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Uneasy Intelligence Collaboration, Genuine Ill Will, with an Admixture of Ideology: The British Military Mission to the Soviet Union, 1941-5

Alaric Searle

Although until recently historians have only shown limited interest in the history of military advising, some attention has been devoted to the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union, 1941-5. Nonetheless, much of what has been written is incomplete and tends to concentrate on Britain’s Military Mission No. 30 within the wider context of diplomatic and intelligence relations with the Soviet Union. The most important study covering the mission examines its role in intelligence exchange with the Soviet military together with the United States Military Mission in Moscow. But, unfortunately, there has hitherto been no single attempt to provide a complete history of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union. Moreover, considering the diverging judgments which have been passed on the mission in the available literature, our understanding of its successes, failures, and leading personalities, still remains confused. This is particularly so in the case of Bradley F. Smith’s study, Sharing Secrets with Stalin, which at times appears dismissive and patronizing towards the British mission, yet in some places also suggests it was fairly successful in gleaning intelligence.

If a number of historical question marks still surround Britain’s Military Mission No. 30, one area in particular does not seem to have received the attention it deserves: that of ideology. A thorough examination of the documents available strongly suggests that ideology, and the suspicions which ideology generated, was probably the major factor dominating the relationship between the members of the military mission and the Russian military officers with whom they liaised during the course of the Great Patriotic War. There were, in fact, two ideologies within this relationship: on the one hand, Communism, or
Bolshevism as it was better known among members of the political and military elite in Britain; and, on the other, ‘anti-Bolshevism’, in many ways just as much an ideology as Communism. Not only did Red Army officers and Soviet officials take exception to the part previously played in the Allied intervention of 1919-20 by individuals with whom they were involved as part of wartime military cooperation, British officers, too, carried with them attitudes acquired immediately after the First World War.

In examining the relationship between members of a military mission and the ‘host officials’ with whom they cooperate, there are many factors which can be identified as exerting an influence on behavior. The British Military Mission to the Soviet Union had a number of aims and, as a component part of a broader policy to provide the country with military supplies, it certainly had its role to play in the war effort. However, without the element of ideology it is impossible to understand the officially defined goals of the mission, the positions adopted by the six heads of mission, the reactions of British officers and men to life in the USSR, and the policy disputes which arose in London over the role of the mission. Indeed, in any wider view of the history of military advising, it can be argued that ideology has been an important – yet underrated – factor which holds the potential to regulate the relations between a military mission and the host nation. This chapter is, therefore, as much a case study in the role of ideology in the activities of a military mission as it is, specifically, an analysis of Britain’s Military Mission No. 30 in the Soviet Union, 1941-5.

I

Important for any appreciation of British policy in relation to the military mission is quite obviously the general attitude of Britain’s armed services towards the Soviet Union during the interwar period. From the moment the Bolshevik revolution occurred, the military, together with the ruling political, diplomatic, and social elites, felt threatened by
Communism. The Bolshevik revolution was, though, but one head of a hydra of revolution: in addition to the Red threat, there was the problem of the Sinn Fein ‘revolutionaries’ in Ireland, and nationalist movements in India and the Middle East. These threats were on the one hand strategic: war at the backdoor in Ireland, the unstable situation in India, and the challenge of the Soviet Union to the Empire. But the ‘revolutionary movements’ of Bolshevism, militant Irish nationalism, and ‘Mohammedism’ all combined to generate a feeling of insecurity which was intensified in the early post-war years by a fear of Bolshevik revolution in Britain itself.⁸

Not surprisingly, relations with the Soviet Union were always going to be strained, so that even after Germany began serious rearmament in the mid-1930s hostility towards the USSR remained. That the First World War had left the British Empire overextended, with too many military commitments, a fact which became all too obvious in the 1930s,⁹ further increased the distaste of British officers for Bolshevism. A closer look at British strategic planning and talks with Soviet staff officers in the period from early 1939 until the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 makes plain just how strong this feeling was.

The attitude of the Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union in this period was characterized by political hostility and considerable professional skepticism towards Russian military capabilities. This dismissive attitude is reflected in an intelligence summary of information on the Red Army of November 1939 which concluded that the ‘consensus of opinion is that the value of the Red Army for war remains low’.¹⁰ However, despite all the negative assessments, there was still fear of a possible Soviet threat to British interests in the Middle East.¹¹ The full extent of this fear can be seen in a Chiefs of Staff Committee report for the War Cabinet dated 8 March 1940. One of the assumptions was, ‘Should Allied-Soviet hostilities commence... we must expect Germany to be ready to provide such military aid as the Soviet may be willing to accept.’ Although the final conclusions of the report rejected the
idea that Britain could assist the early defeat of Germany through action against Russia, it reflected the long-standing obsession with the danger from ‘the dissemination of subversive propaganda and the stirring up of disorder and rebellion’ by the USSR. It also made clear the signatories’ (C.L.N. Newall, Dudley Pound and Edmund Ironside) worries of possible threats to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.  

Following the disastrous defeat of the BEF in France in June 1940, there was no clear sign of a major turnaround in British military attitudes towards the Soviet Union, hardly surprising given that the USSR and Germany were still alliance partners, however unholy an alliance that may have been. The suggestion made in October 1940 by Russian officers that staff talks be conducted with the British did, however, lead to a positive though cautious response in the War Office. The final decision to send a military mission to the Soviet Union was, in fact, one to which Britain had been slowly drifting shortly before the Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa. In response to a request by the War Cabinet to give ‘preliminary consideration’ to dispatching a military mission, it was agreed at the 210th Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting held on 13 June 1941 that ‘if a Mission or Delegation were sent to Russia, all three Services should be represented on it’. The Chiefs of Staff Committee also instructed the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee to consider ‘the general principle of sending of a “Mission” or “Advisers” to Russia if she were attacked by Germany’, and also what ‘the composition and functions’ of such a mission would be.

The report produced by the Joint Planning Staff on 19 June is a most revealing document. Although it was pointed out that the mission could ‘provide the Russians with the benefit of our experience in fighting the Germans up to date’, at the same time the ‘Russians would however be likely to demand information from us which it would be undesirable to provide.’ Even though it was generally assumed that the Germans would succeed in defeating
the Red Army within a relatively short period of time, it was nonetheless noted that, in the event of Russian resistance being ‘more prolonged than we expect’, the mission would help in the coordination of British and Russian strategy against Germany. Yet, enthusiasm was anything but overwhelming. The compilers of the report noted that, on balance, the main advantage would be intelligence gathering, but that they felt that the value of the mission would disappear ‘in the face of Russian mistrust’. This negative attitude on the part of the Joint Planning Staff hardly augured well for the success of the mission, which – it was recommended – ought to receive the title of British Liaison Mission, ‘in order to avoid political complications’. Nonetheless, the functions of the mission were identified with a good deal of pragmatism: the provision of intelligence on both Russian and German operations; the coordination of British and Russian strategy against the Germans; and, in the event of a defeat of the Red Army in the Western regions of the country, to stimulate resistance in the parts of the country where forces were still in existence.15

The day after the completion of the report, the Chiefs of Staff met to consider its recommendations. The Chiefs ‘agreed that no further action was required until it was known whether the Russians would accept such a Mission’.16 The German attack on the USSR two days later changed the situation dramatically. The Chiefs of Staff Committee now found itself overtaken by events, and on 24 June had to rubberstamp the directive which led to the appointment of Lieutenant-General Noel Mason-MacFarlane as head of the Mission which, due to the urgency of this situation, was already being prepared for departure.17

Even after the German attack, the Chiefs of Staff attitude towards a wartime alliance with the USSR remained dominated by their lack of faith in the ability of the Red Army, Air Force, and Navy to withstand the German onslaught. There is little doubt that this military assessment could not be so easily disentangled from their ideological distaste for Communism. However, even if the Germans were only to be temporarily preoccupied in the
Soviet Union, this still seemed worth exploiting to Britain’s advantage. Thus, the Chiefs of Staff saw opportunities emerging, but far less for assistance to Russia and rather more as one further means of supporting Britain in its fight against Germany.\textsuperscript{18}

II

Noel Mason-MacFarlane’s tenure of the position of head of Military Mission No. 30 was probably the most turbulent of all the six heads of mission, in part due to the speed with which he changed his attitude towards the capacity of the USSR to resist the German invasion. This not only put him irrevocably on the side of the Sir Stafford Cripps, the controversial British ambassador in Moscow, it also laid him open to the suspicion of too much sympathy with the Russians. At the same time, he was placed in the difficult position of having to pass on Russian requests for military aid at a time when Britain was not in a position to provide very much. Yet, despite his own distaste for Communism, MacFarlane quickly developed an independence of mind and belief in the Russian cause which was most unwelcome in Whitehall.\textsuperscript{19}

While doing his utmost to carry out the major tasks of the mission, MacFarlane rapidly reached realistic assessments of what it would be possible to achieve vis-à-vis the Russians, provoking sharp exchanges between himself and his superiors. On 10 July, he wrote in a secret cipher telegram to the War Office, ‘I am very disturbed at our insistence on approaching Russians at once on subject of letting us co-operate over preparations for demolition [of] Caucasus oil fields.’ He thought that an approach of this nature ‘would be a great psychological mistake’.\textsuperscript{20} He also showed some insight into Russian psychology. At the end of August 1941, for instance, he stated bluntly in a cipher message: ‘Under existing circumstances Russians will never reveal their own dispositions and intentions. Apart from other considerations they mistrust our security principally on account of press and B.B.C.’\textsuperscript{21}
Particularly interesting was one response of the Chiefs of Staff to further unwelcome views. In a message to MacFarlane in mid-July, they noted: ‘We are disturbed at suggestion in your M.I.L. 11/7 that Russians are convinced we are not pulling our weight.’ There then followed the statement that ‘our present difficulties are largely due to Russian action in 1939 and for last 12 months we have been fighting alone against heavy odds.’ The Chiefs of Staff bristled at the possibility that the Russians might make ‘quite impossible demands for action by us’, while the references to the only recently extinguished alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union showed a considerable degree of continuing ideological mistrust towards the USSR on the part of senior military officers.\(^{22}\)

Nonetheless, even though MacFarlane had become convinced within a short period that the Russians could hold out, this did not make his task any easier as Red Army resistance began to stiffen. But many of the difficulties which were experienced under his leadership were problems which continued throughout the duration of the war, no doubt reinforcing already existing anti-Communist tendencies on the part of some members of the mission. On the one hand, there was the constant surveillance by the Soviet security services, all of which made it virtually impossible to maintain any contact with the inhabitants of Moscow. By and large, social life was restricted to embassies and the flats or hotel rooms of other mission members. The Russian officers with whom the mission had contact were afflicted by the widespread attitude in the USSR towards foreigners: one of deep suspicion.\(^{23}\) According to the mission’s chief interpreter under MacFarlane: ‘Cooped up as we were in restricted surroundings, with little or no normal intercourse with local people... and often watched and followed by plain clothes police, the outcome would have been collective insanity had it not been for the indomitable spirit of Mason-Mac and one or two others.\(^{24}\)

Another problem which MacFarlane faced was the unwieldy structure of the mission, with three separate service chiefs for the military, naval and air sections, who in some ways
duplicated the work of the service attachés who were also present in Moscow. At a meeting at the Kremlin on 30 June 1941, for example, Molotov and the Deputy Chiefs of the Red Army and Naval staffs received MacFarlane, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Miles and Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Collier, together with the service attachés. At the same time, the mission was split up geographically, with a considerable number of personnel stationed at the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, not all of whom were naval. There was a contingent of army and air force technicians who were required to assist in passing on tanks and aircraft in working condition, after they had been delivered by British convoys. Moreover, the Russian staffs were constantly making all kinds of demands for information, such as for advance lists of the quantity of stores and equipment which were to be delivered in each convoy; and, frequent objections were made to the number of British personnel serving in Russia.

In addition, MacFarlane’s command suffered from the evacuation of all British mission and embassy staff from Moscow to Kuibyshev in mid-October 1941. Even though the military mission was able to return in January 1942, the embassy staff remained stranded in Kuibyshev, complicating the coordination of policy between mission and embassy. Even in April 1942, the Foreign Office advised the British Ambassador not to put pressure on the Soviet Government for a return of the embassy to the capital, and to rely simply on ‘prolonging’ the length of his visits to Moscow to keep in touch with the military mission. However, for the mission a return to Moscow also meant a return to the daily frustrations of dealing with the Otdel, the Soviet organization responsible for liaising with the British officials. In fact, the nature of this daily business led MacFarlane to note in a cipher message of March 1942, reporting on an encouraging visit to the northern ports, that ‘the trip… emphasized how much easier things are when you get away from Moscow.’

But if MacFarlane’s visit to the northern ports had shown that the situation there was positive, and relations with the local Russian commanders good, the work of the British Tank
Detachment continued to be a source of intense irritation.\textsuperscript{30} Information obtained in early January 1942 by a member of the military section of the mission, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, indicated that British bren-gun carriers had already been employed for reconnaissance purposes in conjunction with motorcycles, and that British tanks had been contributing positively to the situation at the frontline.\textsuperscript{31} Yet, despite this, the Russians continued to make no use of British technical experts stationed at Moscow, Gorki, Archangel, and Kazan, and the Red Army Tank Directorate took two months to respond to a request by Mason-MacFarlane in October 1941 for discussions. While the Russians were aware of the importance of British maintenance work carried out on tanks delivered to Archangel and Murmansk before they were sent on by rail, the workings and machinations of Soviet bureaucracy conspired to sabotage an effective use of the available British technical personnel.\textsuperscript{32}

MacFarlane’s ‘indomitable spirit’ in the face of such difficulties did, however, gradually undermine his position at home. At the Moscow conference in late September and early October 1941, he had been extremely outspoken at a meeting on 2 October between Lord Beaverbrook and Stanislaw Kot, General Wladyslaw Sikorski’s representative in Moscow. Likewise, he had to some extent been a victim of the lukewarm attitude of the Chiefs of Staff towards the mission. They seemed unable or unwilling to understand his exasperation after the mission and embassy staff had been evacuated to Kuibyshev in October. MacFarlane was also caught up in the disputes over policy in the Cabinet, which were in full swing in the wake of the Moscow conference. Above all, in late 1941 and early 1942, the infighting in London created an atmosphere in which it was politically expedient to blame the head of mission for any difficulties which arose in military cooperation with the Russians.\textsuperscript{33}
In fact, the very discussions surrounding MacFarlane’s replacement indicated the divisions and confusion over British policy vis-à-vis the mission. Despite his reasonably good relations with the Russians in early 1942, including a long and friendly talk with Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov on 23 February, in late March the question of MacFarlane’s replacement was raised at a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting after some prompting by the Foreign Office. But the deliberations over his successor dragged on for so long that by the time he was informed on 8 May 1942 that he was to be replaced (and to be taking up an appointment as Governor and Commander-in-Chief Gibraltar), the question of his successor had still not been settled. In a final message to the War Office he reminded the Military Secretary that, when selecting his successor, it ought to be borne in mind that ‘the Soviet Staff are extremely suspicious of officers who were either in Russia during the revolutionary war period or who have been prominently identified with intelligence work’. After a farewell dinner given by officers of the mission on 15 May, he departed from Moscow Central Airport on 19 May.

As it turned out, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Miles, already serving in the USSR, was entrusted with the position of head of mission. This decision, which reversed the earlier intention to recall Miles before the winter of 1942, seems to have been viewed as a convenient, interim solution, since it meant that ‘Miles would be taking over a “running” show with which he was well acquainted’. The period of Miles’ tenure as head of mission can be seen as an interregnum in the history of Military Mission No. 30. In early June, Miles reported back to London that there seemed to be signs of an improvement in relations with the Soviet military, one of the rays of light being progress in cooperation with the Russian Tank Directorate in Moscow. However, by mid-July, there were the first signs that he was running up against the sort of frustrating difficulties his predecessor had encountered.
problem was quite simply that the new head of mission lacked the initiative, dynamism, and insight of Mason-MacFarlane.

Needless to say, Miles displayed the sort of mistrust of the Russians which typified the British personnel serving with the mission. In a telegram at the beginning of June 1942 he argued: ‘I can see no reason why we should continue these one sided arrangements for ever and give Soviet Mission [in the UK] something for nothing. It certainly does not help the military section here.’ Still, it was in many ways an unfortunate time to be head of mission. The War Office remained jittery over anything which might rock the Anglo-Soviet boat, and was quick to advise Miles in July 1942 against pursuing a request to inspect Moscow’s anti-aircraft defenses due to the ‘obvious preoccupation’ of the Russian General Staff with the German summer offensive. Nonetheless, many of Miles’ messages to Whitehall displayed a general sense of helplessness in the face of the difficulties he was encountering; and, he made frequent requests for ‘guidance’ on various issues, in particular on that most thorny of all problems: how to deal with Russian questions on the formation of a ‘second front’.

During a visit to Britain, Miles reported on 29 September 1942 to a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in Whitehall that there appeared to be a food shortage among the civilian population, and that he thought the Russians might ask for food supplies and oil to be sent with the next convoys. He also noted that Murmansk ‘had been considerably devastated by enemy air action’, but continued to complain about the difficulty of obtaining information from the Russians, even though he had been allowed to inspect the port. In February 1943 he made the demand that the British Government should take ‘concerted action’ in order that ‘Soviet information and experience’ be obtained in a timely fashion, yet justified his request by pointing out that the American military attaché, Brigadier-General J. A. Michela, had suggested he follow his policy of pursuing the issue of increased diplomatic pressure at a higher level. Not surprisingly, the reply from the Chiefs of Staff was extremely icy.
At the beginning of the following month, Miles was informed he was to be replaced, no doubt as a result of his hapless approach to adhering to official policy. Indicative of his lack of success was the fact that when he finally left Moscow by air on 22 March 1943, following the announcement on 17 March that his successor would be Lieutenant-General Giffard Martel, no representative of the Soviet General Staff came to the airport to see him off.

Martel arrived at an aerodrome near Moscow on 5 April 1943 at 7.30 a.m., and was met by high-ranking officers of the mission and two Red Army officers, Major-General Dubinin and Colonel Evstigneev. He had been sent to Moscow with two letters in his pocket, one from Churchill addressed to Stalin, the other from Alan Brooke addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, at that time Marshal A.V. Vasilevsky. Both letters praised Martel as a distinguished officer with an excellent military record. According to Martel, on his arrival in Moscow he felt that the chances of success of his mission would be slight. He asked the advice of members of the mission and officials on the Embassy staff and was told he would have to be tough with the Russians. In his own – perhaps rather exaggerated – view, he took this policy to heart and enjoyed some initial successes. Martel’s own extremely positive, post-war view of his performance as head of mission has been more or less discounted by Bradley Smith, who sees him as being too blunt and accuses him of making a series of mistakes. Is Smith correct, or did Martel actually achieve something?

There is no doubt that during the first four months of his tenure of the post of head of mission that Martel enjoyed a number of successes in gaining access to information and senior Red Army officers. Having met Marshal Vasilevsky on 21 April, two days later he was granted permission to visit the frontline in the Kursk/Oriel region. During the visit, which
took place between 11 and 19 May, he was able to gather a considerable amount of order of battle material and gain impressions of the strengths and capabilities of the Red Army. Martel also met R. Ya. Malinovsky at the latter’s headquarters. After Malinovsky had explained the situation at the front with the aid of a large map, Martel demanded in an outraged tone that the Russian dispositions, which were covered by a piece of paper, be revealed to him. The Red Army commander was taken aback, but then pulled the piece of paper aside. According to Martel, this confrontation led directly to the full cooperation of the Red Army in his tour of the front line; and, he achieved a number of other successes shortly afterwards in gaining access to the Russian General Staff.  

Throughout his time as head of mission, Martel did prove to be extremely effective in the way in which he collated military information, processed it, and passed it back to London. Periodic reports which summarized experiences and important information attest to his professional and energetic approach. What is interesting is that his pronounced anti-Communist attitude did not interfere with his military judgment when it came to making use of the intelligence and general impressions which he gathered from conversations and meetings. One field in particular illustrates Martel’s professionalism better than any other: that of armored warfare. In June 1943, for instance, he compiled an insightful report on the organization and methods of the Russian armored forces, based on observations gathered during his visit to the front the previous month, and a long discussion with the head of the Red Army Tank Directorate in Moscow on 15 June. In September 1943, he sent a report drawing lessons from the Russian front for future Allied operations in Europe on the basis that the experience in Russia would be more relevant than that of the British in North Africa.  

Moreover, he showed that he was perfectly capable of being insubordinate. As a result of comments made in his ‘Report No. 3 from the British Military Mission to the U.S.S.R.’,
the Chiefs of Staff Committee communicated the strong objection which the Foreign Office had taken towards criticisms by Martel of their ministry. After a largely implausible explanation about certain ‘shortcomings’ not being attributable to officials in the Foreign Office, the letter closed with the recommendation that in future ‘you will... ensure that any criticism you may have to make in future reports are more impartially distributed.’

However, and as later correspondence made abundantly clear, Martel was not mistaken in attributing to the Foreign Office what he saw as a policy of ‘appeasement’ towards the Russian military authorities.

At the beginning of September, in a report which summarized information gained from ‘long discussions with the General Staff at Moscow’ in July and August, Martel was still fairly optimistic. Although he noted that it would be necessary to take a firm line when the Russians were being ‘particularly tiresome’, he pointed out at the same time that problems in ‘domestic relations’ (visas, difficulties over mail, and the treatment of British personnel arrested by the Russian authorities) had been no fault of the Russian military, who had in fact been helpful ‘at all times’ in such matters. The War Office also seemed satisfied. At the end of June, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) had written to Martel stating that there was ‘no doubt that during the short time you have been there you have been able to get us an enormous amount of information’. ‘Pug’ Ismay wrote him a personal letter towards the end of September 1943, commenting that, ‘I like your reports and appreciations of the Russian situation so much and feel that, despite your misgivings, you are doing a grand job of work.’ Furthermore, in an estimate of the information supplied by Martel between July and October made by M.I.3 in the War Office the conclusion was reached that ‘there has been a very satisfactory flow of information’.

By the end of September 1943, however, Martel felt that relations with the Russians were beginning to turn sour. Partly a result of the effects of a clash between Martel and the
new head of the Air Section (appointed in June 1943), Air Marshal Sir John Babbington,\textsuperscript{58} the deterioration may well also have been exacerbated by frustration caused by decisions made in Whitehall. As a result of the progressive worsening in relations between the mission and the Soviet authorities in the final months of the year, opinion in Whitehall began to turn against the head of mission. Still, this was as much due to pressure being exerted by the Foreign Office as it was to the War Office’s dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{59} Hence, considering the evidence, Bradley Smith’s view of Martel’s leadership as inept seems misplaced. For instance, Martel had sent clear and perceptive warnings of the necessity of reducing the size of mission as early as May 1943, stating in one cipher telegram: ‘Am investigating possible reductions in size of mission. Russians dislike large missions. Undesirable to force an increase on Russians at moment when they are co-operating well.’\textsuperscript{60}

Towards the end of 1943, Martel was becoming increasingly frustrated at the uncooperative attitude of the Russian military, not least of all due to his wish to gather information on German Army methods before the invasion of northern Europe. Since his visit to the front-line in May there had been no further opportunity to witness active operations. He found it particularly galling that in the second half of the year, the Soviet Military Mission in London had made sixty visits to see units and bases of the British Army, Navy and Air Force, and over 100 visits to armament factories, while a Russian general had been able to observe British combat operations in Italy.\textsuperscript{61} In January 1944, Martel continued his pressure on the Chiefs of Staff in order that he be allowed to adopt a tougher line. He sent a request to this effect to the VCIGS on 12 January; a similar request ‘suggesting a firmer attitude’ was sent on 25 January. On 28 January, the CIGS sent a message to Moscow that he was to be recalled. Martel left the Soviet Union just over a week later by air on 7 February 1944.\textsuperscript{62} The recall had obviously been discussed in advance; a letter of 10 January 1944 from Martel to the VCIGS makes clear that the former was aware that he was to be leaving the
USSR shortly. His recall – which he may well have deliberately set out to provoke – seems to have been due to his constant demands for greater firmness and the feeling that he was not being allowed to take the strong stand he felt necessary. But it was certainly not due to the depression which tended to grip other members of the mission. In his letter of 10 January to the VCIGS, he wrote that he was ‘keeping fit and boxing and can so far take on any of the youngsters here. One has to do something like this to counteract the depressing influence of dealing all day with these astonishing Bolsheviks.’

Back in London, Martel made plain to the military authorities in Whitehall, not least of all the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that the position of the mission could only be improved if it were instructed to take a firm line, were supported by ‘the authorities in this country’, and by exerting pressure on the Soviet Military Mission in London. He pointed to recent American successes as proof of his point of view, as well as noting that his own experience had shown that ‘The Russian does not resent plain truthful speech. He despises the bootlicking methods which we sometimes employ.’ While these views represented the thinking of many senior British officers, no one had stated them before, or did so later, quite as bluntly as Lieutenant-General Giffard Martel.

V

Well over a week after Martel’s departure, the War Office informed the British Ambassador in Moscow of the appointment of Lieutenant-General Brocas Burrows as new head of the military mission; he subsequently arrived in Moscow on 30 March 1944. Until Bradley F. Smith’s study, Burrows only appearance on the historiographical stage was a brief walk-on part during the Moscow conference of October 1944. In fact, he is portrayed by Smith in his study of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation with the Soviet Union as a virtual cliché of an anti-Communist British general. Specifically, he notes how Burrows insisted on being
presented to Stalin wearing medals which he had earned during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. Still, the references he makes to Burrows’ period as head of mission are rather inconclusive. On the one hand, he notes that ‘Burrows got off to an especially rocky start regarding intelligence-sharing matters’, but, on the other, that certain aspects of British intelligence relations with their host counterparts ‘were warmer during the spring and summer of 1944 than they had been in the chilly winter atmosphere of 1943-4.’[67] To what extent, then, did Burrows fit the ideological role model provided by his predecessor Martel?

Of considerable interest is an assessment by him of the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards its Western Allies before his first month in Moscow had been completed – in other words, before he had really had time to assess the situation properly. Burrows thought that the Soviet government had been active in trying to prevent close cooperation between the Soviet military forces and their Western Allies because ‘a close comparison would display all too soon the bareness of the Soviet military cupboard’. For Burrows, the over-confidence of Soviet military commanders was due to the fact that they knew nothing about the capabilities of the armed forces of their allies, this being mainly due to the activities of the secret police. He was also of the opinion that without ‘Allied supplies of all types’ the Red Army would have been unable to have resisted the German invasion. He ended his communication by warning that the Soviet authorities were now nervous about the second front, and likely to try and downplay its significance. Burrows’ memorandum reveals a great deal about his anti-Soviet attitudes, and is interesting for the way in which he looked forward mainly to the post-war portrayal of the military achievements of the Allies, rather than current operations, going as far as to recommend a press campaign in the wake of the landing in Europe which would highlight the anticipated Anglo-American achievements.[68]

As in the case of other high-ranking British officers, this negative assessment of Soviet military capabilities seems to have been dominated, and more probably driven, by a
strong anti-Communist political stance. It can be ascertained from Alan Brooke’s diary that Burrows was in a negative frame of mind before he even set off for Moscow. According to the entry for 17 February 1944: ‘After lunch I had an interview with Brocas Burrows who is off to Moscow... and found that the Foreign Office had been briefing him on such a conciliatory basis that he did not imagine he was to get anything back out of the Russians.’

This attitude does not seem to have changed much during the course of Burrows command of the mission. Further evidence can be seen in his reactions towards a suggestion which began to receive attention at the beginning of July 1944. On being informed by Major-General John R. Deane, head of the United States’ Military Mission, that Stalin had told W. Averell Harriman, the American ambassador, ‘he thought the time had arrived to form in Moscow a military committee to coordinate matters of military importance concerning the Allies’, Burrows sent a cipher telegram to generals Hastings Ismay and John Alexander Sinclair asking whether they agreed in principle. Burrows himself saw in the idea a way of rescuing the British Military Mission from its impasse, commenting that ‘it is vital that this combined staff should be formed in Moscow’. The reaction of the Chiefs of Staff was, predictably, one of suspicion. Sir Charles Portal suggested that both Deane and Burrows should visit London to discuss the idea further, while it was agreed that Burrows should not commit the chiefs to the functions of the proposed committee.

By the beginning of August, Burrows was back in Britain for consultations with the Chiefs of Staff. He submitted a very revealing paper – which was read by the VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Archibald Nye – dealing with the issue of the proposed combined committee, and still seemed at this stage convinced of its potential value. Although he went on to complain about the lack of cooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet military, he explained this as being partly due to the lack of centralization in their battlefield intelligence system. His disapproval of the Foreign Office policy was made plain in the statement: ‘In my
opinion there is only a very remote possibility that the Military Mission in MOSCOW will be allowed any access to the Red Army at any level if the present policy of complete appeasement continues.’ The message was an old one: the lack of freedom to bargain was interpreted by the Russians as weakness and put the mission in an impossible position.\textsuperscript{72} It is clear from the wording of this memorandum that a political stance had taken precedence over military analysis.

On 2 August 1944, Burrows attended a Chiefs of Staff meeting at which the idea of the combined committee was discussed, but the chiefs remained unenthusiastic. Alan Brooke noted afterwards in his diary, ‘I feel that it is highly unlikely that Stalin will ever agree to any such organization being established.’\textsuperscript{73} A further meeting took place on 16 August, at which Burrows referred to the combined committee as ‘an opportunity’, yet at the same time warned that he thought the Russians would try to use it to obtain advance information on Anglo-American plans. Two days later, in a communication to Washington, the Chiefs of Staff stated that they were ‘wholly opposed to the creation of a United Chiefs of Staff Committee.’\textsuperscript{74} With that, the idea was effectively killed, even though the Foreign Office continued to pursue it long after it had become clear that it was stillborn.\textsuperscript{75}

On his return to Moscow, in addition to the usual and frustrating wrangles over the exchange of intelligence material, in particular order of battle details, Burrows seems to have performed reasonably competently when it came to the general management of intelligence exchange. Bradley Smith is unable to reach a conclusion as to whether Burrows’ tenure of the position was ineffective due to the general’s own failings, or because of the incoherence of official British policy. While he was dealt a poor hand, Burrows does though appear to have rubbed the Russians up the wrong way, and the most obvious contributory factor was clearly his openly anti-Communist attitude.\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, as Burrows probably foresaw, the failure of the Combined Committee ended his attempt to rejuvenate the work of the mission. On 18
October 1944, it was announced on the BBC that he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief West Africa. On 25 and 29 October he paid two final visits to General Kutuzov, and then departed from Moscow on 1 November.77

VI

The final phase of the British Military Mission in Moscow can best be described as lackluster. Following the departure of Burrows, the head of the naval section, Admiral E.R. Archer, took over as chief of mission. His period in office can be viewed as decidedly uneventful.78 It was fitting for the continuing impromptu nature of British policy that Whitehall decided three days before VE-Day that the status of the mission could be enhanced if a higher ranking officer were to become its head. Thus, Lieutenant-General J.A.G. Gammell was sent to replace Admiral Archer, but not in time to attend the formal surrender ceremony organized by the Red Army in Berlin.79 In fact, as the ever fewer and more laconic entries in the war diary indicate, in the final months of the war the mission ceased to hold any of its previous significance. At the beginning of May 1945, one of Admiral Archer’s last dispatches noted that relations with the Russians had deteriorated considerably in the preceding weeks.80

On 1 August 1945, the Chiefs of Staff informed Gammell how to react should the Soviet Union declare war on Japan. In particular he was instructed to show a willingness to provide intelligence on enemy forces in areas under the command responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff, although he was to refrain from volunteering material on British equipment, or ‘our own intentions, distribution or Order of Battle’.81 But as the first Cold War frost began to form, the last head of Military Mission No. 30 could only watch as Anglo-Soviet relations began to seize up, even before the final defeat of Japan. It seems cruelly symbolic that the war diary of the mission contains no entries for the penultimate month of its presence in the
Soviet Union. At some point towards the end of September 1945, Gammell left Moscow, finally ending the existence of the mission in the USSR.

The last six months of the mission had made plain that latterly it had become effectively irrelevant to the conduct of the war in the East. Still, despite all the frustrations of the six heads of mission, there seems little doubt that certain successes were achieved in the exchange of intelligence, especially details on order of battle and German equipment. Likewise, one cannot underestimate the contribution of the mission to managing the arrival and maintenance of vital British supplies, including tanks and aircraft. The uneasy intelligence cooperation did though obviously favor the Russians, who showed – other than during fairly brief periods – little desire to reciprocate. However, since Britain’s aim in mid-1941 had been to keep the Red Army in the field fighting the Germans, then one of the central goals surrounding the dispatch of the mission was achieved. But the question under consideration here is less, ‘Was the mission a success?’, and much more, ‘What role did ideology play in the work of Britain’s Military Mission No. 30?’

One of the most important observations which can be made is that there was a clear correlation between a strong anti-Communist conviction and a negative perception of the fighting abilities of the Red Army. This is clearly noticeable in the decision making of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1941. In many cases, anti-Communist attitudes led to completely unrealistic ideas as to how the British Military Mission should become involved in the war in the East, the suggestion that mission members should assist the Russians in the demolition of the Caucasian oil fields being one glaring example. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the two heads of mission who came to the most realistic and positive assessment of the fighting abilities of the Soviet forces, Mason-MacFarlane and Martel, made a clear differentiation between ordinary Soviet citizens, and also Russian officers and men at the
front, and those Soviet state and military officials whose main job appeared to be obstruction and surveillance. 85

Essentially, the influence of ideology led to a three-cornered fight in British policy-making circles in relation to the military mission. On the one hand, the Foreign Office tended to play down the mission’s difficulties in favor of nurturing ‘good relations’ with the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, this led to clashes not only between the Foreign and War Offices, but also between the Chiefs of Staff and the heads of mission – after all, the chiefs could hardly ignore the instructions of the War Cabinet. Yet, this was not the only cause of friction between the Chiefs of Staff and the heads of mission. The ideological influence on the chiefs’ view of the situation in Russia caused intense disputes between them and the two most competent heads of mission, MacFarlane and Martel. Although these two generals were certainly anti-Communist, their military professionalism led them to a pragmatic attitude when dealing with Soviet state and military authorities. Instead of the suspicious, mistrusting anti-Communism of the early interwar period, which certainly survived in the War Office during the war, they reached an appreciation of what made Soviet officials and the Soviet system tick. The very different post-war careers of MacFarlane, who in 1945 was elected as a Labour Member of Parliament, 86 and Martel, who became one of the most prominent military Cold War publicists, 87 cannot detract from the quite similar views which they held about the Soviet Union as a result of their war-time experiences.

Thus, it can be argued that ideology can seriously distort the perspective of the situation of a military mission as seen from the decision making center at home. Senior military officers of average ability appointed to serve as head of mission (men such as Miles and Burrows) are likely to be affected by any prevalent ideological leanings in the armed forces. However, senior officers with a certain flair for independent thought (such as MacFarlane), or the assessment of foreign military capabilities (such as Martel), are capable
of putting aside their ideological predispositions and reaching sound assessments of the capabilities of the host nation’s armed forces and the best approach to military collaboration with them. In short, managing the effects of ideology, and selecting officers with the ability to work against prevailing ideological attitudes, can decisively influence the effectiveness of a military mission. In the case of the British Military Mission to the USSR, the impact and effects of ideology on decision making were never seriously addressed, so that the mission was never able to achieve its full potential.

Endnotes


3 For various definitions and discussion, see: Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (Verso: London, 1980); Kurt Lenk, ‘Ideologie/Ideologiekritik’, in Dieter


5 The head of the Soviet Military Mission to Great Britain (1941-4), Admiral N.M. Kharlamov, mentions a Major Swan of the British Army in his memoirs, who had been suggested as a representative of the British General Staff in Moscow, but who apparently turned out to have served as a British commander in Archangel during the Allied intervention; Kharlamov claims he succeeded in blocking the appointment. See N. Kharlamov, *Difficult Mission. War Memoirs: Soviet Admiral in Great Britain during the Second World War* (Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1986), pp. 114-15.

6 It is worth pointing out here that part of the reason for the anti-Communist attitude of British officers was that they regarded the Bolsheviks as having betrayed the Allied cause during the First World War, allowing the Germans to concentrate forces for the March 1918 offensive. On this point, see Giffard Martel, *The Russian Outlook* (Michael Joseph: London, 1947), pp. 34-5.


8 Correspondence between leading British Army officers in 1920/1 indicates that they viewed Bolshevism as a threat to British society at home as well as to the security of the Empire. For


10 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter, TNA), WO193/642, M.I.2(b), SECRET. The Red Army, memorandum, 22 Nov. 1939.


13 TNA, WO193/648, COS (40) 842, War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Staff Talks with the Soviet [sic], 18 Oct. 1940.


22 TNA, WO193/644, Foreign Office (hereafter, FO) to Moscow. Chiefs of Staff for MacFarlane, 14 July 1941.


29 TNA, WO193/645A, cipher telegram, MIL/3998, MacFarlane to Director of Military Intelligence, 30 Mar. 1942.
Recent research is starting to suggest that the contribution to Russian combat strength of British tanks and Bren-gun carriers in late 1941 and early 1942 has hitherto been underestimated. For a recent contribution, see Alexander Hill, ‘British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November-December 1941 – A Research Note’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19 (June 2006), pp. 289-94. See also the remarkable collection of photographs of British Valentine, Matilda and Churchill tanks in Red Army service, in M. Kolomyjec I. Moszczanski, Lend Lease Vol. I (Waydawnictwo Militaria: Warsaw, 2001).

31 TNA, WO208/1792, MacFarlane to Director of Military Intelligence, 7 Jan. 1942.


33 Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission, pp. 236-37; Smith, Sharing Secrets, pp. 112-15.


35 TNA, WO193/645A, Chiefs of Staff Committee, extract from minutes of meeting, 25 Mar. 1942.

36 TNA, WO178/26, 30 Military Mission. War Diary, entries for 8, 11, 15, and 19 May 1942.

37 TNA, WO193/645A, Chiefs of Staff Committee, extracts from minutes of meetings, 25 Mar. and 11 May 1942.

38 TNA, WO193/645A, cipher telegrams, 30 Military Mission to WO, 8 June and 18 July 1942.


TNA, WO193/644, Chiefs of Staff Committee, extract from 275th meeting, 29 Sept. 1942.

TNA, WO193/645A, cipher telegram, Miles to Chiefs of Staff, MIL/8360, 16 Feb. 1943, reply by Chiefs of Staff, 20 Feb. 1943.

TNA, WO193/645A, cipher telegram, FO to Miles, reply to telegram of 1 Mar. 1943.


TNA, WO178/27, 30 Military Mission. War Diary, entry for 5 Apr. 1943.


IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol. 2-5, SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL. Notes on Russia, n.d.

Smith, Sharing Secrets, pp. 179-80, accusing him of ‘heavy-handedness’ and having ‘patronized and quarreled with senior members of his own mission’.


IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol. 85, Most Secret & Personal, Nye to Martel, 22 Nov. 1943.


58 See IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol.149, Martel to Alan Brooke, 31 Aug. 1943, fol.127-69 for other documents relating to the dispute and, for an account of the affair, fol.2-5, Notes on Russia, pp. 4-5.

59 Smith, Sharing Secrets, pp. 142-61, 177-80.

60 TNA, WO193/645A, cipher telegram, Chiefs of Staff from Martel, 20 May 1943.

61 IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol.32, Brief. Difficulties which the British Military Mission have encountered during the last six months, n.d. [late 1943].


63 IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol.61, Martel to Nye, 10 Jan. 1944.

64 IWM, Martel Papers, GQM 4/4, fol.19-21, War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(44) 49th Meeting, 16 Feb. 1944, fol.17-18, SECRET. The British Military Mission and its Relations with the Russians, n.d. [1944].


67 Smith, Sharing Secrets, pp. 180-1, 192.
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69 Bryant, *Triumph in the West*, p. 121.

70 TNA, WO193/671, cipher telegram, 30 Military Mission to AMSSO, 2 July 1944.

71 TNA, WO193/671, Extract from the Minutes of the COS(44) 219th(O) Meeting, 3 July 1944, and, Extract from the Minutes of the COS(44) 221st (O) Meeting, 5 July 1944.


73 Bryant, *Triumph in the West*, p. 196.

74 TNA, WO193/671, Extract from the Minutes of COS(44) 277th (O) Meeting, 16 Aug. 1944, and cipher telegram, AMSSO to JSM Washington, 18 Aug. 1944.

75 TNA, WO193/671, Extract from Minutes of COS(44) 360th (O) Meeting, 7 Nov. 1944, Meeting to be held on 29 December 1944. Note on COS(44) 1055(O). Tripartite Military Commission in Moscow, and Minutes of the COS(45) 9th Meeting, 9 Jan. 1945.


78 The war diary of the military mission does not even mention the promotion of Archer to head of mission, merely noting that on 7 November 1944 he attended a reception given by Molotov. TNA, WO178/27, 30 Military Mission. War Diary, entry for 7 Nov. 1944.


81 TNA, WO208/1787, cipher telegram, AMSSO to 30 Military Mission, 1 Aug. 1945.

82 TNA, WO178/27, 30 Military Mission. War Diary, August 1945.
TNA, WO208/1787, cipher telegram, 30 Military Mission to WO, 21 Sept. 1945, indicates that Gammell was preparing a farewell meeting with General Antonov at some time between 27 and 30 September. The Soviet Military Mission to Great Britain was disbanded in early October. Kharlamov, *Difficult Mission*, p. 229.

Anti-Communism in Whitehall is a prominent theme in the memoirs of the head of the Soviet mission to Britain, 1941-4. Kharlamov identifies Admiral Dudley Pound in particular as one of the most ardent anti-Communist senior officers. Kharlamov, *Difficult Mission*, pp. 37-8, 111-13.

