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The Central African Federation, Katanga and the Congo Crisis, 1958-65

MATTHEW HUGHES

Published by European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford
This working paper is published under the auspices of the Military and International History cluster within the Centre for Contemporary History and Politics, which forms part of the European Studies Research Institute. Members of this cluster are engaged in research on contemporary military and international history with particular emphasis on France, Russia/USSR, the First World War and the Middle East.

*Working Papers in Military and International History:* Edited by Professor Steven Fielding & Dr Nikolas Gardner, September 2003.

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Published by:

European Studies Research Institute (ESRI)
University of Salford

*ISBN: 1 902496 37 X*
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Matthew Hughes
Before the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980, black guerrilla forces had fought a long war through the 1970s against the white-dominated Rhodesian government. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, long before the start of the insurgency that led to the end of white rule, the white-settlers of Rhodesia, then part of the Central African Federation (CAF), fought against black rule in the Belgian Congo. The focus of this fight was Congo’s Katanga province that bordered on the CAF. This struggle in the Congo forms part of the same narrative of white-Rhodesian resistance to black-majority rule that carried on until 1980 (and until 1994 in South Africa). Even before Belgium’s decision to pull out of the Congo in 1960, the whites of the CAF were looking to effect a political union with the Belgian settlers in Katanga; once Belgium withdrew in the summer of 1960, the whites of the CAF did all they could to help preserve white interests in the Congo. The purpose of this article is to examine the two issues of a political union between the CAF and Katanga before 1960 and the CAF support for white-settler interests in Katanga and the Congo in the period from 1960 to 1965. This examination extends the periodisation of Rhodesia’s fight against black rule to the late 1950s and adds to our understanding of the process of decay of white rule in central and southern Africa.

There is a comprehensive historiography on decolonisation in the Belgian Congo that spans the transition from Belgian colonial rule to Congolese independence on 30 June 1960, and deals with the succession of internal wars and conflicts that erupted
across the Congo in the early 1960s following the end of Belgian rule. The existing literature on the Congo is impressive in terms of both quality and quantity. It tackles nearly all of the significant issues: the dynamics surrounding independence in both the Congolese and Belgian camps as the latter hastily pulled out of the Congo; the impact of the Cold War and the Superpowers on events in the Congo; the collapse of the Congo’s civil society (and infrastructure) after 1960; the continued involvement of Belgium in the Congo after 1960; the role of United Nations (UN) peace-keeping forces deployed in the Congo; and the question of the secession of Katanga province in July 1960.¹ There is also on-going interest in the death of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, murdered, as is argued by, among others, Ludo de Witte in *De Moord op Lumumba* (1999), by agents of the Belgian government in 1961.²

Omitted from this corpus, however, is any in-depth analysis of the role played by the neighbouring British-run Central African Federation in events in the Congo in this period. Although Alan James’ *Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63* (1996) is a notable exception, his work, while examining the linkages between Britain, the CAF and the Congo, concentrates primarily on Britain’s role vis-à-vis the Congo. Moreover, as James admits, ‘The literature on the Congo is voluminous. That on Britain’s part in the crisis is to all intents and purposes non-existent.’³ This gap in the scholarship is even more apparent when looking at the CAF and the Congo. There is no relevant material in Portuguese and French-language sources concentrate on
Belgium’s role in the Congo crisis. Meanwhile, in English, with the exception of James and articles that touch obliquely upon the subject, the relevant printed primary and secondary material – such as JRT Wood’s 1983 work on the Prime Minister of the CAF, Sir Roy Welensky – focuses primarily on events inside the CAF, rather than on the interchange with neighbouring Congo. The exception to this is the interest in the death of the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in September 1961 in an aeroplane crash near the Northern Rhodesian airfield of Ndola while attempting to broker a deal over Katangan secession. However, this analysis typically comes in the form of investigative journalism implicating the Federation in Hammarskjöld’s death that, interesting as it may be, does little to shed light on the real nature of CAF activities in the Congo. Indeed, much if not most of the work on the death of Hammarskjöld fits best into the category of conspiracy theories of the type that often emerge following the violent death of a famous person in murky circumstances.

Intuitively, one would expect the CAF to be extremely concerned with events in the Congo generally and Katanga in particular as Belgium made the sudden decision to withdraw as the colonial power in the late 1950s. Established in 1953, and, from 1956, headed by Welensky, the CAF was a ten-year association that brought together Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, run by the Colonial Office, with Southern Rhodesia, whose affairs were managed by the Commonwealth Relations Office
(CRO). While technically a Crown Colony, Southern Rhodesia had since 1923 enjoyed de facto self-government and the CAF was an attempt by the more powerful and effectively independent Southern Rhodesia to dominate Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and their majority black populations. The seat of power for the CAF lay in Salisbury, the Southern Rhodesian capital, while a gerrymandering of legislative and executive power ensured white control of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the life of the CAF. The CAF protected the economically dominant minority group – the white settlers – and bears ready comparison to the East Africa High Commission, with the difference that the CAF was both an economic and political union in contrast to the economic integration envisaged for British East Africa.

The effectively autonomous CAF had a long-standing economic association and political interest in Katanga province. The economic connection stretched back to 1899 when Cecil Rhodes, determined to have a share of Katanga’s mineral riches, established Tanganyika Concessions Ltd (or ‘Tanks’). It promptly sent an expedition north into Katanga. In response, the Belgian Comité Special du Katanga (CSK) agreed to share Katanga’s wealth – 60% CSK to 40% ‘Tanks’ – and to keep the mining side as a separate concern the jointly run Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) came into being in 1906. The UMHK was a collaborative business venture, a union of British and Belgian capitalists who, together, provided the initial capital for the UMHK. Inextricably joined, the two companies shared reports,
correspondence, directors, dividends and shares, headed notepaper and auditors. British money continued to flow in and out of UMHK and British directors sat on the UMHK board up until the 1960s, a sign of the successful multi-national element to the company. Sir Charles Waterhouse, former Conservative MP and a frequent visitor to the Foreign Office during the Congo crisis of the 1960s was, in addition to being chair of ‘Tanks’, a director of the UMHK. Other British members of UMHK at the time of the Congo crisis included Sir Ulick Alexander and Lord Selbourne. There were also substantial British investments in Katanga through such firms as Unilever, the British-American Tobacco Company and Shell Oil.

The intimate links between London, Brussels, ‘Tanks’, the UMHK and the CAF resulted in the formation of a ‘Katanga lobby’: a shadowy group of business people and politicians keen to maintain the economic wealth that derived from white rule in Africa. James describes it as an ‘important and sometimes influential pressure group. It had no formal structure. But among its leading members were the Marquess of Salisbury, a senior Conservative peer, and Captain Charles Waterhouse. The ‘Katanga lobby’ found political allies in reactionary backbench Conservative MPs ‘of the Suez rebel sort’ and in the CAF, whose leader, Welensky, enjoyed widespread support within the right wing of the Conservative Party. The American Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs noted the presence of a special interest group in a memorandum drawn up following a bout of fighting in the Congo in 1961: ‘the
Macmillan Government should be able to free itself from the pressures of City and Conservative groups in the UK and the Rhodesias and join us in trying to bring about a peaceful reunification of the Congo. Rhodesian coal from the Wankie fields that fed the furnaces of Katanga and the fact that CAF or British-run railways carried the bulk of Katanga’s imports and exports were a final reminder of the CAF’s intimate economic relationship with Katanga. Indeed, in 1960-61 when the Congo’s infrastructure collapsed following the Belgians’ departure, CAF railways or the British-run Benguela railway through Portuguese Angola exported all of Katanga’s considerable mineral production.

The profits from the economic exploitation of central and southern Africa depended on the maintenance of direct or indirect white political rule in central and southern Africa. But even before Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech on decolonisation in Africa in February 1960, black African nationalism and a new pragmatism on the part of the central authorities in London were challenging white rule in the region. Britain’s granting of independence to Ghana in 1957 foreshadowed independence for its colonies in central and eastern Africa – all of which became independent in the 1960s and threatened to upset the Southern-Rhodesian dominated CAF. Because of the new mood in British colonial policy, there was obvious common political cause for the whites in the CAF with fellow settler communities in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, South Africa and
Katanga. Standing together, they could act as a barrier against black African pressure, both internally and from newly independent African states to the north.\textsuperscript{24} The Irish diplomat, Conor Cruise O’Brien, who served with the UN in Katanga, contextualised the predicament of the white settlers in the CAF in the foreword he provided for a radical anti-colonialism pamphlet published in 1962: “In Katanga, I came to feel that I was living at the point where the “wind of change” begins to veer: that is, the point where it encounters the escarpment of a relatively solid area of European settlement and rule. The 30,000 or so Europeans of Katanga felt themselves to be backed by the 300,000 or so of the Rhodesias and by more than 3,000,000 in South Africa."\textsuperscript{25} Aware of its predicament, the CAF Committee for the Consideration of External Policy in Relation to the Defence of the Federation “...considered the advisability of entering into a defence commitment or understanding with the Portuguese and South Africans on the basis that, despite the differences which separated our policies, the geographical facts of our position indicated that we would either stand or fall together in meeting a movement which sought to remove European influence from Africa.”\textsuperscript{26}

Wanting to preserve its power base, Welensky’s administration was keen to create a NATO-style defence pact for southern Africa – the African Treaty Organisation (ATO) – with the CAF as a leading member.\textsuperscript{27} From 1958, Basil Maurice (‘Bob’) de Quehen, the head of the CAF security service, the Federal Intelligence and Security
Bureau (FISB), was suggesting the formation of just such an organisation to resist Soviet expansion, drawing comparisons with the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which had been founded in 1955.28 Hoping to make use of the new mood of containment and, after the Korean War, 'rollback' of communism, Welensky's final defence pact proposal in December 1959 was an attempt to draw Britain and the USA into supporting the CAF against Soviet-sponsored African nationalism. Had it been implemented, the final proposal would have established a cordon sanitaire across central Africa: 'It will be seen from this suggestion that I have in mind the creation of a firm line stretching across the 10° parallel and running from Ruvuma River, on the East Coast, across the northern boundary of Mocambique, the Federation and Angola to Cabinda, south of Pointe Noire, on the west coast of Africa. I have in mind that the pact, which would establish this line would be kept top secret.'29 As for the Belgian Congo, '....which, it can be anticipated, will be feeling the loneliness of autonomy soon, it might well be to the advantage of Brussels to require the future government or governments of the Congo to subscribe to the pact so that the West might retain some degree of control over the Congo's external affairs.'30 Casting a wide net, Welensky also suggested that they consider French Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa for the new pact.31

Britain's lacklustre response to the idea of a regional defence pact prompted Welensky to pursue an alternative strategy of bi-lateral defence links with Portuguese
Africa. As early as November 1958, Welensky had met the Portuguese leader, António de Oliveira Salazar, to discuss how best to forge links with the neighbouring Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Welensky proposed that the two regimes should jam subversive radio broadcasts from Egypt and combine to resist Soviet encroachments in the region. The Portuguese responded positively to these ideas and in May 1960 Welensky suggested to Macmillan the possibility of secret discussions with Portugal to help cement co-operation between the CAF and Portuguese Africa. Macmillan's response, as with the regional defence organisation, was lukewarm, merely agreeing to consider the proposal. Welensky's defence pact with Portuguese Africa concentrated on key security issues such as military and security co-operation, improved communications, and counter-propaganda, as well as better trade links that would integrate the economies of the CAF and Portuguese Africa. Welensky hoped that Portugal would respond positively to his overtures, at least in terms of agreeing to combine to control subversion. While events in the Congo overtook the attempt to tie the CAF in with Portuguese Africa, the Portuguese authorities in Angola worked closely with the CAF in supporting its policies in the Congo in the early 1960s.

At the same time as the CAF was negotiating with the Portuguese, it put out – and responded to – suggestions for a political union that would bring together Katanga province and the CAF. Indeed, in 1958, long before the Belgian government declared
for an independent Congo, the settlers in Katanga had suggested a merger with the CAF.  The talks between the two sides intensified in late 1959 and early 1960 when a ‘European group from Katanga’ and senior figures from the CAF met to discuss ‘questions of common interest posed by the accession of the Congo to independence.’  As a British secret service report noted in December 1959, Welensky was heavily involved in these discussions: ‘He [Welensky] told me that he had recently received a secret delegation from the Katanga area....This delegation had asked him whether, if certain political developments took place in the Congo, the Katanga area might be received into the Central Federation.’

The white settlers in the CAF regarded a united black Congo in control of Katanga as a ‘grim warning’ of what might happen if Britain gave independence to any of the territories of the Federation. The sudden decision by Belgium in January 1960 to withdraw from the Congo and grant independence within six months gave the talks with the Belgians in Katanga sudden urgency. The Belgian démarche left the CAF with the prospect of a black-run administration in place by June 1960 in a neighbouring province – Katanga – that was, geographically and culturally, akin to the ‘Copperbelt’ zone of the overwhelmingly black Northern Rhodesia. Thus, with the news that Belgium was leaving the Congo, discussions began in earnest between Welensky and the leaders of the Belgian community in Katanga on the possibility of closer links, including a political union. In March 1960, three months before the
hand-over of power to black rule in Leopoldville, the local Katangan paper, the *Echo du Katanga*, reported that the Rhodesians were proposing a new federation that would include Katanga, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Mozambique. Moreover, as the *Echo du Katanga* noted, Welensky also wanted to integrate Katanga into the CAF. Welensky's dealings with the Belgians aroused considerable speculation in the media of a possible political alliance between Katanga and the CAF, and, by the spring of 1960, there was much talk in the local press of a merger backed by the Belgian government. In March 1960, the Belgian Consul General in Salisbury, Etienne Harford, called on Welensky to pass on the suggestion of the Brussels government that, when the Congo attained its independence, Katanga should enter into a 'political association' with the Federation. The *Rhodesia Herald* confirmed Harford's offer: not only the settlers and mining companies of Katanga, but also the Belgian government wanted a political union that would allow the settlers to carry on business as usual after independence.

Welensky did nothing to scotch these reports, instead giving a revealing interview to Rene MacColl of the *Daily Express* in March 1960 in which he said that Katanga might well join his Federation. MacColl asked him if there would be a definite political alignment with a breakaway Katanga:
‘Yes’ rejoined Sir Roy - then added characteristically and with a twinkling eye: ‘Now I suppose there is going to be the hell of a row for my having told you this...Suggestions have been made to me - I got the latest letter on the subject only yesterday from a source which I had better not name - that the federation should “hold out the hand of friendship” to Katanga when the Congo gains its independence.’

A supportive editorial summed up the mood of the Daily Express on the question of Katanga: ‘If Katanga decided to become a state in the federation its mineral wealth would be linked with the copper, coal, and water power of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Central Africa would be better off and therefore nearer freedom. Sir Roy Welensky’s ideal would be closer to realisation.’ With whom exactly was Welensky negotiating? According to MacColl, the talks had been inspired by mining groups; meanwhile, ‘The Daily Express let it be understood that the approaches had not been made by representatives of the 30,000 Europeans in the province, nor by the powerful Union Minière, but by Moise Tshombe, the Conakat leader.’

When the issue of Katanga joining the CAF was raised in London, officials noted that Welensky had received letters from sources he declined to name urging collaboration. These were almost surely Belgian settlers keen to join the Federation. These settlers were intimately associated with mining interests in Katanga, including the powerful UMHK. Belgian diplomatic staff told their British counterparts that the UMHK was utterly opposed to a black-run Katanga: ‘Should such a prospect arise they would seriously consider the possibility of seeking the amalgamation of the
Katanga with Northern Rhodesia.' The Belgian diplomats added how for years there had been close contacts between the white settlers of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia.30

The local press seized on these reports of an alliance. On 3 March 1960, the Rhodesia Herald recorded that the fear of an independent, black Congo was driving Katanga into a union with the CAF. This news came as no surprise in the Federation with the Rhodesia Herald reporting that many Rhodesian MPs 'were offering bets that Katanga would soon be Federal controlled. They admitted yesterday morning that on Tuesday they had heard rumours of an approach having been made to... Welensky... from a source which the Prime Minister was not prepared to disclose.'51 At the same time, in the Northern News, Welensky maintained that 'certain circles' in Katanga had approached him and that he made it clear to the group that he favoured some form of amalgamation.52 Further confirmation came in an another article in the Rhodesia Herald: 'Police are investigating a new but powerful Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia alliance group, which is busy canvassing support on the Copperbelt. The new organisation – Fetrikat – is affiliated to the powerful Conakat Party and has its headquarters at Elisabethville. The group promises access to the Congo after June 30 only to members. The group is electing “reliable” people to its ranks. It seeks alliance between the Haut Katanga Province and Northern Rhodesia’s Western Province, which includes the Copperbelt.'53
Why did a political union between the CAF and Katanga never materialise? The answer can be found in both external and internal factors. Externally, Britain, America and the UN, keen to maintain the integrity of the Congo, worked together to prevent the loss of Katanga, Congo's richest province. There were also internal factors limiting Welensky's actions. At about the same time as Belgium was making the decision to pull out of the Congo, serious rioting erupted among the black population of Nyasaland. There were further disturbances in Northern Rhodesia. In March 1959, the Governor declared a state of emergency in Nyasaland and imprisoned the black leader Hastings Banda. Following these disturbances, Britain appointed the Monckton Commission to inquire into the future of the CAF. There was also a conference at Lancaster House in early 1960 that brought together Welensky and African nationalists such as Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia and the recently released Banda. The conference achieved nothing but Welensky could see that the talks with leaders such as Banda were 'the beginning of the end'. Led by Iain Macleod, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Britain was pushing for independence for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia – something that both countries achieved in 1964.

Much as Welensky favoured a union with Katanga, the gradual destruction of the CAF and the future of white rule in the region were more pressing concerns. He was
fighting a political rearguard action, attempting; for instance, to block the
deployment of British troops to Nyasaland whom he felt would aid London’s policy
of independence for black Africans.\textsuperscript{55} When Macmillan visited the CAF in January
1960, Welensky found him to be ‘bland and unrepentant’ on Britain’s new policy
towards its African possessions.\textsuperscript{56} Angered by the Conservatives’ lack of support for
his administration, Welensky, it has been argued, threatened a \textit{coup d' état} in
February 1960 if Africans were put in control in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{57}
The constitutional future of the CAF dominated Welensky’s agenda in late 1959 and
1960. Pressed by Britain and African nationalists, his administration tried,
unsuccessfully, to preserve the Federation created in 1953. As Lord Alport, British
High Commissioner to the Federation, recalled, the ‘excitement and flurry’ of
Katanga was a sideshow in which Welensky escaped or temporarily avoided ‘the less
interesting but perhaps more difficult problems of the constitutional future.’\textsuperscript{58}

With the CAF collapsing, it made little sense for Welensky to gamble on an overt
political or military adventure to support a secessionist movement in Katanga that all
the major world powers and international organisations opposed. Neither was there
internal support in the CAF from the majority black population for Katangan
secession. Blacks in Northern Rhodesia watched with ‘satisfaction’ as desperate
Belgian settlers from Katanga streamed over the border seeking sanctuary and a
haven from the anarchy in the Congo after July 1960.\textsuperscript{59} Neither were the Rhodesian
armed forces strong enough to maintain order within the CAF while also deploying north into Katanga to support any attempt at political union. The Rhodesian army order-of-battle in 1966 – when it was a stronger force following reforms instituted by Welensky – was two regular battalions (one ‘European’ – the Rhodesian Light Infantry – and one ‘African’ – the Rhodesian African Rifles), a Special Air Service squadron, eight Territorial (TA) battalions (the Royal Rhodesian Regiment) and one TA artillery regiment. This represented a total strength of 3270 regulars and 8097 TA reservists.60 Responsible for a huge landmass covering 487,137 square miles of rough terrain with poor communications, the fully stretched force had little or nothing in the way of a reserve able to deploy into the expanse of Katanga. In normal circumstances, the Federation could call on the considerable strength of the British armed forces in an emergency but this was not possible considering London’s differences with the Federation over both a political union with Katanga and the future status of the CAF. As the editor of Welensky’s papers noted, following a meeting between Macmillan and Welensky in May 1960: ‘...Macmillan’s constant harping on British military involvement arose out of more than a concern for the Federation. A sizeable force would have given Whitehall the means to influence policy in the Federation, which the current Federal control of the armed forces denied to it.’61 Aware of his weakness, Welensky tried to upgrade his armed forces. He instituted reforms to increase the strength of the army and bought in some new equipment such as Ferret armoured cars, modern machine guns and Belgian FN
semi-automatic rifles to replace the Second World War-vintage weapons in use in 1960. The Federal Cabinet in July 1960 recognised that its army was inadequate to deal with both further disturbances in Nyasaland and ‘any intensification of tribal clashes in Katanga’. The cost of the extra spending on defence in case there was a spill-over of trouble in Katanga into Northern Rhodesia following Belgium’s departure was estimated at £2,650,000 as an initial outlay plus £970,000 as recurrent expenditure. As the Federal Cabinet noted, this ‘would tax the country’s financial resources to the utmost, but it was felt that that position would have to be faced.’

Once Katanga under Tshombe seceded from the Congo in July 1960, Welensky urged London to sanction the deployment of CAF troops to help Tshombe. Knowing that London’s response would be negative, Welensky still reserved the option of using his forces in any role that best served the interests of the Federation. But the deployment of CAF troops outside the borders of the Federation in anything other than small advisory teams was impossible considering the limited size of the force and its primary role in maintaining order within an increasingly turbulent CAF. Faced with the impracticability of a political union with Katanga backed by CAF military force, Welensky shifted his policy towards Katanga, providing less overt and indirect support in the form of economic, military and political support for Tshombe and an independent Katanga. As a US special report from 1961 noted: ‘White settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Angola fear an extension of the Congo’s disorder
into their areas. To prevent this, they are willing to give some political support and to countenance the passage of some military supplies, mercenaries, and advisers to Tshombe. They are also willing to grant Katanga continued access to the sea for its exports.  

While unable or unwilling to use its troops in Katanga to help Tshombe resist military attempts by the UN to force him back into the framework of a united Congo, the CAF (and South Africa) became the recruiting ground and forward base for a largely white mercenary force that was deployed in Katanga as Tshombe’s private army. These mercenaries opposed and fought UN forces in the province that were trying to re-integrate Katanga. Largely paid for out of the Katangan budget – 1,977.8 million Katangese Francs in 1962 was spent on mercenaries – this force was initially composed of French and Belgians (who deservedly earned the sobriquet les affreux) but by 1961 the focus of recruitment had shifted from Paris and Brussels to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Seeing Tshombe as a bulwark for the whites of the CAF, Welensky, despite repeated requests from London and the UN, failed to halt the recruitment of mercenaries in Salisbury and Bulawayo. Not just the UN but also the local press commented on the recruitment drives for mercenaries in Southern Rhodesia after 1960. Often done out of hotel bars, this recruitment seems to have included ex-Rhodesian army personnel. Indeed, two Rhodesian Light Infantry soldiers, Firth and Damer, picked up by the UN in Katanga, claimed they had had no
trouble getting past the CAF border authorities. As the British Consul in Katanga concluded: 'It would seem reasonable to ask the military authorities in Rhodesia to place Katanga out of bounds to their personnel on leave, in present circumstances. Firth and Damer held leave passes from their commanding officer and assured me that they had come here with his knowledge.'

The Congolese authorities, other African states and the UN repeatedly blamed the Rhodesians for the mercenary problem. The UN mission to the Congolese Foreign Minister reported back in 1961 how: 'On se rappellera que le capitaine Wicks [a mercenary officer] était officier d'état-major du contingent de mercenaires sud-africains attachés à la Gendarmerie du Katanga et s'occupait activement de recruter des hommes pour ce contingent en Afrique du Sud et Rhodésie.' Two months later, another UN officer, Brian Urquhart, made similar comments that were passed back to the Foreign Office: '...he [Urquhart] had little doubt, in view of the volume of reports reaching the United Nations, that a good deal of questionable activity was indeed taking place on the Rhodesian side of the frontier.' The Nigerian Foreign Minister made the same point when he appeared on an American TV panel discussion in October 1961, articulating the view held by many newly independent African states on the CAF's involvement in Katanga.
Even British officials, some of whom felt sympathy with the whites of the CAF, noted the wilful nature of CAF activities in Katanga. Thus, the British ambassador in the Congo in 1963 sent back a note to the Foreign Office on the issue of black gendarmes from Tshombe’s force who were using Northern Rhodesia as a safe-haven to escape Katanga:

I assumed that it [a reference to an exchange of telegrams] was an answer to the Central African Office’s telegram No.608 of November 30 and that what it was saying was that the Northern Rhodesian authorities have no intention of departing from their present practice in dealing with ex-gendarmes crossing the border from Katanga and are not prepared to go even so far as to make one or two token hand-overs to show they accept the Congolese position. If this is correct, it is very disappointing. The Congolese will not understand any more than I do, why armed intruders into Northern Rhodesian territory cannot be handed back to them; or if there are insuperable legal obstacles to that, why they cannot be warned in advance when and where the intruders are to be put across the border so that they can be on the other side to meet them. Refusal to go even this far would look to them at the best like overscrupulous legalism, and at the worst like deliberate connivance at rebellion.80

Even when the CAF authorities under pressure did restrict mercenary recruitment – as they did at times – this led to a temporary displacement of mercenary recruitment, usually to South Africa, and all the while there was the question of overly lax visa controls that allowed mercenaries from South Africa and Europe to pass unhindered through the Federation, using it as a convenient transit point for travel to Katanga.81 When responding to reports of Belgians passing through the CAF, the latter professed that it could nothing to stop anyone who had legal travel documents from
transiting the Federation. However, further British reports showed that the Rhodesians were allowing passengers travelling with the Belgian airline Sabena to land at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia close to the Katanga border without visas. As one CRO official concluded, if the CAF confirmed that this was the case: ‘...there will now be virtually no control over the possible entry of mercenaries into Katanga via the Federation and that the present arrangement whereby all transit visa applications are referred to Salisbury, appears to be valueless.’ There is also evidence that the CAF colluded with Belgian and UMHK officials over mercenary recruitment and passage to Katanga. For instance, it was reported that recruitment in Salisbury was carried out by one Monsieur Bogard, a former employee of UMHK. Moreover, Marcel Hambursen, a Belgian industrialist from Namur responsible for mercenary recruitment – for which the French authorities sentenced him to a year in jail – travelled without any hindrance through the CAF on his trips to and from Katanga.

The forward staging post and safe-haven for the mercenaries was the Northern Rhodesian town of Ndola close to the Katangan border. It is perhaps for this reason that so many conspiracy theories emerged when Hammarskjöld died in September 1961 in an aeroplane crash near the town. After all, as UN Secretary General, he was flying into one of the main centres of opposition to the UN operation to re-integrate Katanga. Not just English-speaking mercenaries, but French soldiers-of-fortune such
as Colonel Trinquie
t used Ndola as a convenient meeting point when liaising with Katangan officials from Tshome’s ministry. The United States Military Attaché in Leopoldville, after noting the presence of suspicious aircraft at Ndola airfield, had breakfast in the airport canteen. At an adjoining table were ‘...eight or nine Europeans of whom some were wearing Katanga emblems. Three of these he recognised as having been pointed out to him on a previous occasion by Colonel Egge [of the UN force in the Congo] as being ex-mercenaries. Some of this group left the table saying that they now had to catch the aircraft to Kolwezi. The conversation was in French.’

The reference to warplanes at Ndola tallies with UN reports accusing the CAF of using Ndola as an air base for Katangan warplanes: ‘In this regard I might call to your attention that although Sir Roy has vigorously tried to explain away the crossing of the 48 jeeps at Kipushi, he has never made any public reference to the activities of the Dornier aircraft based at Ndola and piloted by one Mr. Wickstead – probably because the evidence we presented was too convincing for Sir Roy to deny.’ The capture in Katanga in September 1961 of the landlord of Ndola’s Elephant and Castle public house, a Mr Catchpole, by UN forces during a major sweep against mercenary forces further weakened CAF claims that Ndola was not a mercenary base.

Kipushi airfield that straddled the Katangan-Northern Rhodesian border was the next stop on the route in and out of Katanga after Ndola. As one mercenary recalled, he
and his comrades 'flew regularly' between the two towns.\textsuperscript{91} UN reports give credence to the Ndola-Kipushi link:

Further information received from Elisabethville gives additional evidence that Ndola Airport is being used as a recruiting and forwarding point for mercenaries returning to Katanga.\textsuperscript{92} Evidence received from a number of independent and reliable sources leaves little room for doubt that both recruitment of mercenaries and provisioning of supplies to the Katangese forces are being organised along the Rhodesian border. These sources have also confirmed the entry into Katanga of considerable numbers of Rhodesian and other mercenaries across the frontier at Kipushi.\textsuperscript{92}

Moreover, the CAF authorities deceived Alport, Britain's High Commissioner, over the facilities at Kipushi. Alport complained that he was never told about improvements to the landing facilities at Kipushi, nor alerted to the fact that camouflaged aeroplanes were visible on the Katangan side of the landing strip. It was also the case, as Alport recalled, that the CAF authorities exerted no control over the arrival and departure of flights: 'I said [to Welensky] that I was gravely concerned at what appeared to be a serious breach of faith and that the evidence I possessed seemed to show that there was collusion between the Federal Army and the Katanga Authorities.\textsuperscript{92} I said that while I was not inferring that either he or Parry had deliberately misled us, it was clear that the orders he had given in my presence [to block Kipushi airfield] were not being carried out and that the consequences could be very serious for the reputation of the Federal Government.\textsuperscript{93}
The CAF also became a conduit for supplies and *matériel* going to and from Katanga. American intelligence reports noted the passage through the CAF of military equipment, mercenaries and advisers bound for Katanga; also the fact that the Federation provided Katanga with a vital transhipment route for its imports and exports. Tshombe's agents bought Land Rovers, small vehicles, lorries and small arms in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Angola. The easiest way to get this equipment to Katanga was via Northern Rhodesia and the movement of military convoys was a frequent topic for discussion. U Thant, Hammarskjöld's successor as UN Secretary-General, commented on reports that forty vehicles armed with machine guns and driven by mercenaries had crossed the CAF border into Katanga. This probably stemmed from an earlier statement by the Congolese Foreign Minister who protested ‘...énergiquement contre le fait que les autorités de la Fédération Rhodésie et Nyassaland aient permis le transit de matériels et d'armes au Katanga...Il relève le fait que ces autorités viennent encore de permettre à 48 jeeps pilotées par des mercenaires européens de franchir la frontière du Katanga.’ Alport went to see Welensky to discuss the issue of the convoys transiting CAF territory to and from Katanga:

When I saw Welensky yesterday to report on my visit to Ndola and to thank him for the facilities provided for me by the Federal Government, I took the opportunity of emphasising to him the grave consequences which might arise if there was any suspicion that any military material, weapons or personnel were reaching Katanga from the Federation during the next few days while the negotiations at Kitona were in progress. I told him that I was not rrt not
satisfied with the public explanations which had been given respecting the convoy of 15-20 lorries which crossed into Katanga by night some days ago. I said that while I knew that some of the lorries were meat lorries, as alleged by the Federal Government, others were reported to me as being painted in Katanga Army colours carrying goods of an undefined character, and had been taken over by Katanga Army drivers on the Katanga side of the frontier.\textsuperscript{96}

Commenting on the differences between the Federal and Territorial administrations in the CAF, Alport's view was that Welensky – despite efforts by the Northern Rhodesian Governor – had no intention of closing the border and 'anyhow the presence of an active enforcement system might cramp a lot of people's style.'\textsuperscript{99} As Alport noted, at Kipushi, 'local relations with Katangese and Union Miniere personnel are perhaps a shade too cordial.'\textsuperscript{100} The UN also charged the CAF with assembling seven Fouga Magister jets smuggled in from Europe and bound for Katanga at the airbase at Ndola. According to the UN, Katangan forces also quickly made good any losses in equipment after engagements with UN forces from military stocks in the CAF.\textsuperscript{101} Considering these reports, U Thant, in January 1962, addressed the UN Advisory Committee on Congo on the issue of the porous nature of the CAF frontier with Katanga:

I have asked you to come to this meeting for three main reasons: (a) I wish to consult you about the replies I have received to my request to the governments of the United Kingdom and Portugal that observers be stationed along the frontiers of Rhodesia and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic with Katanga, about which you have already seen something in the press...Here I might say that this approach was made because we finally had some concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side, which we immediately presented to the British government and which Sir
Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as gracious.  

Alongside the covert military support afforded Katanga, Welensky launched a diplomatic offensive in support of Tshombe’s Katanga. This came mainly in the form of increasingly strident correspondence with London. In a series of letters to the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, Welensky emphasised the dangers facing Tshombe, pointing out that if he fell from power, ‘the alternatives are too frightful to contemplate. Surely the time has come for the West...to exert its influence to retrieve the situation.’ Unwilling to ‘stand idly by and watch Mr. Tshombe destroyed...if he is in danger of being destroyed by Afro-Asian pressures masquerading as United Nations operations I shall do everything in my power to assist his survival’, Welensky questioned whether the British government had fallen for the Afro-Asian line that Tshombe was a Belgian puppet. While many UN personnel were convinced that Britain’s opposition to the use of force to defeat Tshombe was thinly disguised support for Tshombe, Britain never openly supported Katangan independence or a political union of the province with the CAF. Such a move ran counter to the thrust of British colonial policy and could have led to greater expense and commitment in Africa. It would also have gone against the wishes of the UN and the Americans, both of whom wanted to preserve a united pro-Western Congo. Britain vacillated over Katanga as it tried to safeguard its investments in the mining
concerns of Katanga without, however, becoming directly involved.\textsuperscript{106} There was certainly an element of ambivalence to British policy toward the Congo. Thus, on 15 July 1960, less than two weeks after Katanga’s secession, Macmillan passed on a message to Welensky informing him that if Tshombe were able to sustain his independence, ‘ad hoc recognition would probably have to be considered.’ But as the Prime Minister added, it was important that neither Britain nor the CAF should give any grounds for an accusation that they were assisting in the break up the Congo.\textsuperscript{107} Britain’s willingness to join with Salisbury, Brussels and Lisbon in protesting at UN actions, along with its blocking of over-fly rights for UN warplanes that needed to cross British East Africa to get to Katanga, seemed to give substance to the charge that Britain was helping Katanga.\textsuperscript{108} It is true that elements in the British establishment worked to support the CAF, something that is noted in the secondary literature, but the prevailing mood in London was that Welensky and the CAF should work to preserve a united Congo.\textsuperscript{109} John Profumo, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in July 1960, when confronted with Sir Charles Waterhouse, a director of the UMHK and someone keen to interest Britain in Tshombe’s break-away state, made it clear why Britain opposed secession, pointing to the advantages of a wider settlement that kept the Congo together, as a ‘state truncated of its richest province would become just the sort of African slum in which communism would be most likely to take root.’\textsuperscript{110} A few months later, in September 1960, Macmillan echoed Profumo’s
worry, pointing out that Katangan secession would turn a large tract of Africa into 'a kind of Africa slum...wide open to Communist penetration'.

The generally hostile atmosphere in London towards Katangan secession did not deter Welensky, using his semi-autonomous position in Salisbury, from trying, unsuccessfully, to convince Whitehall that it should provide more help for Katanga. On 30 August 1961, after the launch of the first UN operation – 'Rumpunch' – designed to extend its influence in Katanga against Tshombe's gendarmes and mercenaries, Welensky stood up in the Salisbury Parliament and accused the organisation of trying to subjugate the province by force, assuring MPs that he would take 'necessary measures' to help the Katangan people who, 'regardless of race, stood up like heroes'. The following day, the British Vice-Consul in Elisabethville, who also represented the interests of the CAF, read the text of Welensky's speech to Tshombe in a clear show of support for Katanga. Welensky, however, failed in his attempts to get Britain to honour its pledges to stop the UN using force in Katanga. While unable to check the UN's move to military action, the CAF did all it could to help Katanga short of direct military intervention. This support included the production of propaganda material such as a booklet published for public consumption that detailed UN atrocities against white settlers in Katanga. Designed to paint as negative a picture as possible of the UN force in Katanga, the booklet
included statements of the rape of male and female settlers in Katanga by marauding UN soldiers.\textsuperscript{115}

While African and Asian states strongly supported the UN’s Operation ‘Rumpunch’, Welensky’s response was to mobilise troops, armoured cars and warplanes, supposedly because of the serious threat to Rhodesian security. As he stated in Parliament in Salisbury: “...nothing so disgraceful in the whole history of international organisation” had ever happened before.\textsuperscript{116} The mobilisation of Rhodesia’s armed forces along the Katangan border was a show of military support for Tshombe.\textsuperscript{117} To back up his threat to use force, on 13 September 1961, Welensky moved Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) warplanes to Ndola. With the RRAF went troops, including Rhodesian Light Infantry units, and Selous Scouts armoured formations.\textsuperscript{118} Welensky also issued a warning that if the UN tried to use Sabre jets in Katanga the RRAF would be forced to retaliate if, as Welensky believed was inevitable, the UN Sabre jets violated CAF airspace.\textsuperscript{119} The military build-up was apparent to visitors to the CAF. Bengt Rosio, the Swedish Consul-General in Leopoldville, on a visit to Northern Rhodesia found a ‘raw hatred’ of the UN and roads ‘absolutely jammed’ with heavy army vehicles.\textsuperscript{120} The support given to the Katangans by the CAF might even have extended to the use of bases inside Northern Rhodesia: in 1961, the US State Department reported that Tshombe’s forces were using Kipushi airfield, which straddled the Katanga-Northern Rhodesia border, for
logistical support, movement of soldiers and as a safe-haven for their warplanes, something that Welensky vehemently denied.\textsuperscript{121}

The mobilisation of CAF military units failed to cow the UN from taking action in Katanga in late 1961 and 1962. Welensky’s armed forces were too weak militarily to provide Tshombe with direct military support, and with Britain unwilling to provide more than fitful diplomatic support, Welensky watched from the sidelines as UN troops deployed for battle with Tshombe’s mercenary led army. Furious at the deployment of UN forces in Katanga in September 1961, Welensky informed the parliament in Salisbury: ‘What has happened in Elisabethville today is the law of the jungle. The right of the biggest to impose his will on the smallest...A government that is out of step can be made to toe the line. If not it can, upon a pretext, be taken over by the Secretariat of the United Nations.’\textsuperscript{122} Welensky did what he could to help Belgian settlers escaping the war in Katanga.\textsuperscript{123} He also agreed to a secret FISB-organised military operation, opposed by Britain, in which Rhodesian forces infiltrated into Katanga to help Tshombe leave the province. They also, it seems, took Tshombe’s gold reserve back to Salisbury for him.\textsuperscript{124} But direct military intervention was impossible. Thus, from 1963 to 1965, with the ascendancy of the UN in Katanga, the CAF, with assistance from the Portuguese authorities in Angola and from South Africa, intensified its policy of destabilising the Congo by supporting mercenary forces.
Following defeat at the hands of the UN in late 1961 and 1962, the mercenary force in Katanga gradually dissolved. Some of the mercenaries, such as Bob Denard, after escaping to Angola went off to fight other wars (in Denard’s case, in the Yemen). Many, however, decamped to eastern Angola where they ‘signed on’ with the Portuguese; others like Jean (or Jacques) Schramme simply remained in Angola alongside over a thousand Katangan gendarmes, all awaiting orders from Tshombe. The Portuguese authorities willingly provided a safe-haven for the mercenaries and gendarmes from Katanga. Portugal had supplied arms – including warplanes – for the mercenaries using Luso (now Luena) as a forward base, so it came as no surprise that mercenaries and gendarmes could settle unmolested in eastern Angola after their defeat in Katanga. Indeed, Portuguese trawlers shipped mercenaries from South Africa to the Congo via Angola in 1964. The mercenaries also took as much heavy military equipment with them as they could to Angola.

Using eastern Angola and Northern Rhodesia as their base, mercenaries who had been ejected from the Congo by the UN regrouped and re-equipped with Rhodesian and Portuguese help. As the British embassy in the Congo noted following information delivered by a secret source:

I am afraid there is growing evidence that we must take seriously the possibility that Tshombe, with help from outside sources (particularly
Rhodesian and Portuguese) is organising a force of ex-mercenarys and Katangan gendarmes in Eastern Angola. The entry of fairly large bodies of ex-gendarmes into Northern Rhodesia also seems to show that there is some guiding hand at work. Maybe I am building more into this than is warranted but I cannot help feeling that it would be only prudent for us to consider whether there is not evidence to show that certain elements in Southern Rhodesia together with the Portuguese and Tshombe are acting in concert to constitute an armed force in Eastern Angola for eventual use in Katanga. The Congolese know that the ex-mercenarys and ex-gendarmes are using Northern Rhodesia as a bolt-hole. On November 10 Ilovo gave Bill Wilson a list of ex-mercenarys (Michel Bloch, Robert Lefebvre, Barthier, Schramme, Bob Denard, Vluyen) who were thought to be using Northern Rhodesia as a base for their activities. I can only say that if we or rather the Government of Northern Rhodesia not only fail to expel these ex-mercenarys we shall be seen to the Congolese and African nationalists in general to be aiding and abetting Tshombe and the colonialists.

In 1962-3, Tshombe built up, maintained and paid for a mercenary force for future use in the Congo, a force which had "...tentacles in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and in Angola." Before 1963, the FISB had forged links with both Portuguese Africa and South Africa. These included extra-territorial joint CAF-Portuguese operations in places such as Dar-es-Salaam. The Angola operation utilised these connections, allowing the CAF and the Portuguese to co-ordinate activities across Northern Rhodesia and Angola. As the British Consul General in Angola saw on a visit to Cavungo in eastern Angola, the Northern Rhodesian police had cordial relations with their counterparts in Angola and a tradition of cross-border cooperation. Portuguese officials and British and American missionaries stressed "...the close and easy relations previously maintained between the Cazombo
territory and Northern Rhodesia, referring among other things to visits made to the Angolan side by Northern Rhodesian police officials.\textsuperscript{136}

South Africa’s role in Katanga is less well documented. Before 1962, it had been one of the sources for weapons supplied to the mercenaries fighting in Katanga.\textsuperscript{135} Bob de Quehen of the FISB encouraged Welensky to push the South African leader, Hendrik Verwoerd, to create an organisation like the FISB that would be able to impress on Verwoerd the importance of South African involvement in Katanga.\textsuperscript{136} It is not clear whether he was successful. Certainly, the South African police did little or nothing to stop the recruitment and passage of mercenaries for Katanga and the Congo.\textsuperscript{137} Senior South African army personnel such as Brigadier Jan Robertse and Commandant WP Louw had talks with Tshombe’s contact in South Africa.\textsuperscript{138} In addition, South Africa provided the mercenaries with equipment such as boots and had expressed a willingness to supply other material, an offer rescinded after a ‘…returning South African mercenary had made indiscreet remarks about the extent to which the South African Government were helping No.5 Commando.’\textsuperscript{139}

In July 1964, by which time UN troops had left the Congo, Tshombe was back in power as the Prime Minister of a government of national reconciliation in the Congo, a post he held until October 1965, when he was replaced by the pro-Western Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko). Once in power in Leopoldville, he recalled
his gendarmes from exile to suppress a rebellion by pro-Lumumba forces in eastern Congo around the city of Stanleyville. To support the black troops attacking Stanleyville, he built up a strong force of at least 400 white mercenaries using the existing cadre in Angola plus new mercenaries recruited in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In August 1964, Tshombe's force, led by English-speaking commanders such as Mike Hoare at the head of Five Commando, attacked eastern Congo assisted by Belgian paratroopers dropped from US-supplied aeroplanes. As with the Katanga operation of 1961, the mercenaries had been openly recruited in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa before flying to Kamina in the Congo for training. As British embassy staff in Pretoria noted, under direction from Tshombe in Leopoldville, South-African recruiting offices enlisted hundreds of recruits in late 1964 and early 1965: 'Captain Eric Bridges, in charge of Johannesburg Recruiting Office, has told Press that he has orders from Leopoldville to launch a new drive for 300 South African mercenaries and have them ready for transportation to Congo within a month. He added that almost all new recruiting would be in South Africa although there might also be a little in Salisbury.' The mercenaries from South Africa - using Jan Smuts airport in Johannesburg - flew with a Rhodesian commercial airline via Salisbury to the Congo; at the same time, Rhodesian banks channelled the mercenaries' pay. The British embassy in Leopoldville reported that the vast majority of the mercenaries used by Tshombe in 1964-5 had Southern Rhodesian or South African passports, ignoring the fact that Tshombe also used
French-speaking mercenaries in the fighting in 1964-5 in eastern Congo. Britain could do little to stop the 'continuing supply programme' that Southern Rhodesia ran for the mercenaries in 1964-5, knowing that this would be viewed by Welensky as evidence of a 'pusillanimous' approach to the Congo and so ignored. Indeed, as late as 1976, Welensky could be found helping a friend who wanted to serve as a mercenary with the Rhodesians in their counter-insurgency war against black insurgents.

In 1961, a resident of Northern Rhodesia had written to Welensky assuring him that neither he nor his white neighbours had any doubt that '...the White Kaffirs of the British Government have betrayed us. Let us now for the love of God have the "Boston Tea Party."' This was a sentiment echoed by Welensky who, in 1963, the year that the CAF collapsed, wrote to a friend explaining that if the British government '...think I'm throwing up the sponge they have another thing coming. I'm determined to do everything I can to see Southern Rhodesia get its independence. That to me is now priority number one.' Welensky and the white settlers of the CAF had their 'Boston Tea Party' when, in 1965, Southern Rhodesia – now led by Ian Smith whose Rhodesian Front party had ousted Welensky from power in 1964 – issued its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This began a long struggle to preserve white rule in Rhodesia, a conflict that continued until the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980, an event witnessed by Welensky who retired from politics in
1965 and lived until 1991. As this article has attempted to show, the military and political struggle against black rule in the region began in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the whites of the CAF supported the Belgians and Tshombe in Katanga and the Congo; after 1965, this fight against black rule moved from the Congo to the borders of Southern Rhodesia.


2 Alan James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) p.xvi.

4 Information courtesy of Professors Małyn Newitt and Patrick Chabal, Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies, King’s College London. The work on Portugal tends to concentrate on the counter-insurgency campaigns in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau from the late 1960s, after the period examined in this article. An example of this is Ian Beckett, ‘The Portuguese Army: The Campaign in Mozambique, 1964-74’ in Ian Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St Martins, 1985). In French see the excellent collection by Jules Gérard-Libois et al (eds), Congo 1959-1965 (Brussels: Dossiers du Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politiques [CRISP], 1960-66).


6 For accusations of skulduggery in Hammarskjöld’s death see Home to Welensky, 34 October 1961 in Welensky papers, Bodleian Library (Rhodes House) Oxford, 259/1 (all references to the Welensky papers in this article are from those in the Bodleian library unless otherwise stated). Macmillan told Welensky: ‘It is hard indeed that you should have to endure suggestions from various quarters that Hammarskjöld’s death was in some way brought about by a plot organised by us, for which you provided the means’ (from Macmillan to Welensky; 29 September 1961 in National Archives London (incorporating the Public Records Office) (hereafter PRO): PREM1/4049). That Hammarskjöld’s death might not be an accident was widely discussed in the press at the time and continues to attract interest: George van Smith, ‘Mercenaries accused of killing Hammarskjold’, The Observer, 18 May 1980; Harry Debelius, ‘Thombe linked with Hammarskjöld death’, The Times, 2 February 1982; David Pallister, ‘Mercenaries blamed for death of UN head in air crash in Northern Rhodesia’, The Guardian, 11 September 1992; Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘Foul play on the Albertina’, The Guardian, 25 September 1992; letter to The Guardian from George Ivan Smith, 30 September 1992; letter to The Guardian from Bernt Rosio, 13 March 1993; Michael Evans, ‘West “plotted to kill” UN chief, The Times, 20 August 1998; Carol Coulter, ‘O’Brien dismisses Hammarskjold plot’, The Irish Times, 21 August 1998; Conor

7 For a recent discussion of this see Matthew Hughes, Diary, London Review of Books, 22/15, 9 August 2001, 32-3.

8 While Belgium formally made the decision to withdraw from the Congo in January 1960, new policy initiatives in the late 1950s were a portent of the decision to quit the Congo in 1960. Belgian officials, civil and military, and Belgian civilians continued to work, reside and direct events in the Congo after the formal withdrawal in June 1960.

9 Murphy, “Intelligence and Decolonisation”, JCH, 104.


12 Summary of the Memorial “1906-1956” issued by Union Minière du Haut-Katanga on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary’ (1957) p.5.

13 See TCUM 98 Unites Lubumbashi 1928 and TC.22 Union Miniere (in the latter especially Tanganyika Concessions to Count Guy de Baillot Lateur of UMHK, 16 June 1933; Representative of Tanganyika Concessions to Scotland, 19 January 1933; and UMHK AGM of shareholders, 8 July 1935) in Tanganyika Concessions Group Archive, John Rylands Library, University of Manchester.


15 James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, p.31.

16 James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, p.xii. See also White, ‘The business and politics of decolonisation’, EHR, 553.


19 Norman Pollock, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia: Corridor to the North (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 1971) p.408.

20 Hempstone, Katanga Report, p.50.

21 Fisher, Macleod, p.142.

23 Fisher, Ian Macleod, p.158. The war in Algeria and the ‘Mau Mau’ Emergency in Kenya further reinforced the change in thinking in Whitehall on colonial possessions.

24 Gérard-Libois, Kenyangan Secession, p.175.


27 For Welensky’s support for NATO-style pact see memorandum, 22 December 1959 in PRO: CO968/699.


29 Memorandum by Welensky, 22 December 1959 in PRO: CAB21/3175.

30 Memorandum by Welensky, 22 December 1959 in PRO: CAB21/3175.

31 Memorandum by Welensky, 22 December 1959 in PRO: CAB21/3175. See also AT (FED) 14, 31 December 1959, Prime Minister’s Visit to Africa January 1960, Sir R Welensky’s Proposal for an African Defence Pact, Additional Brief by the CRO in PRO: CAB21/3175.


33 Note of a conversation between Sir Roy Welensky and Dr Salazar, 29 November 1958 in PRO: FO371/131639. See also Welensky in Macmillan, 22 December 1959 in PRO: CAB21/3175.

34 Notes of a meeting between Welensky and Prime Minister, 9 May 1960 in PRO: PREM/1/3683.


34 Cutting from The Times, 9 March 1960 in PRO: FO371/146632.

39 Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p.57.

40 Report by a British SIS officer (MI6), 11 December 1959 entitled ‘Notes on a Visit to Africa in PRO: PREM1/2585.


42 Cutting from the Echo du Katanga, 4 March 1960 in PRO: FO371/146630. See also Smith papers, Bodleian library Oxford, MSSEng c.6490, ff.102-3 (pp.29-30).

43 Smith papers, Bodleian library Oxford, MSSEng c.6490, ff.102-3 (pp.29-30).


45 Cutting of ‘Katanga to link with Federation’, Rhodesia Herald, 2 March 1960 in Welensky papers, 262/7.

46 ‘There’s going to be hell because I’ve told you this - Rene MacColl interviews Sir Roy Welensky’, Daily Express, 2 March 1960.


48 Gérard-Libois, Katangan Secession, pp.36-7.

49 Note on parliamentary question by The Viscount Stansgate on report of a political association between Katanga and Rhodesian Federation, 8-9 March 1960, Government’s response to question to be given by Viscount Halliford on 9 March 1960 in PRO: FO371/146631.


Wood, Welensky Papers, p.728.

22 Iain Macleod to Prime Minister, 13 July 1960 in PRO: PREM/11/2831/182-5. For similar see also PRO: CO1015/2224.


25 Alport to Sir Sackville Garner [CRF], 5 January 1962 in Alport papers, University of Essex (hereafter UoE), box 18, file 3.

26 Wood, Welensky Papers, p.797.

27 Details in PRO: FCO36/54.


29 Wood, Welensky Papers, p.801.

30 Cabinet Minutes of Federal Cabinet, FGC(60) 27th Meeting. Conclusions of a Special Meeting held in the Prime Minister’s Room on 12th July, 1960. Welensky, Barrow, Coldicott, Owen, Goldberg and Graylin present in Welensky papers, 110/3.


33 Message to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations from the Federal Prime Minister - handed to High Commissioner in Salisbury, 14 July 1960 in Welensky papers, 258/4.

34 Note on opposition question in the Lords on 14 July 1960 on how Welensky would use his forces in Welensky papers, 258/4.

35 In August 1960, in response to appeals from Tshombe for military support, the Salisbury government vacillated, worried that any overt flow of arms would soon become common knowledge and so discredit the CAF in the international arena (from Barrow, Minister for Home Affairs, CAF to Macmillan following conversation with Tshombe’s special envoy, M. Onckellinx, 31 August 1960 in Welensky papers, 258/4).


Clarke, *Congo Mercenaries*, ch.3 & p.32.

Clarke, *Congo Mercenaries*, p.34.

Extracts from Sunday Mail (9 April 1961) and Herald (10 April) enclosed in High Commission (Salisbury) to CRO, 10 April 1961 in PRO: FO371/154997.


DMH Riches (Leopoldville) to FO, 26 September 1961 in PRO: FO371/155002.


UK Mission at UN to KM Wilford at the FO, 3 October 1961 in PRO: FO371/155002.


EM Rost (British Embassy Leopoldville) to GE Millard (FO), 6 December 1963 in PRO: FO371/167303.


DMH Riches (Leopoldville, British Embassy) to EB Brookby, FO, 12 January 1962 in PRO: FO371/161533.

HRE Browne (CRO London) to DA Scott (Salisbury) 30 August 1962 in PRO: FO371/161535.

Riches (Leopoldville) to FO, 7 October 1961 in PRO: FO371/155002.


UK Mission at UN to FO, 30 September 1961 in PRO: FO371/155002.

AEP Robinson, High Commissioner, Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Home, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 10 January 1962 in PRO: FO371/161/532. The UN report Robinson quoted from (albeit with some very minor


40 RW Jones (British Consulate Elisabethville) to JH Ure (British Embassy Leopoldville) and ICC Alexander (FO), 6 November 1962 in PRO: FO371/161536.

41 Extract from UN report in UK Mission at UN to FO, 3 October 1961 in PRO: FO371/155002.

42 Alport to London, 12 December 1961 in Alport papers, UoE, box 18, file 4


44 FO to UK Mission at UN, 10 October 1962 in PRO: FO371/161555.

45 U Thant to Sir Patrick Dean, British representative at UN passed to Welensky, 1 January 1962 in Welensky papers, 259/2.

46 Congolese Foreign Minister to British Embassy in Leopoldville, 27 December 1961 in PRO: FO371/155003.

47 Alport to Secretary of State, 20 December [1961?] in Alport papers, UoE, box 18, file 4.

48 Alport to Secretary of State, 20 December [1961?] in Alport papers, UoE, box 18, file 4.

49 Alport to CRO, 14 December 1961 in Alport papers, UoE, box 18, file 4.

50 UN Katanga Command Report, 30 December 1961 in Welensky papers, 259/3.


52 Welensky to Macmillan, 23 January 1961 in Welensky papers, 258/5. See also Welensky to Dominions Office by way of Commonwealth Relations Office for attention of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 2 September 1961 in PRO: DO158/68.

53 Welensky to Home, 21 April 1961 in Welensky papers, 258/5.

54 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p.258.

55 Ciarke, Congo Mercenary, p.34.


111 Macmillan to Barrow, Minister for Home Affairs, CAF, 10 September 1960 in Welensky papers, 258/4.


113 Abi-Saab, _The United Nations Operation in the Congo_, p.132.

114 Welensky to Robinson, CAF High Commissioner in London for Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 31 August 1961 in Welensky papers, 258/6.


119 Cutting of 'Points to emphasise for Daily Express', September 1961 in Welensky papers, 262/2.

120 Smith papers, Bodleian library, Msaling-c.6490. F.115 (p.42).

121 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium, 1 December 1961 in Schwar (ed.), _FRUS_, p.255. For denial see Welensky to Robinson, CAF High Commissioner, London for Macmillan, 7 December 1961 in Welensky papers, 259/1.

123 On help for refugees, see Belgian Consul General in Salisbury (Jacques Heward) to Edgar Whitehead (Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia), 1 August 1960 in Whitehead papers, Bodleian Library (Rhodes House) Oxford, MS. Afr.s. 1482/2e.


125 Clark, Congo Mercenaries, p. 33.

126 Moelker, Mercenaries, pp. 170-1.

127 JC Wardrop (British Consulate-General, Lusaka) to PM Foster (FO), 20 February 1963 in PRO: FO371/167281.

128 Pretoria Embassy to FO, 4 September 1964 in PRO: FO371/176716.

129 Assistant Commissioner E Leighton (Northern Rhodesian Special Branch, Lusaka) to Permanent Secretary Office of the Prime Minister, 8 May 1964 in PRO: FO371/176733.

130 EM Rose (British Embassy, Leopoldville) to GE Millard (FO), 29 November 1963 in PRO: FO371/167303. For the FO response (and note about secret source) see Memorandum entitled ‘Mercenaries in Angola’ by GE Millard (FO), 5 December 1963 in PRO: FO371/167303.

131 British Embassy, Leopoldville to FO, 5 March 1964 in PRO: FO371/176732.

132 Murphy, Intelligence and Decolonisation, JCH, 117.

133 BM de Quehen to Welensky, 17 July 1962 in Welensky papers, 239/2.


135 Alport to Secretary of State, 20 December [19617] in Alport papers, UoE, box 18, file 4.

136 BM de Quehen to Welensky, 2 August 1962 in Welensky papers, 239/2.


138 Pretoria Embassy to FO, 4 September 1964 in PRO: FO371/176716.


140 Kall, The Congo Cables, p. 378.

141 For an account of Mike Hoare’s time in the Congo in 1964-5 see Hoare, Congo Mercenary (London: Robert Hale, 1967) (later reprinted with the title of Mercenary) and Hoare, The Road to Katangatia: A Congo Mercenary’s Personal Memoir (London: Cooper, 1989). Hoare also served in Katanga in 1961-2 and an account of the Katanga operation can


143 McKeown, Mercenaries, p.174. See also FO to British Embassy Leopoldville, 4 August 1964 in PRO: FO371/176716.

144 Pretoria to Foreign Office, 6 January 1965 in PRO: FO371/181705.


146 British Embassy Leopoldville to FO, 1 August 1964 in PRO: FO371/176716. See also British Embassy Leopoldville to FO, 25 November 1964 in PRO: FO371/176717.

147 Telegram Salisbury (High Commission) to CRO (copied to FO), 4 August 1964 in PRO: FO371/176716.


150 Welensky to Lt-Col The O’Donovan, 16 April 1963 in Welensky papers, British library, Add.Mss.71586.