Adam, AE 2008, 'Ethics for things' , Ethics and Information Technology, 10 (2-3) , pp. 149-154.
![]() |
PDF
- Published Version
Restricted to Repository staff only Download (185kB) |
Abstract
This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ‘as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ‘moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Themes: | Media, Digital Technology and the Creative Economy |
Schools: | Schools > School of Health and Society > Centre for Applied Research in Health, Welfare and Policy |
Journal or Publication Title: | Ethics and Information Technology |
Publisher: | Kluwer |
Refereed: | Yes |
ISSN: | 1388-1957 |
Depositing User: | AE Adam |
Date Deposited: | 04 Nov 2011 16:59 |
Last Modified: | 07 Apr 2018 23:41 |
URI: | http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/18862 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
Edit record (repository staff only) |