Catch-22 in a signalling game
Carmichael, F 2002, 'Catch-22 in a signalling game' , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 158 (3) , pp. 375-392.Full text not available from this repository.
In this paper signals are observed by two receivers who have different preferences about the sender and therefore respond to information about him in different ways. This can result in a Catch-22 for the sender; if he sends a signal to induce a positive response from one receiver, this may induce a negative response from the other. The problem is modelled as a three player game and the analysis shows that the Catch-22 can be resolved but only when there are three possibilities with respect to the sender's disposition or the initial probabilities relating to the sender's type are equal.
|Themes:||Subjects / Themes > H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
Subjects outside of the University Themes
|Schools:||?? sch_sbs ??|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics|
|Depositing User:||H Kenna|
|Date Deposited:||16 Oct 2007 13:13|
|Last Modified:||27 Sep 2011 12:29|
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