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The ‘Coalition of the Semi-Willing’: American Diplomacy and the Recruitment of Allies in Vietnam, 1964-68

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FOREWORD

This latest contribution to the European Studies Research Institute (ESRI) 'Working Papers in Military and International History', which examines the history of the United States search for allies during the war in Vietnam, is – quite apart from the high quality of scholarship – a welcome addition to the series for three reasons.

First, the Centre for Contemporary History & Politics within ESRI, and hence also the Politics & Contemporary History Subject Group, at the University of Salford, has for some time maintained an active interest in International History. Recently, however, the Subject Group made two new appointments in this field, so that International History can look forward to a bright future as an important component of the study of history within ESRI. This Working Paper, co-authored by Dr Jonathan Colman, one of Salford's International History specialists, is one more indication of the expertise which ESRI now holds in International History.

Second, as a European Studies Research Institute, ESRI is committed to collaborating with research institutes beyond Britain's shores, but especially with other institutes in Europe. Jake Widén, who has collaborated with ESRI member Jonathan Colman on this paper, is a researcher at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm. Since he was only very recently elected to an ESRI Research Fellowship, it is pleasing to be able to see him already cooperating to good effect with a member of the European Studies Research Institute here in Salford.

Third, this paper provides a good example of the way in which studying past events can provide insight into very contemporary problems. This study of the American search for allies during the Vietnam War is timely since this war has re-emerged in the minds of historians and political scientists as particularly relevant to the conflict still raging in Iraq as a point of analytical orientation. Yet, at the
beginning of the conflict, there would have appeared to have been virtually a ‘conspiracy of silence’ in the American media over any possible parallels with the war in Vietnam. Whether or not some Machiavellian plot existed to forbid any mention of that war, or whether the omission was the result of a form of self-imposed censorship, is not the central issue. After all, it is clear that there was a genuine fear of drawing parallels with the war in Vietnam in Washington, most notably when the American (or, as the US media insisted, the ‘coalition’) occupation forces began to run into difficulties in the second half of 2003. In fact, privately, by 2004 many high-ranking US Army officers were already drawing parallels between errors being committed in Iraq and errors which some of them had experienced themselves in Vietnam, or which younger officers had investigated for PhD theses on the conflict. The recent book by American journalist Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Allen Lane, 2006), provides startling evidence of the degree to which the comparison took hold in US military circles. Although the parallels which have been drawn usually concentrate on the US Army’s tendency to employ conventional methods in an unconventional, insurgency-style war, this paper suggests that some remarkable similarities can be identified in the problems facing American diplomats in their search for allies in two deeply unpopular wars.

As such, the paper provides an important historical perspective for the debate over the war in Iraq, a war which has been declared by some commentators to be a unique historical occurrence; yet, as the authors show, even in the field of ‘coalition building’ the wars in Vietnam and Iraq display some truly unexpected parallels.

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The ‘Coalition of the Semi-Willing’:
American Diplomacy and the Recruitment of Allies
in Vietnam, 1964-68

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Recent years have seen a tendency to draw parallels between the wars in Iraq and Vietnam.¹ Both conflicts degenerated into bloody, costly and unpopular enterprises, in which political and military success proved much more elusive than was first anticipated. Yet there is a further parallel, less often invoked, in that both conflicts have involved the United States constructing and fighting in a coalition.² In Vietnam, four countries – the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand – provided combat troops, while the Philippines contributed a civic action group with its own security force of infantry, armour and artillery. By 1969, there were almost 69,000 third country combat personnel present, alongside roughly 550,000 American and 850,000 South Vietnamese troops.³ Thirty more countries obliged with help for Saigon in forms such as food, medicine, technical assistance,
equipment, educational facilities, training and economic aid. Washington wanted to defend South Vietnam as part of a collective largely as a means of furthering the international legitimacy of the war and ‘selling’ the conflict to legislators and the public at home.

Unfortunately for American diplomats, third country contributions fell short of what was desired. Certainly, the number of troop contributors compared poorly with the Korean War of 1950-53, when ‘free world’ efforts included combat forces from fourteen countries, plus the United States. Washington wanted to mount the Vietnam coalition on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), but this proved impossible with the absence of soldiers from SEATO members France and Pakistan and with the fact that the main third country troop contributor, Korea, was not even part of SEATO. The coalition was therefore more of an ad hoc grouping than the United States government had desired. Moreover, while quid pro quos are characteristic features of alliances and coalitions, there was a recognition among American diplomats that the attractions of American largesse featured among the motives of some of the troop-contributing countries. The anxious courting of allies, some of whom were otherwise of little account in world affairs, and the meagre results of the recruitment campaign did not bode well for the outcome of the war and demonstrated that in the absence of outright coercion the United States’ ‘superpower’ status had distinct limits.

This paper explores American efforts to recruit third countries in Vietnam under the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964-68. It was in 1964 that the recruitment campaign began; in 1965 Washington ‘Americanised’ the war by introducing US combat forces; and by 1968 it had become evident to a beleaguered White House that the free world’s war in Vietnam was all but unwinnable. Events had overtaken the idea of seeking increased third country contributions. Source material includes US government documents such as State Department and White House memoranda, along with oral history testimony, memoirs and secondary analyses.
This study helps to fill a notable omission in the literature of the Vietnam War. Standard American texts on the conflict have a tendency towards solipsism, in that they usually make little or no mention of the coalition element. This probably stems from the obvious fact that the United States was by far the dominant external power in the defence of South Vietnam, but it is at odds with the desire of American policymakers in the 1960s to internationalise the war. Moreover, the gap in the literature can also be explained by the fact that research on the international rather than the American history of the Vietnam War is still in its infancy, not least because of practical difficulties inherent in multi-archival research. These include linguistic challenges and restrictions on the release of documents. While this paper focuses on American policy and cannot, for example, offer any definitive verdicts on why third countries acted as they did, it does at least acknowledge that the anticomunist effort in Vietnam during the period in question was a coalition war and not waged solely by the United States and South Vietnam.

The work is divided into a number of sections, each addressing different aspects of the topic at hand. Initially, there is an exploration of why the United States sought allies in Vietnam. Then there is an account of the attempts made to create a solid political framework for the coalition and the limitations of SEATO in this regard. Thereafter, there is an examination of the many difficulties Washington faced when trying to recruit third countries. Here it becomes apparent that while allies were often willing to convey rhetorical support for South Vietnam, they cited political and legal obstacles to the provision of their own troops. After this, there is a brief description of the discreet diplomacy employed by the United States to try to succeed, followed by a discussion of the apparent deficiencies of the recruitment campaign. The paper moves on to consider the United States’ attempts to use economic measures to obtain combat troops, and provides a short assessment of the practical value of the third country contributions. Finally, there are a few broad reflections on the American efforts to recruit third countries in Vietnam under the Johnson administration, 1964-68.
I. Why the United States Sought Allies

Although by early 1964 countries such as Australia and Korea were already providing non-combat assistance, the Vietnam recruitment campaign began formally in April that year, with the ‘More Flags’ or ‘Many Flags’ initiative. President Johnson stated during a press conference that ‘we would like to see some other flags’ in South Vietnam and that ‘we would all unite in an attempt to stop the spread of ... communism in that part of the world’. The assistance was originally called ‘Third Country Aid’, and, according to Frederick Flott of the Saigon Embassy, ‘it was basically aid from other countries, other than the United States, to help the government of Vietnam. It was very open-ended. The more aid we could get the more we liked it.’ Flott states that he ‘changed the name of the program ... to Free World Assistance because of the obvious favorable political connotation’. Initially the programme was intended to elicit non-combat assistance such as medical, engineering and police support, but by the time of the launching of the United States’ bombing campaign and the commitment of American combat troops in spring 1965 this had given way to a desire to see third countries engaged in the fighting as well.

Johnson himself felt a wholehearted concern with the recruitment effort. According to Paul M. Kattenburg, who served in the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, he brought ‘almost fanatical fervour’ to the programme. Frederick Flott adds that Johnson was

... personally very much interested in the program, and if he had a visiting head of state from a potential donor country coming in to see him in the Oval Office, he’d ask us, ‘Just what should I ask this fellow for?’ He was trying very hard to help.

Such was his enthusiasm that Johnson ended up ‘leaning on all our embassies around the world to be supportive of this program and to try to find donors’. Hot Cold War policy doctrines originating in the late 1940s and early 1950s had led Washington to believe that the loss to communism of even a small state was
profoundly detrimental to American and Western security interests. The problem with South Vietnam, however, was that it proved too weak to provide for its own defence against a communist uprising drawing upon the vast resources of the Soviet Union and China. Consequently, reinforcements had to come from the United States and from other free world countries. Yet, from the perspective of Washington, third country support was of greater political than practical value: combat troops above all else had, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out in 1966, ‘an importance beyond mere numbers’. Third country contributions helped to relieve American policymakers’ sense of isolation and to strengthen the international legitimacy of a war whose moral and geopolitical virtues were hotly contested. An American participant at the Manila Conference of troop-contributing nations in 1966 expressed the point succinctly: he valued the gathering as an opportunity to demonstrate ‘not-US-aloneness’. Given, too, that in Vietnam the United States was not merely defending a single country but abstract values such as democracy, world order and civilisation, then it was incumbent on other free world states to participate.

While the military contributions of ‘white’ countries like Australia and New Zealand were deeply appreciated, assistance from Asian states were of special value, because of the American concern to avoid ‘anything that looks like a white man’s club in Asia’. In an age in which numerous Asian and African states had only recently gained their independence from European colonialism, American policymakers felt that the presence of non-white contributors would erode any perception among the ‘non-aligned’ states that Washington had inherited the imperial mantle. Washington policymakers felt too that help from each third country would have a multiplier effect, in that it would encourage contributions from more third countries. During a diplomatic tour in late 1967 to generate further support among the troop contributing nations, Secretary of Defense (1967–69) Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor and pointed out that while more troops might not make much of a military difference, their presence would nonetheless ‘enable the United States to add several times the number of Asian forces to the effort in Vietnam’.17
President Johnson had made a name for himself in the Senate in the 1950s, and throughout his presidency he was especially concerned about maintaining popular support for the war and furthering his ambitious ‘Great Society’ programme of domestic legislation. Johnson considered that third country contributions would help to soothe the thorny issue of the United States’ own troop commitment. He indicated in 1966, for example, that ‘key members of the Congress’ felt ‘very strongly’ that other troop-contributing states should meet a ‘substantial part of the need’ for reinforcements. Foreign troops would help to reduce the American commitment, and they were also a means of justifying the growing financial burdens of waging war in Vietnam. On their 1967 tour, Clifford and Taylor argued that faced with tax increases the American people would ask ‘if we have to put this [extra] money in the war, what are our allies going to do?’ They were not going to believe ‘this is important to us if it’s not important to you’. As the war intensified, Congressional critics such as Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield sought a wholesale reappraisal of US global commitments, feeling that the overambitious application of ‘containment’ policy had led to the United States’ responsibilities greatly exceeding its interests. US diplomats felt, however, that the presence of other states in Vietnam in defence of free world interests would help to legitimise American commitment not only there but elsewhere. In a discussion with Prime Minister Sir John Grey Gorton of Australia in 1968, Clifford indicated that the maintenance of third country assistance was ‘essential to our own continued involvement’ in Vietnam. In the event of ‘a pullback’ by free world forces, Americans would ask ‘If Southeast Asia is not important to our allies, why should it be to us?’ At the NATO meeting at The Hague in May 1964, Dean Rusk asked alliance members for at least a token amount of support in Vietnam. Some states agreed to provide small amounts of non-military help but, for reasons that will be considered later, none was willing to send combat troops. Aside from the general legitimising function of internationalising the war, contributions from NATO members were sought in part as a way of helping to resist pressures for cutbacks in the American troop commitment to Europe. Rusk explained to the
German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder in 1965 that the ‘revelation to the Congress of the extent of our requirements in Vietnam will raise major questions about what others are doing in the face of our own continuing commitments in such areas as NATO’. While by 1967 the administration had to bow to political as well as economic pressure to reduce the numbers of American troops in Germany, the main American outpost in Europe, some skilled diplomacy ensured that the matter was addressed without doing serious damage to transatlantic ties, in part by leaving a still-substantial American commitment on the European continent.21

Not surprisingly given the evident public-relations dimension of third country contributions, the White House worked assiduously to placate the domestic critics of US involvement in Vietnam by publicising the additional help. In 1964 Johnson indicated that he wanted the third country presence to be as ‘large and visible as possible in terms of men on the scene’.24 In 1966, he ordered a ‘systematic assessment’ of the efforts to widen third country contributions.25 The White House disseminated the results of this survey to Congress, to make it known that the administration was engaged in a war with international support. In sum, Washington sought third country contributions for both domestic and foreign policy reasons. At home, such contributions helped to placate Congressional worries about greater financial burdens and about geopolitical over-stretch, while abroad it served both diplomatic and military objectives.

II. Finding a Political Basis for the Coalition

One of the challenges for US policymakers was to ensure that the free world coalition rested on a sound political foundation, to give the war greater propriety and as a means of encouraging further contributions. The non-communist powers had fought in Korea under the aegis of the United Nations, but Washington had in this instance been able to operate under the UN banner because of the Soviet boycott of the Security Council over American policies towards communist China. The Soviets were therefore unable to veto the use of the UN for the purpose of the free world’s war in Korea. There was no comparable opportunity for American policymakers in
relation to Vietnam. Washington tried instead to base the coalition on SEATO, which had been established in 1954 under American sponsorship to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. However, according to Chester Cooper of the National Security Council, ‘the SEATO rationale was more cosmetic than real’. Of the seven member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand), three – the United Kingdom, France and Pakistan – were not represented. The United Kingdom did not provide troops, and France and Pakistan did not give even rhetorical support for the war. Moreover, Korea, the largest contributor after the United States, was not even a member of SEATO. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand were ANZUS members instead. So far as SEATO was concerned, Cooper noted that in May 1965 the meeting of its Council in London published a communiqué implying strong support for South Vietnam: ‘the defeat of this Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of Southeast Asia’.28 However, these sentiments were undermined by Pakistani opposition to the Council’s views and by France declining even to send an official representative to the meeting.27 So what was intended to be essentially a SEATO coalition became a looser, more ad hoc one, reflecting mere expediency rather than a more compelling rationale.

Paris in particular compounded SEATO’s Vietnam problems. The French had suffered their own debacle in Indochina in 1954, and had grave reservations about the American stand there some years later. At the SEATO conference in Manila in April 1964, French nay-saying ensured that US diplomats faced, as one of them put it, ‘a real crusher’ on how to word the conference communiqué so that it would ‘condemn North Vietnamese aggression’ and ‘express satisfaction with [the South Vietnamese prime minister] Khanh, the current programme and confidence it will succeed’.28 After the Manila meeting, Franco-American differences over Vietnam intensified, and President Charles de Gaulle became ever more strident in his criticisms of American policy.29 Early in 1965, an American diplomat expressed hopes privately that the French would withdraw from SEATO, so that the organisation could ‘play a more active role in Vietnam including if desired initiation
of collective SEATO action'. The view was that this might help to correct the impression in Congress and beyond that Vietnam was an American war. However, France did not pull out from SEATO, to the disappointment of some American diplomats. Instead, de Gaulle continued to exasperate the White House and State Department not only in connection with Vietnam but in relation to policies such as withdrawing France from the NATO command structure in 1966.

In contrast to the French example, American pressure for support in Vietnam did lead Pakistan to consider withdrawing. In 1964, President Ayub Khan indicated that his country would not be making even a token contribution because of the 'impossibility of enlarging Pakistan's political or military commitments in that area' owing to increased vulnerability in relation to India. He then suggested that withdrawal 'might be the most honourable and realistic course for Pakistan'. While the threat of Pakistani withdrawal had more than one cause, Vietnam was in this instance the precipitating factor. SEATO's Vietnam-induced difficulties continued. In 1967, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, who had especially little patience with reluctant American allies, noted fears that the 'foot-dragging' of France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom might erode SEATO's vitality. On a number of occasions Thai diplomats in particular had 'questioned the usefulness of participation in SEATO by those who will not assume real responsibility, notably France, the UK and Pakistan'.

American policymakers faced the problem that while they wanted a coherent vehicle for the free world effort in Vietnam they lacked a substitute for SEATO. This was partly a difficulty of their own making, according to one US diplomat. In response to a suggestion for a conference of troop-contributing nations instead of a yearly SEATO Council meeting, US Ambassador to Thailand Graham A. Martin maintained that repeated US assertions about the commitment to South Vietnam deriving from SEATO obligations made it difficult to adopt any other coalition vehicle without undermining SEATO and without raising awkward questions about Vietnam in the United States Senate. Thus, trying to use SEATO as a vehicle for the defence of South Vietnam ended up reducing the salience of the alliance as a
means of containing communism and preserving stability in Asia. The unilateral American 'opening' to communist China in 1971 played a further part in weakening SEATO and the alliance was dissolved in 1977.

III. The Challenges of Recruitment

Washington found that many third countries were willing to express rhetorical support for the principle of defending South Vietnam while offering little or nothing of substance. When the United States considered a more active combat role in Vietnam in early 1965, William Bundy of the State Department indicated that he and his colleagues had met with 'sympathy to our principles of action – resistance to aggression while working for peace – but ... little tangible evidence of prospects of substantially increased assistance'.

Probably the main reason for the reluctance to provide combat support was that, as Frederick Flott noted, allies 'didn’t quite see the urgency' of the war in Vietnam 'in the same terms that we did'. He believed that many Asian allies in particular had 'the feeling that the Viet Cong did after all have a popular base of a sort and that they just didn’t want their country in the long run to be associated with having fought against the Viet Cong'.

The perception that ultimately the communists might well triumph was vindicated in 1975, with the collapse of the Saigon regime – though American policymakers would have argued that the relatively limited third country support played at least an indirect role in this outcome.

Clifford returned from his 1967 mission with Taylor to troop contributing countries in the Pacific area with a sense of what the Washington correspondent Henry Brandon described as

... unenlightenment, even dismay. He had come to the conclusion that these allies did not agree with the American analysis of the importance of the war. The allies felt no urgency, no real sense of danger, certainly nothing to compare with their feelings when Japan had been on the march in the Second World War.
Few NATO states, either, identified much with the fate of South Vietnam. Their security interests in Southeast Asia were limited, and there was the issue of growing public hostility to the American position in Vietnam to be taken into account. In late 1964 McGeorge Bundy noted in relation to the United Kingdom, which gave only diplomatic support and non-military practical assistance, that there was ‘no political base whatever ... in any party, for an increased ... commitment’. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was one of largest contributors to South Vietnam economically but Bonn felt various inhibitions towards a more substantial involvement. One German government official stated that his country could not become involved in ‘brush-fire’ wars: ‘Military adventures outside our own borders have characterised two disastrous world wars. People still remember and resent that all over the world. So please leave us out.’ As with the United Kingdom, there were popular inhibitions. According to the German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, ‘people in Germany are under the impression that all of South Vietnam is a war zone’. South Vietnam’s condition as a ‘war zone’ was precisely why US policymakers wanted support, but no European leaders were willing to risk their careers by committing troops in the absence of popular support or even trying to create that support.

Dean Rusk suggested that in general terms the lack of help from European states was an ‘echo of the past’ and recalled ‘colonial disputes in which European nations believe we worked against them’. These disputes included the Suez Crisis of 1956, when, having launched military action to reclaim the newly nationalised Suez Canal in Egypt, Britain and France had to enact a humiliating withdrawal under American pressure. As with Vietnam in the 1960s, policy differences stemmed from conflicting national interests and priorities. While one cannot make a direct link between the Suez affair and the respective policies of the United Kingdom and France towards Vietnam later on, there is abundant evidence that the episode had an especially profound impact on French attitudes to the United States. France was concerned to be seen as an assertive, independent power rather than a
subordinate of the United States, as the differences over Vietnam and other matters showed.

Some foreign leaders invoked legal restraints as a means of deflecting American pressure to provide soldiers. Although Johnson argued that the United Kingdom had legal obligations under the SEATO treaty to fight in Vietnam, the British maintained that they had to remain neutral, citing their position as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1954 (which had partitioned Indochina into the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos) and as a member of the International Control Commission established to uphold the settlement. German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder rejected Dean Rusk's entreaties for construction or police units to perform non-combat roles on the grounds of 'legal as well as policy obstacles'. President Castelo Branco of Brazil pointed out to Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman late in 1965 that under the terms of the Brazilian Constitution, Congressional approval was required 'before troops can be sent abroad and the Brazilian Congress does not reconvene until March'.

Where feasible, American diplomats sought opportunities to obviate any legal or constitutional niceties on the part of third countries. In 1964, once informed of Korea's willingness to commit 3-4,000 combat troops, Ambassador Samuel Berger investigated ways to help the Seoul government overcome the prohibitions hindering its troops from serving abroad. In connection with deploying German troops, few if any American diplomats expressed much appreciation or respect for constitutional restrictions on German military activities. Of course, had the states in question felt much of a stake in the future of South Vietnam, then they would almost certainly have found means of overcoming any legal barriers. In the absence of any such desire, then those restrictions offered at least a semi-plausible justification for inaction.

International-political concerns inhibited some otherwise close American allies from contributing. Flott suggested that in the case of Israel, for example, 'the biggest problem was that the government ... did not want to be seen as doing something that would antagonize the Russians unnecessarily and therefore
compromise even further the position of Soviet Jewry'.

American policymakers refrained from approaching Tehran for military assistance because an Iranian contribution might antagonise Iran's neighbour, the Soviet Union. Washington made requests only of those countries with a reasonable prospect of obliging. African countries were, as Thomas L. Hughes of the State Department's Intelligence and Research office noted in 1964, 'preoccupied with their own problems and only marginally interested in what is happening in Asia'. They also considered that 'their own material needs are greater, and their means of satisfying them smaller, than those of most other countries, including South Vietnam'. Furthermore, African governments tended to regard the Vietnam conflict 'as one having Cold War overtones and therefore calling their own policy of non-alignment into play'.

A number of third country leaders felt the need to avoid being seen as a pawn of the American government. In December 1965, the Australian Ambassador to the United States indicated that Canberra planned to increase its military contribution but believed 'that any action should be an Australian self-starter rather than under pressure from the United States'. Critics were inclined to regard Thailand as 'the prostitute of the United States', partly because of the presence of Thai troops in Vietnam. Clifford commented after the completion of his mission with Taylor in 1967 that each head of government that he had visited had subsequently felt obliged to make a public statement to the effect that 'they were not on the tail of the American kite'.

Not surprisingly, the efforts to elicit third country contributions often bred a good deal of frustration among American policymakers, and led occasionally to the use of threats. At a late 1965 meeting with German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, President Johnson requested a battalion each of construction workers and of medics. To make his case, he 'reckoned all we have done for Germany. Now was the time for Germany to pay us back', and complained that 'If I can get legislation to put 200,000 more men into Vietnam, surely the Chancellor can get two battalions to Vietnam. If we are going to be partners, we better find out right now.'
weeks later, Secretary of Defense (1961-67) Robert McNamara complained that the Germans had still not provided

... a damn thing except the hospital ship. The Ambassador came in the other day and asked if the hospital ship was satisfactory as the substitute for combat troops and I told him absolutely not.... I told him that you had personally asked the Chancellor for a medical unit and a combat construction battalion, done it twice in my presence, and I saw absolutely no excuse whatsoever for their failure to send it. Well, he didn’t indicate they would. 53

There was frustration even in relation to the main third country contributor, Korea. In early 1968, Rusk advised Ambassador William Porter in Seoul that if President Park raised the question of reduced Korean ‘participation in Viet-Nam ... you should not hesitate to point out that that would require a reduced US participation in Korea’. 54 A discussion between Korean leaders and US officials a few days later saw the threat unveiled to dramatic effect:

When [Prime Minister] Chung stated that National Assembly pressure might force his government to withdraw their troops from Vietnam, [Cyrus] Vance told him flatly we would reciprocate by withdrawing our troops from Korea. He gasped, sputtered and immediately went out 55

In other instances, there was a sense of resignation towards the limits of recruitment, not least because most of the allies upon whom the United States was obliged to knock had severe limitations of one type or another. These included small armies and modest defence budgets. McNamara complained in 1964 that the Australian commitment was ‘much too small. Because their entire defence budget is so low, the Australians would be able to put in only a token force in South Vietnam’. 56 Australia provided 7,661 troops by 1968 and New Zealand 516. These countries were not the only ones facing restrictions on what they could contribute, even given the will to do so. An American diplomat in Thailand noted in 1967 that if the Thais increased their commitment to around 10,000 from the existing 2,300, then the financial burden would amount to 1/8 of the country’s defence budget, ‘solely to
pay the overseas allowances for 10,000 troops at the present rates. American financial support for some of the contributors (considered later) was therefore essential, and while Washington was keen to see any form of participation for its symbolic value, the view was that the larger the contribution the better.

It has to be said that some of the non-military contributions were of little inherent worth. Israel was reluctant to antagonise Washington by refusing outright to provide help, offering instead to teach, in the words of Frederick Flott, 'desert or dry soil agriculture to trainees who would have to take their training in Israel'. These techniques were largely irrelevant in tropical Vietnam, and there was the further difficulty of 'how do you get draft-age young men out of Vietnam to go to Israel anyway'? Flott also commented that Greece 'offered to give us ... a hundred dollars worth of surgical equipment that was rusted and they would give it to us as long as we didn't say that they had done so'. The Greek contribution was 'the lowest point of those who said reluctantly yes to joining the effort'. Other contributions, such as 10,000 cans of sardines from Morocco, were rather incongruous. The fact that the United States was willing to publicise even trivial contributions shows the importance attached to presenting the war as an international rather than merely American enterprise. Little if anything was rejected.

IV. Low-profile Diplomacy
A further characteristic of the recruitment campaign was that diplomats were obliged to maintain a low profile to avoid generating public opposition in the donor countries. In November 1966 McGeorge Bundy confirmed in an internal memorandum that, for reasons of their own, Australia and New Zealand needed little urging to increase their respective contributions, but American pressure 'right after the elections' which were due to take place in both countries 'would be badly misconstrued' and possibly counterproductive. The diplomatic skills of President Johnson, whose ambitions lay mainly in the domestic sphere, were not always held in the highest regard by his contemporaries, but on at least one occasion he acted with notable grace. In 1967 Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach praised
(though perhaps with a touch of sycophancy) the President’s ‘sensitivity’ during a visit to Thailand ‘in conveying your desire for a Thai troop contribution in Vietnam without making a direct request’.65

In relation to the visit to European capitals of US ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge in August 1964, a circular telegram was sent to US missions explaining that the

Major purpose of his trip, although this will not be indicated publicly, will be to enlist support for increased economic and technical assistance from third countries as regards getting more third country personnel out into the field. For public consumption it will be stated that [the] purpose [of] Amb[assador] Lodge’s trip is to explain to leaders of various foreign governments in Europe the current situation and US policies in Vietnam.64

So, though compatible, the publicly stated purpose of the visit differed from the main purpose. Likewise, the official rationale of Taylor and Clifford’s diplomatic tour in July-August 1967 was to consult the other members of SEATO on strategy in Vietnam, but contemporary documentation acknowledged that the more important and more closely-held aspect of the mission was to secure additional contributions. Moreover, one US diplomat suggested revising the schedule in order to avoid conveying the impression of ‘great urgency’.65 All told, then, the administration was obliged to operate with great circumspection in its efforts to increase the third country combat commitments in Vietnam, as to act otherwise would have been counterproductive, both in terms of eliciting additional contributions and in terms of the political value of contributions.

Circumspection was also important in situations where there was a chance of antagonising the major communist states. The Soviet Union’s response to expanded third country support was confined largely to diplomatic protests,66 but there were particular concerns in Washington about provoking the Chinese communists into intervention, as had happened in Korea in 1950. In spring 1967, President Johnson was thinking of approaching Taiwan and the Republic of China for support, but he had to consider the longstanding claim of mainland China to that island. In this case,
Washington wanted 'men for functions which would be least inflammatory ... with minimum noise in the international system'. In public statements policymakers had to be careful to convey the impression that third countries were contributing largely for independent reasons and because of the evident 'rightness' of the war, rather than because Washington was dictating to them or offering material inducements. Sometimes the American press publicised matters that the administration would have preferred to have kept low-key. Johnson lamented to Clifford and Taylor after their 1967 diplomatic tour that 'the worst thing we did was to announce that your visit was to discuss troops'. Clifford and Taylor rued the fact that 'the editorials and news reports obstructed their mission and in each meeting it was necessary to emphasise that they are not there to ask for troops'. It was a paradox that while the United States needed to operate in relative secrecy in the task of recruiting allies, generally it sought, as mentioned earlier, to publicise any new or expanded third country commitments.

V. Weaknesses of the Recruitment Campaign

So far as the recruitment procedure was concerned, the drill was that Washington diplomats would prompt the Saigon regime to ask the country concerned. When Frederick Flott and his colleagues in Saigon learned 'that a country would be willing to send a team, we'd generate a request, that is, stimulate the bureaucratic and paper process of getting the government of Vietnam to request the aid'. Then he or a colleague would 'follow up on the project with the intended donor country's ambassador in Saigon, to ensure that it moved forward'.

Some US diplomats recognised, however, that the efforts to recruit third countries could have been more carefully thought out. Maxwell Taylor, then US Ambassador to Saigon, complained in April 1965 that Washington had directed him to raise the question of an Australian combat force with the regime in Saigon, only for him to be told soon after that he should now wait for further orders. He had also been told to discuss with South Vietnam the question of Korean combat troops, but lacked an indication of how these troops would be deployed — something Saigon
would want to know. There was confusion even about how US combat troops were going to be used, now that the Americanisation of the war had begun. Taylor wanted an authoritative indication of Washington’s desires with respect to the introduction of US and, above all, third country, combat troops: ‘It is not going to be easy to get ready concurrence for the large-scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit.’ On another occasion, Taylor even argued that the deployment of an international combat force to north Vietnam might intensify Vietnamese xenophobia and encourage Saigon to let the United States bear still more of the burden. US Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown in Seoul opposed third country contributions, because of the possible detrimental impact on bilateral relations between the United States and would-be donors. He warned in 1965 that recruiting Korean combat troops would risk creating a situation in which Korea appears to its own people and to others in the world not as an independent and willing contributor to a struggle in which it has a vital interest, but as a puppet or vassal of the United States, brought into danger in distant Southeast Asia and at home to serve the interests of the United States.

Later, Brown expressed concern that his masters in Washington were pushing too hard and too quickly to elicit a Korean contribution. Even if ‘low-key’ initial representations were made in South Vietnam, those representations would ‘of course, immediately become known to ROK Government, which will just be emerging from [a] highly difficult struggle to obtain Assembly approval for [the] despatch [of an] additional brigade and division’. This struggle had undermined Korean-American relations and led to criticism of Washington for applying ‘too much pressure’ on Seoul. However, Korea did add some 50,000 troops, by far the biggest third country effort, by 1968. It seems, therefore, that Ambassador Martin’s fears for US-Korean relations were exaggerated, at least in the short-term, but he was of course correct to note that Washington was proceeding with pressure and haste to cultivate third country commitments.
The regime in South Vietnam was scarcely able or even willing to take part in the recruitment programme. Saigon was chronically preoccupied with its internal politics as one regime gave way to another, with the result that the South Vietnamese were ill fitted to take the diplomatic initiative. According to Chester Cooper, "Saigon appeared to believe", with some justification in fact, "that the [recruitment] programme was a public relations campaign directed at the American people." A related problem was that South Vietnam's foreign policy establishment was small and inexperienced. Robert McNamara complained in 1964 that Saigon was "inadequately represented abroad" and should despatch "many more able ambassadors" to enable "proper" representation in the United Nations, African and South American countries, and in Europe, above all, the FRG. Effective representation would help to increase international concern for South Vietnam's plight, and might lead, it was hoped, to more third country assistance.

On one of the few occasions when South Vietnamese diplomats took action, they managed to impede American recruitment efforts. In June 1965, President Park of Korea noted a recent message from Saigon expressing thanks for the decision to send a division of combat troops and asking for the troops as soon as possible. Park complained that despite his personal wishes it was at that stage "impossible for ROKG [Republic of Korea Government] to act on such a message", because publicly he had "consistently and publicly denied any decision to send combat troops." In fairness, American diplomats might have played a role in this diplomatic faux pas, in the sense they had an obligation to coordinate their efforts with South Vietnamese diplomats. Furthermore, it is probably too much to expect that a state as beleaguered as South Vietnam should have had the resources and the skill to mount a major diplomatic campaign. It seems too that Saigon might have had realistically modest expectations of the recruitment campaign. Thomas L. Hughes suggested late in 1964 that along with not having "made a great deal of effort to push the third country program" the South Vietnamese did not hold "any great expectation of it." The fact that Washington rather than Saigon – which
needed the help most of all, given that its very survival was at stake – did most of the work was one of the oddities of the campaign to recruit third countries.

Officially, the Pentagon supported the programme to increase third country support, but some military personnel harboured reservations. A State Department official suggested in 1964 that military staff at the United States Mission in Saigon looked upon third country assistance ‘with very little zeal’. This was mainly because of their experience in allied commands such as Korea, when ‘the care and feeding of these third country elements has always proved more trouble than it is worth’.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against relying on allies in Vietnam because the United States had received ‘no significant support in Korea…. The United States did essentially all the fighting, took all the casualties, and paid all the bills.’ This was a harsh view especially in relation to the Republic of Korea’s contribution, but the perception was that unless third country forces were present in large numbers it was scarcely worth having them on board. Overall, given their sphere of action, it is not surprising that US military officials in Vietnam were more interested in the practical rather than the political value of third country contributions.

VI. Payments for Third Countries

On occasions, American policymakers tried to use economic coercion to obtain combat troops. In mid-1965 a number of White House advisers came up with the idea of providing support for the pound, which suffered periodic crises or ‘runs’ that required American bailouts, only if the British would send soldiers to Vietnam. According to McGeorge Bundy, ‘a British brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling’. President Johnson was keen to bring the British onto the combat scene because the United Kingdom was a leading member of NATO, but he did not want to adopt Bundy’s approach to recruitment. Johnson realised that if the British agreed to send troops to Vietnam only under duress then the national and international controversy of America’s stand might be inflamed still further should British motivations become public knowledge. The
White House advisers duly conceded to the wishes of their chief. Bundy informed Johnson in September that

The one thing which [Prime Minister Harold Wilson] was apparently trying to avoid was a liability in Vietnam, and you will recall that it was your own wisdom that prevented us from making any such connection earlier in the summer, although I did once informally say to one of the Prime Minister’s people that a battalion would be worth a billion – a position which I explicitly changed later.83

However, ‘battalion for a billion’ type thinking did not disappear entirely. Even as late as 1967 Dean Rusk remarked ‘rather wryly ... that he did think we could help the British’ with their financial troubles ‘if they put forces into Vietnam’.82

It was not just in relation to the British that American diplomats thought in terms of financial *quid pro quos*. In December 1965, the American Ambassador explained in connection with Brazil that ‘while the [development] program loan decision was not contingent on a Brazilian military contribution in Vietnam, it was expected that Castelo Branco would make every effort to help in Vietnam’.83 In 1966, McNamara told President Johnson that ‘There’s no question but that the Koreans will come. It’s just a matter of price.’ Seoul had requested ‘about $500-$700 million worth of cumshw [gratuities or bribes] that they wanted from us in order to send that division’.84 Other officials understood that the motives of third country contributors were not always idealistic. Clifford suggested in 1968 that while Korea was willing to send 5,000 civilians to provide various types of help, Seoul’s main motive was ‘to obtain high paying jobs and to earn additional foreign exchange’.85 Flott commented that Philippino troops were ‘on per diem and there were perhaps other incentives than fighting the fight for freedom’.86 Early in 1968 Pakistan offered to provide 5,000 civilians but only at what Clifford described as ‘an exorbitant price’.87

Without a doubt, some contributors were inclined to try to exploit the political vulnerability of the United States in seeking assistance. In September 1967 Thailand offered an additional 8,500 men, but only at a high price. As Walt Rostow
indicated, 'The Thai have tied to this offer a statement of their military requirements, which, if taken at face value, is huge.' Even after isolating 'those elements of the price list necessary to receive the additional troops' the package still amounted to $149 million. However, if Washington decided that the price was too high and chose 'to forget the whole thing', then Bangkok might become less willing to make Thai 'real-estate' available to the United States 'for a broad range of Vietnam-related projects', such as bombing missions and logistical support. Some third country officials were unabashed in admitting the connection between participating in Vietnam and financial considerations. Flott noted that 'there were a number of enterprising individual Filipinos' who arrived at the Saigon embassy 'saying, well, if you can make such and such a contract for barges or floating cranes or something from my firm, or if you can buy so much San Miguel beer for sale on the PX' (post exchange) they could 'be very influential and we'll certainly see to it that you get the free world assistance'.

There was, for American policymakers, some undesirable publicity about the economic dimension of third country recruitment. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey complained in 1966 that 'Dastardly are the news stories coming from the United States -- "Philippines are human mercenaries."' While some US officials acknowledged the importance of financial quid pro quos in eliciting third country support, it is too easy to charge the United States with recruiting mercenaries -- the situation was far more nuanced. In September 1966 Walt Rostow pointed out in relation to the Philippines, which was then in the process of introducing its civic action group, that it was 'all too simple -- and generally superficial -- to take an action by Government A and an action by Government B and make one the "pay off" for the other'. The American assistance programme to the Philippines was 'a determined effort to help a friendly country that is in trouble'. It had been underway before the Phillipino decision to provide troops and would have been implemented regardless of the situation in Vietnam. He noted too that there was no sending of 'economic aid to our Australian and New Zealand friends -- who also have sent troops to Vietnam'. Moreover, the fact that Australia and New Zealand chose to
cover all their costs indicates the existence of motives other than money. Canberra and Wellington sought to strengthen their security links with the United States in an era in which British power in Asia was declining. Financial issues aside, the Thais had a range of motives in providing troops. Their contribution was, according to Dean Rusk, in part ‘a gambit to have a larger voice in determining the composition of any future peace conference and related actions, dealing with the command structure, etc.’. They also wanted to modernise their armed forces. According to Stanley Robert Larsen and James Lawton Collins, Seoul relished the political symbolism of sending its army as an independent (if American funded) force to assist the United States. While generous American largesse played a role in some cases, it was not the sole reason why third countries were willing to contribute troops; given their locations, they all had a significant interest in the outcome of the war in Vietnam. This was in contrast to the NATO states, who were geographically and psychologically far removed from the action.

VII. The Practical Value of the Contributions

It is worth noting that even when third country troops came at a price, they could be good value. After accompanying Vice-President Humphrey on a tour of the Far East early in 1966, Presidential adviser Jack Valenti commented that the cost of equipping two or more Korean divisions, and sending them to Vietnam was ‘cheap – for the equipping Koreans is at the ratio of 5:1 to 10:1 for the same equipment of the same number of Americans. Moreover, the Koreans are competent jungle fighters – and are ready to fight.’ Third country forces generally acquitted themselves well in the field. On a visit to Vietnam in June 1967 Special Counsel to the President Harry McPherson was ‘stunned by the soldierly bearing of the Philippino soldiers’. They had ‘an effective civic action project, a med cap [medical capabilities] program, and they are building a large and decent refugee camp’. According to Frederick Flott, close Philippino-American ties meant that ‘a Philippino medical team would proceed very much like an American one would, so it was much easier to integrate them into our effort’. For McPherson, the Korean Marines and Tiger Troop were ‘a
tough bunch. They have a method of seal and search that is the epitome of war psychology; it is slow, harrowing, and effective'. General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff from 1968, commented that the activities of the Koreans 'left nothing to be desired' and that the Australians had 'performed very well'. Flott commented that 'the Australians and New Zealanders both had first-rate medical programs and did very good things, and of course they also had troops there'.

That is not to say that the third country troops were always perfect. Freeman Matthews, who was based in the United States embassy in Saigon 1964-66, was surprised that the brutality and cruelty of the Koreans in 'how they enforced the rules in their particular sectors' did not create 'more trouble' for the United States. Harry McPherson commented that the view that the Koreans had 'created as many problems as they have solved, that they are too brutal and careless of civilian life' was widespread among American civilians in Vietnam. There is some evidence of holding back from engagements. Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland suggested in 1965 that the Koreans were especially 'sensitive to the possibility of heavy casualties', and two years later McPherson noted the common perception that the Australians were 'too cautious; they did not patrol widely, or invite attacks ... their effectiveness was being diminished by their conservatism'. According to another commentator, the often somewhat reticent character of Australian military operations had domestic political causes, 'as the home government did not want to see a big casualty list'. One might suggest, however, that the refusal to take payments mitigated Canberra's seeming reluctance to permit the sacrifice of Australian lives.

The Honolulu conference of American political and military leaders in April 1965 established the principle that that South Vietnamese and third country forces would accept US operational control. However, there were limits to American influence over third country activities, mainly due to national sensitivities. Early in 1968, during the Tet Offensive, Clifford was surprised that General Westmoreland did 'not have the authority to control Korean or Australian forces'. For his part, Rusk felt that it would be beneficial to establish a Combined Allied Command with
South Vietnam's President Thieu as Commander-in-Chief and Westmoreland as Chief-of-Staff, but political difficulties — namely, Saigon's concerns about encroachments on its sovereignty — inhibited such a development. Ambassador Bunker feared that changes in command arrangements would lend themselves to propaganda exploitation by the communists, 'and indeed all critics of the present Vietnamese government and of our efforts here'. The use of 'some international umbrella, such as the United Nations afforded the Korean War command structure ... might make the proposal more digestible', but 'the façade of a Vietnamese overall commander for the seven nations grouping' would not be suitable, given national sentiments and petty rivalries. The Koreans, for example, would want 'high-level positions in the command structure'. They wanted, for reasons of prestige, to operate with relative independence and without the continued scrutiny of American forces or advisers, and above all, one might suggest, without taking orders from the South Vietnamese.

The participating states sometimes expressed concerns about the conduct of the war and about the terms of a settlement. Bundy noted in 1965 that 'to hold some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about talks'. A bombing pause as a prelude to negotiations would, among other things, 'ease the domestic pressure' on allies such as the Australians. The Manila conference of troop-contributing countries in 1966 saw intense wrangling between the United States and its allies over the wording of the communiqué on peace negotiations and US troop withdrawals should negotiations succeed. There were different views among the contributors about the prospects of Soviet and Chinese intervention, an issue that was of dominating concern to strategists in the White House and the State Department. The State Department's Philip Habib noted in 1967, for example, that Asian contributors were less concerned than the Australians and New Zealanders about such outside intervention. Political differences are endemic to coalition warfare and were not detrimental to the allied effort in Vietnam, given that the United States and South Vietnam carried by far the heaviest burdens. The decision not to send troops into North Vietnam, for example, for fear of precipitating direct
Chinese intervention, was a Washington strategy rather than one deriving from any concerns of third countries. Nor did the communists succeed in exploiting any rivalries to harm the coalition. However, differences in outlook and policy between the contributors did have to be considered by American policymakers whose energies were already well dispersed by the myriad demands of waging war in Vietnam.

Given that financial inducements played a role in bringing some third countries into Vietnam, it is not surprising that some of the contributors were notably corrupt. Andrew Antippas, who served as a Political Officer in Saigon 1967-69, commented in relation to the Philippines that

the manager of the Commissary or the PX in Cholon was a Filipino employee. The PX would get in a supply of TV sets, stereos, or whatever. He would call PHILCAG, Philippine Civic Action Group, which was out in Tay Ninh province. He would call them, and they would scarf up everything that had come in. I was in Saigon for months before I could buy a TV set.115

Antippas noted the saying about the Thais that, ‘If we could only manoeuvre the Viet Cong between the Thai and the PX, we’d have a military victory on our hands.’ Thai soldiers ‘would buy refrigerators and sell them off the back of their trucks.... on a wholesale basis.’116 According to General Westmoreland, the South Koreans would ‘use their presence to get as much new American equipment as possible, trading off their participation in operations for new helicopters and artillery’. He noted that ‘the reputation of the Koreans for scrounging afforded one argument against a combined command, for under such an arrangement foreign officers would have made up part of the MACV staff.’117 America’s allies were ‘so corrupt’, Antippas concluded, ‘It used to anger everybody in the Embassy.’ However, there was a general sense, as Antippas suggested, that corruption ‘was simply the cost of doing business, and who cares?’118 Hence, there was little or no desire on the part of American policymakers to admonish the culprits or see the racketeering publicised, lest such measures besmirch the entire free world contribution in Vietnam and
weaken the coalition. Corruption was a serious matter nevertheless. It was a drain on resources, offered grist to the communist propaganda mill and risked undermining morale in the more upright elements of free world forces.

Ultimately, one might measure the contribution of third country troops in Vietnam by their sacrifices. With 5,241 dead (mainly Korean) between them, third country forces accepted a notable share of the losses.\textsuperscript{119} This amounted to around a tenth of American casualties, and was proportional with the numbers of third country troops in Vietnam. Larsen and Collins noted in 1975 that the Korean troops, for example, ‘received almost no recognition in the American press and it is doubtful if many Americans fully appreciate their contributions in Vietnam’.\textsuperscript{120} Decades later, third country contributions have, for a range of political and cultural reasons too complex to consider here, yet to receive much acknowledgment in the United States.

\textbf{VIII. Conclusion}

It is apparent that there are a number of interesting paradoxes involved in coalition-building which stretch far beyond the US experience in the Vietnam War. First, while coalitions are often sought for the purposes of burden-sharing and legitimacy, they can also take place against the background of conflicting interests between coalition-partners and make coordination of policy even harder. Burden-sharing may be fine in principle but it also hinders effective control of policy and war-planning. Second, it might seem strange that even an overwhelmingly superior power like the United States still needed allies in order to legitimise its actions, both domestically and internationally. If anything, this indicates the close relationship between war and politics, and points to the potential conflict of interests between winning a war and winning the peace. Finally, while the United States needed allies in Vietnam, this could not be seen to occur as result of political pressures from Washington but had rather to be ‘voluntary’ and based on allied initiatives. This was in essence a public-relations issue but it had important consequences for the efforts to gain political legitimacy and domestic and international support for US efforts in the region.\textsuperscript{121}
In some regards, the campaign to recruit allies in Vietnam can be seen in a positive light. For a start, it is natural for states to try to wage war as part of a coalition rather than carry the political and military burdens alone. This policy of course serves many useful purposes, such as sharing military burdens, enhancing domestic support and strengthening political legitimacy. In the 1960s, the United States had the politically if not militarily successful Cold War coalition warfare example of Korea upon which to draw. Though *quid pro quo* are sometimes distasteful, especially in the light of the exalted rhetoric of freedom and self-determination usually deployed to justify the making of war, implicit or explicit deals feature in all coalitions. So far as payments for contributors in Vietnam are concerned, it is simplistic to speak of the United States recruiting ‘mercenaries’ – for a start, of the five countries furnishing troops, Korea had offered to make a contribution in 1954, long before the launching of the ‘More Flags’ appeal, and Australia and the Philippines were providing non-combat assistance before the appeal. In proportion with their numbers, third countries made sacrifices and played a useful practical role – Australian troops, to mention but one example, had notably well-honed skills in guerrilla warfare because of operations with the British in Malaysia.

Vietnam was one of the most divisive conflicts in history, so one might expect at best only modest results from a recruitment campaign. The presence of Asian allies went some way in obviating the view, noted by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, that ‘this war is a matter of white people against yellow people’. Although the coalition did not give rise to a long-lasting alliance between troop contributors, such a development has rarely been the case historically. The Grand Alliance of the Second World War, for example, gave way to the bitter geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War within two years of the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Korean War did not lead to a recasting of free world alliances. Some of the negative attitudes expressed by US officials towards the recruitment campaign and its results might have derived as much from the general frustrations towards the war as from frustrations towards allies.
However, the limitations of the coalition-building effort do seem to overshadow the more positive aspects. It seems unlikely that in the absence of material incentives from the United States the Koreans, the Thais and the Filipinos would have contributed on the scale that they did. The recruitment campaign was episodic but pushy, and its limited results—just five third country contributors of combat troops—was surely a comment on the wisdom of American policy in Vietnam. The historian Fredrik Logevall has argued with good justification that President Johnson seemed to prefer pressuring allies for troops to taking advice from them. The prime example of this attitude is Johnson’s blunt response to Harold Wilson’s telephone call early in 1965 to try to moderate the United States’ response to communist attacks in Vietnam—essentially, he told the British leader either to provide troops or to mind his own business. Yet had the caution of allies been heeded then the United States would have had further cause to think especially hard about Americanising the conflict in 1965. One hardly need add that with hindsight the decision to introduce US combat troops was a disastrous initiative, staking American prestige on the survival of South Vietnam as never before and leading to the loss of nearly 60,000 American lives in a war whose scars have not yet healed.

The alliance of troop-contributing states in Vietnam might be described, in the light of some of the measures needed to induce assistance from the Asian countries, as ‘a coalition of the semi-willing’. SEATO had notable limitations as vehicle for the coalition, which ended up merely as an ad hoc grouping. Asian and Antipodean third country participation certainly did not prevent the wrenching domestic divisions in the United States, popular protests in Europe or Congress’s later imposition of checks on the White House’s capacity to wage war without a formal declaration.

It is also worth noting that the melancholy experience of trying to increase third country combat support led at least one American official, Clark Clifford, to a sense of profound disillusion with his country’s policies in Vietnam. Clifford was, in the words of Henry Kissinger, one of the ‘shapers of the postwar foreign policy
consensus' in the United States. Among other things, this consensus emphasised the primacy of preventing the spread of communism across the globe, based on the premise that the 'loss' of one state to that ideology would have grave consequences for the future of other non-communist states in the region. However, for Clifford the fruitlessness of the 1967 recruitment tour with Maxwell Taylor 'buried Washington's treasured domino theory'. By early the following year he had concluded that the war had become a lost cause. Clifford's apostasy, along with that of a number of other advisers, encouraged Johnson to abandon his plans to run for the presidency again, and the problem of Vietnam fell to President Richard Nixon. All told, the 'More Flags' in Vietnam recruitment campaign had turned the United States into a supplicant and confirmed well before the evacuation of US troops from 1969 that the American-dominated coalition war to defend South Vietnam was a deeply flawed enterprise.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1 The literature in this field is substantial. See, for example, John Dumbrell & David Ryan (eds.), *Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and Ghosts* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007); and Jeffrey Record & W. Andrew Terrill, *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights* (Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004). In the former work, see especially the contributions by John Dumbrell & Trevor B. McCrisken. Other useful works include Robert K. Brigham, *Is Iraq Another Vietnam* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006); and Lloyd Gardner & Marilyn B. Young (eds.), *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: New Press, 2007). Record and Terrill is the only one of the accounts mentioned that compares the role of allies in the conflicts; see here pp. 28-32.


3 Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cost Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of China, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. All statistics for third country troops are from Larsen & Collins, *Allied Participation*, table, p. 23. Legally, the United States was a ‘third country’ in Vietnam, but given its role in backing first the French in Indochina from the end of the Second World War until 1954, then supporting South Vietnam, and given Washington’s centrality in building the free world coalition, it is considered integral to the conflict and as such distinct from other free world participants.

4 The term ‘free world’ has its origins in American Cold War propaganda and is used throughout this article only to mean non-communist states allied with the United States. On the coalition dimension of the Korean War, see Wayne Danzik, ‘Coalition Forces in the Korean War’, *Naval College War Review*, 47 (Autumn 1994); Stanley Sandler, *The Korean


6 Research Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes (State Department Director of Intelligence and Research) to Dean Rusk, 28 August 1964, Document 143, Vietnam Memos Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64, Box 7, NSF: Country File Vietnam, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBIL). The authors would like to thank Rebekah Ross of the Johnson Library for providing this valuable document.


9 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.

10 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.


37


26 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 267.

27 Ibid.

28 Telegram from SEATO meeting delegation to State, 14 April 1964, Document 48, FRUS 1964-1968 XXVII.


32 Rostow to Johnson, 19 April 1967, Document 89, FRUS 1964-1968 XVII.

33 Embassy Bangkok to State, 12 January 1967, Document 185, FRUS 1964-1968 XVII.

34 William P. Bundy to Johnson, 27 July 1965, Document 95, FRUS 1964-65 III.

35 Flott Oral History, LBJL/ADST.


37 Bundy to Johnson, ‘The British and Vietnam’, 5 December 1964, Bundy Vol. 7 10/1-12/31/64 (2 of 3), Box 2, NSF: Memos to the President, LBJL.

38 Research Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes (State Department Director of Intelligence and Research) to Dean Rusk, 28 August 1964, Vietnam Memos Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64, Box 7, NSF: Country File Vietnam, LBJL.


41 For an overview, see e.g. Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance, trans. Susan Emanuel (New York & Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 2-10.


44 Harriman to Johnson, 23 December 1965, Document 87, FRUS 1964-1968 III.


46 Flott Oral History, LBJL/ADST.

47 Harriman to Johnson, 23 December 1965, Document 87, FRUS 1964-1965 III.

48 Research Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes (State Department Director of Intelligence and Research) to Dean Rusk, 28 August 1964, Document 143, Vietnam Memos Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64, Box 7, NSF: Country File Vietnam, LBJL.


50 Alexis Johnson to Martin, 23 September 1966, Document 324, FRUS 1964-1968 XVII.

51 Notes of Meeting, 5 August 1967, Document 270, FRUS 1964-1968 V.


54 State to Embassy Seoul, 11 February 1968, Document 175, FRUS 1964-1968 XXIX.

55 Embassy Seoul to State, 14 February 1968, Document 179, FRUS 1964-1968 XXIX.

56 NSC meeting, 15 May 1964, Document 156, FRUS 1964-1968 I.


58 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST. For official purposes this medical equipment was valued at $15,000. Larsen & Collins, Allied Participation, p. 166.

59 Larsen & Collins, Allied Participation, p. 164. For a detailed, if sanguine, account of third country non-military contributions see ibid., pp. 160-69.

60 Chester Cooper points out that Washington ‘periodically published a list of contributions that included a shipload of coffee from Latin America and an X-ray unit from Europe’. Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 266.

61 William P. Bundy to Rusk, 15 November 1966, Document 309, FRUS 1964-1968 IV.


64 Editorial Note, Document 301, FRUS 1964-1968 I.

65 Editorial Note, Document 253, FRUS 1964-1968 V.
66 Research Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes (State Department Director of Intelligence and Research) to Dean Rusk, 28 August 1964, Document 143, Vietnam Memos Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64, Box 7, NSF: Country File Vietnam, LBJL.

67 White House to Embassy Saigon, 5 May 1967, Document 159, FRUS 1964-1968 I.

68 Notes of Meeting, 5 August 1967, Document 270, FRUS 1964-1968 II.

69 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.

70 Embassy Saigon to State, 17 April 1965, Document 259, FRUS 1964-1968 II.


72 Embassy Seoul to State, 15 April 1965, Document 39, FRUS 1964-1968 XXIX.

73 Embassy Seoul to State, 18 March 1966, Document 82, FRUS 1964-1968 XXIX.

74 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 266.

75 Embassy Saigon to State, 14 May 1964, Document 152, FRUS 1964-1968 I.

76 Embassy Seoul to State, 14 June 1965, Document 55, FRUS 1964-1968 XXIX.

77 Research Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes (State Department Director of Intelligence and Research) to Dean Rusk, 28 August 1964, Document 143, Vietnam Memos Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64, Box 7, NSF: Country File Vietnam, LBJL.


79 Quoted in Danzik, ‘Coalition Forces in the Korean War’, p. 25.

81 Bundy to Johnson, ‘Report from George Ball’, 10 September 1965, Bundy Vol. 14 (2/3), Box 4, NSF: Memos to the President, LBJL.


86 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.


89 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.


98 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.


101 Flott OH, LBJL/ADST.

102 H. Freeman Matthews Jr OH, conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 20 April 1993, ADST.


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113 Cooper, *Lost Crusade*, pp. 267, 316.


115 Andrew F. Antippas OH conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 19 July 1994, ADST.

116 Antippas OH, ADST.


118 Antippas OH, ADST.

119 Blackburn, *Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's 'More Flags'*; p. xiii. The breakdown was as follows: Republic of Korea, 4,407; Australia and New Zealand, 475; Thailand, 350; and the Philippines, 9. *Ibid*.

The authors want to thank Andrew Priest for pointing them in the direction of some of these paradoxes.


Logevall points out (p. 177) in ‘The Western Powers and the Escalation of the War’, in Daum, Gardner & Mausbach (eds.), *America, the Vietnam War and the World*, that ‘the governments in London, Ottawa and Tokyo ... failed ... to truly confront the administration with the choice it was making. In doing so, they performed an essential function in allowing Lyndon Johnson in late 1964 and the first half of 1965 to escalate the Vietnam War by stealth.’


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