – which refers to the human ability to form a thought about another thought or, in other words, to inferentially attribute mental states or intentions to others on the basis of their behaviour. At the same time, Sperber & Wilson claim that utterance comprehension processes are subject to a distinct Interpretation ‘submodule’ of the theory of mind, which computes the information according to the communicative principle of relevance and contains the relevance-theoretic inferential comprehension heuristic. This submodule thus allows the hearer to infer the meaning of the uttered sentence on the basis of the evidence provided (Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2004).

Consider, for instance, the following thoughts formed by someone in an office who sees their colleague placing their laptop in a drawer:

(19) The laptop is in the drawer.

(20) a. Danny thinks that the laptop is in the drawer.
    b. Danny thinks that the laptop is not in the drawer.
    c. Danny thinks that Martine thinks the laptop is in the drawer.
    d. Danny thinks that Martine thinks the laptop is not in the drawer.

Thoughts (20a) and (20b) can be seen as first-order representations of utterance (19), whereas sentences (20c) and (20d) are analysed as second-order representations. A metarepresentation is therefore a representation of a representation, i.e. a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it.

According to Grice, a distinction needs to be drawn between two metarepresentational abilities: on one hand, the *speaker’s*, who metarepresents the thoughts he is willing to convey (i.e. communicated thoughts are representations and utterances are representations of those thoughts); on the other, the *hearer’s*, who is able to form representations of thoughts that the speaker intends to convey (i.e. Interpretations are representations of attributed thought). I shall now focus on the second ability, i.e. the hearer’s.

Since a thought is a private representation and an utterance is a public representation which has a propositional form, an utterance can be said to be meta-representational, i.e. it can be used to represent another representation which has a propositional form – or a thought.

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61 ‘Mind reading’ is perceived as a misleading term as it is taken to hint at the decoding of thoughts.
Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 230) thus assume that “every utterance is an interpretive expression of a thought of the speaker’s”.

The picture of communication which is emerging here is not one in which communicative success depends on the duplication of thoughts, but is one in which communication results in what Sperber & Wilson describe as the enlargement of “mutual cognitive environments” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 193). In this context, an utterance is simply ‘public’ evidence for a ‘private’ thought, and the communicative process will be successful to the extent that the optimally relevant Interpretation of the utterance achieves the sort of ‘loose’ coordination proposed by Sperber & Wilson (1998: 199): “the type of co-ordination aimed at in most verbal exchanges is best compared to the co-ordination between people taking a stroll together rather than to that between people marching in step”.

In particular, an utterance is an Interpretation of a thought to the extent that its propositional form resembles the speaker’s thought, or, in other words, to the extent that it shares logical and contextual implications with that thought. Furthermore, according to Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 233-4), two representations interpretively resemble each other if and only if they share logical and contextual implications; the more implications they share, the more they interpretively resemble each other.

For instance, the description of utterances (9b) and (10b) as restatements by Mann & Thompson (1989) can be analysed in terms of the notion of interpretative representation, which is central to Sperber & Wilson’s account of the communication of propositional attitudes (example (9) is repeated from 4.1.2):

(9) (a) At the beginning of this piece there is an example of an anacrusis. (b) That is, it begins with an unaccented note which is not part of the first full bar. (Blakemore, 2001: 111)

(10) (a) A well-groomed car reflects its owner. (b) The car you drive says a lot about you. (Noel, 1986: 69, quoted in Mann & Thompson, 1987: 71)

In RT, reformulations have been analysed in terms of the way utterances achieve relevance as representations of utterances which they resemble (Blakemore, 2002: 180). The question whether utterances are relevant as an Interpretation (rather than a description) is not related to
how they are connected to a preceding text, but to the relationship between the proposition they express and the thought they represent (cf. Blakemore, 1993, 2002). The speaker’s perception of an utterance as a restatement or reformulation is not tantamount to his recognition of such utterance as a segment of discourse (which stands in a relationship with another part of discourse), but rather of a relationship between propositional representations.

In example (9), the second segment achieves the same contextual effects as the first, that is it “achieves relevance by virtue of communicating information about the meaning of the term anacrusis in addition to the information it communicates about the piece of music” (Blakemore, 2002: 179). Thus, the utterance can be seen as a faithful Interpretation of the preceding segment. On the contrary, in the example (10) – which appears to be an ad for car polish - a different contextual effect is achieved. In contrast, segment (10a) can be analysed as a pun that captures the hearer’s attention thanks to its two readings, segment (10b) is an Interpretation of only one proposition, i.e. owning a well-groomed car is evidence for being a smart kind of person. However, although the Interpretation of segment (10a) entails processing costs not ‘included’ in the second segment, the effort is counterbalanced by the way: (a) it captures the hearer’s attention; and (b) it yields contextual effects about the qualities of being ‘well-groomed cars,’ which would not have been yielded by segment (10b) alone.

As utterances have a range of properties - i.e. phonetic, lexical, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic – speakers can exploit resemblances in phonetic, linguistic or logical form to metarepresent another utterance. As an illustration of a speaker exploiting linguistic and semantic similarities, consider the different ways in which speaker C might answer B’s question by representing the director’s utterance in (21) (adapted from Blakemore, 2002: 180):

(21) A (the director): We will have to let her go.
    B: What did the director say?
    C(a): We will have to let her go.
    C(b): They’ll have to let her go.
    C(c): She’s fired.

In example (21), the utterances produced by three hypothetical speakers (C) are to be seen as answers to speaker B’s question in a situation where the company director (A) had uttered the
following words: “We will have to let her go”. What kind of resemblance do we have? Whereas speaker C(a)’s utterance has a similar linguistic and semantic structure to the director’s statement, C(b)’s utterance is characterised by a different semantic structure (since C(b) changes the pronoun), but common propositional form. Lastly, the sentence uttered by C(c) is relevant as an Interpretation of a propositional form or thought and the resemblance involves the sharing of logical and contextual implications.

On this account, utterances which are relevant as representations of attributed utterances or thoughts can only be said to be more or less faithful to the original. For instance, the speaker of C(c) creates expectations of faithfulness, whose degree will be determined by the extent to which the two propositional forms share logical and contextual implications.

The degree of faithfulness will vary from situation to situation. In particular, a fully identical (or literal) representation is not necessarily the most relevant one; metaphor, hyperbole and loose talk are cases in point (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 2006, Carston, 2002). The degree of faithfulness attempted will be governed by the search for optimal relevance. For instance, if we take the following example from Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 233), which represents possible answers to a friend’s enquiry of how much you earn:

(22)  a. I earn £797.32 a month.
    b. I earn £800 a month.

The optimally relevant reply in the abovementioned context will therefore be (22b).

But what does a thought represent, and how? In RT a distinction is drawn between descriptive uses and attributive (or interpretive) uses of language (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 231 ff.). In general terms, a descriptive utterance is an Interpretation of a thought which is a description of an actual or desirable state of affairs, whereas interpretive utterances are Interpretations of a thought which is an Interpretation of another thought or utterance (e.g. a thought or utterance attributed to another person or to the speaker at another time). The latter might be explicitly communicated by use of parentheticals, such as I think, they claim, or it must be inferred in cases where overt linguistic indication is not given.
Against this background a distinction is made between attributive uses of language indicated by the linguistic form and tacitly attributive uses. Consider the following examples (based on Wilson’s (2006: 1734) example on free indirect speech and thought):

(23) a. I thought I had cooked a nice lunch. b. But according to Danny, it was very heavy.

(24) a. The Members of the House of Lords had come to a decision. b. The government’s plans to increase tuition fees will be approved.

(25) a. The students spoke up. b. If they didn’t act immediately, it might be too late.

Example (23) is a case of attributive interpretive use of language indicated by the linguistic form (“according to”). On the other hand, free indirect speech and thought, as in (24) and (25), are a well-known type of tacitly attributive use of language. An Interpretation of (24) is that the thought that the government’s plans will be approved (or an appropriate summary thereof) is being tacitly attributed to the members of the House of Lords. The same can be said of example (25): a plausible explanation is that the claim that if the students didn’t act immediately it might be too late is being tacitly attributed to the students. In both (24b) and (25b) the speaker “does not take responsibility for their truth, but is metarepresenting a thought or utterance with a similar content that she attributes to some identifiable person or group of people” (Wilson, 2006: 1734).

Utterances in example (21) C were example of attributive use of language. (21) C(a) and (b) were a case of attributive use indicated by the linguistic form, whereas (21) C(c) was a case of tacitly attributive use. The following is a review of the two uses of languages according to RT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>Descriptive</th>
<th>- Utterance: Interpretation of a thought which is a description of an actual or desirable state of affairs.</th>
<th>- The speaker can exploit resemblances in phonetic, linguistic or logical form to metarepresent another utterance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Attributive</td>
<td>- Utterance: Interpretation of a thought which is an Interpretation of another thought or utterance.</td>
<td>- These utterances can only be said to be more or less faithful; the degree of faithfulness varies and is governed by Principle of Relevance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Two levels of representation in RT.

A sub-type of tacitly attributive use of language is verbal irony. However, the interpretive dimension of language use is not restricted to irony; this has served to shed light on a range of traditional linguistic topics such as metalinguistic negation (Carston, 1996, 2002), echo questions (Wilson, 2000; Noh, 2001), hearsay particles (Ifantidou-Trouki, 2001, 2005; Itani, 1998), and translation and interpreting (cf. Gutt, 1991/2000; Setton, 1998, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995).

This section has shown that the analysis of free indirect speech and thought as straightforward examples of attributive use in which a speaker communicates her thought about someone else’s thought is due to Sperber & Wilson; on this view, they are analysed as being analogous to irony. However, this approach to free indirect speech and thought is not shared by all those who adopt a relevance-theoretic approach to utterance understanding. In the next section, I will discuss Blakemore (2010, 2011)’s analysis whereby, while interpretive representation is involved in free indirect speech and thought, it should not be treated (by analogy with irony) as a variety of attributive use in which the speaker is communicating her thoughts about the thoughts of another (4.3.2). In light of this analysis, I will reassess Sperber & Wilson’s account of the representation of thought in interpreter-mediated dialogue (4.3.3). Firstly, however, it is essential to look at DMs and their role within a relevance-theoretic account.

4.3 Discourse markers in Relevance Theory: Implications for interpreter-mediated events

In RT, the expressions known as discourse markers or connectives are interpreted differently not only from the coherence-based accounts discussed in section 4.1, but also from Brown &

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62 In particular, the notion of dissociative echoic use plays a key role in the relevance-theoretic analysis of verbal irony (cf. Wilson, 2006). This view differs from Grice’s account of metaphorical or ironic utterances, which he sees as examples of the way in which a speaker may deliberately violate the quality maxim in order to communicate something other than what is said.
Levinson’s (1987; cf. 2.2.3) and Schiffrin’s (1987) definitions of DMs as the social functions which they have attributed to DMs is argued not to be part of their linguistic meaning, but pragmatically inferred from its encoded meaning on the basis of contextual assumptions and the principle of relevance.

We will begin by reassessing the coherence-based analysis of DMs from the perspective of relevance-theoretic distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning (Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Jucker, 1993; Wilson & Sperber, 1993).

4.3.1 A procedural account of discourse markers

The term discourse marker does not refer to a well-defined category of expressions despite all of the work to date, in which DMs have been analysed from such diverse perspectives as discourse analysis (e.g. Schiffrin, 1987), CA (e.g. Owen, 1983), interactional sociolinguistics (e.g. Watts, 1989), and lexical approaches (e.g. Bolinger, 1989). Some writers (e.g. Schiffrin, 1987) use this term, while others prefer ‘cue markers’ (e.g. computational linguists) or ‘discourse connectives’, as highlighted in 4.1.1.

Firstly, there is the vexing question of their syntactic identity. DMs are regarded as a heterogeneous subset of a larger range of items which are seen as having ‘pragmatic’ meaning and range from non-lexical items (oh), through words such as well, and phrases like all right and of course to larger fragments such as you know and you see. In this subset, for instance, we find: sentence adverbials (e.g. unfortunately, as you’ve said, to sum up), interjections (huh, ah, oh), coordinate conjunctions (and), subordinate conjunctions (so), and expletives (e.g. damn). Although most scholars would agree that such elements of speech do not belong to any particular syntactic category, they are nevertheless said to display regularities of occurrence in relation to utterances with a propositional structure. While not a separate syntactic category per se, they are argued to be “propositionally separate” (Fraser, 1999: 943); in English, in particular, they seem to occur mostly outside the syntactic sentential structure, mostly as left-hand discourse brackets in sentence initial position. In this way, DMs are seen as lexical adjuncts which are syntactically independent of the discourse of which they are part, yet simultaneously as a link between their syntactic regularity of occurrence in sentences and the meta-pragmatic functions they are said to fulfil in such sentences.
Secondly, DMs are attributed with a wide variety of functions. For instance, Schiffrin (1987) identifies three main roles for the eleven DMs she discusses: they act as contextual coordinates, they index adjacent utterances to the speaker, hearer or both, and they index the utterance to prior and/or subsequent discourse. She sees them as serving an important integrative function, acting as “discourse glue” (Fraser, 1988: 20).

All the properties attributed to DMs as a subset of pragmatic markers are as follows:

a. ‘pragmatic’ meaning (e.g. Fraser, 1990) rather than ‘semantic’ meaning;

b. non-truth conditionality;

c. their domain is at a discourse level, rather than a sentence level;

d. expressive or interactional functions.

Furthermore, as previously discussed, they are characterised by the following properties not shared by all ‘pragmatic’ markers:

e. they are typically discourse initial and mark utterance boundaries; and

f. they signal relations among units of discourse (cf. ‘discourse glue’; Schiffrin, 1987).

Property (e) is shared by other ‘pragmatic’ markers. So it would seem that what distinguishes DMs from other pragmatic markers is that their function is to signal discourse relations. Indeed, it has been argued (Knott & Dale, 1994) that DMs are evidence for the existence of coherence relations.

In section 4.1.2, I have critically analysed the account of DMs given by coherence theorists, according to which DMs signal coherence relations and encode coherence relations between segments of discourse (cf. property (f) in the abovementioned list). In particular, we found that the recognition of binary coherence relations in communication are neither necessary nor sufficient for utterance comprehension (cf. Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Blass, 1990; Wilson, 1996). Indeed, everyday discourse is full of utterances which although they cannot be understood in isolation from the context, are not part of a coherent text. For instance, I have analysed the discourse initial so in example (11) (repeated from 4.1.2):

(11) [Someone comes in with loads of parcels]
So you’ve spent all your money.63

We have further seen another example (cf. (12) “Dogs must be carried”, or an utterance such as “Not you again”) where it is difficult to recover an Interpretation without particular contextual assumptions. More generally, it is implausible to Interpret utterances that are part of a text in a different way than utterances that are not part of a text. This means that it is necessary to develop an account of expressions like *well* and *so* that is grounded in a theory of utterance Interpretation that applies to all utterances - be they discourse initial, isolated or part of a text.

As previously highlighted, according to many writers (e.g. Fraser, 1990; Schiffrin, 1987) DMs are not only distinguished property (e), i.e. they connect segments of discourse, but also by property (a), i.e. they have ‘pragmatic’ meaning. In their frameworks, ‘pragmatic’ refers to the conventional or linguistic meaning which does not contribute to truth conditional or propositional content (e.g. Fraser 1990). For instance, example (26), which we have divided into sub-parts (a) and (b), will be true if and only if Paul is beautiful and he is quite intelligent:

(26) (a) Paul is beautiful, (b) but he is quite intelligent.

The suggestion that there is a contrast between the two segments (a) and (b) is not a condition on the truth of what has been said, i.e. the speaker will not be considered to have spoken falsely if there is no contrast between the two states of affairs described. In other words, example (26) will still be true even if such suggestion is false.64 Now, consider (27) (adapted from Hall, 2004: 216):

(27) (a) It’s raining, (b) but the grass is wet.

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63 As seen in 4.1.2, not only can DMs be used discourse initially, but also as fragmentary utterances. This use also raises difficulties for a coherence relations approach and is not considered by, for instance, Knott & Dale (1994; cf. Blakemore, 1997).

64 However, he might be considered to have committed what Grice calls a ‘semantic offence’ in the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ (Grice, 1989: 362). For further discussion on this aspect, see Wilson & Sperber (1993: 14).
Again, we suppose that (a) it is raining and (b) the grass is wet, however the suggestion that there is a contrast between (a) and (b) is not true. Nevertheless utterance (27) will be true; the fact that it is difficult to see how (a) and (b) contrast does not affect the truth value of (27) and there could be a context in which (27) is perfectly acceptable.

As pointed out in section 4.2.2, Grice argued that the suggestions of a contrast between the segments (a) and (b) in the aforementioned examples (26) and (27) are called conventional implicatures. In particular, they are regarded as conventional because they are tied to the use of a particular word (in this case, but) and are to be regarded as implicatures because they are not part of what is said (or truth conditional content). However, to say that expressions like but contribute to suggestions which are not part of truth conditional content says nothing about what these suggestions contribute to. In brief, DMs do seem to affect the Interpretation of the utterance, but how exactly? Furthermore, it is not clear if the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction is in fact the fundamental distinction in semantics and pragmatics. In particular, is it right to assume that linguistically encoded meaning coincides with conventional meaning or, in other words, that linguistically encoded meanings fully determine the propositional content of utterances?

As seen in 4.2.2, within RT the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is based on a distinction between decoding and inference, seen as two separate processes in utterance comprehension. When an utterance is produced, a hearer recovers a semantic representation of that utterance, based on information delivered by the grammar, which is seen as an autonomous linguistic system. The pragmatic inferential process, instead, integrates the semantic representation with contextual assumptions in order to reach an intended Interpretation of the utterance, and is guided by the Communicative Principle of Relevance (cf. 4.2.1). Further, as Carston (2002, 2004) argues, the semantic representation is not fully propositional, but is just a ‘template’ for utterance Interpretation which requires pragmatic inference in order to recover the proposition the speaker has intended (see, for instance, example (13) on disambiguation). Therefore, RT argues that ‘semantics’ is a relation between a linguistic form and the information it provides as input to the inference system, rather than a relation between a linguistic form and an entity in the world (Carston, 2002).

In this context, relevance theorists assume that there are ways in which a linguistic form may provide an input to the inference system which yields utterance Interpretation. On the one hand, there are elements of speech which encode concepts, which in turn are constituents of
propositional representations undergoing an inferential computation. On the other hand, there are expressions which “encode procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension” (Wilson & Sperber, 1993: 12; my emphasis), i.e. they encode a procedure for performing an inference or for narrowing down the hearer’s search space by directly specifying an inferential route. If that is the case, an expression like so or but ensures that the intended Interpretation is recovered for a minimum cost in processing. As Traugott (1995) has shown, these procedural DMs have developed through a process of semantic change from conceptual expressions. For instance, however has developed out of a conceptual however (cf. the utterance ‘However you do this, you should ask me first’). Traugott also argues that once an expression has become procedural, it either remains such or drops out of the language altogether.

Let us consider the sequence in (28) (Wilson & Sperber, 1993: 12):

(28) (a) Peter isn’t stupid. (b) He can find his own way home.

According to coherence-based accounts, the recognition of a coherence relation between the two segments is essential for understanding the utterance (28). Thus, the proposition describing the intended coherence relation - a relational proposition according to Mann & Thompson (1987, 1988; cf. 4.1.1) - would be part and parcel of the Interpretation recovered.

As we have seen, within a RT account in order to understand sequence (28) a hearer is encouraged to recover the intended explicit content in both segment (a) and (b) (i.e. the explicatures) and the intended implicit content (i.e. the implicatures). Such a recovery of explicatures and implicatures is an inferential process constrained by the Principle of Relevance and consists of an on-line, ‘mutual adjustment’ of hypotheses about context, explicit content and cognitive effects (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). The Interpretation the hearer derives depends on the contextual assumptions used in its derivation and on the type of inferential computations she performs. For instance, the sequence in (28) might be Interpreted in two ways, depending on whether the (b) segment is understood as a premise in an inference which has segment (a) as a conclusion or it is understood as a conclusion derived from the segment in (a). Blakemore has claimed that there are linguistic expressions which encode information about the inferential phase of Interpretation. Thus:

65 As Traugott (1995) has shown, these procedural DMs have developed through a process of semantic change from conceptual expressions. For instance, however has developed out of a conceptual however (cf. the utterance ‘However you do this, you should ask me first’). Traugott also argues that once an expression has become procedural, it either remains such or drops out of the language altogether.
(29) (a) the use of after all indicates that the speaker is intended to use segment (28)b as a premise in an inference; while

(b) the use of so indicates that the speaker is intended to derive segment (28)b as a conclusion; while

In particular, (29)a involves making an inference in which segment (28)b is a premise in a deduction which yields (28)a as conclusion as exemplified in (30):

(30) Peter can he can find his own way home ((28)b premise, new information)

If Peter can he can find his own way home, then he isn’t stupid (contextual premise)

├ Peter isn’t stupid ((28)a conclusion)

Note that the independent evidence provided here is for an assumption the hearer already holds, therefore the evidence has the effect of strengthening that assumption. In contrast, (29b) involves an inference in which (28b) is a conclusion derived from premises which include (28a) as follows:

(31) Peter isn’t stupid (premise, (28)a)

If Peter isn’t stupid, then he can find his own way home (contextual premise)

├ Peter can find his own way home

We have seen that there are two entirely different inferential routes, which lead to a different sort of contextual effect intended by the speaker and are consistent with the Principle of Relevance, i.e. other things being equal, the hearer can recover either contextual effect for a minimum cost in processing. To sum up, utterance (28) has two possible Interpretations, which are encouraged by the formulations in (32)a and (32)b respectively (after Wilson & Sperber, 1993: 12):

(32) (a) Peter’s not stupid; after all, he can find his own way home.

(b) Peter’s not stupid; so, he can find his own way home.
As we have seen, a coherence theorist would say that *after all* and *so* mark different coherence relations so that the difference between the two interpretations in (28) lies in the fact that a different coherence relation (explanation rather than cause-consequence) is identified in each case. However, according to Blakemore’s RT analysis, the role of these expressions is to constrain the inferential computations that are performed in the course of interpreting the utterances that contain them. Thus while *after all* sends the hearer to the inferential route in (30) above, *so* sends the hearer to the inferential route in (31). In other words, both expressions contribute to the inferential phase of comprehension by narrowing down the hearer’s search space by helping him identify the intended context and contextual effects, or, as Jucker (1992: 438) says, they are similar to “signposts directing the way in which the following utterance should be processed by the addressee”.

It should be noted that in contrast with the coherence approach, this analysis does not offer a taxonomy of discourse relations (cf. 2.1.1), but rather it assumes that hearers are looking for cognitive effects (cf. 2.2.1). On this account, a number of DMs are linked to particular cognitive effects and can therefore be classified corresponding to the three types of cognitive effects:

1. allowing the derivation of particular contextual implications (*so*);
2. strengthening previous assumptions (*after all*);
3. contradicting or eliminating previous assumptions (*but, however…*)^{66}

According to Blakemore’s account, expressions such as *so* and *after all* do not encode constituents of conceptual meaning, but simply activate inferential procedures. That is, they must be analysed in procedural rather than conceptual terms. This distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning is justified in a framework which assumes that the question for semantics is not to say what contribution an expression makes to truth conditions, but rather what kind of contribution it makes to pragmatic inference. The point is that since pragmatic inference involves performing computations over conceptual representations, it seems reasonable to assume that linguistic expressions may encode not only the constituents of conceptual representations which undergo inferential computations, but also information about those computations themselves.

^{66}This also means that Blakemore’s (2002) approach, in contrast with the coherence approach, will analyse *so* in discourse initial position in the same way that it analyses *so* in an utterance such as (32)b.
Since the distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding is the result of a move away from the assumptions underlying truth conditional semantics, there is no reason why it should be co-extensive with the distinction between truth conditional and non-truth conditional meaning. And, indeed, work which followed Blakemore’s (1987) original proposals has shown that the two distinctions are not co-extensive. On the one hand, there is truth-conditional meaning which is procedural (e.g. pronouns) and non-truth conditional meaning which is conceptual (e.g. sentence adverbials).

Since 2002, the notion of procedural encoding as since been applied to the analysis of a range of phenomena (e.g. DMs, mood markers, pronouns, tense markers) from a variety of languages (e.g. Sissala or Japanese). As many authors have highlighted (e.g. Blass, 2003; Bravo Cladera, 2002; Chu, 2002; Dansieh, 2008; Hussein, 2009; Trujillo Sáez, 2003), the use and distribution of procedural devices varies across languages since such devices must exploit linguistic resources. In particular, in different languages DMs can encode different distinctions and different aspects of the pragmatic inference system are linguistically encoded.\(^{67}\)

However, it remains to be discussed whether expressions which constrain aspects of implicit communication are tied to particular cognitive effects (Blakemore, 1987), as stated above. As Blakemore (2002) herself highlights, if expressions such as but and however are tied to the cognitive effect of contradiction (or elimination), then her account of DMs would be no better equipped to explain similarities and differences between such elements than coherence-based approaches, which analyse them as indicators of a contrast relation.

For instance, the expressions but, however and nevertheless appear to be linked to one and the same cognitive effect, yet it does not seem that they mean exactly the same. In some cases, the three expressions seem to be interchangeable, as in (33):

\[
(33) \text{(a) Danny hasn’t got his rolling mat. But I think we can still have sushi.}
\]

\(^{67}\) I will discuss this issue further in section 4.3.3. It is worth noting that the conceptual-procedural distinction and, in particular, the notion of procedural meaning has proved to be a valuable tool in the analysis of several issues at the semantics-pragmatics interface. However, it has not been free from criticisms. From a linguistic perspective, it has been pointed out that this distinction does not allow a clear-cut classification of linguistic items, since most units seem to contain a combination of both conceptual and procedural meaning (Espinal 1996; Fraser, 2006). For instance, procedural instructions are said to include some conceptual features as well: in fact, indicating how two pieces of information are to be combined sometimes seems to require using and manipulating concepts (Espinal, 1996).
(b) Danny hasn’t got his rolling mat. *However*, I think we can have sushi.

(c) Danny hasn’t got his rolling mat. *Nevertheless*, I think we can have sushi.

However, in other contexts this is not the case. Consider the following utterance (taken from Blakemore, 2002: 123):

(34) [Speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whiskey] *But/*? *Nevertheless* I don’t drink.

According to Blakemore (2002), the same cognitive effect is present in each case (cf. 33a-c), but effect is achieved in different contexts (cf. the difference in (34)). Each expression encodes a different constraint on the context in which the effect of contradiction and elimination is recovered. Blakemore (2002) thus proposed that the concept of procedural encoding must be broadened so that it includes information about the contextual assumptions used in pragmatic inferences. According to Blakemore’s (2002) extended account, therefore, the *similarities* between expressions such as *but* and *however* are accounted for in that they are tied to the same cognitive effect; whereas the *differences* are explained in terms of the fact that they can impose a different constraint in the context in which those cognitive effects are derived. 68

Finally, Blakemore analyses the DM *well* in RT terms. *Well* is particularly frequent in English conversation 69 and has probably attracted more attention than any other DMs in English. However, the meaning of *well* is extremely hard to state and there is little agreement about what it means, why it is used and how it should be analysed. It has been studied from many different perspectives (e.g. Bolinger, 1989; Carlson, 1984; Fraser, 1990; Lakoff, 1973b; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Jucker, 1993; Svartvik, 1980; Schiffrin, 1987; Smith & Jucker, 2000; Schourup, 2001; Watts, 1987, 1989; Wierzbitka, 1976;). These studies can be roughly grouped into two approaches: those which look for a unified meaning of the DM on the one hand (e.g. Carlson, 1984; Bolinger, 1989), and, on the other, those which are primarily pragmatic or interactional and interested in the functions that *well* performs as a warning

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68 Note that a coherence-based account would argue that whereas in some contexts the three expressions in (33) encode the same coherence relation, in other contexts they encode different relations. This, however, does capture either the similarities or the differences.

69 It is among the 100 most frequent words in the conversational part of the London-Lund Corpus, where it occupies rank 14 (Svartvik, 1990: 66).
signal in different discourse contexts (Blakemore, 2002; Jucker, 1993; Smith & Jucker, 2000). Schourup’s (2001) study differs from either of these approaches in treating *well* in relation to interjections.

Firstly, Carlson (1984) bases his description of the meaning of *well* on its semantic source, which is the adverb with the meaning of ‘according to one's wish’. This description of the DM *well* implies that “the speaker accepts a situation” (Carlson, 1984: 27), where the meaning of ‘acceptance’ is taken up as the core meaning of *well* by Carlson and is considered appealing “on etymological as well as on intuitive grounds” (1984: 28). Carlson further specifies what it means to accept a situation and to describe the interaction of the meaning of *well* with different dialogue contexts. Noteworthy in Carlson’s study is that he posits a unitary meaning which offers a plausible explanation in many contexts and that he gives a detailed description of the functions of *well* in different contextual environments. However, the unified meaning approach still leads Carlson to recognise many subtypes, in particular *well* as frame and as qualifier.

Bolinger (1989) also rejects the view that *well* is empty (a view, for instance, defended by Schiffrin, 1987) and points out that his own treatment of the DM is closest to Carlson’s. Like Carlson, Bolinger maintains that the meaning of DM (or ‘interjection’, in his study) *well* must be sought in its relation to other uses of *well*. The study of these other uses brings Bolinger to the notion of norm or conformity: by using *well* the speaker invokes “some standard” (1989: 321). The content of *well* in the locutionary sphere (‘relatively good, relatively strong’) is transferred to the illocutionary sphere (‘matched to a standard or norm’; cf. Bolinger 1989: 332). The link with Carlson is clear, since ‘acceptance’ implies that one finds something ‘good’, i.e. in conformity with a norm.

Schourup (2001) does not start from the analysis of the meaning of *well* as an adverb, but posits a close link with interjections such as *wow* or *ouch*, which express ‘mental states’. Despite the dissimilarities with prototypical interjections, *well* is claimed to be “usefully viewed as a species of gestural interjection” (2001: 1046). Schourup puts *well* at one end of a continuum from interjections “which border on full lexicality” to those which are fully gestural and lexically empty (2001: 1049).

Studies which look at *well* from a RT point of view show what it *does* in conversation rather than from what it ‘means’. These are Jucker’s (1993) and Smith & Jucker’s (2000), and
Blakemore’s (2002) study. Jucker (1993) relies on RT to explain the use of *well* and shows that in many cases *well* indicates a shift in context, in the sense that the speaker signals that the background assumptions need to be renegotiated in order to establish common ground. In Smith and Jucker (2000) a similar position is taken. Looking at *actually, well* and *in fact*, the authors find that they all “introduced repairs to the common ground” (2000: 209). This means that *well* is seen as used in contexts where speakers feel that there is a discrepancy between propositional attitudes of the partners in conversation. Hence, *well* (and other discourse particles) is used “to facilitate conversation” (2000: 208). Blakemore’s (2002) analysis of *well* shows that an expression may encode a procedure even then it does not impose a constraint on cognitive effect at all. In particular, Blakemore (2002: 138) argues that the information that *well* encodes amounts to:

> a green light for going ahead with the inferential processes involved in the recovery of cognitive effects, and the renegotiation of the context may be, but is not always, a consequence of interpreting the utterance in accordance with the constraint which *well* encodes.

Comparing all these approaches of *well* we find that they are - though proposed within different theoretical models and having different goals - not completely incompatible. Carlson’s and Bolinger’s accounts look for a unified semantic description of *well* by establishing a link between the DMan and its semantic source, the adverb *well*. This type of approach is interesting from a contrastive perspective, because it allows one to set up comparisons between different languages with regard to which lexical words they have mobilised to fulfil DM functions. On the other hand, I believe that a RT account of what *well* does in conversation is necessary in order to account for its multifunctionality and its use as a warning-signal. Thus, RT analyses are plausible ways of finding a common denominator in the plurality of its contextual uses.

In conclusion, we have analysed the notion of procedural encoding derived from a cognitively grounded distinction between linguistic encoding and pragmatic inference and first put forward by Blakemore (1987). I have given a brief history of the development of such concept, in which particular attention was paid to the argument whereby the distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding is not co-extensive with the distinction between
truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. I have shown that the relevance-theoretic conceptual-procedural distinction is not simply a re-analysis of a truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction, but rather a separate distinction entirely, which emerges from the claim that linguistic semantics should be viewed as a means to relating sentences and thoughts rather than as a means to relating sentences and state of affairs in the world.

Nonetheless, Blakemore (2002: 185) concedes that “there is still much work to be done before we have a full understanding of the notion of procedural encoding”.\(^{70}\) In particular, as Blakemore recognises in more recent work (Blakemore, 2010), it needs to be explained how we apply the procedural approach just outlined to DMs in free indirect thought representations. As we have seen, FIT representations have been analysed within RT in terms of the notion of interpretive representation which is defined in terms of resemblances of content. However, according to the procedural account of DMs just outlined, expressions such as *well* and *so* do not encode constituents of conceptual representations. The question addressed by Blakemore (2010) is whether we can reconcile the procedural account of DMs with their use in FIT representations which turn on resemblances of content. As we shall see in section 4.3.4, this question also applies to the use of DMs in interpreting. For according to Gutt’s (1991/2000) RT approach to translation and interpreting, interpreting/translating can also be analysed as a case of interpretive use in which speakers use one conceptual representation to represent another by exploiting resemblances of content.

4.3.2 Discourse markers and perspective dependence: Blakemore’s analysis of discourse markers in free indirect thought representations

Departing from Sperber & Wilson’s account of FIT as an example of attributive use in which the speaker is communicating her thoughts about someone else’s thoughts (cf. 4.2.3), Blakemore (2009, 2010, 2011, forthcoming) provides an account of FIT representations by drawing from Banfield’s (1982) and Fludernik’s (1993) no-narrator approach to free indirect speech.

\(^{70}\) For a discussion on how the notion of procedural meaning might be broadened to include natural signals - such as smiles and facial expressions, which are also fundamental to (police) interpreting (cf. chapters 6 and 7) - see Wharton (2003a, 2003b) and Wilson & Wharton (2006).
According to the relevance-theoretic framework the evidence provided by the author in FIT texts and used to derive meta-representations of the character’s thoughts is indirect in the sense that the reader must infer or work out the character’s thoughts from the linguistic properties of the utterances together with contextual assumptions (Blakemore, 2010, 2011). The reader is said to invest her effort in processing FIT representations because she has recognised the author’s act of ostensive communication. In this sense, the communicative intention in free indirect texts must be attributed to the author who represents the character’s consciousness.

Although the author is an intermediary between the character and the reader, the effort expended in Interpreting FIT texts does not seem to lie in the resulting relationship between reader and author, but rather in a sense of ‘affective mutuality’ between reader and character. The reader is not intended to recover meta-representations of the author’s thoughts about the character’s thoughts, but is given the illusion that he is being given evidence for the character’s thoughts or state of mind, i.e. that he is “participating in her thought processes” (Blakemore, 2010: 19). The idea underlying this analysis is that such representations are perceived to be unmediated representations of another person’s thoughts. An author is not present ‘in the text’ as communicator and the result of communication is not a sense of mutuality between reader and author, but rather between reader and character.

Blakemore’s (2010) analysis of examples from fiction suggests that the use of “mimetic” elements (such as DMs)\(^{71}\) contribute to this illusion of ‘absence of mediation’ by imposing “a constraint on the relevance of the thought representation which contains it” (Blakemore, 2010: 19; cf. 4.3.1), which leaves the reader with the responsibility for the recovery of assumptions which are not represented by the author in the text but which can be attributed to the character whose thoughts are being represented. One of the examples provided by Blakemore (2010: 17) is taken from Katherine Mansfield’s *Collected Short Stories* (1981: 223):

(35) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. (…) Even if she had had the strength she never would have nursed and played with the little girls. No, it was as though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank Heaven, mother had taken him. (emphasis in the original)

\(^{71}\) Also known as ‘subjectivity markers’ (e.g. repetitions, interjections, and so on; cf. Fludernik, 1993).
In Blakemore’s analysis, the use of *well* in the main character’s (Linda’s) FIT text imposes a constraint on the Interpretation of the thought representation which it introduces, and the reader has the responsibility to access the contextual assumptions needed in order to derive an Interpretation of the thought which is consistent with the constraint it encodes - in order words, any contextual assumptions the reader thinks the main character would believe would justify this use of *well*. In this particular case, these contextual assumptions would have to “derive from the need to demonstrate that (...) the answer to the question ‘what about the baby?’ is indeed relevant” (Blakemore, 2010: 19). However, readers are free to access these contextual assumptions, thus being under the illusion that they have accessed the same assumptions which are accessed by Linda as she has these thoughts or, in other words, that they are participating in her thought processes.

Other features of FIT representations have been shown to contribute to an increased sense of mutuality between reader and author or a corresponding impression of distance between reader and character, while others (such as parentheticals) play both types of role (Blakemore, 2009). An example of this latter case is the use of parenthetical interruptions, such as the one in the opening page of *Mrs Dalloway* by Virginia Woolf (1976: 5, quoted in Blakemore, 2009: 144; emphasis in the original):

(36) It was his sayings one remembered; his eyes, his pocket-knife, his smile, his grumpiness and, when millions of things had utterly vanished – how strange it was! – a few sayings like this about cabbages.

Again, the interruption in FIT representations (cf. “how strange it was”) is argued to increase the sense of mutuality between reader and character discussed above and encourage the reader to create meta-representations of thoughts not actually revealed by the author.

On the basis of this relevance-theoretic account of FIT representations in fiction I shall now examine the representation of thought in the interpreter-mediated interaction.
4.3.3 Interpreting as ‘unmediated’ representation of a speaker’s thoughts

The framework outlined in 4.2 has been used by a number of scholars (Gutt, 1991/2000; Mason, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Setton, 1998, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) in an interlingual context in order to analyse translation and interpreting processes. One of the most influential works in this field is Ernst-August Gutt’s (1991/2000) *Translation and relevance: cognition and context*. Working on the assumption that translation falls within the domain of communication, Gutt (1991/2000, 2001) argues that RT contains the key to providing a unified account of translation. Translators must be able to recover the intended meaning instantly and render the content in a way that might resemble the original less closely, but that allows them to get across what they consider to be relevant aspects of the original. In other words translations come with a (explicit or implicit) presumption that they *interpretively resemble* the original content.

Gutt makes a distinction between ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ translations. The former are designed to function on their own (e.g. a touristic leaflet) and may be modified in order to achieve maximal relevance for the users, whereas a ‘direct’ translation seeks interpretive resemblance, i.e. the interpretation of a target text is as similar as possible to that of the source text (as long as the target text has been dealt with within the context of the source text). The more comparable the context of a direct translation is to the source text context, the closer the interpretation will be to that of the source text (Gutt, 1991/2000).

In this context, Gutt (1990; 1991/2000) argues that the notion of direct translation must be defined in terms of “shared communicative clues”, allowing for explicit treatment of many issues in translation, including poetic effects, that have often been claimed to be beyond the scope of objective analysis. Just like a communicator who gives his hearer ‘clues’ that allow the inference to be made, a translator is required to provide “communicative clues” arising from a wide range of properties: “semantic representations, syntactic properties, phonetic properties, *discourse connectives*, formulaic expressions, stylistic properties of words, onomatopoeia and phonetic properties that give rise to poetic effects” (Gutt, 1990: 140, my emphasis).

Gutt draws on the distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘interpretive’ use of languages (cf. 4.2) to define translation as a case of “interlingual interpretive use” (Gutt, 1991/2000: 136).
Translators can achieve relevance by communicating to the audience what the original author wrote in the source text. In other words, the audience is not confronted with the original content, but with that produced by the translator, and states that “de facto translation is an act of communication between translator and target audience only” (1991/2000: 213, emphasis in the original). According to Gutt, the distinction between translation and non-translation is therefore a matter of communicator’s intention, and hinges on “the way the target text is intended to achieve relevance” (Gutt, 1991/2000: 210, emphasis in the original).

Thus, translators are faced with a similar situation to ‘normal’ communication and have several responsibilities; they are required to decide whether and how it is possible to communicate the informative intention, whether to translate descriptively or interpretively, and what the degree of resemblance to the source text should be. All these decisions are to be based on the translator’s evaluation of the cognitive environment of the target text receiver. To succeed, the translator and reader therefore share basic assumptions about the resemblance that is sought and the translator’s intentions must agree with the reader’s expectations (Gutt, 1991/2000: 192).

This concept of translation as a case of interlingual speech or quotation is directly transposed to the realm of (simultaneous) interpreting (Gutt, 1991/2000: 213-215). Gutt claims that interpreting (as well as translation) can be accommodated in the relevance-theoretic view of communication represented diagrammatically in Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 232):

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72 As an instance of failed communication, Gutt (1991/2000: 193-4) gives the example of a translation of the New Testament into Gaurani. In this instance, the initial, idiomatic translation had to be rewritten because the Gaurani expectation was for a target text that more closely corresponded to the form of the high-prestige Portuguese.
Figure 2. Gutt’s account of simultaneous interpreting (adapted from Gutt, 1991/2000: 214, based on Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 232).
According to this interpretation of the diagram, texts or utterances are interpretive representations of author’s or speaker’s thoughts, and hence involve one level of meta-representation, while a text or utterance produced by a translator or interpreter is an Interpretation of the author’s or speaker’s thought, which in itself is an Interpretation of a thought attributed to someone who expressed it in a different language. In other words, such a text or utterance involves a further level of meta-representation and is relevant as a thought about a thought. Gutt thus concludes that “the communicator whose utterance the target audience is actually dealing with is that of the translator” (1991/2000: 215, emphasis in the original).

Gutt’s (1991/2000) view on translation as attributed thought is shared by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) as well as a number of other translation studies scholars (e.g. Blass, 2010; Edwards, 2001; Smith, 2000, 2002, 2007; Unger, 1996, 2000, 2001), some of whom also share Gutt’s claim that translation as communication can be explained using relevance-theoretic concepts alone and that “there is no need for developing a separate theory of translation, with concepts and a theoretical framework of its own” (Gutt, 1991/2000: 235).

In interpreting studies, similarities have been drawn between the relevance-theoretic notion of context put forward by Gutt and other approaches, namely cognitive processing (CP) models such as Gile’s (1985, 1997/2002) Effort Model for simultaneous and consecutive interpreting (as well as sight translation and simultaneous interpreting with text). This focuses on the cumulative effect of three competing and demanding efforts, requiring sufficient processing capacity on the part of the interpreter in order for her to meet the varying requirements of a given task.73

A comparison can be made between the relevance-theoretic notion of inference and the comprehension part put forward by the théorie du sens or Interpretive Theory of Translation (or ITT; cf. Lederer, 2010: 178), championed in Paris from the 1960s by its leading researchers, Danica Seleskovich and Marianne Lederer, and mainly applied to the analysis of simultaneous and consecutive interpreting (see Lederer, 1994/2003; Seleskovich, 1962, 1976; Seleskovich & Lederer, 1984).

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73 The ‘Effort Model’ varies slightly according to the mode of operation. For instance, in consecutive interpreting is broken down into two phases (listening/analysing and reformulation), whereas in sight translation and in the simultaneous mode with text, the listening effort is replaced by the reading effort.
According to ITT scholars, their experience as a professional interpreter has shown that linguistic knowledge alone is not enough to achieve understating, and that it needs to be compensated or supplemented by other cognitive inputs, i.e. contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge, a kind of storage which builds up from the beginning of the understanding process. The final product of such interpretive process of understanding is called sense, perceived as the result of the interdependence of all linguistic and non-linguistic components. Understanding amongst interpreters is seen as different from understanding in a monolingual conversation since it is more deliberate and requires (and, indeed, is “geared to”) the apprehension of sense in its totality so that the sense matches the intended meaning (vouloir dire) of the source text speaker (Seleskovich, 1976: 109). The same applies to translators, who are seen as “privileged readers called on to understand the facts in a text and to feel its emotional connotations” (Lederer, 1994/2003: 31).

In particular, the previous ‘world knowledge’ activated in interpreting (and understanding in general), which combines perceptual input to form a conceptual mental representation, is perceived to be de-verbalised. Thus, ‘deverbalisation’ (Lederer, 1994/2003: 115) becomes an “essential intermediate phase if the translation [and the interpreter] is to avoid transcoding and calques”. However, such a key process in the ITT interpretive model of interpreters’ cognitive processing is seen by other authors as underdeveloped theoretically, partly due to the problems of observing the process per se (see Pöchhacker, 2004).


Setton’s main aim was to reconstruct specific processing stages and mental structures. To this effect, he devised a detailed model of such complex psycholinguistic processing operations, addressing aspects of comprehensions, memory and production involved in this mode of interpreting. Described as “a hybrid of best available theories” (Setton, 1999: 63), this model considers “context” (i.e. all accessible knowledge) to pay a pivotal role at all stages of cognitive processing, merging the cognitive-psycholinguistic and pragmatic dimensions of
comprehension. The (task-oriented) “mental model” (Setton, 1999: 65) in adaptive memory is assumed to be sourced by both situational and world knowledge and to share with the “Assembler” a language of representation which encodes meaning in terms of propositions and attitudes.

In particular, Setton’s process model focuses on cognitive-pragmatic processing of linguistic and contextual cues “used by a speaker (…) to direct Addressees to relevance as realising and developing the act of ostension in the discourse itself” (Setton, 1999: 8). This notion of “pragmatic clues to inference” (Setton, 1999: 204) draws on the relevance-theoretic distinction between conceptual information, which enters into inferential computations, and procedural information about the inferences that are performed (cf. 4.3.1). Although Setton did not integrate procedural elements such as DMs fully into his model of SI, he notes that:

> The use and distribution of procedural and non-truth-conditional devices obviously varies between various languages. (…) Not surprisingly, such items tend to disappear in German-English or Chinese-English translation, since their closest equivalents in some uses would be parentheticals (…), which may result in an undesirable loosening of the register (…). (Setton, 1999: 204, my underlining)

In his interdisciplinary analysis of dialogue interpreting Mason (2004, 2006a, 2006b) suggests that “a way forward in analyzing the pragmatics of dialogue interpreting might lie in using the evidence of actual responses (…) to trace the communication of meanings beyond what is said” (Mason, 2006: 366, emphasis in original). Further, he agrees with Gutt (1991/2000) that the concept of ‘interpretive resemblance’ can be used to describe dialogue interpreting and regards the principle of relevance as “applicable to the interpreted encounter as much as it is to any communicative event” (Mason, 2004: 365). In particular, the Cognitive Principle of Relevance is argued to be particularly adequate to account for interpreted events as interpreters “are constantly conscious of the need to be brief (efficient) and to-the-point (effective) because of the perception that their interventions hold up or lengthen the communication process” (Mason, 2006b: 109).

Mason argues that the pragmatic shifts involved in the interpreters’ renditions may be analysed as translational adjustments made in order to improve relevance; in other words, the interpreter is required to adjust his/her output in order to preserve the balance between
contextual effects and processing effort. This view is reflected in the account that Mason (2006a: 361-2) gives for the interpreter’s representation of utterance 5/6 in the following interpreter-mediated interview between an immigration officer and a Polish immigrant:74

1 IO: OK when you arrived in the United Kingdom, did you see an immigration officer in Dover?
2
3 PW: Tak [Yes]
4 IO: That immigration officer would ask you some questions. (…)
5 Interp: Urzędnik zadał ci dwa pytania. Coś ty jemu powiedziała? Dlaczego tutaj przyjechałaś?
6
   [The official asked you two questions. What did you say to him?
   Why did you come here?]

Here, the immigration officer and the interpreter are said to share a ‘mutual cognitive environment’ (cf. 4.2.3), and the contextual effects of utterance 4 are retrieved by the interpreter without unnecessary processing effort. The interpreter’s response shows that what is meant by utterance 4 is taken by her to mean ‘I know the immigration officer asked you some questions, and I would like to know how you replied’. There was no guarantee, however, that a literal translation into another language of either the linguistic meaning of utterance 4 or of what is actually said would allow the same contextual effects to be derived: hence, the interpreter’s explicitation in utterance 5/6.

In contrast with this approach to translation and interpreting as interlingual interpretive use, a comparison between free indirect style or thought (FIT) representations in fiction as analysed by Blakemore (2009, 2010, 2011, forthcoming) and interpreter-mediated utterances can be drawn in order to reassess the way in which attributed thoughts are represented in face-to-face interpreting.

As we have seen in 4.3.2, Blakemore claims that FIT text contains features which enable the author to establish the impression of a direct line between reader and character, or rather an ‘unmediated sense of mutuality’ between the reader and the character whose thoughts are

74 Key to the dialogue: IO = Immigration Officer; PW = Polish Woman.
being represented. In this way, the effort in Interpreting FIT representations is rewarded by a sense of intimacy between reader and character, even though the reward for this effort is guaranteed only by the author’s act of overt communication.

In general terms, interpreters’ (cf. authors) renditions can be argued to contribute to the illusion that the hearer (cf. reader) has direct access to the speaker’s (cf. character) thoughts. As with fiction, where “the effect of free indirect style is a seemingly unmediated view not only of a character’s thoughts but also of his thought processes” (Blakemore, 2010: 138), the effect of interpreted speech may be regarded as a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts which is perceived to be unmediated by the thoughts of the interpreter who is responsible for producing the utterance. If this is right, then interpreting cannot be treated as an example of tacitly attributive use of language in the sense described by Gutt (1991/2000) and the interpreter cannot be treated as communicating her thoughts about the thoughts of the original speaker.

Let us now take one specific professional setting: police interpreting. The police interpreter’s act of revealing a speaker’s (be it an officer’s, a suspect’s or a victim’s) thoughts can be said to communicate a guarantee of optimal relevance, which in turn justifies the hearer’s effort to derive meta-representations of those thoughts from the evidence provided by the interpreter. Nonetheless, the reward for this effort can be argued to be a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts which is perceived to be unmediated by the thoughts of the interpreter, who is responsible for producing the utterance in the first place. The result can be viewed as an illusion according to which the speaker is acting out his mental state in a direct relationship with the addressee.

Taking Blakemore’s analysis of audience-directed expressions in FIT representations in fiction one can thus argue that DMs and other audience-directed expressions used in interpreted discourse have an important role to play in creating an illusion of being able to gain entry to the speaker’s (cf. judges’, officer’s, lawyer’s, etc.) mind, or rather of “being able to witness him/her as s/he is actually having the thoughts in much the same way as we are able to witness a speaker as he constructs utterances as public representations of his own thoughts” (Blakemore, 2010: 4).
4.3.4 Discourse markers in interpreting

As discussed in chapter 2, previous works on legal interpreting (e.g. Hale, 1999, 2004, Berk-Seligson, 1988, 1990) have adopted different theoretical frameworks – mainly Brown & Levinson’s (1987) and Leech’s (1983) politeness theories – in order to explore how DMs used in the courtroom and police stations are conveyed by the interpreter and have found a high number of such elements in interpreters’ renditions. I argue that the latter might be due to the fact that interpreters wish the hearer to take responsibility for the recovery of assumptions which are not represented by the interpreter herself, but which can nonetheless be attributed to the speaker.75

Consider the following example from Berk-Seligson (1990: 141, emphasis in the original) mentioned in chapter 2, where the defendant has been asked to describe the house in which he lives:

Attorney: What kind of house is that?
Interpreter: ¿Qué tipo de casa es?
Defendant: Es una casa chica.
Interpreter: Well, it’s a small house.

As previously highlighted (cf. 2.2.3), Berk-Seligson argues that the defendant’s answer is definite and clear, while the interpreter’s rendition is a “hedged way of offering the information” (Berk-Seligson, 1988: 32) and thus weakens the certainty of the original.

This example raises two issues, the second of which is more central to the present discussion. Firstly, in contrast with Berk-Seligson, the relevance-theoretic account is based on the argument that the social function of well as a hedging device (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1978: 172; Leech, 1983:140) can be shown to follow from the way in which its semantically defined

75 Our explanation for the role of these DMs in interpreting is, nevertheless, relevance-theoretic: in particular, it appeals to the procedural analysis of DMs (Blakemore, 1987, 2002), the relevance theoretic notions of ostensive communication and interpretive resemblance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson, 2000, 2012) and the relevance-theoretic analysis of style (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Pilkington, 2000).
role as a constraint on relevance interacts with particular properties of the context. As Blakemore (2002) has shown, this relevance theoretic analysis of *well* in as a constraint on relevance is able to accommodate the way in which its function varies from context to context. These contextually determined functions include the sort of hedging function noted by Berk-Seligson. However, they also include functions which cannot be analysed in terms of hedging. Consider for example, the way in which *well* interacts with prosody and context in the stand-alone uses illustrated in (37) and (38), and the prosodically reduced *well* in (39) where it is used to introduce an utterance produced as an attempt to close an argument (/ represents an intonation rise, \ an intonation fall, and ˡ an accented syllable):

(37) [Hearer returns from making an enquiry at a train station ticket office]
   / Well?
(38) [Someone has just left the room after losing their temper]
   \ Well.
(39) [Following protracted argument between A and B]
   A: I just don’t think it’s important.
   B: Well, ˡ I \ do. [speaker then leaves room]

Secondly, the insights of Blakemore’s (2009, 2010, 2011) approach to free indirect style can help readdress Berk-Seligson’s account of this use of the DM *well*. In fact, this issue breaks down into two sub-issues:

1. how do we account for the use of *well* (whose function is analysed in procedural rather than conceptual terms) in an utterance which achieves relevance as an interpretive representation of another utterance (where interpretive interpretation is defined in terms of resemblance in content)?

2. how do we account for the fact that the interpreter’s rendition in Berk-Seligson’s example contains *well* even though the original speaker’s utterance does not contain an expression corresponding to *well*?

The key to the role of these expressions in FIT representations and, I argue, the explanation for the sort of phenomenon in Berk-Seligson’s example (cf. above) is that they facilitate the recovery of thoughts and thought processes not represented explicitly in the text. By encouraging the reader to draw on his own imagination and his Interpretation of earlier parts
of the text, they create the illusion that a character is acting out his thought processes in immediate relationship with the reader. In this way, these devices contribute to an impression of emotional immediacy that could not have been recovered from a narrator’s description or Interpretation of this state.

As seen in 4.3.2, it need not be assumed that the reader of Mansfield’s example (35) treats well as a constituent of an utterance that Linda would have made had she voiced her thoughts. Instead, one can argue that well can be treated as a means of encouraging the reader to derive a representation of Linda’s thoughts and thought processes. In particular, the hearer is encouraged to access whatever contextual assumptions they believe would justify its use – assumptions which are then attributed to Linda, even though they are not actually represented explicitly by Mansfield. According to Blakemore’s (2002) analysis of well, these are assumptions which derive from the need to demonstrate that the baby’s presence on her lap does not compromise the relevance of Linda’s representation of herself as having no maternal feeling. In other words, the use of well indicates that this is a relevant representation of Linda’s feelings, no matter what one might think given the fact that the baby is there on her lap. However, the point here is that what well does is to help us understand Linda’s feelings, and since the reader is given the responsibility for accessing the assumptions which justify its use, she is left with the impression that she has accessed thoughts and assumptions which are similar to those accessed by the character. In this way, well contributes to the illusion that he is participating in Linda’s thought processes.

To sum up, Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) have shown that the more responsibility the hearer is given for the recovery of assumptions, the greater the sense of intimacy that is created between audience and communicator. However, we have argued that there generally appears to be no communicator speaking in the interpreter’s utterances, hence the sense of mutuality that is communicated is a relationship between speaker and audience. As in Berk-Seligson’s example, the more responsibility for the Interpretation process the (court) interpreter gives to the audience, the greater the sense of intimacy between speaker (cf. defendant) and audience is communicated by the interpreter’s utterance, and in turn the greater the impression that the audience is directly participating in the speaker’s mental processes. Within this framework the court interpreter’s use of well does therefore make perfect sense as it substantially contributes to an increased impression of a direct line between the audience and the defendant’s thoughts and emotions.
4.4 Conclusion

A number of scholars agree that interpreters’ renditions should be “clear, unambiguous and immediately comprehensible” (Namy, 1978: 26) so that the audience does not have to make an unnecessary effort to re-interpret what they hear. In their renditions of original utterances dialogue interpreters generally strive to ‘disguise’ their presence in order to allow the hearer to hear another voice, i.e. that of the original speaker. However, the way interpreters achieve such renditions is still an object of debate. In particular, a series of questions arise in relation to how utterance comprehension occurs and to the perceived ownership of the utterances and the way in which thought is represented in dialogue interpreting.

Unlike the coherence-based theories analysed in 4.1, ‘discourse’ – or rather, utterance comprehension – within RT is not analysed in terms of a set of rules and conventions due to the very nature of utterance understanding. Grounded in a general view of human cognition, the central thesis put forward by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) is that the human cognitive system works in such a way as to tend to maximise relevance with respect to communication. In this context, the communicative principle of relevance is responsible for both the recovery of both explicit and implicit content of an utterance. Furthermore it is argued that pragmatics, which incorporates the relevance-theoretic heuristic of utterance understanding, is a submodule of the ‘theory of mind’ (Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 2004).

Given the role of pragmatic inference in the derivation of both implicit and explicit content of an utterance, utterances cannot be said to communicate thoughts by duplicating them, but rather to interpret the thoughts that they are used to communicate (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 230). In RT successful communication does, therefore, not require the duplication of the communicated meanings. Instead, it can be defined as such to the extent that it results in the enlargement of the ‘mutual cognitive environment’ (cf. 4.2.3) of speaker and hearer, i.e. a shared set of assumptions which constitute the ‘context’ of communication. This is assumed to be the case even when the speaker produces an utterance which achieves relevance as an interpretation of an attributed thought. That is, in cases of attributive use, the speaker is communicating his thoughts about someone else’s thoughts, and communication succeeds to the extent that it contributes to the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer, i.e. to establishing and building on the relationship between the original speaker and the hearer.
Within a relevance-theoretic framework, an interpreter’s aim should therefore be to produce a faithful interpretation of the original, where faithfulness is defined in terms of resemblance in content (cf. Gutt, 1991/2000; Mason, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Setton, 1998/2002, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). However, as Blakemore (2002) has shown, DMs such as well or but do not contribute to conceptual content, but are analysed in terms of the particular constrains they impose on the contexts in which the utterances containing them are interpreted. This seems to raise the question of how we accommodate the use of DMs by the (police) interpreter in an attributive account of interpreting which turns on resemblances in content.

I argue that Blakemore’s (2010, 2011) account of the use of expressives and DMs in FIT representations goes some way towards providing an answer to this question. Since they are intrinsically communicative devices for directing pragmatic inference, one might not expect to find them in representations of thoughts attributed to characters not engaged in communication. Instead, they play a central role in creating the illusion of a character acting out his mental state in immediate relationship with the reader. According to Blakemore they achieve this effect in virtue of the fact that they lead the audience to construct representations of a third person’s thoughts, thought processes and emotional states not represented explicitly in the text. That is, they allow the audience to view the world inhabited by a character from that character’s perspective rather than from the perspective of the author/narrator actually responsible for the representation.

The interpreters’ use of DMs in dialogue interpreting can be approached along similar lines. In particular, I have argued that the dialogue interpreter’s act of revealing the speaker’s thoughts can be said to communicate a guarantee of optimal relevance, which in turn provides a justification for the hearer’s effort in interpreting his/her utterances. However, one can argue that the reward for this effort is not the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of interpreter and hearer, but a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts which is perceived to be unmediated by the thoughts of the interpreter who is producing the utterance. Once the interpreter has provided the evidence, she can often be said to ‘disappear’ in order to leave the audience to draw on their imagination either to create meta-representations of thoughts which are not represented in the utterance, or to create meta-representations of otherwise “ineffable

76 Thus defined, it must be noted that this notion significantly differs from the legal requirement for a ‘faithful’ rendering of the original enshrined in police interpreters’ Codes of Practice (cf. 1.3). However, RT definition of ‘faithfulness’ in terms of ‘resemblance in content’ seems too weak in this setting, as Blakemore’s (2010, 2011) account of the use of expressives and DMs in FIT representations shows.
emotions and thoughts” (Blakemore, 2010: 23). Either way, the result is that the audience is under the impression of accessing the thoughts of the speaker directly.

To sum up, as Blakemore (2010) shows, free indirect style exploits cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of any act of verbal communication – processes which, as Gutt (2000) shows are also involved in audience’s interpretation of the renditions provided by an interpreter. At this level of explanation, expressions such as well can be shown to play a role in renditions such as in Berk-Seligson’s example above, which is analogous to the one it plays in the free indirect style representations discussed by Blakemore: they ensure that the audience hears the ‘voice’ of the original speaker (S₁) even though his interpretation of S₁’s thoughts is based on the evidence provided by another speaker (S₂). The problem is that when we unpack this idea along the lines suggested by Blakemore (2010), we find that we must depart both from Wilson & Sperber’s argument that free indirect style must be analysed alongside indirect thought attributions as interpretations of the speaker’s (author’s) thoughts about the thoughts of another, and Gutt’s (2000) claim that interpreting and translation can be accommodated straightforwardly in the model of communication outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

This is not to suggest that all aspects of translation and interpreting can be explained in cognitive terms. Interpreting is a complex form of interaction and involves the interplay of a variety of factors. The RT account of communicative context and ‘discourse’ from the viewpoint of the “sub-personal cognitive processes which are involved in the human ability to entertain representations of other people’s thoughts and desires and ideas on the basis of public stimuli such as utterances” (Blakemore, 2002: 60) is different from, but arguably complementary to the second theoretical framework I will adopt in my analysis of interpreter-mediated police interviews, i.e. Goffman’s interactional sociolinguistics as mediated by Wadensjö (1992, 1998), in which communication must be viewed as a social phenomenon and each participant in a triadic, interpreter-mediated encounter affects each other participants’ behaviour.

Both theories raise a fundamental, overall question which needs to be proved: what is the impact of the interpreter’s use and interpretation of DMs on police interviewing? Within this

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77 For instance, as we shall see in Chapter 6, cases in which the addition of a discourse marker by the interpreter is intended to represent the perspective of the interpreter must be explained in social interactional terms specific to the social environment in which the interaction occurs.
primary question, the following questions arise with regards to the pragmatic dimension of interpreting:

1. Given the procedural nature of DMs – which arguably makes them more difficult to process and render than conceptual words – is the police interpreter sensitive to their role in communication, and if so, is she able to convey them in her interpretation? Is an expression found that corresponds to the lexically encoded constraint on inference in the source language or, conversely, that varies the set of implicatures the original DM triggers?

2. Are DMs substituted or even omitted? If so, does this divergence from the original decrease the overtness of an utterance, i.e. does it prevent the hearer from recovering the overtly intended Interpretation?

3. Do DMs play a central role in creating the illusion of a speaker acting out his mental state in immediate relationship with the audience as predicted by analogy with Blakemore’s (2010, 2011) account of DMs in FIT texts? And if so, how often and how effectively?

At the same time, the aim of this study will be to answer the following questions regarding the interaction in police settings as a whole:

4. What is the likely outcome of the police interpreter’s choices of DMs in terms of the distribution of interlocutors’ roles within the participative framework (Goffman, 1973, 1981)? What are the critical success factors of the interpreter’s use of DMs for the “communicative pas de trois” (Wadensjö, 1998: 12, cf. 3.2.1) between police officers, interpreters and individuals being interviewed? Do DMs help the police interpreter fulfil her crucial role as speech organiser and coordinator or do they create asymmetry?

5. To what extent is the speaker’s choice of DMs constrained by cognitive constraints on communication and to what extent is it constrained by social factors? More generally, to what extent are these different types of constraints reconciled?

6. What is the impact of DMs in interpreters’ renditions on modern police interviewing techniques (cf. 1.1)? Does this ultimately jeopardise the citizen’s legal rights to fair pre-trial proceedings?
However, before we address our research questions, it is necessary to discuss the methodology adopted to select and collect the data, together with theoretical issues related to the combination of micro- and macro-levels of analysis.
CHAPTER 5

Methodological and theoretical issues in the analysis of discourse markers
in police interpreting

This chapter presents, on the one hand, the methodology adopted in this study for the selection and collection of an authentic dataset of video-recorded and transcribed interpreter-mediated interviews, and on the other, the theoretical issues that underlie my combined model. In section 5.1, the emphasis will be on the obstacles to data collection and the ways in which they were overcome; in particular, the issues concerning the preparatory work for the transcription phase such as confidentiality, ethics, and consent (5.1.1). Following this, I will address the criteria adopted for the selection and collection of the data, together with the transcription conventions used to annotate the interactions (5.1.2). Once the methodological aspects of data collection and selection have been explored, the main features of the set of interactions which constitute the corpus will be described. Specifically, the data will be explained in terms of a set of variables, i.e. participants, language pairs, content and purpose of the police interview (5.1.3). Sections 5.2 and 5.3, on the other hand, will address theoretical issues, in particular, the question of whether the cognitive relevance-theoretic framework presented in chapter 4 can be reconciled with the social, interactionist notions presented in chapter 3. Section 5.2 suggests that by examining my data at both macro- and micro-level it is possible to bring together the two frameworks in a theoretically adequate description of interpreted police interviews. Section 5.3 explores the tension resulting from the juxtaposition of cognitive-psychological relevance-theoretic and descriptive-social approaches to communication. Finally, I shall provide concluding remarks and pave the way for the analysis carried out in chapter 6.

5.1 Data selection and compilation process

The use of real-life data is “central to empirical accounts of interpreting activity in community settings” (Mason, 2006: 105). In this section, I will discuss these issues with a view to raising
awareness of the criticalities, commenting on potential advantages and disadvantages of my
(authentic) data compilation and selection process. I shall start by looking at confidentiality
and ethical issues, which are perceived to be potential obstacles which any researcher
analysing naturally-occurring data is confronted with in the fieldwork during the preparatory
phase.

5.1.1 Responsibilities towards primary participants

The issue of confidentiality is of great relevance because of the sensitive nature of data
previously protectively marked by the Chief Constable under the Government Protective
Marking Scheme. At the beginning of 2010 I submitted a formal request in order to gain
access to video- or tape-recordings of interpreter-mediated police interviews to Greater
Manchester Police (hereafter GMP) authorities. It has proved to be a lengthy process, which
lasted over ten months and ended in November 2010.\textsuperscript{78}

In order to gain permission to access the interviews I have been required to undergo various
security checks by the GMP Force Vetting Unit aimed at all non police personnel who have
unsupervised access to police premises and GMP computer systems. On successfully passing
the Force vetting process, I have received vetting clearance to access GMP premises and
systems for a minimum of five years, subject to confirmation each twelve months that my
personal circumstances have not changed. In addition, I have signed a Research Agreement\textsuperscript{79}
which identifies what information I would be permitted access to, for what purposes and the
terms and conditions that I (and the University of Salford) would be required to abide by and
implement in relation to the use, access, safeguarding, retention and disposal of force
information. Throughout the preparation of the agreement and application for approval I have
consulted with Professor Salama-Carr as my supervisor and Head of Translation and
Interpreting in the School of Languages, Professor Blakemore as my co-supervisor and
Acting Associate Head of Research, and Matthew Stephenson, Head of Information

\textsuperscript{78} In 2.1 I have mentioned that only a small number of articles on interpreted police encounters had been
published. It has been highlighted that this is partly due to the difficulty of obtaining real-life data (Jarmołowska, 2011).

\textsuperscript{79} The written agreement regulates my relationship with the GMP as suggested in the British Society of
Criminology’s Code of Ethics regarding sponsors (cf. British Society of Criminology, 2013: 5). The first
Research Agreement lasted for the period 01/11/10 to 01/10/11, at which time the agreement expired and was
renewed for another year.
Governance at the University of Salford. Finally, I have been required to sign a statement to the effect that I agree to abide by the restrictions of the Official Secrets Act.

As required in the Research Agreement with the Police Forces, measures have been taken to protect the anonymity and privacy of primary participants (cf. British Society of Criminology, 2013: 4, on the Researchers’ Responsibilities towards Research Participants).

Before sharing data obtained from research in conference papers, publications, this work and other contexts, I have anonymised them so that individuals, organisations or businesses cannot be identified. I have followed the guidelines on quantitative and qualitative data anonymisation set out in the UK Data Archive (Van den Eynden et al., 2011) in order to retain as much meaningful information as possible. In particular, direct identifiers such as names, addresses, postcode information, and telephone numbers, have been removed, whereas indirect identifiers have been replaced. The latter, when linked with other publicly available information sources, could identify someone, e.g. information on occupation or exceptional values of characteristics like salary or age. However, neither the interpreter nor any other individual actor is automatically taken to be representative of a certain social category in every respect. In the transcriptions, people have been referred to using fictitious, yet ‘realistic’ names, rather than by social category.

Further, I have investigated the ethical questions which need careful weighing up while collecting discourse data, particularly in order to “protect the rights of those [researchers] study, their interests [and] sensitivities” (British Society of Criminology, 2013: 4(i)). For this purpose, the months before my data collection have been devoted to reading the relevant literature which subsequently served to lay the foundations to obtain ethics approval from the University of Salford Research Ethics Panel. In November 2010, after the approval of the Police institutions, I wrote and submitted a comprehensive Ethical Approval Form to the University of Salford Research Ethics Panel, anticipating the ethical issues - the potential solutions to issues - that might arise in my project and providing a thorough explanation of the data and methodology I aimed to adopt. After an initial request for further comments, I was given formal (and unanimous) ethical approval.

Securing the approval of the institutions meant that I was not required to seek informed consent from participants (interviewees or interpreters). The absence of a clause on consent led to a specific request for further comments from the Research Ethics Panel. In this context,
the British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology guided my approach. In particular, Clause 4 (iii) of the Code of Ethics states: “base research on the freely given informed consent of those studied in all but exceptional circumstances” (British Society of Criminology, 2013: 4(iii)).  

In my response, I stressed the “exceptional” importance of my research at a national and international level, particularly its objective to challenge the role conflicts inherent in police interpreters’ work in the context of their various loyalties and allegiances in society and the factors that may jeopardise the citizen’s legal rights – and, ultimately, to contribute to the creation of a more robust UK and EU legal framework governing the provision of full professionalisation and regulation of legal interpreting.

Finally, an advantage of using video-recordings is that they are considered to be less threatening to people’s integrity and less intrusive on primary participants’ behaviour, partly because of the less bulky shape of a video-camera built at a corner of the room as compared to a tape-recorder. Further, the video recording of interviews in England and Wales is “to be carried out openly to instill confidence in its reliability as an impartial and accurate record of the interview” (Home Office, 2011: 1.5(A)).

5.1.2 Data selection and collection

In accordance with the Research Agreement, I have been neither required nor allowed to ‘go into the field’. Rather, I have been allocated previously video-taped material available within GMP premises, namely at the Serious Crime Division Unit within GMP headquarters in Ashton-under-Lyne (Greater Manchester, UK).

The criteria for the selection of the data were as follows:

- The data would be comprised of copies of interview videotapes involving different interpreters and different language combinations, ideally English-Italian. However, if the number of English-Italian tapes available would prove not to be sufficient, other

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80 Exceptional in this context thus relates to exceptional importance of the topic rather than difficulty of gaining access.

81 For this reason, one can categorically exclude the “observer’s paradox” (Labov, 1972: 209-210), whereby participants’ awareness of the researcher casts doubts on the validity of the analysis.

82 This is due to the fact that my mother tongue is Italian, whereas English is my main language of study and at work.
language combinations that would have been suitable were English-Portuguese and English-German;

- The number of interview tapes would be significant as it is necessary to study a large number of interpreted events in order to shed light on the interpretation of DMs in police settings and the effects of the police interpreter’s choice on the interaction (cf. Hale, 2006). In particular, I have transcribed five out of the twelve tapes I was given by the authorities (cf. Table 10).

- Date periods of the interview would ideally be from January 1997 to January 2010 i.e. five years before the National Agreement between police, courts and other legal agencies came into force in 2002 requiring every interpreter working in courts and police stations to be registered with the National Register of Public Service Interpreters. In this way, I would be able to compare registered and non-registered interpreters’ performances.

- The selection of copies of interview tapes would ideally be limited to Group C offences. The nature of the offences did not constitute a criterion for my research. Accordingly, I agreed to access copies of taped interviews where an interpreter was used relating to what – at least from the point of view of the institutions – are considered to be less sensitive, routinely handled, everyday type of cases (e.g. excluding cases of grave sexual offences).

However, the last two criteria were not met (cf. also 5.1.3). All the interpreters in my data are registered with the NRPSI and the information disclosed was not limited to Group C offences because the only occasions when it is appropriate to visually record an interview in the UK is in the case of serious crimes and vulnerable victims and witnesses.

The result was a two-tier (rather than three-tier) ‘screening’ process concerning the transcription and publication of selected data. Firstly, the agreement provided for a “regulated” transcription of the interview tapes. In other words, the transcribed data should not contain the actual names of any individuals, nor any form of personal data or sensitive personal data, that is present within the interviews. Further, such data held on the interview tapes should not be recorded, retained, removed from GMP premises or further disseminated at any time during the course of the research or after expiry or termination of this agreement. The second ‘tier’ of screening, instead, anticipated that any submissions or materials that contain, relate to or are derived from the transcribed data and are intended for publication
must be provided to GMP prior to their publication so that GMP can ensure that the contents of such submissions or materials comply with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.  

Particular attention was given to physical security, network security and security of computer systems and files to prevent unauthorised access or changes to data, or disclosure and destruction of data. At GMP headquarters I was given a password-protected laptop on which I could watch and listen to the recordings through headphones on the full screen image of 27 cm in width and 17 cm in height. In 2010 I also obtained funding from the University of Salford to buy a new password-protected netbook used only for the purposes of this research. In accordance with the guidelines on data storage outlined in the UK Data Archive (Van den Eynden et al., 2011), encoded transcripts of and general annotations on video-recordings were stored in electronic format as .doc files onto an encrypted memory stick provided by GMP. The electronic data was thus password protected, while paper-based data was stored in locked filing cabinets. Particular care was taken with data which is held on other laptop computers or on memory sticks, CD/DVDs or portable hard drives.

As far as data documentation is concerned, the videos were of an excellent quality in terms of clarity of image, audio and light, which helped increase the accuracy of the transcripts of the interactional exchanges. During video-recorded police interviews in England and Wales an operator (often a police officer) constantly checks the video and audio functions of the digital camera and zooms in and out on participants, mainly the interviewees. Thus, the full screen of the video interview principally features the interviewee’s face or body, but also the date and time of the interview and a small screen image at its corner showing a view of the room. Video recordings are fundamental to fulfill the purposes of this study. However, they are not sufficient for a systematic analysis of interaction due to the “transient, highly multidimensional, and often overlapping events of an interaction as they unfold in real time” (Edwards, 2003: 321). A number of different approaches can be adopted to the investigation of mediated interviews, but production of transcripts is a common and necessary step when approaching real-time data (e.g. Heritage & Atkinson, 1984; Hutch & Wooffitt, 1998).

83 Unlike other theses in this field, I cannot enclose the transcripts as Appendix because I have not yet translated all the foreign language utterances, nor have I given them to GMP – with the exclusion of the extracts analysed due to lack of time.

84 The small screen image was 6 cm in width and 8 cm in height. A request for a computer with a wider screen could be taken into consideration for future projects, particularly during the process of finalizing an agreement with the authorities.
The methodological and theoretical issues surrounding the transcription process has been the focus of research since the seventies (see, for example, Jefferson, 1973, 1983; Ochs, 1979; Edelsky, 1981). It is thought that even the most detailed written transcripts cannot reproduce all the characteristics of spontaneous human interaction in writing (O’Connell & Kowal, 1994) because there are many features - e.g. gaze, body language, etc. - which cannot be represented by conventional transcription.

With these issues in mind, I have opted for a linguistic transcription in which all the words spoken are transcribed only when comprehensible (orthographic transcription), figures and dates are fully spelt out and punctuation signs are avoided. Further, given the focus of analysis on the dynamics of interaction as a whole (as well as on a micro-analytical level) I have selected a number of paralinguistic features to encode, e.g. lengthened words, truncated words, pauses, and non-verbal communication which accompanies verbal behaviour in everyday conversation (cf. gestures and proxemics). I have captured phenomena which are deemed relevant to a sequential organisation of talk, e.g. location of silence, overlapping talk (Psatha, 1995; Schenkein, 1978), whereas prosodic symbols – particularly those marking intonation – are given only when they indicate points of importance to my analysis, namely the prosodic properties of DMs. To represent these features in writing, I have adopted the following transcription conventions simplified after Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974):

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>A short silence (micro-pause)</td>
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<td>(..)</td>
<td>Untimed intervals of longer length</td>
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<tr>
<td>er:</td>
<td>Long vowel (multiple colons indicate a more prolonged sound)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Questioning intonation (rising tone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!</td>
<td>Animated tone</td>
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<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>Terminating intonation (falling tone)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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85 I follow the European Portuguese and British English spelling throughout my transcripts.

86 Ideally one would create a physical representation of prosodic properties in a time-aligned, machine-readable way, which allows to compare, search, quantify, and improve accessibility. In accordance with the agreement with the authorities, however, I was the only person given restricted access to the corpus and was not allowed to upload any transcription software (e.g. ELAN, PRAT or Toolkit 08) which would have enabled me to add a (potentially) unlimited number of annotation tiers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>Continuing intonation (sustained tone)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Sudden cut-off of prior word or sound</td>
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<td>…</td>
<td>Open-ended intonation (fading out, ambiguous intonation terminal)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Underscoring</strong></td>
<td>Increased volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>°Degree signs°</td>
<td>Lower volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((giggle))</td>
<td>Verbal descriptions of sounds or movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>(text)</td>
<td>Items in doubt</td>
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<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>No hearing achieved for the item in question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>italics</em></td>
<td><em>(In original text)</em> Non-phonemic respelling used to convey phonetic details of mispronounced words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(In back-translation)</em> Author’s English back-translation of non-English talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>Overlap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7. Transcription conventions simplified after Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974).*

These transcription conventions have been subject to some remodelling and updating, following repeated listening of the recorded police interviews and my understanding of the way in which verbal and non-verbal dimensions unfold and complement each other in mediated encounters. This transcription system is far from complete. For instance, linking other non-verbal components – accessible through a video-recording (e.g. gaze) - to the transcript may have been helpful to disambiguate the meaning of certain verbal behaviours or pauses. However, this would have exceeded the scope and specific purposes of the present study. It could, nevertheless, represent a useful avenue for future projects (cf. 7.4).

Last but not least, the bilingual nature of mediated interaction meant that back-translations were added to the transcripts in order to make them accessible to non-Italian and non-Portuguese speakers. I have strived to create glosses as close as possible to the source utterances without altering the pragmatic impact of what is being said. However, adjustments
were made from time to time, particularly when a ‘literal’ translation would have hindered understanding.

Transcribing proved to be very time-consuming. It took about 50 hours to fully transcribe 90 minutes of interview, not dissimilar to what Berk-Seligson (1990) reports regarding her data collection. The dataset comprises approximately nine hours and 30 minutes of recorded material; I estimate that around 320 hours of labour have gone into transcribing the tapes.

5.1.3 Corpus of authentic mediated police interviews

In order to identify key features of the phenomenon, I have analysed real-life data provided by Greater Manchester Police, consisting of transcribed excerpts drawn from interpreter-mediated police interviews in the UK. This corpus is unique in two main respects: it provides real-life material video-recorded in a rarely explored setting and a rich, varied set of variables. In particular, it involves four NRPSI-registered interpreters, two language combinations (English-Italian and Portuguese-Italian), and a vulnerable victim (Manuel or M in interview 1) and two suspects (Letícia or L and Antonio or A in interviews 2 to 7). The total time of the interviews provided by GMP is 21 hours and 24 minutes, of which nine hours and 32 minutes were transcribed. The latter corresponds to the duration of the five interviews highlighted in Table 10 – namely interviews 1, 2, 3A, 4A, and 5A – and is considered a significant sample. Interview 1 has been chosen because it represented the only interview provided involving a child, whereas the others have been selected to cover different “stages” (cf. Collins & Frank, 2002) of the interviewing process and the four interpreters present in the dataset.87

Interviews 1 and 2-7 were held to investigate two distinct offences, a robbery and a murder. Interview 1 was held at Seltford police station on 15 May 2007 with a vulnerable child, Manuel, the alleged victim of a robbery in a park which lasted about 25 minutes. The interview is therefore defined as a “vulnerable witness interview”88 and is held with only

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87 Cf. Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix 1.
88 As defined by section 16 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009; cf. UK Parliament, 2009), children are defined as vulnerable “by reason of their age” (section 16(1)). The Act makes all children under 18 years of age, appearing as defence or prosecution witnesses in criminal proceedings, eligible for Special Measures to assist them to give their evidence in court. For instance, M’s evidence in chief during the court hearing would have been the video recording of interview 1 and M would therefore not have been required to physically deliver his evidence from the witness stand, any cross examination would be conducted by live video link with M in a separate room within the court. (For the classification of
Manuel, the interpreter (I1) and the police officer (P1) present in the room (cf. Fig. 4). Manuel is a teenage boy around 15 years of age; at the time of the alleged offence he was wearing a school uniform (with a blazer) and a coat and carrying a Messenger bag. The offender is instead described as a man, 30 to 40 years of age, with a native English accent and slightly dark-skinned, around 1.80m tall, wearing black track-suit bottoms, a zipped-up black hooded tracksuit jacket (with the hood held over his head), and black trainers.

According to Manuel’s recollection, the events unfold according to the following figure:

Figure 3. Alleged robbery in East Side park (interview 1).

On a Tuesday, approximately three months before the date of the interview (i.e. in February), Manuel decides to stay longer at school after finishing school support at around 3.30-4 pm. Around 4:50 pm the teenager walks from his school through East Side Park to the bus stop (red line 1). However, he misses the bus and decides to wait for the next one (the red circle indicates Manuel’s position). No-one seems to be around. A man who is allegedly standing on the other side of Levys Inn Road (blue circle) suddenly crosses the road in order to approach Manuel at the bus stop (blue line 1). The man orders the teenager to follow him into the park.

witnesses, see Ministry of Justice’s (2011) Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using special measures).
with a gun rolled in a white cloth, and they walk through the park’s other entrance until the middle of the park (red and blue lines 2). There, Manuel gives the man his bag and the man proceeds to frisk his bag and pocket and to steal his Samsung 70 mobile phone.

The teenager becomes extremely frightened, has what he describes as a “nervous breakdown” (cf. extract 49 in 6.4), and kneels down repeatedly begging the alleged offender to let him live. Subsequently, the alleged robber asks him to follow him slowly to another park gate; as they reach the gate, Manuel throws the bag and manages to flee, reaching an area of newly-built houses (red line 3). There the boy cries for help and knocks at several doors before a woman comes out (pink in Fig. 1). After Manuel has told her what has happened, the woman lets him into her house and calls the police, who come to take him back to school. At the school they ask the boy some questions. The police manage to find the bag in the park with all the contents apart from the mobile phone and give it back to Manuel. Finally, the police take him to the police station.

Interviews 2 to 7 are, instead, part of a ‘secondary investigation’, i.e. one which takes place “after the primary recipient of an incident report has drafted their primary account” (Johnson, 2003, 181). Interviews 2 and 3 were held roughly at the same time in different rooms and feature Leticia and Antonio, who agreed to be taken from hospital and be interviewed under caution as “visitors”, i.e. suspects with no necessity to arrest, recorded for the purpose of integrity (Home Office, 2011: s. 24). In contrast, interviews 4 to 7 feature the suspects when they are under arrest. After interviews 4 and 5, Leticia and Antonio are booked into the custody system and bailed until interviews 6 and 7. At the beginning of the latter, both suspects are re-arrested and faced with the “challenging phase”, where more direct questions are made on anomalies in their story recollections. Following interviews 6 and 7 - at the end of which Leticia and Antonio were again bailed - the facts were presented to the Crown

89 The power which the police possess to arrest persons under s. 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Home Office, 2011) exists in respect of any offence. In order to prevent the power being exercised in an arbitrary manner, it is subject to various safeguards. These include that the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person either has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence. In this case, even though it is an indictable offence, arrest is not deemed necessary as the investigation is still in its infancy and the suspicion is not “strong” enough (e.g. there might have been other people in the room at the time when the incident happened).

90 The arrest comes during the interview.

91 For instance, interview 6 sees Leticia being questioned on the events taking place from the eve of April 27 (when Maria is put to bed) until the arrival of the ambulance on April 28.
Prosecution Service, which decided that there was no case to answer and the investigation concluded with no charges.

During interviews 2 to 7, the police officers specifically seek to look into the death of Maria, the suspects’ daughter, when she was approximately 3 months old. Doctors noted internal bleeding and swelling to the surface of Maria’s brain and bleeding to the back of Maria’s eyes. As a result, early indications to death causes were a head injury following abusive head trauma (AHT) or inflicted traumatic brain injury, i.e. a form of inflicted head trauma that can be caused by direct blows to the head, dropping or throwing a child, or shaking a child. At the time of Maria’s death the suspects, Letícia and Antonio, had been partners for over a year and lived together for approximately the same amount of time. However, they come from a very different backgrounds.

On one hand, Antonio Rossi, born on 15 September 1982 in Benevento (southern Italy), undergoes the (then compulsory) military service in the Italian Navy’s Security forces, and then works as a climber. At the same time, he enrols as a chemistry student at the University of Benevento. However, studies and work prove to be irreconcilable. He takes a test to join the army, which he passes and allows him to start working in barracks near Naples, where he is stationed for two years. He subsequently tries to join the Carabinieri corps, unsuccessfully. As a consequence of this and other disappointments at the barracks Antonio decides to move up North – where his mother lives - in order to find work and start university again. The only shifts he finds, however, are in the night and this does not allow him to pursue his academic career. Under the suggestion of his brother, Silvio – who already lives in the UK – he moves to Lynnborough (UK) in October 2008. There he starts working at a pub as a barman and meets Letícia through a common friend.

On the other, Letícia Cardoso, born in Brazil on 12 November 1977, had already lived in the UK for some time before she meets Antonio, specifically in Guilford in the South West of the country. She moves to a council flat at 30 Manor Street, Sanford (a big city in the north) in 2007 with her daughter Anna Morelli, born in 2001 during a previous relationship. Letícia and Antonio now live together in this same apartment, however they are planning to move to a bigger house soon due to mould infestation.

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92 This type of brain injury is also defined as “shaken baby/shaken impact syndrome” (or SBS).
93 The Carabinieri is the national military police of Italy, policing both military and civilian populations.
Other people involved in the case can be divided into three groups, i.e. other family members, friends, and professional figures:

1. other family members:
   - *Silvio Rossi*: Antonio’s brother, who moves into Antonio and Letícia’s flat approximately three months before the alleged murder;
   - *Ivan Rossi*: Antonio and Silvio’s father, who lives in Via Albero 12 (or 14) in Benevento in the region of Campania (southern Italy);
   - *Letizia*: Ivan’s wife, who lives with her husband in Benevento;
   - *Chiara Merzocchi*: Antonio and Silvio’s mother, who lives in Savona in the region of Liguria (northern Italy).

2. friends:
   - *Rosa de Oliveira*: Letícia’s closest friend, whom she has known since 2003 and who lives in Tedford, a big city in the UK where Letícia also used to live;
   - *Marcos*: Rosa’s son, eight years old (born in 2002), who lives with his mother;
   - *Carmine*: friend who introduced Antonio to Letícia.

3. professional figures:
   - *Maria Tosi*: Letícia’s private gynaecologist in Benevento, who was suggested by Antonio’s father;
   - *Dr Folden*: Letícia’s GP in Marten Lane, Silverston (neighbourhood in Sanford, UK);
   - *PC Janet Lewis*: Officer who brought Letícia at the police station (cf. interview 2);
   - *PC Adam Daniel*: Officer mentioned in interviews 3 and 5.

The sequence of events described in interviews 2-7 can be traced back to December 2008, when Letícia and Antonio met, up to the sudden death of Maria on Friday, 30 April 2010. Table 8 summarises the main events and is intended as a reference in order to follow the excerpts of transcripts analysed in chapter 6 (A stands for Antonio and L for Letícia; the interview dates are highlighted):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>A and L start a relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>A moves houses in Lynnborough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>As soon as A comes back from a trip to Italy, he moves in with L at her home address in 30 Manor Street, Sanford (UK).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A starts working as a night security guard.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>L finds out that she is pregnant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>A and L go for a scan at Saint Paul’s Hospital in Sanford South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A and L decide to go to Italy because an appointment with Dr Tosi was arranged for L; furthermore, A wants to introduce L to his parents. They will end up staying longer than expected due to L’s circulatory system problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anna goes to stay in Tedford at Rosa’s as she cannot miss school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A and L take a train from Sanford Central to London, where they change to Paris and in Paris to Genoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From Genoa A and L travel to Savona, where Antonio’s mother lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>From Savona A and L travel to Benevento, where Antonio’s father lives, in order to see Dr Tosi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 5 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>around 1.30-2 am: L has contractions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>around 2.15 pm: A, L, and Ivan leave to go to a hospital called Benevento Centrale (interview 5A) or San Giuseppe (Interview 4);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>around 3.30 pm: Maria is born. Her weight is 3 kg 302 grammes and is 48 cm long (interview 5A). The delivery lasts approx. 20 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 8 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>L is released from hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 9 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>Due date predicted by Italian doctors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11 February</td>
<td></td>
<td>Due dates predicted in the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two weeks from Maria’s birth, her parents decide to have her baptised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A and L stay in Campania in A’s father’s house for approx. three weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of February</td>
<td>A and L go back to Liguria by train to visit Antonio’s mother.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A and L are advised to wait for at least a month before they fly again.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 12 March</td>
<td>Around 6pm: they fly back to the UK on a JetLine flight from Bergamo (near Milan) to Bristol.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat, 13 March</td>
<td>- A travels by coach to pick up Anna in Tedford;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- L and Maria go to see Dr Folden.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baby clinic appointments are scheduled every Tuesday or Wednesday.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon, 29 March</td>
<td>Anna starts school again.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 9 April</td>
<td>- 4pm: Maria is inoculated against tuberculosis and other diseases at the GP’s;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Maria suffers from constipation, therefore the midwife suggests she should be given</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orange juice diluted with water.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat, 24 April</td>
<td>L, Anna and Maria travel to Rayford rail station in Tedford to visit Rosa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 27 April</td>
<td>- 7pm-9:15pm: L, Anna and Maria travel back from Tedford to Sanford Central;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- pm: A goes to work at 10 pm as he must be there by 10:20 pm. L is feeding Maria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed, 28 April</td>
<td>- Maria sleeps in the straw Moses basket next to L, on the right-hand side of A &amp; L’s bed;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- approx. 4.30 am: first night feed;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- approx. 7 am: second night feed;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- approx. 8 or 8:30: Anna does not wake up, therefore L asks A to check whether she is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ill. A goes, then L goes and speaks to Anna, who tells her she is not well. As a result,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L lets her stay in bed and not go to school;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- L takes a shower, whilst A walks into the kitchen. Maria is asleep in their bedroom;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Maria has convulsions, is red and limp, and froth is coming out of her mouth. A picks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>her up and hands her to L. After moments of panic, L calls an ambulance. Anna listens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to the instructions on the phone and reports them back to A. Maria is taken to Saint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Hospital and then transferred to the intensive care unit of Saint Mark Hospital.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurs, 29 April</td>
<td>Interviews 2 and 3 are held while Maria is still in hospital.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 30 April</td>
<td>Maria dies in hospital.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue, 16 May</td>
<td>Interviews 4 and 5 are held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri, 19 May</td>
<td>Interview 6 is held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat, 20 May</td>
<td>Interview 7 is held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8.* Sequence of events described in interviews 2 to 7.

Data comparability represents an important issue to explore when dealing with authentic data collected in a number of interviews. Although they are different in purpose and nature, the five encounters to which I was given access are fully comparable in terms of the following characteristics:

- Background of the interpreters: as previously pointed out, at the time of the interviews the four legal interpreters were members of the NRPSI. I consider this relevant with a view to gathering a comparable set of data that can provide evidence of what trained interpreters do at work. Given that I could not interview the interpreters, there was no way for me to ascertain whether they worked in bilateral legal settings on a regular or ad-hoc basis. However, I am aware that they received formal training and had been registered with the NRPSI for a number of years. Lastly, the number of interpreters involved – together with the use of a fairly large data set – makes the results of my analysis more generalisable (Hale, 2006: 212).

- Number of participants: with the exception of interview 1 (where the legal adviser and other officers are not required), interviews 2 to 5A see the presence of the interviewee, two officers, and the interviewee’s legal adviser, who mainly acts as an overhearing presence and does not take part in the co-construction of the event (except for a couple of occasions in which they are briefly addressed by the police officer).\(^\text{94}\)

\[^{94}\text{Specifically, interviews 2 to 7 see the participation of: 2: L, I2, P2, P3, La1; 3: A, I3, P4, P5, La2; 4: L, I2, P2, P6, La1; 5: A, I4, P3, P5, La2; 6: L, I2, P2, P7, La1; and 7: A, I3, P3, P5, La2 (cf. also Table 11).}\]
Language pairs: English-Italian (interviews 3 and 5A) and English-Portuguese, in both its Portuguese and Brazilian variation (interviews 1, 2, and 4A).

Setting: each police interviewing room had approximately the same room layout and equipment. The conditions specifically created for the interviewees can be said to vary slightly between interview 1 and the other interviews in terms of room layout and seating arrangements allocated to participants, excluding the interpreter who is always seated next to the interviewee. On one hand, the interview with Manuel features close proximity between the interviewer and the interviewee who is a vulnerable victim of crime in order to enhance “rapport” (Milne, 2004; Milne & Bull, 1999). Fig. 4 shows a graphic representation of the participants’ seating arrangements (for participant initials, see Table 11):

Figure 4. Room layout for interview 1.

As one can see from the position of the video-camera at the bottom right of Fig. 4, the full screen only shows the back of the interpreter’s head and Manuel’s upper body (I1’s head covers Manuel’s legs); thus, one cannot see I1’s face or verify whether she is taking notes or gesturing (unless she waves her hands outside her frame).
On the other hand, interviews related to the murder case tend to feature the police officers facing the interviewee, as is the case for interview 5 (cf. Fig. 5). An open space between the suspect and the police investigator is to be preferred as investigators can analyse the suspect’s body language (e.g. scratching, etc.). I4 is placed on one side so that she does not become a psychological crutch for Antonio. As a result, however, Antonio and the interpreter do not share the same “communicative radius” (Wadensjö, 2011: 82) and the suspect has to turn his head away from the officers in order to look at the interpreter. This may facilitate the establishment of a privileged communicative axis with the officers, but prevent mutual engagement with the interpreter:

Figure 5. Room layout for interview 5.

Thus, the main screen shows the full bodies of I4 on the left, A in the middle and La2 on the right.95 The camera is zoomed in on A’s drawings (cf. Appendix B) from utterances 1467-1517, 1535 to 1553, 1563 to 1570, 1571-1583, 1695-1730, and 1735-1744.

95 The small screen is on the top right corner of the big screen, wedged in between A’s and La2’s head (i.e. on the door).
Conversational purposes and “stages” of interview: as seen in chapter 1, the investigative interview protocol known as ECI seeks to generate a large amount of information from either a suspect or a witness. The longest rapport phase is in interview 1 as proper use of rapport child witness interviews appears to be present in the majority of good practice memoranda (Davies & Westcott, 1999: 20ff.). Note that interviews 3A, 4A and 5A do not include phases 4 to 8 as my transcripts are part of a longer interview (see Table 10).

In this section, I have discussed the difficulties and potential advantages and disadvantages of my data compilation and selection. I will now turn to the theoretical issues which are involved in the analysis of the naturally-occurring data described so far.

5.2 Analysing discourse markers in mediated police interviews: A two-pronged approach

In order to address the research questions set out in chapter 4 my analysis will be based only on those sequences in the total set of recorded data which contain DMs as they are introduced by participants and interpreters. This means that DMs are analysed within the utterances in which they occur, with a view to investigating and describing the interpreter’s use and interpretation of DMs in naturally-occurring police interviews.

In terms of methodology, I follow the most recent trends in CI studies (Grbić & Pöllabauer, 2006: 256ff.; Pöchhaker, 2004), as I adopt a descriptive, qualitative method of inquiry, which “seek[s] to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (Van Maanen, 1979: 520). In other words, my thesis strives to describe and interpret the variable of DMs in a transcribed corpus generated in real-life police interpreting sessions, in this way ruling out both an empiricist approach which relies only on factual evidence, but at the same time addressing the criticism sometimes levelled at more rationalist positions, i.e. that their theoretical claims are not based on ‘real’ data.96

Given that the main object of my thesis is to explore the overall effect of the use (or renditions) of DMs by police interpreters on the interaction, my large-scale theoretically-
A grounded, empirical study of DMs in interpreter-mediated police interviews is characterised by a combined approach, proceeding from the broader levels of social context to the intricacies of cognitive processes. This means that both interactional (cf. chapter 3) and relevance-theoretic (cf. chapter 4) approaches will be adopted in order to relate micro-level analysis of participants’ utterances to the broader, macro-level issues of role and power distribution that have dominated discussion in interpreter-mediated communication (cf. 2.2.2).

The cognitively grounded relevance-theoretic account of the semantics of DMs and their role in establishing voice might be considered to be at odds with treatments of interpreter-mediated encounters in terms of dialogic interaction (cf. Wadensjö, 1998). However, in this thesis I shall make a case for an interdisciplinary approach in which the two types of approach complement (rather than compete with) each other in various ways. A strong case for the co-existence of discourse-analytic and RT-based studies of interpreter-mediated events was made by Mason (2006b), who states that it is a way of “fill[ing] the gap between the turn-by-turn analysis of talk in its narrowest sense and the ethnographic study of interpreters as social beings and of the events in which they participate” (Mason, 2006b: 117).  

On a macro-level, Goffman’s frameworks of social interaction and discourse analysis provide a deeper, more complex understanding of the nature of rights and responsibilities within an interpreter-mediated encounter. Wadensjö’s *Interpreting as Interaction* (1998) suggests that we can understand the task of interpreting much better if we alter our perspective to account for the interactivity of the primary participants, rather than looking only at the interpreter and/or the interpreted message. In Wadensjö’s (1998: 195) own words: “In an interpreter-mediated conversation, the progression and substance of talk, the distribution of responsibility for this among co-interlocutors, and what, as a result of interaction, becomes mutual and shared understanding - all will to some extent depend on the interpreter’s words and deeds”.

I adopt Wadensjö’s analysis of dialogue interpreting which is based on Goffman’s influential concept of participation framework in order to explain the interactional aspects of police interpreting as an activity taking place in - and, simultaneously, shaping - a specific situation, and in particular an individual’s involvement (or “status of participation”) in communicative interaction. Wadensjö’s model will serve to account for dynamic changes in the constellation

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97 In his work, Mason (2006a, 2006b) adopts certain aspects of RT to analyse interpreted exchange, in particular the notion of “mutual cognitive environment” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 41) required for relevant communication to occur. However, this “should not be taken to imply espousal of the whole theory” (Mason, 2006b: 120).
of ‘speaker-hearer’ roles at utterance level and for the organisation of communicative interaction “through potentially changing alignments in the ongoing flow of discourse” (Wadensjö, 1998: 86). As highlighted in chapter 2, this analysis in the context of interpreted police interviews has proved to be a useful analytical tool to explore the nature of the interpretation by looking at the appropriateness of particular renditions and the interpreter’s shifts in footing (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 2009; Nakane, 2007, 2008).

At the same time, I will focus on the mental processes underlying language use and adopt the relevance-theoretical approach to interpreting outlined in chapter 3. In particular, this approach provides a framework which explains how DMs – or more generally expressive devices – are used as evidence of ‘voice’. In this framework DMs can be treated as a means of discovering whose voice is heard in interpreter-mediated exchanges – the interpreter’s or the original speaker’s.

As mentioned earlier (cf. 4.3.1), DMs are the focus of controversy in semantics and pragmatics not only because they raise problems for traditional truth-conditional semantics, but also because they lie at the interface between linguistically encoded and contextually derived meaning. As we have seen, I follow Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) relevance-theoretical approach to the classification of DMs which says that the expressions which have been described as DMs do not in fact constitute a uniform classification from the point of view of their semantics. In particular, the total set of expressions that have been called DMs include both expressions which encode concepts and which contribute straightforwardly to the conceptual representations, and expressions which do not encode constituents of conceptual content, but which activate procedures for interpreting the relevance of the proposition expressed by the utterances that contain them. This distinction is based on a cognitively grounded approach to communication, one in which utterance understanding involves performing inferential computations over conceptual representations (cf. chapter 4).

Following Blakemore’s (2002) approach, I restrict therefore my analysis to the following ‘DMs’ or procedural expressions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EN</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>IT&lt;sup&gt;98&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Então, agora</td>
<td>Adesso, ecco, allora, ora, dunque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So</td>
<td>Então, por tanto</td>
<td>Allora, ora, dunque, cosi, quindi, sicché, perciò, pertanto / per cui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreover / besides</td>
<td>Além disso, além do mais</td>
<td>Inoltre, anche, per di più, oltre a ciò</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indeed</td>
<td>Claro, certo, por certo</td>
<td>Appunto, infatti, già</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After all</td>
<td>Afinal, depois de tudo</td>
<td>Alla fine, dopotutto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But / nevertheless</td>
<td>Mas, porém, só que</td>
<td>Ma, però, nondimeno, solo che, eppure, tuttavia, invece, bensì</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>However</td>
<td>Todavia, contudo, entretanto</td>
<td>Tuttavia, comunque, invece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyway</td>
<td>Contudo, entretanto</td>
<td>Comunque, tanto, in ogni caso / modo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>Então, bem, bom</td>
<td>Allora, dunque, ecco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Non-exhaustive list of DMs analysed (Blakemore, 2002).

It will be recalled that according to Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) an utterance achieves relevance to the extent that it achieves cognitive effects. As Blakemore has argued, this suggests we might expect to find “signposts” (Jucker, 1992: 438) which activate inferential

<sup>98</sup> For further discussion on Italian DMs, see Bazzanella (1995: 251-3).
processes that lead to each of the three types of cognitive effects Sperber & Wilson have identified – contextual implication, strengthening, and elimination. This is not to say that procedural devices are exhausted by these three sorts of function. Nor is it to say that the meaning of a procedural DM is exhausted by its role in leading a hearer to one of these three cognitive effects; both *but* and *however*, for example, might be said to the function of the cognitive effect of elimination. However, as Blakemore (2002) has shown, they are not intersubstitutable in all contexts. Thus, in restricting the data in this section of the paper to the abovementioned DMs I do not intend to suggest that the function that they exemplify are representative of all procedural DMs.99

It must be also noted that the DMs listed in the Portuguese and Italian columns are not direct translations of the English DMs found in Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) work. According to cross-linguistic and typological research (e.g. Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2006, 2011), DMs can be found in many languages. However, not all languages have the same range of lexically encoded constrains on inference; and even where an expression in one language has a role which corresponds to one played by an expression in another language, it may turn out that one of these expressions has other roles which do not correspond to roles played by the other.100

This raises a methodological issue. According to Mason (2006b: 114) “in the absence of access to the interpreter’s thought processes” the researcher can show evidence of ostensive behaviour, yet they “can only suggest possible inferences, except where succeeding turns at talk provide evidence of actual take-up of particular meanings by participants”. This is a point which may also been made about Seleskovitch & Lederer’s (1984) interpretive model. I would argue that a researcher can gain access to ‘deverbalised’ (Lederer, 1994/2003) processing – which indeed takes place in a non-verbal cognitive state – by analysing the reconstituted form of the verbalised output after the re-expression stage. Thus, one of the aims of this work is to observe the police interpreter’s sensitivity to the pragmatics expressed, how

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99 For an up-to-date approach to the justification for procedural meaning, see Wilson (2011).
100 For example, it may seem that both Japanese expressions *dakara* and *sorede* correspond to the English expression *so*. However, Sasamoto (2008) shows that while *dakara* and *sorede* seem to lead the hearer to different interpretations, the difference in interpretation is not reflected linguistically in English. In other words, an English native speaker would use *so* in order to achieve both types of effects and the hearer would be expected to recover the difference on the basis of the context (including prosodic clues).
this is conveyed in the interpretation, and the likely outcome of the interpreter’s respective choices for the interaction.

To conclude, while both Goffman’s (1981) interactional framework and Sperber & Wilson’s cognitive framework have generated spirited debate, they have nonetheless resulted in insightful analyses. However, the question is whether one type of framework on its own can be taken as the basis for the complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon of (police) interpreting, or whether it is possible to develop an analysis which encompasses both the cognitive and the social dimensions of communication. This, in turn, raises the question of whether it is at all possible to reconcile these two theories (and their account of human communication) in a unitary interdisciplinary framework.

5.3 Sub-personal and personal levels of explanation

As discussed in the previous chapters, there are different ways of looking at communication. A number of scholars believe that linguistic communication obeys the rules embodied in what is generally called grammar, defined as “a device which generates all and only the grammatical [i.e. correct] sentences of a language” (Crystal, 1981: 221, citing Chomsky, 1957). This assumption has been challenged by linguists and sociologists alike. They have pointed out that language (as it is generated by grammar) is not necessary for human communication and that grammar is not sufficient for human communication to occur. Indeed, human communication rarely unfolds in accordance with the strict rules of grammar. But how? Linguistic and sociological theories tend to differ significantly in the ways they answer such question regarding human communication.

At the beginning of chapter 4 I have analysed Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) view, according to which the connections created by cohesive elements of discourse contribute to the distinction between a text and a mere string of unrelated sentences; accordingly, a text is seen as having “texture, and this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text” (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 2). They recognise the importance of the relationship between language structure and its use in communication, but their object of study is limited to linguistic features, as it is explained in the following passage:
The internal and the external aspects of ‘texture’ are not wholly separable, and the reader, or listener, does not separate them when responding unconsciously to a passage of speech or writing. But when the linguist seeks to make explicit the basis on which these judgments are formed, he is bound to make observations of two rather different kinds. The one concerns relations within the language, patterns of meaning realized by grammar and vocabulary; the other concerns the relations BETWEEN the language and the relevant features of the speaker’s and hearer’s (...) material, social and ideological environment. (...) in this book we are concerned with the LINGUISTIC factors that are characteristic of texts in English. (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 20; my emphasis)

As Blakemore (2002: 153) points out, while Halliday & Hasan have stressed the importance of the role played by non-linguistic situational factors, they seem to argue that these context-dependent aspects of textuality fall within the domain of linguistics, “since they are encoded in exactly the same way as the linguistically determined […] aspects of a text are”. At the same time, Blakemore continues, if we turn to a functionalist account of the role of situational factors in utterance interpretation (such as the one proposed by Schiffrin, 1994), then we end up with a personal-level account which aims to explain how people communicate in a social context. Such an account contrasts with sub-personal accounts in Chomskyan linguistics which abstract away from the socially determined factors constraining what people do and focuses only on the cognitive mechanisms (processes and principles) underlying what people do. The question is whether the move to a personal-level account is inevitable if we aim to examine the contextual or situational factors that play a role in utterance interpretation. As we have seen, Goffman’s social interaction view takes this personal-level account. However, the RT approach to pragmatics outlined in chapter 4 is based on the assumption that the move to a personal-level approach is not inevitable, and that the way in which people understand utterances in context can be explained in sub-personal terms.

The idea that pragmatics should provide personal-level explanations is advocated by Mey (1993: 81), who argues that pragmatics should say something about “real communicative interaction, as it happens in our society”. He argues that a theory which abstracts away from social factors is treating people as mindless automatons. This criticism is specifically directed at RT which, as we have seen in 4.1, sees the domain of pragmatics as the cognitive computations involved in recovering Interpretations on the basis of the interaction between the linguistic properties of utterances and the context (where this is defined in terms of the assumptions that are accessible to the hearer). The question is whether Mey’s criticism is
justified, and in particular whether it can be assumed that people are able to communicate in a social context without an understanding of the sub-personal systems that enable human beings to communicate.

In shifting “the whole centre of gravity of pragmatic theory by locating it firmly in a general theory of cognition” (Levinson, 1989: 455), Sperber & Wilson have developed a theory whose aims are analogous to those of generative grammar. In particular, both RT and generative grammar aim to give sub-personal explanations which are fully explicit. In contrast, socially oriented approaches lack the generality required for an account of comprehension which covers all utterances. In Carston’s (2002b: 91) words:

[Both RT and Chomsky] aim at “generativity”, in at least one sense of the term: that is, full explicitness, leaving nothing to the intuitions of the reader or user, so that the description or mechanisms specified could be employed by a mindless automaton with the same results as in the human case. (...) the extent to which Relevance Theory has succeeded in providing sub-personal explanations of the aim for explicitness is another matter.

However, in contrast with generative grammar, RT assumes that communication involves two distinct cognitive mechanisms, namely coding-decoding and inference. In particular, it has been argued that the decoding mechanisms studied by generative grammarians are not sufficient for successful communication and that the ability to entertain representations of other people’s thoughts and desires on the basis of the linguistic evidence provided by an utterance must also depend on their inferential abilities. This means that a cognitive account of communication within the model of generative grammar would be inappropriate (cf. Blakemore, 2002).

This distinction between the process of decoding and the process of making inferences from evidence is the basis of the relevance-theoretic distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Decoding is performed by an autonomous linguistic system (the grammar) which is dedicated to the performance of mappings between an utterance and its semantic representation. In contrast, the inferential process integrates the output of decoding with contextual information in order to yield a hypothesis about the speaker’s informative intention.
According to RT these inferential processes are constrained by the communicative principle of relevance, which is itself grounded in a cognitive principle which constrains the way in which human beings approach (non-communicated) information (cf. 4.2.1). However, in contrast with Grice’s co-operative principle and maxims, such principles are not maxims which are either followed or flouted by speakers in a communicative interaction, but apply automatically in every case of ostensive inferential communication. In other words, they must be seen as an ‘automatic reflex’ of the human mental capacity, so much as relevance is analysed as a form of ‘unconscious’ inference:

Communicators and audience need no more know the principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce (…) Communicators do not “follow” the principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to. The principle of relevance applies without exception; every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 162).

At the same time, as both Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) and Carston (2002a) have underlined, RT is even more inferential than Grice envisaged. In particular, the gap between the encoded meaning of utterances and the propositions they express must be filled by pragmatically constrained inference and contextual assumptions. This means that Grice’s thesis that the identification of what is said (explicit meaning) does not involve inference or general maxims governing communication cannot be maintained (cf. 4.2.2).

Nevertheless, Sperber & Wilson see Grice as having laid the foundations of a cognitive approach to pragmatics based on the idea that communication involves inferential processes in the recognition of intentions. This ‘underdeterminacy’ thesis aims to account for the discrepancy between the meaning encoded in linguistic expressions and the proposition expressed by the utterance of these expressions. The code model of communication is said to be descriptively inadequate since comprehension involves much more than the decoding of a

101 The fact that the principles of relevance are exceptionless generalisation raises the issue of falsifiability of the theory (Huang, 1994, 2000; Levinson, 1989; see also Wilson & Sperber, 2004, for a reply to such criticism).
102 There are also personal-level interpretations of Grice, such as Leech’s (1983) social approach to pragmatics, whereby Gricean maxims have their roots in social structures. In particular, Leech sees Grice’s cooperative principle and maxims as “essentially a theory about how people use language” (1983: 102) efficiently and effectively in conversation. However, it is worth pointing out that although Grice contemplated the possibility that there is a social basis for his maxims, he quickly dismissed this argument (cf. his discussion of the basis for the maxims).
linguistic signal. According to pragmatics, the gap between the semantic representation of a sentence and the messages conveyed by uttering such a sentence is thus filled by inferential processes, which generally depend on speakers’ intentions and human beings’ real-world knowledge. In other words, communication in both classical and neo-Gricean pragmatics is achieved through, on the one hand, the speaker’s intention to convey a certain meaning and, on the other, the hearer’s mental processes to infer such meaning on the basis of the evidence provided.

In a relevance-theoretical perspective, context is defined as a set of contextual assumptions, which are propositional in nature and accessed by the hearer for use in pragmatic inference. Contextual assumptions may be about anything relevant (e.g. the hearer, cultural norms, general knowledge, etc.) and derived not just from the Interpretation of the preceding utterance, but also from the hearer’s observation of the physical environment and from memory. However, it should not be assumed that these assumptions must be available to the hearer in advance of the utterance. On the contrary, it seems that they are made accessible by the utterance itself or, in other words, that they are identified as the result of Interpreting the utterance (rather than a pre-requisite for its Interpretation). As an illustration, let us consider example (40) from Blakemore (1992: 126):

(40) A: Do you like this music?
   B: I’ve never liked atonal music.

On the assumption that B’s reply is optimally relevant, the hearer will access the assumption “the music we are listening is atonal” in order to derive an optimally relevant answer to A’s question. This relevance-theoretic, sub-personal definition of context differs significantly from theories which analyse context at a personal level and, in particular, from Goffman’s interpersonal definition of context.

As discussed in 3.1, Goffman provides new insight into the nature of social interaction. Its original motivation for the study of interaction is however “not about the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another” (1967: 2; my emphasis). In fact, Goffman’s dramaturgical theory suggests that a person’s identity is not a stable and independent psychological entity; rather, it is constantly remade as the person interacts with others.
In developing a front (i.e. standard elements of social performance such as appearance and manner, repeatedly used by actors in their interactions with others), information about the actor is conveyed through a series of communicative sources, which are to be controlled to effectively convince the hearer(s) of the appropriateness of behaviour in line with their role. As noted in 3.1, it follows that social credibility is constructed in terms of both verbal meaning (which is used by the actor to establish intent) and non-verbal meaning (which is used by the audience to verify the veridicity of the actor’s statements). Attempts are made to present an “idealised” version of the front, more consistent with the norms, mores, and laws of society than the behaviour of the actor when not before an audience (Goffman, 1959: 35).

As an illustration of Goffman’s notion of context let us take the influential paper The neglected situation (Goffman, 1964). Here, the author criticises the definition of social context in terms of correlations between macro-level sociological variables (such as class, institutional roles and gender) and claims that situations have their own properties that derive from the abovementioned fact of interlocutors’ co-presence. Goffman’s notion of context must therefore be understood as the ad-hoc situation or space of mutual monitoring possibilities.

According to his studies, three conditions apply for such context to be created, i.e.: (a) mutuality (the capacity of the participants to notice and attend to each other); (b) participants co-occupy the same space-time (the here and now); and, finally, (c) reciprocity (the participants are both perceivable and able to perceive one another). However, it is worth mentioning that such conditions are not necessarily activated all the time and in all fields, but rather they are alive as potentials. Thus, Goffman’s context can be seen as “minimally structured, logically prior to an utterance, and notably lacking any object beyond the copresent parties. (…) the situation provides a sort of ‘prior outside’ into which speech and language are projected through utterance acts” (Eckert, 2004: 112).

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103 For further discussion on the notions of context (and, in particular, Goffman’s notion), see Wadensjö (1998: 96ff).

104 A distinction is also made between merely situated and inherently situated aspects of speech production. On one hand, merely situated factors are linguistic and symbolic structures embedded in utterances, but do not depend on the situation in terms of their definition. On the other, inherently situated factors are said to include timing and delivery of utterances, which reflect the ad-hoc mutual adjustments between interlocutors (Goffman, 1964).
In this way, dialogic speech in Goffman’s interactional framework is argued to be situated in the perceptible, interactive relation between interlocutors, and the three abovementioned conditions apply. This can be further explained by underlining Goffman’s distinction between text transmission and infusion. Goffman’s analysis of a university lecture not simply as a form of information delivery, but also as a type of interaction is a case in point.

According to Goffman (1981: 167), a lecture is a form of talk held in a traditional, highly ritualistic context (i.e. in a university or amongst scholars) and differs from a written text by its responsiveness to the current audience and ad-hoc situation. This responsiveness is mainly achieved through devices such as topical references and other topicality tokens, fresh talk, amongst others.105

In this context, the lecturer is defined by Goffman as both animator, author, and principal and presents himself in his full bodily being; he opens up and exposes his ‘self’, makes himself accessible to the audience (and the audience only) as compared to the non-exclusive access provided by the printed version of the same lecture. Thus, the speaker’s exposure to the audience and his commitment to the particular situation are to be analysed as fundamental “ritual work” (Goffman, 1981: 191) which differentiates the delivery of a lecture from its printed text:

The context of a lecture is not to be understood as something distinctive to and characteristic of lecturing. (…) Audiences in fact attend because a lecture is more than a text transmission (…) They attend in part because of something that is infused into the speaking on the occasion of the text transmission, an infusion that ties the text into the occasion (…) Plainly, noise here is a very limited notion. For what is noise from the perspective of the text as such can be the music of interaction - the very source of the auditor’s satisfaction in the occasion, the very difference between reading a lecture at home and attending one. (Goffman, 1981: 186)

In this way, this ritual analysed by Goffman is performed in order to connect the content at hand with the immediate situation. The speaker aims to the “mingling of the living and the

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105 DMs are included in this category of ‘contextualising devices’.
read” (Goffman, 1981: 168), i.e. to align the audience with the text and to assure them that they are capable of understanding the content of the lecture.

Goffman’s (1963, 1981) notion of situation thus represents a layer of context which is prior to language, but where a distinction is made between merely and inherently situated factors. The parties to discourse are seen to play a key role in such context and to sustain various degrees of involvement in social practice. His distinction between unfocused and focused interaction clarifies this: the former refers to mere situations, while the latter refers to settings (called “encounters”) in which the participants share a common orientation. In focused interactions, Goffman further explores the degree of intensity of involvement and the distribution of such involvement amongst the interlocutors over time. This, in turn, led Goffman to distinguish among contexts according to how they regulate involvement (i.e. modes of occupancy of position) and the overall “tightness or looseness” of contexts (Goffman, 1963: 198-210). In other words, the embedding of utterance production in such (social) contexts defines a space of involvement among agents.

To sum up, relevance theorists view the notion of context as a “psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995: 15) which derive from memory, perception, knowledge of the world, current discourse, etc. Therefore the RT framework is heavily grounded in cognition and recognises “aspects of the world, intentionalities and meaning in language only through evidence of their mental representations” (Setton, 1999: 267). In contrast, in a sociolinguistic perspective context is grounded in the nature of social (and cultural) interaction rather than cognition. I wish to conclude by returning to the main question which is the focus of this section: given that Goffman’s approach to communication is a personal-level approach and Sperber & Wilson’s approach aims for a sub-personal explanation, is there any way in which they can be reconciled?

There are multiple points of interface between the two theories discussed above. Firstly, as pointed out at the beginning of this section, both theories offer alternative models to the fundamental determinacy of linguistically encoded meaning and recognise that comprehension involves much more than the decoding of a linguistic signal; see, for instance, linguistic underdeterminacy thesis discussed above or Goffman’s (1967) sociological notion of face as a the public self-image that every speaker wants to claim for themselves.
A parallel can also be drawn between the relevance-theoretic distinction between first-order informative intention and a higher-order (communicative) intention – the attribution of which is yielded by ostensive behaviour (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wharton, 2008, 2009) - and Goffman’s notion of communication as intentional stage behaviour, whereby not all interactions are necessarily communicative (see process of “dramatic realization” as in Goffman (1959) discussed before; cf. Mason, 2006a, as discussed in 4.2).

However, different in scope and aims, this idea of a situated context, where speech incessantly transforms and adapts to situations, is nevertheless shared by both RT and Goffman. In particular, the common emphasis on mutual shared understanding and meaning\textsuperscript{106} led authors such as Pöchhacker (2004: 79) to remark on “considerable shared ground between the DI paradigm and the cognitive-pragmatic approach” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 79). In other words, both theories take seriously the “real-time on-line nature” (Mason, 2006: 360) of communication and consider it as a process of joint negotiation of meanings among participants and the context as a dynamic set of assumptions used by participants. The utterance is thus seen as embedded in a specific, immediate communicative context and there is nothing for language to be, only the occasions of utterances and the face-to-face immediacy of spoken encounters.

For instance, Wadensjö (1992, 1998) defines Goffman’s (1981) notion of footing as a “person’s alignment (as speaker and hearer) to a particular utterance”, thus emphasising the simultaneity of ‘speakership’ and ‘listenership’ (cf. 3.2) and implying that talk in face-to-face interaction is carried out and ‘created’ in parallel with listening (where listening may include overt verbal activity; cf. back-channelling).

It may be the case that a single model cannot provide a complete account of every aspect of communication (or indeed interpreting). The relevance-theoretical emphasis on context as mental representation can be argued to downplay features of context as a form of social interaction, a “socially constituted, interactively sustained (…) phenomenon” (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992: 6), i.e. the power relations involved. These issues have been shown to assume varying degrees of importance in any kind of ‘discourse’, but are particularly important to explain aspects of interaction in dialogue (and, thus, police) interpreting, which has been defined as a truly triadic event or “communicative pas de trois” (Wadensjö, 1998:

\textsuperscript{106} In relevance-theoretical terms, I refer to the idea that communication enlarges the mutual cognitive environment of the participants; for a definition, see section 4.2.3 and Cartson (2002a).
As we have seen, Mey (1993) argued that in abstracting away from the social factors which govern communication, RT has portrayed human beings as mindless automatons, instead of ‘social’ beings who interact in “pre-existing [socially determined] conditions” (Mey, 1993: 82). However, as Blakemore (2002) points out, a theory which abstracts away from the socially determined conditions which affect interaction does not necessarily assume that people do not operate in socially determined conditions or that human assumptions or beliefs cannot be culturally or socially determined. The question raised by RT is whether one can have a personal-level explanation of communicative behaviour of people in socially determined conditions without first having a sub-personal explanation of the cognitive systems that enable people to behave in such conditions. Thus, one can argue that while it is true that “the social character and context of communication are (...) essential to the wider picture” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 279), it is also true that “in communicating in a social context people are enabled by various sub-personal systems – grammatical competence, an inferencing system, the visual system” (Blakemore, 2002: 8). In other words, communication in socially determined conditions as described by Goffman can be said to be enabled by a sub-personal inferencing system as described by RT.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted the interdependency of the principal components of my design. The main purposes of this thesis and the conceptual context (that is, the theoretical assumptions and frameworks informing and guiding the study) are linked up with the research questions as a central component, which are in turn closely interrelated with the methods to be used.

This chapter has provided a description of the data selection and collection, as well as of the working methods and procedures essential to understand how the two theories I have presented in chapters 3 and 4 can be practically implemented to address and answer my research questions, however great the tension between the two (cf. 5.3).

As a disciplinary entity which is more than the sum of its parts, police interpreting is free to develop along various pathways. My work aims to do so simultaneously, ‘pushing the envelope’ in several interconnected directions by combining a micro-linguistic (pragmatic)
analysis with macro-social understanding. This approach is based on the view that communication cannot be described as “corollaries of relevance theory” (Ward & Horn 1999: 556) – in other words, as following readily from the concepts of RT – and that they should be investigated by focusing on the points of contact between the cognitive and social aspects of communication. As Simon (2000: 25) states in a passage on his theory of bounded rationality, “rational behavior in the real world is as much determined by the ‘inner environment’ of people’s minds, both their memory contents and their processes, as by the ‘outer environment’ of the world on which they act, and which acts on them”. Further, there are multiple points of interface between the two research traditions in interpreting studies discussed in chapters 3 and 4, one based on a personal and the other on a sub-personal view of human interaction.

Having presented the conceptual design and methodological frameworks underlying this work, the next analytical chapter will show how the tools and notions selected can be implemented and related to each other with a view to answering the research questions. In other words, I will attempt to show how Wadensjö’s and the relevance-theoretic approach can be combined to analyse interpreter-mediated police interviews.
CHAPTER 6

Analysis of the police interpreter’s use of discourse markers

This chapter summarises the most significant results of my relevance-theoretic and sociolinguistic analyses of interpreters’ treatment of DMs found in video-recorded, naturally-occurring data consisting of transcribed and anonymised excerpts from all phases of the ECI (Milne & Bull, 1999, 2006; Milne, 2004).

As discussed in section 4.3.1, the use of expressions such as so and well are justified within RT in terms of their role in communication: their use provides a means of reducing the effort the hearer must invest in recovering the intended interpretation of an utterance, contributing to the recovery of the intended cognitive effects for minimum processing costs. We have also seen that in contrast with conceptual analyses (e.g. Fraser, 1990; Grice, 1989), the RT procedural analysis predicts that DMs are not only difficult to acquire by L2 learners, but also that they are difficult to translate. Recall that according to our analysis expressions such as so and well encode computational information, and as Sperber & Wilson (1993) point out, computations are extremely difficult – if not impossible – to define or translate. Moreover, as Blakemore has shown (2002), the particular contribution of a DM varies from context to context. At the same time, Blakemore (2010, 2011) has argued that these expressions play a key role in allowing writers and speakers – including interpreters – to provide faithful interpretations of other people’s thoughts, and this means we should expect to see DMs used by interpreters who have the aim of providing faithful interpretations of the thoughts communicated by speakers in another language. Given these conflicting considerations, it is important to evaluate instances in which interpreters render or, more generally, use or omit these devices and whether their treatment facilitates shared understanding by making a comprehension pattern more evident in a communicative circle in which all parties acquire participation statuses constantly negotiated in interaction (Wadensjö, 1998).

107 Again, it must be highlighted that, in this work, the notion of faithfulness refers to the degree of faithfulness governed by the search for optimal relevance, and as such it significantly differs from the legal requirement for a ‘faithful’ rendering of the original enshrined in police interpreters’ Codes of Practice (Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 2006; cf. 4.4).
In my corpus, DMs are ubiquitous and integral to the ongoing understanding in police interpreting. In the analyses that follow, I shall highlight how these commonly used elements guide the hearer to an intended interpretation even though they do not contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterance that contains them. However, interpreting practice is quite variable with respect to the approach to these intrinsically communicative and effective devices. Loosely based on Wadensjö’s (1993/2002) distinction between *expanded*, *reduced*, and *substituting* renditions, I shall firstly distinguish between three broad categories with reference to the extent the interpreter departs from the contextual implications derived from the original utterance. In the first section, I will focus on data from my corpus featuring passages in which the interpreter translates the DMs ‘operationally’ or accurately\(^\text{108}\) and can be said to act as animator. In section 6.2, I will turn to examples in which the interpreter’s rendition does not include DMs found in the original utterance, thus providing no linguistic indication of the type of inference process that the hearer is expected to engage in and making the interpreter an author. Section 6.3 explores utterances which include the addition of procedural elements which do not have a corresponding element in the source utterance. In particular, section 6.3.1 focuses on cases in which the interpreter’s rendition includes DMs not found in the original and which must be attributed to the interpreter, who is thus taking responsibility as principal. Section 6.3.2 analyses an interesting and so far unexplored set of examples in which the interpreter’s rendition includes a DM not found in the original, but which is nevertheless understood as being attributed to the original speaker, allowing the interpreter/author to ascribe to the hearer the responsibility for what they say (cf. 4.3.4). Lastly, section 6.4 analyses the use of non-equivalent DMs in interpreters’ renditions, i.e. DMs which appear not to trigger comparable procedures and, thus, do not seem to play a role in the delivery of a faithful Interpretation of the original.

\(^{108}\) From a relevance-theoretic point of view the term *accuracy* could be taken to suggest replication or identity, which does not describe the nature of interpreting, as emphasised in chapter 4. However, the term is used here as it “appears in the literature on interpreting as a widely accepted yardstick” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 141) to gauge interpreters’ performance at a deeper level.
6.1 ‘Operational’ or accurate renditions of discourse markers

Although they represent more the exception than the rule (especially in interviews 3A and 5A), the category of operationally rendered DMs found in my corpus mirror the general trend in terms of frequency of DMs, which is in line with previous findings in Police studies (cf. Johnson, 2002; MacLeod, 2010). According to this trend, DMs such as so - activating particular types of contexts - are characterised by the highest correspondence rates, followed by procedural (generally adversative) elements such as but or however. In order to illustrate this category, consider the following extract which is part of a prolonged questioning sequence from phase 4 of interview 1, featuring a vulnerable child (Manuel).109 Here, the interviewer (P1) uses a ‘specific-closed’ question which aims to close down an interviewee’s response, thus allowing only a relatively narrow range of responses:

Extract 3 (1: 822-823)110

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>822</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>So when you were walking out er:: towards the gate (.). he wasn’t er carrying the gun then in his hand?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>823</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Então quando tu já estavas a fug- a:: andar para o portão er:: ele já não tinha a arma [na mão? ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>So when you were already runn- wa:: walking towards the gate er:: he already didn’t have the gun [in his hand?]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previously, Manuel stated that the alleged robber was holding the gun in his hand “normally”, wrapped around a white cloth (486). However, Manuel does not seem to remember the robber holding the gun in the moment when he ran out of the park. In her rendition of 822, Mariza can be said to produce a faithful interpretation of the original as she renders the original DM so (832) with a corresponding DM in Portuguese (então), which contributes to relevance in a similar way in that it guides the hearer towards the intended contextual effects. In particular, it constrains relevance by directly specifying the kind of effect that is intended – in this case, the

109 For a discussion on the ECI phases, see 1.1.
110 In this chapter I have used bold to indicate DMs under discussion.
derivation of a contextual implication. A hearer recognises that he is expected to access a particular set of contextual assumptions for the interpretation of utterances 822 and 823, namely, one which includes the assumption in: If Manuel does not seem to remember the robber holding the gun in the moment when he ran out of the park, then the robber “wasn’t er carrying the gun then in his hand”. The hearer is expected to access those contextual assumptions which enable him to interpret the second segment as a conclusion derived from the proposition expressed by the first. Interactionally, one must notice the self-correction and the addition of the adverb “already” in 823.

A similar analysis can be applied to the following excerpt, taken from an earlier stage of interview 1’s questioning phase. Here, Manuel is being questioned with regards to the position of the mobile phone in the early stages of the robbery:

Extract 4 (1: 418-442)

| 418 | M   | E:: o homem disse pa eu (.) para:: dar-lhe o (.) para:: pôr o telemóvel no bolso (.) e para o
|     |     | And:: the man told me to (.) to:: give him the (.) to:: put the mobile in the pocket (.) and to
|     |     | seguir pro: (.) pra o parque
|     |     | follow him to the: (.) to the park
| 419 | I1  | The man said to him put the mobile in your: (.) pocket (.) and follow me into the park (.) can I just clarify one thing (.) which pocket was it that he:: [that...]
| 420 | P1  | [well ] I'll I'll come to that
| 421 | I1  | Okay sorry alright ((slight giggle)) eu ia perguntar-te que bolso era mas ele já vai
|     |     | I was going to ask you which pocket it was but he’s about to
|     |     | perguntar isso (.) well whose pocket anyway that’s what I meant to say (.) his or the (.) the
|     |     | ask you that
|     |     | the man’s
| 422 | P1  | Mh (.) ye- yeah can can you cla- clarify that (.) ’cause you said your pocket and and...
| 423 | I1  | Exactly
| 424 | P1 | Is it er: [is that wh- whose po-] just say whose pocket was it ( ) |
| 425 | I1 | [em que bolso foi que ] [no teu?] |
|     |     | [in which pocket was it] [in yours?] |
|     |     | ele pediu-te de pôr no bolso o: o telemóvel (.) [no teu ] bolso ou no bolso dele? |
|     |     | he asked you to put in the pocket [the mobile] [in your] pocket or in his pocket? |
| 426 | M  | [mine ] |
|     |     | [no meu] |
|     |     | [in mine] |
|     |     | °no meu casaco° |
|     |     | °in my coat° |
| 427 | I1 | In his own yeah that’s correct yeah |
| 428 | P1 | So which one of your pockets did you put it back into? |
| 429 | M  | Er:: er in in the:: in the:: like (.) that ((he puts his right hand in the hoodie’s right front pocket)) |
| 430 | I1 | In er:: |
| 431 | M  | Aqui ((keeps on indicating the same pocket)) |
| 432 | I1 | Er:: in that one |
| 433 | P1 | Is that is that in your coat or in your jacket? |
| 434 | M  | Er... |
| 435 | I1 | No teu casaco o dentro do:: no teu: casaco que tinhas pra fora ou no casaco da uniforme? |
|     |     | In your coat the inside of the:: in your: coat that you had on the outside or in the blazer? |
| 436 | M  | Não no casaco que tinha pra fora |
|     |     | No the coat that I had on the outside |
| 437 | I1 | In the one outside (.) the one he was wearing outside the uniform |
| 438 | P1 | °Okay° so so it wasn’t in the inside pocket anymore then |
Manuel’s reply (418) does not specify whose pocket the mobile was in, and this prompts the interpreter to switch to principal and ask for a repair of the primary speaker’s turn in line 419. Aware that this non-rendition (Wadensjö, 1998; cf. Table 5) generated by the interpreter is ethically and investigatively unacceptable, the police officer prevents her from asking the clarification question (420). Mariza reluctantly gives in, first giggling and then explaining her behaviour to Manuel and the officer (421). As discussed in 4.3.1, the information well encodes amounts to a “green light” for following the inferential processes involved in the recovery of cognitive effects. Following the police officer’s suggestion, I1 “just say[s] whose pocket was it” (425), to which Manuel replies “mine” and adds “in my coat” (426). In terms of Manuel’s clothes casaco may indicate either “coat” or “(school) blazer” (i.e. casaco da uniforme), thus I1 should have asked for clarification in order to specify which casaco Manuel was referring to. Alternatively, the interpreter could have made the interviewer aware of the lexical ambiguity so that the interviewer himself would have been in the position to ‘query’, which is seen to help “clear up misunderstandings and also demonstrate active listening” (Milne, 2004: 27).

Instead, P1 asks the question “Is that is that in your coat or in your jacket?” (433), to which Manuel replies that it was the former (436) contrary to what he previously stated. This prompts a probing question prefaced by the DM so (438) which is operationally translated by the interpreter (440). Here, so encodes the information that Manuel should perform an inference in which the utterance it prefaces is a conclusion derived from an assumption which is made accessible by processing information contained in the preceding utterance (“It was in

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111 We will discuss non-speaker oriented additions of DMs in 6.3.1.
112 Later in the interview, casaco will have a further meaning with reference to the robber, i.e. casaco com capuz, which is the Portuguese equivalent for a hooded jacket.
the coat’s pocket”). The rebuttal of the assumption involves challenging Manuel’s previous statement and necessitates the interviewee reforming an earlier position (439).

The next extract is taken from interview 5A which – as is the case for interview 4A featuring Letícia - sees Antonio as a suspect under arrest. In particular, the following sequence contains Antonio’s answers (383-389) to an open-ended question on the day of Letícia’s birthday during the third ECI phase, i.e. the free report phase:

Extract 5 (5A: 381-390)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>381</th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>Right okay (.) <strong>so who</strong> (.) <strong>who</strong> went to the hospital?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Chi: è andato in ospedale <strong>allora</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Who: went to the hospital then?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Io che:: guidavo la macchina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Myself I: was driving the car</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Myself (.) I was driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Letícia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Letícia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Mh [Letícia ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[e:: e:: la] la compagnia di mio padre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>[and:: and:: my] father’s partner</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>And er my father’s er:: ((she looks up and shakes her head)) er [friend ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[my step]-mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Step-mother? mh? ((shrugs))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 382 I4 translates the inferential DM *so* in the original with corresponding *allora* (so, then). Notice here I4’s nonverbal communication, notated at the end of the passage, which does not attempt to reflect Antonio’s nonverbal signals and is arguably not suitable to the situation or
the interlocutors. In 388 I3 indicates through facial expressions the fact that she is struggling to retrieve the information from her memory or find an English term for *compagna* (387). The visible effect is a lack of interest and professionalism. Possibly prompted by the interpreter’s insecurity, Antonio intervenes in English to give her the synonym “step-mother” (389). To which I3 reacts by aligning herself as a principal; she asks a direct, rhetorical question (“Step-mother?”) and shrugs as if to indicate that she does seem to believe this is the ‘right’ term, thus acting obtrusively and flouting the ‘impartiality’ norm.

Caterina Filippi shows this type of attitude throughout interview 5A. In terms of facial expressions, she rarely smiles or makes eye contact within the interaction, thus preventing both rapport building and the gaining of trust amongst the co-participants. Rather, she stares in front of her – at an imaginary person between La2 and P5 – or looks down at her notepad with her mouth and eyes open, glasses half way down her nose. Her lack of confidence and clarity is not just shown through the signs of nervousness on her face. I4 does not sit upright and comes across as sloppy and casual. Moreover, she waves her right or both hands about dismissively and casually at the end of sentences, and places a higher tone on the last words in each case, which often prompts a reassuring “okay” from police officers. Lastly and more importantly, her theatrical gestures and body language do not correspond to interlocutors’ and are therefore to be seen as improper according to PSI protocols.

Another example featuring an operationally translated *so* comes at a later stage during the same phase from interview 5A. More than an hour has gone by, and officer P4 is discussing issues related to Letícia’s troubled pregnancy and the couple’s whereabouts before and after it:

Extract 6 (5A: 926-933)

| 926 | P4 | Okay (.). *so* after Maria had been born (.). where: where did you stay then until you came back to (..) the UK? |
| 927 | I4 | E quindi dopo la nascita di Maria e: fino al momento in cui siete tornati qua (..) dove è stata And so after Maria’s birth and: until the moment when you came back here (..) where was |

113 This is the case even when she mentions the offence (murder) Antonio is suspected of. I4 looks at P4 nodding along for the first time in utterance 768.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 928 | A | Siamo stati in Campania  
*We stayed in Campania* |
| 929 | I4 | We stayed in Campania |
| 930 | A | E d-e dopo siamo andati:: er in Liguria  
*And t- and then we went to:: er to Liguria* |
| 931 | I4 | And then we went to Liguria ((pronounced clearly in an Italian accent)) |
| 932 | P4 | And then we went to... |
| 933 | I4 | Liguria ((pronounced clearly in an Italian accent)) it is a region in Italy ((points at an imaginary point in front of her with her pen)) Genoa () the region in Genoa |

An instantiation of an accurately translated DM can be found in utterance 927. From a macro-perspective, it must be noticed that Caterina steps out of her animator role altogether and speaks on behalf of herself in line 933, thus assuming the role of a principal, which typically occurs when a need arises to coordinate the discourse in order to ensure effective communication or, more specifically, to prevent breakdown of communication. In particular, this is a case of potential cultural misunderstanding, whereby the judicious intervention by the interpreter prevents the interview from becoming ‘bogged down’ in extraneous and irrelevant exchanges. Although I4 tends to interrupt the flow of the interlocutors’ - especially Antonio’s - speech very often (seemingly due to short memory), here I4 intervenes appropriately and justifiably to alert the police officer of a missed intercultural reference (Liguria) after being prompted by P4 himself (932). This shows her ability to simultaneously keep in mind production and reception formats and keep them separate.

We now turn to the procedural device *but*, which generally has adversarial effects given the interaction between linguistically encoded meaning and the particular contexts found in my corpus. The first extract focused on *but* is taken from interview 4A and, in particular, from the end phase 2 of this ECI, i.e. the ‘closure’, where advice on seeking help and support is frequently given (Milne, 2004: 57ff.).
Extract 7 (4A: 1582-1592)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1582</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>Er:: we’ll leave you in here but please be aware that the cameras are still working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1583</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Vamos deixar você aqui mas por favor fica consciente que as câmeras ainda estão funcionando.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>We’ll leave you in here but please stay awake that the cameras are still working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Er:: if you want to have a private consultation with Mister Middleton that’s perfectly fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Se você quer ter uma consulta privada com o Senhor Middleton tudo bem não tem problema.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If you want to have a private consultation with Mister Middleton that’s fine no problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>But we’ll arrange that in a separate room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Mas vamos organizar essa conversa no quarto diferente desse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>But we’ll arrange this conversation in a different room from this one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Okay so we’ll stop for now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Nós vamos...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>We will...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>[and the] time is er:: eleven fifty-two am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Vamos parar agora a hora agora é as onze e cinquenta e dois minutos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>We’ll stop now the time now is eleven and fifty-two minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Okay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

114 I2 tends to be influenced by English lexis. She might have also been influenced by a similar expression in Portuguese, i.e. “ficar ciente” (become aware). However, “to be aware” is usually expressed as realizar or compreender.
The two DMs used by the officer in 1582 and 1586 are operationally translated by Juliana, who renders them with elements which encourage a ‘denial of expectation’ understanding (Blakemore, 1987, 2002). Notice that the police officer cuts off I2’s rendition in 1590, forcing her to reformulate her utterance in line 1591.

Another example of operationally rendered but can be found in line 70 of the next extract drawn from phase 1 of interview 1 (utterances 1-217). In this long preliminary phase, the officer is affable, but at the same time assertive; for instance, he tends to underline the first parts of utterances with a deep, rumbling voice. Likewise, I1 displays a courteous and confident manner in line with professional protocols; she nods as other participants speak and her eye contact is consistent thorough the interview, thus showing involvement in the triadic encounter. In contrast, Manuel is under a considerable amount of stress from the beginning of the encounter, which is shown in his body language. For instance, he taps his right-hand fingers on his lap and bites his lip and nails, or rubs his hand and shuffles on his seat, looking around. When he recalls the event, he fidgets and looks up in the air on his left-hand side, and at times he touches his forehead.

The following extract features P1 giving a ‘cognitive’ instruction on the role of the interpreter, aimed at making sure that interviewees’ ethics is upheld and that the interviewing process is transparent:

Extract 8 (1: 67-72)

| 67 | P1 | Er:: and just on the wall on each side of us these metal boxes ((points with his right hand)) they’re the microphones |
| 68 | I1 | ((Points at microphones)) estas caixas de metal aos dois lados da parede são os microfones |
| 69 | P1 | Er:: you don’t need to shout Manuel but (. ) I still need you to speak loudly and clearly |
| 70 | I1 | Não é preciso:: gritares mas ele precisa que tu fales er:: suficientemente alto para a tua voz |

You don’t need to:: shout but he needs you to speak er:: sufficiently loud so that your voice.
As RT argues, it is in the speaker’s interest to produce utterances that require as little processing effort as possible to achieve the intended effects. This is valid for both P1 in 69 and I1 in 70, who seem to find it useful to employ a lexical item such as *but* that constrains the inferential phase of utterance interpretation and thus narrow down the range of possibilities Manuel may have to consider. In both utterances the fact that *but* indicates that segment B (“Manuel is required to speak loudly and clearly”) contradicts and eliminates an accessible assumption may well mean that P1 thought it at least possible that the hearer derived the assumption that he need not speak loudly from segment A (“Manuel is not required to shout”). In this case, the denial is direct, i.e. the proposition expressed by the *but*-prefaced clause directly contradicts (and eliminates) that assumption.

In terms of interational mechanisms, one well-documented shift of interpreter’s footing is reflected in an unelicited shift of pronoun of address, specifically in the use of the third-person footing with a distancing effect (“ele precisa” in 70) instead of the direct first-person (“eu preciso”). I1 is thus “relaying by displaying,” i.e. presenting the other’s words and simultaneously emphasising personal non-involvement in what she voices (Wadensjö, 1998: 19). The interpreter’s change of person deixis in 72 (“eu esteja a interpretar”) is instead not an
unreasonable reaction as this may be construed as a means of marking her role as interpreter in order to avoid misunderstanding.

As exemplified in 70, it must also be noted that I1 – along with all of the interpreters in my corpus – tend to omit the interviewee’s first name to be found in the police officers’ original utterance (“Manuel” in 69). Addressing interviewees in their first name is a common rapport building technique, amongst others such as making physical seating arrangements or establishing common interests or concerns, and its use helps give the impression that interviewers “contribute as an interested party, not simply asking a series of census-like questions” (Milne, 2004: 6-7). That is, there is no change to surnames during the probe-challenge phase. This may be contrasted to the formal use of surnames throughout trials, further confirming the “quasiformality” (Arminen, 2000: 446) of the interview.

Another example in which the meaning of a DM in the original is rendered by the use of a DM by the interpreter includes the interpretation of the caution during the preliminary formalities of interview 5A (already mentioned in 2.2.1). The faithfulness of the rendition given by the interpreter in this case is a particularly significant issue for the interviewers. If this is not administered properly, it may undermine the legality of this or any subsequent suspect interview (see Gibbons, 2004: 133):

Extract 2 (5A: 59-70)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Okay (.) you are under caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>E:: sotto:: al (.) l’avvertimento ((opens her arms outwards, perplexed))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You are:: under:: the (.) the caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>You do not have to say anything</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115 For further discussion on this issue, see Lord & Cowan (2011).
116 A tentative explanation for this phenomenon related to social imposition might come from a socio-stylistic consideration on interpreters’ innate cultural sensitivities. In Italian or (Brazilian- or Portuguese-)Portuguese, the use of first names is much less prevalent than in Anglo-Saxon countries, and would generally not be used unless the social conditions also exist for the use of the familiar second person singular pronoun. For instance, I3 refers to Antonio as Lei (polite form pronoun) throughout interview 3. Thus, interpreters are faced with the choice of either orienting to cultural correctness and using surnames and police forms (as the interpreters in my data do), or committing what feels to them a ‘cultural’ offence in the interests of accuracy.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 62 | I4 | Non ha l’obbligo di rispondere  
*You do not have to reply* |
| 63 | P4 | *But* it may harm your defence |
| 64 | I4 | Ma potrebbe danneggiare la Sua difesa  
*But it may harm your defence* |
| 65 | P4 | If you do not mention when questioned |
| 66 | I4 | Se durante l’interrogatorio non menziona  
*If when questioned you do not mention* |
| 67 | P4 | Something which you later rely on in court |
| 68 | I4 | Qualcosa che poi più tardi potrà dire in tribunale  
*Something which you then later may say in court* |
| 69 | P4 | Anything you do say may be given in evidence |
| 70 | I4 | Qualsiasi cosa dica può essere portata (...) contro di Lei  
*Anything you do say may be held (...) against you* |

At this crucial stage of the police interview *Ma* (64) plays an important role in ensuring faithfulness. In particular, it eliminates an assumption assumed to have been derived from the preceding utterance (63), ensuring that the hearer (the interviewee) derives only those assumptions that are intended by the police officer. We can also observe that in this passage the interpreter’s terminology is sufficiently faithful to the original. First, the translation of legal terms such as “caution”, “questioned” and “given in evidence” is adapted to the source culture, highlighting the police interpreter’s essential role of a cross-cultural bridge, i.e. that of converting from one set of social and cultural norms and assumptions to another set.

A ‘special’ case of operational rendition by the interpreter is included in utterance 483 of interview 1:

Extract 9 (1: 476-483)
In 479, we see that the interpreter reiterates part of what the interviewee said in the interviewee’s exact words and by repeating the DM with inflexion in the form of a question. This form of ‘echo probing’ would pertain more to the police officer than the interpreter. However, the reason for her aligning as a principal to ask for repetition might be to prevent breakdown of communication as the denial of expectation encoded in só que is unclear. The proposition expressed by the só que-prefaced clause should directly contradict (and eliminate) the assumption that “A normal police gun is not ‘normal’ (i.e. small)”.

Another example belonging to the category of accurate renditions of DMs features a series of DMs. In this passage, the interviewer is checking if the suspect understood the caution (cf. also 5A: 59-70). In the video one can clearly detect the suspect’s tiredness; she does not seem to grasp the meaning of P2’s questions, mumbling answers such as “Vou responder” (I’m going to answer) in 101 and “Eu vou responder (todavia)” (I’m going to answer (anyway)) in 115, which bear no relation to the questions asked:

| 476 | P1 | “Okay” (.) wha- what kind of gun was it then? |
| 477 | I1 | Que tipo de arma é que era então? |
|     |     | What kind of gun was it then? |
| 478 | M  | Era uma (.) pistola (.) normal da do tipo que os policiais têm (.) só que era uma normal |
|     |     | It was a (.) normal (.) gun like the ones that policemen have (.) but it was a normal one |
| 479 | I1 | Só que era perdão? |
|     |     | But it was sorry? |
| 480 | M  | Era normal |
|     |     | It was normal |
| 481 | I1 | Mh (.) he said it was a... |
| 482 | M  | Era das pequenas |
|     |     | It was one of those small ones |
| 483 | I1 | A normal (.) gun such as policemen carry (.) er:: but it was normal er it was small |
**Extract 10 (4A: 97-118)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Error Code</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>Annotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td><strong>Now (. because the caution is so important (. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about it now Leticia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td><strong>Devido ao facto (. que essa advertência ser algo er tão importante (. então eu quero agora</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Given the fact (. that this caution is something very important (. so I now want</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lhe fazer uma ou duas perguntas sobre ela a você**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>to ask you one or two questions about this</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td><strong>Er:. so (. do you have to answer any of my questions today Leticia?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td><strong>Então uma pergunta (. você tem que responder a qualquer pergunta que eu lhe faça?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>So one question (. do you have to answer any of my questions?</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>((Nodding)) °vou responder°</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>°I’m going to answer°</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>I’m going to answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Oh! er I I’m glad you will Leticia and I thank you for that</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td><strong>Eu tou satisfeito que você vai</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>I’m glad that you are</em>(^{117})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td><strong>But it’s important that you understand that you don’t have to answer any question (. if you don’t wish to</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td><strong>Mas é importante que você entenda (. que se você não quiser responder é teu direito</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>But it’s important that you understand (. that if you don’t want to answer you have the right</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(. de não responder**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(. not to reply**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Do you understand that Leticia?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{117}\) In her renditions I2 is at times influenced by English lexical and grammatical constructions. In particular, this utterance is influenced by the English repetition of the auxiliary verb in abbreviated replies. However, Portuguese grammar would require the repetition of the whole sentence (in this case, “que você vai responder*”).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 108  | I2      | Você entende isso?  
*Do you understand?*
| 109  | L       | "Entendo"  
*I understand"  
| 110  | I2      | I understand  
| 111  | P2      | Okay er: **now** if you *don’t* answer a question today Leticia (.). and this (.). if this investigation ends up going to trial  
| 112  | I2      | Então (.). se você *não* responder a qualquer pergunta aqui hoje (.). e essa investigação então no  
*So (.). if you don’t answer a question here today (.). and this investigation then in final (.). termina lá no tribunal vai no tribunal  
*the end (.). ends up in court goes to court*  
| 113  | P2      | Er: (.). and then (.). you did answer the same er question (.). at court (.). what might the court think about that?  
| 114  | I2      | E lá no tribunal eles fizerem a mesma pergunta (.). mas lá você responde (.). o que é que o  
*And in court they asked the same question (.). but there you did answer (.). what might the juiz vai pensar?  
*judge think?*  
| 115  | L       | "Eu vou responder de todo jeito"  
*I’m going to answer anyway"  
| 116  | I2      | I am going to answer  
| 117  | P2      | Okay er:. (.). good (.). er: I just want to make (.). it’s difficult sorry with (.). translating these (.). bits Leticia (.). because it sounds a bit more complicated than it is  
| 118  | I2      | Mh (.). é difícil com a interpretação (.). porque parace mais complicado do que realmente isso é  
*it’s difficult with the interpretation (.). because it sounds more complicated than it really is*  

As far as the interpreter is concerned, the animator role was (almost) maintained throughout this sequence. Seemingly aware to non-denotational aspects of speech, I2 renders every
utterance – including DMs (*Now* in 97-98, *So* in 99-100, *But* in 105-106, and *Now* in 111-112) – accurately, without any attempt at self-repairs even though she might have known that the suspect’s responses may suggest her own incompetence. The police officer is, nonetheless, quick to blame the interpretation process in 117-118. One constant shift in footing is again to be noted in the interpreter’s systematic tendency to drop Leticia’s name from her renditions (cf. extract 8).

The procedural analysis of DMs has also been extended to *well*, which simply indicates that the utterance it introduces is relevant (or, does yield cognitive effects). According to this analysis, in some cases the use of such an expression is justified in a context in which the utterance containing it would otherwise be considered *not* to be relevant by the hearer. The particular effect of a given DM may vary from context to context because the constraint it imposes may be met in different ways in different contexts. In particular, while the linguistic meaning of *well* is invariable – it always encodes the information that the speaker’s utterance is optimally relevant – we have seen that this may have the effect of: (a) closing the interaction (cf. 2: 2304 in extract 13); (b) it may have a hedging effect to indicate that the speaker’s attempt to provide an optimally relevant answer to the question is being compromised by the question itself; or (c) it may simply indicate that the hearer is intended to draw his own relevant conclusions from something that is mutually manifest, such as in the following example in which *well* interacts with prosody and context in a stand-alone use (cf. 4.3.4):

(38) [Someone has just left the room after losing their temper]

\ Well.

Consider, for instance, this case of operational translation of *well* taken from the same phase of interview 3 as the previous extract, some 800 utterances later. Here, Antonio mentions that Leticia’s flat was treated for mould, in particular Anna’s room, albeit unsuccessfully. This passage begins with I3 moving away from her normative role of animator and assuming that of a principal by asking Antonio a direct question and thus forcing him to readily acknowledge that she has taken personal ownership of these words:

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118 In this sense, it could be said that the use of *well* is tied to the speaker (cf. Schourup, 2001).
In Antonio’s reply (1523), the DM Allora (Well) is used as in the above-mentioned case (b), i.e. in a context in which the speaker believes that a ‘yes/no’ answer to the question would yield misleading cognitive effects (e.g. *The treatment has been carried out successfully* in the case of ‘yes’ and *The treatment has not been carried out* in the case of ‘no’); in this way, it indicates that the utterance is the most relevant one. It must be noted the interpreter leaves out the second chunk of Antonio’s utterance, i.e. the one which she interrupted in 1524 in order to start translating. Antonio has no time to resume his utterance as I3 intervenes - again inappropriately - as a principal, firstly to give her opinion on where the treatment had been carried out (“To er Anna’s bedroom to the walls I assume”), and then to act on behalf of the police officer and query Antonio’s statement in an attempt to clear up misunderstanding. In turn, Antonio specifies that the “main bedroom” was amongst the rooms where the treatment was carried out, seemingly implying a ‘yes’ to I3’s query.
To sum up, although operational renditions are present in the investigated corpus, they have been shown not to exclude footing shifts of another kind. However, as we shall see, the operational renditions exemplified in this section are significantly outnumbered by examples in which the interpreter’s utterances do not render DMs found in the original.

6.2 Omissions

As previously noted by a number of authors discussed in chapter 2 (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale, 1999; Wadensjö, 1998: 160), omission in my corpus is by far the largest category as DMs are typically not textually (or otherwise) represented in interpreters’ renditions. Together with non-propositional - and often non-lexical - devices such as backchannel, DMs seem to be treated as part of the “garbage” (Czyzewski, 1995: 73) and left untranslated. For instance, in interview 4A: 97 (extract 10) the DM now has been left behind by the interpreter.

One explanation for the interpreters’ treatment of DMs as “disposable” (Hale, 1999: 79) may indeed be that a language may not have a DM which is equivalent to a given DM found in another. It is, however, fair to ask whether or to what extent an interpreter translating into a language which does have expressions corresponding to certain DMs in the source language (cf. Table 9 and previous section) and who nevertheless omits these elements in their rendition does this because their concern with denotational vocabulary – i.e. vocabulary which encodes conceptual content – outweighs their concern with linguistic (and, possibly, non-linguistic) devices which interact with pragmatics. What could this lack of concern to non-propositional, non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning ultimately be attributed or linked to? I believe one factor in the equation is (legal) interpreters’ lack of training in these aspects of language and the related tendency to clean up the apparent ‘disfluencies’ and ‘false starts’ of primary participants and desire not to be seen as unprofessional or incompetent (cf. also Morris, 1995; Shelinger, 1991). Further, in consecutive interpreting mode the constraint of time is indeed pressing. Interpreters may feel, at some level, that DMs such as so can be synonymous and/or homonymous in the two working languages, but may be unable to process all of the possibilities in the interactional space available to them.

Let us first examine two extracts from the closure of interview 2, held roughly at the same time of interview 3 and featuring Letícia, who agreed to speak under caution as “visitor”, i.e.
a suspect with no necessity to arrest, yet recorded for the purpose of integrity (Home Office, 2011: s. 24). In extract 12, P2 thanks the interviewee for her cooperation and efforts, and asks if she has any questions (2257):

Extract 12 (2: 2255-2263)

| 2255 | P2   | "Okay" (.) well thank you very much Letícia for coming in today to speak to me about these things today |
| 2256 | I2   | Muito obrigado por ter vindo aqui hoje para falar conosco sobre estas coisas |
|      |      | Thank you very much for coming here today to speak to us about these things |
| 2257 | P2   | Is there: anything else you want to (.) add Letícia at the moment "[apart] from what you said?" |
| 2258 | L    | [yeah] |
| 2259 | I2   | Há [qual]ue coisa que você gostaria mencionar? |
|      |      | Is the [re] anything else that you want to mention? |
| 2260 | L    | [Tenho] yes |
|      |      | [I do] |
| 2261 | P2   | Yes |
| 2262 | L    | Fale pra ele que a coisa em que mais tenho na minha vida é as minhas filhas |
|      |      | Tell him that the thing I value the most in life are my daughters |
| 2263 | I2   | The thing that I most value in my life is my children |

In this context, the interviewee proceeds by stating that her integrity as a mother is unquestionable, and so is her love and affection for her two daughters. To that the police officer replies as follows:

Extract 13 (2: 2294-2305)

| 2294 | P2   | "Thank you" (.) Letícia |
In 2297 the interviewer tries to prolong the interview’s functional life by asking if Leticia would be willing to stay for more questioning; however, the legal adviser intervenes on her behalf in order to bring the interview to an end. In both instances (2255 and 2304) the use of the untranslated *well* indicates that the following utterance is relevant. In other words, it indicates that his expression of thanks is relevant even though it does not follow on from the preceding utterance in the sense that its relevance does not depend on it in any way. Thus the speaker is able to signal that the preceding utterance is the last one in the interview. Given the complexity of the interaction leading up to this point it might have been difficult for the interpreter to see what the intended contextual implication was, and hence the omission.

In sociological terms, the first extract sees Leticia directing her utterance directly to the interpreter, thus signalling her wish for the interpreter to act as ‘mediator’ (cf. “Fale” in 2262). After being addressed as a ‘responder’ or ultimate addressee (cf. chapter 3) I2 avoids
taking up the role of ‘principal’ by shifting her footing, i.e. through the use of the direct first-person footing (“I” in 2261) instead of the distancing third-person present in the original (“Fale” in 2262). This coordinating move shows the interpreter’s awareness of her reporting modes and is arguably dictated by a desire to avoid an unnecessary sequence of turns. A similar reason might be behind her move in 2259. In the previous utterance, Letícia attempts to reply directly to a question from the officer without waiting for the interpretation. In order to avoid assuming the role of a principal, I2 ignores Leticia’s utterance and (partially) renders the original.119

As was the case in 1: 70 (extract 8), the interpreter omits the interviewee’s first name to be found in the police officers’ original utterance and renders the original with standardised phrases (cf. 2259 from first extract) which depersonalise the interview, thus conveying to the interviewee that they are ‘just another one’. Nonetheless, in the second extract I2 renders both instances where Letícia’s proper name is used by the officer (cf. 2296 and 2305), possibly due to an instinctual desire to reduce the interviewee’s state of anxiety.

There are more obvious cases in which interpreters take the role of principal and become a co-participant or even co-investigator, omitting DMs and implementing strategies that go beyond an ethically acceptable level. In interviews such as interview 1 below, in which the victim is a vulnerable child, the rapport phase is used not merely to reduce the social distance between interviewer and interviewee or explore the child’s understanding of truth and lies, but also to estimate the child’s level of knowledge and linguistic competence (e.g. Bull, 1995; Davie & Westcott, 1999). In the following extract, the police officer is asking his interlocutors to introduce themselves (35-37 and 39):

Extract 14 (1: 35-44)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>35</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Okay (.). er:: (.). I’ll just (.). ne:ed to make sure we get everybody introduced so Mariza can you just say what your name is and what your role is…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>“Er”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Today please</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

119 Interviewees using an interpreter in the UK may have at least a rudimentary knowledge of English, and Letícia’s understanding of English can be defined as fair. See Table 11 (Appendix A).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>My name is Mariza (.) João and I’m the interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Okay thank you (.) er:: and er can you just give me your name and date of birth please?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 40   | I1   | Podes dizer o teu nome e a tua data de nascimento [por favor? ]  
Can you give your name and your date of birth [please?] |
| 41   | M    | [em português] ou em inglês?  
[in Portuguese] or in English? |
| 42   | I1   | O que é com- como tu quiser! (..) he:’s asking should I answer in Portuguese or in English?  
Whatever yo- as you wish!  
and I said whichever one you want |
| 43   | M    | I can say in (.) in English |
| 44   | I1   | Just say it in Portuguese fala em português ((chuckles))  
* speak Portuguese |

Instead of translating segment A (“I need to make sure we get everybody introduced”) of the officer’s utterances 35-37 in third person and then using the first person in so-prefaced segment B (“Mariza can you just say what your name is and what your role is”), the interpreter leaves the DM untranslated and switches from animator to principal, providing a direct response and thus aligning herself as responder in 38.

Another interesting phenomenon to be noted is the omission of the ‘conclusive’ interjection *okay* in 35 and 39.\(^{120}\) By far the most common interjections used by police officers – and most commonly omitted by interpreters - in interviews, *okay* and *right* are analogous to non-linguistic sounds such as *mh mh* and *uhm* (cf. extract 4 in 6.1),\(^{121}\) serving both as a confirmatory response token, verbalising the listener’s attention, and as an unwarranted means of managing the turn-taking system due to poor memory retention. *Right* used as an active listening strategy is generally to be avoided by police officers as “non-verbal behavioural

\(^{120}\) In particular, in utterance 40 I1 only translates the conceptual information represented by the routine question regarding the child’s contact details.

\(^{121}\) Goffman (1981: 324) terms these ‘non-linguistic’ sounds - which are either non-linguistic or on the borderline of linguistics proper - “the clucks and tsks and aspirated breaths, the goshes and gollies and wows”.

195
feedback should not be qualitative” (Milne 2004: 28) and it may give the interviewee the impression that this is the type of information required and can be judged by courts as rewarding certain types of utterance. However, both interviewers and interpreters are shown to use these response tokens, frequently accompanied by nodding and “co-murmuring” (Russell, 2001: 155).

Working within a RT framework, Wharton (2003a, 2009) argues that okay and right can be seen as a linguistic analogy of non-linguistic expressions such as the backchannels mh mh, etc. He sees them on a continuum between what would be considered fully linguistic meaning and clear cases of non-linguistic meaning (e.g. smiles, gestures, etc.), with right and okay situated more towards the linguistic end and mh mh situated somewhere in between. He further argues that while these elements might sit on different parts of this continuum, they must be treated as encoding procedures for the recovery of a representation of the speaker’s communicative intention. Therefore, the okay used by the officer in 35 and 39 can be analysed in procedural, non-translational terms as an expression which leads the hearer to an interpretation, rather than as encoding a constituent of that interpretation. However, unlike the DM so it does not lead to specific contextual effects, rather it indicates that Manuel has identified (what he takes to be) the intended contextual effects or, in some cases, that he believes that all participants have understood each other in that they have recovered the intended effects of the utterances made so far (Blakemore, personal communication).122 Thus, its omission has a major effect on P1’s investigative techniques and, particularly, rapport-building.

Lastly, utterances 42 and 44 are examples in which the interpreter stops interpreting and starts talking as a third party, disrupting the rapport between interviewer and child further. Manuel’s request for clarification as to which language he must adopt (41) is confronted by the interpreter’s rather abrupt exclamation “As you wish!” (42). When the child tentatively tries to speak English, the interpreter again intervenes in 44, this time suggesting to “[just] say it in Portuguese” with a chuckle, possibly finding the child’s accent funny. Although Manuel’s statement in 43 was ignored and found amusing by the interpreter, it constituted an important piece of information. If the interpreter had not interrupted the child, a longer narrative regarding the child’s level of knowledge and linguistic competence may have been elicited, contributing to what Boggs & Eyberg (1990: 86) defined as “a positive relationship […] that

122 Note that the speaker may be wrong to assume that the interview is going ‘okay’.
sets the tone for the entire assessment process and helps increase both the amount and accuracy of information provided”. Instead, the police officer is left to accept the interpreter’s decision in 44.

To conclude, while DMs such as *well* and *so* may be available, they are routinely ignored by police interpreters. It is difficult to ascertain with any certainty the effects of interpreters’ lack of concern (and, possibly, training) in non-denotational aspects of meaning in each given context. Given their pervasive use by officers, one may suggest that the multi-faceted pragmatic relevance of each of these devices in the ongoing discourse of police interviewing frequently disappears from the interpreters’ renditions, leading to shifts in footing and, ultimately, diminishing the results of the interviewing process. However, as shown in the next section, interpreters’ alignment as author to a particular utterance with respect to DMs does not always lead to omission.

### 6.3 Additions

We now turn to cases in which the DM used by the interpreter is not a rendition of a primary participant’s expression and is hence classed as an addition. These examples, while less frequent than the ones considered so far, are no less important from either the point of view of interpreting studies or pragmatics. However, as we shall see, these cases do not fall into a single category. On the one hand, there are cases (6.3.1) in which the DM added by the interpreter must be attributed to the interpreter (rather than the speaker). On the other hand, there are cases (6.3.2) in which the added DM is understood as being attributed by the hearer to the original speaker. While the two types of additions can be regarded as evidence for a ‘visible’ interpreter (e.g. Laster & Taylor, 1994; Roy, 2000; Wadensjö, 1998), they are justified in different ways. In particular, we shall see that the second class of additions gives rise to an apparent paradox: a visible, mediating interpreter may through the act of mediation create the effect of invisibility.
6.3.1 Non-speaker oriented additions

This section focuses on cases - such as *well* in 1: 421 ("well whose pocket (...); cf. Extract 4) - in which the interpreter’s rendition includes DMs not found in the original and which must be attributed to the interpreter, relating to her utterance as principal. These are instances in which an interpreter’s rendition includes a DM not included in the original, yet which can be regarded as an intrusion – analogous to authorial intrusions in free indirect discourse discussed in chapter 4 – justified in terms of their contribution to the success of the interaction overall (Blakemore, 2010, 2011). In the case of police interpreting, a number of these additions which are understood as being attributable to interpreters can be justified in social, interactional terms because they are used in operational terms, for example in order to clarify matters of police procedure. However, as we shall see, not all these cases can be ‘justified’ or seen as examples of good practice.

*So*-prefaced utterances represent a clear example of this phenomenon as they enable the interpreter to construct, summarise and organise the previous utterances (cf. Johnson, 2002; see also 6.2). Let us first look at an added *so* in the initial, phatic exchanges of interview 3 (1-43). Here, P4 repeatedly uses the interjection *right* (cf. 11, 15, and 17) to acknowledge the prior turn and express affiliation with Antonio’s and the interpreter’s utterances. This might be due to the fact that she is taken aback by I3’s long series of interaction-oriented initiatives as a principal on her behalf which violate the Code of ethics both in terms of accuracy and impartiality:

Extract 15 (3A: 1-43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>&quot;Okay er:: ((sighs)) okay er:: (.) before we ask you anything there’s just a couple of things that we need to go through</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>&quot;Okay er:: ((sighs)) okay er:: (.) before we ask you anything there’s just a couple of things that we need to go through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Oh! I’m sorry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

123 DMs like *so* and *now* are also shown to recurrently contribute to the dialogic nature of the complainant’s account, which often relates to the dominant ‘common sense’ ideological resources surrounding the crime (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 2009; MacLeod, 2010).
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Er:: Antonio understands quite a bit (.). I’ll just intervene whenever (.). he finds a bit difficult to: [er:: answer]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>[right okay ] (.). okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>°Okay°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Ho- how much English can you actually speak?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yeah! ((encouragingly to A))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>°I can’t say er…°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I understand but no...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>I’m just [I’m just wondering] would it be: is it easier for you to speak in Italian (.). and then we we don’t get mixed up?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[(find the) word] sometime you know why? because er:: I have the habit to: speak er half and half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>And sometime I confuse but…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sometime I feel like I want to: speak English and sometime in Italian (.). when I: don’t (.). I really don’t know (.). English words (.). I find it (using) to: speak Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>To speak Italian alright (.). I’m just wondering whether while we’re here whether it’s easier to speak in Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Tutto il [tempo Lei intende ] no? vuol parlare sempre in italiano (.). e io All the [time she means ] right? would you mind speaking Italian all the time (.). and I traduco e così... translate so…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[yeah yeah yeah yeah] okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Because otherwise it gets a little bit complicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>[Ye]ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[E-] e- exactly and er...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>We can understand that (.) so like misunderstandings can arise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Because of er the the meaning of words et cetera and it might be easier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yes [facciamo er:: ] seguiamo questo corso d’azione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[let’s do er:: ] let’s follow this course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[for Antonio to]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Perché è più semplice [anche per er Lei]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Because it’s easier [for you er as well]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[just talk in your] mother tongue [and then] you know?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>[yeah ] just (in Italian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>&quot;Yeah&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[And we’]re fully clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>[Okay ] alright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Okay (.) I I appreciate it may be difficult to switch from Italian into English sometime (.) <strong>but</strong> if you just try your hardest to speak er:: in in Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td><strong>Ecco</strong> [se Lei parla] solo in italiano parla con me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>So [if you could only speak] in Italian talk to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[okay okay ] okay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the rigid question-and-answer format of interviews, we have seen that taking turns to speak through an interpreter requires a rigid discipline that is not always enforceable, particularly where one participant – in this case, both I3 and Antonio - is from a culture where overlapping and interruptions are acceptable or even desirable (see Tannen, 1984). In particular, interruptions are associated with negotiation of power and are seen to have an impact on the trajectory of investigative interviews.

In this excerpt, it appears that role shifts disadvantage Antonio, based on the information that is lost or repaired through the interpreters’ discourse management. No reference is made to the people present in the room as P4’s first utterance is followed by an embarrassing inter-turn pause of around two seconds and utterance 2, which suggests that the interpreter was waiting for Antonio to speak (possibly following an exchange between him and I3 prior to the interview). Thus, she immediately becomes principal by initiating a non-elicited problem-solving act, which leads to unnecessary confusion amongst the interviewers (5 and 6), whose frame or schema of an interpreted interview is rendered void by I3’s interventions. The invitation to start talking in 9 and failure to interpret both utterances 13 and 19 shows that her role as co-participant in the interaction is kept throughout the dialogue between the police officer and the suspect (8-19), who struggles to clarify his English speaking skills. Aware of the risk of miscommunication and eager to protect her reputation as a competent interpreter (Jacobsen, 2010), the interpreter abruptly shifts from principal to author and animator, rendering part of P4’s request for Antonio to speak Italian (20). However, she quickly switches back to the role of principal in 22, and this prompts the police officers to respond directly to the interpreter (23 and 24). Understood like this, the officers project upon I3 what Wadensjö (1998: 165) would call a “responder’s listenership” in relation to what the

interpreter hears (the affirmative adverbs “yeah” and “exactly”). I3, therefore, aligns herself as “responder”, providing a direct response and thus once relating to 25 and 27 as principal.

P4 only manages to regain full control of turns as an investigator in line 38, that is towards the end of a long and convoluted sequence in which I3 directly talks to the suspect (both in Italian and in English; see 29, 32, 34), while P5’s unsuccessful attempt at restoring the interaction order (see 26-36) is met by I3’s “alright” (37). The interviewer’s but-prefaced utterance 38 contains half of a conditional sentence (or protasis: “if you just try your hardest to speak er:: in in Italian”), whereas the other half (or apodosis), i.e. ‘that would be good’, must be pragmatically enriched. After adding the non-speaker oriented DM Ecco, the interpreter translates the protasis in 39, however she also adds “con me” (to me) in an attempt to influence the footing of the suspect (e.g. “Please address me, not the police officer”) and expands her utterance in 41.

It is clear that disruption in turn-taking makes accurate and complete renditions difficult, and in fact some of the source utterances are not rendered at all. This lack of rendition is not acceptable, because the original utterances were not rendered (accuracy) and the interpreter answered the questions (impartiality). I believe that the participants’ divergent feelings towards the interpreter’s constant role shifts are well summarised by the stark contrast between how the adverb ‘okay’ is uttered in lines 42 and 43, the former suggesting frustration, while the latter almost satisfaction.

Let us now move on to a passage from the uninterrupted free report phase, initiated by P4 through the use of an open-ended invitation. In particular, Antonio explains that on the morning in which Maria fell ill, he realised that Anna would not get ready to go to school and went to speak to her in her room:

Extract 16 (3A: 219-230)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E son tornato da Letícia e gli ho riferito: quello che:: mi aveva detto Anna che aveva...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And I went back to Leticia and told her: what:: Anna had told me that she had...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Right so I went back back to to Leticia and er:: told her er: what er: Anna had told me (.) previously</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E Leticia mi aveva: mi ha detto che:: lei sapeva già di questo perché lei precedentemente gli

And Leticia had: had told me that:: she already knew this as she previously

aveva (.) aveva accusato di questo: malessere al braccio e anche...

had (.) had complained of this: pain in her arm and also...

Right...

E che non si sentiva molto bene e Leticia l’aveva attribuito al fatto al fatto che lei

And that she was feeling very well and Leticia had attributed it to the fact to the fact that
diciamo nei mesi precedenti aveva avuto il primo periodo

you know in the previous months she had had her first period

Okay er:: so: Leticia said she was aware of this pain in her left arm because the night before
she: er you know felt this pain er: anyway and er:: e cosa ha detto (poi)?

and what did she say (then)?

And Leticia anche...

Che aveva avuto le prime mestruazioni?

that she had had her first period?

Lei lo attrib- lo attribuiva al fatto che lei nel mese precedente aveva avuto le prime

She attrib- attributed it to the fact that in the previous month she had had her first
mestruazioni quindi...

period so...

La prima volta?

The first time?

Esatto [e poi: è stato]
The two reasons that Antonio is given and subsequently reports back to Letícia are (a) a long-standing problem with Anna’s arms (cf. 221) and (b) symptoms related to Anna’s menstrual cycle (cf. 223). The interpreter begins her renditions in 220 and 224\textsuperscript{126} by adding the DM so, an inferential DM indicating that the assumption which follows it is a conclusion or a summary. By doing so I3 steps out of her role of interpreter and into that of police officer. The use of so, however, has not only an effect on footing, but also on the investigation in that it can be said to narrow the focus onto specific evidential details perceived to be of investigative value to the police institution (and of evidential value to the judge and jury), thus minimising the importance of other details perceived as salient by the interviewee, often removing them from the account altogether. Interestingly, in both cases so is preceded by either right or okay used as an acknowledgement of prior turn and as a turn-management device.

At a macro-level, I3 seems to have forgotten the second reason and unjustifiably asks for repetition in 224. As Antonio repeats his explanation (225 and 227), the interpreter/principal interrupts his flow of speech through echo probing, reiterating part of what the interviewee had said in 223 as if remembering it at last – not once, but twice (226 and 228).\textsuperscript{127} In this rather chaotic series of turns, Antonio’s own inferential DM (“quindi” in 227) ironically gets lost in translation. Lastly, utterance 230 is prefaced by well, added by I3 and having the effect of closing the interaction.

A similar case can be found roughly an hour and a half into the interview, when I3 ineffectively tries to stop the speaker following a long description of the room layout:

Extract 17 (3A: 1591-1599)

\textsuperscript{126}“The night before” is information added by the interpreter, whereas the original utterance contains a more generic “precedentemente” (previously).

\textsuperscript{127}It is unclear whether I3’s direct question in 224 is in any way prompted by Antonio’s non-native use of the term “periodo” (from the English period) instead of mestruazioni or ciclo mestruale, which may be derived from his living abroad and which might have required extra cognitive effort on the interpreter’s part.
| 1591 | A | Vicino all’angolo c’è una sp- un er un er:: er: c’è la ce-vici- verso l’angolo c’è
Next to the corner there’s a sp- a er a er:: er: there’s the ba- ne- toward the corner there’s
la cesta di Maria ((indicates to his right))
Maria’s basket |
| 1592 | I3 | Right |
| 1593 | A | E qua ((keeps on indicating with his hand)) accanto alla cesta di Maria c’è ci sono:: c’è
And here
next to Maria’s basket there’s there are:: there’s
una cesta dove mettiamo er le riviste [o dei do-] o dei documenti
a basket where we put er the magazines [or some do-] or some documents |
| 1594 | I3 | [alright ] yes |
| 1595 | A | E [c’è] un er una un er un cassettino
And [there’s] a er a a er a small drawer |
| 1596 | I3 | [sò:] alright |
| 1597 | A | Una cassettiera (..) dal lato sempre su quella parete ((indicates right)) c’è un un un diciamo
A chest of drawers (..) on the side always on that wall there’s a a you know
un er: mobile con dei cesti di vimini dove ci sono tutte le cose:: [per (prepararla)] esatto
er: furniture with wicker baskets where there’s all the stuff:: [to (prepare her)] that’s right |
| 1598 | I3 | [per la bambina]
[for the baby] right |
| 1599 | A | E un altro a fianco con le stesse cose però solo nei cassetti e...
And another next to the same stuff but only in the drawers and... |
Added *so* in 1596 can be analysed as in the previous extract, as well as *right* (1592, 1598) and *alright* (1594, 1596) is used as a means of restricting answers during focus retrieval, which is seen as bad practice in that interviewees should “feel that they have an unlimited time for recall” (Milne 2004: 12) so that they can search memory and provide detailed responses. Indeed, interpreters should not “interrupt the interviewee during their narration or to ask specific questions” (Milne 2004: 22). I3 understandably tried to reduce the length of speech in order to prevent breakdown of communication due to overload; however, other methods – i.e. asking a direct question – would have been more effective.

Another (this time, macro-analytical) means used to interrupt is overlapping (cf. 1594, 1598). It is not uncommon for interpreters to render part of a segment simultaneously either when they are beginning to tire or – in spite of her best efforts at control – the participant (especially the interviewees) continually denies her space to complete her interpretation, as is the case in this passage.

While the interviewer in interview 3 is certainly responsible for the production of many examples of non-speaker oriented DM additions, she is by no means the only example of an interpreter who adopts this practice in my corpus. For example, consider the following extract (15) taken from interview 1, which shows the interpreter in her role as principal:

Extract 18 (1: 132-139)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>[...] er I just need to clarify something (. ) you said before (. ) that you wanted him to ask if he didn’t understand the question? or if he didn’t know the answer [so…]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>[yeah]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Which one? (. ) do you want him to clarify if he doesn’t understand the question?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Right ah! that that’s what I’m coming up to sorry er er my my next rule rule two ((giggles))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Oh! <em>so</em> the first one was if he does know the answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>If if he doesn’t know the answer er I need him to say I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>I’m sorry I’ve I’ve misinterpreted that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>That’s okay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This passage between the interpreter (I1) and the police officer (P1), which is triggered by a misunderstanding on the part of the interpreter, is taken from the opening stage of the Cognitive Interview. As we have seen, during this stage police officers are required to introduce themselves and other participants, to use open-ended questions in order to create a relaxed atmosphere and enhance the interviewee’s confidence and, thereby, their powers of recall, and to instruct the witness or suspect as to what is expected from them.

Here, the police officer informs Manuel that he should follow two “rules”, i.e. (a) to say “I don’t know” in case he does not know the answer to a question, and (b) to say “I don’t understand” in case he does not understand the question. The interpreter thinks that she confused the first rule with the second and interrupts the interview in order to ask for clarification (132). The interruption and the subsequent direct question to the officer (134) foreground the interpreter as an interlocutor in her own right, triggering the footing shift to a principal. On a micro-level, I1’s use of so in both lines 132 and 136 indicates that that the following utterance is intended to be understood as a contextual implication derived from the preceding segment. In line 132, she does not actually articulate the utterance which is understood as a contextual implication of the preceding utterance (‘please repeat the rule’), and the police officer must construct this for himself on the basis of the context, the principle of relevance, and, of course, the constraint encoded by so. However, the police officer’s failure to clarify the confusion by repeating the rule prompts the utterance in line 136, where the interpreter’s utterance is intended as a means of checking her understanding of what the police officer has said: she is, in effect, asking whether the proposition expressed by utterance introduced by so is indeed a contextual implication of what he has just said. The point is that in each case, so must be understood to be attributed to the interpreter (rather than the interviewee) in the sense that it triggers an inferential process which results in an interpretation which is understood as a representation of thoughts attributed to the police interpreter.

We now turn to an extract from interview 4A, in which the interpreter is directly asked to read out a previously prepared description of her role in the interview. And so she does in both languages, relating her prototypical role within the interaction in a self-referring, almost metatheatrical fashion:
| 15 | P2 | “Okay” also present... |
| 16 | I2 | Is Juliana Rodrigues Juliana Rodrigues (. ) eu sou a sua intérprete |
|     |     | *I’m your interpreter* |
| 17 | P2 | Okay can you just explain you role please [to ] Letícia? |
| 18 | I2 | [mh mh] I wrote er:: shall I: read it in English or in Portuguese first? |
| 19 | P2 | Er:: in Portuguese |
| 20 | I2 | In Portuguese (. ) eu vou ler o que eu preparei (. ) sobre a minha função eu sou a sua intérprete |
|     |     | *I shall read what I prepared (. ) on my role I’m your interpreter* |
|     |     | (. ) a minha função é de interpretar tudo o que é dito (. ) durante essa interrogação (. ) a |
|     |     | (. ) my role is to interpret *everything* that is said (. ) during this interview (. ) the |
|     |     | interpretação do português (. ) e do inglês será feita na fala direita significa |
|     |     | interpretation from Portuguese (. ) and from English’ll be carried out in *direct* speech that is |
|     |     | na primeira pessoa (. ) e não (. ) ela disse ele disse (. ) tudo o que você diz (. ) será interpretado |
|     |     | in the first person (. ) and not (. ) she said she said (. ) *everything* you say (. ) will be interpreted |
|     |     | ((clears her throat)) eu talvez lhe peça pra falar mais devagar ou indicar a você que fale |
|     |     | *I may ask you to slow down* or *indicate* to you to speak |
|     |     | em etapas (. ) para que eu não perca nada do que você diz (. ) se eu não conseguir entender |
|     |     | in stages (. ) so that I do not miss *anything* you say (. ) if I cannot understand |
|     |     | qualquer coisa que você disse (. ) er:: e que faça (. ) impossível de eu poder interpretar (. ) então |
|     |     | anything that you said (. ) er:: and that *made it* (. ) *impossible* for me to *interpret* (. ) so |
|     |     | eu me: (. ) vou me dirigir ao oficial (. ) e pedir a ele *permissão* (. ) que eu lhe peça *clarificação* |
|     |     | *I’ll:* (. ) *address* the officer (. ) and ask his *permission* (. ) for me to seek *clarification* |
do que você disse(.) ou que você repita(.) o que você disse(.) "okay?"(.) I’m your interpreter Juliana Rodrigues(.) my role is to interpret everything that is said during this interview(.) the interpretation from Portuguese and from English will be(.) in direct speech(.) that means(.) the first person and not(.) she said or he said(.) everything that you say here will be interpreted(.) I may ask you to slow down or indicate to you to speak in stages(.) so that I do not miss anything you say(.) if I do not understand anything you say(.) that makes the interpretation impossible(.) I’ll then direct myself to the officer and ask his permission to seek clarification from you(.) or for you to repeat(.) what you said

In line 20, clearly perceived as the interpreter’s, the procedural information encoded by então is to process segment B (i.e. “I’ll address the official and ask for his permission”) as a conclusion. On a macro-level, the analysis of the interpreter’s role as a principal shows that the attitude of interpreters towards primary participants may be seen as ‘biased’ towards the authorities, specifically towards their image of an interpreter as a translation machine (see the use of everything and anything and her reference to direct speech). Around two weeks before (cf. Table 8) during phase 2 of interview 2, Juliana had managed to avoid the notion of ‘verbatim’ translation, possibly because she is aware that such requirement is untenable:

Extract 20 (2: 92-97)
Notice that the DM now is omitted by I1, as is often the case (cf. section 6.2). Further, by rendering “verbatim” with “everything” (95) and “word for word” with “directly” (97) she becomes an author responsible for softening the original utterance. Moreover, the use of the verb “ajudar” (to help) in utterance 93 delineates an alignment with the interviewee’s goals and expectations. Thus the omission of the DM together with the softening of verbatim shows that the interpreter is not interpreting the original utterance ‘word for word’, but rather acting as a multi-role performer (Wadensjö, 1998).

Furthermore, one can find a number of instances where the DM well is not found in the original and, thus, must be attributed to the interpreter, acting as ‘principal’. In particular, the interpreter in encounter 3A is highly active in terms of autonomous production. This could be due to the fact that she is a long-term member of the NRPSI (cf. introduction) who has been working for the register for many years and feels part of a ‘team’. Indeed, when observing interview 3A one gets the impression that at times she is conducting it. Consider, for instance, the three extracts from the ‘free report’ phase of the interaction. Here, Antonio is asked to elaborate on his past work experiences:

Extract 21 (3A: 670-677)

| 670 | A | Finito quello ho fatto diciamo il clim- the climber ho fatto l’arrampicatore il ( ) per sette otto
| 671 | I3 | I: [did so-] |
| 672 | A | [e l’ho f]atto per i soldi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>670</th>
<th>671</th>
<th>672</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finito quello ho fatto diciamo il clim- the climber ho fatto l’arrampicatore il ( ) per sette otto</td>
<td>I: [did so-]</td>
<td>[e l’ho f]atto per i soldi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once finished what I did as you know the I worked as a climber a ( ) for seven eight months | [and I d]id it for money |
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>673</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yes I did er: er: climber er: type of thing on on rocks I think well mountains I assume sulle montagne? mountains?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>674</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Si Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>For how long? per otto mesi? for eight months?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>676</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Se- per otto mesi poi me ne sono andato perché... Se- for eight months then I left because...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>677</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Seven eight months it was just to make some money yeah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract 22 (3A: 817-819)

817 | A | E:: poi dopo: diciamo c’è alla fine un colloquio col comandante per vedere: se c’era:: And then later: you know there’s an interview with the commander to see: if one had:: l’attitudine o meno aptitude or not |
818 | I3 | Yes and of course there would have been a: a: an interview with er a: commandant er well the headman to:: see if I was er I had aptitude for this kind of er:: [career?] |
819 | P5 | [mh mh] (.) mh |

In 673 and 818, the use of *well* seems to be elicited by the interpreter’s reformulations. In other words, the speaker gives vent to her frustration caused by her difficulty in accessing the optimally relevant expression. After the long search, the information *well* encodes amounts to a ‘green light’ for going ahead with the inferential processes involved in the recovery of cognitive effects triggered by the newly reformulated sentences. As with all the previous
cases in this section, both DMs are included in an utterance for which the interpreter takes responsibility as principal.

The final examples in this section are taken from the varied and extensive retrieval phase of interview 1, in which P1 asks investigatively important questions. Here, I1 clearly and repeatedly assumes the role of principal - and, more specifically, police officer – as she tries to “explain what you: mean by (. ) face to face” (1162). The breakdown in the turn-taking organisation alienates the police officer for most of the interaction:

Extract 23 (1: 1132-1162)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1132</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>“Okay” er:: and how much of the time (. ) were you sort of face to face with this (. ) man?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1133</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Quanto (. ) quanto de- desse tempo (. ) é que estiveste de frente a frente com ele?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How much (. ) how much of this time (. ) were you face to face with him?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1134</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mh? o quê?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mh? what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1135</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>No teu contato com este homem (. ) quanto tempo é que estiveste d- frente a frente com ele?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In your contact with this man (. ) how long were you face to face with him?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1136</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Quanto tempo? frente a frente? er:: foi mesmo só: da paragem até ao parque (. ) e depois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How long? face to face? er:: it was really only: from the stop to the park (. ) and then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>começámos a:: afastamo-nos um pouco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>we started to:: distance ourselves a bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1137</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Frente a frente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1138</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Eu (. ) eu tou me sentir um bocado quente demais ((takes his hoodie off))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I (. ) I’m feeling a bit hot a lot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1139 | I1 | Mh he’s feeling a bit warm (. ) I asked him how long where you facing him and er: he said it was only until when we came into the park (. ) and I said are you sure? and I asked it’s face to
And he said *yes* it’s until when we went to the park

Ah! *so:* er: wha- you mean (...) er it’s only in the park that they were face to face?

No er from the moment he showed the gun until they went into the park

“*Right*”

I don’t know if he understood that what it [*means*] face to face

[*“right?”* okay (...) *fa- by face to face* I mean you know you’re looking at me (...) directly in the...]

Olh- olhar olhos [nos olhos?]

*To lo- to look someone [in the eyes?]*

[frente a] frente quer dizer a olhar direita[mente na: cara] [*face to ...* face means to be looking some[one straight in the eye]]

([condescendingly])

*não houve* ( ) [*didn’t happen*]

*não houve* ( ) [não o olhei ]

*it didn’t happen* ( ) [I didn’t look at him]

[there was never er:: that never happened]

*Sou eu que olhei pa a cara do homem** mas ele nunca olhou pa mim* [*I was the one looking at his face but he never looked at me*]

I always looked at his face but he never looked back at me

“*Right*” (...) that’s what I mean *so* you were looking directly at his face er (...) ho- although it’s (...) less than thirty minutes how many (...) of those minutes did you spend...

*Mh*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1155</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Looking at his face?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1156</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>O que ele está a perguntar é quanto (.) nesses trinta minutos em que estivestes com e- ele no total (.) houve um momento em que tu estiveste (.) ele estava à tua frente (.) não é? in all (.) was there a moment when you were (.) he was in front of you (.) right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What he’s asking is how much (.) of those thirty minutes in which you were with him all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1157</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Er:: ((touches his head as if in doubt)) ele tava à minha frente mas ele nunca olhou pa mim it was me who looked at him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>he was in front of me but he never looked at me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1158</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Tá bem! ((abruptly)) mas quantos minutos é que se passaram um de frente ao outro (.) that’s what he wants to know (.) not not back to back [that’s different]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That’s fine! but how many minutes did you spend face to face with each other (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>é isso o que ele quer saber (.) não não costas a costas [isso é diferente]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1159</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>[um minuto (.) un minuto pra aí a minute (.) a minute or thereabouts]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1160</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>No more one minute more or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1161</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>&quot;Right&quot; (.) [&quot;okay&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1162</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>[I had ] to explain what you: mean by (.) face to face</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mariza only briefly adopts the role of author (1133, 1139, 1141, 1150, 1152, 1156, and 1160), from which she frequently steps out to become a principal, mainly as a result of a free choice (1137, 1139, 1145, 1154, 1158, and 1162), but also as a reaction to the fact that primary participants address their utterances directly to the interpreter (1135, 1143, and 1148), thus signaling a wish for the interpreter to act as ‘mediator’ (Wadensjö 1997).

At first Manuel seems not to understand the expression “frente a frente” (face to face; 1134 and 1136), which has the effect of causing a change in the interpreter’s footing (1135 and
1137) with I1 stepping out of her ‘institutional’ role while the trouble is repaired. As is the case in these shifts, the change of personal deixis in the interpreter’s renditions (1139, 1141, and 1143) means that the direct relationship between the two primary interlocutors gets lost. P1’s so-prefaced direct question to the interpreter in 1142 is linked with a misunderstanding stemming from I1’s non-rendition of the original “só: da paragem (...)” (only from the stop (...)) in 1136.

Finally, in 1145 I1 clarifies that she didn’t “know if [Manuel] understood that what it [means] face to face”. The police officer tries to re-establish a rapport with Manuel by explaining the meaning of the phrase “face to face” (1146). However, I1 abruptly prevents P1 from replying by not rendering Manuel’s utterance and directly answering in a condescending way (1148). In 1150 and 1152 she finally switches back to her role as animator, correctly rendering Manuel’s answers (including the DM mas in 1151).

Again, in 1153-1155 P1 asks a so-prefaced direct question, this time to Manuel, in an attempt to clear the confusion surrounding the phrase “face to face”. In I1’s rendition (1156), the interpreter moves away from the original “you were looking at his face” (1155), resorting to a rather vague paraphrase (“ele estava à tua frente”), which is closer to the officer’s first utterance (“you were face to face” in 1132). To the interpreter’s reformulation Manuel replies correctly, stating that “[the alleged robber] was in front of me, but he never looked at me”. Possibly aware of her vague rendition in 1155, I1 abruptly addresses Manuel as a principal in 1158, almost as if no other interactant were present. Here, the use of the DM but signals her annoyance at Manuel’s struggle to understand P1’s and her questions (1136, 1157), triggering an inference which results in the elimination of an assumption assumed to have been made accessible by the first segment of the utterance (“What you stated so far is relevant”).

We find a very similar use of but in another intervention as a principal by Mariza, in which she alerts P1 of Manuel’s emotional state (1196). However, the information has been retrieved in a conversation she privately had with the victim when P1 had left the room to fetch a glass of water (1171-1184). Firstly, I shall report the transcript of this conversation, which challenges any idea of interpreter’s neutrality as she takes up the role of the police officer and gives unwarranted advice, suggesting the witness to consult “a psychologist or someone (a psychoanalyst)” (1174):
<p>| | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1171</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>(Takes a deep breath and rubs his arms))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1172 | II | Estás nervoso? ((inquisitive voice))  
Are you nervous? |
| 1173 | M | É a primeira vez que uma coisa assim aconteceu ((continues rubbing his arm))  
It’s the first time that something like this happens to me |
| 1174 | II | Já tens já tás a fal- er:: já falaste com alguém? um psicólogo [ou] alguém  
Have you do you already sp- er:: have you spoken to someone? a psychologist [or] someone  
(um psicanalista)?  
(a psychoanalyst)? |
| 1175 | M | [não]  
[no]  
eu antes quando as pessoas olhavam pra mim eu dizia pfh! olha! estam a  
before when people would look at me I said pfh! look! they’re  
olhar pra mim! (.) mas agora fico (.) quase que tremo  
looking at me! (.) but now I get (.) almost shaky |
| 1176 | II | Ele disse que já não demora muito (.) tá bem? já tá quase a acabar  
He said that we won’t be long now (.) alright? it’s almost over |
| 1177 | M | Onde é que foi? ((puts his hoodie on his lap and crosses his arms))  
Where did he go? |
| 1178 | II | Ele foi ali porque: a fita do audio de de de do som acabou (.) e ele:: aquele: som nós  
He went there because: the audio-tape of of of of the noise ended (.) and he:: that: noise we  
estávamos a ouvir era a fita  
were hearing was the tape |
At this point, the police officer comes back in the room and after a few turns P1 states he only has one question left, prefacing his utterance with the DM so (omitted by I1) which indicates that his utterance in 1191 is a conclusion derived as a contextual implication from previous utterances:

Extract 25 (1: 1191-1199)

| 1191 | P1 | So we’ll just continue .(.) there’s only one question that .(.) Danny wants me to ask and that is just d- do you think that y- you .(.) that you would recognise this man if you saw if again? |
| 1192 | I1 | Só há mais uma pergunta que eu queria fazer antes de:: que é se visse este homem seria |

There’s only one more question that I want to ask before:: that is if you saw this man would
capaz de o reconhecer?

you be able to recognise him?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1193</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Er acho que não sei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Er I think that I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1194</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Er:: er I don’t know (imitating M’s hesitation))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1196</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Can I just say while while you were away (. ) er Manuel said that er normally when people looked at him in the street (. ) he would just er:: look at them and say oh! look at him! he’s looking at me! (. ) <strong>but</strong> now he feels very <strong>scared</strong> and he gets very <strong>nervous</strong> when they look at him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1197</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Okay <strong>so</strong> this has affected you quite badly really?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1198</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>E isso te afetou muito esta situação?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>And this has affected you a lot this situation?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1199</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>((Nods))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1196 the procedure encoded by the *but* added by the interpreter reduces the hearer’s processing effort by pointing him towards the intended contextual effects of the clause it introduces. More precisely, *but* indicates that what follows (“now he feels very **scared** and he gets very **nervous** when they look at him”) contradicts and eliminates an available assumption. In this utterance, I1 is thus responsible for the meaning expressed, summarising the conversation held with Manuel in the previous extract. It is unclear whether her behaviour stems from her awareness of how evidentially important the victim’s feelings are, or from simple overzealousness. Like unwarranted change of person deixis from first to third, the interactional effect of this utterance is however to create a sense of distance, of moving the interpreter away from the speaker and, further, of imposing an extra “person” between the interviewee and the interviewer. The illusion of a dyadic exchange is destroyed as the third

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128 In particular, I1 might be aware that one of the purposes of a victim personal statement (or VPS) is to give the victim an opportunity to state how the offence has affected them physically, emotionally, psychologically, or in any other way, and also that psychological harm is an aggravating factor in court.
party (the interpreter) moves into focus, coordinating the interview as an officer would. The result is perhaps the opposite of what the interpreter aimed at, i.e. a statement that would hardly be deemed admissible as evidence in court.

This section has explored interpreter’s renditions which include a DM not found in the original and clearly attributable to the interpreter, acting as a principal. The next section, however, will present a number of cases in which the interpreter’s mediation - while it is clearly evidence of their visibility - nonetheless contributes to the impression of the ‘invisible’ mediator.

6.3.2 Discourse markers understood as being attributed to the original speaker

This section focuses on cases in which no DM can be found in the original utterance, however one is added by the interpreter, giving the impression that is to be attributed to the original speaker. They are quite different from the previous cases in that they must be explained in terms of the aim of providing a faithful representation of the speaker’s utterance in a way that is indicative of the speaker’s perspective rather than the interpreter’s. Clearly, an interpreter who mediates in this way must be visible and still acts as a principal, responsible for the meaning expressed. However, as discussed in section 4.3.4, the fact that these mediations are designed to encourage the hearer to recover a faithful representation of the original speaker’s thoughts and thought processes means that, paradoxically, the act of mediation may actually create the effect of invisibility.

We can accommodate this in the relevance-theoretic model of communication outlined in chapter 4 if we decouple the responsibility for ensuring that the effort of processing the utterance will be rewarded by optimal relevance from the point of view that is being represented. Thus while the interpreter is responsible for orchestrating the Interpretation of thought representations, for selecting and organising material in such a way that the effort of processing will result in optimal relevance, the hearer does not necessarily assume that this function is being performed by someone who intends to communicate their own thoughts: the relevance of the act of interpreting may instead lie in the sense of mutuality that is achieved between hearer and speaker.
In this section, we show that this sort of decoupling allows us to explain how the use of DMs in interpreters’ renditions allows the interpreter to maintain an illusion of invisibility even though in fact he may be adding material which is not present in the original. These types of DM additions are interesting not only from the point of view of pragmatics in the sense that, contra Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) and Gutt (1990), not all cases of attributive interpretive use can be explained in the same way as cases in which the speaker’s utterance is an interpretation of the speaker’s thought about the thought(s) of another (cf. 4.3). But they are also noteworthy from the viewpoint of interpreting studies in that they show how an act of mediation and its resulting sense of affective mutuality (paradoxically) contributes to the impression of the ‘invisible’ interpreter as required in many Public Service Interpreters’ Codes of Conduct and good practice guidelines.

My investigation of this phenomenon starts by looking at additions of the most frequently used DM, i.e. so. In particular, the first example is taken from the early stage of interview 4A, in which P2 states that the caution will be explained again to Letícia as she is no longer ‘just’ a witness:

Extract 26 (4A: 59-64)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td><strong>Now</strong> I know (. ) when I spoke to you before er:: I explained the caution to you</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 60 | I2 | Eu sei que quando eu falei com você antes (. ) você *entendeu* essa advertência  
    |   | *I know that when I spoke to you before (. ) you understood this caution*  |
| 61 | P2 | **But** now because you’ve been arrested Letícia (. ) the caution is slightly different  |
| 62 | I2 | Mas devido ao facto que agora você está detida (. ) *então* essa advertência é um pouco  
    |   | *But due to the fact that now you’re under arrest (. ) so this caution is a little bit*  
    |   | diferente  
    |   | *different*  |
| 63 | P2 | **So** I want to take a few moments to make sure that you understand it  |
| 64 | I2 | Então quero passar alguns momentos para ter a certeza que você entenda  
    |   | *So I want to take a few moments to make sure that you understand*  |
The first phase was relatively short (58 utterances) given that this interview is a follow-up to a previous interview, namely interview 2. P2 feels the urge to point out that the caution he is about to administer is “slightly” different than the one Leticia heard in interview 2: 60ff. as she is now under arrest on suspicion of murder. DMs in 61 (*But*) and 63 (*So*) are operationally translated in 62 and 64 by I2, encoding comparable procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension by indicating the type of inference process that the hearer is expected to go through. However, the DM *now* in 59 is omitted, whereas Juliana adds a DM (*então*) in 62. The interpreter’s addition of a DM not found in the original is to be understood as evidence for the original speaker’s perspective, rather than the perspective of the interpreter. It can be argued that this addition is analogous to the example (35) provided by Blakemore (2010: 17) taken from Mansfield’s (1981: 223) *Collected Short Stories*, as discussed in 4.3.2:

(35) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children. (...) Even if she had had the strength she never would have nursed and played with the little girls. No, it was as though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank Heaven, mother had taken him. (emphasis in the original)

Here, the author provides a free indirect representation of a character’s thoughts, which - since they are non-communicated, private thoughts – are unlikely to contain an audience-directed device whose only function is to help the audience recover the intended interpretations of a public utterance. The use of the DM in this example was justified by the role that it plays in allowing the reader to derive assumptions and thought processes attributable to the character, but not necessarily represented explicitly in the text, thus contributing to an increased sense of mutuality between reader and character. In the same way, the interpreter’s addition of *então* in 62 not actually found in the original utterance allows the hearer to derive thoughts which can be attributable to the speaker even though they have not been represented explicitly, thus contributing to the sense of mutuality between the hearer and the speaker (rather than between the hearer and the interpreter). In other words, it can be said that in these examples both the author (Mansfield) and the interpreter successfully suppress their own voices so that the only voice we ‘hear’ is that of the character or – in the case of utterance 62 – the police officer, thus creating the illusion of the officer acting out his mental state in direct relationship with the hearer. It is the interpreter who is responsible for communicating the guarantee of optimal relevance so that any effort expended in processing
will be rewarded by cognitive effects. However, in contrast with other cases of interpretative use (e.g. irony) the reward for this effort is a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts, rather than a representation of what the interpreter thinks about those thoughts.

A similar phenomenon is illustrated in the following extract taken from the initial phase of interview 2 and involving the interpreter Juliana:

Extract 27 (2: 13-20)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>And the only thing different about this room is that there is two cameras mounted on the wall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 14 | I2 | A única coisa diferente nesse quarto é que tá: er tem duas câmeras que se vêem
*The only thing different in this room is that there is: er it has two cameras that you can see in this room*
| 15 | P2 | Okay there’s one behind you there [Letícia] |
| 16 | I2 | [há uma] atrás de ti
* [there’s one] behind you |
| 17 | P2 | And there’s also one there |
| 18 | I2 | E uma outra aqui também
*And another one here as well* |
| 19 | P2 | And they will take a video of our conversation today |
| 20 | I2 | E então vai gravar vai fazer um video de que se passa aqui hoje
*And so it’ll record it’ll make a video of what’s going on here today* |

Following Blakemore (2002), the addition of the DM então (so) in 20 indicates that the interviewee (Letícia) is expected to follow an inferential route in which the proposition expressed by her utterance is a conclusion derived in an inference in which the propositions expressed by the previous utterances (lines 14, 16, 18) are premises. However, in contrast
with the use of *Ecco* in 3A: 39, the interpreter’s addition of *então* is justified by its role in leading the hearer not to a representation of the interpreter’s thoughts, but to a representation of thoughts which are meant to be attributed to the original speaker. While the interpreter’s rendition communicates a guarantee that any effort expended by the hearer in processing it will be justified by relevant cognitive effects, the reward for this effort is a meta-representation of the police officer’s thoughts rather than a representation of what the interpreter thinks about the police officer’s thoughts. In other words, just as Mansfield suppresses her own voice in example (35), the interpreter ensures that the only voice we ‘hear’ in 20 is that of the police officer, thus creating the illusion of the police officer acting out his mental state in direct relationship with the suspects. In interactional terms, Juliana aligns herself as an author by omitting “okay” (cf. line 15) and turning the subject into a singular (*it*) in 20.

Although the subject of culture and (power) alignment is beyond the scope of this thesis, it must be remembered that police interpreting means facilitating interaction not only between two languages and two cultures, but also between two social spheres. One the one hand, besides avoiding any alteration of the pragmatics involved in the primary participants’ utterances, the interpreter is arguably barred from any intervention that might alter the legal implications of what is said. In particular, in the context of dissimilar legal systems in different countries and the consequent impossibility of terminological equivalence, the interpreter is caught between translating for ‘skopos’ (Vermeer, 1998) and the legal requirement for a ‘faithful’ rendering of the original (Johnson, 2001; Nakane, 2008, 2009; cf. rendition of caution in extract 2). I will note in passing that interpreters in my data (especially I1 and I4) appear – unsurprisingly perhaps – to align with the more powerful participant, i.e. the officer. For instance, this is shown in issues relating to register which are also inherent in the difference between social spheres of primary participants, the “clash of world perspectives” (Hale, 1997b: 197) between the officer as institutional representative and suspect or witness as lay person. A tendency can thus be noted for I1 to lower the register when interpreting the officer’s utterances, and to raise it when interpreting the interviewee’s utterances into English. In 1: 13, for instance, P1 uses lexis from a higher socio-economic
class (“cameras mounted on the wall”), which is simplified when interpreting for the witness (cf. “cameras that you can see…” in 14).129

Clearly an experienced (DPSI Law and Home Office certified) and apt interpreter, Juliana is shown to use these devices quite regularly. Here are four other instances from a long questioning sequence in which Juliana successfully gives the impression to disguise her ‘presence’ in the interaction behind the DM então:

Extract 28 (2: 836-839)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>836</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Uhm what time (.) was that then can you remember what time you would have given her that that feed on the Tuesday night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>837</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Então a que horas foi que você deu essa alimentação a ela? você se lembra? So what time is it that you gave her that feed?130 do you remember?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>838</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Exato eu acredito que foi às dez horas porque o Antonio tinha que pegar o ônibus para ir trabalhar às dez e vinte Exactly131 I think that it was ten o’clock because Antonio had to get the bus to work at ten twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>839</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Exactly te- it was exactly ten o’clock because I know Antonio had had to get the bus to go to work at ten twenty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract 29 (2: 1651-1652)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Yes just (.) next to the mattress (.) next to you as you lay on the mattress is that correct?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Então (.) fica a cesta fica: do lado do col[chão e você] dorme no colchão?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

129 Examination of the data for this thesis, instead, reveals a limited number of instantiations of hyperformality. It may be that this phenomenon is less frequent due to the “quasiformality” (Arminen, 2000: 446) mentioned in 6.1, i.e. because the social distance between interviewer and interviewee is perceived as being (or kept) smaller than in courtroom exchange.

130 “Alimentações” is literally feeds, but not generally used to indicate breastfeeds. The singular, “alimentação” could be taken to mean diet or feeding; however, in the latter case it could also more generally indicate bottle or any kind of feeding. Instead, “amamentação” specifically indicates breastfeeding, together with the aforementioned collocations.

131 This should be a question (exactly?), but the speaker’s intonation is flat.
It is:: well (.) the basket is is: next to the mattress and you sleep on the mattress?

Extract 30 (2: 1673-1678)

| 1673 | P2 | And then you said that you sort of settled back then er:: (..) and then you mentioned earlier on you said that the next time Maria woke (.) was just around seven o’clock on Wednesday morning |
| 1674 | I2 | En- |
| 1675 | P2 | Is that correct? |
| 1676 | I2 | Então você a acalmou  
So you calmed her down |
| 1677 | L | Yeah |
| 1678 | I2 | E só foi lá pra dormir só foi lá pra as sete horas mais ou menos então que ela acordou  
And it was just to sleep it was only at around seven more or less so that she woke up novamente  
again |

Extract 31 (2: 1719-1723)

| 1719 | P2 | Okay now you’ve mentioned that on this occasion er Letícia (.) you said that you know she was arching back and you’ve mentioned (.) as well that she cried or screamed a little |
| 1720 | I2 | ( ) |
| 1721 | P2 | Yes |
| 1722 | I2 | Você mencionou que: naquela ocasião também que ela então (.) se esticou (.) e que ela  
You mentioned that: on that occasion as well that she then (.) was streching (.) and that she também chorou naquela ocasião  
também chorou naquela ocasião |
In the four instances shown above, the DM *então* constrains relevance by directly specifying the kind of effect that is intended; in this case, the derivation of a contextual implication. Both Leticia and the police officer are able to recognise that they are expected to access a particular set of contextual assumptions for the interpretation of the *então* utterance. For instance, in 837 the DM includes the following assumption: “If Leticia has given a feed on Tuesday night, then she must remember the time of the feed”. Thus, Leticia would be expected to access those contextual assumptions which enable her to interpret the second segment as a conclusion derived from the proposition expressed by the first.

Retrieval may also be varied by probing different senses. Typically interviewers concentrate on what the interviewee saw and as a consequence what a person heard, touched, smelt and tasted are often ignored. Valuable information may therefore go unreported. Sketch drawings can be also used, which not only help in reinstating the context of the event but also aid both the interviewee and interviewer to orientate themselves (i.e. relations between people and objects in the event scene). This is especially important when identification may be an investigative issue. Such is the case in the following passage, featuring a series of turns uttered after about one hour and a half into interview 5A and revolving around the description of Maria’s Moses basket, which once fell onto the ground with Maria still lying in it. In other words, the child might have died of injuries suffered on a previous occasion, i.e. this incident involving a fall. After a series of questions on its purchase and use, P4 asks “what part of the stand broke” (1453), to which Antonio volunteers to make a series of drawings of the folding Moses basket stand (1455):

Extract 32 (5A: 1428-1465)

---

In interview 1, Manuel draws a map of the places where the alleged robbery took place (cf. Fig. 3).
<p>| 1429 | I4 | Ah! so they came home and she showed me that they had bought this Moses basket |
| 1430 | P4 | Right okay (.) [did it ] sorry did it come with the stand? |
| 1431 | A | [after t-] |
| 1432 | I4 | Quindi... |
| 1433 | A | Si |
| 1434 | I4 | Era era compreso con lo stand? ((gesture indicating a stand)) |
| 1435 | A | Si si |
| 1436 | P4 | Right |
| 1437 | I4 | Yeah |
| 1438 | P4 | Okay (.) did she did she buy it new or did she buy it second hand? |
| 1439 | I4 | L’ha comprato nuovo o:: [di seconda] mano? |
| 1440 | A | [no nuovo ] |
| 1441 | I4 | New |
| 1442 | P4 | New okay okay (.) so how long had you been using the Moses basket before the stand broke? |
| 1443 | I4 | E: per quanto tempo avete: er usato questo:: cesto (. ) prima che si rompesse la barra del (.) |
| 1444 | | And: how long have: er you been using this:: basket (. ) before the stand bar (. ) |
| 1445 | | ((makes gesture of bar breaking)) dello stand? |
| 1446 | | broke? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1444  | A     | N- non mi rico- eh! se mi ricordas- da quando l’abbiamo comprato (.) da quando l’abbiamo comprato quindi...  
I d- don’t reme- oh! I wish I rememb- since we bought it (.) since we bought it so... |
| 1445  | I4    | No quanto tempo: è passato da quando l’avete comprato fino al momento in cui si è rott? ((indicates one point to another with her right hand))  
No how long: was it since you bought it until the moment it broke? |
| 1446  | A     | È quello che non mi ricordo perché...  
This is what I cannot remember because... |
| 1447  | I4    | I don’t remember it now that’s er... |
| 1448  | P4    | Okay was was it the first night that you used it? or...  
Dice la prima: sera? o...  
He says the first: night? or... |
| 1449  | I4    | No no no no no no no  
No ((dryly)) |
| 1450  | A     | No ((dryly))  
No |
| 1451  | P4    | Right okay (.) so (.) wha- what part of the stand broke?  
Quale parte dello (.) [stand si è rott? ] ((indicates a line in front of her))  
What part of the (.) [stand broke?] |
| 1452  | I4    | Can I draw it?  
[come posso spieg]garlo? (.) mi: sarebbe più facile se potessi:: disegnarlo [ how could I explain it? (.) it’d: be easier for me if I could:: draw it |
| 1453  | P4    | |
| 1454  | I4    | |
| 1455  | A     | |
| 1456  | I4    | |
| 1457  | P4    | Mh mh! |
| 1458 | I4 | He says it would be easier if I could draw it |
| 1459 | P4 | Tha- tha- that pen or a big... |
| 1460 | I4 | La matita qua (.) er o con quella? ((points at marker pen))
   *The pencil there (.) or with the other one?*
| 1461 | A | Si
   *Yes*
| 1462 | I4 | Yes |
| 1463 | P5 | ((Gives A a notepad while P4 gives him a marker pen)) Lean on that (.) it might be a bit easier |
| 1464 | A | Thanks |
| 1465 | I4 | **Ecco è è più facile**
   *So it’s it’s easier* |

While *so* in 1429 can be said to be non-speaker oriented and *so* in 1453 is omitted, in utterances 1432 and 1465 include expressions (*Quindi* and *Ecco*) which do not represent anything in the thoughts being represented.\(^{133}\) Nevertheless, in spite of this mediation, the hearer gets the impression (illusion) that he has direct access to the speaker’s thoughts. Far from being just an “obstacle” (Wadensjö, 1998: 225) to interpreter-mediated communication or a hedge on an utterance’s illocutionary force (cf. 2.2.3) the added, inferential DM *Ecco* in 1465 creates the illusion of unmediated representation (even though there is clearly mediation) and that the interpreter is solely ‘animating’ primary interlocutors’ utterances within the current framework of participation.

From a macro-perspective, I4’s uncourteous and unprofessional attitude (cf. 6.1) is shown in her footing shifts. For instance, in 1439 she omits the DM, acting as author. Further, in 1445 she assumes the role of principal to reformulate the question, although there was no need given that Antonio did understand it and was simply reflecting upon his answer. In 1449 and 1458, the footing shift corresponds to a shift of pronoun and address, a common signal of a principal in interpreted events as discussed in 6.1.

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\(^{133}\) The case of *so* ‘translated’ by *e* in 1443 shall be discussed for extract 48.
Another example of this type of addition is in line 1714 from the end of interview 3A, in which the police officer allows for a break to take place before Antonio goes back to hospital:

**Extract 33 (3A: 1713-1734)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Right okay er j- just at this stage do you want to stop for a minute and have a drink or something like that?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1714 | I3    | *Ecco* ci vogliamo fermare [un momentino]  
*So shall we stop [a second]* |
| 1715 | A     | [I would prefer ] er:: the earlier I finish the earlier I come back |
| 1716 | P4    | Right okay |
| 1717 | I3    | °Yeah° più presto finisce più presto va all’ospedale?  
*the earlier it finishes the earlier*[^134] you go to hospital? |
| 1718 | A     | Si  
Yes |
| 1719 | I3    | Yes the quicker we finish the quicker I get back to hospital |
| 1720 | P4    | Right okay er: alright what what I’m gonna do I’m just gonna have a couple of minutes alright? I I appreciate that you do want to [go back] to the hospital |
| 1721 | A     | [okay ] |
| 1722 | I3    | Maybe a glass of water (what do you think) |
| 1723 | P4    | I certainly don’t intend to to to stop everything but I think we just need we just need a couple of minutes |
| 1724 | A     | °Okay° |
| 1725 | P4    | It’s just to perhaps stretch your legs er... |
| 1726 | P5    | Mh |

[^134]: "The earlier” is more frequently translated with *prima*; her rendition is rather clumsy.
I won’t keep you here for any longer than you need be.

((Nods)) okay

((Nods))

Alright: so we’ll just have a little rest and the time is [fifty-six minutes] past two in the afternoon.

[fifteen hundred] ((smiles and looks at her watch again)) fifteen hundred hours exactly by my watch ((laughs))

Mine’s not

Sorry

It’s alright ((laughs))

Utterance 1713 is a clear signal of the police officer’s orientation to her institutional role (cf. Heydon, 2005, as mentioned in chapter 1) and is prefaced by the interjection right. Interpreting and coordinating discourse are simultaneously present as the interpreter continuously shifts footing from author to principal. As a principal I3 first repeats Antonio’s statement in Italian (1717) and – inexplicably – in English (1719), then suggests the reason for a break (1722), until she decides to stop interpreting (1723-1731). In particular, not only does she not interpret the police officer reporting the end-time of the interview, but she chooses to say it herself (1731), to which P5 replies abruptly and then laughs with a hint of despair.

Lastly, we find a similar addition of so in interview 1, in particular from the beginning of phase 3 (cf. chapter 1). Here, P1 encourages Manuel to report every detail he can remember, even partial information:

Extract 34 (1: 225-232)
| 226 | 11 | Mh (. . .) er: seria bom que::. escolher er: um momento certo para começas a contar a tua história portanto (. . .) logo antes de ter começado o problema er::. até ao momento em que chegaste à polícia 

   *er: it would be good if::. you picked er: a specific moment to start telling your story*

   *story so (. . .) just before the problem has started er::. until the moment when you arrived at the police*

| 227 | M | Er::. não percebi ((touches his right temple, puzzled))

   *Er::. I didn’t understand*

| 228 | 11 | He didn’t understand I’ll explain again (. . .) er::. tens que escolher um momento (. . .) portanto quando começas a contar a tua história conta a:. partir de (. . .) um bocadinho antes disto ter acontecido (. . .) até ao momento em que chegaste à polícia ((gesture to indicate beginning and end))

   *er::. you need to choose a moment (. . .) so when you start telling your story tell it from::. (. . .) a bit before this has happened (. . .) until the moment when you arrived at the police end)*

| 229 | M | Bem

   *Okay*

| 230 | 11 | O::. o o::. o assalto não?

   *The::. the the::. the robbery yeah?*

| 231 | P1 | Okay (. . .) okay over to you ((gestures towards M))

| 232 | 11 | Então (. . .) "podes começar" 

   *So (. . .) "you can start"*

The fact that Manuel does not understand the police officer’s attempt to initiate an uninterrupted report of the events leading up to his arrival at the police station prompts the
interpreter/principal to “explain it again” by providing further renditions of the police-officer’s utterance in (225). In both instances, the DM *portanto* (*so*) is added in a similar position within the utterance, and in both cases this addition can be argued to encourage the hearer (i.e. Manuel) to see the proposition that he should start reporting the events from the moments before the robbery occurred up until the moment he arrived at the police station as a contextual implication of the request to pick a good place to start the account. Clearly, it will be possible to identify this proposition as a contextual implication of the request only if further contextual premises are accessed. For example, it will be understood as an implication of the request if it is further understood that this will help the police officer to reconstruct the sequence at a later stage. However, the identification of the particular contextual premise used in the inference will be the responsibility of the hearer, and it is possible that another assumption will be accessed. The point is that since the constraint imposed by *so* is met by accessing this assumption, it will be understood that it is part of what the officer intended to communicate. In this way, the addition of *portanto* (*so*) contributes to the derivation of the hearer’s representation of the officer’s thoughts and thought processes even though they are not represented explicitly by the interpreter.

I now move on to consider cases in which *but* is added by the interpreter in order to represent the original speaker’s perspective. The following extracts from the same interview, in which Letícia uses an impassioned tone of voice in the description of Antonio’s attempts to revive their child’s limp body, are a highly significant piece of evidence for the investigation:

Extract 35 (2: 340-345)

| 340 | L | E:: nesse momento a Anna chorava desesperada o Antonio nervoso tentava pegar ela  
*And.: in that moment Anna was crying desperately Antonio’s nervously trying to pick her up* |
| 341 | L2 | Anna was crying crying a lot and Antonio was er: very nervous |
| 342 | L | Tentava pegar ela  
*He was trying to pick her up* |
| 343 | L2 | And er Antonio was trying to pick her up |
| 344 | L | E:: tentava (.) fazia Maria! Maria! e ela toda mole |
And he was saying Maria! Maria! but she was all (. ) limp

Extract 36 (2: 2087-2088)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2087</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>E o Antonio pegou ela tentou reanimá-la de novo Maria! [a voltava pra assim]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And Antonio picked her up he tried to revive her again Maria! [he turned her this way]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maria! e ela toda mole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maria! and she [was] all limp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2088</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>[and then Antonio ]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>er held her and he held her like this (. ) and said Maria! but she was all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>limp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract 36 is drawn from phase 3 of the ECI, in which Letícia is encouraged to recount the incident in a free, uninterrupted order, whereas the second extract is taken from one of the latter phases of the interview - i.e. phase 5 or ‘varied and extensive retrieval’ (Milne & Bull, 1999, 2006) - in which the interviewer encourages Letícia to recall the same event using a variety of different orders, working backwards and forwards in time from the most memorable aspect of the event. Here, the interpreter adds the same DM (but) in a comparable position within both renditions (345 and 2088), even though the two passages are far apart. In both cases, the addition of but indicates that the relevance of the segment she was all limp lies in the fact that it eliminates the assumption presumed to have been made manifest by the first segment, that is, the baby will respond to Antonio when he cries her name. Thus as in the examples with so, the addition of the DM not only allows the hearer to recover contextual assumptions that have not been made explicit, but it also allows the hearer to derive an understanding of the original speaker’s thought processes. In particular, it allows the hearer to gain an idea of the contrast between the parents’ hopes that the baby would revive and their feelings when she did not. In this way, its addition contributes to a sense of mutuality between the original speaker and the police officer.
I now take another example of the interpreter’s addition of but by the same interpreter, but from interview 4 and a different stage of the investigation (phase 2). The police officer (P2) in the following extract is explaining in plain terms the first and second part of the caution administered to the suspect upon arrest:

Extract 37 (4A: 67-92)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>The first part says (.) you don’t have to say anything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Na primeira parte diz (.) você então não tem que dizer nada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the first part it says (.) you then don’t have to say anything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>And that’s just as it says (.) you don’t have to answer any of my questions today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>E é: o que diz (.) é que você não tem que responder as perguntas que eu vou fazer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And it is: as it says (.) that is you don’t have to answer the questions that I’m going to make hoje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Er: and the next part of the caution says</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Mas a outra parte da advertência então diz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>But the other part of the caution then says</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Er: if you don’t answer a question today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Que se você não responder à pergunta que foi feita hoje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That if you didn’t answer a question that was asked today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>And this investigation ends up in a case that goes to trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>E essa investigação então termina em que (.) term- er vai per- er perante um tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And this investigation then ends up in that (.) end- er goes t- er to court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>And then if you do answer the same question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>E você então responde a ela (.) à:: às mesmas perguntas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>The court might think (...) well why did Leticia not answer the question today?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Então o juiz pode pensar porque é que a Leticia não respondeu às perguntas hoje</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>But why is she now (...) answering it now that it’s gone to trial?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Porque é que agora (...) que ela tá perante o tribunal que ela então tá a responder às perguntas?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>And they may think (...) that that’s because you’re (...) you’ve had a chance to make something up (...) or you might be lying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>E: talvez eles pensem que você então tá inventando uma história ou (...) que talvez você esteja mentindo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Er: and er: if you answer a question today (...) [and-]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>[e se ] I beg your pardon (...) e se você responder a uma pergunta aqui hoje [and if] and if you answer a question here today</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>And this investigation goes to trial (...) and you give a different answer (...) to the same question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>E: essa investigação então vai perante o tribunal (...) mas lá você dá uma resposta diferente And: this investigation then goes to trial (...) but there you give a different answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Again the court might think (...) well why did Leticia (...) say one thing today (...) and why is she now saying something different (...) now that it’s gone to court?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

135 Had the interpreter kept the adverbial subordinate clause introduced by *se* (*if*), the future subjunctive tense (*responder*) would have been required, expressing a neutral or expected condition for a present (or future) tense main clause. Instead, she renders the original protasis with a main clause; this might be due to her difficulty in applying the subjunctive mood, as seen in a number of passages from interview 4.
The judge then might think why did she answer here today one thing and in court she answered differently

And again they might think well maybe it’s because you might be lying or you’ve had a chance to make something up

And again they might think that you are making up a story or that you may be lying

For the sake of clarity the interviewer divides the caution into two parts. The first part is phrased as “You do not have to say anything” and is briefly illustrated in lines 67 and 69. The explanation of the second, more intricate part (“but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court”) is broken down into five parts. The police officer links the first and the second part of the explanation in utterance 71 by means of a coordinating and (“and the next part…”). However, the interpreter’s rendition in 72 (as well as 88) includes Mas (But), which shows her active role and triggers an inferential path which leads to the elimination of the contextual assumption that no legal consequences will ensue if she chooses not to answer. In this way, the interpreter ensures that the interviewee recovers the cognitive effects intended by the interviewer, thus contributing to the sense of mutuality between interviewee and interviewer. A similar effect is reached in line 80 through the addition of the DM Então (So) which, as we have seen, plays a role in ensuring that the hearer will interpret the proposition expressed in line 80 (“the court might wonder why Letícia did not answer the same questions during the interview”) is a contextual implication derived from the proposition expressed in line 78 is a premise.

136 The interpreter’s use of the present subjunctive of “poder” (to be able to) is unclear. I2 could have adopted either the present indicative (pode, see utt. 80) or the present conditional tense of the same verb (poderia).
137 The adverb “talvez” (maybe) would require the use of the subjunctive (in this case, “pensem”).
The following extract is drawn from the preliminary phase of interview 1, in which P1 is giving another ‘cognitive’ instruction after the introduction of the note taker Danny (cf. 1: 67-71 in 6.1). Note that police officers in my data repeatedly highlight the need for ‘verbatimness’ by the recurrent use of expressions such as exactly, verbatim, word for word, everything, which are (paradoxically) closely rendered or sometimes even added by the interpreter (cf. 200 “everything that you say”):

Extract 38 (1: 197-212)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>197</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Er:: and I mentioned earlier that Danny (.) er: is writing notes as well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Mh mh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Er:: (. ) it’s not normally too much of a problem really when we’ve got an er an interpretation (. ) taking place as well but (. ) normally er at this point I would ask you not to talk too fast so that we can keep up (. ) but obviously with the int- wi- with yourself Mariza interpreting Danny has a little bit more time to write things down anyway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>“Okay” (. ) er:: o Danny também está a tomar nota (.) do outro lado (.) e:: tá a to- a tomar notas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Danny is taking note\textsuperscript{138} as well (. ) on the other side (. ) and is ta- taking notes da conversa (. ) e normalmente ele ia-te pedir pra tu não falares muito depressa (. ) para dar ao
danny o tempo de tomar notas (. ) mas como eu estou presente (. ) eu tenho que interpretar

Danny the time to take notes (. ) but as I’m here (. ) I need to interpret
tudo o que tu dizes (. ) e isso já não vai ser necessário (. ) portanto podes falar [ao teu:]

everything that you say (. ) and that will no longer be necessary (. ) so you can speak [at your:]
tua maneira (. ) normal

your normal (. ) pace |

201 | M | [okay ] |

\textsuperscript{138} The English collocation ‘to take notes’ would be accurately rendered in European Portuguese with expressions such as tirar notas or fazer anotações.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>That’s fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>But in any case just take your time because obviously (.) you know Mariza needs to tak- be able to take in (.) er what you’re telling me: in order to (.) be able to interpret it properly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Mas [seja com for] er:: (.) fala er:: <em>pausadamente</em> porque a Mariza <em>tem</em> que tomar notas <em>But [in any case] er:: speak er:: <em>slowly</em> because Mariza <em>needs</em> to take notes</em> and needs to explain to me what is happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>[for the tape ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&quot;Mh mh²&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Okay (.) er ar- are you okay Mariza with (.) what we’re doing there as far as (.) [your] role is concerned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>yes that’s fine [yes ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Ele perguntou-me se eu esta- se eu estava de acordo (.) estava tudo bem com (.) a minha <em>He asked me if I wa- if I agreed (.) everything was fine with (.) my</em> função como intérprete na discussão <em>role as an interpreter in this discussion</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Now when I spoke to Mariza before: (.) in here (.) I was just explaining she needs (.) to (.) as directly as possible interpret exactly what you said (.) to me (.) a- and (.) and vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Quando eu falei com a Mariza antes aqui na sala eu tive-lhe a explicar er: que ela tem que er:: _When I spoke to Mariza before here in the room I was explaining to her er: she needs to er:: interpret diretamente (.) o que é que tu me dizes (.) e: vice-versa <em>interpret directly (.) what you tell me (.) and: vice versa</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

239
It is worth mentioning that, at a micro-level, while *but* in 200 has been operationally rendered, *portanto* is added. The former makes salient an inferential route in which (a) the interpretation of the first segment gives Manuel access to an assumption such as: *I am required to speak slowly*, whereas (b) the interpretation of the second segment leads to the recovery of an assumption which contradicts this assumption, namely *I am not required to speak slowly*. The inferences can be summarised as follows:

In this part I would ask you not to talk too fast so that we can keep up. (proposition expressed by segment 1)

If that is the case, I am required to speak slowly (contextual premise)

├ I am required to speak slowly. (implicated conclusion)

With yourself Mariza interpreting Danny will have a little bit more time to write things down anyway. (proposition expressed by segment 2)

If Danny has more time to take notes, I am not required to speak slowly (contextual premise)

├ I am not required to speak slowly. (implicated conclusion)

Instead, the segment including *portanto* is added in order to make implications of the police officer’s utterance explicit and, in this sense, it could be said to represent a thought which is not represented explicitly in the utterance:

Mariza is required to interpret everything that Manuel says. (proposition expressed by segment 1)

If Mariza is interpreting everything Manuel says, Danny will have time to make notes even if you speak at your normal pace. (contextual premise)

├ You can speak at your normal pace. (implicated conclusion)

In the unmarked role of an animator who is expected to maintain impartiality and accuracy stipulated by the Code of Conduct, the interpreter might have managed and rendered the police officer’s utterances in lines 197-199 quite differently. As in 1: 72 (“eu esteja a interpretar”), the interpreter’s shift to the first-person in 200 (“eu estou presente (.) eu tenho que interpretar”) is required to mark her role as interpreter. However, in utterances 204, 212,
and 214, the interpreter chooses to resort to the third-person (‘Mariza’), showing inconsistency with her previous renditions. Another shift of footing is to be found in the last part of 200 (“that will no longer be necessary (.) so you can speak at your: [your] normal (.) pace”), when the interpreter appears to make the inferences drawn from P1’s prior original utterance more explicit.

Mariza’s one-word utterance in 198 can be said to function as a supportive feedback, confirming her attentive listening. As such, it signals the interpreter’s role as a principal and can be categorised under the label of non-rendition (Wadensjö, 1998: 108; cf. Table 5), i.e. as an interpreters’ autonomous contribution which does not correspond – as translation – to prior original utterances by primary parties. Another example of non-rendition signalling the interpreter’s principal role is utterance 210, in which Mariza explains the police officer’s direct question included in 207 to Manuel (the role shift is clearly indicated by the use of the third person pronoun ‘he’).

I shall now consider examples in which well is added in the rendition of utterances by interpreters. First, let us take the example in line 24 from the ‘summary’ phase of interview 1. Here, Manuel is arguing that the robber’s accent resembles that of those who live nearby his house and repeats that his voice is hoarse:

Extract 39 (1: 1017-1025)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1017</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Right (.) just like the local people [you] mean or...?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1018</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>[mh] e:: [que andam sempre]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and:: [who always go around]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1019</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>[como as pessoas ] locais não é?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[like the local] people right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mh (.) que andam sempre de bicicletas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mh (.) who always go around with their bikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1021</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>And they’re always riding their bicycles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although *well* is in line 1025 is clearly intended as part of a representation of what the interviewee said, there is no expression which corresponds to it in the interviewee’s utterance. What would justify this mediation by the interpreter? The answer in RT would be that it contributes to the sense of mutuality between the hearer (the police interviewer) and the original speaker (the interviewee) by giving the hearer a sense that he has immediate access to the interviewee’s thought processes. And how does it do this? In this case, it seems that the use of *well* could be motivated by the interviewee’s recognition of the possibility that the information about the hoarseness of the voice might not be considered optimally relevant because he had already communicated it - or, more generally, that this is the most relevant information he can provide given his ability to recall and provide information in the context of the interview. In this way, the DM creates this illusion by indicating that the interviewee believes his description of the voice as a bit hoarse is relevant even though he has already communicated this information – or, in other words, by indicating that this information is the most relevant information compatible with his ability to recall and provide information in the current circumstances. The interviewer might gain access to other assumptions not explicitly communicated by the interviewee, for example, that he is not entirely sure whether the interviewer had taken this description on board earlier on, or even that he is not entirely sure whether he has given this description already.

We now look at five extracts from interview 3 in which the communicator is Gianna Bianchi, in the sense that her act of representing the thoughts of another is optimally relevant: she is
responsible for orchestrating her rendition in such a way that the hearer will recover the optimally relevant interpretation of the original speaker’s utterances. However, optimal relevance is achieved not by increasing the mutuality between interpreter and hearer, but by creating a sense of mutuality between the original speaker and the hearer. This means that the intimacy that is created through the interpreter’s use of well is not between the communicator as guarantor of relevance, on the one hand, and the hearer: instead, this DM contributes to a sense of intimacy between the hearers (P4 and P5) and the original speaker (Antonio).

The first extract is taken from the beginning of the interview, in which Antonio is asked whether he remembers if the door was open or locked, and in the middle of his recollection I3 interrupts his flow (314):

Extract 40 (3A: 311-315)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 311 | A | I can’t see er cioè no- non posso dire se la porta era chiusa o aperta  
* I mean I c- I cannot say if the door was locked or open |
| 312 | I3 | No  
* No |
| 313 | A | Perché non me non me lo ricordo sinceramente so solo che (.) quando sono arrivato (.) a  
* Because I don’t I don’t remember to be honest I only know that (.) when I got there (.) to  
varcare:: la soglia non mi ricordo se era...  
* cross:: the threshold I cannot remember if it was... |
| 314 | I3 | I don’t remember exactly I said that before er:: if the door was closed well I’m not sure  
whether it was or not but when I just er got over the threshold and I... |
| 315 | P5 | Mh |

Here, well is used in a context in which the speaker believes that a ‘yes/no’ answer to the question would yield misleading cognitive effects, and in this way indicates that the utterance is the most relevant one that is compatible with her preference for preventing the sort of confusion which might otherwise ensue. Similarly, we could say that the suggestion that the
character in example (35) would be relieved if her mother would take the baby boy she is nursing might be considered not to be relevant in a context in which she is sitting nursing him. In this way, the use of well creates the impression that the character is aware of the apparent contradiction between what has just said to herself and the presence of the baby on her lap and is protesting that what she is telling herself is a relevant representation of her real feelings – no matter what someone else might think.

A similar analysis can be applied to utterance 1141, this time taken from another questioning phase in which Antonio is asked about Maria’s routine:

Extract 41 (3A: 1140-1)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1140</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[poi c’è anche da dire che ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[then it must also be said that]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>esatto poi c’è anche da dire che in pratica er:: che i bambini appena nascono (. ) secondo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>that’s right then it must also be said that basically er:: that new-born babies (. ) according</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>l’esperienza che ho con lei che hanno mu- mutano il giorno per la notte dormono di giorno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to my experience with her what they have they sw- swap day and night they sleep by day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e sono svegli di notte...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and are awake by night...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1141</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yes and often with babies er:: well it it happens that er:: they take night for day and vice versa don’t they? yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first and the second sentences in the original are combined into one sentence, with a considerable amount of omission and finishing with a backchannel (yes) produced by the interpreter as a principal. However, the DM is used effectively to suppress her own voice.

Consider, now, a sequence of open-ended questions to Antonio, enabling him to supply extensive answers. The picture of the event that derives is full of elaborate details, starting from the answer to P4’s question “who’s the main carer of Maria?” (1240):
Further along, the conversation veers towards Maria’s eating habits, and P4 finds out that Maria would only breastfeed, however she would sometimes be short of breath whist breastfeeding:

---

139 Again, Antonio uses a high-register term for “to care for, look after” (accudire), however fails to conjugate its third person correctly (“accude” instead of “accudisce”).
### Extract 43 (3A: 1264-1267)

| 1264 | A | Però lei:: si allontanava cioè a un certo punto mangiava e si come se mancava di aria le  
|      |   | But she:: would detach herself I mean as she was eating sh- as if she couldn’t breathe\textsuperscript{140}  
|      |   | mancava l’aria  
|      |   | *she couldn’t breathe*  

| 1265 | I3 | Right it’s Letícia that offered when she was breastfeeding er Letícia noticed that er she she::  
|      |   | (..) she seem- er she seemed to become (..) short of breath and she would leave the say the nipple the breast (..) and take a breath  

| 1266 | A | E: piangere come se:: non er lei non capiva se era forse il fatto che (..) lei pi- si:  
|      |   | *And: cry as if:: she didn’t er she didn’t understand if it was the fact that (..) she p- was:*  
|      |   | innervosiva per il fatto che: non c’era latte a sufficienza  
|      |   | *getting nervous because: there wasn’t sufficient milk*  

| 1267 | I3 | Well she didn’t understand whether (..) the child wasn’t taking sufficient milk from the breast  

In the third example, instead, the questioning has moved towards the present, and P4 is enquiring into Maria’s recent health history:

### Extract 44 (3A: 1290-1299)

| 1290 | P4 | Right so has there ever been an occasion where you’ve (..) you’ve been concerned and you’ve taken Maria to the doctor’s?  
|      |   |  

| 1291 | I3 | Mh ci sono state delle occasioni quando Lei si è sentito er:: magari: preoccupato che  
|      |   | *Mh has there ever been an occasion when you’ve been er:: perhaps: concerned that she*  
|      |   | dovesse farla vedere dal medico?  
|      |   | *should be seen by a doctor?*

\textsuperscript{140}The standard collocation is “le mancava l’aria”, as he rightly uses after a self-correction. Antonio’s lapse could be due to his lexical influence from Portuguese (in this case, the expression “faltar de ar”), present in several occasions throughout interviews 3A and 5A.
In 1244 (continued in 1246), 1267, and 1299), the use of *well* leads the hearer to derive further assumptions which, while they are not relevant from the hearer’s point of view, are relevant if one takes the speaker’s preferences into account. In this case, the desire to demonstrate that a ‘yes/no’ answer to the questions on parenting and Maria’s routine would yield misleading cognitive effects (i.e. *Maria’s routine is regular, Letícia knows why Maria cries when she breastfeeds and Letícia is the only one who looks after Maria*). The reward for interpreting the three utterances is not an Interpretation of what the interpreter thinks Antonio is thinking, but simply an Interpretation of what Antonio is thinking. I3’s own voice is suppressed and we are left to explore Antonio’s mental life, using the DMs (and other procedural elements) as evidence for an illusion of the sort of affective mutuality that we normally have with communicators in monolingual conversation.
Finally, extracts 45 and 46 are taken from interview 5A at the beginning of phase 3. The police interpreter’s addition of *well* is justified by the way in which they contribute to the impression of a more direct line between the officer and the interviewee’s thoughts:

Extract 45 (5A: 316-24)

| 316 | P4 | Okay (.) what was Leticia’s prescribed date (.) what was her due date? |
| 317 | I4 | **Well** qual’era la data che:: dove in cui poteva nascere (.) in cui avevano detto che...<br>wha- what was the date that:: where when she could be born (.) when they said that...<br>doveva nascere?<br>she was due? |
| 318 | A  | **Quindi** in Inghilterra avevano detto (.) il tr- la prima volta il er:: il (.) l’undici (.) la...<br>Well in England they said (.) the thi- the first time the er:: the (.) the eleventh (.) the...<br>prima volta avevano detto che era il dieci scusi<br>first time they said that it was the tenth sorry |
| 319 | I4 | The first time they said it was the tenth er di febbraio?...<br>of February? |
| 320 | A  | Si...<br>Yes |
| 321 | I4 | The [tenth] |
| 322 | A  | [e poi] mi avevano detto l’undici (.) qui in Inghilterra<br>[and then] they told me the eleventh (.) here in England |
| 323 | I4 | And then they said the eleventh |
| 324 | P4 | Er still of February? er [tenth eleventh... ] |
Since it is in I4’s interests that the hearer take up the guarantee of relevance she is communicating and invest effort in the derivation of cognitive effects, it will be in her interests in such a circumstance for her to provide a linguistically encoded signal (well in 317) that there are cognitive effects to be derived or, in other words, that all is well. However, she then decides to omit the same signal from Antonio (318) that his utterance yields a level of relevance consistent with guarantee communicated by every act of ostensive inferential communication. It is noteworthy that communication in the subsequent utterances (319-324) breaks down, beginning with the interpreter’s shift of footing to ask for clarification on the month. However, I3 fails to render it in 321, possibly due to Antonio’s overlap as he joins in whilst I3 is in mid-turn (322). This culminates in the police officer’s confusion about the month (324).

*Well* is also added by the interpreter in her rendition of Antonio’s utterance in 850, where Antonio informs the interviewer that his wife suffered from a serious ear infection and was advised to undergo surgery before getting pregnant:

**Extract 46 (5A: 850-856)**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qui- quindi per questo: (..) noi volevamo (.) volevamo questa bambina però: abbiamo sempre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S- So that’s why: (.) we did want (.) we did want this baby (.) but: we have always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aspettato perché (.) se fosse stata (.) grav- er incinta (.) non avrebbe potuto (.) av- er: ricevere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>waited because (.) if she had been (.) pre- er pregnant (.) she couldn’t have (.) ha- er: undergo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>l’operazione diciamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the operation you know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>851</td>
<td>I4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ah! we we waited to have the baby because if she had been pregnant well she couldn’t have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>had the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>852</td>
<td>P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okay (.) s- so is this er a condition with her ears that she’s had obviously before:: (.) she’d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>been pregnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>853</td>
<td>I4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quindi questa condizione ((indicates right ear)) [er:: ce l’aveva prima di ] essere stata:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>So this condition [er:: she had it before] she’d been:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this case, the use of well might be justified by Antonio’s belief that the police interviewer may not fully understand his explanation for deferring the pregnancy: it seems that the use of well provides an assurance that although becoming pregnant would have had a number of consequences, it is the impossibility of having the ear operation which is the most relevant. Thus by adding well the interpreter gives the hearer access to assumptions not explicitly communicated – assumptions about not only about the way in which the interviewee sees his contribution to the exchange, but also about the way in which he believes the interviewer might see that contribution.

To sum up, as in Blakemore’s (2010, 2011) account of FIT representations these intrinsically communicative devices for directing pragmatic inference play a central role in creating the illusion of a speaker acting out his mental state in immediate relationship with the audience. According to Blakemore (2010, 2011), they achieve this effect in FIT in virtue of the fact that they lead the audience to construct representations of a third person’s thoughts, thought processes and emotional states not represented explicitly in the text. That is, they allow the
audience to view the world inhabited by a character from that character’s perspective rather than from the perspective of the author/narrator actually responsible for the representation. Similarly, the dialogue interpreter’s act of revealing the speaker’s thoughts can be said to communicate a guarantee of optimal relevance, which in turn provides a justification for the hearer’s effort in interpreting his/her utterances. However, one can argue that the reward for this effort is not the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of interpreter and hearer, but a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts which is perceived to be unmediated by the thoughts of the interpreter who is producing the utterance. Once the interpreter has provided the evidence, she can often be said to ‘disappear’ in order to leave the audience to draw on their imagination either to create meta-representations of thoughts which are not represented in the utterance, or to create meta-representations of otherwise “ineffable aspects of thoughts” (Blakemore, 2010: 22). Either way, the result is that the audience is under the impression of accessing the thoughts of the speaker directly. While this act of mediation might appear to contravene PSI Codes of Conduct by ‘embellishing’ or, rather, modifying the original utterance, the sense of mutuality which is achieved by the addition means that the interpreter gives the impression that she is suppressing her own voice, thus making herself less visible. In this way, the interpreter’s mediation is in fact consistent with PSI guidelines.

In conclusion, I have applied Blakemore’s (2010) relevance theoretic analysis of the role of DMs in free indirect thought (FIT) representations to the role played by similar expressions by interpreters. Interpreting is analysed within relevance theory as a special case of attributive use (cf. Gutt, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95). However, the role of DMs in the representation of a point of view that is not the interpreter’s shows that this account must be modified in order to explain how interpreters suppress their voices in order to maintain an impression of mutuality between hearer and original speaker.

Our data from interpreter-mediated police interviews shows that interpreting practice is variable with respect to the inclusion of DMs. In particular, renditions include DMs not found in the original but which are understood as being attributed to the original speaker. While the addition of DMs might be regarded as evidence for a mediating interpreter, and hence contrary to public authorities’ codes of conduct, such additions are justified by the aim of providing a rendition that achieves relevance by increasing the sense of mutuality between hearer and the original speaker. Thus the interpreter’s ‘interference’ may (paradoxically) contribute to the impression of invisibility interpreter required by public institutions.
6.4 Some problematic examples of non-faithful renditions

In this section, I consider cases where the interpreter appears to render a DM by the use of an expression which is not linguistically equivalent to it. However, as we shall see, not all of these cases are the same. In particular, only one of these can legitimately be described as a case in which the interpreter is rendering a procedural DM in the source utterance by using a procedural DM in the target utterance which imposes a different constraint on the interpretation of the utterance which it introduces. I shall discuss this case first. I shall then turn to another case and show that while this is a case where the interpreter renders a procedural DM by an expression which encodes conceptual information, these two expressions are not semantically equivalent. Lastly, I turn to a case which despite appearances should not be in this section at all, but should be included in the earlier parts of this chapter since it actually involves both an omission (cf. 6.2) and an addition (cf. 6.3).

First, let us recall that the particular effect of a given DM may vary from context to context because the constraint it imposes may be met in different ways in different contexts. Given the role of the context in the interpretation of utterances containing DMs it is possible that in a particular context DMs which encode different constraints nevertheless give rise to effects which overlap. And indeed we do find such cases. Consider extract 47 from interview 3, which comes at the end of a long passage in which Antonio describes his unsuccessful attempt to join the Carabinieri corps. He suggests that candidates were chosen over him thanks to their connections within the corps. For instance, he recalls overhearing that a candidate did not meet the height requirements; however, the head of the medical examination panel decided to put him through after receiving a phone call. Antonio is still visibly bitter about the application results, and says as follows:

Extract 47 (3A: 838-839)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>838</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Comunque a parte questo...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Anyway apart from this...</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>839</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Well (.) this is [the the past]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like *well*, *Comunque* (anyway) can be treated as imposing a meta-pragmatic constraint in the sense that it leads the hearer to assumptions *about* the utterances the speaker is making. In this context, the meaning of *anyway* overlaps with that of *well*, which however encodes a broader constraint. As we have seen, *well* indicates that the upcoming utterance is relevant, providing a ‘green light’ for Interpretation. *Comunque* might be seen as encoding a more specific version of this constraint in the sense that it indicates that while what the speaker has previously said is relevant, what he is about to say (the new ‘topic’) is also relevant, even though its Interpretation does not depend on the Interpretation of the preceding utterance. One last remark on this extract is the vague conceptual information included in 838 (“apart from this”) is inappropriately explicitated in the interpreter’s rendition, thus indicating a footing shift that might be dictated by the interpreter’s willingness to prevent a potential breakdown of communication.

Another case in which a DM in the original is substituted by a DM, which however imposes non-comparable linguistically encoded constraints, is given in extract 48. The police officer has finished explaining the difference between truth and lies (190) and summarises the three rules mentioned to Manuel (192), prefacing his utterance with the DM *So*:

Extract 48 (1: 190-194)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>190</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Okay I think that shows that you know the difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Sim (.) eu acho que tu sabes qual é a diferença</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Yes (.) I think that you know what the difference is</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>So those are the three rules er:: say if you don’t know (.) say if you don’t understand and er tell the truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>E essas são as três regras (.) diz se não souberes a resposta diz se não compreenderes (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>And those are the three rules (.) say if don’t know the answer say if you don’t understand (.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e diz sempre a verdade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>and always tell the truth</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Okay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mariza chooses *E* (And) in her rendition (193) instead of using *so*; the latter would have indicated that the hearer is intended to interpret the segment it introduces as a conclusion derived in an inference which has the proposition expressed by the first segment as a premise.

In RT (Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Blakemore & Carston, 2005; Kostopoulos, forthcoming), the use of *and* indicates that the two propositions it takes as arguments (its conjuncts) should be processed collectively in a single pragmatic inference. As Kostopoulos (forthcoming) shows, one way in which this constraint can be satisfied is by encouraging the hearer to take one argument as a premise in an inference which has the other as a conclusion. Indeed in some cases a speaker will indicate this linguistically by combining *and* with *so*. However, the point is that according to this account the constraint imposed by *so* is compatible with the one imposed by *and* because the proposition that is relevant as an Interpretation is a faithful representation of the proposition derived as a contextual implication.

A little further down, Manuel recalls the events linked with the robbery freely, telling them as if carefully rehearsed (cf. interjection “ah!” in 242): 141

Extract 49 (1: 233-251)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>233</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Eu tava em er no apoio escolar e:: que foi mais ou menos (.) quando acabei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>I was attending the er the after-school class and:: ’cause it’s more or less (.) when I finished</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>foi mais ou menos às (.) três horas e meia quatro horas (.) <strong>então</strong> eu perdi o autocarro e fiquei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>it was more or less (.) half past three four o’clock (.) so I missed the bus and was left</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sozinho (.) eu tava a correr pra o autocarro <strong>mas</strong> (.) perdi- o (.) <strong>então</strong> eu fiquei sozinho e não</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>alone (.) I was running for the bus but (.) missed it (.) so I was alone and there was</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tava mesmo lá ninguém ném carros que:: passar (.) e depois (.) de repente vejo um homem do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>actually no-one there not even cars that:: went by (.) and then (.) suddenly I see a man on the</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>outro lado e não liguei (.) não liguei ao homem e continuei</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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141 Cf. 5.1.3 for full description of events.
other side and I didn’t pay any notice. I didn’t pay any notice to the man and carried on
à espera do autocarro. O homem veio veio ter comigo e disse ((sighs)) segue-me
waiting for the bus. The man came up to me and said follow me
que eu tenho uma arma e eu vi a arma dele que tava enrolada ((makes gesture of wrapping))
’cause I have a gun: and I saw his gun that was wrapped
num pano branco e...
in a white cloth and...

| 234 | I1   | Só um momento  
|     |      | Just a moment |
| 235 | P1   | Do do you want to (.) so sorry can I interrupt (.) do you want to just (.) make it into smaller bits so that (.) so we can get the interpretation done in in between Manuel |
| 236 | I1   | Yes I think we’ll get more er detail in er that way |
| 237 | P1   | Yeah |
| 238 | I1   | Er: eu se tu:: se nós conseguirmos partir mais eu vou conseguir dar mais detalhes sobre
Er: I (.) if you: if we can break it down more I’ll be able to prove more details on
aquilo que tu estás a dizer
what (.) you’re saying |
| 239 | M    | Tá bem  
|      |      | Fine |
| 240 | I1   | Eu vou explicar agora também (.) er:: I was in er:: an after- er:: school support? (.) er: class?
I’ll now explain as well
and it was finished about fifteen thirty (.) or four o’clock (.) and er:: I missed the bus (.) I was running towards the bus but I couldn’t reach it (.) so I was left alone in the street (.) and er:: there was no-one around (.) not even cars passing by (.) er:: I did notice there was a man on the other side of the road but I didn’t pay any attention to him (.) er:: this man (.) er: came |

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142 Vir ter com is a colloquial expression whose meaning can only be inferred from the context, i.e. “to come across / up to(wards)” (similar to vir falar com or abordar).
across the road towards me (.) and said (.) follow me I have a gun (.) he had a:: and I noticed he had a gun rolled in a white cloth

| 241 | P1 | Okay |
| 242 | M  | Er:: e depois eu segui-o (.) er:: fomos para um er parquinho pequeno em que também não tava lá ninguém (.) eu: ele disse-me pra eu lhe mostrar o que eu tinha (.) então eu mostrei (.) eu tava (.) atrás dele a mais ou menos um metro de distância (.) ele tirou-me (.) o que eu tinha I was (.) behind him more or less a metre away (.) he took from me (.) what I had na mala e depois voltou-a pra fora (..) então eu comecei (.) ainda fiquei com er: eu tev- in my bag and then turned it upside down (..) so (.) I started er:: I even have a er: I ha-
tative um ataque de nervos (.) que isso acontece-me algumas vezes (.) e:: e eu disse-lhe I had a nervous breakdown (.) 'cause that happens to me sometimes (.) and:: and I asked him pode viver se podia viver (.) e o homem não me respondeu perguntei outra vez se podia viver I could live if I could live (.) and the man didn’t answer me I asked again if I could live e o homem ((sighs)) disse que não podia viver então (.) o homem disse segue-me (.) e eu disse and the man said that I couldn’t live so (.) the man said follow me (.) and I said ah! e eu:: ajoelhei-me no chão e pedi pa:: que não queria morrer e ele disse que ele ah! and I:: knelt down on the floor and begged that:: that I didn’t want to die and he said he não queria saber para eu o seguir (.) e então o homem continuou eu finge que segui-o didn’t wanna know I had to follow him (.) and so the man carried on I pretended to follow him e depois fui (.) fui...

| 243 | I1 | Okay (.). okay (.). só um momento né? (.). okay (.). so I followed the man into a small park just a moment yeah? |
where there was no-one either er:: (.) and the man said to me show me what you have (.). er:: I was standing about a metre behind him (.). and er he looked through my stuff and er:: he took whatever he wanted (.). and then I at that point I had a a nervous er: attack (.). nervous fit\[^{143}\] (.). er:: that happens to me sometimes (.). so I started asking him (.). can I live? (.). er:: (.). er:: will I be able to live? can you l- can you er:: can I live? (.). and I just want to say that live as is life (.). as in living (.). not leave as in to go away

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>244</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Oh! live (.). yeah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Yeah sorry (.). and er: the man said er:: he didn’t er:: answer me (.). he just said I’m not sure you can live pl- follow me (.). and er:: so I kneeled down on the floor (.). in front of him at that point (.). er:: I’m sorry I need to clarify s- something if you don’t mind (.). vou só fazer uma pergunta desculpa (.). tu pr- tu: tiveste um ataque de nervos e ajoelhaste-te não foi? I’m just gonna ask you a question sorry (.). you tr- you: had a nervous breakdown and knelt down right?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Er:: (.). e depois de- er levantaste-te e foste atrás dele foi isso? Er:: (.). and then yo- er you got up and followed him is that right?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mh mh (.) [eu co]nsegui segui-lo muito devagarinho e depois quando tive quase (.). perto (.). da saída do parque (.). fugi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>[okay] okay so he knelt down asking begging him to let him live (.). I was just clarifying at which point he got up to leave (.). the park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Okay (.). but he said follow me (.). so er:: Manuel got up and followed him slowly (.). towards the the the: the gate of the: park (.). and when he reached the gate of the park he ran away</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[^{143}\] In utterance 242, Manuel uses a colloquial term (ataque de nervos, “nervous breakdown”) to describe his fit, possibly meaning ataque de pânico (panic attack). Influenced by the original utterance, I1 opts for “nervous attack” and, after a self-correction, the collocation “nervous fit”.

\[^{144}\] Cf. “estive”.
This passage exemplifies the variety of uses of DMs by the interpreter, ranging from operational renditions (e.g. “but I couldn’t er reach it (.) so I was left alone” in 240), to omissions (“and then I at that point I had a a nervous er: attack” in 243), additions attributed to the speaker (e.g. “so he knelt down” in 249 or “so er:: Manuel got up” in 251) or to the interpreter herself (e.g. “so I kneeled down on the floor” in 245 or “but I didn’t pay any attention to him” in 240). Finally, there are cases in which there are overlapping effects in particular contexts, such as between the DMs so and and (“então eu perdi o autocarro” and “and er:: I missed the bus”) in 233 and 240 respectively.

On an interactional level, I1 mainly displays good management strategies, intervening appropriately and justifiably only when necessary to clarify (243) or prevent breakdown of communication (234, 240). In particular, in 243 the interpreter explains a language-specific phoneme representation (cf. Manuel’s cry “Can I live?”) in order to notify the officer of a potential meaning confusion on the part of the robber. The confusion is likely to occur from Portuguese learners’ mispronunciation of vowels (Lieff & Nunes, 1993) and regards the minimal pair live and leave, that is if /i/ is pronounced /i:/ instead of /ɪ/ in the word live.

On one occasion (cf. 245) is I1 required to intervene inappropriately as a principal, asking for repetition in order to avoid communication breakdown. This is linked with an interesting, specific participants’ feature of my data, namely the different conversational styles displayed by the interpreters. For instance, I3 tends to take the floor quite often and render shorter chunks of speech, providing what Gavioli & Baraldi (2011: 227) call “immediate renditions”. In other words, I3 adopts a frequent, turn-by-turn rendition mechanism, through which she is arguably able to facilitate direct contact between the institutional representative and the interviewee (e.g. 3A: 220-222 in extract 16). Conversely, I1 tends to let the parties - generally the interviewee - talk for several turns before delivering her rendition, which is thus “suspended (...) particularly through indicators of listening activity, such as continuers or acknowledgement tokens” (Gavioli & Baraldi, 2011: 228; cf. 222 above). In this case, the interpreter tends to produce renditions as “formulations” (e.g. Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Heritage, 1985) which involve summarising and developing the gist of the participant’s utterance (230). This approach in police interpreting settings generally seems to give participants more space to discuss issues and to understand in greater depth what is to be translated. However, I1 often forgets the previous parts of speech due to information overload and/or inattention or poor retention.
In the corpus, cases where there are overlapping effects between *and* and *so* in particular contexts are not an isolated occurrence. An example was given in 5A: 1442-1443 (cf. extract 32 in 6.3.2), and they are again found in utterances 1471-1472 and 1542-1543 in extract 50, in which Antonio starts drawing to describe how and where the Moses basket broke:  

Extract 50 (5: 1467-1569)

| 1467 | A | ((Draws Fig. 6)) lo stand per sommi capi era così (. ) ( ) qui per non fare scivolare la cesta  
the stand roughly was like this (. ) ( ) here so that the basket would not fall off  
dallo stand diciamo  
the stand you know |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1468</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Ah! at the top there was something so that the the the the Moses basket would stay there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1469</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>[Mh]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1470</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[Mh]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1471 | A | ((Draws Fig. 7)) allora visto dall’alto era così più o meno  
so seen from above it was like this more or less |
| 1472 | I4 | And on the other side it was ( .. ) dall’alto? no  
from above? no |
| 1473 | A | Si visto dall’alto  
Yes seen from above |
| 1474 | I4 | Ah! from the top [seen fro]m the top |
| 1475 | P5 | [mh mh ] |
| 1476 | I4 | Uhm more or less like this |
| 1477 | A | "E dopo questo ( ) va qui" ( . ) e:: si è rotto questo ((points with the marker pen))  
"And then ( ) goes here" ( . ) and:: this broke |

145 Cf. Figures 6-11 in Appendix B.
| 1478 | I4 | Ah! this **this** ((points with her pencil on the same point as A)) this is is the side that broke |
| 1479 | A  | This one ((points at red circle in Fig. 6)) |
| 1480 | P5 | Mh mh |
| 1481 | I4 | It is in there |
| 1482 | P5 | Okay and what was it (.) that broke? |
| 1483 | I4 | Cos’è che si è rotto?  
*What was it that broke?* |
| 1484 | A  | Er:: il legno  
*Er:: the wood* |
| 1485 | I4 | Proprio la stecca di legno?  
*That same wooden bar?* |
| 1486 | A  | Si  
*Yes* |
| 1487 | I4 | The the wooden (.) bar |
| 1488 | P5 | Okay (.) and and what did you put the wooden bar on? |
| 1489 | A  | Era...  
*It was...* |
| 1490 | I4 | E come l’ha:: ri- l’ha ri- rimessa insieme?  
*And how did you:: pu- put it back together?* |
| 1491 | A  | ((Draws Fig. 8)) questa era: la barra di legno  
*this was: the wooden bar* |
| 1492 | I4 | That was [the the wooden] |
| 1493 | A  | [diciamo che era] rotta: da questa parte qua ((points at breaking line))  
*[you know it was] broken: on this side here* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1494</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>About...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1495</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Er:: visto che il peso andava: da (.) da qui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Er:: given that the weight was coming: from (.) from here</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1496</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>So the weight was coming (.) from there ((points with her pencil to the arrow indicating the direction of the weight))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1497</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Er:: qui era attaccata per una: vite ((draws screw at the bottom of bar))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Er:: here it was held by a: screw</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1498</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ah! there there were (.) a screw ((draws a line indicating the screw))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ah! two screws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E:: è scivolato:: è andato verso il basso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>And:: it slipped:: it went downwards</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1502</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>So it went (. ) downwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1503</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Mh mh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1504</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>It just broke (. ) [down]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1505</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[yeah ] right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1506</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Era in questa parte qui ((indicates the right side of the stand from the front with the marker pen))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>It was on this side here</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1507</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>On that side there ((indicates the same side with her finger))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1508</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Questo qua era di metallo era [(..) era fatto...] ((indicates left side of the stand from the front))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>This here was made of metal it was [(..) was made...]</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1509</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>[and that side ] was metal ((indicates the same side))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1510 | A  | Circa in questa maniera:: ((draws Fig. 9)) e diciamo questa è la barra di legno (. ) e:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1511</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td><strong>Ah! so</strong> this this is the (.) questo è di metallo? ((points at the metal bar in Fig. 9 with her pencil))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1512</td>
<td>A</td>
<td><strong>Si</strong> (Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1513</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>((Keeps on pointing at the metal bar in Fig. 9)) that was the metal bar and it was (.) hooking up on the: wooden (.) bar ((points at wooden bar)) that it was going... ((draws an imaginary line with her pencil starting from the centre of the wooden bar away from the catch )) yeah?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1514</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Right right okay (.) and how high was the stand?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1515</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td><strong>Quanto era:: alto?</strong> (How high was it)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1516</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Like that ((shows height from the floor with his left hand))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>More or less like that ((points at his gesture with her hand)) cos’è? un metro? <strong>what is it? a metre?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1518</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>No no (.) [I think it would be less than a metre]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1519</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>[a metre it would be? I don’t know ] ((to P5))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>&quot;Right&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1521</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>((to P5)) &quot;Do you understand that stand?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1522</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>So er:: ((about to draw something))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1523</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>I think so ((nervous laughter)) [I think so ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1524</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>[so was the] stand like this? ((crosses her forearms in an X-shape))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1525</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>[Era cosi lo stand no? aveva le gambe] ((taps A’s shoulder to draw his attention as he has))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The stand was like this right? it had legs
already started drawing Fig. 10. She crosses forarms, imitating P4’s gesture in an agitated tone)

1526 A  [If you want er:: se vuole posso ridisegnarlo in maniera migliore non lo so
if you wish I can draw it again in a better way I don’t know

1527 I4  ((Taps A’s right arm to catch his attention)) dice er aveva lo stand era aveva le gambe per
he says er it had the stand was had its legs traverso ((crosses forarms, agitated tone)) cioè incrociate?
sideways I mean crossed?

1528 A  Si
Yes

1529 I4  Yeah

1530 P4  [Yeah] ((crosses forarms))

1531 I4  [Yes ] quindi [quando] si apriva aveva le gambe [incrociate]
so [when] it opened it had legs [that crossed]

1532 P4  [but the ]

1533 P5  [crossed  ]

1534 I4  [Yeah crossed  ]

1535 P4  [Yeah and with] the basket on top of it

1536 A  ((Draws Fig. 10))

1537 P5  Mh mh

1538 I4  E con il yeah si
And with the yeah yes

1539 P5  Mh mh

1540 I4  E col er cesto sopra
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1541</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sì</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1542</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>And was it designed to fall flat (.) when you weren’t using it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1543</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Quindi era disegnato- si poteva anche chiuderlo: piatto (.) farlo andare giù completamente?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>So it was design- one could also close it: flat (.) fall flat completely?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>((agitated tone))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1544</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Questo cadeva: [piatto sì ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This would fall: [flat yes]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>[cadeva se] uno [vo]leva lo poteva...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[it would fall if] one [wa]nted one could...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>[se ] se non mettevo questo: fermo qui diciamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[if] if I didn’t put this: catch here you know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>((indicates catch on Fig. 9))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Er</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cadeva...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>It would fall...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1549</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Piatto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Piatto si ((indicates falling flat with both hands))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flat yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1551</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Come una tavola da stiro diciamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Like an ironing board you know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1552</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sì</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timestamp</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1553</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Yeah (.) without this ((indicates catch in Fig. 9)) it would fall flat (.) like an ironing board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1554</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[Right]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1555</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>[Yeah]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1556</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>&quot;Yeah&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1557</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>&quot;Okay&quot; (.) so so that was the catch (.) that made it stay upright (.) that broke?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1558      | A           | Si  
Yes |
| 1559      | P4          | [Right okay] |
| 1560      | I4          | [Quindi era] questa barra di metallo che andava... ((points at Fig. 9)) |
| 1561      | A           | È questa qui ((indicates finger on drawing))  
*It was this one* |
| 1562      | I4          | Che era lì e andava giù nel legno che veniva di qua no? [nel ] legno ((keeps on indicating with her finger))  
*That was there and went down onto the wood that came this way right? [in] the wood* |
| 1563      | A           | [così] ((draws Fig. 11)) e vede (.)  
*[this way] and you see (..)*  
*è questo che si è rotto (.) e poi si è er poi si è:: agganciato diciamo [fixed]*  
*it’s this one that broke (.) and then it er then it:: latched on you know* |
| 1564      | I4          | [yeah] yeah so this was the bar ((indicates Fig. 11 with her pencil)) from there it was er: lifted up ((indicates upward arrow in Fig. 11)) or (.) put it down and this er:: ((indicates the catch on Fig. 9 with finger)) I don’t know la er:: tying or going on top of the wooden bar ((indicates wooden bar on Fig. 9 with finger)) |
| 1565      | P4          | Right |
As was the case for the beginning of interview 3A, police officers use *right* and *okay* repeatedly to acknowledge the prior turn and express affiliation with Antonio’s and the interpreter’s utterances in a long series of interaction-oriented initiatives which see I4 as a principal and which violate the Code of ethics both in terms of accuracy and impartiality.

On an interactional level, omissions of DMs and consequent shifts to author must be noted (cf. 1472, 1476, 1483, 1490). However, I4 repeatedly aligns herself as a principal when she ‘echo probes’ the primary party (e.g. 1472, 1485, 1511), changes the demonstratives and other pronouns (e.g. 1492, 1496, 1507, 1509, 1527) and adds backchannels (e.g. “ah!” in 1468, 1478, 1498, 1500, 1511) or her personal comments and explanations (e.g. 1476, 1481, 1513). On several occasions Antonio bypasses her and resorts to English (1516, 1518, 1522).

The interpreter’s moves as principal contribute to the police interpreter’s participation and, on the other hand, to the police officers’ realisation that they have lost the control of topic and turns and that the effectiveness of the interrogation is reduced (1520-1523). P5 tries to regain control by asking a so-prefaced question about the stand’s shape. However, I4 has now become agitated, aware that the confusion has partly ensued due to her footing shifts, and gains the floor by directing questioning and gesturing to Antonio in an animated fashion (1525, 1527, 1531). P5 regains control, at which point Antonio decides not to wait for the interpretation and starts drawing another sketch (1536). From 1544 to 1552 the interpreter and the suspect have a conversation between themselves, thus excluding the other primary participants, who are involved in the interaction again only through the rendition in 1553 (in which the comparison with “an ironing board” had been prompted by the interpreter). To the last probing initiative by the interpreter (1562) the police officers almost give it up and nod along (1567-1568).

There seems to be a different sort of case in the next extract, about one hour and twenty minutes from the beginning of interview 3. Here, the officer is going through phase 4 of the
interview in order to elicit an account of Maria’s birth from the interviewee. In particular, she
decides to start from the moment Letícia’s waters broke, stating that Letícia did not want to be
driven to hospital due to the different type of pain she felt from her first pregnancy:

Extract 51 (3A: 1101-1119)

| 1101 | A   | Perché lei: diceva no! no! sono dolori lei pensava no! no! non c’è bisogno sono 
Because she: was saying no! no! this is a pain she thought no! no! there’s no need this
dolori che passeranno
pain will go away |
| 1102 | I3  | No she said they are pains that they go they go |
| 1103 | A   | Perché lei era gli era stato detto dal medico perché (.) i dolori che erano ( ) erano differenti
Because she was she was told by the doctor because (.) the pain that was ( ) was different
dall’altra
from the one with the other |
| 1104 | I3  | Yes the doctor did warn her that er each er pregnancy is different from the other of course
yeah |
| 1105 | A   | Per Maria lei aveva sentito dolori alla schiena al basso: nella parte bassa della
With Maria she had felt pain in the back in the low: in the lower part of
schiena
her back |
| 1106 | I3  | Right because she er with Maria she [had backache ] Anna! sorry with Anna she had felt
different kinds of pains |
| 1107 | A   | [no Anna Anna] |
| 1108 | P4  | Right okay |
| 1109 | A   | Er:: questa volta invece i dolori no tutta un’altra parte no la parte superiore della |
Er.: this this time instead the pain no in a completely different part no the upper part of
della pancia qui ((shows))
her stomach here

1110 I3 Dell’addome (.) yes well ((coughs)) this time with Maria she felt these pains they were:: on
the upper part of the abdomen [so] she didn’t er connect [to it for this] reason too

1111 A [( )]

1112 P4 [okay yeah ]

1113 A Perché lei aveva pensato che non fosse l’ora
Because she thought that the time hadn’t come yet

1114 I3 Right! because for this reason she didn’t think it was the time for delivery

1115 P4 Right okay

1116 A Però poi: insieme abbiamo pensato che forse era meglio (.) [and]are in ospedale
But then: together we thought that perhaps it was better (.) [to] go to the hospital

1117 I3 [yes]
we thought it would be better it would be better to go (.) to the hospital...

1118 P4 Right okay

1119 I3 Anyway yeah

The interpreter’s renditions include a range of interjections and DMs which can be analysed
in procedural terms, namely right in 1106 and 1114, well and so in 1110. The right present in
1106 and 1114 can be analysed as an active listening strategy as discussed in section 6.2.1,
whereas DMs well and so in 1110 belong to the category described in the previous section
(6.3.2).

However, let us focus on utterances 1116-1117 where the original speaker’s but seems to be
replaced by a sentence adverbial in any case which, in contrast with but, must be analysed in
conceptual terms as a constituent of a higher-level explication whose relevance lies in the
comment it makes about the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition expressed (cf. 2.2.2). In particular, it communicates something like: ‘The speaker believes Q in spite of P’ (where Q is the proposition expressed). Notice that the interpreter could have signalled an inferential route (and make the Interpretation even clearer) by saying “But in any case…” Without the Però (but) trigger, however, P4 has to work out not only what the ‘something else’ is (P), but why it is relevant to say that one believes Q in spite of P. The Però trigger would take the hearer to an inferential route in which thinking Q contradicts or is inconsistent with a manifest assumption (P). Clearly, if Q contradicts an existing assumption P and one admits that P is true, then one would be believing Q in spite of thinking P. According to this account, Però is therefore not doing what in any case does: the constraint it imposes is consistent with what it does. Nor do they work in the same way: in any case is a constituent of a proposition which is relevant as the relevance lies in the comment it makes on the relevance of the lower-level explicature. Però is not a constituent of a proposition which is relevant – it simply triggers an inference involved in the recovery of implicit content of the utterance it introduces.

From an interactional point of view it can be noted that I3 – possibly unconsciously - does not shift footing, rendering the mistake Antonio absent-mindedly makes in the previous utterance (Maria instead of Anna). However, after Antonio joins in whilst the interpreter is in mid-turn to amend his own and (subsequently) the interpreter’s mistake, I3 aligns herself as a principal and self-correction her rendition by saying “Anna! sorry with Anna” (1106).

Finally, there are cases in my data which at first sight appear to be examples of the rendition of one DM by one which has a non-equivalent linguistically encoded meaning. Consider, for example, lines 1174-1177 from extract 52. Here, the officer in 1144 asks an open question to Antonio about “Maria’s actual (…) pattern during the day what’s her routine during the day”. The aim of this type of questioning is to elicit responses similar to those obtained by free recall. Antonio states that they usually bathe Maria at about six o’clock and that she relaxes in the water. P4 then giggles and switches to a specific-closed question in 1161:

Extract 52 (3A: 1161-1178)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1161</th>
<th>P4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mh ((giggles)) so when when you’re talking about the bath (.) er you say six o’clock do you mean er:: six o’clock so in the day in the afternoon? ((to A))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1162</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1163</td>
<td>P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1164</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1165</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1166</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1167</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1168</td>
<td>P5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1169</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1170</td>
<td>P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1171</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1172</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1173</td>
<td>I3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1174</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

270
The passage starts with the interpreter abruptly changing alignments in the ongoing flow of discourse as she provides a direct response and thus aligns herself as responder and principal at the same time. More specifically, she first replies to the officer’s question on the exact time (1162) and then justifies a previous lack of specification in her rendition by stating that she would normally convert am and pm in 24-hour clock (1165). Both speaker-oriented utterances end with the DM *but*, which encodes the instruction that the main cognitive effect of the utterance of the clauses that would follow it (“This time I did not say it” and “This time I did assume it would be inferred” respectively) is one of contradiction and elimination.

In 1167 the interpreter adds qualitative, non-verbal feedback with the interjection *right* (cf. 6.3.1) which can be contrasted with the non-qualitative feedback used by the interviewer in 1168. In this utterance, she correctly promotes extensive answers/rendition during a pause by expressing a simple utterance (*mh*) conveying her expectation that the interviewee should carry on.

Linked with the use of interjections such as *right* there are two other (verbal and non verbal) behaviours which reveal her tendency to use endearing tone and expressions, thus going against one of the fundamental criteria for quality of delivery in police interpreting, i.e. impartiality. This, for instance, leads to the shift in I3’s footing in 1167, in which she uses a lexical construction expressing affection (cf. *nice and fresh*) not to be found in the original.146 She also sometimes ends her renditions with the question ‘yeah?’ in a soft voice directed to A.

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146 Other terms of endearment such as “piccolina” (the little one) in 190 instead of the neutral “baby”, or “little party” in 248 instead of “celebration”. 

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<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1175</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1176</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Lei non la sveglia non la non er non la svegliamo [per mangiare ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<pre><code>|     | *She we don’t wake he- don’t er don’t wake her up [to feed her]* |
</code></pre>
<p>| 1177 | I3  | [well they said er] you know if the baby |
|     | doesn’t wake up (.) she doesn’t wake up during the night and she’s not asking for it don’t |
|     | wake her up [and feed] her you know |
| 1178 | P4  | [mh mh ] |</p>
as if to encourage him to speak. In proxemical terms, on more than one occasion she sighs and reaches out to pat A on his shoulder, invading A’s interpersonal space, which is to be avoided as it “may result in gestures indicative of stress” (Milne, 2004: 24).

While the DM *be’* (well) in 1172 has been operationally translated, no comparable procedural instructions to DMs *so* in 1161 and 1163 and *allora* (so) in 1172 can be found in I3’s renditions. Furthermore, the DM *Ecco* (So) in 1171 is perceived by the hearer to be uttered by the interpreter as it is followed by a reference to the original speaker (P4). The result of the total omission of the police officer’s and Antonio’s inferential connectives is a lack of indication in the interpreter’s rendition that the assumption which follows them is a conclusion.

Finally, let us turn to the rendition of *Perciò* (So) in 1174, involving both an omission and an addition. Although there is evidence that *perciò* can be (and has been) translated by *so* in other instances, it has been rendered by *well*. As we have seen, each of these expressions encodes a different constraint. Could this be a case like the ones we have just analysed where the interpreter uses a linguistically non-equivalent DM in her rendition on the grounds that it gives rise to effects which happen to overlap in the given context? In fact, this is not the case here: the interpreter has chosen *not* to indicate that the utterance that follows is relevant as a contextual implication, and instead decides to use *well* to indicate that the answer (“If the baby does not wake up during the night, there is no need to wake her up to breastfeed her”) is optimally relevant. This could be motivated by the aim of representing the speaker’s uncertainty about what the officer is expecting as an answer to the question in line 1170. In other words, the interpreter has used *well* in order to represent Antonio’s belief that the officer’s question about Maria’s feeding routine is framed in such a way that it does not allow him to provide an answer which communicates all the facts – he is giving the best answer he can given the officer’s question.

In this section, I have looked at a number of cases in which the DM used by the original speaker seems to be rendered by an expression which does not have the same meaning. When we analysed these cases in more detail, it emerged that not all of them are the same. There are cases in which the original DM is rendered by a DM whose meaning overlaps with it and can hence lead to a similar Interpretation in a particular context. Further, there are instances in which the original DM is replaced by an expression whose meaning must be analysed in conceptual terms, but whose use is compatible with the original procedural DM in that given
context. And, finally, there are cases which do not really belong to this section at all since they turn out to be cases in which one DM is omitted and another is added. However, all these cases are united by the fact that the motivation behind them is the aim of capturing the speaker’s point of view: they all lead to an Interpretation which is a faithful representation of the speaker’s thoughts.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Drawing on interpreting studies, pragmatics, forensic linguistics and criminology, the main aim of this thesis was to examine in detail the role of DMs and their translability in interpreted pre-trial proceedings. Following a comprehensive, critical literature review in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, and a thorough description of the data collection procedure in chapter 5, the qualitative analysis was reported in chapter 6. In the investigated corpus - comprised of five police interviews involving four NRPSI-registered interpreters, three interviewees (a victim and two suspects), and two language combinations (English-Italian and Portuguese-Italian) - different treatments of DMs were identified as corresponding to four categories, which are described in detail in sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4.

The purpose of this final chapter is to situate the present study in the context of the theoretical notions put forward in chapters 3 and 4 in an attempt to answer the initial research questions (cf. 4.4). Further, it discusses the contributions (and limitations) of the research project to the field of police interpreting as well as its application to current practice. Finally, section 7.4 suggests potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

7.1 Summary of results

Gerver (1971: viii, quoted in Pöchhacker, 2007: 16) defines interpreting as “a fairly complex form of human information processing involving the reception, storage, transformation and transmission of verbal information”, i.e. the performance of multiple cognitive tasks concurrently. In the bilingual police ECI setting, the cognitive demands made of the interpreter are even higher given the likelihood of ‘problem triggers’ such as longer turn lengths, intentional pauses inserted, and specialised verbal strategies employed by the police officer.
Since its inception, research on legal interpreting has challenged the myth of literalism and, in particular, demonstrated interpreters’ lack of awareness of maintaining pragmatic aspects of language. A number of scholars (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1988, 1990; Hale, 1999, 2004; Johnson, 2002; Russell, 2000, 2002) have observed that DMs are frequently found in interpreters’ renditions and have adopted a variety of theoretical frameworks to explain their impact on communication. However, as shown in chapter 2, there has been a lack of research exploring the relationship between pragmatics and the interpreting process in police settings.

Working with Wadensjö’s (1981) framework of interpreter roles and Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics, this study builds on previous work in an attempt to verify whether the use of DMs by police interpreters effectively promotes or - as scholars have previously argued (cf. chapters 1 and 2) - hinders direct contact between the parties, and what their interactional impact on the encounters is. This overall research question was broken into two sub-questions for the purpose of the investigation (cf. 4.4) with the aim to investigate (a) how and whether interpreters convey implicatures triggered by a DM in the original utterance in order to match the intention of the speaker, and (b) the impact that resulting “shifts in footing” (Wadensjö, 1998) may have on the interaction as a whole and the different stages of the ECI.

An interpreter, like any communicator, is constrained by the Principle of Relevance, which governs all acts of ostensive communication (cf. chapter 3). Since it is in the interpreter’s interests that the hearer take up the guarantee of relevance she is communicating and invest effort in the derivation of cognitive effects, it would be in her interests in such circumstances to provide a linguistically encoded “signpost” (Jucker, 1992: 438) that there are cognitive effects to be derived or, in other words, that all is well. However, when interpreting DMs, (qualified) police interpreters – regardless of their language combination – seem to be concerned more about the comprehensibility and acceptability (Ng, 2009: 41) of the interpretation, rather than the procedural elements present in the original utterances. Aside from a number of renditions (mainly by I2) the study established that interpreters rarely render DMs ‘operationally’, thus providing a faithful interpretation of the original, where faithfulness is defined in terms of resemblance in content (Gutt, 1991/2000; Mason, 2004, 2006; Setton, 1998, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; cf. 4.2). Instead, the largest category is omissions (cf. 6.2). As a result of the loss of DMs, potential for miscommunication increases.
Possible reasons for this imbalance in omissions were suggested in 4.3.1, such as the procedural nature of DMs which may pose a comprehension and translation problem for L2 speakers, regardless of their language proficiency or accreditation. Divergence between the source and the target utterances may also be due to cross-linguistic pragmatic differences, which are impossible to rule out, or to stylistic preferences by the interpreter, which are difficult to predict. However, more often than not interpreters in my corpus translate into a language which does have expressions corresponding to certain DMs in the source language (cf. Table 9), yet they omit these elements in their rendition. I suggest that this lack of concern to DMs is attributable to (a) the consecutive, ad-hoc nature of face-to-face interaction, which makes it difficult for police interpreters to adjust their strategies accordingly and quickly, and (b) interpreters’ lack of training in cross-linguistic pragmatics, especially in recognising the non-propositional, non-truth-conditional aspects of interpreted speech. The latter is related to a lack of pragmatic competence, that is their ability to comprehend and produce language appropriately in a communicative situation, taking into account contextual elements necessary to derive implicit meaning.

Omission is, however, not the only feature of interpreter’s treatment of DMs. Opposed to omissions, we also find additions, i.e. cases in which DMs are also added in renditions of utterances which do not contain corresponding expressions. While some of these added DMs can be attributed to the interpreter acting as a principal (6.3.1), others must be treated as being attributed to the original speaker in the sense that they give rise to an Interpretation of that speaker’s thoughts and thought processes (6.3.2). As we have seen, these additions (in both the English and non-English utterances) have important implications not only for Gutt’s relevance theoretic account of translation and interpreting, but more generally, for the relevance theoretic account of interpretive representation in communication.

As Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) have shown, the more responsibility the hearer is given in the Interpretation process, the greater the sense of intimacy that is communicated between the communicator and the audience. However, as I have shown, the point about both the FIT representation in 4.3.2 and the interpreter’s renditions discussed in chapter 6 is that neither the narrator nor the interpreter are communicators who speak in the text. Like the narrator in Mansfield’s example (35), the interpreter is a communicator in the sense that her act of representing the thoughts of another is optimally relevant: she is responsible for orchestrating and crafting her rendition in such a way that the hearer will recover the optimally relevant
interpretation of the original speaker’s utterances. However, optimal relevance seems to be achieved not by increasing the mutuality between interpreter and hearer, but by creating a sense of mutuality between the original speaker and the hearer. This means that the intimacy that is created through the interpreter’s use of DMs is not between the communicator as guarantor of relevance, on the one hand, and the hearer: instead, these DMs contribute to a sense of intimacy between the hearer and the original speaker. Thus according to this approach the police interpreter’s addition of DMs discussed in 6.3.2 is justified by the way in which they contribute to the impression of a more direct line between the officer and the interviewee’s thoughts.

In these cases, the interpreter’s decision to add a DM in a rendition is inevitably based on her own understanding of the utterance made by the original speaker - an understanding which may be inaccurate in some respect. The reality is that her rendition is intended as an Interpretation of her Interpretation of the original utterance. It is this reality which is captured by Gutt’s (2000) claim that translation and interpreting should be treated as examples of attributive use in which the interpreter’s utterances are Interpretaions of her thoughts about the thoughts of the original speaker. This is in line with recent research in interpreting studies which shows that interpreters are in reality both visible and active.

Nevertheless it seems that the additions I have examined in 6.3.2 shows that there is a sense in which the interpreter can be said to be aiming at invisibility: her aim in adding a DM which is attributed to the original speaker is to create the illusion that the audience is ‘hearing’ the ‘voice’ of that speaker rather than that of the interpreter. Of course, we cannot understand ‘hearing’ or ‘voice’ literally here. The interpreter is a distinct presence, speaking a different language from the original speaker, and speaking that language in her own voice. At the same time, there does seem to be a difference between the sort of utterance an interpreter makes in cases such as in 6.3.2, where the addition creates the illusion of hearing the original speaker’s ‘voice’, and the cases in 6.3.1, where this is not the case. In order to explain this difference, we must explain what is meant by saying that the audience has the impression that he is ‘hearing’ the ‘voice’ of the original speaker, and this involves a departure from the view of interpreting as a case of attributive use, where the interpreter is assumed to be producing an utterance which is relevant as an Interpretation of his/her thoughts about someone else’s thoughts. Similarly, Wilson & Sperber’s (2012) analysis of free indirect style as attributive use accommodates the fact that the reader knows that Linda and her thoughts are the product
of Mansfield’s imagination, and thus that what s/he is reading is an interpretation of the author’s thoughts and imaginings. However, it does not explain why free indirect style creates the illusion of having direct access to Linda’s thoughts or of ‘hearing’ her ‘voice’ as we read. In this way, I have provided an explanation how mediation by the interpreter can contribute to the illusion of the ‘invisible’ interpreter enshrined in public authorities’ Codes of Conduct. Once the interpreter has provided the evidence, she can often be said to ‘disappear’ in order to leave the audience to draw on their imagination either to create meta-representations of thoughts which are not represented in the utterance, or even to create meta-representations of otherwise “ineffable aspects of thoughts” (Blakemore, 2010: 22). In particular, well is often independently introduced in the interpreter’s utterance to help disguise the interpreters’ voice and establish rapport with the interviewee. This conclusion diverges from Wadensjö’s (1998: 225) view of DMs as “obstacles” to interpreter-mediated communication and from legal interpreting scholars’ (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1988, 1990; Hale, 1999; cf. 2.2.3) analysis which imply that the addition of hedges - amongst other features such as particles and disfluencies - imbues the testimony with a more powerless style.

Section 6.4 explores a limited number of instantiations which also contribute to the illusion of ‘absence of mediation’. In particular, there are (a) cases where a DM is rendered by a DM whose use overlaps with the original in specific contexts, and (b) cases where the DM is rendered by an expression with conceptual meaning that is consistent with the original procedural DM and can be motivated by the aim of capturing the original speaker’s perspective. And, finally, we looked at a category in which an omission and subsequent addition are involved and which could also be justified in a similar way.

Secondly, the study set out to establish the macro-level impact of interpreters’ use of DMs on the interaction. My analysis shows that shifts of footing linked with DMs characterise passages in every phase of the interview, and that the alignment as animator is infrequent throughout my corpus in both directions and regardless of language combinations and the interpreter’s known professional affiliation and education. These results corroborate previous studies in police interpreting, showing similar examples of role shift and arguing that interpreter-mediated police interviews are a type of discourse that is co-constructed by the police officer, the interpreter, and the interviewee, rather than police-interviewee interaction through a ‘conduit’ interpreter (cf. also Nakane, 2007, 2008; section 1.3).
With specific reference to DMs, the triple production format can be applied as follows:

1. operational renditions of DMs see the interpreter as *Animator*, i.e. the ‘default’ role of interpreter who are responsible only for the production of speech sounds and expected to maintain impartiality and accuracy, as stipulated by Codes of Practice;
2. omissions are the result of the interpreter acting as *author*, i.e. the agent responsible for formulating the utterance.
3. non-speaker oriented additions mean that the interpreter intervenes as *principal*, i.e. responsible for the meaning expressed, whereas speaker-oriented additions again make the interpreter an *author*.

At various stages of the speech event, interpreters in my corpus adopt *all* of the identified production roles, not just as a result of a free choice, but as a reaction to the principal participants’ assumptions about her ‘appropriate’ role (Wadensjö, 1997). A dialogue interpreter’s ability to simultaneously keep in mind production and reception formats - and keep them separate – is said to be “one of her most essential skills” (Wadensjö, 1995: 127). Through both *interpreting* and *coordinating* discourse, police interpreters contribute to establishing a conversational order while furthering interpersonal relationships amongst interactants, minimising misunderstandings, and enhancing participation. The latter is particularly obvious in the case of the role shift to author through the addition of a speaker-oriented DM. It could be suggested that in those instances interpreters align themselves as authors to preserve the participants’ ability to recover relevant implicit content from the interpretation of such markers.

On the other hand, the interpreters’ frequent omissions or non-speaker oriented addition of DMs are evidence of their pronounced involvement impacting on their neutrality enshrined in interpreters’ Codes of Practice, the various stages of the Cognitive Interview (Milne, 2004; St-Yves, 2006) and, ultimately, on the fairness and effectiveness of the legal process. In such a demanding interactional context, from the rapport phase through to closure, the use of DMs by the interpreter is thus shown to have a negative impact on the different aims of the ECI phases, including rapport building, retrieval strategy, and, more generally, evidence- and information-gathering.

As discussed in chapter 1, the main aim of a police interview with suspects or witnesses is maximum retrieval, a difficult task requiring concentration on the police officers’ part. In the
case of interviews 2 to 5A, the purpose of the interview was to maximise the opportunity to detect deception, whereas the aim of interview 1 was to make the police aware of all the events before, during and after the alleged robbery, minimising misinterpretation and uncertainty. Clearly, if interpreters omit or add their own DMs, then they knowingly deprive the officers of a strategy and may be the cause of failure in certain lines of questioning (cf. chapter 6).

In particular, observation of the interpreters’ shifts in footing suggests that interpreters’ conversational initiatives linked with DMs have a significant role in the introductory stage of the Cognitive Interview model, specifically in relation to the interactional control and the effectiveness of rapport building strategies. As highlighted in chapter 1, this opening phase is fundamental as it “substantially determine[s] how well the interview proceeds” (Milne & Bull, 1999: 40). Further, interpreters’ use of procedural devices affect the way interviewees are asked questions or given statements and how they communicate information of investigative value. Here, interpreters are shown to use rapport-inhibiting DMs in order to actively take up the principal role of the interviewer with the intention to facilitate retrieval and help the interviewee to recall information from memory. For instance, the nature and prevalence of so-prefaced questions (often in combination with ‘co-murmuring’ through the interjections okay and right) were discussed and interpreter’s treatment of these was examined in 6.2 and 6.3.1. These utterances hinder maximum retrieval, especially when they interrupt the interviewee during their narration and/or ask specific questions.

Pragmatic alterations of DMs in interpreters’ renditions can therefore be said to have procedural consequentiality and impact on modern police interviewing techniques, as it has the effect of moving the interpreter into focus, taking power away from the police officer (due to the turn-taking system) and destroying the impression of a dyadic exchange (cf. section 2.2.1). In order to investigate these effects, I have applied a rigorous and originally structured methodology, which makes this work a valuable contribution not only to police interviewing current practice, but also to interpreting studies and pragmatics. In particular, modelling implies two levels of analysis to be foregrounded in the representation of naturally occurring DMs, extending from the micro-process oriented cognitive sphere to the sociological dimension of the macro-processes of communication (cf. 5.3). On one hand, the sociological aspects of interpreting as an activity taking place in – and, at the same time, shaping – a particular interaction were analysed. On the other, an interest in the mental processes
underlying language use led to the adoption of a relevance-theoretic framework in order to show how and if interpreters convey implicatures triggered by a DM in the original utterance, matching the intention of the speaker.

While the significance of the combination between the adopted disciplines has been recognised before, existing studies which aim to draw an explicit connection between them were still largely lacking in empirical focus. In particular, as Mason (2006: 108) stated, “pragmatics offers an additional dimension to the analysis of interpreter-mediated communication”. The present study illustrates the explanatory potential of RT in providing a cognitively based, cause-effect account of interpreting and “getting closer to primary participants’ intentions” (Turner, 2013). Along with Blakemore’s (2010, 2011) analysis of point of view in FIT, my approach to the representation of thought in face-to-face interpreting represents a significant contribution to a RT explanation of interpreted utterances and, as such, has implications for Wilson’s view of FIT as well as Gutt’s and Setton’s RT framework of interpreting (cf. 4.3). We have seen how this approach can be argued to serve as the basis for the explanation of the frequent use of speaker-oriented expressions (such as DMs) in dialogue interpreters’ renditions as devices which contribute to the illusion of ‘absence of mediation’ by encoding constraints on the implicatures of the dialogue interpreter’s utterance. Indeed, the interdisciplinarity of this work is a natural consequence of the decision to observe the phenomenon of police interpreting, which is of such complexity as to elude attempts at constructing a comprehensive model. Reducing this complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon to the cognitive-communicative dimension would however have been as one-sided as previous attempts to take social interaction as the one and only yardstick of interpreting quality.

As can be seen from the summary of findings above, notwithstanding the different approaches and styles adopted by the interpreters in my data, this study highlights similarities in the way interpreters’ use of DMs is constructed verbally. My in-depth, interdisciplinary analysis of bilingual police interviewing shows that interpreters resort to form-based interpreting in renditions characterised by disfluency, inaccuracy and uncertainty, contrary to the “verbatim” requirement discussed in 1.3, according to which an interpreter’s role is to produce an utterance that almost exactly reflects the original speaker’s intentions for the hearer.

In line with previous research on the use of DMs in legal interpreting (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale, 1999, 2004; Linell, Wadensjö & Jönsson, 1992: 127ff.), this study shows that
interpreters often condense the source language discourse by omitting DMs, arguably due to:
(a) their lack of sensitivity to (and training in) DMs’ pragmatic role as effort-saving devices containing information that constrains the computational process of constructing and testing interpretive hypothesis, and of their strategic use within police interviewing discourse; (b) time constraint characterising dialogue interpreting. As a result, the central strategy of modern police interviewing techniques – eliciting a free-form narrative from the witness or suspect – is often disrupted by the use of DMs in the interpreting process. Further, the participants are deprived of the means to establish the relaxed, unthreatening rapport that allows police officers to pursue their institutional goals.

In this way, the selected extracts from police interviews do show a quite extraordinary level of intervention and related footing shifts on the part of the interpreter, both as an ‘interpreter’, coordinator, and cultural mediator. However, speaker-oriented additions of DMs can contribute to the illusion of an ‘unmarked’ participation status as well as the effectiveness of the interviewing process with suspects and witnesses by giving procedural instructions and guiding to the intended interpretation (cf. 6.3.2). The result can indeed be the illusion of a ‘non-mediating’, ‘invisible’ interpreter that is either explicitly required or suggested by interpreters’ Codes of Practice.

Finally, this study set out to make a methodological contribution to this fledgling area of research by adopting an interdisciplinary outlook which is a balance between applied pragmatics (RT) and interactional sociolinguistics. In the context of interpreted police interviews, I have created an intergrated, two-fold model which has proved to be a useful analytical tool to explore the complex and multi-faceted nature of interpreting, in particular to investigate the fluctuating asymmetries in operation between the DMs found in the source utterance and the interpreters’ rendition and the related interpreter’s shifts in footing during all phases of ECI.

7.2 Limitations of the study

I have kept my research flexible and data driven, interrogating the corpus comprised of spontaneous interpreted interaction. In order to limit the variables and recreate a manageable data set, it was necessary to restrict recordings used to those within the criteria set out in 5.1.
Out of necessity, this constitutes a process of selection which removed any possibility of random sampling. However, since the selection of tapes was carried out for ‘technical’ reasons, before beginning the analysis, and since the analysis proceeded inductively after initial selection, it is not felt that the validity of the process is compromised.

As in most analytic research in interpreting studies, the data set for this thesis was relatively small. Because of the fine-grained nature of much of the analysis and time-consuming process of transcription (cf. chapter 5), larger-scale corpora simply cannot be managed, at least not by a single researcher. The five interviews analysed, covering more than nine hours of tape, however, compare favourably with recent research (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale, 1997, 1999). Not only the investigated hours of recorded authentic data, but also the number of interpreters and language combinations involved make the results more generalisable and add to their reliability. Further, whereas many other studies of interpreting involve ad-hoc, unprofessional interpreters, this analyses the performance of NRPSI-registered interpreters working in a country where interpreters are required to pass a certification or accreditation examination (although few would have formal interpreting training; cf. Introduction).

Further, the transcription is far from complete, as is the case with many transcriptions of naturally occurring data. In particular, a number of non-verbal phenomena are apparent in the data, but not all transcribed; and although these are treated here in less depth, the analysis suggests that they nonetheless contribute to the pervasive ‘interpreter-effect’.

Another point to consider is that studies based on naturally occurring data cannot claim to prove the potential impact of the interpreter-induced changes on the hearer’s thoughts and thought processes, but only examine its impact on the interaction. However, this is true for all communication due to the discrepancy between the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding and the proposition expressed by the utterance of these expressions (cf. 5.3). There may be “implicatures to identify, illocutionary indeterminacies to resolve, metaphors and ironies to interpret” (Sperber & Wilson, 2002: 3). All this requires an appropriate set of contextual assumptions, which the hearer must also supply. In particular, our analyses of the interpreter’s use of DMs such as so, but and well in their renditions is based on an approach in which these expressions do not encode a particular constituent of the proposition expressed by the utterance, but simply encode a constraint on the Interpretation of the utterances that contain them. This means that the hearer is left with the responsibility for the Interpretation process, i.e. of deriving any interpretation which is consistent with that constraint.
Lastly, it may be suggested that the data could have been compared to similar events, that is, interviews conducted in Italy, Portugal or Brazil between officers and English-speaking suspects and witnesses. However, police interviews are not routinely tape- or video-recorded in those countries. Therefore, this thesis concerns the interview with suspect and witness as carried out in the English criminal justice system, and has demonstrated that it is a genre *sui generis* (cf. PEACE model in 1.1).

7.3 Practical applications and theoretical implications

Applying the models of reception and production formats (Wadensjö, 1998) and Blakemore’s (2002, 2010) procedural analysis of DMs to police interpreting, findings from this exploratory investigation on face-to-face police interpreting show an extremely high number of shifts both at micro- and macro-level, resulting in and from the interpreter’s rendition, omission or addition of DMs in all ECI phases. These shifts concern a number of areas – forensic linguistics, legal interpreting studies, pragmatics – and demonstrate the significance of an interdisciplinary approach to addressing and understanding problems in interpreter-mediated discourse in police settings. Consequently, a variety of recommendations arise from the results of the study which may be of interest to both linguists and practitioners, i.e. police interpreters and officers, solicitors, and ultimately barristers and judges.

Firstly, utterances emanating from primary participants have been shown to be subject to distortion, omission or amplification and these can be so subtle that neither the officer nor the interviewee is conscious of any resulting miscommunication. This means that no compensatory or repair moves are made, and the interpreters’ utterances are reified on tape and in the transcript and, therefore, at trial. Thus, my analysis highlights the importance of not only video-recording interpreted interviews (in particular, due to the importance of nonverbal communication), but also of transcribing the interpreter’s renditions, which would minimise the issue of disputed statements taken from non-English speaking witnesses and suspects.

Justice goes some way to being served when statements from police interviews with suspects or witnesses are admissible as evidence in court. In particular, statements of the interpreter “are regarded as the statements of the persons themselves” (Berk-Seligson, 2000: 225) and therefore not subject to the hearsay rule. Thus the written statements are prepared in English
in the form of a first person monologue and signed by the witness, and this multi-authored version (the third generation of the original story) becomes the official exhibit in the case and court record contains only the words of the translator, not those spoken by a witness in another language (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 31). I suggest that the original utterances by the witness and suspect should therefore be transcribed (according to a well-defined encoding system)\textsuperscript{147} and translated so that they can be accessed by interviewees and authorities alike. Transcripts of non-English parts are likely to benefit the legal process in the same way as the implementation of interview recordings did, making it more transparent. In particular, the reality presented in the written English exhibit can be cross-examined in order to clarify event- and language-related issues. This would also facilitate supervision and training and, consequently, improve the practice of investigative interviewing. In the event of disputes, a second interpreter should be provided and the transcribed interview re-interpreted so as to provide a comparison between both interpreted versions.

Secondly, as seen in the Introduction, both domestic (Home Office: 2011) and European (Directive 2010/64/EU; European Convention of Human Rights, Art. 6) legislation - alongside a series of European and international reports on legal interpreting (e.g. Hale, 2011; Bordes & Driesen, 2012) - highlight that failing to engage appropriately qualified and competent interpreters in criminal proceedings can amount to a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. But if linguistic presence entails the assistance of a qualified and competent interpreter, it is reasonable to ask how we define competence and how it can be certified. In particular, we need to ask what criteria are used in assessing whether an interpreter is competent and how police can use these criteria to find qualified interpreters.

As suggested by many scholars (e.g. Bordes & Driesen and Hale’s reports), I believe that the first step would be to reinstate the National Agreement (NA) and the related (public) national register in order to avoid gross miscarriages of justice and ensure full compliance with standards and regulations in accordance of Directive 2010/64/EU (cf. introduction). While it is not the aim of the study to formulate such generalisations, in the absence of compulsory testing and accreditation of legal interpreters, as well as lack of quality control, there is no insight into the quality of interpreting taking place in police stations, and no guarantee that

\textsuperscript{147} Police authorities could adopt the transcription conventions simplified after Sacks, Schegloff \& Jefferson (1974) I used for my transcripts (cf. 5.2), in which non-verbal phenomena are not all transcribed. In particular, verbal descriptions of sounds and movements should be reduced to minimum due to lack of time and used only when needed to explain verbal phenomena which would not be understood otherwise.
similar situations as the examples of bad practice found in my data are not taking place today. In particular, the analysed cases may serve as a looking glass for all the pragmatics-related issues that can potentially happen in criminal proceedings.

It must be remembered that, although research has conclusively shown that police interpreters are visible participants, this work demonstrates that “intrusive behaviour” (Berk-Seligson 1990: 214; cf. 2.2.1) needs to be defined more accurately in legal interpreters’ Codes of Conduct in terms of its extent and possible impact on the interaction. As discussed in 6.3.2, sometimes the interpreter’s voice is very much ‘heard’, and at other times is somewhat ‘disguised’ through the addition of a DM. In those instances, the dialogue interpreter’s act of revealing the speaker’s thoughts can be said to communicate a guarantee of optimal relevance, which in turn provides a justification for the hearer’s effort in interpreting his/her utterances. However, one can argue that the reward for this effort is not the enlargement of the mutual cognitive environment of interpreter and hearer, but a meta-representation of the speaker’s thoughts which is unmediated by the thoughts of the interpreter who is producing the utterance. The result is that the audience is under the impression of accessing the thoughts of the speaker directly, as seems to be required by the ‘neutrality’ clause found in many Public Service Interpreters’ Codes of Conduct and good practice guidelines.

Although DMs are analysed as playing a central role in creating the illusion of a character acting out his mental state in immediate relationship with the hearer, my analysis obviously leaves no room for literalism, or perpetrating the notion of verbatim translation - what Morris (1993: ix) calls a “convenient fiction”. Rather, since the effectiveness of interrogation is affected by the extent to which interpreters and officers have an understanding of interpreters’ practice in this area, my research suggests the need for a more nuanced conceptualisation of Codes of Practice. This implies that the degree of latitude afforded within role definitions for police interpreters must be a negotiated outcome of a discussion between users of interpreters and practitioners as well as researchers, and best practices shared for the purpose of interpreters’ assessment and certification.

A worrying point suggested by my study is, however, that the interpreters featured in the corpus were all registered with the NRPSI, and that they might have carried a somewhat blurred perception of their role manifested in my data into other interviews. Clearly, the aspects of accuracy and completeness mentioned in Codes of Practice are directly intertwined with training. So, the question is: what does and should a course for trainee interpreters
include? How and to what extent can we raise awareness in interpreter training needs, simultaneously raising the status of interpreters within the criminal justice system?

The situation concerning interpreter training curricula and opportunities in the UK and, more generally, in the EU is complex and uneven, ranging from university courses to no training at all regardless of whether the interpreter is registered or not (cf. Bordes & Driesen, 2012). However, the aforementioned codes - and other codes such as the code of deontology drafted by EULITA - training initiatives or reports on police interpreting place greater emphasis on grammatical ability than on pragmatic competence.

The implications of this thesis for interpreter training are clear and go precisely in the opposite direction. In particular, a problem may reside in a deficient (meta-pragmatic) ability to fully engage with the procedural processes triggered by the DM. Indeed, interpreters in my corpus seem completely absorbed in the attempt to decipher words and expressions, taking no heed of the modifications in their cognitive environment brought about by the use of a DM in the original utterance. A growing body of empirical research (e.g. H. H. Clark, 1991; Holtgraves, 1999; Leinonen et al., 2003) also shows that pragmatic processing skills are distinct and separate from linguistic processing skills. Besides vocabulary and basic turn-management skills, interpreters should thus be made aware of the pragmatic importance of non-propositional, non-truth-conditional elements which they tend to treat as disposable. If, as RT argues, speakers can be assumed to be aiming at optimal relevance, no aspect of language is disposable: in each case its use will follow from the speaker’s aim of producing an utterance which satisfies the presumption that it is the most relevant utterance consistent with the speaker’s interests and abilities. In particular, omissions and divergent renditions of DMs distort the pragmatics of primary participants’ utterances. One might, thus, envisage a training module based upon chapter 6 of this thesis. More generally, unless extensive training for interpreters in the analysed sociological and pragmatic aspects of the interpreted event is carried out, they can be expected to shift their footing frequently and disrupt the interaction order, together with the interviewing techniques. Instead, interpreters should strive to achieve a fine balance between what is possible, given the nature and dynamics of the interpreted interview, and what is desirable in terms of the context of the event and the aims of its participants.

Although the linguistic strategies of both primary participants are affected, it is the effect of interpreting upon the officer’s aims and strategies that is most clearly demonstrated in this
work. In particular, the police officer’s aim of using DMs as a means of recovering an accurate account of the events relevant to the investigation has been frustrated by the inconsistent practice of interpreters in rendering them. Accordingly, it is important that interpreters not only familiarise themselves with the wider legal context and the ramifications of a police interview, but also have an understanding of the functions of DMs and the issues surrounding their rendition. In particular, they should bear in mind not only the fact-finding character of the interview, but also its role as a piece of evidence in itself, hence the need to tread with caution and to remember that somebody’s liberty or, more generally, justice hinges on their work.

Officers are already trained in interviewing techniques and generally tend to pursue a monolingual strategy in interpreted interviews. A similar approach is seen among some legal professionals (e.g. lawyers and judges), who may for example interrupt during interpreting, or demand a literal word-for-word translation (Berk-Seligson, 1990; Hale & Gibbons, 1999). If they were made aware of the nature of their own (conscious or unconscious) linguistic strategies and the extent to which interpreting frustrates both, this may lead to the formulation of specific training modules. These might highlight such matters as non-truth conditional aspects of language in question structure and management of triadic interaction (especially control of turn-taking), and in this context RT and interactional sociolinguistics can contribute to bringing awareness to the legal process. Another aspect of officers’ training may be on coordination between the police officer and the interpreter, mainly before the interview during a briefing about interview strategies (amongst other organisational aspects of the interview).  

Joint training modules on this area of research could be organised on a regular basis by police academies, interpreting schools and professional associations. Interpreting schools and police academies should also envisage offering training courses to interpreter and officers’ trainers, teaching them how to adapt curricula and design ways of assessing the interviewees’ command of language. In particular, it may be that, in consultation with interpreters, an interviewing format could be devised which takes into account the common effects of interpreting. From the police interviewer’s point of view, missing any information (including

148 A (limited) number of initiatives have already been developed in this field. For instance, Aston University’s Centre for Forensic Linguistics organised a one-day course aimed at police officers in 2012. Further, past and future projects - such as Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s “Enhanced communication via an interpreter” videos, the EU-funded ImPLI (Bordes & Driesen, 2012), and the BMT (Building Mutual Trust) 2 – provide web-based training videos for police interviewers on how to conduct a face-to-face interpreter-mediated interview.
extralinguistic features or DMs) in the interpreted version of the interviewer’s narrative cannot be regarded as ideal. It is contrary to one of the basic tenets of Cognitive Interviewing where free-form narratives are considered highly desirable; further, it may constitute the basis of further probing as required by the investigation. In direct contravention of the prioritisation of free narrative, the interpreter is also likely to innately adopt a strategy of interrupting in order to avoid the cognitive ‘tightrope’ developing, as can be observed in the present study (cf. 6.3.1). The precise repercussions of these constant interruptions and their impact on the interviewee’s construction of a free-form narrative are varied. Overall, it would be reasonable to expect that the interviewee’s train of thought may be at stake at the very least.

I concur with Mason (2008) that a way to reduce interpreters’ omissions of pragmatic features – alongside summarised translation and interruptions - would be to render source utterances in a ‘semiconsecutive’ mode (cf. also De Groot, 1997), i.e. in smaller chunks (instead of one big segment), thus allowing the interpreter to interpret after each chunk, and then return the floor to the speaker who was interrupted so they can move on to the next chunk. In the courtroom context at least, Mason (2008: 53) finds that the practicality of this mode of interpreting depends on the cooperation of the actor (lawyers, witnesses etc.), over which the interpreter has no direct control. In police settings, this could again be overcome through training.

The widespread lack of awareness of the importance of DMs on the part of the registered interpreters in my corpus and of maintaining their pragmatic effects in their interpretation has direct implications for training and certification or accreditation examinations. Today’s legislation and Codes of Conduct around the world seem to focus on grammatical accuracy, and this enables (police) authorities to treat interpreting as an exact, “verbatim” reflection of the corresponding source language talk. The interpreter’s perception of a successful communicative act seems to diverge from that of police officers and legislators in the specific context of an enhanced cognitive interview. It would seem that the solution to the dilemma lies somewhere along the continuum between interventionist and non-interventionist policies. This leaves the legal interpreter to exercise her own judgment to achieve the delicate balance in what she perceives as her normative role. In order to develop this judgment, training is however needed. And, as can be inferred from my findings, sensitivity to pragmatic aspects of utterance comprehension and production play a significant role. Pragmatic competence is of paramount importance when engaging in any act of communication, particularly in an increasingly globalised world, where often largely dissimilar cultures come into contact,
forcing interpreters to confront the demanding task of reconciling differences in an attempt to establish constructive communication. In particular, thanks to added DMs, the police interpreter has been shown to – paradoxically – succeed in becoming “invisible” (Berk-Seligson, 1990: 53-4), giving the impression of speaking in place of the other participants. I suggest that an in-depth knowledge of cross-linguistic pragmatics and of interviewing techniques should be included as a common accreditation criterion for legal interpreter training courses and certification and enshrined in legal interpreters’ Codes of ethics and registers (cf. Bordes & Driesen, 2012: 16). In this regard, the protection of title and regulation of the police interpreters’ profession by statute is critical in order to ensure (savings and) quality within a system that is in full compliance with UK and European Law, and that a public body holds an independent regulatory role. Thus, the National Agreement should again become statutory, and all interpreters working in the justice sector should be registered on a rationalised and improved NRPSI. As suggested by the ImPLI report (Bordes & Driesen, 2012), a European accreditation system with clearly defined criteria should be introduced in order to minimum standards for the LIT market.

Further, police officers should be provided with training for interaction through an interpreter, and so should other institutional users. They need to accept that interpreting will inevitably have an impact on interviews and, consequently, integrate (pragmatic) considerations regarding interpreting into all stages of their interview plan.

In the end, jurisdiction-specific standards implementation represents an eternal struggle between performance quality and professional ethics, mainly resulting in ethical (and emotional) challenges for interpreters and interpreting users alike. However, “when the system fails to acknowledge the need to train, qualify, certify and recruit according to the principle of excellence, it is condemning itself to low-calibre interlingual performance which will seriously impair the “tissue of justice”, by building in systematic “missed stitches”” (Morris, 2008: 39).

7.4 Areas for further research

This thesis has analysed the police interpreters’ approaches to the rendition of DMs at both a pragmatic and interactional level. A search through the literature has not revealed any identical, or even similar studies. Research in the field of legal interpreting has, as mentioned
in chapter 2, concentrated largely upon courtroom discourse. One of the reasons put forward by scholars was the difficulty in obtaining access to police interviews, and this might always be the case. However, with guarantees of confidentiality and anonymisation it should not be considered impossible, as this and previous research projects (e.g. Wadensjö, 1998) show, particularly since the advantages to training – and therefore to more effective interviewing – are obvious. Given the experimental nature of this attempt, there is however large scope for improvement and refinement.

Implementation of verification and validation mechanisms, including other studies on the interpreter’s treatment of DMs or other procedural elements, would be welcome. In particular, further research into both monolingual and bilingual police interviews would be useful in ascertaining the most pragmatically appropriate renditions. Pragmatic ‘equivalents’ of the most frequently used DMs according to a number of contexts could be suggested as a guide to practicing and trainee interpreters. Although this study was restricted to Portuguese and Italian, since these are my working languages as an interpreter, this study should be replicated using data from other language combinations in order for the results to be more universally acceptable. Clearly, completely different challenges may be faced by interpreters who deal with disparate languages and cultures, such as traditional indigenous cultures in Australia (e.g. Cooke, 1995) or sign language interpretation (e.g. Metzger, 1999; Roy, 1996, 2000). Research in courtroom interpreting seems to focus mainly on Spanish (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2000; Hale, 1997b; Hale & Gibbons, 1999; Rigney, 2000). Presumably, it is also the major police interpreting language in the United States and Latin America and shares its Latin roots with Portuguese and Italian, thus Spanish might also be considered as a possible avenue in order to broaden the scope of the present analysis.

This work demonstrates the usefulness of an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (and its underlying assumptions) in guiding the description and explanation of interpreted police interviews both at the interactional and ‘internal’ level of cognitive processing in relation to specific empirical data, with a view to further theoretical elaboration and refinement. The former level based on Wadensjö’s (1998) seeks to represent the interactants and the relations held between them and their utterances in the communicative event, whereas RT aims at a detailed breakdown of mental procedures followed by the speakers and Blakemore’s (2002) framework provides an overarching, systematic approach to the investigation of how DMs are used. Overall, this theoretical framework aimed to describe and explain and is thus ‘validated’
as a blueprint for teaching and new lines of enquiry from both descriptive and theoretical points of view.

To proceed in the most rigorous way and in accordance with the final purposes of this study, I have restricted the analysis to those turns within which a (procedural) DM is uttered and the features to be transcribed. Unquestionably, this ‘hybrid’ research paradigm may provide a general conceptual framework for conducting research on DMs and other (procedural) expressions in interpreting fields as varied as IAP and healthcare interpreting (cf. 2.1). Depeding on the object of analysis, a collaborative project with other researchers would most certainly prove to be beneficial to explore the richness of mediated, video-recorded data as well as to the final interpretation of specific features. Further, a comparative study of monolingual and interpreted police interviews would also shed light on the interactional effects of the interpreter’s treatment of DMs. A similar set of criteria could be applied to data selection as that set out in chapter 5 of this thesis. However, issues of confidentiality would rule out the setting up of a generally available comparable corpus such as that proposed for translation (cf. Baker, 1995; Laviosa, 1997). Nonetheless, much can be achieved by individual (comparative) studies such as the present thesis. A parallel quantitative method of inquiry may help develop and employ statistical models, theories and/or hypotheses pertaining to the phenomenon, particularly serving as a means to explore the multitude of issues arising from the treatment of DMs in interpreter-mediated police interviews. Indeed, triangulation – i.e. combining multiple observers, theories, methods, and empirical materials - can help overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and the problems that come from single method, single-observer studies.

Further, the courtroom is still out as far as the source of data is concerned. Certainly, all of the features highlighted here might form the point of departure for research on interpreting in the upper levels of the criminal justice system. The trial is largely contingent upon the linguistic events recorded on tape several months before, as represented by the official transcript in which, however, most procedural elements seem to be lost and replaced by an ‘ersatz’ version read out in court. Further research should thus attempt to provide an overview of the journey that a single interpreted police interview makes as it advances from the police station into the courtroom. This could be done by drawing from a variety of primary sources, e.g. translations of statements, transcriptions of examination-in-chief and cross-examination in relation to the
statements, as well as barristers’, judge’s and defendant’s comments on translation and interpreting made during the trial.

If there was such a thing as absolute linguistic perfection, the fact that the transcript disguises a triadic, bilingual event as a monolingual one, erasing the interpreter and attributing her own representations of thought to the interviewee, would be of little significance. One could safely assume that the interpreter’s renditions of the officer’s questions or the interviewee’s replies were perfect in form and pragmatic equivalence, matching the source utterance in any way. However, this and other works have exploded the myth of literalism, clearly showing that “a […] declaration of equivalence spells the end of translation” (Hermans, 2007: 59). The analysis carried out in this work focuses on some of the subtle, but nonetheless pervasive procedural consequences of the interpreter’s treatment of DMs in a police setting. However, following from Blakemore (2011), the type of analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5 is not restricted to expressions such as well or so, but can be extended to a range of expressions which impose semantic constraints on the relevance of the utterance that contain them. In particular, it has been recognised that the meaning of interjections such as ah!, right or so-called expressives such as damn and bloody are also procedural elements used for identifying emotional states or attitudes (cf. Blakemore, 2011; Potts, 2007a, 2007b; Wharton, 2003a, 2003b, 2009). This raises the question of whether the use of these expressive devices in interpreters’ renditions can be explained in terms of the attributive account which turns on resemblances in content. The very subtlety of these elements means that participants, including the interpreters themselves, are less likely to be aware of them and therefore less likely to guard against them. Although each one alone, it may be argued, cannot affect the process of the interview, their cumulative effect cannot but contribute to the altered state of the interview with suspects and witnesses alike when an interpreter is present. Further, it needs to be asked whether their addition also contributes to the sort of mutuality discussed in chapter 6, or mainly leads to interference with the officer’s established monolingual strategy for turning events into an account.

Moreover, even though it has been acknowledged that prosodic features and nonverbal channels of communication (gestures, facial expressions, etc.) – or what Shepherd (2007: 56) calls “deeds” – are as important for a successful interview as the linguistic devices

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149 For instance, in interview 5A (39-41) Caterina introduces herself and her role by saying: “I am an er:: an Italian interpreter (. ) National Register… ((shrugs and raises her eyebrows)) […] er:: I’m here to:: help er:: ((looks
considered here, there is still no analogous study of their role in police interpreting. It is clear that the lexical devices that are the focus of my study interact with non-verbal behaviour. Moreover, it is possible that the exploration of non-verbal components accessible through a video-recording - such as eye-gazing - may be helpful in determining the intended interpretation of certain verbal and prosodic behaviour. If the interpreter does not direct her eye gaze back to the interviewee to signal the return of the floor after an interruption, there is a risk that a less confident interviewee might forfeit the floor to the police interviewer or at least wait for instructions to continue. Similarly, a less experienced or more aggressive police interviewer might assume the floor following an interruption by the interpreter, and ask a new question, thus forgoing the opportunity to obtain a full account of the narrative intended by the interviewee. Finally, certain non-linguistic indicators of co-operation (nodding, facial expressions) were absent from my transcripts as this would have exceeded the scope and specific purposes of the present study; however, they would constitute an interesting research project.

Another idea for further research would be to conduct a qualitative analysis of interpreters’ perception of how effective their use of procedural elements of language is through individual interviews. A more ethnographic approach involving attitudinal research amongst officers and other interpreting users would also prove fruitful both as a supplementary research methodology and a prelude to training. This might go some way to find ways of changing the attitude of the legal profession towards interpreters, as my study and my personal experience show that legal personnel do not realise the importance of an interpreter’s role in the legal process.

Experimental studies are needed to follow up on the speculations on training proposed in 7.3, which should extend to the investigation of the effect of adequate training on the overall performance of interpreters (and police officers) and on the feasibility of maintaining a high level of accuracy in procedural terms. In particular, training should result from a rapprochement between interpreters and the police forces, perhaps at a level of that below management (as was the case during the data collection for this project). One could envisage the organisation of contact and joint training workshops at local police stations where officers and interpreters would be able to exchange views and work together to build up a partnership.
based on an understanding of each other’s needs. In order to identify good practice and, where appropriate, provide recommendations, experts in interpreter training should further examine samples of interpreting provided in police settings and devise a full range of criteria for interpreter assessment in training and certification which should include pragmatic competence and, especially, awareness of procedural elements of language. Interpreting scholars should also aim to balance and complement the more advanced development of monolingual police investigative-interviewing studies with further investigations into the impact of interpreters on the different stages of a police interview.

Under Directive 2010/64/EU - which the UK, alongside other EU member states, is required to implement by October 2013 - such training will become mandatory. However, once training standards for interpreters and interpreting have been improved, what should follow? According to the Directive a register of qualified interpreters is then to be created. To this purpose, swift actions need to be taken to adjust guidelines for performance standards (i.e. in terms of accuracy and completeness) and interpreters’ ethical conduct as members of the profession (i.e. in terms of confidentiality and integrity). In particular, my research suggests the need for a more nuanced conceptualisation of Codes of Practice, and legislators and researchers must endeavour to include a balanced degree of latitude afforded within role definitions for police interpreters. In this context, a fundamental aim is the professionalisation of legal interpreting in order to improve the provision of the conditions that contribute to higher standards. While in a (small) number of legal systems there are observable improvements in the status and pay of interpreters, rarely are they accorded the full status or pay of a professional.

Role definition must also respond proactively to the demands of new technologies. However, a very limited number of studies (e.g. Braun & Taylor, 2012; Turner & Wurm, 2012) have explored the role of police interpreters in emerging settings, such as video-conferencing, telephone interpreting or telephone tapping. In particular, virtually nothing is known about the viability and quality of videoconference (or remote) interpreting (VCI/RI), and training for legal practitioners and interpreters on VCI/RI is “almost non-existent” (Braun & Taylor, 2012: 12). This issue is ever more pressing as: (a) the European Council confirmed in 2007 that the use of videoconference technology is one of the priorities for future work in European e-Justice, in particular in the areas of evidence taking and interpreting; and (b) VCI/RI is currently being introduced by London’s Metropolitan Police Service by placing interpreters in
centralised hubs. Research should highlight to what extent new technologies impact on working practices as well as interactional dynamics. As a result, the role of the interpreter might be recast to take those changes into account.

Lastly, awareness of the socially inclusive role and function of legal interpreting should be strengthened and police interpreting evaluated as a social intervention in terms of the extent to which it empowers (i.e. creates a level of ‘social capital’; cf. Inghilleri, 2003, 2005) the people interpreters work for, as well as practitioners and engaging stakeholders (Tipton & Spencer, 2012; Turner, 2013). The question of social intervention is a significant one from the perspective of empowerment, particularly in the context of police interpreting where interpreting can be a both a benign and malign source of empowerment: benign as it has the potential to create a level playing field to access justice; malign because there is the potential for the interpreting process to be blamed for things not going the interviewed person’s way. Again, the main perspective is one of training and competence, whereas my analysis is full of examples where the interpretation clearly served to disempower the interviewee because of the substantive pragmatic interference contained in the discourse. As a result, only qualified (certified) interpreters aware of these wider social issues should be recruited, especially during the decisive pre-trial phase, and working with such interpreters should also be part of police officer’s training.

In wider society, interpreting as social intervention also raises a myriad of questions about amount and timing. In particular, the provision of interpreting services is often subject to widespread public condemnation. Where public awareness of police interpreting is raised, it frequently occurs in connection with media reports on compromised investigative processes due to insufficiently qualified interpreters. The factors which lead to such failures, such as a lack of appropriate training facilities, poor remuneration and problematic working conditions, are rarely examined. Another recurring feature of the public discourse on legal interpreting is the increase in expenditure which is required to respond to increased demand, a phenomenon that was observed in all EU member countries. By contrast, little consideration is given to the financial and personal cost of failing to make such provision and the political arguments about a State’s responsibility to migrants (especially asylum seekers and refugees).

I would argue for the need of early intervention with language support to help more vulnerable and disenfranchised sections of society, but which some form of intervention through interpreting could empower to create confidence and capacity for independence. This
is arguably necessary in an enlightened approach to multiculturalism. Convincing others of this and of the level of vulnerability experienced by some members of society, of course, is the difficult part. Again, the issue of timing could be crucial; can society allow issues to coast along and keep people in similar situations for years or does intervention of some type (e.g. interpreting) help in decision-making and changes for the better? A complex, longitudinal study would be needed to gain insight into what intervention means and what its impact on police interpreting would be.

While the dynamics of the monolingual interview have been object of study in the field of forensic linguistics and criminology, the interpreter-mediated interview still constitutes a largely unexplored area in the judicial process. This work is an attempt to fill this gap. Its findings show that the dynamics in the bilingual interview are radically altered by the presence of the interpreter who is empowered to ensure successful communication, i.e. to incorporate her understanding of what is (implicitly and explicitly) communicated into a pragmatically corresponding target utterance as well as to allocate interactional space through the manipulation of the turn-taking system. In particular, interpreters frequently shift footing by omitting DMs which contribute to the inferential phase of comprehension by narrowing down the hearer’s search space or which signal that the utterance yields a level of relevance consistent with guarantee communicated by every act of ostensive inferential communication. As a result, the cost-effective nature of the utterance comprehension mechanism put forward in RT is lost and extra processing effort is expended.

It is hoped that the methodology employed in this study can be replicated in future research in order to both address its limitations, and confirm or disconfirm its findings. Therefore it is highly desirable that research in this field continues to work towards a ‘healthy’ balance between description and explanation by exploring the nature of what is processed and the way mental models are negotiated in real data sets. Due to the multi-faceted nature of dialogue interpreting “no single model, however complex and elaborate, could hope to be validated as an account for the phenomenon as a whole” (Pöchhacker, 2004: 106). Sociological research in interpreting would thus benefit from and is arguably complementary to an analysis of the corpus from the viewpoint of the “sub-personal cognitive processes which are involved in the human ability to entertain representations of other people’s thoughts and desires and ideas on the basis of public stimuli such as utterances” (Blakemore, 2002: 60).
In particular, more in-depth analysis of authentic triadic interpreter-mediated police encounters is needed to show whether police interpreters effectively contribute to promoting relations between principal parties, creating bridges between legal institutions and second-language speakers. Further research with data from other countries and involving other languages would also help identify examples of good practice and innovation, examine barriers to adopting more effective interviewing methods and means to overcome them, and explore the advantages and disadvantages of police authorities working jointly with, or independently from, interpreters’ associations and/or government agencies on this matter. Also, further work is needed to investigate the impact of police interpreting on the Cognitive Interview model and whether questioning techniques achieve the same outcomes when mediated by interpreters.

Police interpreters are ‘at the crossroads’ between institutions – with their intrinsic power asymmetries, client and institutional needs, and Codes – and linguistic and academic constraints. In the current practice of taking a witness statement or questioning a suspect through an interpreter, the interviewee’s words can be expected to undergo a similar number of pragmatic transformations as shown by my analysis, often – effectively or not – “compress[ing] or alter[ing] what [police officers] say” (Shepherd, 2004, quoted in Shepherd, 2007: 172). One can expect that some of the issues discussed above may arise in police stations and, ultimately (when the interview is used as evidence), courts around the world. We must engage in a more fruitful debate – interpreter trainers, interpreters, police officers and those who teach them – and be prepared to adapt and change our procedures (and registers) in order to ease the tension between the law needing absolutes and meaning being inexact, facilitate good communication, and reduce, as far as possible, the likelihood of injustice. At the same time, it is highly desirable that systematic analytical studies continue challenging the status quo of legal interpreting and impact on interpreters’ practice and other participants’ view of the interpreter’s role both in the EU and internationally.
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This Appendix is comprised of Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 is a list the interviews provided by GMP. Interviews 1, 2, 3A, 4A, and 5A constitute the corpus of this work. Hours in column 5 have been changed for anonymity purposes (cf. 5.1.1), however the total duration of the interviews has been maintained. All names, dates and locations are fictitious and do not relate in any way to any real events. Any resemblance is purely coincidental.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVIEWED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REASON WHY INTERVIEWS ARE ENDED</th>
<th>FROM-TO (time mentioned by the investigator)</th>
<th>EXTRA TIME (before &amp; after the investigator mentions the time)</th>
<th>TOTAL DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15-5-2007</td>
<td>10:15 – 11:50</td>
<td>(no extra time)</td>
<td>1:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>29-4-2010</td>
<td>13:10 – 15:28</td>
<td>+3 mins</td>
<td>2:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>29-4-2010</td>
<td>13:05 – 14:56</td>
<td>+2 mins</td>
<td>1:53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>29-4-2010</td>
<td>15:26 – 16:42</td>
<td>+5 mins</td>
<td>1:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>16-5-2010</td>
<td>10:13 – 11:52</td>
<td>+5 mins</td>
<td>1:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>16-5-2010</td>
<td>14:03 – 15:37</td>
<td>+2 mins</td>
<td>1:36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4C</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>16-5-2010</td>
<td>16:12 – 17:59</td>
<td>+2 mins</td>
<td>1:49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10. List of interviews provided by GMP.

Table 11 shows the relevant information about primary participants, including their pseudonyms, sex, approximate age, the number of interviews they are involved in, known professional affiliation and education, and language proficiency. The roles of each participant in the interaction are as follows: M, L, and A indicate the interviewed, I stands for ‘Interpreter’, P for ‘Police officer’, and La for ‘Legal advisor’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>INTERVIEWS</th>
<th>PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION &amp; EDUCATION</th>
<th>LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>MANUEL SILVA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>teenager</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Teenage student</td>
<td>- PT (Portugal) native speaker;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- EN: limited understanding, weak speaking skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LETICIA</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Professional affiliation &amp;</td>
<td>- PT (Brazil) native speaker;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150 The latter part of interview 5 was not made available.
151 The investigator does not mention the exact end time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Language Skills</th>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>PT (Portugal) native speaker;</td>
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<td>- MA in Interpreting and Translation</td>
<td>EN: near-native understanding and speaking skills.</td>
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<td>- IoL Diploma in Translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JULIANA RODRIGUES</td>
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<td>EN: near-native understanding and speaking skills.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>EN: very good understanding and speaking skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDREW SMITH</td>
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<td>Police investigator</td>
<td>BrE native speaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>JACK JONES</td>
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<td>Police investigator</td>
<td>BrE native speaker</td>
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<td>LISA SIMONS</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>P5</td>
<td>JONATHAN EDWARDS</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>5 7</td>
<td>Detective Sergeant from the PPIU (Public Protection Investigation Unit)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MICHAEL MIDDLETON</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>RACHEL SMITH</td>
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<td>30s</td>
<td>3 5 7</td>
<td>Legal advisor from Davids Solicitors firm</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. List of participants in the dataset.

Formerly known as Child Protection Unit (CPU), as P5 mentions in interview 7. The PPIU deals not only with allegations of child abuse, but also with vulnerable adult protection and other cases.
APPENDIX B

Appendix B includes Fig. 6 to Fig. 11 drawn by Antonio in interview 5A (1467-1579) in order to represent Maria’s Moses basket stand and its fall to the ground (cf. 6.4). Fig. 6 shows the frontal image of the Moses basket stand, in which the red circle indicates the breaking point as drawn by A:

![Figure 6. Frontal image of Moses basket stand.](image)

Fig. 7 represents the Moses basket stand from above. The red circle indicates the breaking point as drawn by A, whereas the green circle shows where the breaking point should have been indicated. The lines at the top of the frame might represent the front view of two plastic retaining hoops, which curve around the basket holding it more securely in place:
Fig. 7. Moses basket stand from above.

Fig. 8 shows the Moses basket wooden retaining bar, which is broken in one part. The blue arrows as drawn by Antonio indicate the two forces counteracting the cradle’s weight (the latter being distributed onto the two catches). The retaining bar breaks at the level of one of the catches (cf. red line):

Fig. 8. Breaking line of Moses basket wooden retaining bar.
Moreover, Fig. 9 is a front view of the wooden retaining bar; the metal frame’s catch is latched onto the bar (cf. blue line to indicate movement):

![Figure 9. Catch latched onto the wooden retaining bar.](image)

In Fig. 10, Antonio draws the inner frame of the stand (in blue) which was not drawn in Fig. 7. His purpose is to show that the stand is comprised of two frames:

![Figure 10. Moses basket stand folded flat, seen from above.](image)
Lastly, Fig. 11 represents the action of lifting the catch off the wooden retaining bar:

*Figure 11. Lifting the catch (with metal frame bar on the left and wooden retaining bar on the right).*