Ethics for things

Adam, AE 2008, 'Ethics for things' , Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3) , pp. 149-154.

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Abstract

This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.

Item Type:	Article
Themes:	Media, Digital Technology and the Creative Economy
Schools:	Schools > School of Health and Society > Centre for Applied Research in Health, Welfare and Policy
Journal or Publication Title:	Ethics and Information Technology
Publisher:	Kluwer
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	1388-1957
Depositing User:	AE Adam
Date Deposited:	04 Nov 2011 16:59
Last Modified:	07 Apr 2018 23:41
URI:	http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/18862

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