Army Officers, Historians and Journalists: The Emergence, Expansion and Diversification of British Military History, 1854-1914

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## Contents

Acknowledgements iv

Abbreviations v

Abstract vii

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Military History and Army Education: Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, 1856-1914 33

Chapter 2 Strategy, Tactics and Campaigns: Military History for Officers, 1854-1914 90

Chapter 3 The Emergence of Official History, 1856-1914 145

Chapter 4 ‘Popular’ Military History, 1854-1914 201

Chapter 5 Historians, Men of Letters and the Universities: ‘High-Brow’ Military History, 1854-1914 258

Conclusion 312

Appendix 1: Biographies 335

Bibliography 353
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<td>CAB</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Files</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Churchill College Archives</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of the Imperial General Staff</td>
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<td>CLW</td>
<td>Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<td>DSD</td>
<td>Director of Staff Duties</td>
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<td>FSR</td>
<td>Field Service Regulations</td>
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<td>HCL</td>
<td>Hove Central Library</td>
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<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her/Her Majesty’s Stationary Office</td>
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<td><em>JRUSI</em></td>
<td>Journal of the Royal United Service Institution</td>
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<td>JSCSC</td>
<td>Joint Service Command and Staff College, Shrivenham</td>
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<td>LHCMA</td>
<td>Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>National Army Museum</td>
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<td>National Library of Scotland</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
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<td>psc</td>
<td>Passed Staff College</td>
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<td>Royal Artillery</td>
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<td>Royal Engineers</td>
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<td>Royal United Service Institution</td>
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<td>The National Archives</td>
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<td>ULA</td>
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<td>UMA</td>
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<td>WO</td>
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Abstract

At the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, Britain had only one military academy which taught Military History, the subject was overlooked at universities, few historians wrote on the topic and the government had not yet sanctioned the writing of official history. Yet, by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the situation was radically different. Not only had Military History come to play an important role in army education, there were several universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, which taught the subject, while the Committee of Imperial Defence had created a ‘Historical Section’ dedicated to the writing of officially authorised histories. Despite this dramatic transformation, the development of British Military History during this period has hitherto not been considered by scholars as a subject worthy of serious investigation. The meagre research which has been conducted on the subject has been limited in terms of its scope and use of primary sources. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in the historiography by analysing the emergence, expansion and diversification of British Military History between 1854 and 1914. It will examine the different factors which led to the expansion of Military History: the need for improved military education, the requirement to collate information on recent wars, commercial opportunism, the desire to influence public perceptions and the discovery of Military History as a subject worthy of historical research.
On 17 March 1897 Colonel Lonsdale Hale began a lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, entitled ‘The Professional Study of Military History’, with the words, ‘Dr Maguire brought before us a few nights ago the study of Military History as a factor in the training of the nation; today, I bring that study again before you, but this time as a factor in the training of the soldier’.¹ This comment, especially from an officer who had taught Military History for many years to officer cadets, suggests that the subject was thought to have a number of functions by the end of the nineteenth century.² However, less than fifty years before Hale delivered his lecture, the subject had been regarded very differently in Britain. In 1854 the country had only one small military institution that taught Military History, it was not studied in any university, few historians wrote on the subject, and the government had not yet sanctioned the writing of official history. Given the developments which Hale’s comment suggests had occurred over a fifty-year period, the emergence, expansion and diversification of Military History in Britain between 1854 and 1914 would appear to be a subject worthy of closer examination.

Although there is no consensus as to the precise definition of ‘Military History’, the subject is currently understood to encompass a wide and multifaceted approach to the study of conflict, as well as the relationship between the armed services and society. The definition found in Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography, for example, characterises the subject as ‘the analytic review of wars, campaigns, battles, and military institutions, including their economic, political, and social foundations and effects, and relationships between military and civil authorities.’ Likewise, Stephen Morillo and Michael Pavkovic have adopted a similar definition, describing the subject as ‘any historical study in which military personnel of all sorts, warfare… military institutions, and their various intersections with politics, economics, society, nature, and culture form the focus or topic of the work’. Such a definition, which encompasses a wide range of considerations, is in part due to the influence of ‘new’ Military History which emerged during the 1960s and which placed an emphasis on ‘recruitment, training… the internal dynamics of military institutions [and] the relationship between military systems and greater society’, rather than on the conduct of military operations.

As the subject is understood to encompass such a wide range of topics, David Gates wrote in 2001 in the preface to his Warfare in the Nineteenth Century that the boundaries of Military History ‘are difficult to identify, for it is hard to think of anything that has not influenced, or has been influenced by, war’.

However, such an approach to the definition of Military History has not always been the case, as Hale, in his lecture at the RUSI in 1897, considered Military History to be simply

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‘military experiences’ in the past.7 Moreover, on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War, John Fortescue, the Lees Knowles Lecturer in Military Science at the University of Cambridge, presented a further definition of the subject in which he described it as ‘the history of the strife of communities expressed through the conflict of organised bands of men’, deliberately selecting his words so as to exclude economic warfare.8 As Fortescue went on to explain further his conception of the subject as the history of ‘the rise and fall of civilisations’, or ‘the process of supplanting the inferior by the superior’, he demonstrated that his understanding of what constituted Military History was heavily influenced by his belief in Social Darwinism.9

As such, then, definitions of what constitutes Military History seem to differ considerably in the twentieth century compared to the views expressed in the nineteenth century. Yet, as most of the more recent historical research on the nature and evolution of Military History as a discipline focuses on the twentieth century, there are still no studies to which the historian can turn to discover how Military History developed during the nineteenth century. This immediately raises the question as to what time-period the nineteenth century might cover. After E.J. Hobsbawn’s use of the term ‘the Long Nineteenth Century’ to refer to the period from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, many historians have adopted this term.10 For the military historian, however, there are just as many reasons for taking the nineteenth century to refer to the period 1815-1914. The final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo in 1815 ushered in a new epoch in military history.11 Hence, before assessing the inadequacies, problems and gaps

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9 Ibid., p. 17.
in the secondary literature, it is important to reflect on different phases in, first, the emergence, then both the expansion and diversification of Military History in Britain during the period 1815-1914.

The Evolution of Military History, 1815-1914

The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 caused an increase in the volume of Military History published. Particularly numerous were memoirs and autobiographies which described the experiences of individuals, mainly officers, during this conflict. Likewise a small number of biographical works on the military figures involved in the fighting were published prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, most of which were related to Wellington or Napoleon. There were comparatively few works dedicated to the narration of a campaign, although Sir William Napier’s six volume study, History of the War in the Peninsula, published between 1828 and 1840, was still considered to be the only ‘classical Military History’ in the English language by the military thinker Major-General Sir Patrick MacDougall in 1856. Similarly, in 1844 Major Basil Jackson wrote that even regarding the Waterloo campaign, ‘it cannot be said that any [British] writer has, hitherto, given us a full and satisfactory account of the momentous events of that period’. Although in this year William Siborne’s History of the War in France and Belgium did provide the ‘full account’

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12 See, for example: ‘Kincaid’, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade (London, 1847); Harry Smith, Autobiography (India, 1844); Robert Blakeney, A Boy in the Peninsular War (London, 1835); John Blakiston, Twelve Years of Military Adventure (London, 1829); H.E. Bunbury, Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France (London, 1854); and, George Jones, Battle of Waterloo (London, 1817).
that was lacking, it was still the only work in the English language that was referenced by Colonel Charles Chesney in his celebrated *Waterloo Lectures* of 1868.\(^{16}\)

The lack of an intrusive European conflict between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 prevented Military History from featuring more prominently in British historical writing during the first half of the nineteenth century. The French Emperor’s defeat in 1815 was thought to have demonstrated that the British constitution was, as the historian William Cruise wrote in that year, ‘quite perfect’.\(^{17}\) Consequently, a historical approach that concentrated on constitutional progress, the development of personal liberty, and the special nature of British Christianity came to dominate much of the historical writing in Britain.\(^{18}\) An emphasis on these factors ensured that despite the rapid expansion of the British Empire between 1815 and 1854, particularly in Asia, Military History did not feature prominently in British historical writing at this time beyond the few campaign narratives produced by officers who had served in these conflicts.\(^{19}\) Although chairs of History had been founded at the University of Glasgow in 1692, at Edinburgh in 1719, at St Andrews in 1737, and the Regius Chairs of Modern History at Oxford and Cambridge were established in 1724, none of these institutions had a History syllabus, a Faculty of History, or an examination in the subject until the 1850s.\(^{20}\)


University of London, founded in 1836, had also created a Professorship in History, which between 1840 and 1860 was occupied by Edward Creasy.\(^{21}\) Creasy, who was educated as a lawyer and called to the Bar in 1837, had an interest in Military History and wrote two works on the subject: *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* in 1851, and *Invasions and the Projected Invasions of England from the Saxon Times*, the following year. So unusual was it for a university historian to write Military History at this time, Creasy felt the need to excuse the seeming ‘strange weakness or depravity of mind’ which he felt people would assume he had for selecting events in which ‘hundreds or thousands of human beings stabbed, hewed, or shot each other to death’ as his ‘favourite topic’. Thus, he focused on the ‘undeniable greatness’ of the personal qualities of many of the combatants and the place of the battle in history, rather than on an examination of the military means employed or on an analysis of the judgements made by commanders. As Military History was not examined at universities at this time, there was no scholarly readership for such work, so Creasy intended his writing for the general reading public. His *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* was particularly well received and it went through six editions in the three years immediately following its publication.\(^{22}\)

In keeping with its lack of prominence, Military History was not taught at any of the army’s academies before 1850. The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, founded in 1741 to train officers for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, did not teach the subject as part of its curriculum before 1854. Admission to Woolwich was limited to boys aged between fourteen and sixteen years of age who had passed an entrance exam. This assessment, which was set by the Professors and Masters of the Academy, reflected the ‘theoretical’ or first

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phase of education a cadet would undertake. As a result, it focused on English, Maths, French, German, Geography, History and Drawing. The study of History at Woolwich paid no special attention to military events, was limited to the period before 1815, and expected the pupil to exhibit factual knowledge only. Once a cadet had passed through the ‘theoretical’ part of his study at Woolwich, he advanced to the ‘practical’ phase of instruction which did not include any historical study.23

Similarly, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, formed for the education of young officers in 1812, did not teach Military History before 1854, either. This institution admitted boys between thirteen and fifteen years of age, so its curriculum was dedicated to providing them with a basic ‘liberal education’ as opposed to specialist military instruction. Passing out of Sandhurst was not obligatory for an officer, since between 1815 and 1871 around two-thirds of all commissions in the army were obtained by purchase, while the other third were ‘inherited’ through regimental seniority.24 Therefore, on successfully completing the Sandhurst course a cadet merely received a ‘recommendation’ for a commission in the army.25 For much of the period prior before 1854 the purchase of a commission in the Infantry or Cavalry did not entail any form of written exam to demonstrate the candidate’s suitability. When promotional exams were introduced, beginning in July 1849, they did not include Military History until 1904.26 The Royal Military College did have a ‘Senior Department’ intended to train serving officers for a staff appointment, a role which entailed assisting a commanding officer with the administrative, operational and logistical requirements of his force, although attendance was not compulsory for such a position. The

23 Anon., Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Best Mode of Re-organising the System for Training Officers From the Scientific Corps, 1857 (0.52), pp. 62-63.
‘Senior Department’ did not teach Military History and the entire teaching staff consisted of only one professor.\textsuperscript{27}

From 1850, the cadets who had graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and were destined for a commission in the Royal Artillery, underwent the army’s only Military History course that was instituted prior to 1856.\textsuperscript{28} For six months they were placed under the command of a ‘Director of Studies’ at the Royal Artillery Institution and were taught, among other subjects, ‘Military History, British and Foreign’, as well as the ‘application of the three arms, strategy, battles… sieges [and] military biography’.\textsuperscript{29} Given the few British volumes on these subjects, teaching was largely conducted from works published in French and German, so not only were students given the ‘opportunity… to keep up the knowledge of these languages already acquired at the Royal Military Academy’, but specialist language instructors were appointed to assist them.\textsuperscript{30}

In the development of Military History in Britain after 1815, it was the Crimean War which represented the major turning point. After this conflict, the army began to expand dramatically the teaching of the subject in its educational curricula. From 1858 the subject was taught at the newly created Staff College which assumed the role of training staff officers from the ‘Senior Department’ of the Royal Military College. By 1870, Military History was included in the syllabuses at Woolwich, Sandhurst, and the Royal Engineers Establishment at Chatham, where those officers destined for the Royal Engineers were trained after they had graduated from the Royal Military Academy.\textsuperscript{31} There was also a dramatic increase in the publication of books which utilised Military History for officer education, the most notable of

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\textsuperscript{27} Bond, \textit{The Victorian Army and the Staff College}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{29} Anon., \textit{Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Best Mode of Re-organising the System for Training Officers From the Scientific Corps} (0.52) (London, 1857), pp. 45, 320 429. (This report will be referred to hereafter as the Yolland Commission.)
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 452, 343.
\end{flushleft}
these being Edward Hamley’s *Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained*, first published in 1866, which had gone through seven editions by 1914, although other similar books were produced by Patrick MacDougall in 1856 and J.J. Graham in 1858.\(^{32}\)

Similarly, from the 1890s, works which utilised Military History for officer education began to diversify in terms of the topics which they were compiled to illustrate. In 1896 Charles Callwell used examples from Military History in his work on irregular warfare, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, and also in his books on maritime operations.\(^{33}\) Equally, Julian Corbett used Military History heavily in his celebrated work *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.\(^{34}\) In the decade before the outbreak of the Great War there was a dramatic expansion in the volume of Military History which was published with the intention of serving a didactic function for officers; in fact several publishers, such as Constable and Swan and Sonnenschein, began to produce series of such works.\(^{35}\)

Official history emerged, too, after the Crimean War when Lord Panmure, the Secretary of State for War, authorised the writing of two accounts of this conflict, the first to document the activities of the Royal Engineers during the siege of Sebastopol and the second the experience of the Royal Artillery.\(^{36}\) Thus, from then on to be classed as ‘official history’, a work, even if it did not contain the term in its title, needed to have been produced using public funds and to have been authorised by the Secretary of State for War.\(^{37}\) Although


\(^{37}\) TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 2.
official history continued to be produced in Britain throughout the period between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, the practice of producing authorised accounts spread to India: from 1874 the British authorities there began to produce historical work which narrated the expeditions undertaken by the Indian Army. Although for many years Britain possessed no permanent body dedicated to the production of authorised history, in 1906 the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory body responsible to the Prime Minister, formed a ‘Historical Section’ dedicated to the production of official history intended to be of use to the Committee and the armed services. Under the guidance of the Historical Section, two Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War were produced with the intention that they would supersede the accounts of this conflict begun by both the Navy and the General Staff. Consequently, under the guidance of the Historical Section a ‘Combined History’, which included equal reference to operations on land and sea, was produced for the first time.

Another development was the unprecedented number of works produced in the wake of the Crimean War which were written with the intention of being accessible to the reading public. They were written in a readable style, did not include complex arguments and were often based on a limited amount of information. The publication of this type of material, which was occasionally referred to as ‘popular’ history, expanded greatly between 1854 and 1914. The Second Boer War, in particular, fought between 1899 and 1902, was the subject of a vast numbers of such works, which included first-hand accounts of the fighting written by

38 W.H. Paget, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes (Simla, 1874); and, W.H. Paget and A.H. Mason, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason (Simla, 1884).
39 TNA, CAB 103/434, Committee of Imperial Defence Historical Section Memorandum, 28 January 1914.
40 TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 3.
42 For two examples, see: ‘Daily News Correspondent’ [J.F. Maurice], The Ashantee War: A Popular Narrative (London, 1874); and, Spenser Wilkinson, Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff (London, 1890).
officers and journalists, as well as biographical volumes on British military leaders, particularly Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, who had commanded the besieged garrison of Mafeking. Similarly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 generated a large of quantity of publications, including several serialised histories, such as Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War, the first instalment of which appeared barely four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities.

In short, any cursory survey of the publication of works of Military History in Britain during the course of the nineteenth century, taken to be the period from 1815 to 1914, reveals that there was limited publishing activity from the end of the Napoleonic Wars up until the outbreak of the Crimean War. Thereafter, however, Military History underwent a dramatic period of expansion and diversification, emerging for the first time as an identifiable discipline. Not only did the instruction of Military History at army educational institutions expand, there was a rise in publishing activity, in terms of works produced both for officers and for the reading public. Military History even began to arouse the interest of scholars at universities. In other words, the period 1854 to 1914 would seem to represent the crucial early phase in the development of the subject. But before considering in more detail what issues face the historian in considering this phenomenon, it is important to examine the views and comments of those few historians who have passed judgment on the emergence of Military History during the nineteenth century.

**Historiography**

The standard historical works which exist on the British Army in the nineteenth century have concentrated on the classic areas of military reform, in particular organisational change, the

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development of recruiting systems, and the improvement of training methods.\textsuperscript{45} There has been much less attention paid to the development of fields of intellectual activity at this time. The scholarly works which have discussed British military thought and history in the nineteenth century have viewed the subject predominantly within the context of the Great War rather than in its own right.\textsuperscript{46} Even more problematic is that, since the 1920s, the limited scholarly work which has commented on how Military History was studied by the army in Britain prior to 1914 has been strongly influenced by the thoughts of J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. As the ideas of these men have been so influential, and have been often repeated verbatim in subsequent historical work, it is important to outline their views on the way the subject was studied by the army.

In the inter-war period Fuller sought to reform the way in which the British Army thought about warfare.\textsuperscript{47} He maintained that British generalship in the Great War had been seriously undermined because the training officers received did not enable or encourage them to think about future developments in the conduct of war.\textsuperscript{48} To demonstrate his view, Fuller pointed to his experience of studying Military History at the Staff College in 1913.\textsuperscript{49} He claimed that the study of the subject there had been centred on only one campaign, fought in the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War, and had been restricted to the compilation of factual information. To Fuller, this approach undermined the point of studying

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[{\textsuperscript{46}}] One exception is Azar Gat, \textit{The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century} (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-15. However, only fifteen pages in this work are devoted to the British Army, and just two sides to the period 1815 to 1870. Gat’s discussion is heavily reliant on Jay Luvaas’ work and so only provides a cursory examination of British military thought at this time.
\item[{\textsuperscript{49}}] J.F.C. Fuller, \textit{Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier} (London, 1936), p. 29.
\end{thebibliography}
the subject as it did not question ‘why’ and ‘how’ success or failure in a campaign had occurred. Much of Fuller’s strident criticism of the study of Military History in Britain appeared in his 1926 book *The Foundations of the Science of War*. Here he outlined his view that war could be treated as a science with principles and laws which could be revealed, studied, and applied to the study of Military History.\(^{50}\)

Liddell Hart agreed with Fuller’s interpretation of the study of Military History in Britain. He too thought that war should be studied as a science, with the role of Military History to ‘throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present onto the screen of the future’.\(^{51}\) In the same fashion as Fuller, even using the same example, Liddell Hart pointed to the study of the subject at the Staff College to demonstrate how he thought the army had misused the subject before 1914. He wrote, ‘to be able to enumerate the blades of grass in the Shenandoah Valley… is not an adequate foundation for leadership in a future war where conditions and armament have radically changed’.\(^{52}\) Moreover, both Liddell Hart and Fuller thought that the flawed approach they had identified in the British approach to studying Military History had caused the army to overlook the importance of the American Civil War. They argued that the army had either drawn the wrong lessons from the conflict or had ignored its significance altogether.\(^{53}\) This led Liddell Hart to consider the American Civil War as ‘The Signpost That Was Missed’, as he believed that this oversight had, in part, caused the army to be unprepared for the style of fighting which took place during First World War.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{50}\) Fuller, *Foundations of the Science of War*, p. 328.


However, there is reason to question the interpretation put forward by both Fuller and Liddell Hart concerning the study of Military History in the army prior to 1914. The only evidence provided by both men is anecdotal. They did not provide any verifiable evidence, such as exam papers, essays, or even a description of the Military History syllabus taught by the army at its training establishments to substantiate their claims about the study of the subject. Moreover, as both men were seeking to promote their own ideas concerning the reformation of the army after the First World War, they had a vested interest in presenting the army in the worst possible light. Furthermore, when the historical writing of Liddell Hart came under scrutiny from John J. Mearsheimer, it was revealed that on numerous occasions Liddell Hart had ‘twist[ed] the historical record’ in order that his own ideas would appear correct.55

Nevertheless, the limited historical scholarship concerning the study of Military History in Britain before 1914 has drawn heavily on the views of Fuller and Liddell Hart. One example is the American historian Jay Luvaas, who wrote several works which examined aspects of British military thought between 1815 and 1940, which included Military History.56 In his book, Education of an Army, Luvaas adopted a biographical approach, and each chapter focused on the life and work of one military writer, so that Military History was not examined in any other than a cursory fashion in relation to the writings of Generals E.B. Hamley and J.F. Maurice, Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, Spenser Wilkinson and Lieutenant-Colonel C. à Court Repington. When he referred to the study of the subject at the Staff College, Luvaas heavily relied on the interpretation provided by

56 Jay Luvaas, The Civil War: A Soldier’s View, A Collection of Civil War Writings by G.F.R. Henderson (Chicago, 1958); idem, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago, 1959), and; idem, Education of an Army.
Liddell Hart and Fuller, quoting Liddell Hart’s remark about ‘the blades of grass in the Shenandoah Valley’ to characterise his own interpretation.\textsuperscript{57}

Although Luvaas did not closely examine the teaching of Military History at the Staff College, Brian Bond’s work, \textit{Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914}, came closer to doing this. Bond’s volume was a great improvement on the only other general study of the Staff College, authored by A.R. Godwin Austen in 1927. Austen focused on articulating the social activities undertaken by the students of the college and adopted an irreverent tone in which he attacked the appearance of officers instead of providing an analysis of the course of study. Bond’s work did discuss the teaching of Military History at the college, but it too relied on Liddell Hart’s interpretation of the study of the subject, also quoting his statement on the ‘blades of grass in the Shenandoah’.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, Bond did not examine the Military History exam papers or essays produced by students at the institution. Likewise, Holden Reid’s working paper ‘War Studies at the Staff College, 1890-1930’ presented the interpretation put forward by Fuller and Liddell Hart on the study of Military History without recourse to primary evidence to substantiate his claims; here, too, Liddell Hart’s phrase on the ‘blades of grass in the Shenandoah’ was repeated.\textsuperscript{59}

The development of the writing of official history in Britain before 1914 has also been largely overlooked. In the wake of the historiographical controversies over the British Official History of the First World War, there has been some interest among historians in the writing of official histories. This has seen three books edited by Robin Higham on official histories published around the world; and, there have been other studies on the writing of the

British and German Official Histories of the First World War. Following Liddell Hart’s famous claim that the British official account of the First World War was ‘official, but not history’, as he thought that it was intended to protect the reputations of British commanders rather than be an accurate record, scholarly work which has looked at the writing of official history has largely fixated on the extent to which ‘official history can be honest history’. This close attention paid to individual histories, and the extent to which they may or may not have been manipulated, has deflected attention away from any analysis of improvements in official historical writing during the nineteenth century.

Of the four edited volumes on the writing of official Military History edited by Higham, only the work *Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from Around the World* contained a chapter concerning official histories produced in Britain before the Great War. Although this short eight-page chapter, entitled ‘The First British Official Historians’, looked briefly at the official histories produced as a result of the Crimean War and the British invasion of Egypt in 1882, it did not engage in any depth with the official histories produced before 1906. In fact, Luvaas described the Official Histories of the Abyssinian campaign, the Zulu War, and the Nile Expedition as ‘nondescript’, only briefly referring to them, with half the chapter devoted to a discussion of the accuracy of the Great War Official History.

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63 Ibid., p. 489.
Some historical work has appeared on individual official histories written at this time, but these have failed to integrate their findings into a broader picture of official history writing before the Great War and have suffered from limited archival research. Following a reprint of the British Official History of the Zulu War, John Laband published a pamphlet Companion to accompany the new edition. The fifteen-page pamphlet focused on the biography of the author of the Official History, and the material used to write it, so it did not discuss the development of official historical writing at this time. Likewise, Brian Robson’s article on the Official History of the Second Afghan War neither provided accurate comment on the development of official history writing, nor did it make full use of all the primary material available.64

The Official History of the Second Boer War has been analysed by Ian F.W. Beckett in greater depth than the official histories of the Zulu or Second Afghan War. But, again, the scope of the work did not allow for much consideration of the development of official historical writing.65 Similarly, Jonathan B.A. Bailey and Gary P. Cox in their writing on the British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War did not attempt to place their findings within the broader context of official historical writing in Britain before 1904.66 Moreover, all three of these studies did not include important primary material. Beckett’s work did not

64 John Laband, Companion to the Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879 (London, 1989); Brian Robson, ‘The Strange Case of the Missing Official History’, Soldiers of the Queen: Journal of the Victorian Military Society, No. 4 (March 1994), pp. 3-6. Without qualification Robson referred to the Official History of the British invasion of Egypt as ‘almost indistinguishable from an Official History, although not technically such’. As he provided no justification for this statement, it is difficult to understand his meaning.
analyse the original drafts of the Official History which survive, nor did he make full use of the files concerning the compilation of the Official History at the National Archives at Kew. Bailey’s work, together with that of Cox, suffered because although they referred to the Official History that was compiled jointly between the Army and Navy on the Russo-Japanese War, neither referred to the Official History which the army produced itself, and which sold a greater number of copies.\footnote{TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 28 January 1914, p. 4.}

The only work to attempt to give a complete overview of the Military History produced during the long nineteenth century is a book chapter by Tim Travers.\footnote{Tim Travers, ‘The Development of British Military Historical Writing and Thought from the Eighteenth Century to the Present’, in David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds.), \textit{Military History and the Military Profession} (London, 1992), pp. 23-44.} However, he only devoted four pages to the period between 1854 and 1914, ignored official military history and, because he failed to consider how an understanding of what constituted the subject developed over time, came to the conclusion that popular Military History only began to appear after the Second World War.\footnote{Ibid., p. 36-7.} In fact, besides John MacKenzie’s \textit{Popular Imperialism and the Military}, which used the term “instant” histories to refer to historical accounts of a campaign written by journalists using their despatches, which often appeared soon after the end of the fighting, only one scholarly article has considered popular Military History published before 1914.\footnote{John MacKenzie (ed.), \textit{Popular Imperialism and the Military} (Manchester, 1992), p. 157; and, G.W. Steevens, \textit{With Kitchener to Khartum} (London, 1898).} Like his discussion of official history, Beckett’s article ‘Early Historians and the South African War’ makes no attempt to place the analysis within the broader context of other Military History produced in this period.\footnote{Beckett, ‘Early Historians and the South African War’, pp. 15-31.}

Hence, it can be seen that the historical literature concerning the writing of Military History in Britain during the nineteenth century is both problematic and incomplete. In the case of the historical work looking at Military History studied by the army, there is an
overreliance on the interpretation provided by Liddell Hart and Fuller which is based only on anecdotal evidence. The scholarly work considering the writing of official history before 1914 consists of one brief overview which disregards much of the subject, or work that focuses on only one official account published before 1914. Likewise, Military History that was not official and was not intended for officer education has barely been considered in the academic literature, reflecting a narrow approach to the research into Military History, one which eschews including popular culture. Given the dramatic expansion in the scale and scope of Military History between 1854 and 1914, the lack of serious historical work on the subject is a major omission. This study will therefore be dedicated to answering the following question: How and why did British Military History emerge, expand and diversify between 1854 and 1914?

**Research Issues**

In seeking to answer the question above, this study will attempt to fill a gap in the military historical literature. In order to answer the central research question, however, it is important that concepts and categories which are commonly used by historians of the twentieth century are not applied without reflection to the nineteenth century. So, before addressing the methodological approach which is to be adopted, it needs to be established what is understood by Military History, what geographical restrictions have been used in the selection of the texts under investigation, what is understood by the term ‘military’, and the relationship between military theory and history.

When it came to characterising their work as History, writers in the nineteenth century were not constrained by the lack of any lapse of time between an event and their study of it. Consequently, the 1889 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* simply defined the subject as ‘the prose narrative of past events’ and gave no explanation regarding the distinction
between the past and the present.\textsuperscript{72} This was also a common feature in the Military History written during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Spenser Wilkinson, for example, in his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor in Military History at Oxford, declared that as ‘Military History is the effort to understand war’, it could include ‘either wars that have happened and are over, or a war that is taking place’.\textsuperscript{73} Such an understanding of the scope of the subject could be seen in works intended for officer education.\textsuperscript{74} But the same applied to ‘popular’ work, such as the first volume of G.B. Malleson’s \textit{Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical Narrative} which appeared in 1857 while the conflict was still raging; similarly, the initial instalment of H.M. Hozier’s \textit{Franco-Prussian War} appeared in 1870, and was advertised by the publisher as ‘a History of the present’.\textsuperscript{75}

As the length of time which had elapsed between an event and the publication of an account did not affect whether it was considered historical writing, this presents a methodological problem in distinguishing between ‘history’ and journalism. In the period examined by this study journalism was understood in very narrow terms closely associated with the appearance of work in a newspaper. Thus, the 1910 edition of the \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica} described it as the ‘intellectual work comprised in the production of a newspaper’ and, similarly, ‘reporting’ was the reproduction in a newspaper of a description ‘in narrative form [of] the events, in contemporary history’, from the ‘notes made by persons generally known as reporters’.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{73} Spenser Wilkinson, \textit{University and the Study of War (an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford November 27\textsuperscript{th} 1909)} (Oxford 1909), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, Anon., \textit{Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in December 1905} (London 1906), p. 20.
Moving to the term ‘military’, in the twentieth century it came to refer to the armed services generally, so now encompasses the army, navy and air force.\footnote{Richard Bowyer, \textit{Dictionary of Military Terms} (Middlesex, 1999), p. 128.} In the nineteenth century, however, it referred exclusively to the army; in 1913 when the International Congress of Historical Studies included a section for work on the armed services, it distinguished between ‘naval’ and ‘military’ histories.\footnote{Julian Corbett (ed.), \textit{Naval and Military Essays: Being Papers Read in the Naval and Military Section at the International Congress of Historical Studies, 1913} (London, 1913), pp. v, 3-23, 225-30.} However, this is not to say that there was not some overlap between Naval and Military History, and, most famously, Julian Corbett’s \textit{Some Principles of Maritime Strategy} of 1911 looked at how the navy and the army should cooperate.\footnote{Julian Corbett, \textit{Some Principles of Maritime Strategy} (London, 1911).} In keeping with the way in which Military History was understood during the nineteenth century, this study will focus on the approaches which were adopted to the history of land warfare. In referring to the subject as a discipline, capitalisation will be used, whereas lower case will be employed when the military past is referred to.\footnote{This follows the convention adopted by Evans in \textit{Cosmopolitan Islanders}, pp. xiii-xiv; and, Anon., ‘History’, in Baynes, \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, Vol. 13 (London, 11th edn., 1910), p. 527.}

As this study is intended to examine British Military History it will naturally focus predominantly on work produced in the British Isles. Given the close connections between the Indian and British armies during the period 1854-1914, particularly as India was under the control of the Crown from 1858 following the Indian Mutiny, it will though also examine how the subject was approached by British historians resident there.\footnote{Lawrence, \textit{Rise and Fall of the British Empire}, p. 230.} However, as other parts of the Empire published less Military History, and eventually gained independence – Canada by 1867, Australia and New Zealand by 1900, and South Africa in 1910 – they were no longer under British rule, and so have been excluded from this study.\footnote{Andrew Porter, \textit{Nineteenth Century: Oxford History of the British Empire}, Vol. 3 (London, 1998), p. 187; Simon Smith, \textit{British Imperialism, 1750-1970} (Cambridge, 1998), p. 30; and, Lawrence, \textit{Rise and Fall of the British Empire}, p. 311.}
While this study focuses on British Military History, the extent to which the way it was written was influenced by the works of Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz is, nonetheless, an important consideration. Jomini used military history to identify ‘principles of war’ which he claimed could be used to understand warfare in any period. As a result, his theoretical writing was based around the articulation of these principles using examples drawn from military history. It was this way of using the subject which was adopted by Yates in *Elementary Treatise on Strategy* and so was the pre-existing method of approaching the subject in Britain in 1854. By contrast, Clausewitz laid out a much more complex system by which Military History could be approached to make it of use to the military student. He observed that following historical research, in which the student ascertained what had occurred in the past, there were two types of criticism which could be used: first, the tracing of effects back to their causes; and second, the testing of the means employed by a commander. This latter method involved appraising the decisions made by historical figures based on the information that was available to them at the time, and was intended to develop the judgement of the student. It is important to identify whether the theoretical views which underpinned the way in which the subject was used to serve a didactic function for officers changed as this might provide an indicator of diversification in the approach to Military History during the period 1854-1914.

The Military History which will be considered in this study was not always published with the same aim in mind, since it contained different types of analysis, utilising different types of source material. Moreover, the early development of the subject prior to 1854 meant that some genres of Military History, such as campaign narratives written privately by officers, had already been established, while other genres had yet to emerge. It would then

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not be possible to judge accurately the emergence, expansion and diversification of Military History written between 1854 and 1914 without separating the work produced into several categories: it was used in officer education through examinations; it appeared in instructional works published for officers; it appeared in the new form of ‘official history’; it was written for a popular market; and, it started to take the form of serious historical research. Considered from another angle, Military History was written by different authors – military officers, civilians and journalists. The new emerging forms of Military History require, then, separate research questions which address different issues related to the transformation of Military History in the second half of the nineteenth century.

First, this study intends to analyse *what caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam syllabuses*. To do this it is necessary to ascertain not only why the army studied Military History, and the extent to which this changed, but also how this affected the way in which the subject was taught. Together these factors will allow the dominant view in the historiography, that the study of the subject was based on the compilation of mere factual information, to be considered through reference to hitherto under-utilised army teaching materials.\(^86\) Moreover, this will shed light on the extent to which the subject played a role in the attempts to professionalise the army during this time, particularly in response to its occasional poor performance, as well as the influence of any theoretical writing which may have underpinned the approach to the subject.\(^87\)

Second, and closely connected to the first issue, is the need to establish *why there was an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers*. It is of particular importance to ascertain the motivations behind the publication of this work as this will determine the extent to which this type of Military History either

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\(^{87}\) Bowman and Connelly, *Edwardian Army*, p. 33.
influenced or reflected the exam syllabuses used by the army. Consequently, this may reveal the advances in British military thought, particularly as regards the extent to which these works were written to create a better understanding of warfare, improve professionalism or were simply written to take advantage of the demand created for material which enabled students to prepare for examinations.

Third, this study will investigate what caused the emergence and diversification of official history. The historians who wrote official history had access to numerous documents when compiling their accounts which were unavailable to other military officers. Access to this information came at a price, however, as it was expected that both high-ranking military and political figures would review the work to ensure that confidential material would not be included, and that the history was, in their view, accurate, and that it reflected the views of the government. The role of these influences later led Liddell Hart to cast doubt on the accuracy of the Official History of the Great War. Thus, to help answer this question it is important to establish why official history first came to be written after the Crimean War, whether it was to serve an educational or intelligence purpose for the military and the extent to which it was influenced by the desire to protect the reputation of the army. Moreover, as the Prussian General Staff produced official accounts of their victories in both the Seven Weeks War and Franco-Prussian War, the degree to which these works exerted an influence on the production of British official history is also an issue of some significance.

Fourth, it is necessary to establish what factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military History. As this type of work was intended for a large readership, it is necessary to examine the extent to which its writing was influenced by commercial opportunism. This consideration is even more important as, throughout the

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89 Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn From History?, p. 32.
period 1854-1914, especially after the educational reforms of the 1870s, public literacy began to increase in Britain, so the size of the potential market for popular Military History was continually expanding. Correspondingly, as between 1867 and 1885 the government passed electoral reform legislation which dramatically increased the number of men eligible to vote, it is important to determine the extent to which this type of Military History was intended to influence voters, especially as regards their perceptions of the army and the Empire.

Fifth, the study will analyse what factors contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and research discipline? As popular Military History was intended to be accessible, it did not engage in a thorough examination of the past or utilise many sources, so it is important to consider, finally, the more intellectually rigorous approaches to the subject which drew on primary source material and conducted a higher level of analysis. To be able to provide a response to this question, it is necessary to examine how the writing of intellectually rigorous Military History developed, prior to the subject’s appearance as a university subject. In this regard, it is also important to ascertain the extent to which the emergence of Modern History as a university discipline stimulated the development of Military History based on primary research into documents. Equally, the way in which Military History was taught once it became a university discipline is of fundamental importance in arriving at an answer to this sub-question.

By addressing these issues, this study will aim to provide a comprehensive assessment of how and why Military History emerged, expanded and diversified in Britain between 1854 and 1914. The five main subjects which will be analysed will provide the structure to the thesis; they will also provide the basis for an answer to the principal research question. But to

answer this question effectively, five specific sub-questions will be posed in order that the development of Military History in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century can be investigated in a more systematic fashion. These sub-questions are as follows:

- What caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam syllabuses?
- Why was there an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers?
- What caused the emergence and diversification of official history?
- What factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military History?
- What factors contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and research discipline?

By considering these five sub-questions this thesis will aim to contribute to a greater understanding of the factors which caused the emergence, expansion and diversification of British Military History in the period between 1854 and 1914.

Source Material

The source material for this study consists of both published historical works and unpublished archival sources. Published Military History will necessarily be the principal form of source material used in this thesis. The published material examined will include books published during the period, as well as articles which appeared in military and civilian journals, illustrated weeklies and the ‘high-brow’ quarterlies. There are, of course, a number
of limitations in the employment of such source material. The use of articles from periodicals can be problematic as on occasion they were published anonymously. Although this problem has been alleviated in the case of civilian periodicals produced in the Victorian period due to the publication of the *Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals* which has identified previously anonymous authors, it remains a challenge in the case of military journals and articles written in the Edwardian period.92

Correspondence between publishers and authors is another important source for this study. The papers of Blackwood’s publishing house are held at the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh; they contain the letters sent to the publisher, William Blackwood, in addition to financial accounts extending over a period of years. This collection is of particular importance as Blackwood maintained a ‘military staff’ of officers who regularly published *Military History* through the company, writing also articles for *Blackwood’s Magazine*.93 Furthermore, the Publishers Archive at Reading University holds further material which relates to the publication of *Military History*, particularly the company papers of Longmans Publishers, and Swan and Sonnenschein.

The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, holds the papers of several military historians which are of particular relevance to this study. The most notable collection of private papers held at this archive are those of Sir John Frederick Maurice who taught Military History at the Staff College, published several works on the subject, and acted as the official historian of the British invasion of Egypt and the Second Boer War. However, there are limitations to this material.94 As is the case with the

Blackwood papers, the material held often reflects one side of the correspondence, as only the letters received are to be found. Moreover, as with all private papers, the quality of the information is variable, and depends on the intended recipient of the letter. Thus, a description of the progress made on an author’s work may differ considerably if the message was sent to the publisher, a personal friend or a spouse.

The material used in the teaching of Military History at the army’s academies has remained virtually unused by historians; this is a reflection, itself, of the lack of scholarly interest in the subject. This material includes the coursework and exam papers set as part of the Military History syllabus at the Staff College, Sandhurst and Woolwich. In fact, the exam papers set by these institutions survive for the period 1854-1914. The Staff College exam papers were published several months after each exam, although exam answers have not survived to the same degree. Nonetheless, the Liddell Hart Centre holds the papers of several figures who either studied Military History at the Staff College or taught the subject. The private papers of officers who held high rank during the First World War have been donated to archives more frequently than those who served in the army before the 1890s. As a result, the coursework and essays produced by students which still survives predominantly relates to the two decades preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, the collective wealth of information contained in some papers provides an unparalleled insight into how the subject was understood and utilised by the army during the second half of the long nineteenth century. The library of the Joint Service Command and Staff College at Shrivenham also holds the majority of the teaching material which was used

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95 The only historian to refer to them is Beckett, but he provides no analysis of the exam papers. Beckett, ‘Early Historians and the South African War’, p. 28.
96 The LHCM holds papers related to instruction conducted at the Staff Colleges by the following officers: Major-General Thompson Capper, Major-General John Frederick Maurice, Colonel Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd and Major-General William Robertson. This archive also holds papers related to the studies conducted at the Staff Colleges by the following officers: Captain William Robertson, Captain Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd and Captain Archibald Wavell.
between 1902 and 1914 at Camberley in a bound collection known as the ‘Camberley Reds’. The Military History exams which were set as part of officer promotion between 1904 and 1914 have also been overlooked by the scholarly literature on officer education. As these exam papers were published with an examiner’s report and the marks awarded to those who sat these exams, they are an invaluable source.

The official histories written between 1854 and 1914, together with the unpublished reports, drafts, and memoranda associated with them, are also important sources, although they are rare and, in some cases, they remained unpublished. Nonetheless, the British Library either holds the only remaining copy or retains re-issued versions of all of the official histories which were printed in Britain. The archival material relating to these official histories is varied: the scope of this material varies according to the era during which it was written or the extent to which it was considered controversial. Very little archival material exists on the official histories produced before 1901. The Topographical and Statistical section of the War Office, and its successors, were responsible for the writing of official history. However, this section was notoriously badly organised and the histories were produced in an improvised fashion. In fact, many of the official historians did not keep private papers, or as in the case of one of the British official historians of the Russo-Japanese war, Ernest Swinton, ‘used to indulge in orgies of tearing up’ their private papers.

The first Official History of the Second Boer War which was undertaken, written between 1901 and 1903 under the supervision of G.F.R. Henderson, created a great deal of controversy and was suppressed by the government. Consequently, a large quantity of archival material associated with this History survives in the National Archives at Kew and has been utilised in this study. Moreover, the only surviving drafts of Henderson’s original

97 TNA, WO32/6054, Memoranda on the Disorganisation of the Intelligence Branch Library, 23 January 1894.
History, which have never been considered by historians, and are held in the Cullen Library of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, can be used to shed more light on why this work was suppressed.

Taken as a whole, then, this body of source material – both published and unpublished – is more than adequate to provide a sound empirical foundation on which an analysis of the emergence, expansion and diversification of Military History between 1854 and 1914 can be based.

**Research Design**

The analytical approach adopted in this thesis will be thematic, based around five chapters, which considers the subject according to the different genres of Military History outlined above. Each genre evolved during the second half of the nineteenth century, so it is necessary that the process of evolution be traced. A thematic approach has been preferred over a more chronological method, which might have allowed certain interactions between authors to become more visible but which would have been largely unmanageable and provided more limited possibilities for the investigation. Each chapter will aim to provide a response to the specific research sub-questions posed above.

The first two chapters will assess the way in which Military History was employed in army education. Chapter 1 examines how the army taught the subject at its military academies and the way in which entrance and promotion exams played a part in the emergence of Military History as a discipline. The desire to improve officers’ professional abilities led Military History to play an increasingly important role in army education; during the three decades before the outbreak of the Great War, the way in which it was taught underwent a major transformation which was strongly influenced by approaches prevalent in Germany. Chapter 2 will then consider the Military History which was written predominantly
for a military audience, usually by officers and civilians close to the army. While much of the work produced for officer education closely mirrored the exam syllabuses created by the army, yet, at the same time, there were still several important volumes authored by British writers which had a considerable impact on how the army taught the subject.

Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the development of the genre of official history, usually produced under the auspices of the War Office. In the early phase in the development of this genre, these histories were intended as sources of information for specialists, in many cases as a source of intelligence information. As the number of histories increased, they became directed towards wider sections of the army, before they began to be written for a new purpose: to protect the army’s reputation or refute criticism of it. As the popular press expanded its reach and influence over the British reading public, military disasters became a ‘new front’ which the army leadership had to consider. Later accounts were conceived, in fact, as intended primarily for the general public and not a professional military readership. Nonetheless, immediately before the outbreak of the Great War some histories came to be directed towards the education of regimental officers, partly due to the role played by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence which was founded in 1906.

What is important to note about this period, however, is that military history was not only directed towards officer education or an official defence of senior commanders’ behaviour. Chapter 4 will reflect on the nature of popular Military History and why it grew in popularity. One the one hand, commercial opportunities contributed to its rapid growth, but at the same time these publications offered an opportunity to influence the public’s perception of a particular campaign or the chance to condition their perceptions of the abilities of the army and its commander. Finally, Chapter 5 will investigate the development of intellectually rigorous approaches to Military History which culminated in the subject starting to be taught at universities. The emergence in the 1880s of Modern History as a discipline based on the
analysis of source material legitimised for the first time the academic study of Military History.

The different genres of Military History which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century appear to suggest, even on the basis of a relatively cursory glance, that the complexity and variation in the discipline has been largely ignored by historians, who have been content to adopt the Fuller-Liddell Hart thesis of learning facts by rote. A closer examination of the subject, however, may topple some of the long-standing and unsubstantiated beliefs surrounding the formative period in the development of British Military History.
At the start of Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War in 1854, Military History was not taught at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, the Senior Department of this institution which trained staff officers, or the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. At this time Sandhurst and Woolwich taught boys who were less than sixteen years of age, and so the majority of the syllabus at these institutions was tailored toward providing a general ‘liberal education’ rather than specialist military instruction. The study of Military History was not required either to obtain a commission, the majority of which were still attained by purchase, or to secure promotion.¹ The only group to study Military History were those cadets who graduated from Woolwich, destined for the Royal Artillery, who between 1850 and 1858 underwent instruction in the subject at the Royal Artillery Institution.²

By the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, however, the focus on the teaching of Military History in the British Army had increased significantly. Not only was the subject studied at Sandhurst and Woolwich as well as at the Staff College, which had replaced the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, but a significant proportion of marks were

¹ Yolland Commission, pp. 48, 44-5, 21, 62. The only exception to this was that between 1850 and 1858 the handful of cadets who graduated from Woolwich and were destined for a commission in the Royal Artillery underwent a course of study which included Military History.
² Ibid., pp. 45, 429, 320.
assigned to it at each establishment, reflecting the importance placed on its study.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, the subject was studied by officers as part of the process of promotion and by those officers in the Militia and Territorial Force who wished to convert their commission into one in the Regular Army.\textsuperscript{4} Despite this dramatic expansion in the study of Military History in the army, no scholarly work has examined either the reasons for this development or the way in which the subject was taught. The standard works on the Victorian and Edwardian Army contain little on the role played by Military History in army education as they have focused predominantly on other areas of military reform.\textsuperscript{5}

It is most surprising, though, that the few works which have examined military education between 1854 and 1914 have overlooked important primary source material; at the same time, they have been too narrow in scope to investigate the subject. As Jay Luvaas’ \textit{Education of an Army} adopted a biographical approach, it focused on the writing of several military historians, rather than on how the subject was taught at the army’s educational establishments.\textsuperscript{6} While there has been no research which has examined the syllabus of Sandhurst or Woolwich, there have been several studies which have examined the teaching conducted at the Staff College.\textsuperscript{7} However, this material, written by A.R. Godwin-Austen, Brian Bond and Brian Holden Reid, has overlooked important primary source material relating to the way in which Military History was studied there, including exam scripts, model answers written by the examiner and material produced by students. Moreover, the writing of Bond, Holden Reid and Luvaas all deferred to the opinion put forward by J.F.C.

\textsuperscript{3} Bond, \textit{Victorian Army and the Staff College}, pp. 51-7.
\textsuperscript{4} Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in November 1904 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1905).
\textsuperscript{5} Spiers, \textit{Late Victorian Army}, 1868-1902, pp. 1-24; and, Bowman and Connelly, \textit{Edwardian Army}, pp. 119-22, 132-3.
\textsuperscript{6} Luvaas, \textit{Education of an Army}, pp. vii-xi.
\textsuperscript{7} Only popular histories of Sandhurst and Woolwich exist, for example see: Smyth, \textit{Sandhurst}; and, G.A. Shepperd, \textit{Sandhurst} (London, 1980).
Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart that the study of the Military History at the Staff College constituted little more than a recital of factual material.\(^8\)

In order to answer the first research question posed in the introduction – namely, what caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam syllabuses – this chapter intends to address three issues. Why did the army study Military History? To what extent did the rationale for studying Military History undergo modification? To what extent did the methods used to teach the subject change? In order to shed light on these questions, this chapter will consider: first, how and why Military History was taught at Sandhurst and Woolwich prior to the outbreak of the Second Boer War in 1899; second, how the subject was used in the training of staff officers between 1856 and 1885, a period when the education of these officers began to undergo a major transformation; third, how the subject was used in the education of staff officers between 1885 and 1914; and, fourth, the role of Military History in exam syllabuses, 1899-1914, especially at Woolwich and Sandhurst. The emergence of Military History as a subject tested in examinations was without doubt an important element in the expansion of interest in the discipline.

I. Sandhurst and Woolwich, 1856-99

The Crimean War put a spotlight on the training of officers, particularly those in the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.\(^9\) This caused the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, to appoint a Commission in January 1856 under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Yolland to investigate the training that these officers received and to suggest how the British approach could be improved.\(^10\) The committee looked to the systems of military education on the continent,

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\(^{9}\) Smyth, *Sandhurst*, p. 74.

\(^{10}\) Yolland Commission, p. 20.
particularly those in France and Prussia. They discovered that the French Military College at St. Cyr taught ‘Military Administration, Military Art and Military History’, with the lectures on ‘Military Literature, Military History, Military Geography and Statistics’ constituting nearly half those a cadet received each year. Similarly, they found that to gain entry to the French Staff College an officer sat an admission exam which included Military History. Once in the establishment the student received one lecture a week in ‘Military Art and Tactics’ which was illustrated by historical case studies. It was also found that in Prussia the subject was intended to communicate military theory and it was studied at divisional level schools, at the school of Artillery and Engineering as well as at the Kriegs-Schule in Berlin.¹¹

The commissioners noted with concern that while Military History and the study of military theory had been largely overlooked in Britain, ‘great attention [was] paid in every important school abroad to the lectures on Military Art and History, Tactics, Military Geography and Statistics, and what is termed Military Literature’. In an attempt to redress this they proposed that both Sandhurst and Woolwich should teach Military History, as it appeared to the commissioners that, ‘if there is such a thing as an Art of War… a military college must be the proper place for studying it’.¹² Likewise, the committee felt that the French and Prussian systems had demonstrated that Military History was ‘a most important branch’ of ‘scientific’ training for the staff officer, and so recommended that the subject should be taught at a newly formed Staff College.¹³

The commissioners also looked to the continent, especially the Prussian approach, when it suggested that a single body should oversee all military education and the appointment of specialist examiners.¹⁴ This idea was accepted by the Secretary of State for

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 60, 262.
War and, so, on 1 June 1857, the ‘Council of Military Education’ sat for the first time. This council found it difficult to find men who were qualified to both teach and examine Military History and so officers who had served in continental armies, where the subject had been studied, were therefore often the most eligible. Thus, Major Charles Adams, who had served in the Austrian Army for thirteen years, was appointed as Instructor of Military History at Sandhurst in 1860, before going on to hold the Professorship in the subject at the Staff College between 1868 and 1874. Likewise, when it came to selecting men to act as the examiner for Military History, a role that entailed setting the admission and final exams in the subject at the Cadet and Staff Colleges, the council encountered the same shortage of suitable applicants. Hence, Captain E.M. Jones, who had spent his early career in the Prussian Army, was appointed to this role in 1862, and eventually succeeded Adams as Professor of Military History at Sandhurst in 1868.

As proposed by the Yolland committee, Military History was included on the course of instruction at Sandhurst in 1858, a change which was made possible by an alteration in the role of this institution. While it was still not compulsory to attend this institution to receive a commission, from this time the college was no longer intended to provide a basic education to young boys, but to provide ‘military training and knowledge’ to cadets aged over sixteen. The inclusion of Military History was primarily intended to teach the cadets ‘the generally received principles of tactics and strategy’. To this end, cadets were first ‘put through a short course of military theory… [and then received] a series of lectures… given upon some short

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17 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 17; and, Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence. From this time Sandhurst cadets were given priority of appointment over those who had not attended the institution and instead sought to purchase a commission directly.
campaign with the object… of illustrating strategy’. The study of military theory was only intended to teach the students ‘the mere elements’ of the subject and explain ‘some of the ordinary technical terms’ which would be expounded with historical examples in the later Military History lectures. Towards the end of the cadet’s time at the college, the emphasis of the course shifted to the study of tactics by ‘going more fully into particular portions’ of the campaigns under study, although at this time the course did ‘not go very far’ into the subject. The course relied heavily on the ninety-minute lecture given each week in which the cadets were expected to take notes. The instructors were able to choose which books to use when compiling lectures, so, while Captain C.W. Robinson stated that ‘Hamley’s *Operations of War* was freely consulted’ as he wrote his, other instructors felt that they would ‘rather take Colonel MacDougall’s book [*The Theory of War*]’ since the work was considered ‘more elementary than Colonel Hamley’s’. Strategy was presented to the cadets as being governed by several principles, or ‘maxims of the art of war’, which had been identified by Jomini and were outlined by Hamley and MacDougall. As such, the cadets were taught that the definition and object of strategy was ‘moving troops to advantage when not in the immediate presence of an enemy’, a definition which closely corresponded with that used by Hamley in *Operations of War*. The campaigns used on the course to illustrate Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ had all taken place later than 1756, and from 1865 the instructors were ‘prohibited’ from using examples

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20 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 102, 105, 25.
23 Ibid.; and, Edward Hamley, *Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained* (London, 1st edn., 1866), p. 55. Here Hamley defined the object of strategy as: ‘so to direct the movement of an army, that when decisive collisions occur it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage’.
from the Seven Years War, so campaigns fought during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period remained the mainstay of the course.\textsuperscript{24}

The notes which the students took in each lecture were used to answer a question set for the second study period that week.\textsuperscript{25} These questions took various forms, asking the cadets either simply to provide a concise account of the campaign covered in the lecture, or be more analytical, and the students were asked to ‘remark on the strategy and tactics of the campaign’.\textsuperscript{26} As the cadets were given no access to a textbook, their answers were based entirely on the notes taken in the preceding lecture.\textsuperscript{27} Even as late as 1904 the Sandhurst library had no copy of Jomini’s theoretical writing or of MacDougall’s work, although it held one copy of \textit{Operations of War}.\textsuperscript{28} The cadet’s answers were marked by the instructors and made up half of the final mark he received in the subject, the other half coming from the exams sat at the end of each year.\textsuperscript{29} The subject commanded a high number of marks, reflecting how important its study was thought to be; in fact, from 1868 only the study of ‘Fortification’ and ‘Military Drawing’ were awarded more marks.\textsuperscript{30}

Although it was hoped that the Military History course would give the young officer ‘an intelligent interest in the study of their profession’, the cadets did not take a great interest in their studies. The atmosphere at Sandhurst at this time was anything but studious and ‘two-thirds’ of the cadets were thought to be ‘idlers’ by the instructors.\textsuperscript{31} The library at Sandhurst also reflected this general lack of intellectual interest and its collection of books was

\textsuperscript{24} Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 194.
\textsuperscript{26} NAM, Henry Cooper Papers, 6112-595-26, Royal Military College Sandhurst, Military History memoir on the Waterloo Campaign, Junior Division, 1865.
\textsuperscript{27} Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{28} Sandhurst, Gentleman Cadet’s Library Catalogue, 1904, p. 17.
predominantly given over to novels and works irrelevant to the military subjects taught at the college. As a result, the marks the cadets achieved in Military History were often very low; in 1864, for instance, of the 125 cadets who took the final exam, only twenty-eight achieved above half-marks in this subject.

While Military History played an important part of the course of instruction at Sandhurst, the subject was not introduced to the curriculum at Woolwich until 1867. The Council of Military Education finally decided to include the subject as ‘superior officers’ in the Artillery and Engineers felt that ‘the absence of all knowledge of Military History was a defect in the course of study at the Academy’, one which placed ‘the establishment in this respect at a disadvantage when compared to the Royal Military College’. Initially Colonel J. Miller, V.C., was appointed to teach the subject and was asked to devise the course of instruction himself. Unfortunately, he decided on an ambitious syllabus which stretched back into ancient times, meaning that he had only reached the early Roman period by the end of the first half-term. When the authorities insisted that he abandon his extensive programme and devote the rest of the course to campaigns ‘of a date not earlier than Frederick the Great’, Miller promptly resigned. Thanks to the ‘Miller fiasco’, Woolwich was left at short notice with a difficult position to fill. Luckily, Captain Henry Brackenbury, who had been appointed as Assistant-Instructor of Practical Artillery at the Academy in 1864, had a keen interest in Military History and had studied the Waterloo campaign ‘so closely… that [he] was prepared to lecture upon it at once’. The Governor of the academy supported his

35 Sandhurst, List and Dates of the Appointments of Officers, Professors, and Mates to the Royal Military Academy from its Formation; and, H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy (Woolwich, 1895), p. 129.
37 Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy, p. 129
38 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4234, ff. 7, Hamley to Blackwood, 16 January 1868.
application and, after the Council of Military Education had attended one of his lectures, Brackenbury was appointed to replace Miller.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite several important differences, Military History was taught at Woolwich in largely the same manner as at Sandhurst: at both institutions the course revolved around one lecture a week in which the cadets took notes.\textsuperscript{40} However, at Woolwich, only the two senior classes were taught the subject, so a cadet only received instruction during the second part of his time at the institution.\textsuperscript{41} To be promoted up the classes in order to finally graduate, a student had to pass an exam, which for those passing into the final class, and those passing out of the institution, included two Military History papers, both of which were set by the council’s examiner in the subject. The weighting of marks given to Military History at Woolwich was significantly lower than at Sandhurst and in the final exam the subject was assigned fewer marks than Mathematics, Artillery Studies, Military Drawing, Chemistry, Physics and French.\textsuperscript{42}

Just as at Sandhurst, the study of Military History at Woolwich was based around campaigns thought to illustrate ‘the principles of strategy and tactics’ which had been articulated by Jomini. However, unlike at Sandhurst, the Woolwich course employed Hamley’s \textit{Operations of War} as a textbook.\textsuperscript{43} Getting the work approved for use was made considerably more difficult as the author sat on the Council of Military Education.\textsuperscript{44} In 1867 the ‘academy authorities’ contacted Hamley regarding the use of the work, but the other members of the Council of Military Education rejected it on two grounds.\textsuperscript{45} First, they felt that it was ‘inexpedient’ for Hamley to recommend his own book and, secondly, they stated

\begin{enumerate}
\item Brackenbury, \textit{Some Memoires of My Spare Time}, pp. 18, 66.
\item Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 287.
\item Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 287.
\item Anon., \textit{Report of the Council of Military Education, 1868}, p. 15; and, Sandhurst, exam scripts sat by Louis Napoleon (The Prince Imperial) at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, 1875.
\item Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 287.
\item NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4221, ff. 25, Hamley to Blackwood, 30 December 1867.
\end{enumerate}
that ‘they considered the work of too high a class for the cadets’ to understand. In response to the first point, Hamley argued that ‘the only question for consideration in such cases is, not who the writer may be, but the fitness of the book for the purpose’. Hamley not only insisted that his work could be comprehended by the Woolwich cadets, but that ‘it was calculated greatly to injure the work if the statement went forth on the council’s authority that it was beyond the capacity of highly educated intelligent young professional students’ to understand it. Hamley was adamant that his book should be used on the course and even considered asking his friend, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, the Duke of Cambridge, who had authority over the council, to ‘waive’ their objection to the use of the book. Indeed, when the authorities at Woolwich reapplied to use the work the council backed down and, by 1888, the library at Woolwich held sixteen copies of various editions.

The use of *Operations of War* had a large impact on the content of the course and its influence can be seen not only in the questions set for the cadets, but also in their answers. For instance, on the exam paper set in July 1874 a question asked the cadets to ‘give a description… of the frontier between France and Germany as it existed in 1870, and [to] point out the strategical advantages or disadvantages which its configuration and physical features presented to either power’. *Operations of War* went into detail describing the influence which the shape of a frontier could have on military operations. In the narrative of the Franco-Prussian War contained in the work, Hamley pointed out that German forces massed in the ‘Rhenish provinces’ were ‘on the side of the angle [of the frontier] which was parallel to the French communications, [and were,] as explained in the chapter on

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46 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 20, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 January 1870.
47 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4221, ff. 25, Hamley to Blackwood, 30 December 1867.
48 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4221, ff. 29, Hamley to Blackwood, n.d., [1867].
49 Sandhurst, Catalogue to the Woolwich Library, 1888, p. 73.
50 Sandhurst, Louis Napoleon (The Prince Imperial) Military History Exam, sat at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Second Class, July 1874.
Configuration of Frontiers, in the most favourable position for offence’. The French Prince Imperial, a cadet at Woolwich at this time, answered this question using the same point as was put forward in *Operations of War*, writing that due to the shape of the frontier, German forces in these provinces could ‘descend the valley of Alsace cutting the French troops… from their base of operations’.

The campaigns studied at Woolwich were much more varied than those employed at Sandhurst. Although the American Civil War was not studied at this time, a variety of campaigns from the Franco-Prussian War, the Second Afghan War, the Russo-Turkish War and the Crimean War were used. However, after 1871 the course increasingly focused on the Franco-Prussian War and so the library of this institution came to hold a large number of works on this conflict. The focus on a war which had been fought with newly developed breech-loading rifled weapons caused the study of Military History at Woolwich to focus increasingly on the influence which technological developments had exerted on tactics. For instance, in July 1883 the cadets were asked ‘what modifications have been caused in the proportion of [field] guns to other arms, and in the tactics of Field Artillery by the introduction of (1) rifled small arms, (2) rifled field guns?’ The examiners also expected the cadets to be able to analyse the tactics under development on the continent in relation to British methods. In 1875, for instance, the Prince Imperial chose to answer a question which

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52 Sandhurst, Louis Napoleon (The Prince Imperial) Military History Exam, sat at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Second Class, July 1874.
53 Sandhurst, Exam Papers set at Royal Military Academy Woolwich, First Class, July 1883, Afternoon Paper, p. 1; and, Sandhurst, Exam Papers set at Royal Military Academy Woolwich, April 1885, Second Class, Afternoon Paper, p. 1.
54 Sandhurst, Catalogue to the Woolwich Library, pp. 37-40.
55 Sandhurst, Exam Papers set at Royal Military Academy Woolwich, First Class, July 1883, Afternoon Paper, p. 2.
asked him to ‘institute a comparison between the German and English methods of attack, as laid down by the recent orders on the subject’. 56

Military History was also taught at the Royal Engineers Establishment at Chatham during the 1870s and 1880s to those officers who had passed out of Woolwich and were destined for the Royal Engineers. 57 The summary of the syllabus written in 1887 by H. Tovey, Instructor in Military History, Strategy and Tactics at Chatham, reflected that Jomini’s work dominated the approach to the subject there. 58 Therefore, not only was strategy defined as the art of ‘properly directing masses of troops upon the theatre of war’ so they had material superiority at the decisive point, but also great emphasis was placed on an explanation of the role played by bases and lines of operation. Moreover, Military History was simply used to illustrate each principle taught to the students, so Tovey’s work listed campaigns by the Jominian idea they were thought to demonstrate. 59

As most officers purchased their commission between 1858 and 1870 they did not attend Sandhurst or Woolwich, and hence were not required to study Military History. Once in the army there was little incentive for officers to study the subject as it did not appear on the exams set for promotion until 1904, none of the Army’s ‘Garrison Instructors’ taught the subject; and, according to John Frederick Maurice, Instructor of Military History at Sandhurst between 1871-3, the officer ‘hated literary work… [and had] hardly the energy to undertake it’. 60 Even though the reforms instituted by Secretary of State for War Edward Cardwell in

56 Sandhurst, Louis Napoleon (The Prince Imperial) Military History Exam, sat at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, First Class, July 1875.
57 Peter Kendall, Royal Engineers at Chatham 1750-2012 (Swindon, 2012), pp. 105-6, 116.
59 Tovey, Elements of Strategy, pp. 22, 60, 68, 70, 72 85, 87, 95.
1870-1 made completion of the Sandhurst course obligatory for those seeking a commission in the Infantry and Cavalry, this did little to increase the study of Military History in the army as the subject was removed from the syllabus of Sandhurst in 1873, replaced by the study of ‘Tactics’.\textsuperscript{61} The reason for this was that a Military Commission which sat in 1870 to consider army education felt that the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars had underscored the importance of a junior officer’s tactical understanding and the commissioners proposed that more time should be devoted to the study of tactics.\textsuperscript{62}

The study of tactics at Sandhurst was centred on the historical development of the ‘elements’ thought to govern the topic.\textsuperscript{63} The textbook selected for the course was F. Clery’s \textit{Minor Tactics} and the historical examples which it used to illustrate these ‘elements’ were the ones used on the course.\textsuperscript{64} Cadets were allowed to purchase additional books to assist them in their studies, and Winston Churchill, who attended the College in 1894, recalled that he had ordered ‘Hamley’s \textit{Operations of War}... together with a number of histories dealing the American Civil, Franco-German and Russo-Turkish wars [since these] were then our latest and best specimens’.\textsuperscript{65} However, the study of Tactics at Sandhurst had a serious flaw. As the course was entirely based on the textbook, the instructors felt that they could not spend long on the most recent developments in tactics caused by technological change as these did not appear in Clery’s work and the examiner would only set questions based on this book.\textsuperscript{66}

Even though Tactics already played an important part in the study of Military History at Woolwich, a committee under Lord Mortley, appointed to revise the syllabus in 1886, put

\textsuperscript{62} Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{64} Anon., \textit{Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1876}, p. 58; and, C. F. Clery, \textit{Minor Tactics} (London, 1875).
forward new regulations based ‘very much on what had already been adopted for Sandhurst’. The committee concluded that although ‘Military History is obviously a useful study for every officer’, the study of Tactics was ‘essential’.\textsuperscript{67} Since it was felt that there was not sufficient time available to teach both topics, a specialised study of tactics replaced Military History in 1887.\textsuperscript{68} At first, the way in which Tactics was taught mirrored the approach used to teach Military History with historical examples used to illustrate the ‘tactical principles’ under consideration. However, by 1892 the number of questions that appeared on exam scripts that required historical knowledge declined dramatically. Most questions set after this time either placed the cadet in an imaginary contemporary situation which tested their decision-making, or merely asked abstract questions regarding the ‘special duties’ of various units.\textsuperscript{69} Although it was not necessary for an officer to have studied Military History in order to gain a commission, from 1857 it had been, in theory if not in practice, compulsory for an officer to have studied the subject to be eligible for a staff position. Consequently, Military History formed an important part of the syllabus at the Staff College from its formation following the recommendation by the Yolland committee.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{II. The Staff College, Camberley, 1858-85}

Following the report of the Yolland Commission, which had found that Military History formed an important part of officer education on the continent, the Duke of Cambridge issued a General Army Order on 9 April 1857 which made it a requirement that those holding staff positions should be ‘thoroughly acquainted’ with ‘the principles of strategy’ through a


\textsuperscript{69} Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Woolwich, Tactics Exam Paper, First Class, July 1892, p. 2; and, Askers-Douglas Committee, Evidence, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{70} Bond, \textit{Victorian Army and Staff College}, pp. 51-77.
knowledge of ‘military history, especially as relates to the campaigns of the ancient and modern commanders’. This requirement was later extended and from 5 March 1859 men promoted to the rank of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were expected to ‘give proof’ that they had ‘carefully studied at least four of the most memorable modern campaigns’, and could ‘explain the apparent objects of the movements, and the reasons which he suppose[d had] led to their adoption’.

Therefore, when the ‘Senior Department’ of the Royal Military College was converted and expanded to create the Staff College in 1858, the Council of Military Education included Military History as part of its syllabus. The study of this subject was intended to give the student ‘an opportunity of studying deeply and thoroughly the accounts of the campaigns of great commanders, and through them the principles of military art’. To gain entry to the college an officer had to pass an admission exam intended to demonstrate he had some knowledge of Military History. At first, candidates were only expected to give a factual, ‘detailed account’ of a campaign which they had studied, but from 1862 campaigns were specially selected for this exam and notification was published in the army’s General Orders as well as in military periodicals. From this time candidates were expected to express an opinion on how effectively these operations had been waged and the exam became ‘principally directed to elicit this knowledge rather than a mere narrative of facts’. Since the entrance exam was competitive, and so only the highest scoring candidates could be admitted

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71 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. cxliv.  
73 Ibid., pp. 3, 13, 56.  
to the college, great importance was placed on the study of Military History as it was allocated the second highest number of marks, with only Mathematics worth more.\textsuperscript{77}

Just as at Sandhurst and Woolwich, the Staff College syllabus relied heavily on Jomini’s writing and campaigns were analysed in relation to his ‘principles of war’.\textsuperscript{78} Consequently, MacDougall’s \textit{The Theory of War}, which embodied Jomini’s ideas, was used as the set-text for the admission exam between 1864 and 1869.\textsuperscript{79} The main method of instruction was through the weekly lecture which was given on ‘the general principles which govern strategy and tactics’, with ‘the operations of one campaign described with a view to illustrate a particular branch of the general subject’.\textsuperscript{80} Until 1869 a variety of mainly European campaigns, which had been fought between 1757 and 1866 were selected for study at the college.\textsuperscript{81} Battlefield tours were also conducted on the continent, although at this time it would appear that the work was not all that intellectually rigorous as Hamley, the first Professor of Military History, reported to Blackwood in 1861, that while they had seen the ‘battlefields to perfection’, the ‘fly fishing was spoilt by the unremitting glare of the sun’.\textsuperscript{82} Since wars fought against native peoples did not conform to Jomini’s model, this type of conflict was seen as below a staff officer, and Hamley was even opposed to sending Staff


\textsuperscript{81} C. Cooper King, \textit{Great Campaigns, edited from the lectures and Writings of the Late Major C. Adams} (London, 1877), p. vi.

\textsuperscript{82} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4161, ff. 49, Hamley to Blackwood, 5 May 1861.
College graduates on the Ashanti expedition in 1873, commenting that ‘it is cutting bricks with a razor to send highly instructed officers into the bush to fight naked savages’.  

The notes which the students took from lectures, together with their wider reading, were used to answer questions set by the professor which, ‘at his own discretion’, he felt deserved greater analysis. The answers the students gave were ‘judged [by] the power shewn to grasp and arrange the subject’ as well as ‘the judgement and acuteness shewn in commenting on the parts which admit of discussion… and the style of writing, which ought to be such as would render a detailed report from a staff officer valuable and reliable’. The marks assigned for these ‘memoirs’ made up half of those assigned to the subject, with the other half coming from the exams sat at the end of the year. Military History, along with Mathematics, Fortification and Artillery were assigned the highest marks at the institution. As such, Military History held a high importance for the students, and those who achieved the highest grades were found to have ‘devoted most of [their] attention’ to the subject. To assist the students with their work, the college library had a ‘large collection’ of military historical works, and even had an arrangement with the publisher Longmans, Green, and Co., so the clerk who purchased the books ‘always [got] them through Longmans’.

At this time, strategy was understood at the Staff College in almost exclusively military terms, as Jomini had presented it, thus concerned with the manoeuvres of armies in a theatre of war. This view was not revised when the ideas of Clausewitz began to play an important part in the study of Military History at the college alongside those of Jomini.

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83 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4304, ff. 125, Hamley to Blackwood, 23 November 1873.
84 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. vii.
89 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4294 ff. 213, J.F. Maurice to John Blackwood, 13 May 1872.
between 1866 and 1873. In fact, Clausewitz was thought to describe strategy in the same way as Jomini. Evelyn Baring, in an essay written during his time at the college in 1868, stated that ‘if any definition [of strategy and tactics] be required, that of Clausewitz seems as good as any: ‘Tactics are employed on the battlefield; strategy is the conduct of troops up to the moment of collision’.\(^{90}\) Since Clausewitz was understood in these terms, his ideas on the manoeuvres of an army in a theatre of war were those which received the most attention. Thus, when Major Charles Adams, Professor of Military History between 1868 and 1874, described Clausewitz’s contribution to the study of warfare, he focused on his work regarding ‘military system, the preparation of the theatre of war, the advantage of the initiative, the moral influence of early success, the values of true selection of the objective, secrecy of purpose and extreme vigour of execution’.\(^{91}\)

Colonel Charles Chesney, Adams’ predecessor at the college, also thought of Clausewitz’s work in the same terms and focused on the Prussian theorist’s discussion of the movement of military forces during a campaign. In October 1868, Chesney published his *Waterloo Lectures* which consisted of ‘some of [his Staff] College lectures [put] together in proper fashion’ which ‘embod[ied] the results of a study… carried on’ at the Staff College.\(^{92}\) The footnotes in this work demonstrate that he had read *On War* in a French translation, published in 1851, and had used it in his analysis of the campaign at the college.\(^{93}\) In an attempt to defend Wellington from Napoleon’s assertion that the British position at Waterloo was ‘badly chosen’, as the forest of Soignies could have prevented an orderly retreat,

\(^{90}\) Baring, *Staff College Essays* p. 8. This definition has a much closer relation to that given by Jomini in *Art of War* in which he stated ‘Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and… Grand tactics is the art of posting troops upon the field’, Jomini, p. 51. In contrast, Clausewitz saw tactics as ‘the use of the armed forces in the engagement’; strategy, ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’. Howard, Paret (trans.) and *Clausewitz, On War*, p. 128.

\(^{91}\) Cooper King, *Great Campaigns*, p. 450.

\(^{92}\) NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS 4230 ff. 122, Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868; and, C.C. Chesney, *Waterloo Lectures* (London, 1868), p. xvi.

Chesney was particularly interested in Clausewitz’s thoughts regarding the influence woodland could have on a defensive position, and he noted that:

Clausewitz... has made the attempt in his ‘Art of War’, to treat systematically the subject of the use of forests by armies. He describes at the opening of his chapter a partially traversable wood (such as is and was that of Soignies) as the first case to be considered, and thus, after some considerations lays down his theory... [that] wooded districts cannot in any manner be used advantageously for defensive actions, except when they lie to the rear. In this case they conceal from the enemy all that passes in the defender’s rear and at the same time serve to cover and facilitate his retreat.  

While Chesney used Clausewitz’s writing to vindicate the position selected by Wellington, he also noted that the recent ‘American experience’ during the Civil War would ‘no doubt have caused [the Prussian to] greatly to modify’ his view on the role of woodland in warfare, as he felt that it had demonstrated its utility during defensive action.

Chesney’s use of Clausewitz’s ideas influenced the final exam set by the external examiner, Major George Colley, in 1868. The Staff College students, who had evidently studied Clausewitz’s writing, were asked to ‘apply the theory of Clausewitz on the use of forests easily traversed to an army on the defensive, to the subject of Waterloo and the English position there’. Likewise, Clausewitz’s views regarding the defensive value of forests were used by Baring in his 1869 Staff College essay on Napoleon’s operations in Poland during December 1806 in which he too quoted from the 1851 translation of Clausewitz.

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95 Chesney, *Waterloo Lectures* p. 185.
97 Baring, *Staff College Essays*, p. 196.
Clausewitz’s views of the influence of other obstacles on the conduct of a campaign were also studied at the Staff College during this time. In the final exam set by the external examiners Colonel Lumley Graham and Captain A. Clarke in 1873, the opinion expressed in On War regarding the role of fortresses in defensive operations formed a central part of one question. The students were told that, ‘Clausewitz says, “Les places fortes sont les premiers et les plus important points d’appui de la defense”’, and were then asked in relation to the recent Franco-Prussian war to ‘consider how far the French Frontier fortresses fulfilled this attribute during the early part of the campaign’. The views of the Prussian regarding the influence of rivers were also studied; in fact, Baring referred many times to his view on this topic as it had been covered in On War in his Staff College essays. Similarly, Clausewitz’s writing on the relationship between attack and defence was discussed at this time. Baring’s essay on the operations in Poland in 1806 used his concept of ‘le point limite de la victoire’ to explain why Napoleon abandoned his offensive operations after the Battle of Pultusk. Moreover, it was Clausewitz’s notion that defensive campaigns should consist largely of offensive action which formed the basis of Baring’s analysis of this campaign. So often had Baring deferred to Clausewitz’s writing in this essay that he felt the need to provide an ‘apology for quoting him so often’, even though ‘his great reputation as a military critic… gives considerable weight to all he says’.

The critical approach to Military History outlined by Clausewitz also influenced how Chesney approached the subject. The Prussian had observed that following historical research

99 This translates as ‘strongholds are the first and most important supports of the defence’ and corresponds with the version ‘we suggest that fortresses constitute the first and foremost support of defence’ which appears in the Howard/Paret translation on p. 395.
100 Baring, Staff College Essays, pp. 129, 175, 198, 215, 216, 217.
102 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. 213. ‘The defensive line in the war is not limited to parry blows, but also includes the use of clever response’.
103 Ibid., p. 219.
there were two types of criticism which could be employed, the tracing of effects back to their causes, and the testing of the means a commander employed.\textsuperscript{104} Chesney directly borrowed from Clausewitz’s ideas on critical analysis. In the introduction to his \textit{Waterloo Lectures} he outlined ‘the two chief classes of critical remarks which writers employ’.\textsuperscript{105} The first which he described corresponded with Clausewitz’s conception of critical analysis, which Chesney saw as the ‘sort of criticism… which… dissects events to find the rules which govern them [so that] an event may be traced in all its leading features, [and] its influence on the course of the campaign may be noted’. The second type of criticism which he outlined mirrored the way suggested by Clausewitz to analyse the means employed by a commander. Chesney described this as ‘deal[ing] with the characters and conduct of the men concerned… [as] the task of the historian still remains unfulfilled if he fail[s] to assign in some degree at least, the relation to the whole of the chief actors and their parts’.\textsuperscript{106}

This approach to the critical analysis of Military History, particularly the testing of the means employed by a commander, directly influenced how the subject was taught and examined at the college from the late 1860s. Baring in his essay on Napoleon’s operations in Poland made sure that his criticism of the decisions made by commanders was limited to an analysis of how they acted given the information available to them at the time, as he noted: ‘Clausewitz says… Lorsque la critique veut prononcer un eloge ou un blame concernant un acte, elle ne reussira jamais qu’imparfaitement a se metre a la place de celui qui a accompli cet acte’.\textsuperscript{107} Similarly, in April 1872, Adams set a question which placed the students in the position encountered by Marshal Bazaine in August 1870 and asked them to ‘propose any course of operations which may suggest [themselves] to you as more conducive to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, ed. Howard & Paret, p. 156.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Chesney, \textit{Waterloo Lectures}, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Baring, \textit{Staff College Essays}, p. 188. This translates as: ‘when criticism is pronounced…or blame for an act, [one must put one’s self] in place of those who performed the act’.
\end{itemize}
interests of the country invaded… the suggestions [should be based] upon such information… as may be reasonably supposed to have been in Bazaine’s hands during the given period’. 108

This style of question also appeared on both the admission and final exams. For instance, those graduating in 1870 were asked to ‘draw up a memorandum on the military situation and scheme of offensive operations, such as might have been laid before a council of war held at the Austrian Head Quarters about the 20 April [1859], assuming the general position of the Allies to be known, and [that] the Austrian army [was] ready to cross the Ticino’. 109 Likewise, in the 1867 admission exam, applicants were asked to ‘discuss the courses open to Napoleon after the fall of Moscow’. 110

As the understanding of Clausewitz’s writing on strategy was limited to that relating to the operations of armies moving in a theatre of war, his ideas regarding the role which politics played in warfare were only imperfectly comprehended. Although there was some realisation that political considerations may impact strategy, this notion received little attention and was even directly criticised at the college. Despite his frequent use of Clausewitz’s writing, Baring in his Staff College essays was adamant that Jomini’s ‘principles of strategy’ presented ‘a strategical standard which never changes under any circumstances’. 111 Thus, Baring argued that, although ‘many non-military matters’ such as ‘the moral and political part of war’ had ‘a very direct bearing and influence on… operations in the field’ during a campaign, any consideration which caused a general to conduct his operations in a manner which was not strictly in accordance with the principles of war also

108 NAM, Henry Cooper Papers, 6112-595-31, Staff College, Military History Memoir on the War of 1870, April 1872, p. 1.
111 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. 195.
led him to violate the ‘strategical standard’ and so had caused him to conduct a faulty strategy which an ‘active and skilful enemy’ could exploit.\textsuperscript{112}

The Jominian conception of strategy in use at this time prevented much emphasis being placed on the character of a general and the influence of an army’s morale on the conduct of a campaign. Although there was the occasional reference to these factors, these were rare.\textsuperscript{113} While Baring in his essay on the operations in Poland noted that Clausewitz had written ‘the moral effect of the arrival of fresh troops on a battlefield even though few in number, must always be very great’, he did not regard the influence of morale a major consideration in his analysis. Baring even rejected the consideration of a commander’s personality when studying a campaign on similar grounds to that which had led him to condemn anything which interfered with the ‘strategical standard’ presented by Jomini’s principles.\textsuperscript{114}

In 1870, when Hamley was appointed commandant of the Staff College, his 
\textit{Operations of War} and Jomini’s \textit{L’art de la Guerre} were made the only text books set for the admission exam, a position they retained until 1894.\textsuperscript{115} As a result, these exams increasingly began to reflect the approach to Military History contained in these works and so campaigns were used simply to ‘illustrate’ the ‘principles of strategy explained and illustrated in the \textit{Operations of War}’.\textsuperscript{116} Often the questions were directly taken from Hamley’s work, and in 1890, 1892 and 1894 candidates were simply asked to state ‘Hamley’s comments’ on a

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\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., pp. 188, 195.
\textsuperscript{113} Anon., \textit{Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1866} (London, 1867), p. 27.
\textsuperscript{114} Baring, \textit{Staff College Essays}, pp. 184, 195.
\end{flushleft}
Unsurprisingly, when preparing to take this exam candidates focused their attention on learning this work by heart. In 1889 the Military History examiner commented that, while the relevant Army Order had stated that ‘the military history... required [for the exam was] that embraced by Parts 1 to 5 of the *Operations of War*, he felt that for several years the candidates ‘appear to have unanimously interpreted this as simply ‘the military history and geography recorded in Parts 1 to 5 of the *Operations of War*, for, with a few exceptions, no candidate has in his answers, ventured to give a fact, to offer an opinion, or to make a statement, which is not to be found within the cover of [this work]’. Since answers now consisted of ‘a parrot-like repetition’ of the *Operations of War*, ‘the candidates, as a rule, show[ed] a very correct knowledge of the historical facts of the campaign [but] the weakness of the papers [lay] in the deductions drawn from correctly stated facts’.

As the *Operations of War* came to dominate the admission exam, the work had an increasing influence on how the subject was taught at the Staff College. Hamley used his authority as commandant to develop the Military History course largely in line with how the subject was approached in his work. This dramatically reduced the use of Clausewitz’s writing at the Staff College; indeed, after 1873, reference to him on the exam scripts ceased. Similarly, the final exams came to focus on the memorisation of judgements in the *Operations of War* as well as knowledge of the events of a campaign. In 1876, for the first time in this exam, students were simply asked to ‘describe the method suggested in the *Operations of War*’ to answer a question. In the same way, a question in 1880 asked students to ‘follow the course of the [Franco-Prussian War] by mentioning in succession all

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the rivers crossed or in any way utilized by the armies on either side’.122 Although this question went on to require students to ‘deduce from this study a general consideration of the influence of rivers in war’, this topic had been covered in part five of Hamley’s work, particularly in chapter seven, which provided an analysis of this campaign.123 As the third edition of the Operations of War, published in 1872, included a new chapter on the conventional phase of the Franco-Prussian War, culminating in the defeat of the French armies at Sedan and Metz, this campaign was frequently studied at the Staff College.124 From 1873 to 1881 it came to dominate the Military History course, so that the Franco-Prussian War became the only conflict studied in relation to strategy during this period.125

Just as the Seven Weeks War and Franco-Prussian War had stimulated the study of tactics at Sandhurst and Woolwich, tactics received increased attention at the Staff College from 1871. Instead of questions on this topic being interwoven with questions on strategy, as had been done since 1858, an additional paper which looked exclusively at tactics was added to the final exam in Military History.126 Even though before 1866 the study of Tactics on the Military History course had revolved around developments in weapons technology, in 1870 the syllabus was formally amended so that its study in the second year included special reference to the ‘recent modifications dependent on improved arms’.127 Thus, the increase in firepower created by ‘breech loading arms of precision’ took on a particular significance. In 1872, for example, E.H.H. Collen won a prize for his essay on the Battle of Wörth which stressed the ‘enormous sacrifice of life’ and failure of the attack which he felt would have resulted if the current British tactics, dependent on a frontal attack using the line formation,
and closing to engage in a hand-to-hand fight, had been used by the Germans during the battle. Instead, Collen suggested that due to the increase in firepower which modern weapons generated British troops should adopt a much more open formation, as he felt this move away from current British methods was ‘inevitable’.

The works of continental writers, especially Prussians, were used to study Tactics at the Staff College. In 1871, Bronsart von Schellendorf’s work was directly referenced on the final exam when the students were asked ‘what general principles [regarding the] alteration of infantry tactics did the author of the Tactical Retrospect of the Campaign of 1866 advocate’. In 1876 students were asked for the ‘opinion of Continental writers, from experience of late wars, on volley and independent firing… and the reasons for the course you advocate’. In fact, the Operations of War also had a considerable impact on the study of tactics; and, Hamley’s approach, based on historical precedent, was the one adopted in the final exam. Given that a close acquaintance with the Operations of War was now essential for all aspects of the Military History course at the Staff College, as well as at Woolwich, Hamley noted in 1874 to his publisher that ‘Operations is selling well… we should have got through more than a thousand in the year… this is by far the best year… it has yet seen’. This domination continued after Hamley had vacated the Commandant’s position in 1877 and only began to be challenged in the late 1880s.

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129 Ibid., pp. 460-464.
130 Anon., Report on Final Examinations at the Staff College, 1871, p. 31.
131 Anon., Report on Final Examinations at the Staff College, 1876, p. 12.
133 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4318, ff. 88, Hamley to Blackwood, 20 February 1874.
134 Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 131.
III. The Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, 1885-1914

The first move away from the reliance on learning factual information and judgements contained in the *Operations of War* at the Staff College occurred when John Frederick Maurice was appointed as Professor of Military History in 1885.¹³⁵ Maurice had previously been trained there, passing out fourth in his class in 1872, while Clausewitz’s writing was still in use.¹³⁶ When he arrived to take up this position, he found that there had taken root ‘an idea of Military History which was certainly very different from [that] held by the very able men who had been those from whom I had myself learnt in the past’. He discovered that the students, in reaction to the emphasis which had been placed on the reproduction of facts, had focused their attention on learning the details of a campaign. He even discovered that ‘a zealous student had actually elaborated a *memoria technical*’ enabling him, ‘for the purpose of an examination, to place the troops in full detail just as they were on every day of any importance… in the campaign which he was studying’, which given ‘the nature of the examination enabled him to take a very high place’.¹³⁷

By contrast, Maurice’s view of the role Military History should play in military training, and how it should be studied, was shaped by the Clausewitzian approach to the subject. Maurice stated, mirroring the Prussian’s writing on critical analysis, that in ‘the study of Military History it is necessary in each separate case first to ascertain accurately what the facts really are; secondly, to endeavour to ascertain what the causes were that led to the facts,

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¹³⁶ Anon., *Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1873*, p. 42. He graduated with 535/600 marks in Military History, the highest that year.
¹³⁷ Maurice, *John Frederick Maurice*, pp. 60-1. It is possible that this anonymous student was Alymer Haldane, who later wrote the General Staff’s Official History of the Russo-Japanese War and went on to command the 6th Army Corps in 1916 during the Great War. In his unpublished memoirs, Haldane, who was a student at the Staff College in 1885, recalled that he undergone ‘a memory course, the Pelmanism of those days, called Loisette’ which he ‘found to be useful for fixing [the] dates and facts in one’s head’ needed for the exam. NLS, Alymer Haldane Papers, MS20254, ff. 58, Unpublished Autobiography, 1946.
and thirdly, to endeavour to draw sound conclusions for the future’. Again reflecting Clausewitz’s view, he felt that ‘it must be emphatically asserted that there does not exist… “an art of war” which was something other than the resultant of accumulated military experience’. As such, he thought that ‘it is essential for a soldier… to keep before him the fact that the object is not merely to acquire information concerning operations, battles, skirmishes, and charges, or indeed, any mere information at all’, but to improve his judgement as ‘knowledge [is] only of practical value in so far as it acquaints us with what we have to expect in war, and in so far as this acquaintance makes it easier for us to act in war’.  

To this end, Maurice set about modifying the Military History course at the Staff College to reflect this aim. However, he could do little about the content of the admission exam, since ‘out of sheer idleness’ the external examiner made a ‘fetish’ out of Operations of War and, until 1895, had continued the ‘habit of exacting verbal accuracy of quotation from the unfortunate candidates’. Maurice reduced the time given to the study of strategy, as he felt ‘it does not seem… possible at the Staff College to do more in that matter than to introduce men to the method of studying campaigns’. On the assumption that ‘a man is likely to acquire a much better knowledge of [how to approach the study of Military History] by a close and intimate study of one particular section of it’, he directed his students towards an in-depth analysis of one campaign in each year they spent at the college. Thus, the way in which Maurice taught the subject was underpinned by the notion that it should guide the student in his own self-education by providing him with the necessary tools for further study.

138 Maurice, John Frederick Maurice, pp. 60-1; and, Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, pp. 156-74.
139 Maurice, John Frederick Maurice, pp. 58, 60.
141 Maurice, John Frederick Maurice, p. 61.
By 1890, Maurice’s reform of the subject had begun to come into effect and questions which focused on the development of a student’s judgement had returned to the course.  

Maurice, however, who retired from his position in 1892, realised that the reform of the Military History was still not complete. Although the external examiner in 1890 found a ‘marked improvement’ in the study of the subject, as the students showed the ‘unmistakeable signs of intelligent reading’ with many going ‘well beyond “chessboard” strategy, [showing] that they appreciate[d] how much campaigns depend on… moral influences’, it was still noted that ‘it was not very difficult to trace the sources from which the information supplementary to that given in the Operations of War was derived [as they] were not numerous’.  

In the year of his retirement, Maurice wrote to his successor, G.F.R. Henderson, that ‘I am deeply conscious that at present the Staff College produces a monstrous deal of bread for very little sack… from the ruck we have turned out, I fear… some cranks and not a few pedants. I am sure that under the new regime you will succeed where I have often failed’.  

Henderson shared Maurice’s view about the role which Military History should play in military training. In a lecture given in 1894, he pointed out that Operations of War had only provided the ‘elementary’ and ‘mechanical’ building blocks of the military art, but had ‘scarcely mentioned’ the ‘higher art of generalship’ by which ‘the great commanders bound victory to their colours’. Henderson thought of a campaign not simply in terms of the lines of advance, or bases of operation, but as ‘a struggle between two human intelligences’.  

Thus, like Clausewitz, Henderson placed great emphasis on the use of Military History to develop an officers’ judgement, and noted that ‘by far the most useful way of studying

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142 For example, Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1890, p. 33.
144 Maurice, John Frederick Maurice, p. 64.
146 Ibid., p. 176.
Military History’ was to ‘find out from your books… what the situation was at any given time’ and ‘decide for yourself what you would have done had you been in the place of one of the commanding generals, and write your orders. [By doing this] you are training your judgement’. 147

This understanding of the role Military History could play in army education directly influenced how Henderson taught the subject at the Staff College. He taught his students that as ‘strategical questions cannot be solved on the spur of the moment but require close thinking and deep reflection… a rusty intellect is of no use, but a trained mind is required to decided rapidly’, since ‘in war a general is involved in darkness… which he can only penetrate by his own genius’. 148 James Edmonds, who entered the Staff College in 1896, recalled that Henderson used Military History as ‘a framework for instruction’. 149 A good example of this came from Edmonds time at Camberley: Douglas Haig was set a question by Henderson which asked him to ‘give the reasons’ behind the orders of the Confederate General Lee from June 13 to June 26 1862. To answer this question, Haig compared the characters of the commanders involved as well as the various methods for ‘solving’ the ‘strategical situation’ at hand, for which Henderson congratulated him on his analysis. 150

In 1893 the final exam was abolished, so students were ranked only according to their work undertaken while on the course. 151 Since the students were no longer required to sit a test set by an external examiner, Henderson was given greater freedom to develop the Military History syllabus along the lines he saw fit. Thus, he produced a list of twenty-one ‘strategical principles’ which replaced Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ as the standard against which a campaign was analysed at the college. These were:

147 Ibid., pp. 182-3.
148 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/13, Military History notebook used at the Staff College, n.d.
150 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/30, Military History Scheme on the American Civil War, used at the Staff College, 1896.
151 Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 231.
1) Strategy and Policy must be in harmony. 2) Good Organisation. 3) Sound Training. 4) Good Intelligence. 5) Concentration. 6) Preparation of the theatre of War. 7) Objectives must be carefully chosen, the main objective is the enemy’s main army. The secondary objectives are strategical points. 8) Direction. 9) Concentration of superior force at the decisive point at the decisive time. 10) The moral is to the physical as three to one. 11) Time is counted in war by minutes not by hours. 12) Compel the enemy to make mistakes. 13) [The importance of] natural features. 14) Victory brings a new strategical situation. 15) The strategic pursuit. 16) The strategic counter stroke is the best weapon for the defence. 17) War is not a matter of precedent. 18) Manoeuvre is the antidote to entrenchments. 19) The best is the enemy of the good. 20) Cavalry… is strategically the most important arm. 21) Command of the Sea.152

When Henderson left the Staff College in 1900 to serve on Lord Roberts’ staff in South Africa during the Second Boer War, his ‘strategical principles’ remained the standard against which a campaign was analysed until 1913.153 For example, in 1905 students in the Junior Division were asked to answer, in relation to Henderson’s principles, the question ‘how far are the strategical and tactical lessons drawn from the campaigns of 1815, 1862, 1866 and 1870 confirmed, or modified, by the experiences of the recent war in Manchuria’.154 Lieutenant-Colonel G. Morris, the member of the Directing Staff who taught Military History in 1909, also frequently referred to Henderson’s principles in the ‘schemes’ he set for students. He expected these principles to be used not only to provide a ‘summary of the lessons’ thought to have been demonstrated by the American Civil War, but to analyse Napoleon’s conduct in the ‘campaign of 1814’.155 Similarly, the papers of W.R. Robertson, LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 4/9, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, 1911.

153 Henderson, Science of War, p. xxxv; and, JSCSC, Shri venham, Junior Division, 1912, ff. 34-36. ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, 6th edn., March 1912. This was the final edition which was issued, and around this time the course began to break away from some of the principles Henderson identified, particularly the notion that the enemy’s army was always the main objective, see below. For biographical information on Lord Roberts, see Appendix 1.

154 JSCSC, Shri venham, Junior Division, 1905, ff. 82, ‘Military History Scheme’, 13 November 1905.

155 LHCMA, Wavell Papers, 1/1, Military History Notes, Summary of Lessons from the Period, 1909; NAM, David Stephen Robertson Papers, 9405-10-12-1, ‘Staff College Historical Scheme, Junior Division’, 1909; and, JSCSC, Shri venham, Junior Division, 1909, ‘Napoleon’s Campaign of 1814’, 17 June 1909.
commandant of the Staff College between 1910 and 1913, contained a copy of Henderson’s principles, too, dated March 1912.156

A key consideration which separated Henderson’s ‘principles’ from those devised by Jomini was the importance placed on psychological factors, which Henderson referred to using Napoleon’s maxim that ‘the moral is to the physical as three to one’.157 Consequently, the consideration of ‘moral factors’ began to play a larger role in the study of Military History at the Staff College; Haig’s notes taken in 1896 demonstrate, in fact, the emphasis which was placed on them. He wrote that ‘the psychological element [of] human nature with its infinite versatility play the chief part in war’ and, under the title ‘moral means’, he noted that ‘there is very little difference between the victor and the vanquished. But the difference is… owing to opinion!’158 Similarly, later that year, when he recorded the main four ‘elements [which] are of importance in leading to decisive action’, he placed ‘morale’ and ‘character’ as the most important.159 After Henderson had left the Staff College, the influence of ‘moral’ considerations on the conduct of a campaign remained an important part of the Military History syllabus and so students continued to be set questions in which the influence of psychological factors was central.160

In terms of the object of strategy and the role which political considerations should play, Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ borrowed heavily from Jomini’s writing. Since the new principles stated that ‘the main objective is the enemy’s main army’, the study of strategy continued to be viewed primarily in military terms, as political factors were excluded

156 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, March 1912.
158 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/20, Military History and Strategy notebook used at the Staff College Part 2, 1896; and, NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/19, Military History and Strategy notebook used at the Staff College Part 1, 1896.
159 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/13, Military History notebook used at the Staff College, n. d.
from setting the objective which an army pursued. Like Jomini, Henderson’s principles included the statement that ‘strategy and politics must be in harmony’; thus political considerations were held to have an influence on how a commander went about the destruction of the opposing army. Haig wrote in his Staff College notebook, that ‘political considerations may modify strategical principles often deemed inviolate… since strategy is dependent on [the] interior political conditions of a country’. Moreover, the admission exams began to refer to how political considerations should shape the conduct of a campaign: candidates were asked in 1899, ‘assuming that from the military point of view a particular series of strategical operations promises the best results, state what non-military considerations may affect the question of its adoption’.

As Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ referred to the influence which ‘Command of the Sea’ could have on military operations, the role which this factor exerted on strategy began to be studied on the Military History course at the Staff College. It is likely that Henderson’s reading of Alfred T. Mahan’s work on the influence of sea-power on history led him to include this factor. Henderson had first referred to the American writer’s work in 1894 in a lecture to the RUSI. In his article on ‘War’, which appeared in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1902, he praised his ‘brilliant analysis of the nature of naval warfare and his masterly elucidation of the great principles of success and failure [in war]’. Reference to the influence of sea-power on land campaigns first appeared on the Staff College admission exam in 1898 when candidates were asked how ‘the conditions of modern war affected the

161 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, March 1912.
163 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/20, Military History and Strategy notebook used at the Staff College Part 2, 1896.
offensive strategy of Great Britain in conflicts with powers beyond the sea’. Since Henderson’s principles were used as a framework around which students constructed their answers to questions posed by the teaching staff, the influence of maritime considerations on land operations often appeared in their work. For example, W.R. Robertson, answered a question set by Henderson in October 1898 on recent ‘Russian acquisitions’ in the ‘Far East’, by arguing that in any future conflict Britain should fall back on its ‘historical strategy’ by using the navy to both blockade the enemy’s ports and to conduct amphibious operations against the enemy’s colonies, so as to find new markets for British merchants, while denying them to the enemy.167

After Henderson had left the Staff College the course of studies there began to place an increasing emphasis on a close co-operation between the army and navy. From 1906 several places were reserved for naval officers and in 1909 the first ‘Combined Naval and Military Staff Tour’ took place, in which students from both services jointly planned operations.168 This emphasis on close co-operation influenced the way in which Military History was taught. Not only did reference to the importance of maritime considerations remain on the Military History syllabus, but students received lectures on ‘Amphibious Strategy’ which drew on examples gleaned from recent operations conducted during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Spanish American War of 1898, and the Chilean Civil War of 1891.169 The Staff College library also held a selection of works on this topic. As part of the Military History course, students in 1913 were expected to read, among other material:

167 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/1, essay entitled ‘What changes in the Strategical relations between Russia and England have been produced by the advance and recent acquisitions of Russia in the Far East?’ p. 8.
168 Godwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 242; Frederick Maurice, Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London, 1928), p. 85; and, JSCSC, Shrivenham, Senior Division, 1910, ft. 27, ‘First Combined Naval and Military Staff Tour, 1909’, n.d.
G.A. Furse’s *Military Expeditions Beyond the Sea*, Major C.E. Callwell’s *Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns* and his *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance*, as well as G. Aston’s *Letters on Amphibious Strategy*. Noticeable by its absence, however, was the work of Julian Corbett, especially his *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911). The inclusion of maritime considerations in the syllabus influenced which campaigns were selected for study and in the decade before the outbreak of the Great War, the campaign fought in the Richmond peninsula in 1862 during the American Civil War, in which an amphibious landing took place, was regularly studied.

Just as the use of Henderson’s strategical principles continued after his tenure at the Staff College had ended, the use of the subject to develop an officer’s judgement remained central to the teaching in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. Consequently, those taking the admission exam were reminded that ‘unless each important situation [during a campaign] is dealt with as a problem, of which the student thinks out his own solution, the study of Military History is of no great value’. Likewise, on the course of study itself, students continued to be set questions regularly which placed them in the position of a commander and charged them with deciding the best course of action. In 1910, for example, students of the Senior Division were placed in the position of the Russian General Mishchenko, who commanded several cavalry units during the Battle of the Yalu during the Russo-Japanese War. They were required to write an ‘appreciation of the situation, winding up with a detail of the distribution you propose for your troops [with] copies of any orders

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This style of question not only allowed students to practise writing orders, but also required detailed information regarding the specifics of the campaign so, to answer the next question, in which the students were placed in the position of ‘General Staff Officers of the Headquarters Staff of the Russian Army’, they were required to use the newly published ‘advanced portion’ of the British Official History of the war.175

Despite these areas of continuity between the approach to the study of Military History introduced by Henderson and that used in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Great War, in 1899 the study of ‘Small Wars’ and warfare against ‘savage’ peoples was introduced to the subject’s syllabus, with Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice acting as the textbook.176 From 1902, the admission exam included a new voluntary paper which was entirely devoted to this subject, which utilised Callwell’s work as its sole textbook.177 Many of the questions set both on this paper and on the Military History course were directly lifted from the work, and Callwell’s central argument, that conventional military forces should always seek to compel the enemy to fight, often acted as their premise.178 Initially, students were simply asked to provide historical examples to illustrate the principles described in Callwell’s work. However, from 1908 a more Clausewitzian approach was adopted and questions began to appear which placed the candidate in a

174 JSCSC, Shrivenham, Senior Division 1912, ff. 82 ‘Manchurian Campaign’; and, NAM, David Stephen Robertson Papers, 9405-10-12-10B, ‘Staff College Historical Scheme on the Manchurian Campaign 1904-5, Senior Division’, 1910.
176 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905; and, JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division, 1904, ff. 85, ‘Military History Syllabus’, 7 November 1904.
historical situation from a ‘small war’ and asked them to decide the best course of action.\textsuperscript{179} In 1909 the topic was removed from the Military History syllabus, although there continued to be a voluntary ‘small wars’ paper on the admission exam, and it became its own subject at the Staff College, known as ‘Warfare in Uncivilised Countries’.\textsuperscript{180} This new subject was also based on Callwell’s writing; it drew on the same examples from Military History, while the notion that ‘strategy favours the enemy’ continued to underpin many questions.\textsuperscript{181}

The number of officers from the Indian Army admitted to Camberley was strictly limited following their first admittance to the institution in 1877. In 1889, and again in 1890, the Indian authorities put pressure on the War Office to allow more of its officers to attend the Staff College, but on both occasions their proposals were rejected.\textsuperscript{182} When Lord Kitchener became Commander-in-Chief in India in November 1902 he began to reconstitute and modernise the Indian Army and so demanded a far greater number of trained staff officers than the existing arrangement could provide. A committee was organised under Major-General E.H.H. Collen in 1904 to consider the formation of a Staff College in India.\textsuperscript{183} The main concern of this committee was that the formation of a second Staff College would ‘certainly result in the gradual growth of two schools of thought, and in a divergence of views on Staff Duties between the officers of the British and Indian Armies’.\textsuperscript{184} Hence, when on the committee’s recommendation, a second institution was opened, first temporarily at Deolali in 1905, and then permanently at Quetta in 1907, the syllabus adopted was modelled on the one used at the ‘mother college at Camberley’. At first, only graduates from Camberley were

\textsuperscript{180} JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division, 1909, ff.122, ‘Warfare in Uncivilized Countries: Lecturers Notes’, 19 October 1909.
\textsuperscript{182} Godwin-Austin, \textit{The Staff and the Staff College}, p. 248; and, W. Braithwaite, ‘Staff College, Quetta’, \textit{Army Review}, 3 (October 1912), p. 413.
\textsuperscript{183} Godwin-Austin, \textit{The Staff and the Staff College}, p. 249; and, Braithwaite, ‘Staff College, Quetta’, pp. 413-4.
\textsuperscript{184} W. Braithwaite, ‘Staff College, Quetta’, p. 414.
selected as teaching staff so as to ensure the ‘fundamental principle’ of ‘uniformity and similarity of thought between the two colleges’.  

As a result of this, the way in which Military History was taught at Quetta closely mirrored the Clausewitzian approach in use at Camberley. The first Military History lecture given each year to students at Quetta, which looked in part at the ‘object and best method of studying’ the subject, presented Clausewitz’s three types of historical criticism as the ‘strictly critical parts of historical study’. The script used for this lecture by Major A. Montgomery-Massingberd in 1913 quoted from the J.J. Graham translation of On War to illustrate the importance of ‘tracing of effects to causes’ and ‘the testing of the means [a commander] employed’. Likewise, students were told to avoid committing ‘to memory too many unimportant facts that are really of little value [such as] the names of generals, places, and the exact details regarding the forces engaged’. Just as at Camberley, the central reason for studying Military History was the development of an officer’s judgement by drawing ‘lessons as how to, or how not to act under certain circumstances’ so that the staff officer ‘may know instinctively the soundest line of action to adopt and what mistakes to avoid’ in the future.  

Henderson’s ‘Strategical Principles’ which had been ‘issued to successive [classes] at Camberley’ were also used in the study of Military History at Quetta. As a result, those factors thought by Henderson to influence the conduct of a campaign were studied, with the consideration of ‘moral’ factors deemed to be the ‘most important’. As at Camberley, emphasis was placed the importance of the ‘Command of the Sea’, since ‘all strategy must

185 Godwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 250; and, Braithwaite, ‘Staff College, Quetta’, pp. 413–4.  
186 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 4/10, Introductory Lecture on the Waterloo Campaign, pp. 1–2, 4.  
188 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 4/10, Introductory Lecture on the Waterloo Campaign, p. 2.
embrace the combined forces of the army and navy’.189 The campaign most frequently used to illustrate this principle was that fought in the Richmond peninsula during the American Civil War in 1862, as at Camberley.190 The one area of difference between the Military History syllabuses at Camberley and Quetta was due to geography. Due to their relative proximity, students at Quetta were able to visit the regions fought over during the Russo-Japanese War, whereas at Camberley the annual tour visited the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War instead.191

At both Camberley and Quetta in the years immediately before the outbreak of the Great War much more emphasis was placed on Clausewitz’s discussion of the influence which political considerations had on strategy than had been the case previously. This change followed a discussion held during a Staff Officers Conference in January 1908 on the ‘necessity for the soldier to study politics in relation to strategy’. Here Brigadier-General Launcelot Kiggell, former Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at Camberley, later to be made Commandant in 1913, commented that the more he had both studied and taught Military History, the more he had become convinced that ‘politics were at the back of all strategical problems’. He continued, ‘it was not possible to separate strategy and politics, and indeed Clausewitz based his whole theory of war on the fundamental principle that strategy must be based on policy’.192

The courses of instruction at both Staff Colleges reflected this greater emphasis placed on the Clausewitzian understanding of war, especially the way in which the political

190 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 4/13, Lectures on American Civil War campaigns of 1862, given in 1913.
191 LHCMA, Thomas Capper Papers, 2/2, ‘Diary of a Visit of Students of the Indian Staff College to the Manchurian Battlefields in 1907’, Simla, 1908; and, JSCSC, Shrevenham, Senior Division, 1910, ff. 25, ‘Instructions for the Visit to Foreign Battlefields’, 1913.
192 NLS, Haig’s Papers, Acc.3155/81, Minutes of Staff Officer’s Conference held between 7-10 January 1908, L. Kiggell comments in a discussion on ‘The necessity for the soldier to study politics in relation to strategy’, p. 37.
end a nation sought should influence its military objective sought by the army. In 1909 the Camberley admission exam defined strategy as ‘the use of combats for the object of the war’ as Clausewitz had done. In 1911, the same exam asked candidates to illustrate how successful commanders conducted their operations, bearing in mind that ‘strategy must consider itself entirely dependent upon and subservient to the national policy’. At Camberley in 1913 the Junior Division were asked to prepare a memorandum on the best way to defend Richmond, the Confederate capital during the American Civil War, as if they were a ‘military advisor to President Jefferson Davis’ on the 20 February 1862. The model answer prepared by the examiner expected the students to realise that the military objective sought by the Confederates was determined by their political objective. Therefore, although ‘purely defensive’ military measures were thought to put the Southern armies at a serious military disadvantage, this was advocated as ‘the Federal[s would] be compelled to take the offensive as the only means of achieving their [political] aim’, and this would make them appear to be the ‘aggressors’, increasing the likelihood of England and France intervening on the Confederate side. Moreover, if the political situation allowed the Confederates to go on the offensive, the examiner expected pupils to identify Washington, not the Federal Army, as the military objective as ‘its fall and the flight of the Federal Government might conceivably expedite the recognition’ of Southern independence internationally. Similarly, at Quetta, in the first Military History lecture given to the Junior Division in 1913, Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd explained that when studying and analysing a campaign it should

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193 Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, pp. 603-10.
194 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1911, p. 2; and, Anon, Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1909, pp. 71-72.
195 JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division, 1913, ff. 28, ‘Problem in Connection with the American Civil War’, 2 April 1913.
be remembered that ‘policy is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a
continuous influence over it’. 196

Although the study of Military History at Camberley underwent significant changes
between 1858 and 1914, the subject was taught continuously at this institution during this
period. In contrast, the subject had ceased to be taught at Sandhurst and Woolwich by 1887.
However, by 1904, both institutions were teaching the subject again and Military History had
also been added to the syllabus of the exams set as part of officer promotion.

IV. Sandhurst, Woolwich and Army Exams, 1899-1914

In an attempt to correct the problems in officer education highlighted by the Second Boer
War, in April 1901 the Secretary of State for War, St John Broderick, appointed a committee
under A. Askers-Douglas to investigate how the army trained its officers and to propose
changes to the existing system. A central concern of the committee was to foster a greater
sense of professionalism in the officer corps, and so an emphasis was placed on balancing
‘the acquisition of knowledge likely to be useful to the officer’ with ‘that which is of still
greater importance, the right training of the mind:…. the development of the power of
acquiring knowledge and of using it when acquired’. 197 The committee was told by
Henderson that since Military History was not taught outside the Staff Colleges the British
officer was not sufficiently educated for ‘modern war’. 198 The solutions which were proposed
and introduced had, however, mixed results; but they were nonetheless significant.

In an attempt to rectify this perceived problem, and in the interests of promoting
professionalism, the Askers-Douglas committee suggested that Military History should play

197 Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd.
198 Askers-Douglas, Evidence., pp. 238-244.
an important part in the course of instruction at both Woolwich and Sandhurst so that a young officer would learn ‘sufficient Military History [as] to stimulate his interest in this important subject’ and so inspire him to take up the study of the subject voluntarily after he had left the institution. To ensure that officers remained committed to their professional development and continued to study Military History throughout their career, the committee also proposed that an annual exam for all regimental officers under the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel should be set ‘on the Military History of a selected campaign’ and that those found ‘conspicuously ignorant on two or more consecutive occasions… should be warned that they will not be promoted’.  

As a consequence of these proposals not only was Military History returned to the Woolwich curriculum in 1903, but the course at Sandhurst underwent modification. Since 1899, Military History had been taught in a limited form at Sandhurst. Students had received three lectures a term in the subject as part of the course of instruction in Tactics. But as only 300 of the 5750 marks available to a cadet during his time at the college were assigned to Military History, it was considered ‘an impossible way of teaching’ the subject. Despite an increase in the time spent on the subject in 1901, so that a cadet received twelve lectures and thirty hours of class instruction during his time at the institution, the number of marks assigned remained the same; an arrangement the Assistant Military Secretary of the Army, Colonel A.M. Delavoye, called a ‘farce’.

Following the implementation of the proposals put forward by the Askers-Douglas committee, the number of marks allocated to the study of Military History at Sandhurst was raised, and an additional ‘voluntary’ paper in the subject was added to the course. This allowed a cadet who had received more than eighty per cent of the marks available in the obligatory exam to receive up to forty-eight additional marks in the subject, in theory

199 Ibid., pp. 20, 28, 30, 38.
rewarding their interest and further study of the subject. Although these changes meant a cadet could now receive up to 400 marks in Military History, on a par with those allotted to the study of ‘Drill’ and ‘Musketry’, the subject was still poorly represented when compared to the 1200 marks available in both ‘Military Engineering’ and ‘Military Topography’. Moreover, the inclusion of the voluntary paper proved to be a failure, as only six of the seventy-four cadets on the course in 1904 received the required marks in the obligatory exam to count towards their grade.202 In light of this, in December 1905 the voluntary paper was discontinued and the marks assigned to Military History were raised to 1200 to reflect the importance which the Askers-Douglas committee had placed on its study.203

In line with the proposals put forward by the Askers-Douglas committee designed to stimulate interest in the study of Military History, measures were adopted at both Sandhurst and Woolwich to encourage the students to read the subject. At Sandhurst from 1903 a textbook was set for each campaign examined: the work used for the Peninsular campaign was the first volume of Major-General C.W. Robinson’s Wellington’s Campaigns (1905), for the Waterloo campaign, Major-General H.D. Hutchinson’s Story of Waterloo: A Popular Account of the Campaign of 1815 (1890), while, in 1904, Henderson’s Campaign of Fredericksburg (1885) was set as ‘the book’ for the study of this campaign.204 However, the use of textbooks did have one important drawback, even though the students were expected to read other works, as it led to some of the ‘weaker’ students ‘cramming’ the textbook and merely repeating its conclusions. In June 1907 the examiners found that this practice had taken place more than usual, since ‘apparently the candidates had learnt it all by heart and felt

204 Ibid., p. 6; H.D. Hutchinson, The Story of Waterloo: A Popular Account of the Campaign of 1815 (Chatham, 1890); and, Anon., Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in July 1904, p. 81.
that they must bring it out at all-risks’. The examiners were highly critical of this approach to the subject, and later commented that although the exam papers were ‘specially prepared to defeat [methods] such as these’, it was apparent that ‘the subject [was still] got up in a parrot-like manner by a large proportion of the candidates’.

At Woolwich a much greater emphasis was placed on ensuring that the cadet read as widely as possible. Students were expected to read works related to the campaign under study and also those on recent and on-going campaigns. In 1905, ‘with a view to testing further whether the cadets have grasped the importance of the study of Military History’, the examiner set a question on the Russo-Japanese War, even though the conflict was still raging and was ‘not included in the synopsis of the term’s studies’. Naturally, to answer this question ‘the cadets were… dependent to a great extent as regards facts on their own private reading, and as regards the appreciation of facts, on their own criticism’. The examiner found that ‘the results of this test [were] noteworthy’, as the work of ten cadets out of the forty examined, ‘were of so high a quality as to earn full marks [and] in only one case was it found necessary to award less than half marks’. As a result of this experiment, the examiner felt that Military History had ‘been so taught and studied’ that ‘the cadets now… obtaining commissions [from Woolwich] have a very good foundation for their future work in the subject’.

At both Sandhurst and Woolwich, an understanding of Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ remained integral to the course, with students expected to define terms such as ‘double lines’

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208 Anon., Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in June 1906, p. 23.
of advance and ‘interior lines’ of communication in the final exams set. Likewise, Hamley’s *Operations of War* continued to influence both courses, with questions such as that set at Sandhurst in June 1905 regarding, ‘mountains [as] military obstacles’, based on examples directly taken from this work. Moreover, Robinson’s *Wellington’s Campaigns*, used as a textbook at Sandhurst, consisted of lectures which he had written using Hamley’s work while teaching there between 1868 and 1870.

However, following the changes implemented as a result of the Askers-Douglas committee, at both Sandhurst and Woolwich a greater emphasis was placed on the use of Military History to develop an officer’s judgement, thus implementing the Clausewitzian approach to the subject, as had already been achieved at the Staff College. From 1904 questions which placed the cadet in the position of a commander making a judgement were employed. In 1908, for example, an exam paper set at Woolwich included questions which asked the cadet to ‘write a short appreciation of the situation as it presented itself’ to General Lee when he assumed command of Confederate troops in Virginia in April 1862, and to ‘discuss the various courses which were open’ to ‘Stonewall’ Jackson on 7 June 1862 at Port Republic. More emphasis was also placed on developing the cadet’s ability to deduce practical ‘lessons’ from the campaigns studied. In the final exam set at Sandhurst in June 1906, in a question on the Peninsular Campaign of 1808-10, the cadets were asked ‘what have you learnt as regards the utility of delivering counterstrokes from your study of this

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212 Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Woolwich, Military History Exam Paper, Autumn 1908, Fourth Class, First Paper, p. 1.

campaign, and is it more difficult to deliver a counterstroke now than it was in those days, if so, why?’ The examiner praised the cadet’s work, noting that ‘they show a considerable knowledge of the facts of the campaign, and, what is still more important, they have grasped the lessons which can be learnt… and which can be applied in future wars’.214

After 1905 the influence exerted by sea-power on land campaigns also became a feature of the study of Military History at Woolwich and Sandhurst. This further brought their curriculum into line with that of the Staff College.215 Since Woolwich placed such a high regard on private study, the library there acquired several books on the subject, including Callwell’s *Maritime Command and Effect on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo*, his *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance*, as well as Julian Corbett’s *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.216 The campaign which was the most regularly used to study maritime operations was also that fought during the American Civil War in the Richmond peninsula in 1862.217 For example, in July 1912 the cadets were asked to ‘discuss the various ways in which “Command of the Sea” influenced the course of the campaign up to the end of June 1862’ and ‘although McClellan’s strategy was based on a full use of sea-power held by the Federals, to what extent do you consider the methods by which this advantage was applied actually furthered the plans of his opponents?’218 At Sandhurst, many of Alfred T. Mahan’s books was purchased for the library, and by 1904 it held *Life of Nelson: the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain* (1897), *Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (1890), and *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*,

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216 Sandhurst, Catalogue to the Woolwich Library, pp. 49-52.
218 Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Woolwich, Military History Exam Paper, July 1912, Third Class, p. 1.
1793-1812 (1892). Consideration of the influence of maritime considerations on land campaigns directly influenced the course at this institution, the influence of British sea-power on the campaigns in the Spanish Peninsula during the Napoleonic wars appeared on the final exams set at Sandhurst every year between 1905 and 1914.

While the proposals made by the Askers-Douglas committee regarding the study of Military History at Woolwich and Sandhurst were accepted, their suggestion that an annual Military History exam be set for all officers under the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was rejected, although the matter continued to be discussed at Staff Conferences in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. Instead, in November 1904, Military History was added to the syllabus of the promotional exams sat by Lieutenants for promotion to Captain, and Captains for promotion to Major. The number of marks assigned to Military History was reasonably high, as out of the total of 1,600 marks available on the syllabus, it was allotted 500. As this was the second highest weighting of marks, only behind the subject known as ‘Military Engineering, Tactics and Topography’, which accounted for 600 marks, it ensured that officers would need to devote a considerable amount of time to the study of Military History to ensure that they were promoted. The Military History papers focused on a specially selected campaign which changed every year, notice of which was placed in the April edition of the Army Orders. Both the Lieutenants and Captains taking the exam

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219 Sandhurst, Gentleman Cadet’s Library Catalogue, 1904, p.118.
220 Anon., Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in June 1905, p. 115.
221 NLS, Haig’s Papers, Acc.3155/81, Minutes of Staff Officer’s Conference held between 7- 10 January 1908, 56-7.
223 Anon., Report on the result of the Examination in May 1909 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion (London, 1909), pp. 1, 33-34.
224 Anon., Report on the result of the Examination in May 1905 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion (London, 1905), p. 22-3. The topics examined were: ‘Military Engineering, Tactics and Topography’ (600 marks), ‘Military Law’ (200 marks), ‘Administration, Organisation and Equipment’ (300 marks), ‘Military History’ (500 marks).
225 Ibid., p. 489.
sat the same two papers, the first of which focused on the ‘strategy and grand tactics’ of the selected campaign, while the second paper concentrated on a ‘special period’ so that the ‘details of the minor tactics’ could be examined.\(^{226}\)

The justification for the inclusion of Military History in this exam, just as the Askers-Douglas committee had hoped to exact at Sandhurst and Woolwich, was to stimulate professionalism by encouraging ‘officers who have perhaps never read a Military History book before in their lives to acquire a taste for this study’, so that they would then read military literature ‘of their own free will’\(^{227}\). Since it was felt that a ‘direct incentive’ was needed to start officers reading more than just the books prescribed by an exam syllabus, no textbook was deliberately set for these exams, ensuring that officers would be forced to read widely in preparation for them.\(^{228}\) In order to place more books ‘within reach of officers’, small libraries consisting of ‘instructive and interesting publications’ were organised in their messes so that they could read in their spare time, as it was thought they ‘would read Military History much more freely if they could feel they were not going to be examined on every book they took up’.\(^{229}\) To further assist officers taking these exams, a series of classes of instruction were organised by the General Staff in order to prevent officers attending an institution intended to ‘cram’ men for the exam.\(^{230}\) At Aldershot, although these classes were conducted differently elsewhere, all officers, not just those up for promotion, were expected to study the campaign selected for the promotional exam by reading the books recommended by the officer in charge of the district, and by attending the lectures on the campaign put on

\(^{226}\) NLS, Haig’s Papers, Acc.3155/81, Minutes of Staff Officer’s Conference held between 17-20 January 1910, comments made by Col. F.N. Maude, on behalf of the Director of Military Training, during a discussion on the ‘advisability of preparing a programme of a suitable progressive course of Military History for junior officers’, p. 66.

\(^{227}\) Ibid.


\(^{229}\) NLS, Haig’s Papers, Acc.3155/81, Minutes of Staff Officer’s Conference held between 7-10 January 1908, p. 27.

\(^{230}\) Ibid., p. 7. Comments by Col. Haking.
over the winter months. Likewise, the RUSI organised series of lectures on the campaigns selected for the upcoming exams.

Just as at Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, the promotional exams used Military History to develop an officer’s judgement, so the questions employed either placed the candidate in the position of a commander making a decision, or asked them to deduce ‘lessons’ from the period under study. While knowledge of Jomini’s ideas, as they appeared in *Operations of War*, was still required, there were far fewer references to them. Likewise, the examiners made it plain in the reports published after every exam that they were not interested in candidates demonstrating a comprehensive knowledge of the events of a campaign. Instead, they expected them to exhibit ‘the training derived from thinking out the difficulties’ presented to a commander, as weighing ‘the advantages and disadvantages of [a] possible course of action’. In short developing judgement was thought to be ‘one of the most important assets derived’ from the study of the subject.

The proposals of the Askers-Douglas committee also influenced the exam sat by officers in the Militia and Territorial Force to convert their commission into one in the Regular Army, and by university graduates seeking a commission, which were collectively referred to as the ‘competitive exams’. In 1899, the ‘Military Law and Tactics’ paper of these exams was replaced by one on Military History, and a new syllabus set ‘parts I, II, III of

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231 Ibid., p. 57. Comments by Col. Godley.
Hamley’s *Operations of War* as the only text.\textsuperscript{235} The flaws in this approach to testing the candidate’s knowledge of ‘the art of war’ was soon made apparent as the candidates merely learnt ‘by heart’ summaries which gave ‘a good cram in the first three parts of Hamley’ allowing them to ‘get a good many marks without knowing anything about the subject’.\textsuperscript{236} The changes brought in as a result of the Askers-Douglas Committee led to the removal of the textbook, with the intention of requiring wider reading from the candidates, and raised the level of difficulty of the exam, so that although it remained of a lower standard than the promotional exams, it would ensure that the candidate’s knowledge of Military History was ‘approximate, as nearly as possible, to that of the Sandhurst Cadet’.\textsuperscript{237} To this end the number of marks assigned to Military History on the syllabus remained the same. Thus, out of the 5000 marks available, 1000 continued to come from the subject.\textsuperscript{238}

However, initially, this exam preserved the influence of *Operations of War* and one of its two papers, entitled ‘the principles of strategy’, consisted largely of questions based on the Jominian ‘principles of war’ and terminology found in Hamley’s work. For example, papers set in September 1904, March 1909, and October 1910 all referred to the importance of forcing the enemy to ‘form a front to a flank’ as Hamley had done, and on every paper the candidates were asked to provide examples from military history to illustrate each principle covered in the exam.\textsuperscript{239} The other paper set for this exam focused on the strategy employed in


\textsuperscript{236} Askers-Douglas, Evidence, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{237} Anon., *Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904* (London, 1904), p. 5.


a ‘special campaign’, which, like that selected for the promotional exam, changed each year. Tactics were examined separately in two additional papers, the first of which focused on their historical development from 1740 to contemporary times, while the other consisted of abstract questions which placed the candidate in fictional combat situations to examine the action they took.  

Even though the promotional exams demanded a higher standard of work and placed much less emphasis on the knowledge of Jominian principles than the competitive exams, both syllabuses expected candidates to analyse the campaigns under study through a set of criteria similar to that used at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Thus, in both exams candidates were expected to comment on the ‘relations between politics and strategy’, the ‘influence… of sea-power’ on land campaigns, and the role played by ‘moral factors, especially personality and [the] characteristics of an opponent’. The reference to the ‘relations between politics and strategy’ received no further explanation on the syllabus, so it appears to have been left deliberately vague so that the candidates were forced to interpret it themselves. Just as at Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, the inclusion of maritime considerations on the syllabus affected which campaigns were selected for study. However, while these institutions consistently revisited the same campaign to study this factor, possibly to make less work for the instructors, the promotional and competitive exams drew on a variety of operations.

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conducted during the Russo-Japanese War, the American Civil War, the Peninsular War and the Russo-Turkish War.\textsuperscript{242}

In the latter part of 1911 an effort was made to standardise the professional exams undertaken by officers in the British Empire. In 1905, following the precedent set in Britain, the Indian Army had included Military History as part of the promotional exams set for those applying for promotion to Captain and Major. The authorities in India appointed W.H. James’ \textit{Modern Strategy} (1904) as the textbook for this exam, a work which was based on the syllabus of the British competitive and promotional exams.\textsuperscript{243} However, in August 1911, the authorities in India scrapped this system and began to use the Military History papers that were set in Britain and which were used in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{244}

Similarly, at this time the competitive exams increasingly mirrored the promotional exams, and the ‘principles of strategy’ paper was dropped so that both papers could be set on the ‘special campaign’, the first examining the strategy employed, the second the tactics used.\textsuperscript{245} This change also marked a reduction in the emphasis placed on Jominian principles, and more questions were devoted to developing the judgement of the candidate. Moreover, by this time, the second paper on both the promotional and competitive exams was altered so that candidates were now expected to demonstrate their ‘knowledge of tactical principles’ and their ability to apply them to the guidance laid down in the first volume of \textit{Field Service}

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\textsuperscript{242} Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in November 1906 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1907), p. 95; Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in November 1909 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1910) p. 96; Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in October 1910 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1911) p. 52; and, Anon., \textit{Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in March 1908} (London, 1908), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{243} Anon., \textit{Report on the Result of the Examination in November 1905 for Officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1906), p. 114. For a more in depth discussion of this book see section four of chapter two.

\textsuperscript{244} Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 491.

\textsuperscript{245} Anon., \textit{Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in October 1912} (London, 1913), p. 17.
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Although it had taken the chastening experience of the Second Boer War, these changes to army education not only reflect that by 1911 a new emphasis had been placed on raising the professional attainments of the officer corps as a whole, but also that the study of Military History had been assigned an important role in this endeavour.

In considering why the army expanded its use of Military History in its examination syllabus, broadly speaking, the justification remained the same from the end of the Crimean War to the outbreak of war in 1914. Military History was always intended to increase the professional capacity of the officer corps, at least in part because it was used to convey a common understanding of war. Despite this, how the subject was thought to contribute toward this end did undergo significant modification, particularly after 1885. The long process of this modification is, ultimately, what is significant because an analysis of why Military History continued to feature in officer education provides important insights into the development of British military thought as the syllabuses necessarily reflected the way in which the army expected officers to think about warfare.

The modifications to the teaching of Military History ran through several phases, the first of which was ushered in by the Yolland Commission of 1857. As the decision to begin the study of Military History had resulted from the Commission’s visit to continental military academies, the method which was initially adopted to study the subject in Britain also

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247 Maurice, John Frederick Maurice, pp. 60-61.
reflected how it was taught abroad.\textsuperscript{248} Subsequently, it was foreign wars which provided further stimulus to the teaching of Military History: the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars led to an increased emphasis on the study of tactics during the 1870s. Military History was drawn on to provide historical examples for the study of the ‘tactical principles’ contained in F. Clery’s \textit{Minor Tactics}.\textsuperscript{249} But as it was impossible to find examples which provided an illustration of the effect of the most up-to-date weaponry, and so the most recent developments in tactical thought, the study of tactics became increasingly based on fictional case studies.\textsuperscript{250} As such, the teaching of tactics differed considerably from that of strategy.

When Edward Hamley’s \textit{Operations of War} came to dominate the study of the subject during the 1870s and early 1880s, this led to an unfortunate emphasis – up to a point unintended – to be placed on rote learning from this instructional work.\textsuperscript{251} The approach to the subject was centred on the study of an individual campaign so that Jomini’s principles could be illustrated. However, the John Frederick Maurice and G.F.R. Henderson era at the Staff College (1885-1900) had a major effect on the justifications for the teaching of Military History in the army. Both were influenced by Clausewitz and they utilised the method of studying the subject which he had proposed. They not only placed an emphasis on the use of Military History to develop the military judgement of the student, but taught the subject in a way which would enable their pupils to be able to use it as a guide to their own education in the future. To this end, a certain focus remained on the communication of the ‘principles’ thought to dictate the conduct of operations.\textsuperscript{252} While these preserved the influence of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{248} Yolland Commission, pp. 14, 20, 27, 31, 40, 68, 168, 176, 214, 246, 220, 233.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Anon., \textit{Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1876}; and, Clery, \textit{Minor Tactics} (London, 1875).
\item \textsuperscript{250} Askers-Douglas Committee, Evidence, p. 198.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Maurice, \textit{John Frederick Maurice}, pp. 60-6; Henderson, \textit{Science of War}, pp.182-3; and, LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 4/9, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, 1911.
\end{itemize}
Jomini’s writing, Henderson instructed his students to employ some of the ideas contained within Clausewitz’s writing as criteria through which to analyse a campaign.\textsuperscript{253}

The notion that Military History could play a role in the self-education of officers and could be used to develop their military judgement influenced the proposals of the Askers-Douglas Committee of 1902.\textsuperscript{254} As this committee emphasised the need to improve the professionalism of the officer corps, it recommended that Military History should be included on the syllabuses of Sandhurst and Woolwich as well as in the army’s professional exams in an effort to create an interest in military literature amongst officers.\textsuperscript{255} Besides its use to develop military judgement, Military History continued to be used to communicate a standardised way of thinking. The syllabuses of Sandhurst and Woolwich, as well as the promotional and competitive exams, employed the criteria used at the Staff College to analyse campaigns, including moral and maritime considerations.\textsuperscript{256}

There were, nonetheless, clear limits to the degree to which the Staff College could contribute to the courses at Sandhurst and Woolwich, as illustrated by the study of irregular and colonial warfare. While the teaching of this subject began after a change in the Military History syllabus at the Staff College in 1899, prior to the publication of Charles Callwell’s \textit{Small Wars} in 1896 there had been no theoretical work on this type of conflict.\textsuperscript{257} That the study of ‘Small Wars’ was not undertaken at Sandhurst and Woolwich, and that it did not become part of the promotional and competitive exams, was due to several causes. As small wars were ‘often campaigns rather against nature than against hostile armies’, the main

\begin{footnotes}
\item[253] See, for example, NLS, Haig Papers, Acc. 3155/30, Military History Scheme on the American Civil War, used at the Staff College, 1896.
\item[255] Askers-Douglas Committee, Evidence, pp. 20, 28, 30.
\item[256] Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 483.
\item[257] NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905; Anon., \textit{Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College}, 1902, p. 45; NLS, Blackwood Paper, MS30102, Callwell to Blackwood, 18 August 1904; and, JSCSC Shrivenham, Junior Division, 1909, ff.122, ‘Warfare in Uncivilized Countries: Lecturer’s Notes’, 19 October 1909.
\end{footnotes}
obstacles to their conduct were seen to be logistical, thus the domain of staff officers.\textsuperscript{258} Moreover, there was little literature available, such as campaign narratives, on which study could be based. Finally, the \textit{Field Service Regulations} of 1909, which began to influence the way in which Military History was taught, placed an emphasis on the similarities between different types of conflict, noting that in ‘warfare against an uncivilised enemy’, the ‘principles of regular warfare’ need only ‘be somewhat modified’.\textsuperscript{259} It is therefore not surprising that the army prioritised the study of conventional campaigns to ensure that an officer had an understanding of ‘regular warfare’ before he studied the factors thought to modify its conduct.

If the justification for the study of Military History, and the way in which it was examined, had advanced rather slowly, these advances were still significant. In the wake of the reforms brought in as a result of the Second Boer War, Military History came to be employed by the army in four different ways as part of an effort to increase the professionalism of the officer corps.\textsuperscript{260} First, the Clausewitzian approach to Military History was introduced to the syllabus for the promotional and competitive exams in 1904, as well as at Sandhurst and Woolwich.\textsuperscript{261} Second, the study of the subject was used as a way to encourage officers to develop an interest in military literature, which it was hoped would lead them to read such material of their own free will.\textsuperscript{262} To this end, no textbooks were set at Woolwich or for the promotional and competitive exams so that students were forced to read

\textsuperscript{258} Callwell, \textit{Small Wars}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{261} Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in May 1905 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1905), p. 96; Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in March 1913 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1913), p. 69; and, Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in October 1913 for Officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1914), p. 56.
\textsuperscript{262} Asker-Douglas Committee, Evidence, pp. 20, 28, 30.
around the subject, rather than just ‘cramming’ a single work. 263 Third, given the contemporary emphasis on ‘learning the lessons’ of the Second Boer War, those sitting Military History exams began to be asked to derive ‘lessons’ from the campaign under study. 264 Finally, the subject was used as a way to instil the directives contained in the Field Service Regulations as Military History papers included reference to this manual and it was expected that candidates would analyse campaigns in relation to its precepts. 265

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264 Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 35-53.
265 For example, Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 490.
Chapter 2

Strategy, Tactics and Campaigns:
Military History for Officers

During the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 British historians produced a small quantity of Military History intended for a military audience. As was noted at the time, the reason for this could be traced to lack of demand for this sort of literature, created in part because the British Army did not have any major continental commitment during these years, or a training establishment which could stimulate interest in the subject.¹ Moreover, the typical regimental officer spent the majority of his career stationed throughout the Empire, where his ability to manage the troops entrusted to him was of greater practical use than the study of Military History.² In other words, before the Crimean War there was no recognisable body of literature which could be described as Military History.

The few works which were published between the Napoleonic Wars and the end of the Crimean War, most notably William Napier’s History of the Peninsular War (1828-1840), focused mainly on campaigns fought in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, so were not only of little direct practical relevance to officers but obscured the Military History which had been written by Britain’s only outstanding military thinker, Major-General Henry Lloyd,

¹ Earl of Ellesmere, Military Events in Italy 1848-9 (London, 1851), p. v.
² Luvaas, Education of an Army, p. 4.
who had died before the outbreak of the Peninsular War.\(^3\) In the period before 1850, the few British officers who did study Military History were forced to rely on works written by continental writers, usually reading them in the original language. This only changed in 1851 when Edward Yates produced a work which articulated Jomini’s principles of war with the intention ‘to prepare the way for, and render advantageous’ the study of Military History.\(^4\) There was also little regiment history produced prior to the 1870s. The need for such histories was thought to have been obviated following the publication of a history of each regiment in the army by Richard Cannon between 1837 and 1854.\(^5\) However, the majority of these volumes consisted of ‘nothing more than copious extracts from Napier, eked out with reprints of the formal reports taken from the London Gazette’.\(^6\)

By contrast, however, during the period between 1854 and 1914 Military History published for a military audience underwent a period of dramatic expansion. Not only were many volumes produced to assist those taking army exams, such as Edward Hamley’s *Operations of War*, which went through seven editions during this time, but also works such as Charles Callwell’s *Small Wars* which drew on Military History to discuss ways of understanding conflict which did not appear on the army’s exam syllabuses.\(^7\) Similarly, periodicals aimed at a military readership featured increasing numbers of articles intended both to educate and entertain this audience.\(^8\) This was a development of major significance.


\(^5\) Roger Perkins, *Regiments: Regiments and Corps of the British Empire and Commonwealth, 1758-1993* (Newton Abbott, 1994), pp. 18-19. All but three of the volumes in ‘Richard Cannon’s List’, as the collection was known, was written solely by Cannon.


\(^7\) Hamley, *Operations of War* (7th edn., 1907).

Nonetheless, the existing scholarly literature has largely overlooked the development of Military History written for a military readership between 1854 and 1914. For the most part, the writing of Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller regarding Military History in Britain before 1914 dealt with how the subject was taught by the army, rather than on an analysis of the work which had been published for military readers. One exception to this was that they both referred to G.F.R. Henderson in their writing on the American Civil War, if only to observe that the conflict had been essentially neglected by British historians prior to the publication of his *Stonewall Jackson*. Although Liddell Hart claimed that it was this work that had first kindled his interest in this war, he argued that its focus on the operations in the Shenandoah Valley had obscured the role sea-power had played in the outcome of the conflict, and so had prevented thought on an aspect he felt was a crucial to the ‘British way in war’.

Henderson’s writing on the American Civil War was also examined by Jay Luvaas in his *Military Legacy of the Civil War*, although his analysis was necessarily limited to an appraisal of the work which had appeared on the conflict. No consideration was given to other wars, or the development of Henderson’s ideas regarding the study of military history. In *Education of an Army*, Luvaas engaged in an analysis of the work of several British military thinkers, including Hamley and Henderson. While there was some discussion of the Military History produced by each writer, there was no attempt to place this within a wider context or to investigate the development of this type of writing, particularly as several notable military historians who produced work prior to the Great War were not examined by

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Luvaas. Moreover, Luvaas failed to undertake a detailed analysis of the multiple editions of Hamley’s *Operations of War* which – given that the work had a major influence on how the army studied Military History – was a major oversight.14

In order to offer a solution to the second research sub-question posed in the introduction, which asked why between 1854 and 1914 there was an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers, this chapter intends to examine what actually stimulated the writing of this type of work. To this end, it will pay particular attention to the extent to which material was produced to assist those taking army exams, the use of the subject to introduce new ideas into British military thought and the role of this type of work in fostering professionalism. This chapter will follow a chronological approach based around four sections: first, it will consider how Military History was written for a military audience between 1854 and 1866; second, the material written between 1866 and 1890 will be examined, particularly in relation to the later editions of Hamley’s *Operations of War*; third, the impact of new approaches to the writing of Military History (1885-99) will be assessed; and, fourth, the influence which the changes to army education caused by the Second Boer War exerted on the writing of Military History will be considered.

### I. Hamley’s *Operations of War* and the Creation of a Market, 1854-66

The writing of Military History for the purpose of military education received an impetus in Britain following the recommendations of the Yolland commission, first published in July 1856.15 Besides advocating that Military History should be taught in the army’s educational establishments, the commissioners realised that the study of the subject on the continent was

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13 The military historians overlooked include, for example, Charles Chesney, Frederick Barton Maurice and Charles Callwell.
15 Anon., *Foreign Military Education: Report of the Commissioners to Consider the Best Mode of Re-Organising the System for Training Officers for the Scientific Corps* (406) (London, 1856). This was an advanced portion of the Yolland Commission’s report.
‘much assisted by the good text-books’ which existed ‘in great numbers in Germany and France, but are scarcely found at all amongst ourselves’. This, they reasoned, created ‘a great preliminary obstacle to the extension of [military] education’ in Britain as ‘foreign works, or translations of them, can never suit our purposes so well as our own productions, not to speak of its being discreditable to us to rely solely or mainly upon them’. Consequently, they hoped that their proposals regarding the study of Military History by the army would lead British writers to ‘create a literature of this kind’.16

In this regard, the commissioners appear to have been successful as, by August 1856, P.L. MacDougall, Superintendent of Studies at Sandhurst, had begun work on The Theory of War: Illustrated by Numerous Examples from Military History, which was ultimately published by Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts that year. MacDougall admitted in the preface that the first half of his book had been entirely compiled ‘from the writings of Napoleon, Frederick [the Great], the Archduke Charles, and Jomini’, and the method of arrangement used ‘was partly suggested by Yates’s… Treatise on Strategy’. It was Jomini’s writing which provided the real basis for the work as MacDougall presented Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ and illustrated each in turn with several historical examples.17

MacDougall’s work proved to be popular; the review which appeared in Colburn’s United Service Magazine praised the work highly, proclaiming that it ‘ought to find a place amongst the limited number of books which an officer may permit himself to possess’, a second edition of the work was printed in 1858, followed by a third in 1862.18

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16 Yolland Commission, p. 43.
Given the success of MacDougall’s book it was added to in 1858 by J.J. Graham’s *Progress of the Art of War*.\(^{19}\) This work was initially offered to the publisher John Blackwood, as Graham’s cousin, James Frederick Ferrier, a professor at St Andrew’s University, had published several articles in *Blackwood’s Magazine*. However, since ‘it did not suit’ Blackwood to publish the work, Graham’s book was published by Richard Bentley.\(^{20}\) The work, mirroring the approach to the study of Military History adopted by Yates, MacDougall, and which was currently in use by the army, sought to communicate the ‘immutable… principles of war’ derived from Jomini, so that the reader could then ‘exercise… with advantage [the study of] the actual operations of war as detailed in history, the great school, rich in instruction… for those who aspire to distinction in the military profession’.\(^{21}\) This work was also well received and, by November 1861, Graham felt able to say that it had met ‘with a fair success’.\(^{22}\)

Part of the reason for this success was that six chapters of Graham’s work utilised examples from classical campaigns and so reflected the Duke of Cambridge’s General Army Order of 9 April 1857 that military operations from this time were to be studied by those officers seeking a staff position.\(^{23}\) Since classical campaigns did not feature in *The Theory of War*, MacDougall, now Commandant of the Staff College, wrote a short book entitled *Campaigns of Hannibal: Arranged and Critically Considered, Expressly for the use of Students of Military History*, which was published in 1858 also by Longmans, to compensate. Although this work did not mention Jomini’s writing directly, the reader was referred to *The Theory of War* to supplement the analysis of the campaigns which appeared.\(^{24}\)

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20 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4160, ff. 261, J.J. Graham to Blackwood, 28 November 1861.
22 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4160, ff. 261, J.J. Graham to Blackwood, 28 November 1861.
24 MacDougall, *Campaigns of Hannibal*, pp. 83, 192, 195. However, *Campaigns of Hannibal* did not stay relevant for those studying military history for a staff appointment for very long, as, on 5 March 1859, the Duke
Following the educational reforms introduced in 1856, ensuring that an officer had access to military literature, particularly Military History, became a matter of concern for the military authorities. Although in 1853 there were 150 libraries run by the army throughout the Empire, all of these were either recreational or specialist technical establishments, so did not contain general works for military education. To rectify this, Albert, the Prince Consort, who had a history of privately funding libraries and promoting officer education, began systematically to purchase military books in early 1857, with a view to personally creating such an institution. When this library opened in 1860 at Aldershot, in a new building paid for by the Prince Consort, it was free of charge for officers to use, and it contained 619 titles, of which 335 were Military History and biography. Given that few works of military literature existed in English at this time, knowledge of foreign languages, especially French and German, was deemed essential for the librarian. This was a stumbling block for most candidates, and it was only a few months before the library opened that a suitable candidate was found.25

Naturally, given the lack of Military History written in English at this time, besides Henry Lloyd’s *History of the Late War in Germany*, MacDougall’s *The Theory of War*, and William Napier’s *History of the War in the Peninsula*, few works were held by the library in this language and majority of the collection was in French and German.26 Both the historical and theoretical work of Jomini and Clausewitz was held by the library.27 Besides *Vom Kriege*, which was held in German as well as in a French translation, the latter undertaken by

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25 P.H. Vickers, ‘*A Gift So Graciously Bestowed*: The History of the Prince Consort’s Library (Aldershot, 2010), pp. 1, 15, 17-18, 30, 33, 56. The library was maintained by the monarch’s Privy Purse until Queen Victoria died in 1901, when funding was taken over by the War Office.


Major Neuens, Clausewitz’s historical writing also featured prominently in the library’s catalogue from its opening, with his Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien, and Der Feldzug von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz held in German language versions, along with his Campaign of 1812 in Russia, which was held in an English translation. However, the library failed to attract officers in the numbers which the Prince Consort had hoped: on average only six people a day visited in the year after it opened. Despite this, the library continued to purchase new works, including Clausewitz’s Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich, which was bought in 1862 for the collection.

From 1855 there was a conscious effort to draw on the ‘military spirit in the country’ and to promote officer education. To this end, the United Service Institution became ‘Royal’ in 1857 and began to publish a quarterly journal. Despite this change, Hamley, now Professor of Military History at the Staff College, still felt that when called on to write an article or present a paper at the Institution he did so ‘very much against [his] will’ because he ‘never felt certain that [he] may be technical [in his treatment of Military History] without becoming tedious’ to the audience. However, the newly created journal did contain Military History intended for officer education and, in its first issue, a paper ‘On the Armies of Ancient Greece’ was given by G.R. Gleig, in which he sought to illustrate that the ‘principles of the art of war never vary’. Despite his reservations, a lecture written by Hamley for use at the Staff College on the campaign of Marengo did appear in the journal in 1860. This journal was not alone in communicating Military History for educational purposes to a

28 Carl von Clausewitz, Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien (Berlin, 1847); idem, Der Feldzug von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz (Berlin, 1837); idem, Vom Krieg (Berlin, 1852); idem, Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London, 1843); and, Anon., Prince Consort’s Library Catalogue, 1860, pp. 4, 56, 58, 62.
30 Carl von Clausewitz, Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich (Berlin, 1835); and, Anon., Prince Consort’s Library Catalogue, 1860, p. 65.
32 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 113, Hamley to Blackwood, 13 February 1860.
military audience: *Colburn’s United Service Magazine* published campaign narratives for those studying the subject.\(^{35}\)

At this time, the only periodical which included Military History intended for a joint military and civilian audience was *Blackwood’s Magazine*, produced by the publisher John Blackwood. This periodical had been started in 1817 as an ideological response to the *Edinburgh Review*, which reflected the liberalism of its ‘Whig’ editor, Francis Jeffery.\(^{36}\) The ‘high Tory’ editorial position of *Blackwood’s Magazine*, which supported the interests of rural landowners, attracted the readership of officers as many came from this class.\(^{37}\) Likewise, the policy of anonymous articles attracted officers with a literary inclination, which allowed Garnet Wolseley, writing as ‘an English Officer’, to publish an account of his time spent with the Confederate Army during the American Civil War in 1863.\(^ {38}\) Hamley was a frequent contributor and, among other work, he produced an article on the career of the Duke of Wellington which he intended for ‘a general reader’ as well as the ‘military student’.\(^ {39}\) In 1860 this was published by Blackwood as a separate volume to serve as ‘a good feeler’ to discover whether a book on military science would be ‘acceptable’ to a military audience as well as the general reading public.\(^ {40}\)

Hamley’s position at the Staff College caused him to come into contact with the few officers who did write Military History at this time, thus allowing him to recommend these

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\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 7; and, Spiers, *Late Victorian Army*, p. 94.

\(^{38}\) Garnet Wolseley, ‘A Month’s Visit to the Confederate Headquarters’, *Blackwood’s Magazine*, 93 (Jan. 1863), pp. 1-29. For biographical information on Wolseley, see Appendix 1.


\(^{40}\) Hamley, *Wellington’s Career*; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 121, Hamley to Blackwood, 20 April 1860.
men to Blackwood, his close friend.\textsuperscript{41} Hamley introduced him to Charles Chesney in March 1862 because of his ‘very good account of the war in Virginia’, and also to Henry Hozier, whom he had met as he passed through the Staff College in 1864.\textsuperscript{42} Hamley was also close friends with MacDougall; the pair regularly arranged fishing trips together, and they discovered that they had a ‘mutual friend’ in Blackwood.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, when John Frederick Maurice won the ‘Wellington Essay Prize’ in 1872, which was subsequently published by Blackwood, he became associated with this group, and both he and his wife came to be acquainted with Hamley, with whom they dined.\textsuperscript{44} So, by 1866, Blackwood’s publishing house had formed a network which consisted of the major British military historians which Blackwood referred to as his ‘military staff’.\textsuperscript{45}

As Hamley was satisfied by the sales of his volume on Wellington’s career, in late April 1862 he began reading ‘some military works’ in the Staff College library with a view producing ‘an elementary essay on military science’.\textsuperscript{46} Despite his friendship with MacDougall, privately Hamley dismissed his \textit{The Theory of War} in a letter to Blackwood as ‘desultory and superficial… scrappy and flashy’. But since he noted that it had ‘paid him well’, he planned to supersede MacDougall’s work with a ‘useful and popular book’ of his own which would make the subject ‘clear to the general reader’ as well as to ‘military men’.\textsuperscript{47} As such, the working title of this book between December 1862 and February 1865 was ‘The Common Sense of Military Art’; however, several months before its publication Hamley

\textsuperscript{41} Gerald Porter, \textit{Annals of a Publishing House: Blackwood’s, Volume 3} (London, 1897), p. 277; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4265, ff. 9, MacDougall to Blackwood, 10 August 1870.
\textsuperscript{42} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 23, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 March 1862, and MS4190, ff. 50, Hamley to Blackwood, 19 February 1864. For the article Hamley was referring to, see below.
\textsuperscript{43} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4318, ff. 100, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 April 1874, MS4318, ff. 108, Hamley to Blackwood, 1 August 1874, and, MS4265, ff. 9, MacDougall to Blackwood, 10 August 1870.
\textsuperscript{44} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4304, ff. 128, Hamley to Blackwood, 26 November 1873.
\textsuperscript{45} Porter, \textit{Annals of a Publishing House: Blackwood’s, Volume 3}, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{46} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 43-44, Hamley to Blackwood, 29 April 1862, and MS4161, ff. 49, Hamley to Blackwood, 12 May 1861.
\textsuperscript{47} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865, MS4161, ff. 49, Hamley to Blackwood, 12 May 1861, and MS4209, ff. 215, Hamley to Blackwood, 6 April 1866.
decided that ‘Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained’ would ‘do’. Likewise, when conspiring with Blackwood to decide, in advance, the findings of the review of the work which would appear in *Blackwood’s Magazine*, Hamley hoped that ‘some intelligent non-professional, who having a taste for the subject and some knowledge of a general sort, might find that I had cleaned up his ideas… [such as] a lawyer [or] a University man… [as he] would be more likely to see the logical aspect of the book than a soldier’.

Hamley signed a publication agreement with Blackwood on 10 April 1865, in which the publisher made the ‘most friendly and liberal offer’ to not only bare all of the risk of production, but to award Hamley 66% of any profit the work made, providing that he kept the book ‘up to date’. Since Hamley insisted on ‘a good many maps [as] without them a book of this sort is of little use’, the cost of production was high, so even if the book was sold at 16/- it was expected to only ‘clear about £140 for every 1000 copies’ sold. Since Hamley felt that ‘it could not pay anybody to write books at that rate’, he advocated ‘at least… a Guinea as the price… [since] I doubt fewer would be sold than at 16/-’; due to these objections when the book did go on sale in 1866 it was priced at 28/-. Even at this inflated price Hamley ‘fully [expected] a good steady sale’ and stood to make 9/9 for every work sold, meaning that for every 1000 copies purchased he would earn £488.8.0, which was £406.0.0 more than he would have earned if the same number had sold at 16/-.

In the book, Hamley argued that military history contained ‘representative operations, each involving and illustrating a principle or fact, which, when elicited and fully recognised, [would] serve for future guidance’, thus allowing the student to ‘read Military History, and to

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48 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 104, Hamley to Blackwood, 15 December 1862, and MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865.  
49 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865, and MS4209, ff. 215, Hamley to Blackwood, 6 April 1866.  
50 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865, and MS30613, Blackwood to Ernle, 9 April 1923.  
51 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865.  
52 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865.
investigate military problems, with the confidence of one who does not grope and guess by
surveys and judges’. While Hamley used these ‘representative operations’ occasionally to
refer to the observations of Archduke Charles, he mainly used them to illustrate Jomini’s
‘principles of war’.53

Hamley also used some examples from the American Civil War to illustrate Jominiian
principles in Operations of War. Most notably ‘Stonewall’ Jackson’s campaign of 1862 in
Virginia was presented as an example of the ‘advantage’ of operating from a central strategic
position against an opponent on a double line of advance’, and Sherman’s operations against
Johnson on the Chattanooga were shown as an illustration of how threatening an enemy’s
flank would cause them to fall back to protect their line of communication.54 Privately
Hamley was very critical of the Union forces, declaring to Blackwood that their defeat and
panicked retreat after the first battle of Bull Run was ‘the greatest joke in the world’, and he
had hoped that ‘the cracks and flaws of the rotten old Union’ would lead to their defeat by the
Confederacy.55 Despite this, in Operations of War he limited his criticism of the Union to a
mild censure of Sherman, claiming that he had moved too slowly against Johnson’s flanks,
because as the war progressed it became clear to Hamley that the North would ultimately
win, and so he decided it would be a ‘pity [to] say anything unpleasant [about] the Yankees’
which would harm his book’s sales in the United States.56

The only other work written at this time on the American Civil War intended for
officer education was by Charles Chesney. His Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland,
published by Smith, Elder and Company in 1863, underscored that the ‘inquiring reader of
military history’ would find ‘profit in studying campaigns and battles’ as in them he may

53 Hamley, Operations of War (1st edn., 1866), pp. viii, 6, 33, 73-6, 139, 159-162.
54 Ibid., pp. 170-3, 195-8.
55 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4131, ff. 193, Hamley to Blackwood, 16 March [1861], and, MS4170, ff. 61,
Hamley to Blackwood, 9 September 1862.
56 Hamley, Operations of War, p. 198; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 41, Hamley to Blackwood, 4 July
1865, and MS4199, ff. 23, Hamley to Blackwood, 17 May 1865.
‘trace not only the great principles of the art itself, but also see how wonderfully natural
genius and matured judgement have varied their application under different circumstances’.
Thus, he too used the war to illustrate Jomini’s principles of war, particularly how the
‘central position of Richmond’ gave the Confederates ‘the advantage of interior lines’ of
communication.  

Similarly, in his articles on these campaigns and those of Sherman in
Georgia, which appeared the JRUSI in 1864, Chesney again used the war to provide an
illustration of Jominian principles which ‘were, or ought to have been, the same which
animated Caesar, Hannibal, or Napoleon’.  

As the educational reforms brought in by Lord Panmure after the Crimean War made
Military History play a greater role in army training, a limited demand was created for work
which reflected the syllabus, which in turn generated a financial incentive for both publishers
and authors to produce such material. Since this work reflected that Jomini’s writing had
been adopted almost wholesale as the basis for the study of Military History by the army, it
stressed continuity in war, rather than change. Thus, initially both ancient and recent
campaigns were selected to underscore the ‘timeless’ principles of war. However, as the
army’s Military History syllabus underwent significant change between 1866 and 1890,
reflecting both concerns regarding the utility of the subject and the increasing prominence of
Operations of War, the idea of continuity in war came to be questioned.

II. Hamley, Operations of War, and the Growth of Tactical Study, 1866-90

As the study of Military History at the Staff College between 1866 and 1874 required
students to read widely, besides Hamley’s Operations of War, several books were produced
by men connected with the college to meet this demand. Chesney’s Waterloo Lectures was

based on his teaching there and was published in 1868 by Longmans, Green & Co.\textsuperscript{59} In 1870 Longmans also brought out Evelyn Baring’s \textit{Staff College Essays}, which was marketed to those studying to take the admission exam.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, in 1877 Blackwood’s published a collection of lectures given by Major Charles Adams at Camberley between 1868 and 1874 under the title \textit{Great Campaigns}.\textsuperscript{61} The work was edited by Charles Cooper-King, then Professor of Tactics, Administration and Law at Sandhurst, and was also intended for ‘those going up for the Staff College’.\textsuperscript{62} Given the nature of these works, they all reflected the way in which Military History was studied at the Staff College prior to 1874, and so they all referred to Clausewitz’s historical and theoretical writing, as well as that produced by Jomini.\textsuperscript{63} As the publication of these works was closely associated with demand for material which reflected the Staff College syllabus, when \textit{Operations of War} came to dominate the way in which Military History was taught there, following Hamley’s appointment as Commandant in 1870, this undermined the demand for them, so this type of work ceased to appear.\textsuperscript{64}

Besides the influence of \textit{Operations of War} on the Sandhurst and Woolwich syllabus, one of the main reasons why it was able to dominate the way the army studied Military History was because the author was obliged in his publication agreement to ‘keep the book up to date’ and to amend the work in relation to the most recent conflicts.\textsuperscript{65} Although the Austro-Prussian War had created a need for a new revised edition of \textit{Operations of War} a few

\textsuperscript{59} Charles Chesney, \textit{Waterloo Lectures} (London, 1868); and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4230, ff. 122, Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868.
\textsuperscript{60} Baring, \textit{Staff College Essays}, p. vi.
\textsuperscript{62} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4347, ff. 13, King to Blackwood, 18 April 1876, MS4361 ff. 25, Cooper-King to Blackwood, 7 June 1877, and MS4361, ff. 32, King to Blackwood, 16 September 1877.
\textsuperscript{63} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4230, ff. 122, Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868; Adams, \textit{Great Campaigns}, pp. 548, 450, 10; Baring, \textit{Staff College Essays}, pp. 9, 22, 213, 13, 18.
\textsuperscript{64} Anon., \textit{Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1870}, p. 7; Anon., \textit{General Orders by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief} (1 October 1874), p. 1; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 26, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 March 1870; and, Lonsdale Hale, ‘Professional Study of Military History’, p. 709.
\textsuperscript{65} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30613, Blackwood to Barbra Ernle, 9 April 1923.
months after the original was published, following an agreement between Blackwood and Hamley, the second edition was not produced until 1,000 copies had been sold from the 1,500 printed during the first impression. Thus, it was not until October 1868, when Blackwood was able to report to Hamley that the original edition was ‘nearly out of print’, that work began on producing a second edition to incorporate Hamley’s amendments. In the second edition, published in May 1869, Hamley added reference to the effect of railways and the electric telegraph on strategy, but largely played down the effect of both. He thought that railways ‘need be regarded only as roads giving increased facilities of movement’, and he pointed to the French operations in Italy in 1859, and the Manassas Campaign fought during the American Civil War in July 1861, to illustrate this point. Likewise, he merely stated that the telegraph had the potential to allow a commander to combine his forces more effectively, but that there had been no historical example of this. Consequently, Hamley felt that these technological developments had not altered the Jominian principles on which he based the work and he had ‘the satisfaction of finding much that he had written illustrated by the events’ of recent campaigns.

In the section of the work on tactics, Hamley argued that a ‘new phase’ in their development had been caused by ‘the changes of the infantry weapon [which added] rapidity of fire… to that of precision’. As a result of this, Hamley found that his chapter on the ‘changes in contemporary tactics’ needed to be ‘in great part rewritten’. Since he felt that these new weapons had made ‘the manoeuvres of [the] former era… in great measure obsolete’, he advocated a move away from formations practised on ‘drill-fields’ and, instead,

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66 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 71, Hamley to Blackwood, 2 August 1870. It is probable that this letter has been misdated and included in this file by mistake, since it is related to the agreement between Hamley and Blackwood regarding the second edition of Operations of War. By August 1870 this edition was already in print and was selling well.
69 Ibid., p. viii.
the use of those which reflected the fact that the war of 1866 had demonstrated ‘light infantry duties’ to be ‘more than ever important’. He also added a passage on the importance of entrenchments as he felt that the American Civil War had demonstrated ‘the value of these [had] increased; for as the fire of the line [became] more formidable, so does shelter from it become of proportionate importance’.  

Hamley’s work became recognised internationally in May 1870 when General William F. Barry accepted *Operations of War* as a textbook at the U.S. Artillery School.  

Hamley believed that the reason for its acceptance was down to the intervention of ‘General Sherman with whom I have had some pleasant correspondence about it, and to whom I sent a copy of the second edition’. Moreover, he was approached several times regarding the possibility of a French translation of the work. However, the translation does not appear to have been undertaken, at least partly because Hamley was not impressed by his correspondence with the proposed translator, who he hoped ‘understands French better than he does English’.

The third edition of *Operations of War*, which was published in the final months of 1872 to incorporate the changes the author felt necessary after the Franco-Prussian War, also presented strategy as little changed. Thus, the new chapter added on the ‘Campaign of Metz and Sedan Considered with Reference to the Forgoing Chapters’ provided a brief history of the campaign which was used to confirm and further illustrate Hamley’s ‘principles’.  

Again, it was in relation to tactics that the biggest changes to the work were made.  

Hamley’s approach in this chapter remained based on historical precedent and consisted of a 

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70 Ibid., pp. 414, 416.  
72 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4290, ff. 36, Hamley to Blackwood, 26 May 1872.  
73 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 61, Hamley to Blackwood, 11 July 1870, and MS4290, ff. 40, Hamley to Blackwood, 24 June 1872.  
74 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 63, Hamley to Blackwood, 16 July 1870.  
76 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4290, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 25 March 1872.
discussion of the tactics employed in 1870, in which he argued that the increase in infantry firepower had made a frontal attack of a position ‘costly and doubtful’. By way of a solution to this problem, Hamley drew on the tactics employed in 1870, and wrote that a ‘flank attack’ was now ‘essential’ and that the battles of ‘Wissenburg, Spicheren, Wöerth and Gravelotte’ had all continued to be indecisive until they were ‘decided by the turning of a flank’.  

The Franco-Prussian War led to an increased focus in British military education on the study of Tactics, so, in 1873, the study of this subject replaced Military History at Sandhurst, as well as at Woolwich from 1887; and, in 1876 a paper on the subject was set for officers promoted to the rank of Captain. Since *Operations of War* was not set as the textbook for the study of Tactics, a need was created for tactical works, hence a large number of German books were translated. Similarly, two works by British authors were quickly published: *Précis of Modern Tactics* by Robert Home, and the work selected as the official textbook, C. Clery’s *Minor Tactics*. Both of these works based their treatment of the subject on historical precedent, especially drawing on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars. Although Clery, like Hamley, recognised that ‘modern improvements in fire-arms’ had made necessary major ‘alterations in the fighting formations of infantry’, he too based his writing on the same set of ‘principles’ which had underpinned British tactics since the Napoleonic Wars. Hence, although he wrote that ‘the ultimate success of [an] attack [now]

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practically depends on the effect produced by the fire of the skirmishing line’, he remained wedded to the idea of the main ‘line of infantry’ covered by skirmishers.\(^82\)

Despite this, in 1872 a reaction began against the use of historical precedent as the foundation of British tactical methods. Some officers, like Lonsdale Hale, instructor of Military History at Chatham, felt that only the most recent wars could be studied with a view to ascertaining effective tactics.\(^83\) While others, such as E.E.H. Collen in his Staff College essay ‘The Battle of Wörth’, which appeared in the *JRUSI* in 1873, argued that if the British Army did not cease to ‘cling to the line formation’, simply because it had been that ‘in which British soldiers have fought and conquered’, it risked defeat at the hands of a more free-thinking continental opponent.\(^84\) Similarly, Colonel W.W. Knollys argued in *Colburn’s United Service Magazine* that while British tactics remained linked to ‘those taught by Wellington and his army’, a platform which ‘should have served us as a scaffold on which to mount higher’, would in fact have ‘been employed as a weight to keep us stationary’.\(^85\) It was during this period, in which British writers struggled to find an approach to the study of Tactics, and in which large numbers of Prussian works were read, that a new approach to the use of Military History for tactical study came into use in Britain.\(^86\)

The final revisions made by Hamley to the *Operations of War* were begun in October 1877 and appeared in the fourth edition of the work which was published in early 1878.\(^87\) Unlike previous revisions, Hamley’s discussion of tactical matters remained largely

\(^{82}\) Clery, *Minor Tactics*, p. 102. This view was not altered by later editions of the work which appeared in 1877 and 1883.


\(^{86}\) This will be examined in the next section of this chapter.

\(^{87}\) Hamley, *Operations of War* (4th edn., 1878); and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4359, ff. 284, Hamley to Blackwood Papers, 15 October 1877.
unchanged; instead, he felt recent operations conducted during the Russo-Turkish War (1877) had demonstrated that modern technological developments had modified one of Jomini’s principles. 88 Hamley argued that the electric telegraph had now ‘diminished’ the ‘disadvantage’ connected with a double line of advance in relation to ‘concentrated forces’ in a central strategic position, as the war had provided examples of how the telegraph had allowed the commander of divided forces to keep in contact with them so that they could rapidly concentrate when necessary. The operation which caused him to come to this conclusion, and which he gave as an example, was undertaken by General Ivan Lazarev against Mukhtar Pasha as the latter covered Kars from a Russian advance in October 1877. Lazarev’s telegraph allowed him to coordinate the movement of a fraction of his force that was forty miles behind Mukhtar’s position so that he could successfully conduct an attack on the Turkish formation from two directions simultaneously.89

Although a fifth edition of Operations of War appeared in 1886, in which corrections were made to small typographical errors, there were no further revisions to the substance of the work until 1907.90 The reason for this was that between 1882 and his death in 1893 Hamley was engaged in a public feud with Wolseley over his role in the British invasion of Egypt. This caused him to lose interest in military affairs and so he devoted more time to his literary writing in the hope that he would ‘break out into a “latter spring” of poesy’.91

88 A new chapter appeared in the work, entitled, ‘Points of Attack, Retreats, and Pursuits’, pp. 417-23. However, it consisted mainly material which had been taken from the previous chapter and provided no references to military history which had not already appeared before. Hamley also advocated the placement of the tactical reserve in a different place than formerly, and changed the way he referred to the different Infantry lines, pp. 433-43. In part 6, Chapter 8, he added a several sections on ‘Minor Operations’ which made no reference to Military History, pp. 449-68.
91 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4304, ff. 73, Hamley to Blackwood, 11 January 1873.
Furthermore, Hamley insisted to Blackwood that ‘there had been no wars illustrative of principles since that of 1870’, so the work was not in need of any further changes.\(^92\)

In terms of sales, the success of the work was closely associated with its use at military training establishments and the appearance of new editions. Thus, as *Operations of War* dominated the way in which the British Army taught Military History during the 1870s, and was used by the U.S. Army during this time, the third edition of the work sold around 1000 copies in the twelve months ending in February 1874 alone.\(^93\) However, following the cancellation of the U.S. Artillery School’s annual order in 1882 and the lack of a new edition which had made major changes to the work, between July 1882 and July 1885 only 401 copies were sold.\(^94\)

As *Operations of War* dominated how the army approached the study of Military History between 1874 and the mid-1880s, the few other works which were produced for professional study were either based on Hamley’s work, or were intended to assist the student in the study of it. In 1870, for instance, F.J. Soady wrote *Lessons of War* with the intention of assisting the military student in his study of the ‘authorities and writers’ of Military History. The work adopted a format which closely mirrored *Operations of War*, and quoted long passages from the work.\(^95\) At first, Hamley attempted legal proceedings against ‘the piratical book of Soady’, but was foiled as he ‘should have had to show the damage [he] had individually sustained as grounds for claiming indemnification’.\(^96\) Hamley, exasperated by ‘the state of the law which professes to protect authors’, took matters into his own hands and used his connection with Henry Brackenbury, Professor of Military History at Woolwich,  

\(^92\) NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4534, ff. 15-16, Hamley to Blackwood, 21 March 1889.  
\(^93\) NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4318, ff. 88, Hamley to Blackwood, 20 February 1874.  
\(^94\) NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30805 Blackwood’s Stock Book, 1882-86, p. 118, MS4432, ff. 71-114, Hamley to Blackwood, 17 February 1882, and MS4534, ff. 13-14, Hamley to Blackwood, 18 February 1889.  
\(^96\) NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4290, ff. 54, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 August 1872, and MS4276, ff. 11, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 June 1871.
whom he knew through Blackwood’s ‘military staff’, to cause the ‘suppression’ of the book at this institution. Similarly, when Macmillan approached Maurice in 1889 for his opinion regarding the possibility of publishing in England Elements of the Art of War, written by James Mercur the Professor of Civil and Military Engineering at West Point, Maurice explained that while Operations of War ‘gets a large sale because all those who are going up for examinations get it’, the sale of other ‘more valuable’ works was ‘very limited’. Consequently, Macmillan did not publish this work in Britain.

Although the example Hamley made of Soady was likely to have deterred others from producing similar works, books continued to be produced to assist in the study of Operations of War. In 1885, Mitchell & Co. published O.R. Middleton’s Outlines of Military History, which consisted of campaign narratives intended to supplement those given in Hamley’s work for those who did not have the time or ‘the inclination’ to read more widely. Moreover, the material produced by those lecturers who taught Military History at the army’s training facilities reflected the influence of Hamley’s work. C.W. Robinson’s Lectures upon the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, published in 1871, which consisted of lectures given while he was Instructor of Military History at Sandhurst, was based on Hamley’s work and often quoted him. Similarly, H. Tovey’s Elements of Strategy, which was ‘printed in order to form the basis’ of the instruction in Military History at Chatham, was also largely based on Operations of War.

Besides the limited role Military History played in the study of tactics, there was no inducement for regimental officers to read the subject for their professional development at

97 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4276, ff. 11, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 June 1871, and MS 4294, ff. 242, Maurice to Blackwood, n.d. [1872].
98 BL, Macmillan Papers, MS55075, ff. 68, Maurice to Macmillan, 31 July 1889.
100 Robinson, Lectures upon the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, p. iii.
101 H. Tovey, Elements of Strategy (Chatham, 1887), pp. 11-12. Tovey stated that Operations of War was used to write the work, p. 11. Operations of War was also extensively quoted on, pp. 60, 85, 93.
this time. Many senior officers even actively discouraged the study of military literature, fearing that their men would become ‘bookworms’ rather than ‘practical soldiers’. As a result, few officers took to studying during the 1870’s, and, at this time, the Prince Consort’s Library only had on average seven visitors a day, which, in some years, fell to as low as four. Charles à Court Repington recalled that once an officer had left Sandhurst his ‘education in the art of war practically lapsed’; and, because this anti-intellectual attitude further limited the incentive for British publishers to produce Military History, he was forced to buy ‘French and German books on war’. 

To make matters worse for publishers who considered publishing Military History, officers came from ‘classes very much dependent for their reading on local circulating libraries’, and so ‘as a rule they did not know where to get’ books on the subject even if they wanted them. In 1872, Maurice recommended to Blackwood that to overcome ‘the great difficulty in getting a sale of books in the army’, the ‘best course of advertisement’ was not to place notices in newspapers, since officers did not read these, but instead to place the advert with booksellers at railway stations, along with a note stating that these works could ‘be ordered at this bookstall’. Maurice hoped that this would create more demand for Military History, not only because officers would ‘gaily read anything during a railway journey’, but it was also likely to lead officers to purchase these books for themselves, rather than forming, as they did currently, small reading groups which left the purchase of the volumes circulated ‘to the one or two men who make it their business’. Similarly, since these reading groups further cut down the limited demand for Military History, Maurice was ‘quite convinced’ that ‘the best sale’ for Military History was to be found ‘among the Volunteers and Militia’ since

104 Charles à Court Repington, Vestigia (London, 1919), pp. 74-5.
105 NLS, Blackwood Papers MS4294, ff. 262, Maurice to Blackwood, n.d. [1872?]
when not on manoeuvres ‘they have little or nothing to do’ and, because they were often out of contact with other officers, ‘they borrow[ed books] less’.  

Given the low demand for Military History intended for military education, publishers produced very few books of campaign history written by British authors expressly for this purpose. Between 1866 and 1890, no histories of this type appeared on the Crimean War, and only one history of the War of 1859 in Italy was published.  

Besides Henderson’s *Campaign of Fredericksburg*, there were no histories, official or otherwise, intended for officer education on the American Civil War, and those who wished to study this conflict were obliged to use works published in the United States.  

Likewise, the only books produced on the Austro-Prussian War thought to be of use for military study by Maurice were Henry Hozier’s *Seven Weeks War*, and A. Malet’s *Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation* which, like the only book on the Franco-Prussian War he considered of use, George Hooper’s *Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire*, had not been expressly written for officer education but principally for a civilian market.

Although there was a limited demand for Military History books written for educational purposes, after the Cardwell army reforms of 1870-1 there was an increase in the

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106 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4294, ff. 251, Maurice to Blackwood, n.d. [1872?], and MS4294, ff. 248, Maurice to Blackwood, n.d. [1872?].

107 Kinglake’s history of the Crimean War was produced during this time, but it was not primarily intended for military study; see Chapter 5. The Official Histories produced in 1859 on the Crimean War were intended for officer education however, see Chapter 3 below. The only work in English on the war of 1859 in Italy was E.M. Jones, *Campaign of 1859* (York, 1869), which was written expressly for the ‘gentleman cadets at Sandhurst’, p. i.


109 Henry Hozier, *Seven Weeks War* (London, 1867); A. Malet, *Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation* (London, 1870); and, George Hooper, *Sedan: the Downfall of the Second Empire* (London, 1884). In the preface to this latter work the author admitted that the work was largely based on the German Official History of the war which was ‘unreadable to the general public’, but he hoped his work would present it to this audience in a ‘succinct and readable form’ (pp. v-vi).
number of regimental histories written. The reforms had amalgamated many regiments which consisted of only one battalion and so began a wave of regimental histories in an attempt to record the exploits and traditions of the units which had lost their individual identity. This type of work appeared frequently in military periodicals, particularly *Colburn’s United Service Magazine*.

As *Operations of War* dominated the way in which the army studied Military History during the 1870s and 1880s and, because beyond examinations, there was no professional readership for military books, there was little financial incentive for either authors or publishers to publish. Even though Hamley’s work remained the pre-eminent book on the subject, he continued to produce new editions which reflected a realisation that technological developments challenged the idea of continuity in warfare. Beyond *Operations of War*, the technological advancement of weapons also stimulated a desire to find a new approach to the study of tactics in the late 1880s and 1890s. This ultimately caused the re-emergence of Clausewitz’s ideas in the study of Military History.

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III. New Approaches to Military History, 1885-99

Sir Garnet Wolseley, as a proponent of officer education, promoted and associated with men who thought in a similar fashion as he rose to prominence in the late Victorian Army.\textsuperscript{114} One such man, who came to Wolseley’s attention after winning the ‘Wellington Essay’ prize in 1872, was Maurice.\textsuperscript{115} Likewise, it was Henderson’s first book, \textit{Campaign of Fredericksburg}, published by Kegan Paul in 1885, which brought him to Wolseley’s attention.\textsuperscript{116} In this work, Henderson emphasised the importance of the study of Military History for an officer, as the ‘great commanders’ had all had ‘their minds fully prepared by the study’ of the subject.\textsuperscript{117} He intended the book for Volunteer officers, partly because he realised that their training was inadequate, but also because he was short of money.\textsuperscript{118} While Henderson admitted that the work was an ‘amplification’ of a chapter in Chesney’s \textit{Campaigns in Virginia}, the level of his analysis surpassed this work, as although he did not overtly utilise ideas put forward by Jomini or Clausewitz, he paid particular attention to decisions made by commanders and analysed their judgements in detail.\textsuperscript{119} On the strength of this work, Wolseley appointed Henderson as an Instructor of Tactics at Sandhurst in September 1889, where he became friends with Maurice, then a Professor at the Staff College; and, he became a ‘frequent visitor’ to Maurice’s house in Camberley where they would discuss Military History ‘until well after midnight’.\textsuperscript{120}

To further the cause of officer education, Maurice purchased \textit{Colburn’s United Service Magazine} from Hurst and Blackett, and restarted the periodical as the \textit{United Service}
*Magazine* with the publisher William Clowes & Sons in April 1890. Maurice hoped that the magazine, with its new editor, Charles Cooper-King, would become popular with both the military and general reading public, rivalling the *Nineteenth Century* and other monthly reviews. Maurice spared ‘neither expense nor trouble’ in securing ‘the ablest and most eminent writers’, so alongside his own writing, articles by Wolseley, Sir Charles Dilke, Rudyard Kipling, Spenser Wilkinson, F.N. Maude and Henderson appeared in the periodical. Unsurprisingly, given the new proprietor, the magazine emphasised the study of Military History as a crucial element in the professional development of an officer. Wolseley, aware of the prestige his name would lend to this cause, wrote several articles for the publication which discussed how he felt Military History ‘should be studied’. He wrote that he had ‘never been engaged in any campaign’ where he had not felt the benefit of his ‘earnest study of Jomini and Clausewitz’, emphasising that Military History must be read ‘critically to be of any use’. He hoped that officers would see the subject as providing ‘the data from which… to solve military problems’, and, in so doing, enable them to ‘deduce principles’ upon which they could act so as to make ‘rapid decisions under fire, and at critical moments in action’.

The magazine published a large number of military historical articles intended both for military education, and for the general readership. Cooper-King asked T. Miller Maguire, a ‘crammer’ well-known for preparing officers for the Staff College, to ‘contribute some illustrations of the principles of strategy… to encourage the study of Military History’. Maguire used British campaigns for these narratives, and based his writing on ‘the works of

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General Hamley, General Clery, and Colonel Home… because there [were] none better in the English Language, either as originals or translations’. For recreational reading, also intended to create an interest in Military History, the magazine included popular accounts of British campaigns, which dispensed with military analysis, and included regimental history, as well as recollections from veterans. This combination of Military History written for education and recreation proved to be popular with the military readership, and although it was felt that the title discouraged the general reading public, in early 1891 Wolseley wrote to Cooper-King that ‘I rejoice beyond measure to think that the magazine is doing so well’.

The JRUSI also increased the number of articles it published on Military History, which were intended to increase the professionalism of the officer corps. For example, in 1897, it published Lonsdale Hale’s paper on ‘The Professional Study of Military History’ in which he argued that officers could increase their ‘personal professional capacity’ through the use of the subject to learn the Jominian principles of war. The institution also created the ‘Chesney Medal’ in 1899 to award an ‘author of original literary work treating naval or military science and literature which has a bearing on the welfare of the British Empire’ with a view to encourage the production of this work in Britain. This award was created following a proposal by the ‘George Chesney Memorial Committee’, which was formed on 24 April 1896, and consisted of, among others, the Marquess of Lansdowne, Lord Roberts, George White, Sir G.S. Clarke, Sir Lintorn Simmons, and the publisher John Blackwood.

130 LHCMA, Basil Liddell Hart Papers, 1/465, R.E. Vyvyan to Liddell Hart, 9 April 1957.
131 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4642, ff. 260, Membership List of the ‘George Chesney Memorial Committee’, 1896. George Chesney (1830-95) was the brother of the Charles Chesney and wrote Battle of Dorking, a work of ‘invasion-fiction’ that was published by Blackwood in 1871.
Likewise, the ‘Aldershot Military Society’ was created by General Archibald Alison in February 1888 with a view to stimulating the professional interest of the officers posted to this station through lectures held on military topics at the Prince Consort’s Library.\(^{132}\) Military History was a mainstay of the lecture series, and Maguire and Henderson regularly presented papers to the society which analysed campaigns, particularly those fought during the American Civil War.\(^{133}\) The series also included papers for the general interest of the members and, on 22 November 1898, the journalist G.W. Steevens gave a lecture on the ‘Downfall of Mahdism’ in the Sudan.\(^{134}\) Just as had been the case with the *United Service Magazine*, this mix of Military History for education and recreation proved to be popular, and by October 1888 the society had 530 members.\(^{135}\)

Military periodicals intended mainly for recreational reading, such as the *Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine*, also began to carry Military History articles during this period. From the first issue, a series on Regimental History was included, entitled ‘Glories and Traditions of the British Army’, as well as one on ‘Old Battlefields’.\(^{136}\) The magazine also included narratives of the most recent British Imperial campaigns, and produced a series of profusely illustrated books on British military history, the first of which was written by Major Arthur Griffith, entitled *Wellington and Waterloo*, published in January 1898.\(^{137}\) From December 1897, the magazine featured a regular section entitled, ‘On the Military Book

\(^{132}\) Vickers, ‘*Gift So Graciously Bestowed*’, p. 70.
\(^{134}\) G.W. Steevens, *Downfall of Mahdism* (Aldershot, 22 November 1898).
\(^{135}\) Vickers, ‘*Gift So Graciously Bestowed*’, p. 72.
Shelf, in which military literature, including Military History, was reviewed by an anonymous writer.\textsuperscript{138}

Prior to becoming a contributor to the \textit{United Service Magazine}, Wilkinson’s interest in the study of tactics had led him to form the ‘Kriegspiel Club’ at Oxford University in 1874, and, following his commission in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Manchester Volunteers in 1878, to contribute to the founding of the ‘Manchester Tactical Society’ in February 1881. This society had initially adopted W. Shaw’s \textit{Elements of Tactics} as its ‘textbook’ and, in 1883 it began to use \textit{Operations of War}.\textsuperscript{139} These works, along with the Volunteers other training arrangements, dismayed Wilkinson and the other members of the society as they felt they were based on the historic ‘drill’ used by the British Army which ‘had been swept off the battlefield by the needle gun’.\textsuperscript{140} As a result, the society turned to German works, with Wilkinson and H.L. Rocca translating several books in the late 1880s by Ernst Wilhelm Hugo von Gizycki, Commander of the 18\textsuperscript{th} (2\textsuperscript{nd} Brandenburg) Field Artillery Regiment.\textsuperscript{141} This German tactical literature convinced the society that British works, which were based on the communication of ‘principles’ both derived and illustrated by historical precedent, did not articulate ‘the proper method’ of studying the subject, which the society now claimed was based on the development of ‘the power… to decide rightly how to act under given circumstances’.\textsuperscript{142}


\textsuperscript{139} Wilkinson, \textit{Thirty-Five Years}, pp. 5, 7, 18, 24; and, Spenser Wilkinson, \textit{Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: Translated from the German} (Manchester, 1887), p. iii.

\textsuperscript{140} NAM, Lord Roberts Papers, 7101-23-82 to 90, Wilkinson to Roberts, 28 Aug. 1892; and, Wilkinson, \textit{Thirty-Five Years}, p. 19.


The translation of Gizycki’s work came to the attention of Maurice while he was teaching at the Staff College, and he wrote in 1889 that he did ‘not think a more valuable series of papers [had] for some time been issued from our military press’. Although Maurice had read *On War* in both German and English by 1891, when in this year he wrote an essay on how an officer should use Military History to ‘improve his judgement’ which embodied Clausewitz’s views on the subject, he attributed these ideas to Gizycki’s *On the Study of Military History as a Means of Increasing the Military Capacity of an Officer*. As Maurice was attempting to promote this new approach to the study of the subject in Britain and, even by 1905, Graham’s translation of *On War* was ‘little known’, it is probable that he felt officers were more likely to read ‘the few pages’ of Gizycki’s ‘little pamphlet’ rather than the lengthy, complex, and rather turgid, *On War*.

Henderson, possibly through his connection with Maurice, also took up Clausewitz’s ideas regarding the role Military History should play in officer education, but he too attributed them to contemporary German tactical writers, including Gizycki. In his second book, *Battle of Spicheren*, published by Gale and Polden in 1891, Henderson pointed out that Gizycki had written that Military History allowed the reader to learn from the experience of others. Henderson argued, mirroring Clausewitz’s ideas, ‘if we would make this alien experience our own’, it was necessary to ‘examine… operations so closely as to have a clear picture of the whole scene in our mind’s eye’, so one could ‘assume… the responsibilities of the leaders who were called upon to meet those situations [so as] to come to a definite

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143 Gizycki, *Exercises in Strategy and Tactics*. Maurice quoted from an advert at the back of the work, p. 34.
144 Maurice commented in this year that Graham had ‘very badly’ translated Clausewitz’s *On War*. Maurice, *War*, pp. 94, 136. The original title of Gizycki’s work, which was published in Berlin in 1881, was ‘Über kriegsgeschichtliche Studien als Mittel zur Förderung der Kriegsfähigkeit des Offiziers’. The translation given above is that given by Maurice. Wilkinson and Rocca did not translate this work into English, and it seems that Maurice read it in German. This work was also held by the Library of the British Museum: G.K. Fortescue, *Subject Index of the Modern Works Added to the Library of the British Museum in the Years 1881-1900* (London, 1902), p. 904.
145 Maurice, *War*, p. 94; and, Bassford, *Clausewitz in English*, pp. 57, 70. Between 1885 and 1900 Graham’s translation of *On War* only sold between ten and twenty copies a year.
decision and to test the soundness of that decision by the actual event’. This affected the style in which Henderson wrote the book. He not only described each phase of the action in great detail and in strict chronological order, so the reader could place themselves in each ‘situation’ as it arose, but also included an appendix which directly posed questions asking the reader how they would have acted at crucial stages of the battle.146

Similarly, the ‘main object’ of Henderson’s subsequent book, which was a translation of General von Verdy du Vernois’ Tactical Study Based on the Battle of Custozza, published in 1894 by Gale and Polden, was ‘to show how Military History may be most profitably studied’. Here Henderson pointed to Vernois’ articulation of Clausewitz’s ideas to argue that the subject, if studied correctly, could develop an officer’s ‘capacity for judgement, forethought and resolution’. Thus, again, Clausewitz’s ideas regarding the study of Military History were attributed to a contemporary German tactical writer.147

Henderson’s next work, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, first published with Longmans, Green & Co. in August 1898, was on a much greater scale than his previous books, as not only was it a two-volume study, but as he now taught Military History at the Staff College, it went into detail on strategic matters.148 This work also reflected the influence of Clausewitz’s writing as it too emphasised the role which Military History could play in the development of an officer’s professional judgement; Henderson explained that Jackson’s ability as a general had been honed by his study of the subject.149 Moreover, Henderson described Jackson as a ‘military genius’, using the same term as Clausewitz; he

149 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 25, 96, 72, 518.
not only pointed to his martial skill but also aspects of his personality, such as his ability to remain ‘cool and composed’ in action.150

Other concepts which Clausewitz used in his writing also appeared prominently in this work and influenced how Henderson described Jackson’s operations. Just as Henderson had paid great attention to Jackson’s personality, he also referred to how he had correctly judged the character and temperament of the commanders opposing him; this allowed him an insight into their decisions, and to ‘upset’ their ‘mental equilibrium’ by acting as they would least want. Similarly, Henderson further emphasised the importance of psychological factors by describing them, using the term *moral* as ‘a power in war more potent than mere numbers’. Reference to their influence on commanders, and on men under fire, formed an important part of Henderson’s description of warfare.151 Henderson also described the ‘mighty power’ of ‘uncertainty in war’, and presented the counter-offensive as ‘the soul of the defence’.152

Despite the addition of these Clausewitzian concepts, Henderson described the fundamental nature of strategy in Jominian terms. Therefore, while Henderson had noted that policy should influence strategy, this was limited to an acceptance that military means should be tailored to the political context of the war and did not extend to the Clausewitzian notion that the object of strategy was achieving political ends though military means. Therefore, while Henderson continued to describe the ‘proper objective’ as always the ‘main army of the enemy’, he considered Lincoln ‘quite justified’ in February 1862 to retain a large force in Washington to prevent the Confederacy gaining legitimacy in the eyes of other nations through the capture of his capital, as this would have increased the chance of foreign

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150 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 23, 177, 142, 511, 223, 510, and, Volume 2, pp. 480, 486; and, Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Howard & Paret, pp. 100-1, taken from Book I, Ch. 3. Here Clausewitz had presented a combination of physical and psychological courage, with a trained intellect, which gave its owner an insight into the likely outcome of military operations, as constituting ‘military genius’.
intervention.\textsuperscript{153} This understanding of strategy also meant that Henderson did not enter into an analysis of how Jackson’s operations were intended to contribute to the ends of policy, but instead he focused on how they were intended to defeat the Federal armed forces arrayed against him.\textsuperscript{154} Likewise, the operations which Jackson conducted in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862, in which his 16,000 men ‘absolutely paralysed’ several Federal armies consisting of 175,000 men, was used as an illustration of the Jominian ‘first principle of war… to compel [the enemy] to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn’.\textsuperscript{155}

Henderson had intended the book for the civilian reading public as well as a military readership, commenting in the introduction that he hoped civilians would not find his in-depth discussion of military matters ‘dull’.\textsuperscript{156} Henderson was vindicated as the book, no doubt assisted by the fact that it covered several campaigns regularly used for exam purposes after 1904, was re-printed ten times between August 1898 and July 1913; in fact, by 1927 he had become ‘one of the few British soldier-historians whose writings [had] been widely read by civilians’.\textsuperscript{157} Henderson was compensated for his efforts financially, as in the publication agreement of 17 May 1897, Longmans agreed to publish the book, referred to by its original working title as ‘A Life of Stonewall Jackson’, at their own risk and expense, and to pay him


\textsuperscript{154} For example in Vol. 1, pp. 227-8, there is no real explanation given as to how sending Jackson to operate in the Shenandoah Valley would help achieve the ends of policy. Instead, there is a description of the military means he is to employ, but no analysis as to how this is linked to policy. Similarly, in Volume 2, pp. 200-1, Lee’s aim in invading the North in September 1862 is presented simply and only briefly as shocking the North into surrender. Henderson provides no real analysis of the likelihood of the military means employed by the Confederates to actually achieve this. This omission is especially clear when we compare his writing on this point to the in-depth analysis provided on the means employed by Jackson to defeat the Federal Armies in the Shenandoah Valley.


\textsuperscript{156} Henderson, \textit{Stonewall Jackson}, Vol. 1, p. xi.

a royalty of 12.5% of the retail price of 16/- for the first 500 copies sold in the Britain or the Empire, then 16.6% on all additional copies sold.158

Although the method of analysing Military History advocated by Henderson drew on a combination of ideas found in the writing of Jomini, Clausewitz and Mahan, and so cannot be considered truly original, from the mid-1880s Callwell, a Staff College graduate who served in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, began to use the subject to explore new approaches to the study of war.159 In 1884 and 1885 Callwell wrote two articles for the *Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution* on the strategy and tactics which had been employed in what he referred to as Britain’s ‘Small Wars’, or campaigns conducted by regular troops against non-regulars.160 These articles, together with his essay on ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been Employed since the Year 1865’, which won the Royal United Service Institution’s ‘Gold Medal’ in 1887, formed the basis of his book on the subject, entitled, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, published for the Intelligence Division by the Stationery Office in 1896.161 Although in this work Callwell presented several ‘principles’ deduced from the past to act as a guide for a commander, as Jomini had done in relation to regular warfare, Callwell’s principles were more conceptual, reflecting his realisation that ‘the conditions of small wars are so

158 RPL, Longmans, Green and Co., Papers, MS1393: 3/2342, Publication Agreement for ‘Life of Stonewall Jackson’. Corrections costing above 10/- per galley proof were to be charged to Henderson through deduction from his royalties. For sales of the work in the USA, Henderson was awarded royalties of 10% of the retail price for the first 500 copies sold, and 15% thereafter. When the first ‘Library Copies’ of the book were all sold Henderson was expected to offer Longmans a cheap edition of the work, on which he would be paid royalties of 25% of the retail price, and 10% on the first 1000 copies of this edition sold in the U.S.A, rising to 15% for all additional copies.

159 For biographical information on Callwell, see Appendix 1.


diversified’ that they did not lend themselves to a strictly positive system, and that the political objective of the war should shape the military objective.\textsuperscript{162}

Despite Callwell’s insistence that \textit{Small Wars} was ‘a treatise and not a textbook to be accepted as gospel’, the work was selected as a textbook at the Staff College in early 1899 and became ‘the standard work on its particular subject’, leading to its translation into French and Italian.\textsuperscript{163} The inclusion of the work on the Staff College Military History syllabus appears to have assisted its sale, as it took until the end of 1899 for the initial print run of 1000 copies to sell out, at which time a new edition of the work was prepared which included historical examples from the Tirah expedition of 1898.\textsuperscript{164} In early 1900, 1,250 copies of this edition were published, although they took until 1903 to sell out. After this, 750 copies of a third edition of the work, which included a new chapter on Guerrilla Warfare, reflecting the British experience during the final two years of the Second Boer War, were printed and by June 1905 only 100 copies had been left unsold.\textsuperscript{165}

The publication of Mahan’s \textit{Influence of Sea-Power on History} (1890) and its sequel, \textit{Influence of Sea-Power on the French Revolution} (1892), preceded the production of several volumes by British writers on the effect which naval power could have on land campaigns. In November 1895, following Callwell’s realisation that ‘Captain Mahan’s great works’ did not continue their analysis beyond 1815, he contacted Blackwood regarding the possibility of producing a volume which examined the ‘effect of sea-power upon land campaigns’ from this

\textsuperscript{162} Callwell, \textit{Small Wars}, pp. 4, 14, 63. For example, in Chapter 7 the ‘principle’ illustrated is that, ‘boldness and vigour [are] the essence of effectively conducting… operations’ and in Chapter 8 the reader was informed that ‘tactics favour the regular army while strategy favours the enemy’. Interestingly, Callwell was taught during his second year at the Staff College in 1885 by Maurice, which may account for the use of Clausewitzian ideas. Charles Callwell, \textit{Stray Recollections}, Vol. 1 (London, 1923), p. 278.

\textsuperscript{163} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905; and, MS30102, Callwell to Blackwood, 18 August 1904.

\textsuperscript{164} Callwell, \textit{Small Wars}, p. i.; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905.

\textsuperscript{165} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905.
time.\textsuperscript{166} Blackwood agreed, and in 1897 published Callwell’s \textit{Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo}.\textsuperscript{167} As the work noted, in a possible reference to Henderson’s inclusion of the subject at the Staff College, ‘the theory is gaining ground that maritime command is a paramount consideration upon which the employment of the land forces in time of war depends’.\textsuperscript{168} In order to further underscore the importance of this factor, Callwell described several conflicts, including the Crimean War and the American Civil War, to demonstrate the important role maritime considerations had played in them.\textsuperscript{169} However, even though the work was recommended reading at the Staff College, it sold just 662 copies between 1897 and June 1907.\textsuperscript{170}

Despite this, Callwell’s book was not the only volume published at this time to draw on Military History to emphasise the importance of maritime considerations for the British Army. In 1897 William Clowes and Son published G.A. Furse’s \textit{Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas}. The first volume of this work examined the factors which the author considered essential for the success of an amphibious operation and the second volume provided a series of historical case studies to illustrate them.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, the following year Julian Corbett’s \textit{Drake and the Tudor Navy} was published by Longman.\textsuperscript{172} In this work the author argued that as Sir Francis Drake had successfully used maritime operations against the militarily superior Spanish, he had demonstrated that he was the ‘unsurpassed master of that amphibious warfare which has built up the British Empire’.\textsuperscript{173} The increased emphasis on maritime operations

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\item \textsuperscript{166} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4627, ff. 238, Callwell to Blackwood, 10 November 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Charles Callwell, \textit{Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo} (London, 1897); and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4627, ff. 238, Callwell to Blackwood, 10 November 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid., \textit{Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo}, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Ibid., pp. 13, 248, 257, 269, 275, 328, 29, 155-196, 225-275, 328.
\item \textsuperscript{170} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30808, Blackwood Publishing House Sales Book, 1896-1901, and MS30809, Blackwood Publishing House Sales Book, 1904-07.
\item \textsuperscript{171} G.A. Furse, \textit{Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas}, 2 vols. (London, 1897).
\end{itemize}
also led to the production of an abridged single volume, or ‘student’s edition’, of A.W. Kinglake’s *Invasion of the Crimea*, which had been published by Blackwood between 1863 and 1880 in eight volumes.\textsuperscript{174} The major task of editing down this work was undertaken by G.S. Clarke as he felt that officers ‘study 1870-71 over-much’ and that ‘profound strategists’ who knew nothing of maritime considerations were ‘not the national need’.\textsuperscript{175}

Despite the use of Clausewitzian concepts in Henderson’s writing, at this time no work written by a British author principally for officer education was based on Clausewitz’s concept that war was a form of political interaction, which used military means to achieve its ends. The only writer to base his work on this premise was Spenser Wilkinson. But this had caused him to direct the majority of his writing at civilians, since this group influenced the policy Britain sought to pursue in war, either directly as political figures, or indirectly as the electorate.\textsuperscript{176} The reason why the Clausewitzian understanding of war was overlooked was partly because the ideas of Jomini and Clausewitz were held to be complementary at this time.\textsuperscript{177} Thus, in the *United Service Magazine* in September 1891 Wilkinson wrote that Clausewitz ‘differ[ed] from Jomini, not in disagreeing with his theorems, but by laying the chief stress on matters which in Jomini’s work appear to be secondary… the two writers thus supplement one another’.\textsuperscript{178} However, Wilkinson felt that the lack of a professional military readership was the main reason why Military History was not based on the Clausewitzian understanding of the nature of war. Wilkinson pointed out that even when Maurice defined ‘War’ in his article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1890, he failed to ‘set out [war] as a form of social relation or as a branch of political action’ and, instead, described it as the


\textsuperscript{175} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4686, ff. 77, G.S. Clarke to Blackwood, 16 November 1899; and, Clarke and Kinglake (eds.), *Invasion of the Crimea: Student’s Edition*, p. v.

\textsuperscript{176} Spenser Wilkinson, *War and Policy* (London, 1900), pp. vii, 54. Wilkinson’s writing on this theme for a civilian audience will be explored in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5 below.


realm of strategy and tactics. Wilkinson realised that Maurice had been ‘obliged to write an elementary’ treatment of the subject, rather than a more complex one which utilised the Clausewitzian understanding of the subject, because of the ‘want of a professional public to address’ who could comprehend such an approach.\(^{179}\)

The lack of this type of readership, despite the attempts by Wolseley, Maurice, Henderson, Callwell and others to create it, was caused by the fact that there was still no direct incentive or compulsion for the majority of officers to study the subject. Even by 1902, most officers were considered by the Asker-Douglas Committee to be ‘lamentably wanting [in] the desire to acquire knowledge and in the zeal for the military art’. As a result, in the same year, Maguire noted that ‘an officer, however rich, who spent £20 a year on military literature would be laughed at by his friends, several generals included’. Therefore, because it was realised that ‘a book that will sell by the tens in England would sell by hundreds in Germany and France’, ‘few publishers will issue a military treatise at their own cost [in Britain since] there is no reading public for them’.\(^{180}\) This, in turn, formed a vicious cycle which kept the price of the few works of Military History which were produced artificially high, meaning that they were ‘so costly only a relatively small [number]... can afford to purchase them’, which further dissuaded officers from studying the subject.\(^{182}\) The Askers-Douglas Committee listened to these concerns, and their proposals, which came into effect in 1904, had a major impact on the writing of Military History for officers.

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\(^{179}\) The same criticism could also have been extended to Henderson’s ‘definition’ of the term which he wrote for the Encyclopaedia Brittanica in 1902. Henderson, *Science of War*, pp. 1-38; and, Wilkinson, ‘Military Literature’, *United Service Magazine*, 3 (Sept. 1891), p. 507.


\(^{181}\) Askers-Douglas, Evidence, pp. 33, 105, 83.

IV. The New Market for Military History, 1899-1914

The changes in army education brought in by the Askers-Douglas Committee created a new large readership for Military History, as besides the cadets passing through Sandhurst and Woolwich, each year more than 300 officers sat the promotional exams, with 536 taking them in May 1905, and around 100 officers taking the competitive exams every year, with 184 taking them in March 1904.\(^{183}\) Moreover, as no textbook was set publishers were given scope to produce a variety of works for those taking these exams.

Since both papers of the promotional exam, as well as the second paper of the competitive exam, were focused on a ‘Special Campaign’ which was selected each year, the opportunity was created for publishers to produce a range of campaign narratives for those taking these exams.\(^{184}\) Swan and Sonnenschein started the ‘Special Campaign Series’ in 1904 when they published S.C. Pratt’s *Saarbruck to Paris: The Franco-German War*.\(^{185}\) The series was intended ‘not only [to] be useful for examination purposes but [as] the nucleus of an interesting library for the military student’; and, by August 1914, it had grown to consist of nineteen uniform volumes.\(^{186}\) Each volume focused on a single campaign and aimed to give ‘a précis of [its] main events’ with some analytical comments, as in the new exams ‘the study of Military History [was] not all about details, but the deductions from them’.\(^{187}\) To ensure

\(^{183}\) For example, Anon., *Report on the result of the Examination in November 1904 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion* (London, 1905) p. 3. In this year, 324 officers took the military history papers.

\(^{184}\) NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/81, Minutes of Staff Officer’s Conference held between 17-20 January 1910, comments made by Col. F.N. Maude, on behalf of the Director of Military Training, during a discussion on the ‘advisability of preparing a programme of a suitable progressive course of military history for junior officers’, p. 66; Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 489; and, Anon., *Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904*, p. 7.


\(^{186}\) Pratt, *Saarbruck to Paris: Franco-German War*, p. i. (publisher’s preface).

that these works were accessible to its intended audience. S.C. Pratt, who became the editor of the series, kept production costs as low as possible by purchasing the rights to use pre-existing maps, rather than incur the large expense of producing new ones, enabling each volume to be sold for only 5/-. This series returned a good profit and its works were considered among the most profitable books produced by the company.

The second book in this series, entitled *Russo-Turkish War 1877: A Strategical Sketch*, was written by Maurice’s son, Frederick Barton Maurice, and was published in 1905. Pratt invited him in December 1904 to contribute to the series and Maurice agreed to a royalty of 20% after 1,500 volumes had been sold, which would rise to 25% after the sale of 2,500 volumes. Pratt emphasized the importance of publishing the book quickly so it could be marketed to those sitting the promotional exam set in December 1905; thus, he insisted that the book be ready for sale by the beginning of November. This approach paid off and Pratt reported that the book’s sales had made a ‘good start’ by January 1906, and by late 1907 the work had earned Maurice £8.7.9 in royalties, suggesting that the work was likely to have sold around 1,660 copies by this point.

Maurice analysed the campaign along the lines set by the syllabuses of the promotional and competitive exams. While he noted that ‘policy always influences strategy and the major operations of war... [and] the policy of the Russian government had the most

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189 RPL, Allen and Unwin Company Papers, 261, Minutes from Meeting of Directors, 31 March 1911, 261, Minutes from Meeting of Directors, 12 November 1907, 261, Report on Swan and Sonnenschein’s financial predicament, 25 November 1907.  
190 Frederick Barton Maurice, *Russo-Turkish War 1877: A Strategical Sketch* (London, 1905).  
193 RPL, Swan and Sonnenschein Company Papers, Letter-book, 1906-1907, Company Directors to Redway, 6 January 1906, Letter-book, 1906-1907, Company Directors to Redway, [n.d.] 1907. It is impossible to know exactly how many copies were sold, as per the publication agreement, the cost of any corrections Maurice wanted to make to the work’s proof sheets were charged against his royalties.
direct influence upon the scope of the operations’, he did not make the employment of military means to achieve the ends of policy the basis of his analysis. Instead, he argued that ‘the objective of sound strategy’ was always ‘the defeat of the enemy’s army’, so his account was centred on the lines of advance adopted by each side in relation to the other. He noted that, as Hamley had done in the fourth edition of *Operations of War*, while ‘Napoleon’s dictum that a double line of operations is unsound is still true... Telegraphy [had]… made it possible to keep forces which are separated still under the control of one man; and they are then working on a single line of operations in the sense in which Napoleon understood the phrase’. The work also reflected the syllabus as Maurice discussed the maritime element of the war and the role of ‘moral’ considerations. He also analysed the tactics employed, as knowledge of them was required for the second paper of the promotional exam. He argued that the Russian Army had ‘misunderstood or altogether neglected’ the ‘tactical lessons’ of the Franco-Prussian War because they employed infantry tactics which were based on the maxim that ‘the bullet is a hag, the bayonet is a queen’. 194

The publisher Constable and Co. also began to produce campaign narratives when they began the ‘Campaigns and their Lessons’ series in 1911, edited by Callwell. 195 Unusually, the first work in the series written by Callwell analysed a British colonial campaign fought on the North-West frontier of India against the Afridi tribe. It is likely that Callwell selected this topic for those sitting his ‘Small Wars’ paper on the Staff College admission exam, as this campaign had featured in the 1905 and 1906 exam papers. 196 By August 1914 this series consisted of another three works which focused on campaigns which regularly featured on the syllabus of Woolwich and Sandhurst, as well as on the promotional

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and competitive exams. The next work to appear was L.H.R. Pope-Hennessy’s *Campaign of 1870-71: After Sedan*, followed by Neil Malcolm’s *Bohemia, 1866*.\(^197\)

Forster, Groom & Co., too, began to publish campaign narratives for those taking Military History exams, producing seven books of this type by H.M.E. Brunker between 1905 and 1912.\(^198\) To distinguish this material from that produced by other publishers the company intended the work to have two unique selling points: it was not only cheaper than those produced by their competitors, it was also intended to be directly relevant to the topic of the upcoming exam.\(^199\) Given this emphasis on keeping the price of these works as low as possible, they only cost 3/6 to purchase; and, the six complementary volumes which the company published each consisted of past exam papers edited by Brunker, including the examiner’s comments, were sold for 1/-\(^200\) As it was the Army Orders issued in April which usually pronounced the campaign selected for the exams sat in November or December, Brunker only had a short period of time to produce each work.\(^201\) Since he realised that he could only treat his topic superficially, he included a list of additional works which ‘should be carefully perused’ once ‘the outline [of the operations] as given in this account is grasped’.\(^202\) However, the emphasis placed on producing the works quickly and cheaply told


\(^{198}\) H.M.E. Brunker, *Story of the Campaigns in the Peninsular* (Portsmouth, 1907); idem, *Story of the Koniggratz Campaign, 1866* (Portsmouth, 1908); idem, *Story of the Franco-German War* (Portsmouth, 1911); idem, *Story of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5* (Portsmouth, 1909); idem, *Story of the Campaign in Eastern Virginia April 1861 to May 1863* (Portsmouth 1910); idem, *Story of the Russo-Turkish War (In Europe)* (Portsmouth, 1911); and, idem, *Story of the Napoleonic Campaign, 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz* (Portsmouth, 1912).


\(^{201}\) Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 489.

in the quality of the final product as they were full of spelling mistakes and inaccurate information.\textsuperscript{203}

Besides producing cheap campaign narratives, several publishers responded to the changes in army education by publishing several works which presented the criteria through which campaigns were analysed at Sandhurst, Woolwich and on the promotional and competitive exams. Thus, Gale and Polden published three cheap works, H.T. Russell’s \textit{Notes on Strategy and Military History}, G.P.A. Phillips’ \textit{Guide to Military History for Military Examinations} and F.F. Boyd’s \textit{Strategy in a Nutshell}, between 1904 and 1910.\textsuperscript{204} Similarly, in 1904, Blackwoods published \textit{Modern Strategy} by W.H. James, and in the same year Cassell produced C.E.K. MacQuoid’s \textit{Strategy Illustrated by British Campaigns}.\textsuperscript{205} As these works reflecting the syllabuses used by the army, they all used examples from history to illustrate the importance of ‘moral’ and maritime factors, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ lines of manoeuvre, and to present the true objective of strategy as the enemy army.\textsuperscript{206} James’ work proved to be especially popular as it was adopted by the Indian Army as the textbook for its promotional exam between 1905 and 1911.\textsuperscript{207} This added to its ‘rapidity of sale’ and, as between July 1905 and June 1908 alone it sold around 1,250 copies, Blackwood needed to produce a second edition of the work within a few months of its first appearance.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{203} Anon., ‘Review of \textit{Military History for Examinations} by Brunker’, \textit{United Service Magazine}, 35 (Feb. 1909), p. 565. For example, the works gave incorrect dates for battles, and occasionally Napoleon was misspelt as ‘Napolean’.


\textsuperscript{206} For example, see: James, \textit{Modern Strategy}, pp. xx, xvi, 41, 179-235, 139-144; and, MacQuoid, \textit{Strategy Illustrated by British Campaigns}, pp. 3, 218.

\textsuperscript{207} Anon., \textit{Report on the result of the Examination in November 1905 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomany and Volunteers, for Promotion} (London, 1906) p. 114; and, Anon., ‘Notes by the Editor, Military Education’, p. 491.

As the first five parts of *Operations of War* were made central to the Military History section of the competitive exams taken between December 1899 and November 1904, the sales of the work dramatically increased, and Blackwood sold 2,304 copies during this time. However, when in 1904 the work was removed as the textbook and the syllabus was altered to include factors which were not covered, such as ‘moral’ and maritime considerations, its sales collapsed, and only 435 copies were sold between July 1904 and June 1907. As a result, Blackwood asked his ‘military staff’ to suggest how the work ‘might be brought up to date, before the expiry of the copyright’ so that it would once again reflect the army’s exam syllabuses. In April 1906, Launcelot Kiggell agreed to edit the book, and sought the help of Major Robert Home, Captain A.H. Marindin of the Black Watch, Colonel Richard Haking, an officer on the General Staff, Callwell and G.S. Clarke, to evaluate the work, although he made all of the changes to the text himself. Kiggell was paid £50 by Blackwood to revise the text; when he was appointed as Assistant of Staff Duties on the General Staff on 1 January 1907 he took a ‘months “Hamley” leave’ to complete his revision of the work.

Kiggell was keen to retain the book’s original character and felt that ‘the principles of strategy are so constant’ that only relatively minor revisions were needed in its first five parts. Thus, he rejected G.S. Clarke’s proposal for ‘a chapter on Imperial Strategy’ because

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210 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30808, Stock Books, 1896-1901, p. 208. The fifth edition (1900) divided the work into two sections, the figures given here are for the first section which contained parts 1-3 of the work.
211 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30102, Chapman to Blackwood, 15 June 1904.
212 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30122, Kiggell to Blackwood, 10 April 1906, MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 3 August 1906, MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 3 August 1907, MS30122, Kiggell to Blackwood, 15 April 1906, and MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 2 April 1907.
213 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 8 January 1907; and, MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 20 February 1907.


‘the book purports to deal with war in general’ and not Britain’s ‘particular case’. The largest break with Hamley’s approach appeared in the sixth part of the work, where his chapters on tactics were removed and replaced with an analysis of the Russo-Japanese War. This conflict was used to demonstrate ‘command of the sea’ as ‘a vital factor’ in warfare, and Kiggell discussed amphibious landings in great detail. Kiggell also broke with Hamley’s purely illustrative use of military history here: as he narrated the campaign, he not only described and evaluated the ‘courses open’ to commanders, but also posed questions directly to the reader, asking them to consider the best course of action available to the commander on either side. As Kiggell’s revision caused the work to once again reflect the criteria through which the army’s exam syllabuses expected students to analyse campaigns, the sales of the work were partly restored, and between July 1907 and June 1914 Blackwood sold 2,134 copies.

To reach the new market for Military History which the changes in army education had created, Longmans, Green and Co., published a collection of Henderson’s lectures and articles under the title Science of War in 1905. Henderson’s literary agent, W.M. Colles, now acting on behalf of Henderson’s wife, originally offered the work to Blackwood on 19 August 1903, stressing that it was of the ‘highest intrinsic merit’, and noted that Major Gretton, one of Henderson’s ‘most intimate friends’ would ‘write a memoir of about 10,000 words in length’ to accompany the introduction to which ‘Lord Roberts [had] consented to

215 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30122, Kiggell to Blackwood, 15 April 1906, and MS30128, Kiggell to Blackwood, 19 April 1907.
217 For examples, see ibid., pp. 360-2, 366-7, 372. On p. 367, Kiggell asked the reader, ‘what is a general placed in such a predicament to do?’ He then noted that ‘it is easy to find fault, but very hard to show a remedy, and the student of strategy will find it a valuable exercise to determine what he would have done under such conditions. The following points are suggested for consideration...’ he then went on to suggest the options available and his solution to the problem.
However, as Longman offered good terms, agreeing to produce the work at their own expense and risk, as well as to pay a royalty of 15% of the published price of 14/- on the first two thousand copies sold, and 25% thereafter, Henderson’s widow agreed they could produce the work. The collection was edited by Neill Malcolm, and under the agreement with Longmans he received a fee of £25, paid on the day of publication.

Hugh Rees Ltd also looked to reproduce the teaching material of those who had taught Military History at the army’s training establishments; and, in 1904, they added a new edition of Tovey’s *Elements of Strategy* to its ‘Pall Mall Military Series’, updated by T. Miller Maguire to reflect the new exam syllabus. In 1907 the company also published *Wellington’s Campaigns* by C.W. Robinson, which consisted of ‘lectures delivered some years ago’ at ‘Sandhurst… and subsequently revised’ to meet the new syllabus. Both of these works heavily reflected the fact that *Operations of War* had been used to write the original version as little attention was paid to political influences on the Jominian ‘principles’ illustrated by the historical examples in the work.

However, W.D. Bird’s *Précis of Strategy* was added to the series in 1910, also to assist those taking Military History exams, and it reflected the influence of ‘the works of Clausewitz’. Bird’s work was based on his teaching at Quetta which broke away from Henderson and Hamley’s contention that the military objective should always be the destruction of the opposing army. He wrote that whether the conflict was a ‘war of conquest,

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220 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30091, W.M. Colles to Blackwood, 19 August 1903. In the end, this memoir was written by Lord Roberts.
221 Henderson died on 5 March 1903 following an illness. See Chapter 3 for more information.
225 W.D. Bird, *Précis of Strategy* (London, 1910), p. v. The work covered all the elements required by the promotional and competitive exam syllabus, for example, maritime considerations, p. 52, and moral considerations, p. 75.
or whether the object is limited to forcing the enemy to agree to our demands’, this was only a ‘general rule’ to follow. Instead, Bird argued, illustrating the point with a historical example, that the military objective should be directly set by the political object of the conflict. He wrote that it ‘may in certain cases be the capital, [such as] Paris in 1814’, or ‘the objective may be the person of the leader, such as Napoleon, when resistance depends on his presence in the field’. 226 Similarly, Hugh Rees published two works by Bird which consisted of lectures he had given at Quetta on the Russo-Japanese War and the Franco-Prussian War. 227 These also reflected the syllabus there, so the objective sought by an army was presented as being influenced by the political end the war was fought to achieve, rather than simply the opposing army. 228 Therefore, with regards to the Russo-Japanese War, even though the occupation of Korea resulted in Japan splitting its forces and risking ‘defeat in detail’, this was held to be the correct course ‘by the political necessity’ of this action, since holding the region gave Japan ‘a strong diplomatic card’. 229

Military journals also published material of use to those taking Military History exams at this time. The JRUSI, for instance, published the syllabus of the Competitive Exams in 1911. 230 Likewise, the Journal of the Royal Artillery Institution also produced articles on campaigns likely to feature in upcoming exams, such as J.C. Dalton’s ‘Campaign of 1866 in Bohemia’, in which his analysis deferred to that of ‘Hamley’ in ‘his famous Operations of War’. 231 This publication also featured numerous articles on Military History and military

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226 Ibid., p. 23.
228 Bird, Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 11-12, 64; and, idem, Lectures on the Strategy of the Franco-German War, p. 8.
230 Anon., ‘Notes by the Editor, Military Education’, p. 924.
theory which had not been selected for exam purposes.\textsuperscript{232} Similarly, the Army Review, which had been created in 1911 by the Army Council for, in part, ‘placing at [the army’s] disposal the results of the most recent research into military history’, lived up to this responsibility.\textsuperscript{233}

The periodical which contained the most Military History for officer education was Maurice’s United Service Magazine. Besides the usual articles on the military history selected for army exams, and those which dealt with the subject for general interest, the new editor, A.W.A. Pollock, included several features which were based on the Clausewitzian approach to the subject, such as A.F. Becke’s Waterloo Campaign: An Appreciation of the Situation from the Point of View of a French Staff Officer on 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1815.\textsuperscript{234} The influence of Clausewitz’s writing on the journal was particularly noticeable as, in 1907, its publisher, William Clowes, acquired the rights to translate the new German edition of On War which had appeared in 1905; from September 1907 the periodical carried a serialised translation, supplemented with comments by Maguire.\textsuperscript{235} However, when this prematurely ended in March 1909, due to the re-publication of Graham’s translation of the work by Maude, it had only covered part of Clausewitz’s writing on the use of historical examples.\textsuperscript{236} Other articles by Maguire which appeared in the periodical, intended to assist those taking Military History


exams, were subsequently published separately in volume form by William Clowes to complement the series of books the author had already published with the company.237

Although during this time the army’s exam syllabuses placed an emphasis on the influence which maritime considerations existed on land campaigns, several works were produced with the intention of exploring this topic to encourage officers to take up its study, rather than simply preparing men for a Military History exam. In 1905 Blackwood published Callwell’s *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance*, which drew on examples from military history to examine the most effective way to conduct amphibious operations.238 As General Lyttleton, then CGS, felt that a work of this type was ‘sorely needed in both services’, he granted Callwell a period of leave so that he could write it.239 Unlike his previous work on this topic, Callwell was critical of Mahan’s writing as he felt that it overestimated the effect which sea-power alone could have on the course of a war and so had downplayed the important role which land forces could play during maritime operations. To illustrate this, he pointed to the Peninsular War and American Civil War, as in these cases the almost total ‘command of the sea’ by one side had not translated swiftly into victory, and ultimately both conflicts had been decided by land forces.240 The work enjoyed good sales between 1905 and 1911, when it sold around 900 copies, reflecting both the growing professional readership for such work and the emphasis placed on maritime considerations at this time. However, following the publication of Corbett’s *Some Principles of Maritime

239 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30102, Callwell to Blackwood, 18 August 1904, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 8 January 1905, and MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 14 January 1905.
Strategy in 1911, the sales of Callwell’s work fell dramatically, and it only sold seventy-five copies between 1911 and 1914.241

Between 1898 and 1914 Corbett produced several works which placed an emphasis on the influence which maritime factors could have on land campaigns.242 From 1904, his work drew on the writing of Clausewitz to argue that naval strategy should not be seen in isolation, but as only one of the means by which a government tried to achieve the political end it had gone to war to attain.243 Thus, for example, in his 1907 study, England in the Seven Years’ War, he argued that as the close co-operation between the British Army and Navy was instrumental in the successful conduct of the war, the ‘practice of amphibious warfare’ during the conflict was ‘as luminously informing as… [the] campaigns of Frederick the Great’.244 In his most famous work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett again drew on Clausewitz’s writing to argue that limited war was only possible when it was fought between two nations separated by the sea. For Corbett, this was the ‘true meaning’ and ‘highest military value of command of the sea’ as it had historically allowed England to successfully compete with more militarily powerful nations.245

Besides the production of Military History for the purpose of military education, the Second Boer War directly led to an increase in the quantity of regimental history published. The role played by volunteer units in this conflict, particularly by the City Imperial

Volunteers, caused the production of work which described the history of this type of unit, even those which had not taken part in the war. The conflict also caused the publication of several volumes which dealt exclusively with the activities of regular regiments during the war. Similarly, complete histories of individual units were produced with sections on the Boer War, partly because publishers could be reasonably sure of a limited but guaranteed sale of the work as officers in the regiment could be expected to purchase it. Moreover, at this time there was also an increase in the production of regimental histories associated with Indian army units following the decision by the Government of Central India to publish *A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895* (1905) in the hope that this would fill ‘up gaps in the Military History of Northern India’.

In considering the role of officer education as a catalyst for the expansion in the publication of Military History after 1854, there was an obvious inter-relationship between the examination syllabuses used by the army and many of the published works. In essence, there was a financial incentive which existed for both authors and publishers: when Military

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History first began to be taught by the army there was a need for textbooks. Although this gap was filled very quickly by works such as P.L. MacDougall’s *The Theory of War* and Edward Hamley’s *Operations of War*, which illustrated the Jominian principles which lay at the heart of military education for much of the nineteenth century, the stranglehold maintained by Hamley’s book acted as a hindrance to the diversification of Military History.

However, the reformation of the way in which Military History was taught by the army after the Second Boer War created a much larger readership, particularly as outside Sandhurst there were no textbooks as officers were expected to read around the subject.\(^{250}\) This created an even greater financial incentive for publishers and authors to produce Military History. As a result, more material appeared which reflected the syllabuses of Sandhurst and Woolwich, as well as the promotional and competitive exams.\(^{251}\) Although the campaign narratives which were published appeared to provide mostly factual information, officers were now required to answer analytical questions.\(^{252}\) Equally, the textbooks which dealt with modern strategy presented the criteria through which students were expected to analyse the campaigns selected for examination; these works, however, were tailored to the syllabus intended for officers below the rank of Major.\(^{253}\) Thus, by 1913, Sandhurst and Woolwich did not reflect the most recent advances in military thought on the relationship between politics and strategy, as they perpetuated Henderson’s view that, while the political context of a campaign should influence operations, the military objective was always the

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\(^{250}\) Askers-Douglas Report, Evidence, pp. 20, 28, 30.


\(^{252}\) See here: Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Woolwich, Military History Exam Paper, Autumn 1908, Fourth Class, First Paper p. 1; and, Anon., *Report on the result of the Examination in May 1907 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion*, p. 103.

\(^{253}\) Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, p. 483.
enemy army. Such an understanding of strategy was increasingly at odds with the Military History syllabus at the Staff College in the years before the outbreak of war.

Financial considerations, and the opportunity to support the army examination system, were not, of course, the only factors which influenced the emergence of Military History directed towards officer education. Although the Military History written prior to the late-1880s and early 1890s displayed little attempt to foster professionalism in the officer corps, thereafter this became an increasingly important consideration. Following the success of the Prussian Army during the Seven Weeks and Franco-Prussian Wars, there was mounting pressure to use Military History to increase the professional abilities of British officers.

The absence of a professional readership for complex military literature, though, in part caused by the level of anti-intellectualism in the army at this time, meant that much of the material was simply intended to encourage officers to read Military History rather than make any great demands on their intellect.

The army’s attempt to stimulate greater professionalism in the officer corps after the Second Boer War by forcing officers to read around the subject was, up to a point, successful. This change assisted in the formation of a professional readership able to digest more complex work which dealt with Military History and military thought. In the years before the outbreak of the Great War, two translations of On War were published; a version edited by F.N. Maude sold 573 copies in the first year alone, which stood in sharp contrast to the handful of copies J.J. Graham’s translation had sold between 1873 and 1899. Similarly,

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255 Bird, Précis of Strategy, p. v; idem., Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War; and, idem, Lectures on the Strategy of the Franco-German War, p. i.
259 Basford, Clausewitz in English, p. 74.
there were translations of several other German and French works, including studies by Rudolf von Caemmerer, F. von Bernhardi and J. Colin. The change also created scope for British writers to address this new professional readership with their own more complex work on military thought and military history. Not only did S.L. Murray’s *Reality of War: An Introduction to ‘Clausewitz’* appear in 1909, but F.N. Maude was able to be ‘dependent on his pen’ for a living. Maude not only wrote works to assist those sitting exams, but also volumes in which he expressed his own ideas regarding military thought, most notably in *Evolution of Modern Strategy* and *War and the World’s Life*. What does seem to emerge from the increasing inter-action between the writing of Military History and Military Theory was the continuing role played by foreign authors. The gradual move away from the Jominian approach to Military History had been instigated in the 1870s through the dissatisfaction with the British approach to the study of tactics. This led to the increasing interest in Britain in contemporary German tactical writers, such as Ernst Wilhelm Hugo von Gisycki, who utilised the Clausewitzian approach to Military History. Thus, possibly through his connection with Maurice, when Henderson expounded upon the Clausewitzian approach he attributed it to German tactical writers, such as Gisycki and Verdy du Vernois. By the late 1890s, Henderson was also including other Clausewitzian ideas, such as the role of psychological factors in warfare. This influenced his teaching at the Staff College, particularly the ‘strategical principles’ through which students were taught to

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analyse campaigns. However, the use of Clausewitz’s writing was not an entirely new contribution to British military thought as his work had influenced the material produced for those attending the Staff College in the early 1870s, as well as Charles Chesney’s *Waterloo Lectures*.

Nonetheless, original ideas were introduced by Charles Callwell, even if *Small Wars* was published by the Crown’s Stationery Office which bore the cost of publication. Although Callwell’s next work, *Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo*, was arguably not as original as *Small Wars*, since it drew on A.T. Mahan’s writing, it was still intended to introduce new ideas into British military thought. These works sold reasonably well, further demonstrating the growth of a professional reading public in the period between the late 1890s and the outbreak of the Great War. While Callwell’s writing on amphibious operations was subsequently overshadowed by Julian Corbett’s, it is likely that this was because Callwell focused on offering practical insights to those conducting this type of operation and so his work not only had a more limited potential readership, but its reputation may have suffered due to the author’s connection to the disastrous Gallipoli landings in 1915. Still, the gradual emergence of a ‘British School’ in writing on military theory demonstrated that Military History had begun to diversify beyond merely serving the requirements of officer education. Military History had also started to break the chains of commercial viability as the sole criterion as to whether a book could be published or not.

266 Chesney, *Waterloo Lectures* p. 185.
267 Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. i.; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905.
Chapter 3

The Emergence of Official History,
1856-1914

The term ‘official history’ was not formally defined in Britain before 1914, and prior to the establishment of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907, there was no organisation dedicated to the writing of History authorised by the government.¹ The first British work to have the term ‘official history’ included in its title appeared in 1889 when the *Official History of the Sudan Campaign* was published, although this phrase had already appeared during the 1870’s in the English translation of the Prussian Official Histories of the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War.² In other words, once again, it appeared as if continental writers had produced the decisive impetus towards the development of another genre of Military History.

Nonetheless, History authorised by the government had often been produced by the War Office before 1889. In a report into the creation of official history submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence in January 1907, the work entitled *Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers*, compiled in 1857, was listed as the first official history written in Britain since it had been produced using

¹ TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 1.
public funds and had been authorised by the Secretary of State for War. The report went on to provide a list of the authorised historical works produced by the War Office, and stated that the *Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia*, which was produced in 1870, was ‘the first detailed official history’ that had been compiled. Following its emergence, British official history underwent a period of diversification prior to 1914, as not only did work appear on almost all of the major wars fought by the British Army during this time, but authorised accounts began to be written in India, as well as on conflicts in which British forces had not participated.

Despite the emergence of British official history, and the number of authorised accounts produced between 1856 and 1914, very little scholarly work has appeared on the development of this type of writing. Following Basil Liddell Hart’s claim that the British Official History of the First World War was ‘official but not History’, as he believed it was intended to protect the reputation of British commanders, the attention of historians has focused on this controversy. In fact, the only work to examine how British Official History was written before 1914 – Jay Luvaas’ chapter in Higham’s *Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from Around the World* – only briefly discussed material produced before the Great War, and focused on the accuracy of the Official History of the First World War.

Beyond this, some scholarly work has appeared which considers individual authorised Histories written before 1914, but these have not attempted to examine the development of

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4 TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 3.


this genre of military historical literature and, at the same time, lack any serious engagement with the available primary material. The articles written by Brian Robson and Ian F.W. Beckett on the Official Histories of the Second Afghan War and the Second Boer War respectively have both overlooked important archival sources. Similarly, Jonathan B.A. Bailey and Gary P. Cox, in their work on the British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, failed to refer to the authorised account of this conflict produced by the army, which sold more copies than the History written by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to examine the causes of the emergence and diversification of British official history between 1854 and 1914. As official history began to be pursued more seriously, a number of factors conditioned its development. At one level, official histories were seen as possessing an educational value for officers, providing information as an aid to study. At another level, these histories provided an opportunity to defend the reputations of commanders, wherever they had taken a battering at the hands of the press. At the same time, the inherent challenge of official histories emerged quite clearly: the problem of providing a critical account while defending the reputation of both the army and government. Finally, the issue of the extent to which Prussian official histories influenced the British histories needs to be borne in mind.

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8 Robson, ‘The Strange Case of the Missing Official History’, pp. 3-6; and, Beckett, ‘Early Historians and the South African War’, pp. 15-31. This article was subsequently used as the basis for these further studies: Beckett, ‘British Official History and the South African War’, pp. 33-9, and, idem, The Victorians at War, pp. 83-92. Beckett did not analyse the surviving drafts of the History of the Second Boer War written by G.F.R. Henderson. This work was subsequently suppressed and the government a concerted effort was made to destroy the proofs, although drafts of several chapters survived and are held in the Cullen Library, Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Robson overlooked crucial material related to the suppression of this Official History.

9 Bailey, ‘Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: The Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study’, pp. 170-195, and, Cox, ‘Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War’, pp. 389-401. TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 28 January 1914, p. 4. By January 1914 the army’s Official History had sold approximately 10,000 copies, with an additional 3,650 issued for ‘official use’. The first two volumes of the Combined Official History, published in 1910 and 1912 respectively, had only sold 1,095 copies by January 1914, with an extra 589 issued for ‘official use’. 
In order to provide a full account of the development of official history, the following four themes will be considered: first, Official Histories written for a specifically military audience and with little concern for generating a profit; second, the Official Histories produced in the period 1880-96 intended for a military audience, but which were written to protect the army and its commanders from criticism; third, the development between 1882 and 1903 which saw authorised accounts written specifically for a civilian readership; and, fourth, the British Official Histories produced between 1903 and 1914 which included for the first time didactic information on operational and tactical methods thought to be of use to regimental officers. If the story of the emergence of official history as a specific form of Military History contains some themes which proved even more controversial in the twentieth century, a close examination of the struggle to write worthwhile official histories is closely related to some of the questions dealt with in other chapters.

I. Official History for a Specialist Professional Readership, 1856-1914

In July 1856 the commission appointed by the Secretary of State of War, Lord Panmure, to investigate army education released an early draft of its report which concluded that one of the major barriers to the study of Military History for officer education in Britain was the lack of works in English. 10 Besides the hope that the inclusion of Military History on the Woolwich curriculum would lead private individuals to produce educational volumes on the subject, the commissioners suggested that ‘the Government might advantageously [order the production] at once [of] some works of this kind’ with ‘great care being taken to place preparation of them in the ablest hands’. 11 Consequently, on 30 September 1856 Panmure

10 Anon., Foreign Military Education: Report of the Commissioners to Consider the Best Mode of Re-Organising the System for Training Officers for the Scientific Corps, 1856 (406). This report also appeared in the subsequent findings of the commission: Yolland Commission, p. 43.
directed that ‘while the incidents of the Siege of Sebastopol are still recent… an official record should be compiled’.\textsuperscript{12}

The official history, entitled \textit{Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers, Published by Order of the Secretary of State for War} was intended purely for professional study by officers from the Royal Engineers. As the preface to the first volume stated; ‘the strictly professional character of this work has constantly been kept in view, and nothing has been inserted that was not required to elucidate the engineering operations’. As a result, the work did not provide a complete narrative of British operations in the Crimea and ‘several of the more important events of the campaign [were] but casually alluded to, whereas others, solely of professional interest, but of little importance to a general reader… [were] dwelt upon at considerable length’. Thus, besides the largest section of the history, which was a ‘Trench Journal’ that listed on a day by day basis the duties the unit had performed, the work contained reports from senior Royal Engineers which were often highly critical of the army and the conduct of the campaign. A reoccurring criticism was the way in which the British and French forces had besieged Sebastopol, since ‘the north side [of the city was left] entirely open throughout the whole period that the operations were in progress, thereby enabling the garrison to receive reliefs of men and supplies of every kind’. Likewise, the account emphasised the inability of the Royal Artillery to bombard the city. It stated that ‘a great mistake was made by designating the several periods of attack as bombardments… it was only toward the end of July that anything of that kind could be considered as having been ordered’ due to the lack of howitzers available to the army.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} H.C. Elphinstone, \textit{Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers} (London, 1856), p. iii.
\textsuperscript{13} Elphinstone, \textit{Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5}, pp. v, 9-10, 159-260.
The task of compiling this work was given to the newly-created Topographical and Statistical Department, which had been set up as part of the War Office in 1855. As the name suggests, the role of this department was to produce any maps that the army might require, and so it was staffed accordingly with two officers, one military clerk and twenty-six civilian lithographers. Even though the department was not set up to write historical accounts, no official historian was specially appointed, and so the compilation of the first part of the work, which consisted of a journal recounting the Engineer’s activities in the Crimea up until February 1855, fell to the head of the section, Captain H.C. Elphinstone. The second volume, which covered the period between February and September 1855, was written by Major-General Sir Harry D. Jones, who had commanded the Royal Engineer department in the Crimea during this time, and so the ‘duty of arranging the journal from that period necessarily devolved upon him’. 

Once work had begun on the Journal of the Operations, an official account of the activities of the Royal Artillery during the siege was also produced. This work, entitled An Account of the Artillery Operations Conducted by the Royal Artillery and Royal Naval Brigade Before Sebastopol, was compiled by W.E.M. Reilly, the commander of the ‘siege train’ employed against Sebastopol, and written under the direction of Major-General Sir Richard Dacres, who had commanded the Royal Artillery in the Crimea for most of the siege. This official history was also intended to provide specialist didactic information on siege warfare, albeit this time for artillery officers, rather than provide a detailed narrative of

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all British operations during the siege; it included detailed lists of artillery ammunition expenditure throughout the siege, yet provided little information about the Infantry assaults on Sebastopol. The work was heavily reliant on the account of the Royal Engineers’ activities during the war. There were no maps included in Artillery Operations, but the reader was told that ‘the Royal Engineer Journal is copiously illustrated with elaborate Maps and Plans, to which reference may be made for the elucidation of this volume’. Important information, such as the intended objective of attacks launched against Sebastopol, was not included in the work and, once again, the reader was told that this information ‘must be sought for in the Royal Engineer Journal of the Siege’. Despite this reliance on the official account, Artillery Operations differed from it in terms of the main lessons regarding siege warfare to emerge from the war. It considered that the siege had demonstrated that earthworks, however strongly they had been constructed, could not ‘withstand heavy and continuous artillery fire’. On the other hand, the Journal of the Siege of Sebastopol stated that earthworks had been shown to be quite effective during the siege.

The only other official history produced about a single unit prior to 1914 was the draft History of the operations of the Royal Engineers during the Second Boer War. This work was never completed and only exists in rough galley proof form with pencil corrections. This official history closely resembled the previous account written about the Royal Engineers as it too focused on technical didactic information intended for officers of this regiment. For example, the first chapter of the work described in detail the defences of Ladysmith, which

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19 Ibid., pp. 208, 96.
20 Ibid., p. iv.
21 For example: Ibid., pp. iv, 74. There is no clear objective given for the second bombardment which started on Easter Monday 9 April 1855.
22 Ibid., p. 201.
24 Although these did not deal with individual units, there were also a medical history of this war and a history of the railway system run by the Royal Engineers. R.J.S. Simpson, Medical History of the War in South Africa: An Epidemiological Essay (London, 1911); and, E.P.C. Girouard, Detailed History of the Railways during the South African War (Chatham, 1904).
was besieged during the conflict, and paid particular attention to the searchlights constructed by the Engineers and the water supply of the town. By comparison, the battle of Colenso, a major operation to relieve the besieged garrison, only received a cursory description as no Royal Engineer personnel had been involved.\footnote{TNA, WO108/283-298, ‘Royal Engineers in the Second Boer War’, Chs. 1-18, n.d [1903?], pp. 9-13, 12.}

Following the completion of 
\textit{Artillery Operations} in 1859, the next official history to be produced concerned the Abyssinian expedition of 1867-8. The work, published in 1870 under the title \textit{Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia}, was compiled in the Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office by Major T.J. Holland and Captain Henry Hozier as both officers had first-hand experience of the staff arrangements of the expedition. Holland, as Assistant Quarter-General of the Bombay Army, had overseen the embarkation of the Indian Army units used in the campaign, while Hozier had been on the expedition’s staff. The work was intended as a compilation of the intelligence information gathered on the area and its people as well as a collection of reports which provided instructive information regarding the administration of an expedition in this region. Thus, the climatic readings taken by the expedition were included along with a history of the British relations with the area, including a description of the language, customs, and religion of the natives. The Official History also contained detailed information about the supplies used by the expedition and the administrative techniques employed by the force. For example, it listed how much food was taken by each soldier in so much detail that even the daily turmeric ration issued to each man was recorded. The arrangement of a water supply was a particular concern of the work, and the methods employed to secure the daily ration of this resource was also considered in great detail. By contrast, the actual fighting which took place only received a cursory mention, and no didactic information was provided regarding it. The decisive action of the campaign, the
Battle of Arogie, was covered in only six pages, whereas the arrangements to acquire mules for the expedition took up thirty pages and two chapters.26

The success of the Prussian Army and staff system in the Seven Weeks War of 1866 and the Franco-German War of 1870-1 spurred the re-organisation of the Topographical and Statistical department. In 1870, a memorandum which highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the organisation was sent by Captain Charles Wilson, the Executive Officer of the Topographical department, to Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War. Cardwell authorised the Northbrooke Committee to examine the department in an attempt to improve it. The committee reported on 30 April 1870, and its findings had important implications for the production and distribution of official history. The committee suggested that the Statistical Section should be divided into three sub-sections each with its own geographical area of responsibility. These sections were charged, among other tasks, with the translation of ‘such foreign works as may be deemed advisable... [and to produce] a series of pamphlets descriptive of foreign armies similar to those prepared by the Prussian Topographical Department, and [these should be sold] to officers of the Army for a small fixed sum’.27

As a result of this new role, work began on the translation of the Official Histories produced by the Department of Military History of the Prussian Staff. The first work translated was Campaign of 1866 in Germany, and was carried out by Captain Henry Hozier and Colonel von Wright, Chief of the Staff of the Prussian VIII Corps, who completed the task in 1872.28 The work consisted of a single volume which was a direct copy of the Prussian original, with no additional commentary added. The work, together with a portfolio of maps and plans, was printed by several private publishers under the supervision of the

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27 Parritt, Intelligencers, pp. 96-97.
Government Stationery Office. The next translation undertaken by the department was the Prussian official account of the war against France, entitled, *Franco-German War 1870-1871*.  

This work was supervised by Captain F.C.H. Clarke, who completed the translation, and the British military attaché in Berlin, Major-General Charles P.B. Walker, who checked the translated proof sheets. The translation, due to the sheer scale of the original, was serialised into twenty sections which could be purchased individually or as a set of five large volumes consisting of the sections bound together. This translation was a major undertaking and it took between 1873 and 1884 to produce the 2,711 pages of the finished work. The time it took to complete was prolonged as Clarke was also expected to continue his other duties within the department; as chief of ‘D’ section, which was responsible for gathering information on Russia, he had much of his time taken up by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, including by several intelligence-gathering trips to Russia.

This Official History provided detailed information regarding both the operational and tactical dispositions of the Prussian Army and did not focus on one unit, or pay close attention to logistical matters as the British official history did. Instead, it provided a detailed campaign narrative which followed the major fighting formations, providing information regarding the location and actions of individual units in battle. This focus on the fighting formations and the success of the German Army in the war caused the work to be the first official account to be used in the study of Military History by the British Army, as in 1870 the Staff College first included this war in its syllabus on the subject. This conflict was

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29 Clarke, *Franco-German War of 1870-1*.
30 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. i.
regularly studied at the Staff College and the Prussian Official History became part of the required reading.\footnote{NAM, David Stephen Robertson Papers, 9405-10-11-6, Staff College Reading List, 1910.}

On 1 April 1873, Cardwell further reorganised the War Office with the establishment of an Intelligence Branch within the Topographical Department.\footnote{Fergusson, \textit{British Military Intelligence 1870-1914}, p. 15.} This change meant that the collection and dissemination of information on campaigns fought by both British and foreign powers became an even more important part of the department’s remit.\footnote{Charles Callwell, \textit{Stray Recollections} (London, 1923), p. 312.} Hence, between 1884 and 1897 it produced a series of short critical accounts of several of these campaigns to ‘place before the reader in a handy shape the experience gained by former generations’.
\footnote{Anon., \textit{British Minor Expeditions, 1746 to 1814} (London, 1884), p. i.} For instance, the first one to be produced, a 91-page pamphlet entitled \textit{British Minor Expeditions: 1746 to 1814}, was often damning in its criticism of the conduct of operations.\footnote{Ibid., pp. i, 10.} While most of these accounts, such as the handwritten ‘British Operations in China, 1840, 1841 and 1842’, written by John Sutton Rothwell between 1884 and 1891, and W.S. Cooke’s \textit{French Operations in Madagascar 1882-1886}, printed in 1886, gave only short narratives of the operations, R.N.R. Reade’s \textit{Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6} provided details regarding the expedition’s logistics.\footnote{TNA, WO273/1, ‘British Operations in China, 1840, 1841, 1842’ by John Sutton Rothwell, 1884-1891; Cooke, \textit{French Operations in Madagascar}; and, R.N.R. Reade, \textit{Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6} (London, 1897), pp. 22, 35.}

In 1866 the Government of India ordered that a ‘record should be composed of the expeditions made from time to time against the North-West Frontier Tribes’, which would contain ‘information as might render the work a valuable guide to those who might have future dealings with these turbulent neighbours’.\footnote{Anon., \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, Vol. 1 (Simla, 1907), p. i; W.H. Paget, \textit{Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes} (Simla, 1874); and, W.H. Paget, \textit{Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason} (Simla, 1884).} As a result, W.H. Paget wrote \textit{Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes} for the Indian Intelligence Department in
1874, which was later revised in 1884 by A.H. Mason.\footnote{Anon., \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, Vol. 1, p. i.} The authorities in India looked towards the system of writing official history then currently in use in England. So, not only was the work primarily intended to communicate intelligence regarding the region traversed by the expedition, as well as the way in which it had been conducted, but the historian was also paid an extra 10/- a day on top of his regimental pay, the same rate as his counterparts in Britain.\footnote{BL, IOR, L/MIL/7/7799, Indian Intelligence Department Papers (1890-93), Brackenbury to Earl of Kimberley, 12 October 1892.} However, the form taken by the work was radically different, as instead of adopting a chronological approach, each tribe was dealt with individually. Thus, following a description of the ‘people and their customs’ the expeditions against them were narrated.\footnote{Anon., \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, Vol. 1, pp. v-vi.} Even though it came in for criticism, as ‘the mass of minute detail of little military importance [swelled] the size of the book to such an extent as [to] frighten all but the most determined’ reader, the Indian Intelligence Branch continued to produce similar narratives for intelligence purposes.\footnote{H.L. Nevill, \textit{Campaign on the North-West Frontier} (London, 1912), pp. 12-13; BL, IOR, L/MIL/17/14/25, Harry Cooper, ‘Afghanistan: A Slight Sketch of the Two Afghan Campaigns of 1839-42’, 1878, L/MIL/17/14/26, A.R. Savile and F.H.W. Milner, ‘Anglo-Afghan War of 1878’, 1879, L/MIL/17/14/28, T.F. Wilson, ‘Afghan Campaign 1879-80’, 1881, L/MIL/17/16/20, R.J. Maxwell and W.A.H. Hare, ‘The Russo Turkish war 1877’, 1877, L/MIL/17/17/46, J.M. Grierson, ‘Précis of Arrangements Connected with the Despatch of the Indian Contingent to Egypt and of its Operations in that Country’, 1882, L/MIL/17/19/31, H.E. Stanton, L.W. Bode, N.N. Davis, J.H. Parson, ‘History of the Third Burmese War’, 1887-1894, L/MIL/17/19/33, G.H.H. Couchman ‘Manipur Expedition’, 1892.} As the frontier of British influence in the region advanced, most notably as a result of the Durand Agreement in 1893, there was a need to revise and extend the scope of Paget’s and Mason’s work to include ‘all the frontier tribes... [as well as] Afghanistan from the Kilk Pass in the north to the border of Persia in the west’.\footnote{Anon., \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, Vol. 1, p. iii.} As a result, the Indian Intelligence Branch produced a seven volume work, entitled ‘Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India’ between 1907 and 1912, access to which was closely controlled; it was not released to
the general public.\textsuperscript{45} The style adopted mirrored that used by Paget; thus one region was dealt with per volume and each chapter in these works was devoted to describing a group of native people and the expeditions which had been conducted against them.\textsuperscript{46} The customs of the natives were thought to be of particular importance, so the reader was told, for example, that ‘the Baloch [are] less turbulent, less treacherous, less bloodthirsty, and less fanatical than the Pathan’, as ‘he has become most honest under the civilising influences of our rule’. The work also provided advice for those planning future military expeditions in the regions described, although it was warned that such action often had no pacifying effect as it ‘often leaves behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss of life’.\textsuperscript{47} Subsequently, this work was supplemented by both accounts of recent operations, such as the Abor expedition of 1912, and ‘histories’ of older campaigns, including the Sikh Wars and Wellington’s campaigns in India.\textsuperscript{48}

Although the Intelligence Branches in Britain and India continued to write official history for the use of specialist groups in the military, from 1880 this no longer became the only intended function of this work. From this time, the desire to influence the reader’s perception of British conduct during a conflict began to play an increasingly important role in the production of some authorised accounts. While this trend may have helped to increase the readership of the histories, it raised on the other hand new challenges and problems. The issue at stake was whether the armed forces could be entrusted with writing the histories of

\textsuperscript{45} Anon., ‘A Review of Campaigns of the North-West Frontier of India by H.L. Neville’, Times Literary Supplement, 29 February 1912, pp. 82-82.
\textsuperscript{46} Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 1, p. i. The volumes were: Vol. 1, North-West Frontier Tribes north of the Kabul River; Vol. 2, North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gomal Rivers; Vol. 3, Baluchistan, and the North-Eastern Frontier Tribes; Vol. 4, North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes; Vol. 5, Burma; Vol. 6, Overseas Expeditions.
\textsuperscript{47} Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 1, pp. viii, xvii.
\textsuperscript{48} Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Supplement, Operations against the Mohmands (Calcutta, 1908); E. Hewlett, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Supplement A, Operations against the Zakka Afridis (Simla, 1908); R.G. Burton, Wellington’s Campaigns in India: Division of the Chief of the Staff, Intelligence Branch (Calcutta, 1908); Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Official Account of the Abor Expedition 1911-1912 (Simla, 1913); G.W.V. Philipe, Narrative of the First Burmese War, 1824-26 (Calcutta, 1905); and, R.G. Burton, First and Second Sikh Wars (Simla, 1911).
the wars and campaigns in which they had participated in, given the pressure which commanders might exert on the official historians.

II. Official History and the Reputation of the Army, 1880-89

The British Army between 1879 and 1885 suffered several major defeats. In 1879, a British column was destroyed by the Zulu Army at Isandlwana in Zululand, the next year two British and Indian Brigades were defeated at the battle of Maiwand in Afghanistan, in 1881 the Boers defeated a British force at the Battle of Majuba, effectively ending the First Boer War, and in 1885 General Charles Gordon was killed in Khartoum causing the failure of the expedition sent to rescue him. The way in which official accounts of these incidents were put together, although they were written primarily for a professional audience, demonstrate that from 1880 official history was also intended to protect the reputation of the army and senior British commanders. This marked an important development in the writing of authorised accounts.

In May 1878, Sir Archibald Alison took over the command of the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, under his supervision the Official History of the Zulu War entitled, *Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879*, was begun by Major John Sutton Rothwell in 1880 and was published in 1881. This work was the first British official account to devote the majority of the work to the deployment and operations of the fighting forces, rather than logistical considerations, and so it was the first British authorised account to adopt an approach that mirrored that used by Prussian official history. The work was predominantly compiled with the use of private letters sent by sixteen officers who held command positions during the war, and the minutes taken at courts of inquiry set up to

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investigate incidents of the conflict. The private letters that were used were initially sent to Alison for intelligence purposes, but were passed onto Rothwell to enable him to compile the History.\(^{50}\) This work was also the first British official account to include information provided by the enemy. Information given by several Zulus was included, but only one warrior, Methlagazulu, commander of one wing of a Zulu regiment at Isandlwana, was specially named as providing information.\(^{51}\) His account of the battle appeared in an extended footnote to supplement the scarce information that the British had about the battle. The Official History retained some highly detailed information concerning the organisation of the expedition for professional use, but this was considerably less than had been contained in previous British official accounts. For example, the appendix contained a section on transport arrangements which provided a description of the ox-wagons used in the campaign, and the daily ration assigned to the animals which pulled them.\(^{52}\) Likewise, as with previous accounts, there was very little discussion of the causes of the war and only sixteen pages, out of a total of 174, were devoted to this.\(^{53}\)

The battle of Isandlwana, fought on the 22 January 1879, in which a Zulu army consisting of around 13,700 men wiped out a British column, killing fifty-two officers and 806 other ranks, together with approximately 300 native troops who fought alongside them, was a serious disaster which significantly set back the campaign to invade Zululand.\(^{54}\) The court of enquiry which was convened after the battle established that the commander of the camp at Isandlwana, Lieutenant-Colonel H.B. Pulleine, had been given strict orders to defend his position.\(^{55}\) On the orders of Lord Chelmsford, the Commander of the British forces, a

\(^{50}\) Sonia Clarke, *Zululand at War 1879: The Conduct of the Anglo-Zulu War* (Brenthurst, 1984), p. 15.
\(^{51}\) Rothwell, *Narrative of the Field Operations*, p. 38.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 171-3.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., pp. 5-21.
\(^{55}\) TNA, WO32/9165, Court of Enquiry held on 24 January 1879, Major Clery’s Evidence, p. 27.
detachment of 468 men under Anthony Durnford arrived to reinforce Isandlwana, and as one of Durnford’s own staff officers recalled at the court of enquiry, ‘Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford… the orders he had received… “to defend the camp”: these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation’. Crucially, as Lieutenant-Colonel J.N. Crealock, a senior staff officer with the expedition, pointed out to the court, these orders ‘as a matter of course [were] binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command’ of the camp. However, the court ascertained that soon after Durnford arrived he heard reports that enemy forces were close by and were in retreat. Despite Pulleine’s protestations that this was against his orders, Durnford led this group of men, which constituted a third of the defenders of the camp, out to attack the enemy. The court was able to ascertain from interviewing the few survivors of the battle that Durnford marched his force over four miles out of the camp. Here he encountered the main body of the Zulu army and began to retreat rapidly to Isandlwana. The Zulus caught up with them close to the camp but beyond the effective range of Pulleine’s defenders. In an attempt to rectify this, Pulleine was forced to extend his semi-circular defensive line away from the camp toward Durnford’s force in an effort to support it. As a result, the court concluded, that British line had become over-extended and the Zulus were able both to out flank the British force and to break through the centre of the line. As Lord Chelmsford later privately wrote to the Secretary of State for War, ‘had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself [as he had ordered]… I

56 Ibid., Lieutenant Cochrane’s Evidence, p. 28.
57 Ibid., Statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock, p. 35.
58 TNA, WO32/9165, Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 28 January 1879, p. 13.
60 Knight, Zulu Rising, p. 446.
feel absolutely confident that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge them’.  

Rothwell is highly likely to have had access to the report of the Court of Enquiry as some of the wording used to describe the battle in the Official History closely mirrored it. However, although the Official History stated that Durnford had taken command of the camp when he arrived, it did not state that Durnford had inherited the orders to defend the position as had been established in the court of enquiry. In fact, the official account suggested that Durnford was not bound by the instructions to defend the camp, only that it prevented him from removing units under Pulleine’s command. Thus, the Official History did not include, as had been established at the court of inquiry, that it was the disobedience of a British commander who ignored an order that was, at least in part, to blame for the defeat at Isandlwana. Instead, the Official History played down Durnford’s role in the overextension of the British line and instead placed the emphasis on factors outside British control for the defeat. Thus, although the Official History made a reference to the British line being over 2,000 yards in length, it did not explain the reason why it had become so extended. The actions of Durnford’s detachment were not narrated in connection with the Zulu assault on the main camp, and so Pulleine’s decision to detach units in an attempt to support him was not explained or made clear. The Official History focused on the ‘enormous force’ of Zulus

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62 TNA, WO32/9165, Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 28 January 1879, p. 13.

63 For example, at the Court of Enquiry Colonel Clery explained that he told Pulleine to ‘draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced. I told him to have a wagon loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out’. In the Official History this became: ‘[Pulleine] received orders in writing to the effect that… the cavalry vedettes were to be kept far advanced, but the line of infantry outposts to be drawn in closer… A wagon loaded with ammunition was to be kept ready to follow the force marching out’. TNA, WO32/9165, Court of Enquiry, 24 January 1879, Clery’s Evidence, p. 27; and, Rothwell, Narrative of the Field Operations, p. 31. Also, small details which were referred to in the Court of Enquiry also appeared in the Official History, for example, Captain Essex recalled for the court that when the Zulus rushed the camp ‘few men of the 24\textsuperscript{th} Regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy were amongst them’. This was repeated in the Official History as ‘before… companies of the 24\textsuperscript{th}… had time to rally or fix bayonets, the Zulus were among them’. TNA, WO32/9165, Court of Enquiry, 24 January 1879, Captain Gardner’s Evidence, p. 30; and, Rothwell, Narrative of the Field Operations, p. 36.

64 Rothwell, Narrative of the Field Operations, p. 32.
which ‘pressed forward from all sides, regardless of the heaviest losses’ and outnumbered the British forces by ‘six to one’. Likewise, it was the gap in the British line created when the Natal Native Contingent turned and fled when the Zulus got within 200 yards of them which received much of the blame for the defeat.\(^\text{65}\)

Similarly, the official account did not include evidence which pointed to a serious breach in the security of the camp at Isandlwana which had allowed Zulu spies to freely examine the British dispositions before the battle. Lieutenant W.H. James had produced a report for the Intelligence Branch in March 1879 which attempted, with the limited information available, to ascertain the main events of the battle and to investigate the cause of the defeat.\(^\text{66}\) James discovered that before the battle, several Zulus, led by a man called Gamdana, were invited into the British position and had ‘a good opportunity… of seeing the nature and composition of the force, and whether the camp was defended or not’. As the report concluded, the Zulus ‘turned out to be spies and went back to the enemy’.\(^\text{67}\) It is highly likely that Rothwell had access to this report, as it was compiled in the same department as the Official History, and both works were overseen by Alison as commander of the Intelligence Branch. The official account barely referred to this major breach in camp security and only mentioned Lord Chelmsford having an ‘interview’ with Gamdana outside his tent.\(^\text{68}\)

Although the creation of official accounts had become standard practice in Britain since 1855, there does not appear to have been an official account written regarding the First Boer War. It is likely that both the highly controversial nature of the series of British military defeats at Laing’s Nek, Schuinshoogte, and Majuba, which led to the decision by the Liberal

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 36.
\(^{66}\) NAM, Lord Chelmsford Papers, 6807-386-8-61, Report: The Disaster as Isandlwana by W.H. James, 21 March 1879.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., p. 1.
\(^{68}\) Rothwell, *Narrative of the Field Operations*, p. 29.
government under W.E. Gladstone to sign a peace treaty with the Boers, made the publication of a history too controversial. 69 Consequently, there is no evidence that a history was compiled or even proposed by the Intelligence Branches in either Britain or India.

The desire to protect the army’s reputation also influenced the production of the Official History of the Second Afghan War. The problems associated with the compilation and belated publication of this official account stemmed from the Anglo-Indian defeat during the Battle of Maiwand. The work was initially compiled under the orders of Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who had served as Chief of Staff to the commander of the campaign, Frederick Roberts. MacGregor collected the documents needed to write this history; and, when on leave in England in 1881, he passed the material to Captain Pasfield Oliver who began to write the work. 70 By 1885 the duty of compiling the account had passed to the Intelligence Branch in India, where the work was treated as confidential and so was not published. 71 In fact, Lord Roberts thought that although ‘the portion of the war which came under Sir Charles’ personal observation is fully and, as a rule, accurately described, the account of the operations which took place elsewhere is neither complete nor invariably correct’. 72 As a result, it was ordered that the Official History ‘should not be issued without the sanction of the Government of India and that all but fifty copies of the same should be destroyed’. 73 Only one known copy of this version of the Official History survives, as the volume belonged to Lord Roberts. 74

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70 F.G. Cardew, Second Afghan War, 1878-1880 (London, 1908), p. i.
71 This Official History is considered by this study, as the work was subsequently published in England in 1908.
73 IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7799, E.F. Chapman to Secretary of the Government of India, 7 June 1888.
In 1888 Oliver requested that an edited version of the confidential history should be released to the public.\textsuperscript{75} Lord Roberts, who had become Commander-in-Chief of India in 1885, agreed with this proposal as ‘the work would prove a valuable record, and would enable officers to study intelligently the military operations of the war’.\textsuperscript{76} Work progressed slowly, and in 1891 Roberts put the project on hold so ‘the work [could] be entrusted to someone noted for his literary skill, who would be able to devote the whole of his time to it’.\textsuperscript{77} To this end, on 19 April 1893, Lieutenant F.G. Cardew began work on a version of the Official History which could be read by both officers and the civilian reading public. However, this was suppressed in 1896 because the British military authorities in India deemed its narration of the Battle of Maiwand to be too controversial and to reflect badly on both British commanders and the army.\textsuperscript{78}

During this battle, British and Indian forces, under General George Burrows, had broken and fled in the face of a determined attack by Afghan tribesmen.\textsuperscript{79} Initially, Cardew included a full account of the battle along with Burrows’ censure of his subordinate commanders in the draft of the History which he submitted for review to the Indian Foreign Department and to the Quarter-Master-General of the Indian Army, Major-General Alexander Robert Badcock. Although the Foreign Department approved the work, Badcock ‘invited attention to the account of the battle of Maiwand… which contains controversial matter’. The straightforward removal of Burrows’ criticism of the other officers, which Badcock ordered, did not satisfy Lord Roberts. He pointed out that as ‘time has somewhat dulled the edges of the antagonism that statement and counter-statement [about the battle has] caused… it is too early… to sharpen those edges by the publication of an official account’.

\textsuperscript{75} IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7799, Major Cross to Lord Lansdowne, August 1888.
\textsuperscript{76} IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7799, E.F. Chapman to Secretary of the Government of India, 7 June 1888.
\textsuperscript{78} IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7804, A.R. Badcock to Secretary of Government for India, 17 July 1896.
Moreover, Roberts pointed out that in 1896 there was ‘no public demand or necessity for publication’ of the official account. Thus he ordered that Cardew’s work should be ‘treated as confidential for the next ten years at least’. Consequently, Cardew’s Official History was suppressed until 1908 when his version, published by John Murray, went on sale in Britain, twenty-eight years after the battle of Maiwand had taken place.

While the Official History of the Second Afghan War continued to cause controversy, work began on an authorised account of the Sudan Campaign which was compiled in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. In January 1886, Major-General Henry Brackenbury took over as the new director of this department and oversaw the writing of both the Official History of the invasion of Egypt and the official account of the Sudan campaign. The branch was seriously underfunded, and had barely enough staff to undertake its ordinary intelligence duties, let alone prepare official history. When Colonel Charles Callwell was appointed to the Intelligence Department in 1887 he found that his section, which consisted of himself and one other officer, was responsible for gathering, compiling, and cross-referencing all intelligence material collected on Austria-Hungry, the Balkans, Egypt, and most parts of Africa. Likewise, between 1896 and 1899, the same being true of previous years, this department was given a budget of only £20,000, even though its topographical section alone estimated that it needed at least £17,000 a year to perform its duties adequately. As Brackenbury and his staff were unable to devote time to compile the official account of the British operations in Sudan, an official historian was appointed to write the

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80 IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7804, A.R. Badcock to Secretary of Government for India, 17 July 1896.
82 Fergusson, *British Military Intelligence 1870-1914*, p. 80.
history of the campaign.\textsuperscript{85} This job was given to Colonel H.E. Colville, the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General in charge of intelligence-gathering during the expedition. He was not considered part of the Intelligence Branch, but merely ‘occupied one of the rooms in the place as a matter of convenience’ while he worked on the history.\textsuperscript{86} Colville had finished the preliminary proofs of the work by March 1887 when he was taken ill and the project was given over to Callwell.\textsuperscript{87} So, as a member of the Intelligence Branch had to devote much of his time to producing the Official History, ‘Brackenbury was a little inclined to grumble at… his staff being taken up by such a job, when heavy arrears of compiling work remained to be disposed in his department’.\textsuperscript{88} The publication of the account became seriously delayed as the controversial nature of the expedition caused many objections to be raised when it was circulated to political and military figures who had been involved in the campaign. Due to these delays the Official History was only ready for publication in July of 1889 and was not published until the November of that year.\textsuperscript{89}

The initial stages of the Sudan Campaign were politically sensitive for the government. Without direct orders, the British General Charles Gordon had remained in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, as an Islamic uprising swept the country. Gordon, a devout Christian and opponent of the slave trade in the region, felt that if he defended the city the British government would be forced to rescue him, and in so doing defeat the uprising. However, the British cabinet could not reach a decision and remained inactive as the siege of the capital progressed.\textsuperscript{90} The Official History encountered opposition from political figures for its narrative of these events as soon as the first draft had been circulated for comment.

\textsuperscript{85} Maurice was the first Official Historian to be specially appointed. See the next section of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{88} Callwell, \textit{Stray Recollections}, p. 319.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. i.
Evelyn Baring, the British pro-consul in Egypt during the campaign, and Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, both ‘concurred’ that ‘steps should be taken… to cancel all the political portions of the work and to prevent them from remaining on official record at the War Office’, as a ‘consequence… some forty pages or so of the book were cut out bodily’.  

Callwell felt that ‘whether Colville’s version was misleading or not, it did seem to me that plunging into these preliminary political events before starting an account of the actual military operations, was to ask for trouble, the more so when, as everybody knew, those preliminary political events had excited much controversy’.  

The Official History attempted to refute the direct criticism of the army that had appeared in the press and had been made by officials opposed to the handling of the expedition. There had been much discussion in the press about the correct route the expedition sent to relieve the siege should take.  

Firstly, a shorter route that went from the port of Suakin, on the Red Sea, directly across the desert to the Nile, reaching it at Berber, was considered. However, the commander of the expedition, Sir Garnet Wolseley, decided to use a longer ‘river route’ that followed the Nile from Egypt to Khartoum. The choice of this route entailed the construction of specially designed boats, which the Official History referred to as ‘whalers’, which further delayed the departure of the force.  

Once the expedition reached the town of Korti on the Nile a small contingent on camels proceeded over the desert to Metemmeh cutting out a large meander of the Nile.  

When this small contingent, commanded by Colonel Charles Wilson, eventually reached Khartoum after many

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92 Callwell, Stray Recollections, p. 319.
93 For example see: Anon., ‘Which is the best way to Khartoum?’, Pall Mall Gazette, 10 February 1885, p. 6; Anon., ‘Muddle in Egypt’, Morning Post, 2 September 1884, p. 2; Anon., ‘Nile Route Farce’, Lincolnshire Chronicle, 19 September 1884, p. 5; Anon., ‘Lord Wolseley on the Suakin-Berber route’, Nottingham Evening Post, 6 May 1885; Anon., ‘Nile Route to Khartoum’, The London Standard, 30 August 1884, p. 2; and; Anon., ‘Navigating the Nile’, London Standard, 1 December 1884, p. 5.
setbacks, it found that the city had fallen only ‘a couple of days’ before it had arrived. Consequently, the army, but principally Wolseley and Wilson, received a great deal of criticism in the press for what was considered to be the unnecessary delays in the advance.

Consequently, while the army had a vested interest in explaining why the longer route had been selected, as the government had put off the decision to send the expedition, any discussion which alluded to this could be potentially embarrassing to politicians. Not surprisingly, when Baring was given a draft of the history he felt that it was not ‘prudent’ to go into detail concerning the selection of the route and argued the account should only state that ‘[Wolseley], after taking... military advice decided to send the expedition by the Nile’. Despite this, the published version of the Official History included extended quotations from the memorandum that Wolseley had sent to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington, who had opposed the ‘Nile route’. Therefore, the Official History, despite opposition from politicians, contained Wolseley’s detailed justification as to why he had selected the longer route and so allowed him to respond directly to his critics.

The delay entailed by the decision to have boats specially made for the campaign was a contentious issue which the army felt the need to justify. While the campaign was being planned, Commander Hammill, an officer from the Royal Navy, submitted a report which was highly critical of the design of the whalers. Although the Official History acknowledged Hammill’s criticism, it devoted much space to refuting it through the inclusion of two reports by officers experienced in the use of such craft during the Red River Expedition of 1870;

99 TNA, WO32/6354, Evelyn Baring to Henry Brackenbury, 8 February 1888.
these reports concluded that the use of these boats in the advance down the Nile was ‘a matter of detail well within the power’ of the force. Moreover, the Official History emphasised the contribution of the whalers to the campaign and, for example, explained that once the expedition had reached Wadi Halfa ‘the river... became impractical for native craft, and but for the whalers the transport arrangements must have broken down’.  

The history also defended Wilson against the charge which had appeared in the press that it was his ‘indecision and total inexperience of warfare’ that caused the delays which had occurred as the expedition neared Khartoum. When the Official History came to discuss the fall of the city, it quoted extensively from Wilson’s own book and explained in his own words that there was ‘nothing to show [him that]... a delay of a couple of days would make much difference’ to the state of the siege. Moreover, not only did the appendix of the official account contain Wilson’s report to Wolseley which explained his delay, but it also contained a report written by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Kitchener on the fall of the city which concluded that the news of the advancing British ‘led the Mahdi to decide to make at once a desperate attack on Khartoum, before reinforcements could arrive in the town’, so exonerating Wilson.

Therefore, although Official History intended purely for the education of a specialist military audience continued to be written between 1880 and 1889, following a series of British defeats a greater emphasis came to be placed on the protection of Britain’s commanders’ reputations in the writing of some official histories. While these works retained detailed information for a military audience, some authorised histories dispensed with this altogether and were, in fact, aimed principally at the civilian reading public. In other words,

101 Ibid., p. 30, 102-3.
104 Ibid., p. 272.
by the 1880s, official histories had already started to perform more than one historical function.

III. Official History for the Reading Public, 1882-1903

The first authorised account that was written principally for the reading public concerned the British invasion of Egypt and was entitled *Military History of The Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*. 105 The author, John Frederick Maurice, who had served during this campaign on the staff of the commander of the expedition, Wolseley, was the first individual official historian to be specially appointed for such a task. 106 Although Maurice had first been given the task of writing the Official History in 1882, it took him five years to complete the work. 107 The main reason for this delay was due to his selection to take part in the Sudan Campaign in 1884, as this meant he could not work on the account until he returned to the Intelligence Department in early 1886. 108 Moreover, Maurice did not give the work priority over his own private literary projects, nor did he remain in the Intelligence Branch while he wrote the account. He began teaching Military History at the Staff College in 1885, took over the writing of an article on ‘War’ from Hamley in 1886, intended for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, was engaged in writing a study entitled *Hostilities without the Declaration of War*, and was also working on a biography of his father. 109 Brackenbury, the commander of the Intelligence Branch, became exasperated by the delay in the compilation of the account as it was being

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106 The previous official histories had either been compiled by an existing member of the Topographical and Statistical section and its successors, or as in the case of Major T.J. Holland and the Official History of the Abyssinian Expedition, had been co-authors of the work. IOR, fol. L. MIL.7.7.7799, Lord Lansdowne to Earl Kimberley, 12 October 1892.
compiled in his department. He wrote to Wolseley in July 1886 to point out that he had been waiting for more than six months but had ‘not yet seen a proof’ of the work. Following Wolseley’s intervention, Maurice sped up and it was finally published in 1887.

When Maurice began compiling the history he received no official instructions; thus, instead of providing details for an officer studying the campaign, he produced an account aimed specifically at the reading public with the intention of directly refuting the criticism of the army and Wolseley which had appeared in the press. Maurice believed that as Britain was a constitutional monarchy, and so had an electorate which could influence national policy, the duty of a British official historian was different to that of his counterpart in a monarchy such as Prussia. As he later put it, ‘the King is on the field of battle in Prussia so there is no danger of the politics getting damaged by journalists misunderstanding and thus having an impact on public opinion’. As Wolseley’s plan of campaign in Egypt had involved several feint attacks and the spread of disinformation to confuse the enemy, the press, as well as the Egyptians, were duped and the former ‘proclaimed to the four corners of the earth’ that his moves were real attacks that had ended in ‘hopeless failure’.

Maurice made it a central concern of his work to point out to a civilian readership that ‘ruses de guerre’ were an important part of the art of war, so should not lead ‘immediately to reports sent to every capital of Europe’ regarding ‘futile enterprises undertaken’. Similarly, he thought that the press had misrepresented the interval between Wolseley’s landing at

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110 LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.2.10, Lord Wolseley to Maurice, July 1886.
111 Maurice, *Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*, p. i.
114 Maurice, *Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*, p. 16-17, 38.
Ismailia and the start of his advance against the Egyptian Army as it had been characterised as a ‘delay’ attributable to ‘sloth which attended the military movements’. By way of response, Maurice noted that when the army was engaged unloading stores, ‘nothing could be recorded of a kind likely to tickle the ears of the readers at home’ and so the press began to criticise the army in order that it could report on something during the interruption in the action.  

As Maurice had aimed this history at the popular market, the idea of commemorating British actions during this campaign became an important part of the official account. The *Campaign of 1882* devoted eighty-two of its pages to appendices that provided a comprehensive list of all of the officers who had taken part in the expedition. The increasing role of commemoration, especially the focus placed on those thought to have distinguished themselves, caused a problem for Maurice as Hamley, commander of the Second Division during the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, felt that both he and his men had not received the credit they were owed for their role in the campaign. Hamley was outraged to hear that Wolseley had not mentioned his division in the official despatch on the battle that he had sent back to England and which had been published in the *London Gazette*. As Hamley wrote to his close friend, the publisher William Blackwood, ‘it is actually a fact that owing to my not being mentioned in the despatch as commanding the division hardly anybody seems to know I was in the battle at all, even my relations fancied I must have been elsewhere’.  

Hamley felt that he and his division had played the decisive role in the battle, and that Wolseley was deliberately hiding his contribution as it had overshadowed his own. Moreover, as the army forced men to retire if they had not received promotion before they reached a

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116 Maurice, *Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*, p. 27.
117 Ibid., pp. 123-194.
118 Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, p. 2.
certain age, Hamley had a vested interest in his conduct during the campaign appearing in the best possible light as this could lead to promotion and prevent his compulsory retirement.\textsuperscript{120} He was disappointed by the way the campaign had been covered by the newspapers, as ‘the press correspondents in Egypt were the worst I have ever heard of’; he felt this had also contributed to his division being overlooked.\textsuperscript{121} Hamley sought to set the record straight with an article which described the battle from his point of view in the \textit{Nineteenth Century} in December 1882. Here, in his attempt to present himself as a great leader, he wrote that his division had attacked the strongest part of the enemy position and had broken the Egyptian defences, causing the enemy to retreat, before the rest of the British force, under Wolseley, had arrived.\textsuperscript{122}

When Maurice circulated the first draft of the Official History in late 1885, he found that for the most part it was considered to be accurate by those who had fought in Egypt. Archibald Alison, who had served in Hamley’s brigade during the battle of El-Tel-Kabir, was especially pleased with the accuracy of the account of that battle; although he suggested altering ‘trifling matters of detail’, he considered it to be ‘clear and concise’.\textsuperscript{123} Hamley, on the other hand, was deeply unhappy with the account as he again felt that his role in the battle had been downplayed. On the same morning in which he read Maurice’s draft, he called on him in person demanding to know ‘whether you are responsible for this thing’.\textsuperscript{124}

Maurice agreed to consider the changes to the account that Hamley had put forward; he had after all circulated this draft so that he could get feedback on it. However, instead of proposing alterations to the account, Hamley ordered the historian to write what he told him

\textsuperscript{121} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4432, ff. 105, Hamley to Blackwood, 7 October 1882.  
\textsuperscript{123} LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.3.10, Archibald Alison to Maurice, January 1886.  
\textsuperscript{124} Maurice, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, p. 418.
and Maurice recalled the meeting as ‘rather that of a slave driver to a slave than even of a General Officer using his military authority to dictate to a junior’, as Hamley ‘held out the most magniloquent threats of his influence and of what he would do if justice were not done him’. Hamley also insisted that he should review each draft of the History as Maurice produced it to ensure that no changes were made to the version of events that he had dictated. This high-handed approach taken by Hamley is apparent in the letters that he sent to Maurice while the Official History was being written. On one occasion, for example, he informed Maurice that he should ‘call at [his] chambers at 10.30 on Thursday and bring the proof and notes [so] that we might finish and revise them there… by that time you will have read what I have to say’.126

The changes that Hamley insisted were made to the Official History were designed to make the official account closely mirror his article in the Nineteenth Century, so to add apparent authority to his interpretation of the battle. He directly manipulated the Official History to reflect his claim that the attack of his division caused the Egyptians to retreat before the other parts of the British force arrived. He told Maurice to write that he had observed ‘numbers of Egyptians, who were… flying from the works southwards toward the canal’ as his division made their attack.127 In his article he had written that, ‘the immediate result of the advance was to split the centre of the Egyptian line… which now crumbled… into… crowds of fugitives, making for the canal’.128 Likewise, Hamley insisted that Maurice include a passage in which he personally stopped several of his men from falling back without orders by calling out ‘rightabout turn’ to them, thus preventing the spread of panic.129 This, too, was intended to tally with his article as here he had claimed he had prevented some

125 Ibid.
126 LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.3.11, Hamley to Maurice, 18 January 1886.
127 Maurice, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, p. 416; and, Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 87.
128 Hamley, ‘Second Division at Tel-el-Kebir’, p. 868; and, Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 91.
129 Maurice, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, p. 419; and, Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 87.
troops from retreating and had ‘sent [them] all on together’ to continue the attack.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, as Hamley’s force had suffered the heaviest British casualties during the battle he claimed in his article that ‘anyone… by referring to the list of casualties, and comparing these with the losses of other bodies of troops, [can] ascertain by that simple test on whom bore the brunt of the fighting’.\textsuperscript{131} As the early drafts of the Official History did not include casualty figures, Hamley rebuked Maurice for this, insisting that ‘I never heard of a narrative of a battle without a statement of the losses’; he insisted that they should be listed by regiment, enabling the reader to see that his force had endured the greatest loss.\textsuperscript{132}

Maurice soon discovered that although Hamley’s division had suffered the heaviest casualties in the battle, he could not corroborate his claim that Egyptian forces fled as he pressed his attack, or that he ordered retreating soldiers back into the fight. When Maurice asked Alison about these claims he pointed out that the main part of the battle had been fought in darkness, so there was no way Hamley could have seen the Egyptians falling back to the canal. When asked if Hamley had issued the command to the retreating soldiers, Alison replied ‘that they could have received from him a word of command and acted on it is absolutely impossible’ as although he ‘was not far from Sir Edward at the time… there was so much noise that I could not make the soldier out in front of me hear one word’. This meant that the ‘statement Sir Edward shouted across the ditch a word of command to barely-visible men, and that they obeyed him, is a product of imagination only’. Maurice also discovered that while Hamley had been dictating the content of the official work, he had been boasting that ‘the Official History would do him justice’ regarding his part in the battle.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Hamley, ‘Second Division at Tel-el-Kebir’, p. 867.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 870.
\textsuperscript{132} LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.3.18, Hamley to Maurice, November 1886; and; Maurice, The Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{133} Maurice, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, pp. 419, 420.
As Maurice could find no corroborating evidence to substantiate the claims Hamley had ordered him to include in the Official History, he resolved to include a footnote which made it plain to the reader that the information came from Hamley alone. Maurice later wrote that, ‘I could not, with honour, have done otherwise than insert that note… unless I was to allow Sir Edward to dictate to me the form which the History was to assume, [which would] then [let him] appeal to it as an independent and official judgement on the case’.  

Maurice’s footnote stated that, ‘I am here and in other parts of the narrative indebted to the personal evidence of Sir E. Hamley. It is more necessary to make this remark because… it is often difficult to get corroborative evidence of parts of the story’. Although Maurice did not change the information that Hamley had ordered him to include, Hamley still never forgave him for including the footnote as it seriously undermined the authority of the passages he had instructed Maurice to write. In fact, Hamley was so angry over the addition of the footnote that when he next met Maurice after the publication of the work, ‘he put his hand behind his back and refused to shake hands’ with him.

The way in which the initial Official History of the Second Boer War was compiled marked a significant change in how authorised accounts were produced. This work was not compiled in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, or under its supervision. Instead, when G.F.R. Henderson was appointed as the official historian in the autumn of 1900 by Lord Roberts, he found that he had not been assigned office space to write the work and as obtaining suitable rooms proved harder than anticipated, he was unable to start work until January 1901. Henderson immediately began compiling large quantities of information as the war in South Africa continued; by early 1903 he and his staff had collected over 850 envelopes containing staff diaries and official correspondence produced during the war. In

134 Ibid., pp. 420.
135 Maurice, *Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*, p. 91.
addition, eighteen large cases of Lord Roberts’ papers and seven cases of Lord Kitchener’s correspondence had been collected and catalogued.\textsuperscript{137}

As was the case with the other official histories produced in this period, the official historian received very little guidance as to the scope and content of the project until a first draft of the work had been circulated to the officials involved in the conflict. As a result of this, Henderson, like Maurice, designed the project as he saw fit. He wanted the work to be more than just a ‘dull record of facts’ and instead to be a ‘picturesque’ History modelled on Napier’s \textit{History of the Peninsular War} and Alexander W. Kinglake’s history of the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover, he did not intend to limit the scope of his work to the events in the conflict. Instead, he undertook a major study of British relations with the Boers from 1796 to 1902 which he estimated would run into seven volumes of at least 450 pages each.\textsuperscript{139} Due to the intended scope, and the scale of the war, this Official History was the first to have a staff of officers working on the account. Between 1901 and 1903, including Henderson, there were seven officers working on the Official History.\textsuperscript{140} Once Henderson had secured office space, Major Gretton was detailed to assist him. Next, in June 1901, Lieutenant Beaty-Pownall joined as a volunteer without pay, although from March 1902 he was allowed to draw 10/- a day. To accompany Henderson on research trips to South Africa and to assist with writing, Captain M.H. Grant and Lieutenant Cockcraft were seconded in November 1902.\textsuperscript{141} On 1 January 1903, Captain Bowers from the Army Service Corps was appointed to the project, and, finally, in February 1903, Captain Ross arrived. Henderson’s account was also the first

\textsuperscript{138} TNA, WO32/4759, Proposed Official History of the War in South Africa, 2 January 1903.
\textsuperscript{139} CLW, Henderson Papers, A320fA2, Draft of Chapter 1, p. 2; and, TNA, WO32/4759, Proposed Official History of the War in South Africa, 2 January 1903.
\textsuperscript{141} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, M.H. Grant to Blackwood, 28 February 1901, MS30077, Henderson to Blackwood, 21 April 1901.
to include a civilian in a literary role, as he employed Miss Reade, ‘a literary woman with a remarkable knowledge of South African modern history to help him produce the first volume’; and she assisted with the verification of quotations which appeared in the chapters which concerned political matters.142

In an attempt to make the official account as appealing as possible to the public, on his own authority Henderson appointed a literary agent to sell the work to a commercial publisher.143 On 8 June 1901, Henderson signed a contract with the publisher Hurst and Blackett which gave them the rights to publish the official account of the Second Boer War.144 Although the contract named Henderson personally as the recipient of the royalty payments, the agreement was signed on the understanding that he was only acting as the representative of the War Office.145 The literary agent, Mr W.M. Colles, induced several publishers to compete against each other for the right to purchase the work. In this way, he managed to induce Hurst and Blackett to agree to pay royalties of 30% of the sale price to Henderson, with a £300 advance for each volume he was able to produce.146 Furthermore, Henderson, again on his own authority, sent Colles to the United States in 1903 to look into the possibility of publishing the Official History in that country.147

By February 1902, the ill health that had forced Henderson to be invalided out of active service in South Africa returned; and, although he went to Egypt in the autumn of that year to avoid the British winter, he died at Assouan on 5 March 1903.148 The lack of official oversight of Henderson’s project meant that it was only after his death that the government

142 TNA, WO32/4755, Notes on the... the Official History of the War in South Africa, p. 6, and, Report of Major Gretton, Position of Literary Agent, 17 March 1903.
143 TNA, WO32/4755, Notes on the... Official History of the War in South Africa, p. 8, and, Report of Major Gretton, Position of Literary Agent, 21 March 1903.
144 TNA, WO32/4755, Note on arrangement between Colles and Henderson’, 14 July 1903.
146 TNA, WO32/4755, Memoranda, Henderson’s agreement with literary agent by Major Gretton, 21 March 1903.
147 TNA, WO32/4755, Note on arrangement between Colles and Henderson, 19 March 1903.
148 Henderson, Science of War, p. xxxviii.
and the Treasury became fully aware that he had been producing more than just a short narrative history of the war, intended mainly for a military readership. The controller of the government Stationery Office was also highly critical of the agreement that Henderson had signed with Hurst and Blackett, as it was so badly worded that not only did a loophole exist so the publisher could refuse to pay royalties if he so chose, but it did not even specify the quality of paper that the publisher ought to use. Furthermore, he pointed out that the Stationery Office already had agreements with several companies entitling them to sell official publications, so the contract with Hurst and Blackett would land them ‘in serious [legal] difficulties’.

The first volume of Henderson’s work was devoted to a political history of the relations between the Boers and British, but since the work was written with the general reading public in mind the discussion of such a subject was particularly contentious and, as one report to the Secretary of State pointed out, it ‘bristle[d] with controversial matter’. Two re-occurring themes ran through Henderson’s history. Firstly, he was highly critical of Boer political thought in an attempt to undermine any sympathy for their cause, writing that ‘Great Britain was backed up by the forces of enlightenment and progress [whereas] the Boer was the champion of political anarchy’. He argued that the Boers had always been opposed to any system of government that they currently had and suggested that the Dutch settlers in the Cape in 1795 had been only too eager, ‘like their kinsfolk in Europe’ to accept French rule as the existing constitution had been ‘not exactly to their liking’. Similarly, Henderson went out of his way to undermine the significance of the ‘Great Trek’, in which the Boer people left the British Cape colony to start their own republic, by suggesting that this had ‘no

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149 TNA, WO32/4759, Henderson to Hurst and Blackett, 4 March 1904.
150 TNA, WO32/4758, Note on Colonel Henderson’s agreement with the publishers, n.d.
151 TNA, WO32/4755, Memorandum concerning Henderson’s agreement with literary agent, by Major Gretton, 21 March 1903.
152 CLW, Henderson Papers, A320f.A2, Draft of Chapter 1, p. 3.
153 Ibid., p. 18.
effect whatever on their status as British subjects’ and so they had not ‘divested themselves of their allegiance to the British Crown’. Moreover, the History suggested that if the ‘Great Trek’ had any real significance it was that it demonstrated the ‘goodwill’ of the British ‘abstinent lion’, which let the Boers have their ‘political protest’.

Henderson intended to undermine further sympathy for the Boer cause by emphasising the way the Boers had treated the natives badly. Henderson argued that ‘to the Boer the man of colour was little more than an animal’, and he maintained that they had consciously adapted their religious beliefs to allow themselves to hold slaves. He stated, ‘a constant supply of submissive blacks was undoubtedly essential… and the student of human nature will note with interest that, according to the creed of the Afrikander [sic], the least troublesome means of supplying this need received divine sanction in the old testament’. By way of contrast, the history presented the British Empire as holding an enlightened attitude toward the natives. It pointed out: ‘the slave trade was done away with in 1806; and from that time forward a broad and unselfish humanitarianism [took over the Empire], of which the most helpless and despised races were the peculiar care’. It was particularly apparent that Henderson was using the Boer attitude toward slavery as a way to alienate support for them as, despite his criticism of this institution in the drafts of the Official History, in Stonewall Jackson he had in fact championed it. Here he had claimed that the abolition of slavery ‘meant ruin to the negro’ as ‘under the system of the plantations, honesty and morality were being gradually instilled into the coloured race’ and that without it they ‘would relapse into the barbaric vices of their original condition’.

155 Ibid., p. 5.
156 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
The second theme which ran through Henderson’s draft chapters was an attempt to place blame for British military defeats in South Africa on political figures, rather than the army, and, in so doing, the work demonstrated partisan opposition toward the Liberal and Radical parties. The history of South Africa was portrayed as a series of crises which ‘for more than ninety years not one of [Britain’s] ministers proved competent to deal’.\(^{158}\) Gladstone’s administration, which had ordered British forces to surrender to the Boers during the First Anglo-Boer War in 1881, was a particular target for Henderson. The History described Gladstone’s Midlothian speeches, in which he criticised British policy in South Africa, as a ‘terrible indiscretion... condemning the annexation before he had acquainted himself with the facts’. The history also accused Gladstone of placing personal motives above the best interests of the Empire as, for him, ‘there was a worse calamity than an inglorious surrender, and that was the return of the Conservatives to power... because it relegated Mr Gladstone to the cold shades of the opposition’\(^{159}\).

Likewise, Henderson blamed government underfunding of the military for the poor showing of the British officer corps during the Second Boer War as ‘few… statesmen appear to have had more than a faint inkling of their predominant influence upon the affairs of nations; and not one had the good sense to endeavour to apply them to the military needs of the United Kingdom’\(^{160}\). Thus, ‘military education had few friends outside of the army’, and so ‘the economists, pursuing a reckless path up the line of least resistance’ were permitted ‘to deprive the British officer of the such facilities for acquiring professional knowledge as he

\(^{159}\) CLW, Henderson Papers, A320f.C1, Draft of Chapter 8, p. 7.
\(^{160}\) Henderson, *Science of War*, pp. 433-34. Although the government forbade the publication of Henderson’s drafts, it appears that the final chapter in *Science of War* was part of the proposed Official History. It is described in this way in Malcolm’s introduction to the work: ‘the essay on ’The British Army’ was practically the last thing Colonel Henderson ever wrote. The proofs were corrected by him at Assouan very shortly before his death. It therefore possesses a peculiar interest which distinguishes it from anything else included in this volume’. Henderson, *Science of War*, p. iv.
already enjoyed’. Henderson pointed to the education of staff officers as a particular case in point, as government ‘economy again intervened’ and so only thirty-two officers per year passed out of Camberley which was ‘even in time of peace… not enough for the needs of the army’.162

As a result of the large quantity of controversial material which appeared in the proposed Official History it encountered opposition when the first drafts were sent to the Foreign and Colonial Offices. Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, took particular exception to it. He was so worried by its divisive nature that he took the first chapters before the Cabinet in late September 1903, arguing that the ‘points of historical summary will be taken exception to in an official publication and will give offence’.163 Other ministers agreed with him. One pointed out that passages such as the one found in chapter three which stated that, ‘the Cabinet that then sat in Westminster overlooked practical politics in the quest of unattainable ideals’, would ‘fitly grace the pages of the National Review but [was] surely out of place in an Official History of a campaign’. Furthermore, the cabinet was worried that, as the funds for the Official History had come from the army’s budget, the ‘taxpayers may object to public money voted for… the history of the war being expended on a political history of South Africa’. It was, after all, ‘an era of Royal Commissions and one may be appointed at any moment to consider how army funds are being expended’.164

So, when Maurice took over the Official History in March 1903, he inherited a project which had raised strong opposition within the government.165 Although Maurice was a supporter of the idea that official history should influence public opinion, the proposed

161 Ibid., p. 395.
162 Ibid., pp. 397-398.
164 TNA, WO32/4758, Memoranda concerning controversial material, St John Brodrick to Edward Ward, 7 October 1903.
165 LHCMA, Maurice Papers, 2.3.80, St John Brodrick to Maurice, 29 July 1903.
history was so vehemently critical of the British government and the Boers, that as he wrote on 28 September 1903 to the secretary of the War Office, ‘I should not myself have attempted to propose or submit anything of the kind; but I find this volume left behind by Col. Henderson’. In an attempt to secure funding for Henderson’s original project, Maurice argued that it was the Official History’s ability to change the way the public thought about the campaign which was its greatest selling point. Even though it was escalating in cost, Maurice argued that if the work could give the public the impression that the war had not gone badly for Britain, it would prevent expensive calls for the reform of the army. As The Times had begun its own history of the war in 1900, Maurice thought that if this became ‘the one authoritative History in England’ it would have an ‘influence on the electorate… and the House of Commons’ which would ‘make it very hard [for the government] not to adopt a view of [conscription]… embodied in the plan of army reform… set forth by that newspaper’, and ‘it would be difficult to devise anything more costly’ for the nation. Similarly, Maurice saw the Official History as a way to combat the Prussian General Staff’s historical section’s own account of the campaign. Maurice drew a direct comparison with how he thought The Times history would dictate popular understanding of the war in Britain. He argued that if the German official account were to become the ‘authoritative History for Europe… written as it will be by men all pro-Boers at heart… [it would lead to] the formulation of an alliance against us of all the nations effected by their statement’. He left it to ‘competent statesmen to judge of the financial cost of meeting the consequences’.

Although Maurice proposed that the offending political chapters should be removed from this history and privately published, so as not to lose such an ‘able and laborious study’, on 17 November 1903 the Secretary of State, H.O. Arnold-Forster, ordered that ‘Volume 1 as

166 TNA, WO32/4758, Maurice to Edward Ward, 28 September 1903.
167 TNA, WO32/4756, Memorandum concerning the state of the Official History, by Maurice, 24 April 1903.
written by Col. Henderson is not suitable for publication... [and] this whole portion of the work will be discarded’. He also instructed that ‘Maurice will be informed that it is not considered desirable to publish a book on the lines suggested by him, viz., a book for general circulation written in a manner to interest ordinary readers’. Instead, Maurice was commanded to write a history ‘as near as circumstances will allow upon the lines of the German official history of the War of 1870’. This revised project was not to exceed four volumes in length, and ‘two or three introductory chapters’ were to be substituted for the volume that had been discarded. Furthermore, the publication of any of Henderson’s account was prohibited and so the government also sent out letters to those who may have had a copy of the original manuscript, including Henderson’s wife who had moved to Ceylon following her husband’s death, instructing that it should be returned as soon as possible. Thus, by early February 1904 the Secretary of State for War was told that he could ‘safely assume’ that all of Henderson’s original manuscript had ‘been destroyed’.

The controversy surrounding Henderson’s History ensured that henceforth much greater oversight was exerted over historical projects at the outset of the research. The work undertaken by Maurice and Henderson had demonstrated that official history, while viewed by many government officials as a valuable undertaking, would always be fraught with political difficulties. Due to both political and budgetary pressures, the intention was now that they would be written exclusively for the purposes of military education. The first account to

168 TNA, WO32/4758, Maurice to Edward Ward, 28 September 1903; and, TNA, WO32/4758, Secretary of State’s decision regarding History of South African War, 17 November 1903.
169 TNA, WO32/4759, War Office to Mrs Henderson, 3 February 1904. It is unknown exactly how the surviving proofs escaped destruction and found their way to the Cullen Library, but handwritten on the draft of Chapter 1 is a note which states that this copy was ‘brought back from Assouan by Mrs Henderson’. CLW, Henderson Papers, A320f.A2, Draft of Chapter 1, p. 1. This suggests that despite the War Office’s insistence, Mrs Henderson retained this copy after her husband’s death and it eventually found its way to South Africa and the Cullen Library. Despite this government’s prohibition on the publication of Henderson’s work, it appears his chapter on the British Army prior to the Second Boer War was included in Science of War. Henderson, Science of War, pp. 382-434.
170 TNA, WO32/4759, Assistant Under-Secretary to Secretary of State for War, 4 February 1904.
be written under these new ‘restrictions’ was Maurice’s history of the Second Boer War; with this project, British official history entered a new developmental phase.

IV. Official History as Source for Officers’ Studies, 1903-1914

The work on the new Official History of the Second Boer War, which was begun following the abandonment of the original project under Henderson, was taken up in April 1903. Hurst and Blackett, despite the major changes to the project that had been ordered by Forster and the realisation that they were likely to make a loss, agreed to publish the work under the original terms of the contract. The inclusion of political matter remained problematic; so, in late 1905 drafts of the new first volume, in which Henderson’s controversial work had been condensed into the first few chapters, were circulated for feedback among politicians. Maurice received agreement from the Prime Minister for this volume to be published on 12 October 1905. However, once the drafts had gone to the printers, the Colonial Office issued a memorandum regarding the discussion of political matter in the History, ‘strongly depreciating any such reference to past [political] events as injurious in the present situation in South Africa’. Maurice was forced to recall the drafts he had sent to the publishers and to remove all of the political comment which appeared in the Official History. It was not until 12 December 1905 that Maurice was able to obtain approval for the latest revision and was finally able to resubmit the work for publication. This was a clear indication of the continuing political sensitivity surrounding official histories.

The first volume of the new history, which covered the opening months of the war, was finally published in early 1906. The second volume did not appear until 1907, as given

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171 TNA, WO32/4756, Memorandum on the state of the Official History by Maurice, 24 April 1903.
172 TNA, WO32/4759, Secretary of the Army Council to G.M. Murray, 23 February 1904.
the problems which had plagued the project, only eight of its thirty-two chapters were in preliminary draft form by the beginning of 1906.\textsuperscript{175} During the course of the writing of this volume, the Committee of Imperial Defence set up the ‘Historical Section’ to oversee the production of all official history in Britain, so the compilation of the two remaining volumes, which appeared in 1908 and 1912 respectively, was carried out under the supervision of this body.\textsuperscript{176} As work progressed, Maurice was taken ill as the third volume was in an early stage, and Captain M.H. Grant took over as the official historian.\textsuperscript{177}

This Official History was similar to the other accounts produced in Britain after 1880 in that it mirrored the Prussian approach in which a narrative of the fighting was the central focus. However, it was the first British account to include didactic information regarding the general conduct of military operations in the text. Previously, British official histories had provided information for military specialists, such as staff officers, engineers, and those in the artillery, but had never provided information regarding the best way to conduct a campaign, or the most effective way infantry fire could be employed. The Official History described Lord Roberts’ advance against the Boer General Cronje as an example of how to outmanoeuvre an opponent. It paid particular attention to the psychological aspect of command and described ‘all war… so far of the two opposing commanders are concerned’ as ‘the play of mind upon mind’ and provided the reader with a list of ways in which a general could misdirect his opponent. The history stated ‘it will be found that in practice Lord Roberts took advantage of every one [of these techniques]’.\textsuperscript{178} Once it had described Lord Roberts’ misdirection in this campaign, the history concluded that ‘the interest of the whole scheme

\textsuperscript{175} TNA, WO32/4760, Maurice to Under Secretary of State, 8 January 1906.
\textsuperscript{176} TNA, CAB103/434, Committee of Imperial Defence Historical Section Memorandum, 28 January 1914. The origins of the historical section will be discussed in detail below.
\textsuperscript{177} Maurice (ed.), \textit{History of the War in South Africa}, Vol. 3 (London, 1908), p. i. Grant published his own writing on the pen-name ‘Linesman’. For evidence that ‘Linesman’ was M.H. Grant, see NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 10 April 1901.
for modern soldiers lies in the fact that it was an application of very ancient principles of war to the times of railways and telegraphs’. Furthermore, the history included the ‘Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare’ which Lord Roberts had circulated during the campaign. These notes were based on the experience of fighting against the well-armed and highly mobile Boers; as such, it placed the emphasis on overcoming the firepower created by modern rifles and artillery. The reader was told that ‘any attempt to take a position by direct attack will assuredly fail… the only hope of success lies in the being able to turn one or both flanks’.  

However, there is no evidence to suggest the Official History was used to teach Military History at the army’s academies, even though copies were retained for official use. It is highly likely that the decision to remove all reference to political matters caused the history to be considered unsuitable for this purpose as knowledge of the motivating political factors behind a conflict had been deemed important by the army in the study of Military History since at least 1889. It was Lord Lansdowne as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Alfred Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in 1905 requested that all political matter should be finally removed from the Official History. Lansdowne argued that the history should ‘be [of] a purely military nature, compiled for the benefit of military students’; he was opposed to it possessing a ‘political complexion’ as he felt that this would mean that it would ‘contain matter which has no direct connection with the operations in the field’. Lyttleton, went even further; he felt that even though most of the political comment had been removed, the Official History should be reduced to a ‘colourless narrative’ that did

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179 Ibid., p. 431.  
181 This is the first instance of the final year examination directly asking a question regarding political aspects of a conflict.  
182 TNA, WO32/4760, Lansdowne to Maurice, 22 December 1904.
not refer to any political matters.\(^{183}\) Maurice responded, mirroring Clausewitz, that ‘Military History… is absolutely useless and worthless except in so far as it places the man who reads it in the position of those whose actions he is studying, and therefore enables him to profit by their experience’.\(^ {184}\) Since he thought ‘all the military operations [of a war] are inextricably interwoven with… ‘political considerations’, he realised that the government were forcing him to ‘produce [a history] that would be absolutely useless and valueless’.\(^ {185}\)

Although Maurice thought that the work had a limited utility for officer education, he still hoped that it could be an accurate record of the events of the wars. Hence, he renewed Henderson’s appeal for officers to submit information for the Official History and sent out a circular letter to this end which stated, ‘we cannot make bricks without straw; and though the mass of material to be dealt with is very great, it often fails us at important points’.\(^ {186}\) The circulation of draft chapters to principal military figures for correction did, though, run into problems. Sir Ian Hamilton, for example, who had commanded the British Infantry during the battle of Elandslaagte early in the war, served as a military attaché with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War and so was unable to comment on the proofs of the Official History that had been sent to him. As Hamilton recalled, ‘Elandslaagte is told all wrong in the Official History… the various times of the movements are muddled up’. But by the time he had returned to England, the volume which contained the account of Elandslaagte had already gone to print. Hamilton later wrote that when he ‘pointed out to [Maurice] the mistakes… he became so angry that I left the matter alone and never explained that I had not received [his] letter [concerning the draft chapter]’.\(^ {187}\)

\(^{183}\) TNA, WO32/4760, Lyttleton to Maurice, 16 January 1905.
\(^{184}\) Maurice, *Work and Opinions*, p. 121.
\(^{185}\) TNA, WO32/4760, Maurice to Lyttleton, 13 March 1905; and, Maurice, *Work and Opinions*, p. 121.
\(^{187}\) LHCMA, Ian Hamilton Papers, 13/89, Hamilton to Charles à Court Repington 2 July 1924, p. 7.
Moreover, General Redvers Buller was particularly unhappy with the way his defeat at the Battle of Colenso had been described in the draft circulated to him by its author, Major Arthur Griffith. Buller wrote to Maurice proclaiming, ‘I thought it the poorest piece of writing I had ever [seen]… not only were there in it several statements which [were] incorrect… only a parody of the truth’; as a result, he offered to write the account of the battle for Griffith.\footnote{LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.3.30, Buller to Maurice, 5 May 1904.} Buller also met with Major Ferryman from Maurice’s staff to discuss further the alteration of the account.\footnote{LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers 2.3.93, Buller to Maurice, 10 June 1904.} It is likely that Buller hoped to respond to the criticism which had been directed at him in the press, and in the \textit{Times History of the War in South Africa}, which had centred on a message he had sent to George White, commander of the besieged Ladysmith garrison, following the Battle of Colenso, in which he apparently called on him to surrender.\footnote{Amery (ed.), \textit{Times History of the War in South Africa}, Vol. 2, pp. 421-65.} However, the restrictions placed on the Official History, as it was now intended principally for officer education, prevented a response to such criticism. Thus, although the history printed a complete transcript of the messages sent between Buller and White, no attempt was made to explain or justify them.\footnote{Maurice (ed.), \textit{History of the War in South Africa}, Vol. 2, p. 551.}

In any case, the disappointing sales of the Official History would have prevented it providing an effective rebuttal to the \textit{Times History}. By 1914, only 4,500 copies of the official account had been sold to the public, while 1,050 copies had been retained for ‘official use’.\footnote{TNA, CAB103/434, Committee of Imperial Defence Historical Section Memorandum, 28 January 1914; John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds.), \textit{Leo Amery Diaries}, Vol. 1, pp. 37, 63; and, Beckett, ‘Early Historians and the South African War’, p. 21. By 1914 the \textit{Times} history had sold 29,500 copies.} The scrapping of Henderson’s original volume, the restarting of the project, and the employment of a writing staff had pushed up the costs. The Committee of Imperial Defence found that the expenditure had been ‘extravagant to the last degree’.\footnote{TNA, CAB103/434, Origin of the Historical Section, October 1919, p. 2.} The Treasury was unable to provide accurate figures as to the final cost as it had not been aware of Henderson’s...
activities, so had no accurate information about his expenses. They estimated in 1905 that the Official History would cost the government at least £26,000 to produce, even though originally only £4,000 had been budgeted for it. To make matters worse, the Treasury concluded that ‘allowing for waning public interest [in the war] and rival publications, it is evidently improbable that anything like a quarter of the cost will ever be recovered’. The Historical Section, in a report submitted in December 1913, admitted that the production of the Official History had ‘not proved satisfactory’, and that the official account had ‘not been widely read either by the general public or by the two services’. 194

Despite Maurice’s concern regarding the value of the Official History of the Second Boer War as a didactic work, the next two British authorised accounts were intended for the education of regimental officers as well as military specialists. In 1907, Section Two of the General Staff’s Directorate of Military Operations, which had been assigned the job of producing official history by the War Office reconstitution committee, released an account of the British operations in Somaliland between 1901 and 1904. 195 The work was written by John Adye and Aylmer Haldane, who had begun compiling information even before the campaign had begun. 196 The work was intended to be ‘an interesting and instructive study for all ranks of all the important work undertaken by units, services and departments’, so, besides logistical and administrative details, a chapter was included which dealt with the ‘strategy and tactics’ employed by both sides. 197 In August 1906 this department also published the first volume of an official account of the Russo-Japanese War, intended to provide information for those taking Military History exams set by the army in 1905 on this

conflict. The work was begun by Haldane and was later transferred to Adye, who was assisted by Major Dowding, a retired officer, along with a military clerk. In the work itself, ‘criticism [was] excluded, as it is necessarily of doubtful value when based upon imperfect knowledge’; and, the discussion of the naval aspects of the war were only included where they directly influenced the operations on land.

On 6 September 1906, Lord Esher, spurred on by fact that the navy had also begun to produce a separate Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, called on the Committee of Imperial Defence to create a ‘Historical Section’ to supervise the production of all official history in Britain. Esher argued that as British military campaigns were often matters of close coordination between the army and navy the production of official history should be conducted jointly by both services. Esher warned that ‘it is most unlikely that the lessons of the operations will be adequately appreciated unless they are treated as a whole’ by an official account which included both the military and naval aspects of the conflict. Moreover, he reasoned that the Committee of Imperial Defence was the best body to conduct this task as ‘no Military History… is complete unless the political considerations which influenced the campaign are included, and neither the Admiralty nor the War Office is specially qualified to deal with history in this aspect’. The production of one official account, rather that several, was also expected to save the treasury money, as this body had described the current arrangement as having led to ‘confusion and extravagance’. Both the army and the navy supported this move largely because it enabled the cost of producing official history to be

198 TNA, CAB 103/434, Memorandum by the Secretary of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, October 1919, p. 3; and, Anon., Report on the Admission Examination at the Staff College held in August 1905 with Copies of the Examination Papers (London, 1905), p. 13.
199 TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 2; and, NLS, Alymer Haldane Papers, MS20254, ff. 4, Unpublished Autobiography, 1946.
201 TNA, CAB 103/434, Memorandum on the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence by Lord Esher, September 1906, pp. 2-3.
borne by the Committee of Imperial Defence’s budget rather than their own. On the
strength of Esher’s request, a special subcommittee was set up under Sir George Clarke to
investigate the current method of producing official history and to prepare a proposal for the
creation of a Historical Section. Clarke’s sub-committee presented its report on 10 January
1907, and on the 21 February the creation of the Historical Section was officially
sanctioned. The Historical Section was finally set up in April 1908, although work was
commenced in August 1907 on a ‘Combined Official History’ of the Russo-Japanese War
which recounted both the naval and military aspects of the conflict.

However, the project to produce only the Combined Official History ran into
difficulties as it was realised that to get an accurate History which could comment on the
events of the war, large amounts of information would need to be analysed. This would mean
that the Combined History would not appear for several years, and so would be of no use to
those sitting Military History exams in the short term. Thus, the Historical Section decided to
continue the Official History begun by the General Staff in 1906 in an effort to provide an
official account for exam purposes which could be used before the Combined History
appeared. So, between 1908 and 1910, when the first volume of the Combined History
appeared, four parts of this original series, produced by Haldane, were published. The second
part of this series, which followed the General Staff publication, was described in the preface
as ‘an advanced portion’ of the Combined History, covering the period from the end of the
battle of Ya-lu to the battle of Liao-Lang. The third and fourth parts appeared in 1909 and

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202 NLS, Alymer Haldane Papers, MS20254, ff. 262, Unpublished Autobiography, 1946.
203 TNA, CAB 103/434, Memorandum by the Secretary of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, October 1919, p. 1. Clarke was the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the man who
had criticised the Official History of the Invasion of Egypt.
204 TNA, CAB 103/434, Minutes of 95th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 21 February 1907, p. 4.
205 TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 3.
206 Ibid.
covered the siege of Port Arthur, and the Battle of Liao-Yang respectively. The final part appeared in 1910 and covered the battle of Sha-Ho.207

The Treasury originally assigned £1,500 for these works, but by early 1907 £1,100 had already been spent on the project, although only one volume had appeared.208 Even though these parts refrained from any analytical comment, the system of producing official accounts in advance of the main Official History was found to have ‘grave drawbacks’. In the case of parts three, four and five, ‘so much fresh information became available’ during their production that they had to be heavily revised and time devoted to ‘re-write them to a great extent’ before they could be published.209 Moreover, a disclaimer was added to the preface of these accounts, stating that they made ‘no claim to be complete and accurate in every respect, but all available information, with the exception of [confidential material], has been utilized’.210

The cause of this problem was the source material available. Initially, the only sources of information came from British officers who had accompanied the Japanese Army during the war, or from official Japanese sources. These, of course, contained little information about the intentions of the Russian Army and, at best, gave a fragmentary narrative of the battle on which the official account could be based. A good example of this can be seen in the British narrative of the actions undertaken by the Japanese Guards and 12th Division during the second phase of the Battle of Yalu on the 1 May 1904. The information which appeared in the second ‘advanced portion’ of the Combined History came from a lecture given by Major Fukuda, the Chief of the Operations Section of the First Japanese Army, to the foreign military attachés. Fukuda explained that the ‘Guards and the 12th Division were very tired and

208 TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 3.
209 TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 3.
hungry’ and so waited for ‘the reserves [which] on the contrary, had been eagerly waiting the order to advance, and came on quickly to Conical Hill’. Lieutenant Colonel C.V. Hume, the British military attaché, ordered that ‘this narrative is the official account for the present’. Consequently, the first British official account of the battle, which appeared in 1909, relied on this information and explained that ‘instead of immediately pressing forward… [the Guards and 12th Division] appear to have halted for some hours’, as ‘the men were tired and hungry and General Kuroki was unwilling to attempt to force the second Russian position until they had had some food and rest’. However, by 1910 information had come to light from the Russian side, so that the Combined History was able to ascertain that the reason for the delay in the advance was in fact down to the Japanese assault being ‘stubbornly opposed’ by Russian forces under General Kashtalinski and not the tiredness or hunger of the Japanese troops.

When Russian information became available, this too was often found lacking and further delayed the advanced portions of the Official History. The publication of the fifth part, which provided a narrative of the battle of Sha-Ho, was held back to ‘enable reference to be made to the account given in the Russian Official (Military) History’. However, this Russian account was found to be so long and inaccurate, due to the fact it had been produced by several writers who worked without coordination and with the use of ‘no maps [which] agree exactly’, that it proved to be of limited use. As a result, no alterations were made to this British account before it was published, although the second volume of the Combined

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211 NAM, D.S. Robertson Papers, 94-10-3-13, Lecture by Major Fukuda, n.d [1905?].
215 TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 4.
History was edited with reference to the information provided in the Russian Official History.\textsuperscript{216}

The Combined Official History ran to three volumes, the first volume appearing in 1910, the second in 1912, and the third, which was completed in 1914, was only published in 1920, as it was ‘unavoidably delayed owing to the late war’.\textsuperscript{217} The first volume was compiled by Major Neill Malcolm, while Major Ernest D. Swinton was responsible for the compilation of the other two volumes. To assist these principal writers, a permanent staff of one military and one naval assistant secretary were assigned to them. Moreover, as some sections of the Official History were handed over to those who had special expertise on the subject, Commander J. Luce of the Royal Navy was entrusted with the production of the first drafts of the naval portions of the History, while Major Bannerman, who had been attached to the Japanese Army during the siege of Port Arthur, wrote the account of this operation.\textsuperscript{218}

The Combined History contained analysis and didactic information for military readers and devoted two chapters of each volume to an analysis of the strategic and tactical elements of the military and naval operations. Not only were the strengths of the Japanese joint naval and military plan analysed in relation to the weaknesses of the Russian plan, but the Official History posed questions to the reader asking them to consider how they would have acted if they had been in command. For instance, following a discussion of the siege of Port Arthur, the reader was directly asked: ‘were the Japanese well advised in attacking Port Arthur, or should they have concentrated every available man against General Kuropatkin, merely masking the fortress?’ Similarly, the History was intended to inform readers how best to conduct military operations in the future. For example, the battle of Yalu was described as

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., Vol. 3 (London, 1920), p. i.
\textsuperscript{218} TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 4.
providing ‘one more example of the difficulty of guarding a river crossing against an enterprising enemy’. The history went on to describe how it felt the river should have been defended using ‘a comparatively weak force’, which would have enabled the Russians to ‘strike a vigorous blow, with superior numbers if possible, at some point’ against the Japanese forces crossing the river.\textsuperscript{219}

Despite the analysis it provided, the Combined History did not sell well. By 1914, only 1,095 individual volumes had been sold, on top of the 589 which had been distributed officially. By contrast, the advanced sections of the Official History had sold 9,998 copies by the same time and 3,657 had been issued for official use. The production of both histories was considered ‘financially a dead loss’, with at least £16,000 spend on the production of both official accounts between August 1907 and March 1914, but with only £1,702 received from the copies sold.\textsuperscript{220}

However, the Combined History was well regarded and Swinton was awarded the Chesney Medal by the Royal United Service Institution in 1919 for his contribution to ‘military knowledge and science’. As Swinton later wrote to Liddell Hart, he considered the compilation of the Official History ‘the dullest work on earth, except the [analysis and] comments’, but he admitted that ‘all the labour was done by my assistants and I got the Chesney medal… which I let them smell over a meal to celebrate my honour’.\textsuperscript{221} Despite all the hurdles which work of this nature presented, the Combined History demonstrated that there was a place for official history and it could make a serious contribution to Military History as a whole.


\textsuperscript{220} TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{221} LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, 1/670/58, Ernest Swinton to Liddell Hart, 4 December 1930.
In summary, in this formative period in the commissioning and writing of British official histories, the origins of the official history as a form of military historical writing can be seen in their function as a means of serving the educational and professional needs of military officers. If this represented the origins of official history, as the popular press began increasingly to influence public opinion during the course of campaigns abroad, official histories offered the opportunity for the army to provide explanations in those cases where commanders appeared to have failed. The official history became a means of defending reputations. Yet, the scope of the official histories became subject to increasing controversy due to G.F.R. Henderson’s desire to include the political background to the South African War. The battle over official history saw it pulled in several directions.

The first British official histories, written on the Crimean War, were produced with the intention that they would enable officers in the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery to learn from the experience of the siege of Sebastopol. However, as the majority of British campaigns fought between 1857 and 1914 consisted of expeditions conducted in hostile environments against culturally diverse groups of native people, after 1870 many authorised Histories were intended to provide information for staff officers as they planned future colonial campaigns in these regions. These works contained extensive material on the area traversed, the natives encountered, as well as the logistical organisation and administration of the expedition, rather than information on tactics. A version of this approach also appeared

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222 Elphinstone and Jones, Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5; and, Reilly, Siege of Sebastopol.
in India, as the Intelligence Branch compiled accounts of the expeditions conducted by the Indian Army.224

Although many official accounts were produced principally for military education, and so were less concerned with the reputation of the army, defending reputations did play an important part in the writing of several works, particularly those published between 1879 and 1903. As the army encountered a series of military setbacks between, which were well publicised following the growing coverage of colonial campaigns in the cheap daily press, the production of authorised accounts during this time began to be affected by the army’s desire to protect its reputation. Therefore, although they were also intended to serve a didactic function, the Official History of the Zulu War obscured British errors which had contributed to the disaster at Isandlwana and the authorised account of the Sudan campaign included passages which responded to the criticism which had appeared in the press or had been made by officials.225 As it was deemed by Lord Frederick Roberts that the narrative of the defeat at Maiwand would cause too much controversy, the Official History of the Second Afghan War was suppressed, only eventually appearing in 1908.226 Indeed, it is probable that the controversy surrounding the British defeat during the First Boer War led to the failure to produce an official account of this conflict.

In the evolution of the compilation of official histories, a development of some significance was the growing control in the writing of the accounts. Prior to 1903 there had been little government oversight of the writing of official accounts before the circulation of the first drafts of the work. This meant that John Frederick Maurice had been able to produce

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224 Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 7; Paget, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes; and, Paget, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason.
225 Rothwell, Narrative of the Field Operations, pp. 32-48; and, Colville, Official History of the Sudan Campaign: Vol. 2, pp. 30, 40, 73.
the account of the Official History of the invasion of Egypt along the lines he saw fit.\textsuperscript{227} As a result, he wrote the work principally for the reading public not only with the intention of directly responding to the criticism of the army and Sir Garnet Wolseley which had appeared in the press, but also to inform readers of the difficulties facing the commander as he conducted the campaign. As Maurice later wrote, the Official History gave him the opportunity of ‘pressing certain considerations upon my countrymen which are of permanent interest… which ought to be present in their minds during the course of every future campaign’\textsuperscript{228} However, as the history was intended for the reading public, Maurice encountered difficulties as Sir Edward Hamley attempted to shape the work’s account of the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir to support his contention that he had played a major part in the engagement.\textsuperscript{229} Despite Maurice’s argument that a work aimed at the general public would help revive Britain’s reputation on the continent and provide a response to the criticism directed at the army in the \textit{Times History of the War in South Africa}, subsequent British Official Histories were produced only to provide didactic information for officers.\textsuperscript{230}

While many of the arguments over the limits and intentions of official histories were specifically British, just as was the case in other genres of Military History, foreign influences did act as a catalyst. Following the translation of the Prussian official accounts of the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian War during the 1870s, many British accounts adopted a similar style and became centred on a narrative of the campaign and the fighting which had taken place.\textsuperscript{231} The term ‘official history’ may, in fact, also have been derived from the Prussian works since it was only after their translation that the term came into use in Britain. The Prussian approach was seen as the ‘gold standard’ for the subject by H.O.

\textsuperscript{227} LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.2.10, Wolseley to Maurice, July 1886.

\textsuperscript{228} Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, pp. 12, 36.

\textsuperscript{229} Maurice, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, p. 418.

\textsuperscript{230} TNA, WO32/4756, Major Gretton to Sir Guy, 21 April 1903.

\textsuperscript{231} Wright and Hozier, \textit{Campaign of 1866 in Germany}; and, Clarke, \textit{Franco-German War of 1870-1}. 
Arnold-Forster when he set the guidelines for Maurice’s account of the Second Boer War, as he told him to model his work on the Prussian Official History of the Franco-Prussian War.\footnote{232 Clarke, \textit{Franco-German War of 1870-1}.}

However, British official history did not mirror the Prussian approach that closely due to several unique British requirements. Given the nature of many British campaigns fought between 1857 and 1914, many Histories were dedicated to providing information for staff officers planning future operations in the same regions, so contained logistical information and intelligence on the native population.\footnote{233 Holland and Henry Hozier, \textit{Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia}, pp. xiv-xvii, 1-43} This requirement was particularly apparent in the authorised accounts produced in India: the style they adopted was largely dictated by the need to provide description of the relations between the government of India and the tribes who inhabited the North-West frontier of the country.\footnote{234 Anon., \textit{Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India}, Vol. 7; Paget, \textit{Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes}; and, Paget, \textit{Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason}.} Given the growing emphasis on maritime operations in British military thought at this time, the Combined History of the Russo-Japanese War placed a great emphasis on this element of the conflict.\footnote{235 Malcolm and Swinton, \textit{Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War}, 3 vols.} It was, in fact, Maurice’s contention that the role of a British official historian was different to that of his counterpart working in a monarchy, such as Prussia: due to the influence of public opinion on national policy, he had produced an authorised account specifically intended for this readership.\footnote{236 Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, p. 12.} So, again, while foreign influence played a part, in this genre of Military History, a specifically British path was trod.
Chapter 4

‘Popular’ Military History,
1854-1914

While for the most part official history was written specifically for those in the military, other forms of Military History appeared between 1854 and 1914 that were intended for a much broader audience. During this period the term ‘popular’ was applied to the Military History which was intended for a wide readership and which was, as a result, written in an accessible style, drawing on a limited range of source material.¹ Just as in the case of Military History exams set by the army, where no significant period of time needed to elapse between the conclusion of a campaign and the appearance of questions related to it, popular Military History often appeared likewise very soon after the event which it described.²

Although the use of the term ‘popular’ to describe accessible Military History does not appear to have come into common use until the 1850s, examples of this style of work were published after the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in the form of memoirs and

biographies.\(^3\) Even with the level of public literacy, which was around sixty-per cent for men in 1851, volumes which provided lists of battles enjoyed some degree of success before 1854. Most notably Edward Creasy’s *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* went through six editions in the three years immediately following its publication in 1852.\(^4\) Prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War, however, popular campaign histories were comparatively rare, although G.R. Gleig, Chaplain General of the Forces, was particularly prolific in the publication of such work.\(^5\) Nevertheless, after 1854 popular Military History underwent a significant period of expansion and diversification, so that by 1907 a ‘British Officer’ writing in the *American Historical Review* noted that every war seemed to produce a ‘stream of popular ephemeral books [which] are read by many… and become for the majority of the public’ the extent of their reading on the conflict.\(^6\)

The development of popular Military History prior to 1914 has been entirely overlooked by historians. Although John MacKenzie in *Popular Imperialism and the Military* used the term “‘instant” histories’ to refer to historical accounts written by journalists published soon after the end of a campaign, this appeared in relation to a study of the way warfare was represented, not how this type of writing developed.\(^7\) Similarly, while there have been some studies which have looked at how popular Military History was written in relation

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\(^4\) Weedon, *Victorian Publishing*, pp. 33, 114; and, Altick, *English Common Reader*, (London, 1957), pp. 171, 81, 83, 84. In 1851 the literacy rate for men was 60%, for women it was 50%; therefore, since the population was approximately 17.9 million at this time, there were around 9.7 million people in the country who were literate.


to individual conflicts during the nineteenth century, these have not sought to place their findings in the broader context of the development of this form of writing. Several works have examined the historiography of the Indian Mutiny, although apart from Christopher Herbert’s *War of No Pity* all were written under the postcolonial dispensation to assume that any writing by a British author on this conflict prior to the end of Britain’s empire in the region was necessarily an instrument of colonial power. There have also been two studies of the historiography of the Second Boer War, the first of which was written by Ian Beckett and the second by Frederick van Hartzfeldt. However, Hartzfeldt’s work consisted mainly of an annotated bibliography, and Beckett’s study overlooked primary material related to the production of the *Times History of the War in South Africa*. As Beckett based his study on the official correspondence sent between *The Times* Managing Director, Charles Moberly Bell, and the editor of the work, Leo Amery, he overlooked the unofficial communications between these men which were purposely not recorded in the newspaper’s archives. Likewise, Beckett did not make use of the private discussions regarding the history which took place between Amery and William Blackwood, who was involved in the proof reading of the work.

To contribute an answer to the fourth research sub-question of this study, which asked what factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military History

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11 For example, CCA, Amery Papers, 1/1/6, Moberley Bell to Amery, 4 May 1900, and Moberley Bell to Amery, 11 May 1900. Letters such as these only appear in the collection of Amery’s correspondence with Moberley Bell at the archive of Churchill College, Cambridge. No transcript of them is to be found in the Times Archive, even though they discuss the *Times History of the War in South Africa*.

12 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30116, Amery to Blackwood, 30 August 1906, MS30121, Amery to Blackwood, 30 July 1906.
between 1854 and 1914, this chapter intends to examine the development of this form of writing. As popular Military History was intended to appeal to a wide section of the reading public, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the degree to which commercial opportunism played a role in the growing popularity of this genre. Equally, since this type of work had the potential to allow an author to address a large audience it is also important to consider the extent to which the writing of popular Military History was influenced by the desire to change the public’s perception of military affairs. Bearing these considerations in mind, this chapter will examine: first, the emergence of a mass market for popular Military History between 1854 and 1884; second, the material produced between 1884 and the start of the Second Boer War in 1899; third, the impetus provided by the Second Boer War on the publication of popular Military History; and, fourth, the popular Military History produced between 1902 and the outbreak of the Great War.

I. Emergence of a Mass Market for Popular Military History, 1854-1884

Thanks to the development of steamships and the telegraph, the Crimean War was the first major conflict in which eyewitness accounts from those directly involved in the fighting, as well as reports from the new breed of War Correspondent, most notably William Howard Russell, could reach London within a matter of days of the event they described.13 The new speed with which uncensored first-hand information was available not only allowed newspapers to provide daily coverage of the war, but also permitted the rapid publication of volumes containing eyewitness accounts and narratives describing the conduct of the campaign.14 The best-selling example of this type of work was Russell’s War, published by

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14 Edward Hamley, Story of the Campaign of Sebastopol (London, 1855); Earl of Cardigan, Eight Months on Active Service (London, 1855); S.J.G. Calthorpe, Letters from Head-Quarters: or the Realities of the War in the Crimea (London, 1855). For examples of the work produced by civilian tourists: Mrs Duberly, Journal of
Routledge, which consisted of his despatches from the Crimea ‘precisely as they appeared originally in The Times newspaper’.\textsuperscript{15} The large sale of this work demonstrated the demand for this type of literature; in fact, by late 1856 it had sold 21,000 copies.\textsuperscript{16}

Not only did these works reflect and foster the reading public’s interest in the conflict, but they also enabled the emergence of a new type of accessible Military History. In 1856 the first part of George Dodd’s serialised \textit{Pictorial History of the Russian War} appeared.\textsuperscript{17} This work, ‘called forth’ by the reading public’s ‘intense interest’ in the conflict, was published by W. & R. Chambers, and was complete in a total of twelve parts issued monthly, each costing 1/-\textsuperscript{18} Dodd explained that this history was made possible since the conflict ‘differed from all preceding wars in… that it admitted, to a very remarkable degree, [to] historical narration during the progress of the events themselves’ through the ‘publication of numerous volumes by military officers [and journalists], describing rapidly, but faithfully, such portions of the scenes and events of warfare as came under their personal observation’. Since it was felt that there was insufficient material on which to provide a ‘complete analysis of events, in their causes, and their consequences’ this was left ‘to a later generation’, and instead the history focused on providing descriptions of battles and life in the allied camp, derived from the first-hand accounts. Given its source material, the history depicted the dreadful conditions which confronted allied soldiers, including the terrible conditions of the Hospital at Scutari.\textsuperscript{19}

Russell also produced a serialised history of the war entitled \textit{British Expedition to the Crimea}, which was published by Routledge in 1858 and was complete in thirteen 1/-

\textsuperscript{15} W.H. Russell, \textit{The War from the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan} (London, 1855), p. i.
\textsuperscript{17} Dodd, \textit{Chambers’s Pictorial History of the Russian War}.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., (part 1), pp. 1, 50. This is an advert for the second part of the work. The history could be brought complete after its initial run and so some library copies do not indicate that this work was serialised. The copy held in the British Library, however, is a collection of the original serialised parts bound together with the cover for each part contained at the back of the work.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. v, 215, 287, 288, 310.
instalments. Like Dodd’s work it was founded on the ‘valuable [and] trustworthy… letters written from the very scene’ of the war, although naturally Russell’s own despatches predominated. The work reflected the strong criticism which he had directed at the British military establishment, particularly the commander of British forces in the Crimea, Lord Raglan, to whose ‘ignorance, mismanagement, and apathy’ Russell attributed ‘so much of the sufferings and losses… of our troops’.20

There was a strong financial incentive for publishers to produce serialised Military History. The use of first-hand accounts not only allowed the work to be quickly produced so that it appeared while public interest in the conflict was at its height, but it also enabled the re-use of material that had already been published. Moreover, while the purchase of a monthly 1/- issue was affordable for the customer in relation to the price of a book, which usually cost at least five times as much, if the complete history was purchased the publisher stood to take more money. For example, although Russell’s War cost 5/-, Routledge was able to charge a total of 13/- for Russell’s British Expedition to the Crimea which utilised essentially the same information.21 The release of single affordable instalments also allowed the publisher to undercut the circulating libraries, as they were cheap enough for a consumer to purchase outright, thus increasing the publisher’s sales.22 Furthermore, the inside covers of each issue also provided advertising space which the publisher could sell, and in Russell’s history notices appeared for silver cutlery and christening robes, suggesting that the publisher envisaged that the work would have a middle class readership.23

20 William Russell, British Expedition to the Crimea (London, 1858), esp. the advertisement on p. 1. This was advertised as a ‘History of the War by the Special Correspondent of the Times’.
21 Russell, British Expedition to the Crimea, p. 1.
22 Weedon, Victorian Publishing, p. 97. A circulating library allowed a user to rent a pre-specified number of books for the payment of a subscription. As throughout much of the Nineteenth Century high book prices ensured that the majority of the reading public could not afford to purchase volumes, this method of circulation provided reading material for large numbers of people. Kate Flint, The Cambridge History of Victorian Literature (Cambridge, 2012), p. 22.
23 Russell, British Expedition to the Crimea, Part 5, p. 256.
Several non-serialised histories also made use of eyewitness impressions sent from the Crimea so they could also be published while the public interest in the war was high.\textsuperscript{24} For example, Henry Tyrrell’s \textit{History of the War with Russia}, published by the London Printing and Publishing Company in 1855, was written whilst the war was on-going and so was subtitled ‘the present expedition against Russian aggression in the East’.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, this history consisted largely of an uncritical synthesis of soldier’s letters and newspaper reports. Russell’s work was particularly prevalent and the account of the charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava which appeared was quoted verbatim from his report in \textit{The Times}.\textsuperscript{26}

The next major military event which resulted in the publication of a significant amount of popular Military History was the Indian Mutiny, which began in May 1857. Given the suddenness of the outbreak there were few correspondents to relay information back to London. The introduction of ‘Gagging Act’ in June, which restricted the content of newspapers in India, and the isolated nature of the British garrisons, meant that there was little reliable information available on the conflict for the press to publish.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, publishers catered to the public’s demand for information by quickly producing a large quantity of work in which an individual narrated the part of the Mutiny they had encountered.\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, soon after the outbreak several historical works appeared which drew on eyewitness accounts to cover all of the Mutiny: the first volume of G.B. Malleson’s \textit{Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical Narrative} was published in July 1857, Charles Ball’s \textit{History of the Indian

\textsuperscript{24} For example: George Brackenbury, \textit{Campaign in the Crimea: An Historical Sketch} (London, 1855); Captain Spencer, \textit{Fall of the Crimea} (London, 1855); Atwell Lake, \textit{Defence of Kars} (London, 1857); and, Charles Duncan, \textit{Campaign with the Turks in Asia}, 2 vols. (London, 1855).
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 318-36, 306, 228-30.
\textsuperscript{28} C.N. North, \textit{Journal of English Officer in India} (London, 1858); J.W. Shepherd, \textit{A Personal Narrative of the Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore During the Sepoy Revolt} (Lucknow, 1879); W. Russell, \textit{A Diary of the Sepoy Rebellion} (London 1857); A. Case, \textit{Day by Day at Lucknow} (London, 1858); Henry Knollys (ed.), \textit{Incident of the Sepoy War: Compiled from the Private Journals of the General Sir Hope Grant} (London, 1874); and, Mowbray Thompson, \textit{Story of Cawnpore} (London, 1859).
Mutiny appeared in 1858 and George Dodd’s History of the Indian Revolt in 1859. To catch the public’s interest in the conflict through quick publication, Ball and Dodd’s histories consisted largely of extended quotations from the first-hand accounts linked together by one or two sentences.

All of these histories overtly supported the idea of Empire and eulogised the benevolence of the British rule in India, indicating how it had ‘improved the lot of the Indians’. They emphasised the plight of the British civilians caught up in the uprising through explicit descriptions and illustrations of the mutilation and rape of Western women, presenting them as victims of native brutality. Some of the most lurid descriptions of Indian atrocities were in relation to the massacre at Cawnpore, in which around two hundred British women and children had been killed. Dodd and Ball repeated stories which related how savagely these women had been murdered and they claimed messages had been left exhorting British men to ‘avenge us’. They used these vivid descriptions of Indian atrocities not only to explain and excuse British counter-massacres, but to justify the commendation of the commanders, such as Brigadier-General J.G.S. Neill, who had committed them. Malleson’s history went even further: he used his work to condemn the government’s mishandling of the uprising and called for the ‘merciless’ hunting ‘down of every mutineer’, as ‘India will not be secure so long as a single [rebel] remains alive’. This attitude also appeared in a series of

30 Malleson’s first volume consisted of a history of the events leading up to the Mutiny, and so was not based on first-hand accounts of the outbreak, his second volume, which appeared in 1858, relied on them, however. Charles Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 1 Vol. (London, 1858), pp. 60, 64, 77, 86; Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 52-5; and, [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Vol. 2, p. 79.
31 Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 1 Vol., p. 31; and, Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 10-1.
biographical works, mainly written about Henry Havelock, published in the years following the Mutiny, which lionised his devout Christianity.\textsuperscript{36}

However, not all historical works produced immediately after the Mutiny demonised the natives, R.M. Martin’s \textit{Indian Empire} and Henry Mead’s \textit{Sepoy Revolt}, both published in 1858, blamed the British misrule of India as the direct cause of the uprising.\textsuperscript{37} While these works presented the notion of the Empire in a positive light, they explained native grievances by highlighting the ‘ineffective administration of Justice’ and ‘exclusion of the natives from all share in the government’.\textsuperscript{38} While Martin acknowledged the viciousness of the massacre at Cawnpore, he pointed out that the 1\textsuperscript{st} Native Infantry ‘hardened as it had become in mutiny, refused to take part in the savage butchery’, underlining the belief that the killings were a result of the native’s inherent cruelty. Similarly, he noted that there was no evidence that British women had been raped and that the messages supposedly left by those massacred were later forgeries. Martin also denounced British reprisals, illustrating in damning fashion that Neill’s policy of ‘unlimited hanging’ had actually spurred the mutineers to conduct the Cawnpore massacre.\textsuperscript{39}

Unlike the Crimean War, the public interest in the Indian Mutiny led to the production of numerous historical works long after the fighting ceased. Those which appeared in the 1860s adopted an attitude toward native Indians that was between the positions held by the first histories. J. Cave-Browne’s \textit{Punjab and Delhi in 1857}, published by Blackwood in 1861, did not shy away from referring to the brutality of attacks on British civilians, but like Martin he pointed out that there was no evidence that British women had suffered ‘indignities to


\textsuperscript{39} Martin, \textit{Indian Empire}, Vol. 2, pp. 262, 288, 300, 383.
embitter and aggravate their end’.\(^{40}\) While Neill was styled as the ‘bold saviour of Allahabad and avenger of Cawnpore’, Browne did not try to justify British reprisals; instead, he ignored them and assured the reader that ‘it must not be supposed that… justice was suspended for war’.\(^{41}\) Similarly, G.O. Trevelyan in \textit{Cawnpore}, published by Macmillan in 1865, explained that one of the contributing factors which had led to the uprising was the lack of regard the British officer had for his native soldiers. He explained, ‘the sepoys were [called] “niggers”… that hateful word, which is now constantly on the tongue of all Anglo-Indians… in such an atmosphere how could mutual attachment exist, or mutual confidence?’ Still, Trevelyan held a low opinion of the ‘spoilt, flattered and idle’ natives in the Indian Army and claimed that their ‘insolence’ and ‘lust for power’ had combined with the uninterested British leadership to be the ‘effective causes of the outbreak’.\(^{42}\)

Despite the continued public interest in the Indian Mutiny, most British colonial conflicts fought between 1858 and the Sudan Campaign of 1884 had little Military History written about them. The reason for this was that during this time few officers produced work regarding a campaign they had taken part in as this was viewed unfavourably by the army and it was uncommon for many correspondents to accompanied British forces, so little information was available for the production of a history.\(^{43}\) As a result, the British expedition to Abyssinia led to just five accounts of the campaign, and the Red River Expedition of 1870 to only one volume.\(^{44}\) The Zulu War saw only three histories produced. Major W. Ashe and Captain E.V.W. Edgell’s \textit{Story of the Zulu Campaign}, published by Sampson Low in 1880,\(^{45}\)

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p. xi; Vol. 2, p. 265.
\(^{43}\) Brackenbury, \textit{Memories}, p. 57.
was uncritical of the conduct of the war. 45 But both the anonymously written *History of the Zulu War*, produced by Chapman and Hall in 1880, and A. Wilmot’s work of the same title, published by Richard and Best, were both highly critical of the justification of war and Lord Chelmsford’s conduct. 46 The First Boer War of 1881 merely occasioned two narratives of the conflict, both produced by civilians, as well as four first-hand accounts. 47 Although historical work on the British invasion of Egypt later appeared alongside those depicting the Sudan campaign, prior to 1884 only a small amount of Military History was written about it. 48

More instant histories appeared regarding the Ashanti campaign of 1873 as not only did the several journalists who accompanied the expedition produce narratives of it, but on the orders of Wolseley, who had led the expedition, two additional accounts were written in an attempt to control how the reading public viewed his conduct during the campaign. 49 To this end, Wolseley requested that Brackenbury, his assistant military secretary, should write ‘an accurate account of the military operations, with other matter as will make it of general interest’. 50 Gaining a large readership was central to Brackenbury’s task and so he felt that it was essential that his work should appear quickly, ‘before public interest in the war had dried out’. Thus he ‘worked with all [his] power’ for ‘twelve to fourteen hours a-day’, enabling

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48 The few exceptions were related to the controversy surrounding Hamley and Wolseley. See, for example, E.B. Hamley, ‘Second Division at El-Tel-Kebir’, *Nineteenth Century*, 12 (Dec. 1882), pp. 861–70.
50 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4300, ff. 206, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 23 November 1873. The work was not classed as an official history as it was not written with the approval of the Secretary of State for War, nor was it produced with public funds.
him to produce the two volume, 795-page account in six weeks.\textsuperscript{51} Despite these exertions, Brackenbury’s ‘unrestricted access to all official documents’ proved to be an inhibiting factor as he was ‘limited’ to the confines of this material and so could not ‘in any way [attempt] to compete in descriptive writing’ with the civilian accounts of the war.\textsuperscript{52} This made the account comparatively ‘dry’ reading, limiting its appeal, and in November 1874 Brackenbury was forced to admit that the limited sale of his work, entitled Ashanti War: A Narrative (1874), had caused it to be a commercial failure.\textsuperscript{53}

Given the lack of impact of Brackenbury’s history, Maurice, Wolseley’s private secretary during the campaign, wrote an anonymous account in which he hoped ‘to answer a number of questions [on the campaign] which everyone is still asking’.\textsuperscript{54} This work, entitled Ashantee War: A Popular Narrative, was much more overt in its attempts to influence the reading public’s understanding of the conflict than Brackenbury’s account had been. It condemned several newspapers for providing a platform for those who attacked the conduct of the war, especially the ‘imaginative friends’ of the Ashanti who presented them as ‘virtuous’ victims of British aggression. Maurice also pointed out that this misinformation had directly influenced the Parliamentary debates on the justification for the war, as the information on which they were based did not come from an official document, but ‘an article … [from] one of the oldest of our magazines’.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{51} Brackenbury, Memories, pp. ix, 232; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4315, ff. 94, Blackwood to Blackwood, 23 May 1874, MS4300, ff. 206, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 23 November 1873, MS4315, ff. 58, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 4 April 1874, MS4315, ff. 69, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 22 April 1874, and MS4315, ff. 75, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 30 April 1874.

\textsuperscript{52} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4300, ff. 206, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 23 November 1873.

\textsuperscript{53} H. Brackenbury, Ashanti War: A Narrative, 2 vols. (London, 1874); Brackenbury, Memories, p. 232; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4315, ff. 98, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 27 November 1874, MS4315, ff. 53, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 28 January 1874, MS4315, ff. 67, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 22 April 1874, MS4315, ff. 94, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 23 May 1874, and MS30805, Blackwood’s Stock Book 1882–6, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{54} Luvaas, Education of an Army, p. 181; and, [Maurice], Ashantee War, p. iii. For evidence that the work was written by Maurice, see BL, Macmillan Papers, MS55075, ff. 33-36, Maurice to Macmillan, 1 October 1882.

\textsuperscript{55} [Maurice], Ashantee War, pp. 2, 6-7, 14, 31-2, 25-8, 52-3, 21.
Although British campaigns in Asia after 1854, with the exception of the Indian Mutiny, received little attention from military historians, the coverage of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, like that of the Ashanti War, was influenced by the desire of a British commander to have his actions portrayed in a positive light.\textsuperscript{56} When The Times correspondent Maurice MacPherson accused Lord Roberts, the leader of the Kabul Field Force, of cruelty and incompetence he was removed from his position and Major George White, Roberts’ own aid-de-camp, replaced him.\textsuperscript{57} Roberts closely controlled the press coverage of the campaign, feeding information to the only remaining civilian journalist with the force, Howard Hensman, special correspondent for the Daily News and Pioneer.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, Hensman’s narrative of the campaign, Afghan War of 1879-1880, published by W.H. Allen in 1881, displayed a very positive view of Roberts.\textsuperscript{59} The only other accounts of this war which appeared before 1884 were written by officers, several of whom had served under Roberts, and they too eulogised British conduct during the campaign.\textsuperscript{60}

Conflicts in which no British forces took part resulted in few historical accounts during this time. British publishers were dissuaded from producing work on the American Civil War as they would be competing with work published in the United States, so only a limited number of first-hand accounts and a single history of this war were written.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{56} For instance, the Lushai Expedition of 1871-2 to rescue British subjects captured during raids into Assam, and the campaign fought in Afghanistan in 1863 to punish incursions into India, only resulted in a single work respectively, while no popular historical accounts appeared on the Bhutan War or the Hazara Expedition. R.G. Woodthorpe, Lushai Expedition, 1871-2 (London, 1873); and, J. Adye, Sitana: A Campaign in Afghanistan (London, 1867).


\textsuperscript{58} Howard Hensman, Afghan War of 1879-1880: Being a Complete Narrative (London, 1881), pp. i, viii; and, Streets, ‘Military Influence in Late Victorian and Edwardian Popular Media’, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{59} Hensman, Afghan War, p. v.

\textsuperscript{60} W. Ashe, Personal Records of the Kandahar Campaign by Officers Engaged Therein (London, 1881); S.H. Shadbolt, Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80 (London, 1882); J.A.S. Colquhoun, Kurram Field Force (London, 1881); C. Swinnerton, Afghan War: Gough’s Action at Pattehhabad (Allen, 1880).

Moreover, at this time the copyright protection for foreign books in the United States was notoriously flawed; volumes with a demand in the country were often pirated and produced in cheap editions by American printers, further undermining the financial incentive for a British publisher to produce work on this war. It is telling that the only complete history of the conflict produced by a British writer, H.C. Fletcher’s History of the American War, published by Richard Bentley in 1865, was written by a man who had travelled in the country during the conflict and so embodied a rare perspective which gave the work more of an appeal to a British audience than if it had been written by an American.

Similarly, despite the scale and the significance of the Seven Weeks War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, and the fact there were few first-hand accounts of these conflicts in English, only a limited number of popular histories were produced. H.M. Hozier, who acted as a correspondent for The Times during these conflicts drew on his reports to produce serialised histories of each conflict. Due to a lack of information, each account focused on details of military organisation, described battles in a dispassionate manner and a large part of his history of the Franco-Prussian War was devoted purely to a description of the Rhine Valley. Although Edmund Ollier, who wrote serialised histories of the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish War for the publisher Cassell, also

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4, 32, 72. E.A. Pollard, Southern History of the War: Third Year of the War (New York, 1865); T.P. Shaffner, The War in America (London, 1862); R.L. Dabney, Life of General ‘Stonewall’ Jackson (New York, 1866); and, E.L. Chide, Life and Campaigns of General Lee (Atlanta, 1866).
62 Flint (ed.), Cambridge History of Victorian Literature, p. 34; and, Weedon, Victorian Publishing, p. 44.
63 H.C. Fletcher, History of the American War, Vol. 1, p. v, vi; and, Vol. 2, pp. 30, 222. The work was pro-Con federate in its sympathies and was compiled using material from the ‘daily press’.
suffered from a lack of information caused by the desire to produce works quickly, his writing was considerably more ‘popular’ in style. In both works he dispensed with a long explanation of the causes of the war, so that in the case of his history of the Franco-Prussian War by page twenty-three he had already moved on to a description of the fighting.\textsuperscript{67}

Besides the desire to catch the reading public’s interest in a conflict while it was at its height, it is likely that the reason why most popular Military History produced during this period referred to contemporary events was that a general lack of historical knowledge undermined interest in work on older campaigns. Military History was not taught at public schools, while in schools for poorer children the teaching of History, let alone Military History, occupied a low priority as most time was devoted to the teaching of basic reading, writing, and arithmetic.\textsuperscript{68} The popular Military History which referred to earlier epochs focused on events which could be understood out of historical context or with little explanation. Consequently, works which provided lists of major battles continued to be produced: Creasy’s \textit{Decisive Battles} went through a further nineteen editions between 1854 and 1874, and MacFarlane’s \textit{Great Battles of the British Army}, first published in 1833, was updated to include fighting which had taken place during the Indian Mutiny and Crimean War.\textsuperscript{69} The commercial success of these books led to the publication of W.F. William’s serialised \textit{England’s Battles by Sea and Land} by the London Printing and Publishing Company in 1854 and also W. Robson’s \textit{Great Sieges of History}, which appeared the

\textsuperscript{69} Creasy, \textit{Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World} (London, 25th edn., 1874); and, Charles MacFarlane, \textit{Battles of the British Army; to which are now added the Battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman} (London, 1855).
following year. Similarly, as during the 1850s and 1860s, while the number of remaining veterans of the Napoleonic wars steadily declined, the production of their memoirs continued to be popular during this period and Longman included Gleig’s *Veterans of the Chelsea Hospital*, a compilation of old soldiers’ experiences during this conflict, in their collections of cheap books sold at railway stations.

The production of Military History underwent a further expansion and diversification during this period as it began to appear in the cheap monthly magazines aimed at a middle-class readership which began to be published following both the abolition of the paper duty and the tax on advertisements by 1861. Although during this time the subject did not appear in the majority of these publications, it appeared prominently in *Temple Bar*, which was first published in 1860 and had a monthly circulation of around 13,000 copies. While the periodical had featured some Military History in the early 1860s, more appeared after 1870 when chapters from Creasy’s *Decisive Battles* were published in the August and October issues. Following the apparent success of this venture, between 1870 and 1875 articles on Napoleon’s campaigns, written by William O’Connor Morris, appeared regularly. The other periodical at this time which contained Military History was *Cornhill Magazine*, which could

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be purchased for 1/- and commanded a circulation of around 80,000 a month.\textsuperscript{76} When William Thackeray left the editor’s position in 1864 the publication began to include Military History related to a wide range of conflicts, including the Crimean War and the Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{77}

Similarly, in the mid-1850s a new type of periodical aimed at middle-class children emerged as publishers decided to combine education with instruction.\textsuperscript{78} While the majority of these publications contained almost no Military History, several contained large numbers of pieces on the subject. Such a publication, \textit{Boy’s Own Magazine}, owned by Samuel Beeton, began publication as a monthly periodical which cost 2.d. in 1855 and contained long running series on the British conquest of India and biographical pieces on famous generals.\textsuperscript{79} Likewise, \textit{Young Englishman’s Journal}, which was launched by William Emmett in April 1867, contained a large quantity of Military History and it featured articles on weapons, military biography, famous battles, and fiction set in historical situations.\textsuperscript{80} In sharp contrast to the Military History which would appear in boy’s literature later in the nineteenth century, that which appeared in these publications contained anti-war elements and often portrayed army life in negative terms. For example, in September 1855 \textit{Boy’s Own Magazine}, contained an eyewitness description of a Napoleonic era field hospital in which the ‘last agonies’ of the

\textsuperscript{76} Sullivan (ed.), \textit{British Literary Magazines}, p. xvi.
\textsuperscript{78} Kirkpatrick, \textit{From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller}, p. 7.
wounded soldiers were described and the reader was exhorted to ‘not believe in the glory of 
war… let us have no fighting for fighting’s sake’.\textsuperscript{81} Equally, in a story set during the Crimean 
War in \textit{Young Englishman’s Journal}, British soldiers were portrayed as cruel, selfish and 
vviolent men who were ultimately abandoned by the army to be left begging on the streets.\textsuperscript{82}

During the period between 1854 and 1884, there were several significant 
developments in the writing of popular Military History. The public interest in the Crimean 
War and the Indian Mutiny, combined with the new speed with which first-hand information 
could be available, not only caused the production of an unprecedented level of this type of 
work, but also led to the publication of serialised histories. Similarly, work which was 
intended to enhance the reputation of military figures appeared; and, Military History also 
began to appear in both children’s periodicals and in new, cheap, literary journals. While the 
limited level of literacy at this time curtailed the further growth of popular Military History, 
by the mid-1880s the numbers of those able to read in Britain had greatly increased. This was 
to have an important effect on how this form of Military History subsequently developed.

\section*{II. Consolidation of Popular Military History, 1884-1899}

Between 1876 and 1880 primary school attendance became compulsory as a result of the 
Forster Education Act of 1870. This, combined with the Balfour Act of 1902, which led to a 
rapid increase in the number of secondary schools, drove up the level of literacy in Britain 
from around sixty per cent in 1851 to ninety-six per cent by 1914.\textsuperscript{83} As the population of 
Britain grew from 17.9 million in 1850 to 45 million in 1901, this created a dramatically 
expanded reading public by the mid-1880s which was further supplemented by the growth of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[82] Anon., ‘Captain Jack: Or one of the Light Brigade’, \textit{Young Englishman’s Journal}, 3 (9 May 1868), p. 18; and, 
\end{footnotes}
the colonial book market during this time.\textsuperscript{84} These changes allowed the development of the cheap popular press in the 1870s and 1880s, which, as it became ever more imperialist and jingoistic, increasingly covered Britain’s colonial campaigns, and caused greater public awareness of them.\textsuperscript{85} Although the short campaign to invade Egypt in 1882 received some newspaper coverage, it was the attempt to relieve Gordon at Khartoum in 1884-5 which became the first British colonial campaign to be extensively covered in the new, cheap, daily press.\textsuperscript{86}

As Gordon was so central to the conduct of the campaign, and was already a popular hero following his exploits in China with the so-called ‘Ever Victorious Army’ (1860-2), the publication of biographical work about him became financially rewarding as publishers could now market work to the new and expanding reading public.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, the publisher Thomas Longman offered £5,000 to Gordon’s brother in an effort to secure the rights to the General’s ‘Last Journals’ sent from Khartoum. However, when he was outbid by Kegan Paul, who offered 5,000 guineas, Longman angrily noted that ‘it was those damned shillings’ that had lost him such a lucrative opportunity.\textsuperscript{88} In an attempt to meet the reading public’s demand for such work a large number of biographical books and articles which dealt with Gordon appeared.\textsuperscript{89} These works elevated the general to the status of a ‘Christian Hero’ and the

\textsuperscript{84} Altick, \textit{English Common Reader}, pp. 81-4; and, Weedon, \textit{Victorian Publishing}, pp. 32, 38, 56, 157, 182. \\
\textsuperscript{86} MacKenzie, \textit{Imperialism and Popular Culture}, pp. 56-8. \\
\textsuperscript{87} Gerald Herman, ‘Charles Gordon’, in Corvi and Beckett (eds.), \textit{Victoria’s Generals}, pp. 129, 151. \\
\textsuperscript{88} Briggs, \textit{History of Longmans}, p. 323. \\
‘Youngest of the Saints’ for his role fighting against a ‘savage’ Islamic uprising that actively supported the slave trade.\textsuperscript{90}

The demand for work on this campaign led to the production of a large number of historical accounts including, \textit{Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan}, which consisted of thirty parts which appeared soon after the end of the war costing 1/- each.\textsuperscript{91} Like earlier serialised histories, it consisted mainly of collated first-hand accounts and official despatches.\textsuperscript{92} The work, written by James Grant, reflected an increasingly nationalistic and sensationalist approach. It lauded British ‘pluck’, did not feature any criticism of British operations and featured a graphic description of Gordon’s death, including details that were impossible for the author to have known.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, several articles dealing with the history of the campaign appeared in the popular periodical press, particularly in \textit{Blackwood’s Magazine}; which, although it had been an established high-brow journal, was increasingly identified as a low-brow colonial and military interest publication as the older generation of contributors had ceased to produce work in the 1880s.\textsuperscript{94}

The re-conquest of the Sudan, which took place between 1896 and 1899, also resulted in a large quantity of press coverage which quickly translated into a significant number of


\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 163; and, No. 30, p. 286.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 5-11, 14, 163, 165, 168; Vol. 2, pp. 130-1; Vol. 3, pp. 2, 130-134, 150-158; Vol. 6, p. 168 and, No. 30, p. 286. For example, although Grant admitted that there was no reliable information on Gordon’s death, his account contained a detailed description of how the Mahdi supposedly jubilantly reacted to the news, including what he said. See also Johnson, ‘Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth’, pp. 302-5.

historical narratives of the campaign.⁹⁵ Such an account by a journalist, who was present for much of the fighting, was G.W. Steevens’ *With Kitchener to Khartum*, which was published by Blackwood in 1898. Since the speed of production was perceived to be all important, Steevens felt that the work ‘should be worth £200, if it is published before… any other,’ so he cabled chapters from the Sudan as the campaign came to a conclusion.⁹⁶ When the account was published in September 1898, shortly after the Battle of Omdurman, it was the first on the campaign to appear and so, given the public interest in the events of the re-conquest, it sold 44,362 copies in the remaining months of 1898 alone.⁹⁷ So great was the demand for the work that it soon outstripped supply and it was ‘impossible’ to obtain copies in London by 7 October 1898.⁹⁸ In part, this was due to the development of the colonial book market as many copies were sold in India during this time and in April 1899, Steevens reported that his book was ‘everywhere’ in the country.⁹⁹ As Steevens had suspected, however, the value of the work was closely related to the public interest in the war, and so sales soon dropped off dramatically. In 1899 Blackwoods sold 10,540 copies, mostly in the first months of the year, whereas in 1900 and 1901 respectively, only 3,242 and 1,514 copies were sold.¹⁰⁰

This rising demand for Military History, particularly from the Indian book market, led to an increase in the production of work related to conflict in that region. Thus, the Chitral Campaign of 1895, the campaign to relieve the siege of Malakand in 1897 and the Tirah

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⁹⁶ NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4682, ff. 68, Steevens to Blackwood, [n.d.] 1898, and MS4682, ff. 69, Steevens to Blackwood, 2 July 1898.
⁹⁷ NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30808, Blackwood Stock Books, 1896-1901, pp. 364-368, MS4682, ff. 67-68, Steevens to Blackwood, 12 May 1898, MS4682, ff. 73, Steevens to Blackwood, 1 October 1898.
⁹⁸ NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4682, ff. 75, Steevens to Blackwood, 7 October 1898.
⁹⁹ NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4695, ff. 52-60, Steevens to Blackwood, 19 April 1899, MS4682, ff. 73, Steevens to Blackwood, 1 October 1898, MS4682, ff. 89, Steevens to Blackwood, 10 December 1898.
¹⁰⁰ NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30808, Blackwood Stock Books, 1896-1901, pp. 364-368, MS4682, ff. 77, Steevens to Blackwood, 10 October 1898, MS4682, ff. 79, Steevens to Blackwood, 18 October 1898.
expedition of 1898, all relatively minor undertakings, resulted in a considerable number of books and journal articles. A particularly notable example of such work was Winston Churchill’s *Story of the Malakand Field Force*, which met with good sales in India. The Indian book market also caused the continued production of work related to the Indian Mutiny, and Trevelyan’s *Cawnpore* was printed in a cheap edition and was added to Macmillan’s ‘Colonial Library’ in 1894.

In contrast, with the exception of the Napoleonic Wars, few campaign narratives were written about other British conflicts which had not recently occurred, suggesting that the popularity of instant history was closely associated with its ability to give the reader an understanding of contemporary events. Nevertheless, work which allowed the reader to get straight to the action and to understand events on some level without the need to fully grasp their historical context also remained popular. Thus, Creasy’s *Fifteen Decisive Battles* went through a further thirteen editions between 1874 and 1894 and it became the ‘inevitable

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However, what set the writing about the campaigns in the Sudan apart from earlier historical work was the extent to which an emphasis placed on the notion of British superiority, thought to be underpinned by a racial primacy. Such an emphasis focused on the supposed superiority of British civilisation in comparison to that of the natives encountered and so was used to justify Imperialism. For example, Reginald Wingate, head of the Intelligence Branch of the British-controlled Egyptian Army, wrote a historical account of the rise of the Dervish, \textit{Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan}, in an attempt to use the popularity of
Military History to create support for the re-conquest of the region. To this end, he contrasted the civilisation and progress which he thought the British had brought to Egypt, with the destruction of the Mahdists, who he presented as fanatical, bloodthirsty, debauched savages, had brought to the Sudan. Also in an effort to create support for the re-conquest of the region Wingate co-wrote the memoirs of European escapees from Khartoum, Slatin Pasha and Father Ohrwalder, which further demonised the Dervish.

Likewise, in the works on the Sudan Campaigns, British officers were presented as on ‘the pinnacle of civilisation’; thus they were naturally intelligent and brave in action, whereas the ‘black [was] a perennial schoolboy, without the schooling’. Equally, as the British had undertaken the reformation of the Egyptian Army following the invasion of this country in 1882, its transformation into an effective fighting force was held as a confirmation of the Imperial ideal as close contact with the British was thought to have turned the natives into ‘a mirror of soldierly virtue’. Consequently, Alfred Milner and Evelyn Baring, writing in 1893 and 1908 respectively, both used the historical example of the Egyptian Army in their writing to further their arguments for Imperialism.

An emphasis on the superiority of the personality traits of British martial figures also appeared in biographical work, the publication of which became more prevalent after the commercial success of work on General Gordon. In 1889 Macmillan began a collection of cheap biographical volumes, known as the ‘Men of Action Series’, with W. Butler’s *General

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111 Wingate, *Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan*, pp. v, 466, 478, 482, 469, 490.
113 Steevens, *With Kitcshner to Khartum*, pp. 11, 19, 21, 27, 45–6, 55–6, 83, 91, 150, 142, 146, 278, 323, 325; and, Churchill, *River War*, pp. 12, 14–17, 91, 28, 30, 33, 37, 64, 90.
Each work gave a simple and uncritical account of the life of the subject, which reflected the increasing nationalism and militarism of the period, through an emphasis on personal characteristics, such as bravery and the ability to remain calm in a crisis, which were thought to be particularly British qualities. Likewise, the publisher George Newnes began the ‘Army and Navy Library: Stories of our National Heroes’ series in 1898 with Arthur Griffith’s heavily illustrated Wellington and Waterloo, which also emphasised the general’s personal characteristics, which were identified as typically British.

While much of the literature aimed at boys, such as the Religious Tract Society’s Boy’s Own Paper, contained little Military History, or gave an anti-war slant to their stories prior to the mid-1880s, this began to change as works increasingly reflected the increasing militarism and Imperialism of the period. In 1892 Cassell first published Chums, which contained considerably more Military History than its competitors. Not only did the paper contain a large number of features on the history of wars and British regiments, it also featured biographical work, interviews with military figures concerning their past service, especially regarding the award of medals. The close association between patriotism and the army in the Military History which featured in this publication was made especially apparent in the double issue produced for the Queen’s diamond jubilee in June 1897, in which the free

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119 For examples: George Emmet, Karl the Uhlan (London, 1885); idem, King’s Hussars (London, 1885); ‘J.J.A.J.M.’, Arab Jack, or the Adventures of a London boy in Egypt in the Soudan (London, 1885); and R. Simkin, Boys Books of British Battles, 1704-1882 (London 1892).

120 Kevin Carpenter, Penny Dreadfuls and Comics (London, 1983), p. 42; and, Kirkpatrick, From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller, p. 292.
‘Commemoration Supplement’ consisted of ‘an interesting pictorial… record of the most brilliant battles of the Queen’s reign’.  

The boys literature market was dramatically shaken up by the appearance of Alfred Harmsworth’s *Half-Penny Marvel* in 1893. As the publisher claimed that this periodical was an attempt to subvert the ‘penny-dreadful’ with more wholesome reading, it aimed to undercut the standard price of serials for children. While *Boy’s Own Paper* and *Chums* continued publication, such financial competition eliminated most of Harmsworth’s rivals, so he was soon able to diversify with new titles. One such publication was *Pluck*, which first appeared in 1894 and also sold for ½ d. The editor of this periodical hoped to ‘strike a decisive blow at penny-dreadful-ism’, with ‘volume after volume’ of stories which celebrated ‘such men as Lord Wolseley, Colonel [Frederick] Burnaby, Lord Roberts [and other] plucky Britons who have helped to make the British Empire’. Thus, the serial was filled with jingoistic stories, usually set around a campaign that had been fought in the Empire, which interwove genuine events from military history with fictional incidents which portrayed British men to be inherently superior to the natives they encountered. Although he did not write for *Pluck*, by far the most prolific writer of this type of work was G.A. Henty, who, beginning in 1868, but with increasing frequency after 1884, produced tales set mainly in British military history which were jingoistic and were full of examples of the supposed superiority of the British hero over the native peoples he encountered.

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122 Kirkpatrick, *From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller*, pp. 11-12, 38, 375; Anon., ‘Why this Paper is Published’, *Stories of Pluck*, 1 (n.d. 1895), p. i.


The role which Military History could play in creating a more nationalistic understanding of British identity and a greater comprehension of the Empire was not lost on the fervent nationalist, T.M. Maguire. On a visit to a school in a poor London district he was dismayed to find that ‘not one boy had… been taught one word of history’, and so ‘they never had been taught anything about… Nelson, or Wellington, or our Army in Europe or Asia’. So alarmed was Maguire at this that he gave a paper at the RUSI in May 1897, entitled ‘The National Study of Military History’, in which he argued that not only would the compulsory study of the subject ‘fill… young souls with patriotism’, but it would teach these ‘future voters’ who controlled the ‘dearest interests of 400,000,000 of the human race’ what ‘the word Empire means’.

Despite Maguire’s concern, an increasing quantity of Military History had begun to appear in school textbooks from the mid-1880s, mainly in the form of the celebration of ‘British’ personality traits in those noted for their martial prowess, or who were associated with a major conflict. While Cassell’s *Stories for Children for Standard III* of 1882 focused on Alfred the Great, the Duke of Marlborough, Nelson and Wellington, other works, such as C.M. Yonge’s *Westminster Reading Books* and J.C. Curtis’ *Elements of the History of England*, championed Gordon and Havelock. The Empire in India was not neglected and short accounts of Clive’s action at Plassey and Wellington’s battle of Assaye were included in J. Franck Bright’s *English History for the Use of Public Schools*. However, besides the discussion of some martial figures in these works, their emphasis remained on the

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125 T.M. Maguire was well known in military circles at this time for his establishment which prepared men for the Staff College admission exam.
127 Chancellor, *History for their Masters*, p. 73.
development of the British constitution, so military events continued to play a secondary role in the explanation of the nation’s history at this time.\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, the curriculum of most public schools remained centred around the study of classics, and Military History was neglected during this time.\textsuperscript{131}

Besides the teaching of Military History to children, Maguire also called for a greater knowledge of the subject among politicians and the electorate, which had tripled between 1867 and 1884.\textsuperscript{132} As Maguire felt that the ‘most fatal evils of democratic politics are cant and hysteria’, as well as the ‘arbitration craze’, he felt that the future of the country depended on the widespread ‘national study of Military History’ which would bring the public to the realisation that ‘the strong man armed is the determining factor, whether domestic order, social decency, or international comity be at issue’.\textsuperscript{133} Maurice also shared a similar view regarding the historical knowledge of politicians, so when he was asked in 1881 by the Adjutant General, Charles Ellice, to write a pamphlet to provide historical examples to assist the Farrer Committee, formed to consider the construction of a channel tunnel, he was keen to oblige. To this end, he wrote \textit{Hostilities without Declaration} in 1883, which argued that as many nations had been attacked in the past without warning, the creation of a channel tunnel would seriously undermine Britain’s defences as it could be seized by an enemy force in a surprise attack and used to invade the country.\textsuperscript{134}

The writer who most frequently used the popularity of Military History in an effort to influence the reading public’s understanding of military matters was Spenser Wilkinson.


\textsuperscript{133} Maguire, ‘National Study of Military History’, pp. 609, 610, 612-3.

\textsuperscript{134} J.F. Maurice, \textit{Hostilities without Declaration: An Historical Abstract of the Case in which Hostilities have Occurred between Civilised Powers Prior to Declaration or Warning from 1700 to 1870} (London, 1883), p. i.
From 1892 Wilkinson increased the number of articles he wrote on martial topics which included reference to military history in the *Spectator, Contemporary Review, Nineteenth Century, New Review* and *National Review.*\(^{135}\) In these articles, Wilkinson intended to appeal ‘to the educated public in general’, especially with regards to the ‘way in which… naval and military operations [are] connected with each other’; he also introduced this readership to the writing of Clausewitz, who he termed ‘the best of all writers on war’.\(^{136}\) Likewise, Wilkinson argued for the use of Military History in the education of politicians, as he felt that the subject had clearly demonstrated that war was principally ‘a political act’, and so ‘just as the ultimate value of all History is to give us political teaching for our future conduct… the true value of Military History is to enable the nation… to bear itself in the future’.\(^{137}\)

In 1890 Wilkinson wrote a short pamphlet entitled *Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff* which was published by Constable. This was intended to provide a detailed description of this system ‘at work in war [during] the campaign of 1866’, and to exemplify ‘some of the relations between strategy and policy’ for both the reading public and the Hartingdon Commission, then sitting to investigate the reformation of the War Office, since he felt neither understood these topics.\(^{138}\) While Wilkinson later told Roberts that almost all of those who read the work ‘assumed that my purpose was to advocate the German plan for England’, in fact his intention was to ‘distinguish between its essentials and its local temporary and personal peculiarities’, so to provide ‘a warning against overhasty imitation’ which he hoped would lead to the creation of a system designed uniquely for the

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British case. However, as the work was published on 11 February, the day on which Hartington’s report was signed, it ultimately appeared too late to have any direct bearing on proceedings. Wilkinson was ‘bitterly disappointed’ by the findings of the Commission ‘for it recommended the creation, under the name of a general staff, of a department bearing little resemblance to the model which it professed to copy’, seeming ‘to justify the apprehension which caused [him] to write’. Despite this, the work was well received by both Moltke and Roberts. Wilkinson took their praise as ‘the highest reward which amateur students of war can look for’.

Although no major British war was fought between 1884 and 1899, the quantity of Military History produced during this time dramatically increased due to the financial incentive for publishers created by the growth of the reading public’s interest in British colonial conflicts. As a result, popular Military History emerged a key element in writing on military matters. Following the Boer declaration of war in December 1899, Britain found itself involved in the largest conflict it had fought since the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. The unprecedented public interest in this war, combined with developments in printing technology, as well as the poor performance of the British Army, had a major effect on the popular Military History which appeared on this conflict.

139 NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-23-82 to 90, Wilkinson to Roberts, 9 October 1891; and, Wilkinson, *Brain of an Army*, pp. 8, 39.
140 Wilkinson, *Brain of an Army*, p. 5.
141 NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-23-82 to 90, Wilkinson to Roberts, 9 October 1891; and, Wilkinson, *Brain of an Army*, p. 17.
III. Popular Military History and the Second Boer War, 1899-1902

As with previous wars fought since 1854, the Second Boer War quickly generated narrative accounts written by eyewitnesses. However, the sheer quantity of this type of work far outstripped that which had been produced previously, reflecting not only the scale of the war but also the level of interest among the reading public. Some of the first volumes to appear were written by correspondents as they were usually based on the despatches sent to their respective newspapers.  

There was an unprecedented number of accounts produced by officers which described either their part in the war or provided a largely uncritical account of the activities undertaken by their unit. A good example of both of these types of work were the two volumes produced by the army officer and correspondent for the *Morning Post*, Winston Churchill, entitled *London to Ladysmith via Pretoria* and *Ian Hamilton’s March*. Both volumes, which were based on his despatches sent to the newspaper, appeared in 1900 as he had been ‘shrewdly advised to seize an hour while the attention of the world is fixed on South Africa’ to publish them. This approach paid off and within a few months *London to Ladysmith* had sold 11,000 copies and earned him £720. As Churchill had expected, the sale of the work soon rapidly declined as the reading public lost interest in the war; in

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146 RPL, Longman Papers, MS1393.2.72, ff. 398, Churchill to Longman, 10 March 1900.

147 CCA, Churchill Papers, CHAR 28/152B/188, Churchill to ‘Jack’, n.d., [1900?].
November 1903 *London to Ladysmith* and *Ian Hamilton’s March* only sold eighty-six and 136 copies respectively.\(^{148}\)

While the majority of the first-hand accounts produced about the Second Boer War were little different in style to those which had appeared on earlier conflicts, after 1900 new types of work began to appear. In 1901 Blackwood published *Words by an Eyewitness: The Struggle in Natal*, which consisted of a series of articles which had appeared in *Blackwood’s Magazine* written by M.H. Grant under the pseudonym ‘Linesman’.\(^{149}\) Instead of providing a simple account of the campaign, the work focused on an attempt to articulate ‘the human side of… war’ through an explanation of the emotions felt by the author during the events he experienced.\(^{150}\) The work proved to be highly successful, going through eleven editions within a year, and it entered into a cheap ‘people’s edition’ which cost 6d. instead of the 6/- of the original as Grant felt that there would continue to be ‘a large market for [the book]… in the colonies… and among the lower-middle class’ in England.\(^{151}\) Similarly, Blackwood also published *On the Heels of De Wet* in November 1902, a first-hand account of British attempts to locate Boer guerrilla forces written by *The Times* correspondent Lionel James under the pen-name ‘Intelligence Officer’.\(^{152}\) To retain his anonymity the author was deliberately vague regarding the exact locations featured in the work and instead focused on

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\(^{149}\) ‘Linesman’ [M.H. Grant], *Words by an Eyewitness: Struggle in Natal* (London, 1901). For evidence that ‘Linesman’ was M.H. Grant, see NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 10 April 1901.

\(^{150}\) [M.H. Grant], *Words by an Eyewitness*, p. v. Another similar work was J. Milne, *Epistles of Atkins* (London, 1902).

\(^{151}\) Anon., ‘Review of *Words of An Eyewitness*', *Times Literary Supplement* (No. 23, 20 June 1902), p. 183; NLS, Blackwoods Papers, MS30084, Grant to Blackwood, 30 January 1902, MS30084, Grant to Blackwood, 9 December 1902. The success of the work brought Grant to the attention of Henderson, who appointed him as his assistant while he worked on the Official History. NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 8 October 1901, MS30077, Henderson to Blackwood, 5 April 1901, MS30077, Henderson to Blackwood, 21 April 1901, and MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 28 February 1901.

\(^{152}\) For evidence that this work was written by Lionel James, see: NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30085, James to Blackwood, 2 March 1902; ‘Intelligence Officer’ [Lionel James], *On the Heels of De Wet* (London, 1902).
providing an impression of what it was like to take part in these operations. Although it did not sell as well as *Words from an Eyewitness*, a cheap colonial edition, which sold at 6 d., was produced in April 1903. Both of these works sold well in South Africa, as there was a ‘considerable demand for war books at the railway bookstalls’ in the country. Grant maintained that this demand was largely due to the British forces in the region, commenting that when it came to popular works, ‘the British Army is a much more of a reading society than most people have any idea of’.

This war also saw the production of an unprecedented number of serialised histories, the majority of which began publication in 1900. Given the advances in printing technology, it was now possible to produce each issue of these works more cheaply and faster than previously. For example, instalments of Richard Dane’s *Cassell’s History of the Boer War* and W.H. Wilson’s *With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War* appeared fortnightly, costing only 6 d. *With the Flag to Pretoria*, which after thirty instalments changed its title to *After Pretoria: The Guerrilla War* and ran for another forty-one issues, was published by the Amalgamated Press, the owners of the *Daily Mail* and *Pluck*, and embodied the increasing commercialisation of serialised Military History. To make the work stand out from its competitors, the front cover of each issue contained either a large

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153 ‘Intelligence Officer’ [James], On the Heels of De Wet, pp. 116, 166, 224, 230-1, 259.
155 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 8 October 1901.
156 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30077, Grant to Blackwood, 25 June 1901.
160 Wilson, After Pretoria: The Guerrilla War.
dramatic image depicting the fighting or the portrait of a famous British commander.¹⁶¹ Moreover, the emphasis on the maximisation of sales also directly influenced the way in which the war was narrated. For instance, as the public had shown great interest in the siege of Mafeking an entire special issue was devoted to it, which contained ‘a new and excellent portrait of Major Baden-Powell’, the commander of the town, even though, by the work’s own admissions, this siege was largely unimportant in terms of the course of the war.¹⁶²

Just as With the Flag to Pretoria demonstrated the new speed and low cost of production which were now possible, the ‘Graphic’ History of the South African War 1899-1900, written by Wentworth Huyshe, exhibited how easy and cheap the reproduction of photographs and other images in print had become.¹⁶³ The selling point of this History was the quantity and quality of the images in the work; it included large photographs and drawings of the fighting, as well as pictures of British generals, including a poster of Baden-Powell. The historical content the work was, though, superficial in the extreme. For instance, the causes of the ‘squabble’ were explained in less than half a page and the account of the battle of Elandslaagte consisted of only one paragraph. The work was also jingoistic; it focused on the bravery of British soldiers, especially those who had won the Victoria Cross, and was largely uncritical of British commanders.¹⁶⁴

The ‘Graphic’ History of the South African War was not alone in providing a nationalistic account of the conflict. The growing nationalism in the years prior to the outbreak of the Second Boer War led to the production of numerous superficial histories which attempted to meet the public’s demand for work which explained the cause of the war

¹⁶¹ Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, No. 26, p. i; No. 19, p. i; No. 18, p. 18. These covers were respectively, a drawing of a British soldier bayoneting a Boer, a portrait of General Buller and a portrait of General Smith-Dorrien.
¹⁶² Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, Vol. 2, pp. 616-7.
¹⁶³ Huyshe Wentworth, ‘Graphic’ History of the South African War (London, 1900); and, Weedon, Victorian Publishing, p. 81
and provided an overview of the operations.\textsuperscript{165} For example, Louis Creswick’s \textit{South Africa and the Transvaal War}, published in 1900-1, consistently portrayed the Boers in the worst possible light and did not give a complete account of the fighting as it was published before the end of the war.\textsuperscript{166} Similarly, F.T. Stevens’ \textit{Complete History of the South African War}, which appeared ‘immediately on the termination of hostilities’, focused on ‘showing the daily development of events over the whole area of the war’ with the intention of providing a ‘cheap, single, popular volume’ for the ordinary citizen. Like Creswick’s, this work uncritically repeated the British government’s justification for the war, emphasised how badly the Boers treated the native population and claimed that they had ‘over and over again’ shown a white flag to British soldiers only to open fire as they came to accept the surrender.\textsuperscript{167}

Just as earlier biographical works produced after 1884 celebrated what were seen as positive characteristics thought to be typically British, much of the historical literature produced on the Second Boer War eulogised Baden-Powell in a similar way for his conduct during the defence of the town of Mafeking; and he was the subject of numerous biographies.\textsuperscript{168} While earlier work on Gordon and Havelock had focused on extolling their Christianity, this was largely absent from that on Baden-Powell and instead there was an emphasis on how he embodied personality traits held in high regard, particularly bravery, which made him ‘typical of the British officer at his best’.\textsuperscript{169} This lionisation of Baden-
Powell led to the publication of numerous accounts of the siege of Mafeking, which often amounted to little more than further biographies of him. Even though the town itself was ‘of no substantial [material] importance to either side’, it resulted in as many historical narratives as did the siege of Ladysmith, a lengthy, pivotal engagement.170

Baden-Powell was not the only figure to be quickly idolised in multiple biographies for his role in this war. In Lord Roberts, who on 23 December 1899 had assumed overall command of British forces in South Africa, writers found another powerful subject.171 While all the biographical work on Roberts was superficial and uncritical, works on other figures were more complex as they were written in an attempt to exonerate officers who had suffered serious and embarrassing defeats by the Boers.172 The other feature of biographical work produced regarding this conflict was that for the first time a large number of books which consisted of collections of letters sent from the front by officers and soldiers who were later killed began to be published by their families as a form of commemoration.173

Despite the uncritical and jingoistic tone of much of the popular Military History written on the Second Boer War, for the first time since the Crimean War a large body of work appeared which was directly critical of British military leadership. For example,

although Foster Cunliffe’s *History of the Boer War* only treated the conflict up until the capture of Bloemfontein in March 1900, it was on occasion critical of British commanders, particularly Kitchener for his handling of the battle of Paardeburg.\(^{174}\) Similarly, Arthur Conan Doyle’s *Great Boer War*, which was first published by Smith and Elder in 1900, was particularly critical of the leadership provided by high-ranking British officers. The work, which was based on the information he had derived from the wounded British soldiers he met as he worked at Langford hospital in South Africa, criticised the lack of ‘care and foresight’ of British commanders and noted that ‘there may be a science of war in the lecture room at Camberley, but very little of it found its way to the veldt’.\(^{175}\) Although such criticism resulted in a response from F.N. Maude, writing in *Cornhill Magazine*, in which he argued that civilians were not competent to engage in analysis of current military operations, the work sold well and within a few months of its publication it had sold 12,500 copies so quickly that the publisher was unable to ‘print it fast enough’.\(^{176}\) By January 1901 the History had sold 30,000 copies in England, 9,000 in the colonies and ‘over 50,000 altogether’.\(^{177}\)

Although in many respects *With the Flag to Pretoria* embodied many elements of the superficial histories produced on the war because it celebrated the bravery of British soldiers, gave romanticised descriptions of the fighting, excused British military blunders and demonised the Boers, it also used Military History as a medium to communicate messages regarding national defence matters as Wilkinson and Maurice had done previously.\(^{178}\) Instead of downplaying the number of casualties Britain sustained, the book emphasised them, even

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containing images of women receiving the ‘fatal telegram’ informing them that their relative had been killed.\(^{179}\) This focus on the cost of a war fought with modern weapons was intended to underscore the result of the Empire’s lack of preparation and readiness for the war. The work called for ‘a higher standard of duty in England’ and a greater ‘solidarity’ in the Empire, which it hoped would cause politicians to ready the country for future conflict since ‘mistakes of generals in the field kill hundreds, [whereas] the ignorance of ministers in the Cabinet slays thousands’.\(^{180}\)

Similarly, the *Times History of the War in South Africa* also drew on the popularity of Military History in an attempt to create both public pressure for military reform and to make a profit. Initially, the work began as a suggestion in January 1900 by Leo Amery, *The Times* colonial editor, that the despatches sent by his correspondents regarding the war should be ‘strung together in a chronological string connected by a few paragraphs’, so to quickly and cheaply create ‘one or two volumes’ which could be put on sale in October 1900 for ‘perhaps 2/-’ with the hope of making money.\(^ {181}\) Both Sampson Low and Macmillan approached Bell with ‘anxious’ proposals that they should publish this work, and he entered into an agreement with the former in early March in which they were to be awarded a quarter of any profit made, with the rest retained by the *Times*.\(^ {182}\) Soon after his appointment as editor of this work, Amery changed his conception of it and suggested to Bell in February 1900 that, instead, he should take until the end of the year to create a longer ‘solid history of the war’ which could ‘illustrate [its] essential lessons’ and could ‘try and help toward the solution of


\(^{182}\) CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 12 January 1900; TAL, Managers Letter books, Second Series, Vol. 22, Bell to Amery, 12 January 1900, pp. 948-9, 952; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Moberly Bell to Amery, 10 April 1902; TAL, Managers Letter books, Second Series, Vol. 23, Bell to Amery, 7 March 1900, pp. 455-6; and, CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 15 March 1900.
our past mistakes’. Bell agreed to this widening of the scope of the project, noting that ‘the more volumes, the more the profit’. 

The decision to produce a longer more critical work ultimately created a conflict between Bell, who saw the History as primarily a way to make money for The Times, which was currently encountering financial problems, and Amery, who instead intended to create a comprehensive analytical account of the war. Initially, this disagreement manifested itself in the content of the first volume. Amery insisted that it should serve as an introduction to the account of the fighting which would begin in the second volume, but Bell, eager to ensure the initial instalment was purchased in large numbers, as ‘those who buy [it] will in all probability feel bound to buy the others’, pointed out that ‘we can hardly advertise a history of the war… which does not deal with the war’. Although Bell was unsuccessful in getting Amery to amend the first volume, he persisted in suggesting ways in which the work could be made more attractive to the reading public, including the suggestion that Baden-Powell should write the portion of the work on Mafeking.

The most persistent and intractable disagreement created by the conflict over the work’s function concerned the length of time it took to produce the work as Bell initially envisaged that a large part would be complete ‘by early October [1900]’, with the second volume out before July. Moreover, Bell placed more pressure on Amery to complete the

183 Amery, Times History of the War in South Africa Vol. 1, p. x; Vol. 2, p. viii; Vol. 3, p. vi; TAL, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Bell, May 8, 1900; and, CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 19 February 1900.
184 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 23 March 1900; and, TAL, Managers Letter books, Second Series, Vol. 23, 23 March 1900, pp. 636-639.
186 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 26 April 1900; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 27 March 1900; TAL, Managers Letter books, Second Series, Vol. 23, Bell to Amery, 27 March 1900, pp. 663-5.
187 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 19 June 1900; and, TAL, Amery Papers, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Bell, June 28 1900. This arrangement fell though as Baden-Powell pulled out so he could produce his own account of the siege.
188 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 12 April 1900; and, TAL, Amery Papers, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Bell, 2 May 1900.
work as from June 1900 he introduced a scheme in which on the advanced payment of £2.2 a subscriber would receive each of the five proposed volumes by May 1901. Since the subscription price was set for five volumes, if only four were produced the public would ‘feel swindled’, but if they were to produce six Bell noted they would have ‘swindled’ themselves. Even though Amery was assisted in the writing of the work by several Times correspondents, including Repington and James, and the third and fourth volumes were edited by Erskine Childers and Basil Williams respectively, his desire to produce a comprehensive history led to the time in which it took to produce each volume wildly exceeding that expected. While volume one appeared in 1900, the second took a further two years to produce, the third volume was not published until 1905, and, ultimately, the history ran into seven volumes, the last of which appeared in 1909. Unsurprising, the subscribers soon began to become unhappy with the delays in publication and by August 1901 Bell reported that letters from them were ‘now averaging eight per day and they are getting angry and asking [for] their money back’.

The main reason why the work took so long to produce was Amery’s desire to collect as much information as possible from which to draw his conclusions. To this end, he not only visited South Africa to ‘go over the battlefields’ in 1902, but would also circulate draft chapters which were extremely critical of British operations to the officers who had conducted them so he could then rewrite it in view of the ‘angry flood of information’ he would receive in reply. For example, the original draft which recounted the Battle of

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189 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 7 June 1900; and, CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 20 August 1901.
190 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 7 June 1900; and, CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 15 June 1900.
192 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 20 August 1901.
193 NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-21-1, Amery to Roberts, 24 February 1902; TAL, Amery Papers, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Bell, 28 July 1902; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/8, Amery to James, 29 August
Paardeburg was ‘sweeping’ in its critique of Lord Kitchener, but the considerably milder version which was published in the History was based on the information received from Ian Hamilton, Kitchener’s Chief of Staff in the final stages of the war. Even though in May 1902 Kitchener gave official permission for officers to assist Amery, Lord Roberts and those closely associated with him, including Henderson, had been already been supplying Amery with a large quantity of official information in a noticeable parallel with Robert’s conduct toward Hensman while he wrote an account of the Second Afghan War.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, given the source of much of Amery’s information, the History was very measured in the few criticisms it directed against Roberts, and for the most part it praised him. It only alluded to the fact that Roberts had completely miscalculated the nature of Boer resistance and, following the capture of the enemy capital, had left for England assuming the war was over, even though serious guerrilla fighting was to drag on for another eighteen months. Instead, as Amery and those close associates of Roberts held a negative opinion of Redvers Buller, the History was particularly critical of him, especially his operations to relieve Ladysmith. Even though in 1902 Amery had yet to learn the actual wording of a telegram the general had sent to the besieged commander at Ladysmith, General George White, in which he apparently suggested the garrison should surrender, Amery

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195 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/8, Amery to James, 27 March 1901; HCL, Wolseley Papers, ff. 3, Henderson to Wolseley, 15 August 1900; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Bell to Amery, 24 May 1900; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1.1.10, ‘Kitchener’s Order’, 15 May 1902; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5.4, Roberts to Amery, 25 January 1905; NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-21-1, Amery to Roberts, 14 June 1904; NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-21-1, Amery to Roberts, 29 June 1904; and, CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5.4, Roberts to Amery, 8 April 1905.


197 Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 487, 495.

condemned Buller, writing that ‘just as in the crisis of the battle [Buller] had failed the men whom he led, so now in the hour of trial he was to fail his country’.  

Through the invective against Buller, Amery hoped to highlight what he felt was the real underlying problem with the army as ‘Buller was but the embodiment of the qualities and defects which the British military system tended to produce’. Thus, the History argued that the army was ‘in no sense organised for serious war’ in 1899 as it had neglected to properly train for the conflict, partly through the failure to study ‘Military History and military theory’. Correspondingly, both the War Office and government were also implicated in the failures during the war as the History pointed out that there had been a ‘want of any real co-ordination between our policy and our military preparations’.

The History received largely positive reviews from the civilian press, with the *Spectator* declaring it to be the ‘finest popular history of a war ever offered to the public’, while the *Athenaeum* gave it ‘almost unreserved praise’. As positive reviews helped to boost sales, James, although he had been heavily involving in the writing of the work, anonymously wrote all the reviews of the work which appeared in *Blackwood’s Magazine*. Roberts and his associates were understandably pleased with the History. James reported that he had heard that Kitchener had been ‘sitting up [reading the work] till after 3am’, and

199 Ibid., p. 459; Ian Hamilton, *Listening for the Drums* (London, 1944), pp. 150, 172; BL, White Papers, IOR/MSS Eur. F. 108/66, Amery to White, 21 May 1901, White to Amery, 14 June 1901. Amery wrote to White asking him to ‘help me on this point’, but was refused a copy of the telegram as the Secretary of State had suppressed it.

200 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 301.

201 Ibid., pp. 297, 550.


203 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/9, reviews in the *Spectator, Athenaeum and Pall Mall Gazette*.

204 Anon., ‘Times History of the War’, 4 parts; *Blackwood’s Magazine*, 171 (June 1902), pp. 826-39, *Blackwood’s Magazine*, 177 (June 1905), pp. 860-71, 180 (July 1906), pp. 116-23, and 180 (Aug. 1906), pp. 248-57. For evidence that Lionel James was the author of these articles, see; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30128, James to Blackwood, 26 April 1907.
Henderson, who agreed with its critique of the army, gave ‘an enthusiastic eulogy of volume two’ and declared Amery to be a ‘wonderful man’.

However, there were many figures in the army, especially those directly criticised, who were incensed by it and James noted that he was regularly ‘visited by many irate warriors with objections’. The *Quarterly Review* carried an anonymous review of the work, attributed by Amery to E.A. Altham, which unfavourably compared the military criticisms made in the History by the ‘committee of Journalists’ who were ‘novices in the art of war’ with the sober analysis of the operations contained in the German Official History of the war. As Amery confidentially told Blackwood, ‘[if the reviewer] had not been so biased, he might have observed that the criticisms were in substance identical in both works’. The reason why he could be so sure on this point was because, as he continued to Blackwood, the German official historians ‘were guided by me in both matters of fact and in matters of criticism… I supplied [them with my] early draft proofs and they submitted all their proofs to me and [they] modified them in accordance with my suggestions’.

Simply in terms of the volume of sales, *The Times* history was successful. By 30 July 1902 Bell estimated that 5,112 sets of the first two volumes had been purchased and, ultimately, the work went on to sell 29,500 individual volumes, far surpassing the meagre sales of the British official history of the war. Despite this, the work made a significant financial loss as from June 1901 the pay of Amery and James was debited from the profits it had made. By August 1905 Amery’s pay of £50 a month had cost the history £2,700, a rate of

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205 TAL, Amery Papers, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Bell, 19 June 1902; CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Moberly Bell to Amery, 1 June 1902, AMEL 1/1/8, Amery to James, 19 June 1902.
206 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30085, James to Blackwood Papers, n.d. [1902?].
207 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30121, Amery to Blackwood, 30 July 1906; and, Anon., ‘First Year of the Boer War’, *Quarterly Review*, 205 (July 1906), pp. 144, 146, 159.
208 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30116, Amery to Blackwood, 30 August 1906.
expenditure Bell labelled ‘positively disastrous to us’.\footnote{CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Moberly Bell to Amery, 10 April 1902 and 17 April 1903.} This problem was compounded since Bell initially had only expected the History to consist of five volumes, setting the subscription price accordingly, and so money was lost as two additional volumes were published.\footnote{CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5.8, Bell to Amery, 16 December 1909; and, Anon., Sampson, Marston and Company’s Catalogue of Books (London, 1914) p. 21.} By the end of 1909, at Bell’s angry insistence, Amery was forced to contribute £1,500 of his own money toward the cost of printing new volumes as all of the profits made by the work had gone.\footnote{CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5.8, Bell to Amery, 20 May 1909, 2 December 1909, 20 August 1909.}

Although the *Times History* was ultimately a commercial failure it represented another attempt to use Military History to inform the reading public of the need for military reform, a practice which had begun following the increased popularity of the subject during the 1880s. The quantity of Military History produced on the Second Boer War demonstrated the continued growth in the popularity of the subject, which reflected the reading public’s interest in the conflict. As popular Military History became increasingly established, work began to be written on conflicts in which British forces did not take part, including a large volume of work on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

### IV. Popular Military History after the Second Boer War, 1902-1914

Although previously there had been little Military History produced about conflicts in which British forces did not play a role, the Russo-Japanese War resulted in a large quantity of work. So many serialised Histories appeared regarding the Russo-Japanese War, that their production assumed a new urgency as publishers competed to gain an advantage over the competition. The first to appear was *Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War*, the initial instalment of which was published on 4 March 1904, barely a month after the outbreak of
hostiles. This was followed on 11 March by the first issues of both *Fight in the Far East: An Illustrated History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904*, published by Black and White, and H.W. Wilson’s *Japan’s Fight for Freedom*, published by the Amalgamated Press. Each new issue of these works, all of which could be purchased for 6d., appeared fortnightly.

Central to Black and White’s strategy to secure a large readership for *Fight in the Far East* was the use of sensational illustrations, which readers were told were ‘based, not on vague telegraphic reports, but [were] actual photographs and sketches from the front’. While such an origin was at best dubious for some of the images, such as a drawing which depicted an oncoming Cossack charge, others, mostly photographs, unflinchingly depicted mutilated corpses and the decapitated victims of Japanese executions. This graphic approach was also reflected in the descriptions of the fighting contained in the work; and, adverts for each new issue declared, in an attempt to entice new readers, the conflict to be ‘the “bloodiest war in history”’. Such an approach proved to be very popular with the reading public, so the work encountered ‘enormous success’ and the first part sold out on the day of publication, forcing it to be reprinted immediately.

By contrast, Cassell’s work contained far fewer images and while it contained elements of sensationalism, it was far less explicit and gruesome in its depiction of the fighting. Instead, this publication contained complex three-dimensional diagrams of weapons and battles, which often provided a cross-section. Despite these obvious differences

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216 Ibid., No. 1, p. i.
217 Ibid., pp. 6, 49, 233, 246.
between the histories, they contained many similarities. Through the desire to release issues as soon after the events they described as possible, the works suffered from a lack of information and so contained vague descriptions of battles, lengthy discussions of largely irrelevant material and large illustrations, depicting insignificant or non-specific occurrences, intended to fill up space and to pad-out each issue.\textsuperscript{220} This problem became considerably worse for Black and White when their correspondent, Edwin Emerson, was shot by the Russians as a spy in June 1904.\textsuperscript{221} The works were all extremely anti-Russian, which reflected the British alliance with Japan as well as the traditional fear regarding Muscovite designs on India.\textsuperscript{222}

Both the Russians and Japanese imposed unusually draconian restrictions and censorship on foreign correspondents. Thus, although some journalists, such as W.R. Smith of the Associated Press, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett of the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, Charles à Court Repington and David Frazer of \textit{The Times}, were given privileged access by the Japanese to their operations around Port Arthur, which enabled them to produce detailed accounts, many correspondents had little information on which to base their reports on the war.\textsuperscript{223} Those journalists caught in this predicament, but unwilling to forgo the chance to make additional money from their observations, produced accounts which were either bland, devoid of insight or which appeared as ‘travel writing’, as they focused on the correspondent’s journey, rather

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\item \textsuperscript{220} For example, the lack of information was most clearly demonstrated in the \textit{Fight in the Far East} when the extent of the description of the major five day battle of Liao-Yang was ‘the most frightful scene of carnage and heroic endurance… the splendid troops of Oku and Nodzu flung themselves upon a foe not less gallant than themselves, and time after time there were held back with broken ranks, leaving great heaps of dead’. Anon., \textit{Fight in the Far East}, pp. 5, 25, 38-9, 223, 333.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Ibid., part 6, p. 1; and, Anon., ‘Reports from London’, \textit{Bendigo Advertiser}, 24 June 1904, n.p.
\item \textsuperscript{223} ‘British Officer’, ‘Literature of the Russo-Japanese War, part 1’, \textit{American Historical Review}, 16 (No. 3, 1911), pp. 514, 519; W.R. Smith, \textit{Siege of and Fall of Port Arthur} (London, 1905); Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, \textit{Port Arthur: Siege and Capitulation} (London 1906); Charles à Court Repington, \textit{War in the Far East} (London, 1905); NLS, John Murray Papers, MS41012, Repington to Murray, 4 March 1907, Blackwood Papers, MS30114, James to Blackwood, 13 January 1905, MS30111, Bartlett to Blackwood, 18 June 1905.
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than events in the war.\textsuperscript{224} Some writers, faced with this lack of information, simply made up or embellished what they had seen.\textsuperscript{225} Most egregious was William Greener’s \textit{Secret Agent in Port Arthur} which was so fanciful that Lionel James thought the author to be ‘a lying waster’.\textsuperscript{226}

As many of the instant histories concerning this war suffered from a lack of information, in the period after the Second Boer War criticism appeared for the first time which called into question whether an account written immediately after the campaign or incident it described could be considered ‘history’. The reviews of the serial histories and eyewitness accounts of the Russo-Japanese War which appeared in the \textit{Times Literary Supplement} and those written by ‘British Officer’ in the \textit{American Historical Review}, pointed out that the information on which these works were based was necessarily far from adequate to ascertain what had actually taken place, let alone to allow a proper ‘estimate [of] the relative value of each event and its bearing on the course of the war’.\textsuperscript{227} Furthermore, the anonymous ‘British Officer’ pointed out that since ‘the strategy of a campaign is entirely based on its political causes… [and so its conduct is] invariably influenced, if not dominated, by the political goals toward which the efforts of the respective adversaries are directed’ it was impossible to write any account which dealt with these vital concerns until such information had come to light.\textsuperscript{228} So, while it was acknowledged that it would be difficult for writers in the Anglophone world to produce ‘a good History of the war’, since Russian and

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., p. 513; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30114, Lionel James to Blackwood, 20 January 1905; and, Cowen, \textit{Russo-Japanese War}.
\textsuperscript{226} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30114, James to Blackwood, 13 January 1905; and, William Greener, \textit{Secret Agent in Port Arthur} (London, 1905). Lionel James also wrote a historical work on this war: ‘O’ [Lionel James], \textit{Yellow War} (London, 1905). For evidence that ‘O’ was Lionel James, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30114, Lionel James to Blackwood, 24 February 1905.
Japanese ‘are known to few people in the West’, the instant histories were thought to be ‘hardly flattering to the intelligence of the British public’ as they owed more ‘to the imagination of the London’ based author than to historical events.\(^{229}\) However, this criticism, and the continued opposition of the *Times Literary Supplement*, did not prevent a large quantity of instant historical works appearing on the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-2 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-3.\(^{230}\)

Besides instant history, Military History written regarding less recent wars and campaigns continued to be produced, much as it had been since the 1880s. Hence, while very few campaign narratives were published regarding wars fought after 1815 outside Asia, books and articles which listed battles or provided an account of one engagement continued to be popular and the sustained growth of the colonial book market ensured that there continued to be a large quantity work produced on Indian military history.\(^{231}\) Given the reinvention of *Blackwood’s Magazine* as a colonial journal in the late 1880s, it published an especially large number of articles on the Indian Mutiny.\(^{232}\) The continued widespread interest in this conflict also directly influenced the writing of Wolseley’s memoirs, as he was told by Andrew Lang, whom he had contacted for advice, that ‘what… the public want is the


Indian Mutiny… West African [campaigns] are very well, but [compared to the] Indian article trifling'. Similarly, a reviewer of Evelyn Wood’s *Revolt in Hindustan* in the *Times Literary Supplement* noted that ‘the large number of letters [which the *Times* had] received from survivors, suggesting modifications in, or additions [to the work]’, not only showed the continued interest in the conflict, but the scope for further histories of the struggle.

The Napoleonic Wars continued to be a very popular subject and a large number of articles appeared on many aspects of the struggle, predominantly in *Blackwood’s Magazine*, *Cornhill Magazine* and *Macmillan’s Magazine*. The books which appeared on this conflict, while numerous, were much more limited in scope and the majority consisted of either a history of the Waterloo campaign, or of a biography of Napoleon or Wellington. The majority of the work was largely superficial, such as Lord Roberts’ *Rise of Wellington*, published by Sampson Low, Marston and Company in 1902. The only substantial popular work to be published at this time which dealt with the Napoleonic Wars was Herbert Maxwell’s *Life of Wellington*, also published by Sampson Low, Marston and Company in two volumes, costing 36/-, in 1899. Maxwell deliberately avoided any analytical comment on the Duke’s ‘military career’ and contented himself to ‘notice and compare the opinion of

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233 HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, ff. 72, Lang to Wolseley, 26 January 1903; and, HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, ff. 12, Lang to Wolseley, 1 December 1902. Andrew Lang (1844-1912) was a Scottish literary critic, known mainly for his work on folklore, mythology and religion.


237 Roberts, *Rise of Wellington*, pp. iii, 7, 72, 73. Wellington’s career was simplistically described as a series of lessons which enabled him to overcome Napoleon at Waterloo.

those writers who seem best qualified to pass judgement on the operations of war’.\(^{239}\)

Ultimately, however, the work was begun at the publisher’s behest as it was felt that it would have a large sale if made accessible to the reading public, and so in 1907 a cheap single volume edition was produced which could be purchased for 18/-.\(^{240}\)

Due to the continued popularity of Military History the subject continued to be used in an attempt to influence public perception of defence matters, particularly in regard to India. Although Lord Robert’s autobiography, *Forty-One Years in India* was originally published in 1897, his exploits during the Second Boer War significantly contributed to its popularity and by 1911 it had run through thirty-four editions and a total of thirty-seven reprints.\(^{241}\) Roberts had partly written the work to convince the reading public that in India Britain held ‘the position of a Continental power’, so the region ‘must be protected by continental means of defence’, or in other words, conscription.\(^{242}\) In an effort to deliver this message in a way which would hold the interest of the reader, Roberts sought Wilkinson’s help to ensure he had ‘touched on most of the points which you think will be attractive to the public’.\(^{243}\) Thus, given the continued widespread interest in the Indian Mutiny, Roberts devoted several chapters to this conflict. Wilkinson reported that ‘they form by far the most interest and clearest History of the Mutiny that I have read and I am sure that on this point my feeling will be shared by the public’.\(^{244}\) Equally, H.L. Nevill’s *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, which was published by John Murray in 1912, was also written ‘in the hope of arousing the interest of the non-military reader’ in the defence of the region, as ‘the responsibility for


\(^{242}\) Streets, ‘Military Influence’, p. 242; and, Roberts, *Forty-One Years in India*, p. x.

\(^{243}\) BL, Spenser Wilkinson Papers, 96850, MFR453, Reel 2, OTP 13/14, Lord Roberts to Wilkinson, 17 November 1895.

\(^{244}\) NAM, Roberts Papers, 7101-23-82 to 90, Wilkinson to Roberts, 6 January 1897.
national honour and safety does not rest with statesmen and soldiers alone… its guardians are… the men… of the British race’. To this end, the reader was told that the study of Military History was essential since the ‘nation will emerge triumphant which has looked ahead, which has studied the lessons of the past the better, and has applied them to the problems of the future with the greater care and intelligence’.245

However, unlike Nevill and Roberts, H.B. Hanna’s Second Afghan War, 1878-79, published by Constable in three volumes between 1899 and 1910, was very critical of British policy in India.246 Not only did it blame the government for manufacturing the Second Afghan War, but it contained a polemic against the ‘Forward Policy’ under which the Indian Army responded aggressively to any incursion into India by the Afghan tribes.247 As the History argued that the ‘Forward Policy’ was simply the ‘crystallisation’ of the approach adopted by the British government which had caused the Second Afghan War, it hoped to ‘lay bare the [initial] error of judgement’ so as to ‘deal a deadly blow to’ the current policy.248 Thus, Hanna chose to write a history of the war since he felt this would be an ‘enduring… indictment’ of the government’s action, and would also provide the reading public with more information about the North-West frontier of India on which to base their opinion of future conflicts.249 Furthermore, Hanna’s work was directly critical of Lord Roberts’ conduct, and so broke with the earlier historical accounts of this war. He attacked Roberts’ ‘exactions and barbarities’ during the conflict, in which he stole food from the local tribesmen to feed his soldiers; and, he pointed out that Roberts’ account of the reprisals exacted on the local population for the murder of the British agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan, was

248 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. viii.
249 Ibid., p. x; and, Vol. 2, pp. 133, 138.
inaccurate. While Roberts had claimed he only destroyed the fort of the local tribe as punishment, Hanna ascertained that he had not only destroyed their entire village as well, but the agent had actually been murdered after this devastation had taken place, so his murder was not the cause but rather the result of the so-called ‘reprisal’.250

The quantity of Military History taught to children continued to be debated during this period. The Askers-Douglas commission of 1902 asked several of the witnesses their view on the role the subject should play in civilian education. Maguire continued to press for the study of the subject as he felt ‘Modern Military History’ would prepare children to make informed decisions regarding national policy when they became part of the electorate; and, he argued that it was a ‘national scandal’ that the topic continued to be ‘neglected in our public schools’.251 Although he was not called by the committee, Roberts argued for the study of Military History in schools. He sent a ‘deputation’ to the Secretary of State for War on 4 December 1906, in which he claimed the study of the subject could ‘exercise’ the students’ ‘powers of intelligence’.252

Alongside these calls, the quantity of Military History included in school textbooks continued to increase as it had done since the late 1880s.253 The Cambridge University Press School Reader, published in 1911 and intended for use in primary schools, included forty historical figures selected for study. Out of these, twenty-four were known for their martial ability or were connected with major conflicts.254 Similarly, Chamber’s School Reader, published in 1901, largely told British history through the medium of a catalogue of wars,

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251 Anon, Askers-Douglas Committee Report, pp. 81, 97, 98.
253 Chancellor, History for their Masters, pp. 72-5.
paying particular attention to the upstanding personalities of a cast of military ‘heroes’, including Wellington, Havelock and Baden Powell.²⁵⁵

At this time, publications aimed at boys continued to feature Military History, although the Second Boer War caused a greater emphasis on fictional stories set during this conflict.²⁵⁶ Two of the boys magazines owned by the Harmsworth Brothers, *Pluck* and *Boy’s Friend*, featured a large number of stories set during the conflict; but in the years before the outbreak of the Great War they became increasingly dominated by ‘invasion fiction’.²⁵⁷ There were some exceptions to the proliferation of stories on the Second Boer War: *Boy’s Own Paper* carried few features on it as the paper was run by a Liberal General Committee which had opposed the conflict.²⁵⁸ Instead, it continued to include articles which focused predominantly on brave acts committed by British soldiers and stories featuring fictional characters in much earlier wars, such as pieces set during Clive’s defence of Fort St. David against the French in 1747-8, entitled ‘A Bold Climber’.²⁵⁹

The emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing, beginning in 1884, had been confirmed during the Second Boer War through the sheer scale of material which appeared on the conflict. This continued to have an impact on how the subject was written about in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. From 1904 a significant quantity of work began to appear on conflicts which had not involved British

²⁵⁶ Kirkpatrick, *From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller*, p. 249.
²⁵⁸ Kirkpatrick, *From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller*, p. 281.
forces, the popularity of the subject meant that it continued to be used to communicate messages regarding nation defence to the reading public.260

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In considering the development of popular Military History, the extent to which commercial opportunism drove the expansion of this type of writing is striking. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, the potential readership for popular Military History grew as Britain’s literacy rate increased and colonial book markets emerged.261 Similarly, declining production costs enabled the price of works to fall just as the public gained a greater awareness of current events and the empire with the growth of the cheap, popular press.262 Therefore, since ‘instant’ and serialised histories were able to exploit these conditions, as they were able to communicate quickly current events in a cheap, accessible form, which was profitable for the publisher and author, they became the most common form of popular Military History. As journalists and officers were often in the best position to produce an account of a conflict rapidly, the majority of these works were written by them. Nevertheless, given the commercial success of material which narrated the course of battles, such as Edward Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles, or discussed some aspect of the Napoleonic wars, such as Herbert Maxwell’s Life of Wellington, historians did produce some popular Military

260 Ashmead-Bartlett, Port Arthur; Repington, War in the Far East; Bennett, With the Turks in Tripoli; Abbott, Holy War in Tripoli; Maclure, Italy in North Africa; Rankin, Inner History of the Balkan War; Ashmead-Bartlett, With the Turks in Thrace; Howell, Campaign in Thrace, 1912; ‘Special Correspondent’, Balkan War Drama; James, With the Conquered Turk; Hanna, Second Afghan War; Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, (10th edn., 1901), p. 258; and, Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, pp. xvii, 382.


History during this time, but in terms of volume their work was overshadowed by the ‘instant’ histories.263

The desire to ensure that popular Military History remained accessible, and so it could sell large numbers of copies, led the majority of this type of writing to reflect, rather than challenge, the growing nationalism and imperialism of the period. Thus, most popular Military History either uncritically accepted the idea of Empire, or, as in the case of Reginald Wingate, Leo Amery, and G.W. Steevens, positively eulogised it.264 The few exceptions to this were in relation to the execution of a specific policy, such as Hanna’s criticism of the ‘Forward Policy’, rather than any opposition to the notion of the Empire itself.265 This tendency was particularly apparent in the popular Military History which appeared on the Indian Mutiny. In contrast to the views held in the post-colonial literature, however, not all the military history on this conflict was a tool of colonial power; even George Malleson’s work, which was most strident in its calls for reprisals against the rebels, equally condemned the government of India for its mishandling of the uprising.266 Similarly, although some of the earliest work on the mutiny portrayed it as a treacherous attempt by elements within the army to overthrow British rule, others, such as R.M. Martin and Henry Mead, pointed to the oppression of the natives as the de facto cause of the uprising.267 So here too, the post-colonial assumption that British historiography on the Mutiny consistently misread a narrative of oppression and resistance for one of loyalty and treachery should be called into question.268

263 Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles (38th edn., 1894); Malleson, Decisive Battles of India; Fitchet, Deeds that Won the Empire; Knox, Decisive Battles since Waterloo; Adams, Memorable Battles in English History; Grant, British Battles by Land and Sea; Forbes, Illustrated Battles of the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols.
264 Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan; Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum; and, Amery (ed.), Times History of the War in South Africa.
265 Anon, History of the Zulu War; and, Hanna, Second Afghan War.
266 [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Vol. 1, p. 46.
267 Martin, Indian Empire; and, Mead, Sepoy Revolt.
268 Baucom, Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity, pp. 106, 112.
The emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing in the 1890s led to its rapid diversification as it came to be seen as a way to influence public opinion on military matters. Initially, it was used in this way by military figures in an attempt to control the perception of the campaigns which they had conducted; but after the 1890s it became the domain of civilian writers.\textsuperscript{269} In the two decades before the outbreak of the First World War the perception that other nations, particularly Germany, were surpassing Britain in terms of economic and military might, a sentiment more broadly expressed at this time in the drive for ‘national efficiency’, was a major motivating factor behind the popular Military History which argued for army reform.\textsuperscript{270} A belief in the need to improve British military organisation led to the writing of some popular Military History of a higher intellectual calibre which, although it was still intended to be accessible to a wider audience, drew on a greater level of research and which made more complex arguments. While Spenser Wilkinson was particularly prolific in writing this type of work, most notably with the publication of his *Brain of an Army*, the *Times History of the War in South Africa*, due to its scale, is perhaps the most prominent example of this type of popular Military History.\textsuperscript{271}

However, as the commercial success of popular Military History was often closely associated with the speed with which it could be run off the printing presses, this prevented the writing of more analytical work that drew on a larger number of sources. This problem was demonstrated by the *Times History of the War in South Africa* as, quite simply, the information needed to create the comprehensive account which could be used as evidence of the need for army reform was not yet available. As Charles Moberly Bell pointed out, Amery

\textsuperscript{269} For example: ‘Daily News Correspondent’ [J.F. Maurice], *Ashantee War*; Brackenbury, *Ashanti War: A Narrative*; Hensman, *Afghan War*; and, Roberts, *Forty-One Years in India*.


was ‘trying to write in 1901 a [type of] History which can never be written until 1911’. The second volume of the History, published in 1902, included a version of General Redvers Buller’s ‘surrender’ telegram to General George White in Ladysmith, but Amery was forced to concede that ‘it is certainly to be regretted, from the historian’s point of view’, that it was not ‘possible to treat this question with such full and complete knowledge of the exact contents of all the official documents as may someday be furnished to the public’. To make matters worse, as the volume ‘brought the matter to a head’, and caused the release of a transcript of Buller’s actual telegram several months after the production of the work, he became worried that ‘people [will now] say the Times history is… out of date’.

As such, then, popular Military History generated interest among the reading public, which included military officers, and among publishers. Commercial pressure did, though, place those with more serious historical, literary, and political ambitions in a series of dilemmas over historical quality versus the demands of publishers.

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272 CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 1/1/6, Moberly Bell to Amery, 20 August 1901; and, Anon., History of the Times, Vol. 4, part 2, p. 1051.
274 TAL, Amery Papers, TT.MGR.CMB.1, Amery to Moberly Bell, 24 July 1902.
Chapter 5

Historians, Men of Letters and the Universities:
‘High-Brow’ Military History, 1854-1914

As popular Military History sought to attract a wide readership, it was unable to engage in a complex examination of the past and, as it often appeared soon after the event, it was only able to draw on a limited range of source material. In the period between 1854 and 1914, however, more intellectually rigorous, or ‘high-brow’, approaches to Military History started to appear in print.¹ Although chairs of Modern History had been founded at several British universities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, prior to the 1850s no institution had a History Faculty or examined the subject.² Much of the high-brow Modern History which appeared before 1854, such as David Hume’s History of England and Thomas Babington Macaulay’s History of England from the Accession of James the Second, focused on the nation’s political history and the gradual growth of individual liberty.³ These historians did not approach military topics as objects for study in their own right, but rather to assist the

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² Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders, p. 59; and, Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, p. 27.
explanation of political change. Despite this, several more intellectually rigorous military histories were written between 1854 and 1914, most notably A.W. Kinglake’s *Invasion of the Crimea*, Charles Oman’s *Peninsular War* and John Fortescue’s *History of the British Army*. Furthermore, Military History began to be taught at universities, which ushered in new approaches to its writing and were crucial in its later transformation into a serious discipline.

Much of the scholarly literature which examines history published in the second half of the nineteenth century bears the influence of Herbert Butterfield’s work which argued that most historians writing during this period followed a ‘Whig’ interpretation of British history which explained the nation’s past in terms of the gradual development of individual liberty. Much of the recent literature has focused on re-appraising the writing of the historians discussed by Butterfield and, as he ignored the writing of Military History, these works have followed suit. For example, although Michael Bentley’s chapter in the *Oxford History of Historical Writing, 1800-1945* is one of the few works on Victorian and Edwardian historiography to mention Military History, reference to it is limited to a single sentence. How the study of History was conducted at British universities prior to the First World War has been considered, while Patrick Slee has provided a study of the teaching of History at Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester between 1800 and 1914, but there is no reference to the

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6 Butterfield, *Whig Interpretation of History*.


8 Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, p. 208. It reads: ‘Lacking an intrusive war in the century after 1815, English historiography did not before 1900 reflect, outside of William Napier’s six volumes on the Peninsular War and Alexander Kinglake’s eight volumes on the Crimea, the concentration on military prowess that one might anticipate.’ While this ignores low-brow Military History, official history and material for officer education, it also overlooks the first two volumes of John Fortescue’s *History of the British Army* which had appeared in 1899.
There is only one work on the teaching of Military History at the University of Oxford prior to 1914, an essay by John Hattendorf. However, he only examined the teaching of Military History after 1905 in any depth, so did not place his analysis within the broader context of the writing of Military History, nor mention its study at other universities, and he made no use of the surviving papers of those who taught Military History there.\footnote{C.N.L. Brooke, \textit{History of the University of Cambridge, 1870-1990}, Vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1993); Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}; and, C. Charle, ‘Patterns’, in W. Ruegg (ed.), \textit{History of the University in Europe}, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 2004).}

To offer an answer to the fifth research sub-question, which asked what factors contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and research discipline, this chapter intends to address the context in which more research-oriented Military History emerged, the precursors of ‘high-brow’ Military History and how and why the subject became established at major universities. In order to pursue this task, this chapter will examine: first, the writing of high-brow Military History prior to the creation of the first schools of History at Oxford and Cambridge in 1872; second, why Military History was neglected by university historians during the period between 1863 and 1890; third, the influence of a new generation of historians at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester, who placed a greater emphasis on the use of primary source material; and, fourth, how Military History was taught at universities, 1899-1914.\footnote{John B. Hattendorf, ‘Study of War History at Oxford: 1862-1990’, in John B. Hattendorf (ed.), \textit{Limitations of Military Power} (Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 4-22.}

\textbf{I. Men of Letters, Biography and Literary Periodicals, 1854-72}

Although History was examined at Oxford and Cambridge by 1851, the way in which the subject was taught at these institutions prevented both the study of Military History and the...
creation of a university audience for intellectually rigorous work on this subject. At Cambridge, despite a reformation of the ‘Moral Sciences’ Tripos in 1860, the newly created History syllabus remained focused exclusively on the development of the British constitution. Even though Charles Kingsley, appointed Regius Professor of Modern History in 1860, chose to lecture on European history from the ‘Invasion of the Teutonic Races’ to the ‘Congress of Vienna’, a topic not covered by the Tripos, he did not make any reference to military history. The Tripos was widely regarded as a failure as on average fewer than five students took it each year, so in November 1866, at the suggestion of Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, Frederick Denison Maurice, the subject was removed and between March 1868 and December 1872 it was taught as part of the ‘Law and History’ Tripos.

At Oxford, the study of History was also focused on the development of the British constitution and political events. In response to J.A. Froude’s fear that History had become a political weapon, manipulated to support the political and religious views of the author, an effort was made at Oxford to teach the subject as dispassionately as possible. As a result, between 1853 and 1862 History students were only set questions which dealt with factual matters and the course was heavily reliant on the set text-books. Montagu Burrows, appointed to the newly established Chichele Chair of Modern History in 1862, instigated a shift away from this ‘mere acquaintance with a multitude of facts’ towards historical research using primary source materials. This change helped pave the way for the creation of the

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13 Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders*, p. 77; and, Slee, *Learning and a Liberal Education*, p. 35.
14 Briggs, ‘History and the Social Sciences’, p. 470; and, Slee, *Learning and a Liberal Education*, pp. 32, 36, 57, 65. Frederick Denison Maurice was the father of John Frederick Maurice.
16 Slee, *Learning and a Liberal Education*, p. 41.
Honours School of Modern History in 1872. However, since none of the textbooks contained any military history, and following Burrow’s reforms, the focus of historical study at Oxford remained on the political history of England.

Given the lack of Military History taught at universities, the only real forum for those writing high-brow Military History were the periodicals founded in the early nineteenth century dedicated to the communication of high-culture and the review of new literary publications. The first of these was the Edinburgh Review, established in October 1802 by Francis Jeffery, a Whig, as an instrument of political and social reform, and published by Longmans, Green and Co. By way of response the Tory publisher John Murray began the Quarterly Review in 1808, while William Blackwood founded Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in 1817. The ‘high Tory’ editorial position of Blackwood’s Magazine attracted articles by serving army officers and their accounts of on-going campaigns were a staple of the periodical. Not only were British campaigns covered, most notably the Crimean War by Edward Hamley, but the American Civil War received wide coverage, as British officers, such as Garnet Wolseley, wrote articles describing their experiences travelling in the country. Although this did not translate into later articles treating the conflict historically, Hamley and Blackwood’s ‘military staff’ went on to write articles on the military history of the Crimean War, the China War of 1860, the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian


22 Ibid., pp. 7, 696.

War. Military biography written by the ‘military staff’ was also a principal component of Blackwood’s Magazine. The large quantity of military literature, including Military History, which appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine contributed to its financial success during this period as the military clubs in London subscribed to it; so in 1860 alone the periodical brought in £45,134.19s.7d for the company.

Although the Quarterly Review published articles commenting on contemporary campaigns, it featured few articles which dealt directly with the history of a war, as much of the journal was devoted to reviewing literary work. Longman’s Edinburgh Review initially responded to the Military History which appeared in the pages of its competitors with a series of articles on military biography written by a selection of well-known, predominantly civilian, contributors. From 1865, Charles Chesney, then Professor of Military History at the Staff College, began to publish regular Military History articles in the Edinburgh Review. At first, Chesney produced critical reviews of recent campaigns, particularly those fought during the American Civil War, the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian War. From 1868, he also contributed a series of biographical articles on famous military leaders.

including U.S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and Gerhard von Scharnhorst. When Longmans purchased *Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country* in 1865, Chesney also contributed articles to this periodical as well. This coincided with an increasing number of military articles appearing in this periodical, including Henry Brackenbury’s analysis of the Union operations against Charleston in 1863.

In comparison to the large number of articles which appeared in the high-brow journals, there were comparatively few volumes which took an intellectually rigorous approach to Military History prior to 1899. Just as biographical writing was the most common form in which military history appeared in these periodicals, the majority of the few books published were also biographical works. Like most of the writers who produced high-brow Military History at this time, Archibald Alison was not a professional historian teaching at a university, but an independent ‘man of letters’. Alison originally published a version of his *Life of John, Duke of Marlborough* with Blackwood in 1848 ‘chiefly for military readers’. But following a ‘favourable reception’ from the civilian reading public, he chose to ‘extend his original design’ and produced two much longer and detailed editions of this work with Blackwood in 1852 and 1855, primarily for this readership. Although Alison drew on the unpublished letters written by Marlborough’s private secretary, Adam de Cardonnel, and his Chaplin, Dr Francis Hare, he mainly used *Letters and Despatches of John Duke of*

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33 Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders*, p. 79.
Marlborough, edited by Sir George Murray in 1845, which provided him with a ‘complete series’ of the Duke’s correspondence from 1702 to 1712.\(^{35}\)

In publishing this work Alison had a dual motive. On the one hand, he intended primarily to revive Marlborough’s reputation, as he felt that the majority of ‘his countrymen’ were ‘ignorant’ of his achievements, or held a ‘dim’ view of him as their knowledge came ‘from the histories of [his] enemies’. On the other hand, he sought to demonstrate how ‘the rise and fall of nations often depend so much on individual agency that the record of their growth and decline runs into the lives of particular men’. The idea that the actions of ‘great men’ were the driving forces which shaped history was so central to Alison’s understanding of the past that, following the production of his History of Europe, he claimed that ‘he who undertakes to write the history of the French Revolution will soon find his narrative turn into the biographies of Napoleon and Wellington’. Equally, Alison saw his biography of Marlborough as fundamentally ‘a history of the war of the Great Succession, at least in those portions of it which Great Britain is immediately concerned’.\(^{36}\)

During this period the Duke of Wellington remained a popular subject for military biographers. A good example is provided by Charles Yonge’s two-volume biography published in 1860. It was based on the Duke’s published despatches, as well as some unpublished primary material from the diary of Lord Colchester, a conservative politician, as well as interviews with Wellington’s son and Algernon Greville, his private secretary. In the first volume of the work, which dealt with Wellington’s military career, it was his personality, particularly his ‘invincible moral intrepidity’ and his ‘military genius’, which were presented as the central impetus behind the development of events during a campaign. The work also sought to maintain the high reputation of its subject and so betrayed the


\(^{36}\) Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough, Vol. 1 (3\(^{rd}\) edn., 1855), pp. iii, viii, 403.
influence of William Napier’s *Peninsular War*. Not only was the author of this work praised as ‘the great historian’, but Yonge also adopted Napier’s view that between 1809 and 1810 Wellington was betrayed by the ‘weak and far from united’ politicians at home who were ‘hesitating as to the expediency of continuing the contest’ in the Peninsula.\(^{37}\)

In contrast to those biographers who wrote mainly to defend the reputation of their subject, Thomas Carlyle in his *History of Friedrich II of Prussia*, published by between 1858 and 1865, wrote primarily to provide an example of his theory, first articulated in his essay ‘Heroes and Hero-Worship’, that certain ‘heroes’ were the agents of divine providence and so were the dominant actors in history.\(^{38}\) He held that, ultimately, history was incomprehensible as man could never come to understand God’s perfect revelation, and even though it was partially revealed through time, historians remained blind to it, constrained as they were with their ‘chains’ and ‘chainlets’ of ‘causes’ and ‘effects’.\(^{39}\) Carlyle believed that a lack of authoritarian government had led to an increasing internal fragmentation within nations, which themselves had become undeserving, through spiritual decay, of a morally righteous ‘hero as king’ to reunite them.\(^{40}\) Thus, Carlyle selected Frederick to be an example of his ‘hero’, as he thought that, without his ‘prudence, moderation, [and] clear discernment’, Prussia ‘could never have had the pretention to exist as a nation at all’, and this nation through its discipline and spirituality had ‘merited such a King to command it’.\(^{41}\)

When the first volumes of the work were published they encountered hostile reviews from the high-brow periodicals, but especially from Hamley writing in *Blackwood’s*

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Hamley not only dismissed Carlyle’s theory as a ‘mirage philosophy’ but noted how it caused him to misrepresent the past in an attempt to tailor it to his own beliefs. Hamley noted that to maintain an image of Frederick’s fairness and honesty Carlyle had downplayed the validity of Austrian claims on Silesia, so that when Frederick seized the province in 1740, causing the Silesian wars, Carlyle could portray his hero as ‘rushing out to seize [his] own stolen horse’, when in reality Hamley felt this act was little more than ‘Royal brigandage’.

It was not only British writers like Carlyle who received strong criticism for the quality of their Military History from reviewers writing in the high-brow periodicals. The work of foreign authors was also assessed, which served to highlight the lack of Military History written in English. Following the publication of the twentieth volume of Adolphe Thiers’ *L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire* in 1862, which dealt with the Waterloo campaign, a series of reviews appeared condemning his account. The criticism centred on Thiers’ numerous factual errors, his effort to exonerate Napoleon of any blame for the loss of the campaign while implicating his subordinates, particularly Soult and Ney, and his attempt to undermine Wellington’s reputation as a general. Although Hamley in his review of Thiers’ work, which appeared anonymously in *Blackwood’s Magazine*, identified numerous factual errors, he was particularly concerned that this latest controversy regarding the factual

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45 Anon., ‘L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire’, *Quarterly Review*, 112 (Oct. 1862), pp. 410-44; Anon., ‘L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire’, *Edinburgh Review*, 117 (Jan. 1863), pp. 147-79; and [E.B. Hamley], ‘Thiers on Waterloo’, *Blackwood’s Magazine*, 29 (Nov. 1862), pp. 607-33. For evidence that this article was written by Hamley, see the letters in which he discusses his authorship of this review with Blackwood: NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 113; Hamley to Blackwood, 13 February 1860, MS4170, ff. 80, Hamley to Blackwood, 18 October 1862, and MS4149, ff. 143; Hamley to Blackwood, 14 October 1860.
accuracy of Military History had led ‘thoughtful persons’ to look on the subject as only ‘a serious and important branch of fiction’ rather than providing material for military analysis.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, Hamley wrote that if Thiers’ ‘calls himself a French military historian he ought to behave as such’.\textsuperscript{47}

This high-profile controversy gave rise to two works written to provide in part a rebuttal to Thiers. George Hooper’s \textit{Downfall of the First Napoleon}, was later followed by Chesney’s \textit{Waterloo Lectures} in 1868.\textsuperscript{48} Although Hooper’s History was very closely based on Charras’ \textit{Campagne de 1815}, Chesney held it to be ‘one of the best single volumes on this campaign existing in any language’. Similarly, Chesney’s \textit{Waterloo Lectures} also provided a comprehensive refutation of Thiers’ view of the campaign, particularly that it was ‘special conditions of weather, [and the] blundering good luck on his opponent’s side’ which had led to Napoleon’s defeat.\textsuperscript{49} Despite the detail Chesney used to refute the views of the French historian, Hamley pointed out that ‘he is particularly praised for… showing up Thiers… [as] I did in the Magazine in 1862 and he has adopted all my views’.\textsuperscript{50}

One of the most ambitious works of high-brow Military History to be written prior to 1899 was A.W. Kinglake’s \textit{Invasion of the Crimea}, published by Blackwood in eight volumes between 1863 and 1887.\textsuperscript{51} When Kinglake began work on this study in 1856, under its initial title, ‘History of the Two Years’ War’, he had a publication agreement with John Murray.\textsuperscript{52} The latter had even begun to advertise the work under its other provisional title, ‘Two Years’ War in the Crimea’, when the author became increasingly unhappy with the

\textsuperscript{46} [E.B. Hamley], ‘Thiers on Waterloo’, p. 607.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} George Hooper, \textit{Downfall of the First Napoleon} (London, 1862); and, Chesney, \textit{Waterloo Lectures}.
\textsuperscript{49} Chesney, \textit{Waterloo Lectures}, pp. 9, 24-5, 30-2, 44, 56, 82-6, 90-4, 110-17, 147-8, 183, 236-8.
\textsuperscript{50} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4324, ff. 22, Hamley to Blackwood, 18 December 1868.
\textsuperscript{51} Kinglake, \textit{Invasion of the Crimea}. For biographical information on A.W. Kinglake, see Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{52} NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 90, Kinglake to Murray, 28 May 1856, and ff. 106, Kinglake to Murray, 9 September 1859.
copyright arrangement. Murray had offered £1000 to purchase the copyright outright, but Kinglake considered this ‘too gloomy’ as he wished to retain complete control of the work. Blackwood heard about Kinglake’s disagreement through a mutual friend, Lawrence Oliphant, in August 1862. Blackwood was particularly impressed by Kinglake’s style of writing, which he deemed essential since ‘the success of the book will now hinge almost entirely on its merits as a historical and literary composition’ as he believed that the public had now largely lost interest in the Crimean War. Keen to recoup his financial loss after his best-selling author George Eliot began to produce work for Smith and Elder that year, Blackwood essentially ‘poached’ Kinglake by offering him £5000 for the right to produce 2500 copies of the first two volumes of the work, as well as also allowing the author to retain the copyright.

Kinglake’s History was particularly attractive to Blackwood due to the primary source material he was able to draw on. In 1856 Lord Raglan’s widow had given Kinglake all of her husband’s papers, including the entirety of his ‘sealed [official] dispatches’, and ‘his private correspondence with ministers, ambassadors, with generals, [and] reigning sovereigns’. As it was widely known that Kinglake was planning to produce a history, ‘information of the highest value was poured upon [him] from many quarters’, including from ‘the French military authorities’ who sent ‘an officer of rank with a “mission”… to impart… what they

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53 NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 107, Kinglake to Murray, 9 September 1859, and ff. 109, Kinglake to Murray, [n.d.] October 1859.
54 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, p. 29; NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 127, Kinglake to Murray, 18 August 1862, and, ff. 129, Kinglake to Murray, 19 August 1862.
55 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 53, Blackwood to Kinglake, n.d., and ff. 54, Blackwood to Kinglake, 3 September 1862.
56 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, pp. 26, 28; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 54, Blackwood to Kinglake, 3 September 1862. Kinglake used his aunt, Mrs Emma Woodforde, as an intermediary with Blackwood. NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 59-60, Woodforde to Kinglake, 15 September 1862. The later editions of the work also paid Kinglake well, for volumes 3 and 4 he was paid £5500 for 5000 copies. NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30014, ff. 371-372, Blackwood to Kinglake, n.d.
57 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4171, ff. 110, Kinglake to Blackwood, 10 September 1862.
Although Kinglake was able to draw on his own experiences of the war, as he had visited the Crimea for a month as a ‘Travelling Gentleman’, there was one obvious gap in his research as he had failed to request the use of the Foreign Office’s correspondence in the belief that Raglan’s papers were sufficient.  

When the first two volumes, which covered the causes and conduct of the war up to the Battle of Alma, appeared in 1863, a storm of controversy broke around them following the almost universally critical reviews which appeared in the high-brow periodical press. Although Kinglake was criticised for his lack of military analysis, as he ‘never’ gave ‘attention to the strategical principles which determined the whole course’ of the war, even more contentious was Kinglake’s treatment of the French Emperor Napoleon III. As Kinglake, like the other high-brow military historians of this period, placed great emphasis on the historical agency of ‘great men’, he blamed Napoleon almost exclusively for provoking the war. Furthermore he also subjected the Emperor to a sustained personal attack that used ‘the vocabulary of abuse’ so luridly that the Edinburgh Review refused to quote it. Unknown to the reviewers, it was likely that Kinglake’s animosity toward Napoleon was personal. In 1846 Kinglake had been employed as a History tutor for Miss Harriet Howard,

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59 William H. Russell, *The Crimea: 1854-1855* (London, 1881), pp. 2, 8; and, ‘Old Reviewer’ [A. Hayward], *Mr Kinglake and the Quarterlies* (London, 1863), p. 5. For an example of the letters Kinglake sent to those who took part in the campaign, see HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, ff. 5i, Kinglake to Wolseley, 9 November 1885.


61 Anon., ‘Review’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Apr. 1863), p. 336. It is possible that this was Hamley writing anonymously in the Edinburgh Review, so he could be critical of the work, something he would have been unable to do in Blackwood’s Magazine.

62 Anon., ‘Review’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Apr. 1863), pp. 322, 312. For example, Kinglake claimed Napoleon III’s ‘sluggish… intellect was of a poorer quality than men supposed it to be’, his features were ‘opaque’, and he claimed that when he seized power in 1851 he had 48,000 people killed in Paris. Kinglake, *Invasion of the Crimea*, Vol. 1, (4th edn., 1863), p. 219. In the review in the Quarterly Review, 113 (Apr. 1863), p. 528, it was concluded that the death toll during the coup was closer to 191.
and ‘was unable to teach [her] without desiring her’.\textsuperscript{63} When she met Napoleon at a party thrown by Lady Blessington they became lovers, after which ‘she followed [him] to France in 1848, and lived openly with him as his mistress’\textsuperscript{64}

Similarly, Kinglake’s emphasis on the historical agency of ‘great men’ meant that although he purported to provide a history of the campaign in the Crimea, his work was largely centred on Raglan.\textsuperscript{65} For example, both his account of the charge of the Light Brigade and the whole of volume six, which covered the winter of 1854-5, in which the British Army suffered significant losses as a result of a supply crisis, consisted largely of an attempt to exonerate Raglan from any culpability for these disasters.\textsuperscript{66} Kinglake blamed Lord Lucan for misunderstanding his orders and despatching the Light Brigade to its destruction, which absolved Raglan of any blame.\textsuperscript{67} The ‘winter troubles’, as Kinglake euphemistically called them, were blamed on the ‘want of land-transport’ and manpower to unpack the supplies of building material and warm clothes which Raglan had prudently amassed.\textsuperscript{68} However, as William Russell pointed out in his pamphlet heavily criticising Kinglake’s history, no explanation was provided as to why Raglan did not either ask for French assistance to unpack the supplies, or why he continued to maintain ineffectual siege operations against Sebastopol, needlessly using up manpower.\textsuperscript{69} These controversies helped to drive the sales of the work, and the first volumes went through four editions in the first year alone, and in total 15,000 copies of the work were sold in 10 years. This made the book the most lucrative published by Blackwood’s in the 1860s, as it had made profits of £6,454 by July 1873. By the end of the


\textsuperscript{64} Tuckwell, Kinglake, pp. 81-2.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 350.

\textsuperscript{66} Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, Vols. 3-8 (6th edn., 1877-88). The sixth edition contained nine volumes rather than the usual eight produced for the earlier editions.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., Vol. 7 (6th edn., 1883), p. 124.

\textsuperscript{69} Russell, Crimea, pp. 57-60.
century, the work was one of the company’s best-sellers and in total it generated more than £20,000 in profit.\footnote{Finkelstein, *House of Blackwood*, pp. 31-2. This is the equivalent to approximately £1,141,200 at current values.}

Almost as ambitious as Kinglake’s work was the *History of the Sepoy War in India*, the first three volumes of which were written by John Kaye and published by W. Allen between 1864 and 1876.\footnote{John Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858*, 3 vols. (London, 1864-76). For biographical information on John Kaye, see Appendix 1.} Kaye, who had previously served as an artillery officer in the Bengal Army and had succeeded John Stuart Mill as Secretary of the Foreign Department in the India Office in 1858, wrote the work ‘to command the common interests… of all classes of readers’. Like Kinglake, central to this work was Kaye’s ability to procure primary sources. His position allowed him access to the ‘official records’ of the department of the Secretary of State for India which it ‘was at least improbable that any other writer could obtain’.\footnote{John Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858*, Vol. 3 (1st edn., 1864), pp. vi, ix.} Most importantly, ‘the executors of the late Lord Canning’ placed in his ‘hands the private and demi-official correspondence of the deceased statesman extending over the whole term of his Indian administration’.\footnote{Kaye, *History of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858*, Vol. 1, p. xiii. Lord Canning was Governor-General of India during the Mutiny.}

In keeping with the other high-brow Military History written at this time, Kaye’s work also placed a great emphasis on the historical agency of ‘great men’. He wrote that it was his ‘endeavour’ to illustrate the extent to which the ‘dangers which threatened British dominion in the East’, as well as ‘the success with which they were encountered’ was ‘assignable to the individual characters of a few eminent men’. Consequently, like the earlier work which had appeared on the Mutiny, Kaye waxed lyrical on the characters of British military leaders, particularly Sir Hugh Wheeler and the ‘saint’ Henry Havelock. Unlike much of the literature which had appeared immediately after the Mutiny, Kaye was especially
reverential toward Lord Canning and dedicated his volumes to his service and memory. To Kaye, Canning embodied the ‘great national character’ in his reaction to the uprising, as he had ‘[arisen] and with his still, calm face’ to confront ‘the dire calamity’.  

When Kaye died shortly after the third volume of this work appeared, his publisher asked George Malleson, who had earlier written Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical Narrative, to take over its composition. It was under this arrangement that the work was completed with an additional three volumes between 1878 and 1880. Malleson made extensive use of primary material and stated that ‘there is not a document relating to the events I have recorded… which I have not carefully read and noted’. For the new author, achieving historical accuracy depended on rendering ‘severe and strict justice’ to historical figures and he told Blackwood that his contribution to the history was ‘very forthright and calls a spade a spade’. Malleson vehemently disagreed with several of Kaye’s judgements, especially regarding Canning’s response to the Mutiny. Consequently, Malleson’s first volume covered the same ground as Kaye’s final instalment so that he could present his alternative view concerning the ‘short-sightedness of the government’ at the outbreak of the uprising. This meant that the history contained two volumes concerning the same events which directly contradicted each other on many important points and, tellingly, Malleson’s volumes were not dedicated to Canning but to Sir Vincent Eyre, a British General involved in the relief of Lucknow.

In spite of this, there were many similarities between the works of the two historians. Malleson also saw ‘great men’ as the driving force behind events: thus, it was the role of Sir

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76 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. ix.  
77 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. x; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4378, ff. 233, Malleson to Blackwood, 4 May 1878.  
79 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. i, Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India, Vol. 3, p. i.
Henry Lawrence in the defence of Lucknow which was presented as allowing the ‘maintenance of the hold of England on India’. Similarly, in marked contrast to the view expressed in *Mutiny of the Bengal-Army*, Malleson agreed with Kaye that it was the ‘bad faith to our sepoys… our policy of annexation… [as well as] our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws’ which were largely responsible for causing the Mutiny. Far from advocating the summary retributory execution of mutineers, as he had in his earlier work, Malleson condemned Brevet Major William Hodson for the murder of the King of Delhi and the Mogul Princes leading the rebellion as a ‘brutal… unnecessary outrage…a blunder as well as a crime’. Despite the repetition of material and the contradictory nature of Kaye’s third volume and Malleson’s first, the history enjoyed a ‘generous reception’ in Britain, the colonies, and in the United States. A second edition of Malleson’s work was required five weeks after it first appeared, an analytical index by Frederic Pincott was published in 1880, and in February 1896 Longmans purchased the rights to the work, re-issuing it in August 1897, July 1898, January 1906, March 1909 and August 1914.

While *Invasion of the Crimea* and the work by Kaye and Malleson sold well, there were few intellectually rigorous military histories produced before the end of the nineteenth century. This appears to be a strange paradox as the financial success of these books is likely to have made the writing of comparable works desirable for publishers. However, the majority of the historians producing serious historical work during this time had privileged access to primary source material, particularly the private papers of key individuals, without which the writing of such work would have been impossible. Moreover, the controversies

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82 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 76-80.
83 Ibid., pp. x.
surrounding the accuracy of Military History, together with its continued biographical focus, also did little to contribute to more rigorous approaches to the subject. In fact, these disputes contributed to the neglect of the subject by university scholars.

II. University Scholars and the Neglect of Military History, 1863-90

At Oxford during the three and a half decades following the appointment of Burrows to the Chichele Chair of Modern History in 1862, the study of History developed from comment on set texts to an independent and rigorous discipline which was increasingly based on original research conducted using primary source material.\textsuperscript{86} After the creation of the Honours School of Modern History in 1872, the syllabus was amended so that first year students studied the constitutional and political History of England, with second and third years able to select a ‘special subject’ and concentrate on a particular period of history.\textsuperscript{87} While the most popular ‘special subjects’ were those on ‘The French Revolution’ and the English Civil War, leading to the appointment of tutors and selection of historical literature for these topics, the focus continued to be on political history and so military events only received passing attention.\textsuperscript{88}

Similarly at Cambridge, steps were also taken to reform the study of history to make it a separate discipline in its own right. J.R. Seeley, in his inaugural address in February 1870, given when he became the Regius Professor of Modern History, devoted much of his lecture to ascribing the function of historical study to the education of aspiring politicians.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, when the Modern History Tripos was formed in 1873, and the subject gained its own separate exam, it focused on the development of the British constitution.\textsuperscript{90} However, it was not until May 1885 that Cambridge adopted the idea of the ‘special subject’ or placed an emphasis on

\textsuperscript{86} Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{87} Evans, \textit{Cosmopolitan Islanders}, p. 79; and, Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{88} Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}, pp. 92, 103; and, Oman, ‘A Plea for Military History’, pp. 817-8. The English Civil War was known as ‘the Great Rebellion’.
\textsuperscript{89} Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}, pp. 58-9.
\textsuperscript{90} Evans, \textit{Cosmopolitan Islanders}, p. 79.
the use of primary sources.  Just as at Oxford, historical study remained focused on the development of the British constitution and little emphasis was placed on the study of military events.

These changes to the study of History at Oxford and Cambridge, the only institutions prior to 1890 to have Schools of History, together with broader university reforms, transformed the subject into a separate discipline largely controlled by professional historians.  This new scholarly readership for History required technical and analytical works that were unlikely to appeal to the general public. In the early 1880’s Seeley wrote a series of articles in *Macmillan’s Magazine* in which he claimed that the public, used to the writing of Macaulay and Scott, made ‘no distinction… between History and fiction’ and so would not want to read complex analytical work. Thus, he called for historians to ‘break the drowsy spell of narrative’ and to produce work primarily for fellow specialists which solved historical problems and sought to identify the causes of historical events. Both a symptom and factor in this development was the creation of a forum for historians with the formation of the Historical Society in 1868, the creation of its yearbook in 1872, *Transactions of the Historical Society*, and the foundation of the *English Historical Review* in 1886. The production of specialist literature led to the devaluation of the amateur status of ‘men of letters’ and the History departments at Oxford and Cambridge increasing disregarded such writers. However, as military events did not feature in the History syllabus of either institution, the new specialist literature focused almost exclusively on political history, so

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92 Briggs, ‘History and the Social Sciences’, pp. 54, 459. In the 1870’s confessional restrictions were relaxed allowing non-Anglicans access to Universities, and also the rules preventing Fellows from marrying were also relaxed.
93 Howsam, *Past into Print*, pp. 7, 25, 52-53; and, Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, p. 213.
94 Eckhardt Fuchs, ‘Contemporary Alternatives to German Historicism’, in Macintyre (ed.), *Oxford History of Historical Writing*, p. 63; and, Howsam, *Past into Print*, pp. 32, 44.
Military History was reduced in value at the two universities, remaining the domain of ‘men of letters’. The ‘Whiggish’ study of the development of the British constitution, which sought to identify long-term factors to explain political change and the growth of individual liberty, continued to dominate historical writing during this time. Despite notable exceptions in this period, such as Seeley’s *Expansion of England* and Charles Dilke’s *Greater Britain*, intellectually rigorous historical writing largely ignored the growth of the British Empire and, consequently, the role of the military in its formation. The political liberalism of British historians also created an aversion to the discussion of military affairs. This was particularly clear in J.R. Green’s *Short History of the English People* in which he strove to ‘never sink in to “drum and trumpet history”’. Furthermore, a tendency toward crediting long-term factors with historical agency led to the ‘revolt against biography’ in which the influence of individuals was downplayed. This also counted against the writing of Military History as it undermined the credibility of military biographical work, the mainstay of the discipline at this time, calling into question the notion that the personality of a military leader drove historical events. For example, Seeley, in his *Short History of Napoleon*, besides making ‘no attempt… to describe or to estimate Napoleon as a military commander’, attributed the Emperor’s achievements to factors beyond his control and claimed that if he had not existed ‘a Moreau or a Bernadotte might have reigned with success and have won great victories’ instead.

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95 Fuchs, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, p. 63.
There were some apparent exceptions at this time to the general disregard of military events by university historians.\(^1\) Samuel Gardiner, while he was a Fellow at All Souls College at Oxford, wrote *History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649*.\(^2\) Gardiner, who ‘disclaim[ed] any knowledge of the military art’, focused mainly on the political history of the period and so did not comment on the raising of armies or provide detailed narratives of individual campaigns.\(^3\) As was common at this time, Oliver Cromwell was discussed almost exclusively as a political figure and his ability as a military leader received little examination.\(^4\) This lack of military analysis did receive some criticism, particularly from A.W. Ward, who reviewed the second volume of the work in the *English Historical Review* in 1887. Ward pointed out that despite Gardiner’s admission that he did not understand strategy, he had still felt qualified to claim that ‘the results of a series of campaigns [were] not solely or even mainly dependent on military considerations’.\(^5\)

E.A. Freeman, in *History of the Norman Conquest*, which was published by the Clarendon press in five volumes between 1867-1876, also largely avoided comment on military matters; he wrote with the consideration ‘of one with whom Political History is a primary study’.\(^6\) Hence, he afforded little space to a discussion of the composition of the opposing armies in comparison to the time he spent on the political and social effects on the

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1. The one real exception was Charles Oman who in 1885 published his *History of the Art of War*. This work is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. Charles Oman, *History of the Art of War: Middle Ages From the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century* (London, 1898).


3. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War*, Vol. 2 (London, 1894), pp. 197-214. The chapter on the New Model Army in the field is the closest this history got to describing military subjects. See also Vol. 1, pp. 364-82, on the campaign of Marston Moor. It was not described with reference to the judgements made by the opposing generals, nor were lines of supply considered.


Freeman, in keeping with the standard historical approach at the time, downplayed the influence of military events on the history of England, arguing that the success of the Norman Conquest was the result of a series of long term causes ‘at work at least ever since the death of Edgar [in 975]’ rather than being dependent on the agency of William the Conqueror. Moreover, Freeman wrote that after the conquest it was only a ‘few generations’ before the Normans were culturally assimilated and ‘England was England once again.’

The one exception to Freeman’s general avoidance of military topics in this work was his analysis of the Battle of Hastings. Given his lack of military knowledge, Freeman sought the assistance of several officers and Captain Edward R. James ‘had the kindness to put [Freeman’s] ideas of the battle, as drawn from the original writers, into scientific military shape’. Therefore, the description of the formations and manoeuvres made during the battle was particularly detailed. Furthermore, Freeman included James’ technical comments in a section entitled ‘the military character of the battle’ in which judgement was passed on the martial skill shown by William’s army and that of his English opponent, Harold.

In an attempt to overcome a lack of a technical military knowledge, which is likely to have deterred historians from writing Military History, Thomas Arnold published an article in the English Historical Review in 1887 which called for ‘some competent military man, acquainted with the tactics and means of attack and defence… in fashion at the times of the Thirty Years’ War [to] take in hand the campaigns of our English Civil War’. Arnold hoped that this would give historians working on the period some ‘accurate and rational accounts of what was done’, and so he provided a complete reading list for anyone willing to undertake

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the task.\textsuperscript{110} This call was answered by Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Ross who had ‘for some years, during time that could be spared from professional duties, been engaged on the task of collecting materials for a Military History of the period in question’.\textsuperscript{111} Although Ross’ subsequent analysis of the Battle of Edgehill, and later the Battle of Nasby, demonstrated that the \textit{English Historical Review} was not averse to publishing Military History, even by a ‘man of letters’, the subject was notable for its rarity as the pages of this journal and the \textit{Transactions of the Historical Society} were largely given over to Political History.\textsuperscript{112} From the mid-1880s, however, this opposition to the subject among university scholars began to fall away as a new generation of historians emerged who placed a greater emphasis on the use of primary source material to examine topics other than the political history of Britain.

\section*{III. The Increasing Acceptance of Military History, 1885-1914}

The professionalisation of history in the 1880s, which had led to the emergence of specialist historical literature that utilised primary sources to solve historical problems, meant that no new ground was broken in the 1890s when historians at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Manchester defined the function of their respective chairs of History in terms of conducting detailed and rigorous research. Instead, in the 1890s the emphasis placed on the use of primary sources by J.B. Bury and J. Acton at Cambridge, T.F. Tout at Manchester, and C.H. Firth at Oxford differed only in terms of degree from their predecessors who had occupied chairs of History in the 1880s.\textsuperscript{113}

In 1890 Tout was appointed to the chair of History at Owen’s College in Manchester. Following the grant of a charter to the Victoria University of Manchester in 1904 and the

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creation of a School of History the following year, Tout was able to form a department around the principle of research. Tout trained his students to undertake historical inquiry and so he introduced a compulsory thesis as part of the degree.\textsuperscript{114} Similarly at Cambridge, Bury declared History was a ‘science, no more and no less’ and altered the Historical Tripos so that in their final year students were able to further specialise on a specific topic, undergoing historical training to assist them in their research.\textsuperscript{115} At Oxford as well, Firth also pressed for the ‘technical training’ of history students.\textsuperscript{116}

Due to the growing rigour with which this new generation of historians approached their work, any historical subject which could be studied using primary sources, even Military History, was seen as legitimate by them. When Firth was appointed to the Ford Lecturership in English History at Oxford in 1896 he argued that it was ‘necessary… to study every side’ of the English Civil War, ‘the military history as much as the political or religious history’. Consequently he presented a series of papers on ‘Cromwell’s Army’.\textsuperscript{117} This lecture series, based on a wide range of ‘pamphlets [and] newspapers’, as well as ‘the memoirs and correspondence of the different actors’, was intended to ascertain ‘how it was that Parliament succeeded in creating an efficient army, while the King could not do so’. Thus, it not only looked at developments in tactics but also the social aspects of the armies, including the influence of religion and politics.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, after becoming Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1904, he began work on \textit{Last Years of the Protectorate 1656-1658}, with


\textsuperscript{115} Evans, \textit{Cosmopolitan Islanders}, p. 101; and, Slee, \textit{Learning and a Liberal Education}, pp. 136, 141.


\textsuperscript{118} Firth, \textit{Cromwell’s Army}, pp. v, viii. See the chapter on infantry, pp. 69-77, the chapter on cavalry, pp. 149-163, and the chapter on religion in the army, pp. 313-48.
which he intended to conclude Gardiner’s History of the Great Civil War.\textsuperscript{119} Although, unlike Gardiner, Firth referred to the military aspects, including tactical details and the organisation of armies, he was still circumspect about criticising decisions in military matters made by historical figures.\textsuperscript{120}

Firth was also a prolific contributor of articles on Military History to both the English Historical Review and the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.\textsuperscript{121} He was not the only historian contributing articles on this topic to the specialist periodicals. In the two and a half decades before the outbreak of the Great War there was a dramatic increase in articles on military historical topics. These articles were not limited to one particular period, with work appearing on modern campaigns, the Napoleonic period, the Thirty Years War, and the medieval era.\textsuperscript{122}

Charles Oman, although he did not contribute to the specialist historical periodicals, was also instrumental in the development of Military History, so that it became an important adjunct to the study of Political History at Oxford.\textsuperscript{123} Oman went to Oxford in 1878, where he studied under William Stubbs, achieving a double First Class in Literae Humaniores and Modern History, before rejecting a place in the Civil Service to take a fellowship at All Souls

\begin{footnotes}
\item[120] Firth, Last Years of the Protectorate, Vol. 1, pp. v, 268-300, 302-340, Vol. 2, pp. 177-223.
\item[123] For biographical information on Charles Oman, see Appendix 1.
\end{footnotes}
College in 1881.\textsuperscript{124} In 1884 he won the University’s ‘Lothian Prize’ with an essay entitled ‘Art of War in the Middle Ages’.\textsuperscript{125} Oman defined his topic broadly as the development of ‘the art which enables any commander to worst the forces opposed to him’. He included a ‘complete sketch of the social and political history’ of the period, so that he could examine the role military considerations played in the ‘origin’ and ‘decline’ of Feudalism. However, Oman’s study was almost exclusively devoted to pitched battles, and not sieges, even though siege-craft was an important branch of military activity at this time.\textsuperscript{126} He originally approached Blackwood with the essay, but was turned down and ultimately published the work with T. Fisher Unwin in 1885.\textsuperscript{127}

Subsequently, this work was to form the basis of *History of the Art of War: The Middle Ages, From the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century*, published by Methuen in 1898. Oman intended this volume ‘to form the second of a series of four’ in which he hoped ‘to give a general sketch of the history of the art of war from Greek and Roman times down to the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century’. Oman’s extensive research, which included walking ‘over the important battlefields’ of Europe, assisted his analysis of the actions taken by military leaders and he was often very critical of them. This work, together with his earlier essay, was the first attempt by a university scholar in Britain to study the historical development of warfare and to provide specific criticism of decisions made by military commanders without deferring to the judgement of the professional soldier.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{126} Oman, *Art of War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 1, 124.
\textsuperscript{127} Oman, *Memories of Victorian Oxford*, p. 85; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS40651, ff. 118, Oman to Blackwood, 5 October 1883, MS4462, ff. 214, Oman to Blackwood, 16 February 1884, MS4462, ff. 218, Oman to Blackwood, 15 May 1884, MS4462, ff. 220, Oman to Blackwood, 20 September 1884, MS4462, ff. 222, Oman to Blackwood, 23 September 1884.
\textsuperscript{128} Oman, *History of the Art of War*, pp. v, 616-30. Creasy did not provide any discussion on developments in the art of war and did not provide a detailed criticism of decisions made by commanders; Gardiner and Arnold both deferred to military writers; Firth’s work appeared four years after Oman’s.
Oman’s next major study, *History of the Peninsular War*, was published by Clarendon in seven volumes, the first four of which appeared between 1902 and the outbreak of the Great War, with the remainder produced between 1922 and 1930.  

Oman undertook his study as he realised that a large quantity of primary material had come to light since Napier had written his History, most notably the papers belonging to the British diplomat Sir Charles Vaughan, recently acquired by the Codrington Library at All Souls.  

Furthermore, since Oman was able to speak Spanish, he was able to use the Record Office in Madrid.  

Some of Oman’s most valuable research came through his numerous visits to the theatre of war, which were assisted by the loan of a motorcar from the King of Portugal.  

On such a trip to Oporto, Oman discovered why Wellington had been able to escape French observation when he crossed the River Douro in 1809. He discovered that ‘lofty and precipitous cliffs’ towered ‘nearly two hundred feet above the water’s edge’, obscuring the crossing from the French on the plateau above the river. This led him to conclude that ‘from Napier’s narrative and plan [of the battle]… he had either never seen the ground, or had forgotten its aspect after the lapse of years’.  

Just as in his earlier works, Oman engaged in an analysis of the leadership of the various commanders on each side; and, he criticised the writing of military figures on the conflict without an apology for his lack of practical experience in these matters as a civilian.

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129 Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*. Volume 5 appeared after the outbreak of the war in 1914, but since it was researched and written by Oman prior to the war it is included here in the discussion of the work.  
Although he claimed in the work that he did not ‘dream of superseding the immortal six volumes’ of Napier, Oman later admitted that his work had ‘two main purposes’: to correct ‘Napier’s inordinate worship of Napoleon’, and to defend ‘the British government against [his] charge that they deliberately starved Wellington and his army’. Therefore, he went out of his way to correct Napier on these points, and to redress Napier’s anti-Spanish bias, as he had ‘invariably exaggerate[d] Spanish defeats, and minimise[d] Spanish successes’ through the deliberate use of only French sources when discussing these matters.

While Oman did not specifically refer to any military theorist in his writing, his examination of Napoleon’s 1809 campaign in Spain, in which he claimed the ‘ordinary rules’ of warfare suggested that the destruction of the enemy’s regular forces and occupation of their capital would cause them to submit, implied the influence of Jomini’s writing. Oman provided a balanced analysis of Wellington’s ability as a commander and concluded that his battlefield successes were largely down to his use of musket fire, noting that ‘an English charge… was practically an advance in line with frequent volleys’, and that ‘it was the ball, not the bayonet, which did the work’. However, Oman considered Wellington was over-reliant on his infantry, while he was critical of his failure to make the ‘greatest possible use of his cavalry’. Similarly, he also condemned Wellington’s attitude toward the lower ranks and his failure to allow subordinates greater scope to act on their own initiative.

Oman was particularly critical of Sir John Moore’s campaign in Portugal in 1808-9. He felt that there was ‘no justification’ for Moore’s decision to send General Hope by a

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134 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. viii-ix; and, Oman, Memories of Victorian Oxford, p. 163.
136 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 19. While both Jomini and Clausewitz had stressed the importance of the destruction of the enemy’s army and occupation of the capital, Clausewitz saw them only as means to a greater political end, and he also rejected notion of fixed ‘rules’ in warfare.
‘detour’ to find a suitable route for his cannons as ‘the roads of Northern Portugal were not impracticable for artillery’. Oman pointed out that in 1706 and 1762 heavy guns had in fact been used on those roads at that time of year with little trouble; and he claimed that Moore had later written a letter in ‘the language of an honest man, conscious that he has made a mistake’ in which he admitted the roads could have been used. Furthermore, he condemned Moore’s ‘headlong’ retreat to Corunna since he ‘drove his men beyond their strength, when he might, at the cost of a few rear-guard skirmishes, have given them four of five days more in which to accomplish [the march]’.139

Oman’s analysis of Moore’s campaign was severely criticised by Maurice in his *Diary of Sir John Moore*. Maurice used Oman’s criticism as ‘an exceedingly interesting illustration of the difference between antiquarian research and the knowledge required for the command of armies’; thus it was an attack on civilian criticism of technical military matters. He pointed out that Oman had not used the Clausewitzian method for analysing judgements made by historical figures, since ‘the practical question before Moore was whether he could safely trust his artillery to mountain roads when a wet season might come on at any moment’. In this regard, ‘no evidence of what had been done in 1706, or even in 1762… would have been the smallest value’, as this told little of the road’s current condition. If Oman’s work was to be of any value to the ‘historical student’, Maurice concluded, he must ‘realise the meaning of “the fog of war”’ and ‘that a General may often be absolutely right in doing…what afterwards, when full information is obtained, turns out to have been… a mistake due to false reports’.140 Moreover, Maurice used the correspondence between Moore and Hope to demonstrate that both commanders knew nothing about the condition of the roads and that the letter Oman had taken as Moore’s omission of guilt had been taken out of

139 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 497, 599.
Maurice was disappointed that Oman’s criticisms had tarnished the reputation of ‘noble Moore’ and his campaign, which he loftily claimed was ‘the boldest, the most successful, [and] the most brilliant stroke of war of all time’.

Firth and Oman were not the only university historians to produce Military History at this time. In March 1896, Cambridge University Press came up with the idea of creating a general history based on German Historian Georg Weber’s Weltgeschichte in übersichtlicher Darstellung, the Cambridge Modern History. Lord Acton, who had succeeded Seeley as Regius Professor in February 1896, accepted the publisher’s offer to edit the work, which he hoped would be a History of the ‘common fortunes of mankind’, and set about inviting ‘every English historian who [was] competent’ to produce a chapter. Volume eight on the French Revolution and volume nine on the Napoleonic period, which appeared in 1904 and 1906 respectively, contained nine chapters on military history written by university historians, reflecting the growing acceptance of the subject. Central to Acton’s vision, a view maintained by Adolphus Ward who inherited the History when Acton fell ill in April 1901, was that it should be impartial, and so, as Acton put it, ‘our Waterloo must be one which satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike’. It fell to Oman to write the Waterloo chapter; although he did his ‘best… to arrive at the exact truth’, he felt that ‘in sober fact it is impossible to write History that every man, whatever his race, creed or

141 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 316-7. The letter had in fact been sent by Moore to reassure Hope that he would accept the responsibility for any negative repercussions which resulted from the route that Hope had selected.

142 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. xv, 290.


145 Anon., Cambridge Modern History: An Account of its Origins, Authorship and Production, pp. 9, 16; and, Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders, p. 86.
politics, can accept’, and so he ridiculed Acton’s notion, writing, ‘imagine an appreciation of
Bismarck that equally pleased a patriotic Frenchman and a patriotic German’. 146

In fact, not only civilian scholars contributed to the Cambridge Modern History as
Acton had written to the War Office asking for the names of ‘good writers’ to produce work
on military topics. 147 Henderson agreed to produce chapters on many campaigns, including
all of those conducted by Napoleon as well as those fought during the Franco-Prussian War
and he intended to write in a style which emphasised the ‘honour and glory’ of the
combatants. 148 However, following his death in 1902 these chapters passed to several civilian
scholars, further underscoring the extent to which the writing of Military History was
becoming accepted by academics.

Outside of university scholarship, as the potential markets for Military History grew,
both the quantity and intellectual rigour of ‘high-brow’ Military History increased. In 1904
Blackwood published George Forrest’s History of the Indian Mutiny, Reviewed and
Illustrated from Original Documents. 149 Forrest, who was ‘Director of Records of the
Government of India’, was able draw on a wide range of official material as well as the
private correspondence of British political and military figures, much of which he reprinted to
accompany his work. 150 Forrest had also published large amounts of primary material relating
to the Mutiny in his Selection from the Letters Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved
in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-8, published in 1893. 151 This
couraged more historical work on the uprising as source material was now more widely

147 Anon., Cambridge Modern History; An Account of its Origins, Authorship and Production, p. 12.
148 HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, Henderson to Wolseley, 15 March 1897.
149 G.W. Forrest, History of the Indian Mutiny: Reviewed and Illustrated from Original Documents (London,
1904).
150 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30103, Forrest to Blackwood, 26 February 1904; and, Forrest, A History of the
151 G.W. Forrest, Selection from the Letters Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Military
available than it had been when Kaye and Malleson produced their History. Forrest rejected the early sensational accounts of the massacre of British women and, throughout his work, he emphasised that the majority of ‘the brave… [native] population… with a few exceptions, treated the fugitives of the ruling race with a marked kindness’.\footnote{Forrest, \textit{History of the Indian Mutiny}, Vol. 1, p. xv. For examples of Forrest demonstrating that atrocities were committed by only a small minority of Indians and that many natives remained loyal, see Forrest, \textit{History of the Indian Mutiny}, Vol. 1, pp. x, 478, Vol. 3, p. vi.} It is likely that Forrest deliberately stressed this point since he hoped the book would sell well in India, he told Blackwood that the sub-continent ‘will be the greatest book market in the world’. To this end, he put Blackwood in touch with S.K. Lohani and Co., ‘the leading booksellers at Calcutta’, to assist in selling his work in India.\footnote{NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30103, Forrest to Blackwood, 21 December 1904.}

Likewise, as American copyright laws had become much more rigorous in 1891 it was now viable for a British publisher to produce work which was likely to have a large demand in the United States as prior to this time there had been little to stop an American printer pirating this type of work.\footnote{Briggs, \textit{History of Longmans}, p. 262. In 1886 there was the first ‘International Copyright Convention’ signed in Berne. However, the United States was not a signatory. In 1891 Congress passed a statute enabling qualified non-resident foreign authors to have their works protected under U.S. copyright law.} Thus, at this time, several volumes on the American War of Independence appeared. Henry Belcher, a rector from Sussex, had his work on the American War of Independence, entitled \textit{First American Civil War}, published by Macmillan in 1911.\footnote{H. Belcher, \textit{First American Civil War: First Period 1775-1778} (London, 1911).} In 1899 Longman published G.O. Trevelyan’s \textit{American Revolution}, which was based on ‘many scores of books’ and ‘an innumerable multitude of memoirs, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, poems, and collections of printed and unprinted documents’. The work was methodologically complex as Trevelyan attempted to determine British public opinion regarding the conflict by ascertaining the editorial positions of the major London newspapers. The premise of this idea was that these publications chose to actively reflect popular attitudes toward the war in an effort to retain a high circulation. He concluded that
the majority of the public were opposed to the government policy to fight to retain the colonies in America, and stressed the good conduct of both sides during the war, particularly that of George Washington.156 Such an emphasis contributed to the positive reception the work received in the United States, and by 1905 the work had reached a third edition.157

The most ambitious Military History to be written outside a university was John Fortescue’s *History of the British Army*, which ultimately ran to twenty volumes, which were published by Macmillan between 1899 and 1930, the first eight of which were written prior to the Great War.158 Fortescue, who had attended Trinity College, Cambridge in 1878, but left before he was awarded his degree, originally undertook to write a four volume history of the development of both the army and of its relations with the government, ‘so as to determine whether success or failure [in war had been] due to the merit or demerits of the army, which is the tool, or of the cabinet, which is the workman, or of both’.159 Fortescue was not the first military historian to attempt such a History. Charles M. Clode in *Military Forces of the Crown* (1869), Clifford Walton in *History of the British Standing Army* (1894), and Sibbald Scott in *British Army: Its Origin, Progress, and Equipment* (1868), had all dealt with the ‘Constitutional History of the Army’.160 However, Fortescue’s work eclipsed them in terms of the scale of his research. For example, in order to examine army recruitment between 1803 and 1814 alone he went through 300 volumes of unseen material. However, travelling to examine battlefields in America or India was beyond the meagre financial means of

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158 Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, Although volume eight was published in 1917, the Fortescue Letter Books at the National Army Museum demonstrate that the manuscript of the volume was complete by the outbreak of war in 1914. NAM, Fortescue Letter Books, 6807-356. For biographical information on Fortescue, see Appendix 1.
Fortescue, so he was obliged to hold a series of jobs, including Royal Librarian at Windsor Castle, as he wrote his magnum opus. Thus, the publication arrangement he made with Macmillan on 7 December 1894, in which he was to receive a royalty of ten per cent of the retail price of each volume sold, and a £100 advance, stood to provide him with much needed income.\footnote{Fortescue, \textit{Author and Curator}, pp. 82-95, 261; and, BL, Macmillan Papers, Add. MSS55064, ff. 52-53, Fortescue to Macmillan, 1 November 1905, Add. MSS55064, ff.1-3, Fortescue to Macmillan, 7 December 1894, Add. MSS55064, ff. 26-27, Fortescue to Macmillan, 16 May 1898. On 31 January 1896 the agreement was changed and Fortescue was awarded a £200 advance.}

Throughout the study Fortescue endeavoured to ‘formulate our military experience of the past in all its branches, so as to give warning against repetition of old mistakes in the future’.\footnote{John W. Fortescue, \textit{History of the British Army}, Vol. 4, part 1 (London, 1906), p. vi.} Hence, the work was highly critical of politicians who Fortescue felt were ‘entirely ignorant of military matters’ and had mismanaged the organisation of the army.\footnote{John W. Fortescue, \textit{History of the British Army}, Vol. 5 (London, 1910), p. 205.} Fortescue condemned the Cabinet’s war planning during the Napoleonic wars and labelled the disastrous Walcheren expedition as ‘merely one of a hundred examples of the hopeless inadaptability of the British Constitution to war’. However, the work was not polemical toward the government and Fortescue rejected Napier’s claim that the cabinet had deliberately withheld support from Wellington during his operations in Spain and Portugal in 1810-1.\footnote{John W. Fortescue, \textit{History of the British Army}, Vol. 7 (London, 1912), pp. 53, 448.} Fortescue hoped that his analysis of the suitability of the British Constitution to war would prove useful for both politicians and military figures. Therefore, he asked Macmillan to send copies of his work to several high-ranking officials. In fact, he felt he had been paid a high ‘compliment’ when in March 1906 Lord Esher ‘begged for an advanced copy of Vol. IV… for the use of the Committee of Imperial Defence’.\footnote{BL, Macmillan Papers, Add. MSS55064, ff. 65-66, Fortescue to Macmillan, 6 March 1906, Add. MSS55064, ff. 39-40, Fortescue to MacMillan, 13 January 1901, and Add. MSS55064, ff. 59-60, Fortescue to Macmillan, 4 March 1906.}
Fortescue, like Oman, engaged in analysis of military operations, particularly those conducted during the Napoleonic wars. He praised Wellington’s generalship, especially his capacity for logistical organisation; and, while he was critical of his inability to delegate to his subordinates, he still felt that he was ‘a man of genius’.\textsuperscript{166} When covering the Peninsular War in volumes six (1910) and seven (1912), Fortescue regularly deferred to the work of his ‘very good friend’ Oman, attributing him with the discovery that Wellington’s tactics were based on meeting ‘the charge of the [French] bayonets with a volley of bullets’.\textsuperscript{167} Fortescue had nonetheless one major area of disagreement with Oman: his critique of Moore’s retreat to Corunna via Madrid. Fortescue sided with Maurice and maintained that ‘beyond all question [Moore] was right’, given the information available at the time of his decision. Still, possibly because of Maurice’s criticism of civilian historians second-guessing military judgements, he was circumspect regarding whether Moore should have engaged his pursuers earlier in his retreat, concluding that ‘whether Moore was right or wrong… is a matter which a belated critic is not competent to decide’.\textsuperscript{168}

Despite Fortescue’s attempts to make the discussion of constitutional considerations regarding the army relevant to his contemporaries, the work failed to sell to any significant degree. He excused the fact that the first two volumes had fallen ‘dead flat’ by explaining ‘one cannot expect such a book to go off quickly… [Lord Roberts] pronounced himself pleased with the book, so far as he had read it; but people are busy with the war in South Africa’. The third volume (1903), which was delayed by his brother’s death in action during the Second Boer War, ‘fell as flat as the first two’.\textsuperscript{169} It was not until the fourth volume

\textsuperscript{167} BL, Macmillan Papers, Add. MSS55064, ff. 177-8, Fortescue to Macmillan, 10 September 1913; Fortescue, \textit{History of the British Army}, Vol. 7, pp. 151, 258, Vol. 6, p. 413. Although Fortescue did not footnote the passage, it is probable that he was referring to Oman, \textit{History of the Peninsular War}, Vol. 1, pp. 116-7.
\textsuperscript{168} Fortescue, \textit{History of the British Army}, Vol. 7, pp. 400-1, and Vol. 6, p. 399, 408.
\textsuperscript{169} BL, Macmillan Papers, Add. MSS55064, ff. 34-35, Fortescue to Macmillan, 6 December 1899; and, Fortescue, \textit{Author and Curator}, p. 88.
(1906) appeared that reviewers began to praise the work, helping to boost sales, but even then it sold so few copies that both the author and publisher were still out of pocket a year later.\textsuperscript{170} Fortescue was particularly exasperated when he was told by Trevelyan that ‘fifty years ago such a book would have given [him] £300 to £400 a year’; he considered this a ‘comment on the spread of education’, sarcastically noting ‘what an encouragement this is to authors and publishers’ to produce high-brow Military History.\textsuperscript{171}

The emphasis on the use of primary source material in historical studies legitimised Military History in the eyes of historians working in universities during the final two decades of the Nineteenth Century. Moreover, as this approach was adopted by the ‘men-of-letters’ who wrote on the subject, less emphasis was placed on the historical agency of individual figures. The growing interest in Military History as a serious discipline opened up for the first time the possibility of the subject becoming established in some of the leading universities.

\textbf{IV. Military History as a University Subject, 1899-1914}

The influence of Oman and Firth led directly to the inclusion of Military History on the Modern History syllabus at the University of Oxford in 1899.\textsuperscript{172} Oman felt that the study of the subject was essential at Universities, not only because of the historical significance of many conflicts, but also because he maintained that ‘every Minister of the Crown’, the ‘editors of newspapers’, as well as the general public, needed an ‘educated… opinion on things military’ if Britain, as a democratic nation, was to avoid a foreign policy disaster. Thus, he wrote in 1900 that ‘it ought to be as disgraceful for an educated man to have to

\textsuperscript{170} Fortescue, \textit{Author and Curator}, p. 94; and, BL, Macmillan Papers, Add. MSS55064, ff. 88-89, Fortescue to MacMillan, 29 April 1907.
\textsuperscript{172} OUA, FA 4.11.2.1 Modern History Faculty Board Reports, 1899-1912, Report of the Committee on English Political History, 26 January 1899, p. 1.
confess that he knows nothing of the lessons of the Crimean War… or the Franco-German War… as to own that he is entirely ignorant of the character of the Reform Bill of 1832’. 173

So, when Oman and Firth sat on a Modern History Board committee formed to examine ways to make the study of Political History ‘less soul-destroying’, they advocated the inclusion of Military History on the syllabus of the final year of the degree course, a proposal the Board accepted on 26 January 1899. 174 It was hoped that this would enable the teaching staff to lecture on ‘Military History without feeling that [it] would not “pay”’. This enabled Oman to subsequently begin a series of lectures on the ‘Military History of England: Early and Middle Ages to 1485’. 175

Despite the inclusion of the subject on the History syllabus, it was ultimately the pressure to improve officer education created by the Second Boer War which had a major impact not only on how the subject was taught at Oxford, but also on its emergence at other universities before 1914. The desire to improve the educational attainments of the officer corps caused the alteration of the existing system by which a university student could qualify for a commission. Previously, a candidate had to pass their first year exams, after which they could leave for a place at Sandhurst. 176 On 10 March 1903 the Secretary of State for War, St John Brodrick, announced to the House of Lords his new scheme intended to allow candidates to receive a ‘genuine University education’ as well as ‘some practical and theoretical training in military subjects during their University career’. 177 Under this new system, the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Dublin and London were

175 OUA, FA 4.11.1.2 Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, ‘Board of the Faculty of Arts: Opinions from persons engaged in teaching Modern History as to possible reforms in the Final Honour School’, 12 March 1898; Anon., ‘Deputy Chichele Professor of Modern History’, Oxford University Gazette, 35 (28 Apr. 1905), p. 474.
allocated a set number of commissions which could be awarded to students by a committee formed at each establishment. Known as the ‘Delegacy for Military Instruction’, these committees included at least one representative of the War Office.\textsuperscript{178} To be eligible for the award of a commission, a student needed to be under 25 years old, unmarried, to have been attached to a regular unit for six weeks for two consecutive years, to have qualified for the award of their degree, and to have passed a series of exams in military subjects.\textsuperscript{179} These exams included Military History. As university candidates were set the same papers as those for officers in the reserve forces seeking to convert their commission into one in the regular army, they sat a paper on the ‘principles of strategy’ and second paper on a ‘special campaign’ selected each year by the War Office.\textsuperscript{180} Military History was assigned the second highest allocation of marks; and so, out of the 3,750 available, up to 1000 were given for the subject.\textsuperscript{181} Given the prominence of the topic, Brodrick called on the Universities to ‘include in their honours examinations two or three military subjects’, including ‘Military History’.\textsuperscript{182}

The University of Oxford, possibly because it already taught Military History, was the first institution to respond to Brodrick’s request. On 24 March 1904, the Hebdomadal Council, the institution’s chief executive body, ‘suggested’ to the Modern History Board that

\textsuperscript{178} ULA, Military Education Committee Minutes, ME 1.1, ff. 38a, Report of Military Commission Nomination Board, 9 March 1909; and, Anon., ‘Army University Candidates’, \textit{Oxford University Gazette}, 34 (14 Feb. 1905), p. 349. Later the Universities of Edinburgh and St Andrews were able to nominate candidates. However, along with the University of Dublin, they did not undertake special courses of Military History for the education of candidates hoping for the award of a commission. Bowman and Connelly, \textit{Edwardian Army}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{179} When the OTC was set up in 1908, the requirement that a candidate be attached to a regular unit was amended and they were required to ‘be an efficient member of the Senior Division Officers’ Training Corps, each year from the date of his registration as an Army Candidate’. OUA, Officers’ Training Corps Records, OT 2.9, Rules for University Candidates, April 1912, p. 2; and, Anon., ‘Army University Candidates’, \textit{Oxford University Gazette}, 34 (14 Feb. 1905), p. 349.

\textsuperscript{180} Anon., \textit{Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1905} (London, 1905), p. 26; and, Anon., \textit{Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1906} (London, 1906), p. 26. This exam used the same papers as those sat by the University candidates and so these reports contained a section on this exam as well.


\textsuperscript{182} Anon., ‘In the House of Lords Yesterday’, \textit{The Times}, 10 Mar. 1903, p. 9.
they should create a special subject in ‘Military Tactics’. The board formed a committee, which included Firth and Oman, to examine the matter, and, on 7 May, following their recommendation, the Modern History Board accepted the proposal. After consultation with the War Office, the committee advocated that the new special subject, initially entitled ‘Strategy and its History’, but later simply known as the ‘Military Special Subject’, should use Hamley’s *Operations of War* and Jomini’s *Art of War* as textbooks. This decision reflected both the influence of these works on the syllabus of the exam set for university candidates by the War Office and the subordination of the ‘Military Special Subject’ to it. Even though the course was open to all History students, and not just those seeking a commission, specific allowances were made so that it could be directly tailored to the requirements of the War Office syllabus. Thus, the Modern History Board relaxed the rules which required a two-year delay before the topic of a ‘special subject’ could be changed, making it possible to keep up with the annual rotation of the campaign the War Office selected for the exam.

Sir William Anson, Warden of All Souls College, who had a personal interest in Military History, as he was the grandson of two of Wellington’s brigadiers, was persuaded by Leo Amery, a Fellow of the College, to put forward £600 to fund a new Lecturership to assist with the teaching of the new ‘Special Subject’. Advertised in July 1905, the holder of this position was to be elected for three years from 15 October 1905, during which time he would

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183 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892–1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 24 March 1904. The other members of the committee were Charles Herberden, Principle of Brasenose College and G. Hassall, a tutor of Christ Church College.
185 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899–1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History Special Subject’ by Foster Cunliffe, 11 June [1908], p. 1.
186 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892–1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 3 December 1904. Modern History Faculty Board Reports, 1899–1912, FA 4.11.2.1, ‘Report of the Committee appointed to consider the proposed Military Special Subject’, 1 December 1904, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892–1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 28 January 1905.
receive an annual stipend of £200, which came out of Anson’s donation. In return, he would
present at least twenty-six lectures per academic year on ‘Military History, not confined to
any special period… but in all cases bearing upon the conditions of modern warfare’. \(^{188}\) Prior
to an appointment to this Lecturership, the necessary Military History was taught to those
seeking a commission by R.P. Dunn-Pattison in Magdalen College.\(^{189}\)

The Lecturership in Military History was awarded to Sir Foster Cunliffe, a Fellow of
All Souls, who had recently written an historical account of the Second Boer War.\(^{190}\) Cunliffe
was a close friend of Amery; not only had he been the best man at Amery’s wedding, but
Amery had also offered him the opportunity to write the fourth volume of the *Times History
of the War in South Africa*. Thus, it is possible that it was Amery’s influence which helped to
secure Cunliffe the Lecturership.\(^{191}\) Cunliffe’s appointment was not approved by everyone,
however. Spenser Wilkinson had been asked by Cunliffe’s publisher to assist him with the
second volume of his History of the Boer War, but upon reading the work Wilkinson
concluded that Cunliffe was a ‘beginner’ in the study of Military History, since ‘he had read
none of the classic works on the art of war’ and he suggested that Cunliffe should study ‘the
theoretical treatises of Jomini and of Clausewitz’. Consequently, when only a few months
later Cunliffe asked Wilkinson to recommend him for the Lecturership, Wilkinson felt forced
to decline, fearing that he had ‘probably made an enemy for life’.\(^{192}\)

\(^{188}\) Anon., ‘Lecturership in Military History’, *Oxford University Gazette*, 35 (4 July 1905), p. 741; and, Anon.,

\(^{189}\) Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, *The Times*, 11 Feb. 1905, p. 11; and, A.H. Johnson, ‘Military Lectures’,
*Oxford University Gazette*, 35 (20 Jan. 1905), p. 271. Dunn-Pattison was an alumni of this college, who after
gaining his degree had served in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. He lectured for an hour on both
Tuesdays and Thursdays and charged students a fee of £1.10s per term.


\(^{191}\) CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5-4, Cunliffe to Amery, 21 June 1905, AMEL 2.5-4, Cunliffe to Amery, 2
July 1905; and, Amery, *My Political Life*, Vol. 1, p. 357. Cunliffe turned down the opportunity to write the
volume for the Times History to enable him to apply for the Lecturership, as he felt that he could not undertake
both.

information on Wilkinson, see Appendix 1.
Cunliffe envisioned that he would undertake a far reaching and in-depth study of warfare as Lecturer of Military History. As he felt ‘the mere study of individual campaigns… is no good’, he intended to treat ‘war as a grand political act and [to] study how a nation should prepare for it’ since he felt ‘this is the only way to commend it to… the Oxford’ student.\textsuperscript{193} However, when Cunliffe began teaching on the ‘Military Special Subject’ in October 1905 he quickly found that he was limited to the exam syllabus set by the War Office.\textsuperscript{194} Consequently, he was forced to adopt an approach which focused narrowly on the ‘principles of strategy’ which it outlined and on the operations conducted during the ‘special campaign’ selected for study that year. In January 1906 he began lecturing on the ‘Franco-Prussian War up to the Battle of Sedan’, due to appear in the March 1906 exam.\textsuperscript{195} In an attempt to make the course as intellectually rigorous as possible, and to retain some semblance of the subject which he had envisaged, Cunliffe increased the number of textbooks on the reading list. In June 1907, he added the first four books of ‘Clausewitz’s On War’, possibly because of his acquaintance with the work following its recommendation by Wilkinson.\textsuperscript{196} Oman assisted with the teaching of the course, and, in 1906, wrote that when he set essays asking for a comparison ‘between the strategy of Napoleon Bonaparte and of Frederick the Great’ there was always a ‘stupid undergraduate’ who complained ‘that he can find nowhere in print’ a ready answer.\textsuperscript{197}

Despite efforts to balance the requirements of those seeking a commission with the need to create a subject in keeping with the intellectual standard required by the Modern

\begin{footnotes}
\item[193] CCA, Amery Papers, AMEL 2.5-4, Cunliffe to Amery, 21 June 1905.
\item[194] OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History Special Subject’ by Foster Cunliffe, 11 June [1908], p. 1.
\item[196] OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 9 June 1907, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 15 June 1907.
\end{footnotes}
History Board, Cunliffe encountered criticism from the independent examiners which reported on his subject in 1907. They found that otherwise ‘weak candidates obtained strong marks’ in his subject and they expressed ‘some doubt’ as to whether ‘the knowledge required was a fair equivalent [to] any one of… other special subjects’. Cunliffe tried to bring the matter to a head before the Modern History Board in May 1908 when the issue of renewing his Lectureship beyond October 1908 was broached. He argued that ‘the study of Military History is complicated by the fact that the selected periods are subordinated to the requirements of Army Examinations’, entailing ‘a good deal of extra work on the teacher, who has to study, often with insufficient time, a fresh campaign when the old one would suffice’. But his ‘main objection to this constant changing of campaigns [was] that it render[ed] the provision of suitable authorities almost an impossibility’ as while the other special subjects had ‘work specifically prepared by competent historians’ to draw on ‘English military literature is singly poor in works of constructive [historical] criticism’. Cunliffe suggested that the Modern History Board should ‘select its own period of Military History irrespective of any changes the War Office make’ to allow the Lecturer to focus on a single campaign, thus raising the study of Military History at Oxford ‘in both scope and method to an equality with other branches of historical investigation’. However, while the Modern History Board secured funding to continue Cunliffe’s position for another year, no changes were made to the syllabus at this point.

The attempt by the University of Manchester to teach Military History in response to Brodrick’s appeal was even more problematic than at Oxford. At a special meeting on 11 July

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198 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports, 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, ‘Report of the Examiners on the 1907 Examination’, n.d. [1907].
199 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 1 May 1908. Cunliffe’s position was due to expire on 15 October 1908.
200 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History Special Subject’ by Foster Cunliffe, 11 June [1908], pp. 1-4.
201 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board Meeting, 1 May 1908.
1905, the University Council discussed the possibility of establishing ‘a scheme for providing instruction in Military History and Strategy’ to assist the students who sought a commission.\(^{202}\) At this meeting John William Graham, Principal of Dalton Hall, the Quaker hall of residence in Owen’s College, and Rev. Dr James Hope Moulton, the University’s Wesleyan Minister, opposed any military instruction, both insisting that it would be ‘a corrupt influence among the students and was to some extent a degradation of the idea of a University’.\(^{203}\) Despite this objection, the Vice-Chancellor, Alfred Hopkinson, upheld the proposed scheme. In September 1905 F.N. Maude was appointed ‘Lecturer on Military Subjects’ for two academic years to instruct both those who wanted a commission, as well as ‘any student in the Faculty of Arts who wish[ed] to offer Military History’ as a subject in their final exam.\(^{204}\)

Maude’s inaugural lecture, entitled ‘The Importance of the Study of Military History to National Commerce’, given at Whitworth Hall on 26 October 1905, greatly antagonised those who opposed the study of military subjects at the University and did little to establish Military History at Manchester.\(^{205}\) In this lecture, Maude argued that ‘the gravest permanent menace to the peace of Europe’ arose from the ‘extraordinary ignorance’ among the electorate ‘as to the view prevailing in all Continental Cabinets concerning both the ethics and the nature of modern war’, the substance of which he claimed was embodied in the writing of ‘that leading German thinker and soldier, von Clausewitz’.\(^{206}\) Maude suggested that Clausewitz’s writing had persuaded Continental governments that the nature of modern


\(^{203}\) Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, \textit{The Times}, 12 July 1905, p. 10.


war centred around ‘instant readiness for action… ensured by arrangements thought out in every detail in peace,’ so that at a moment’s notice ‘the whole destructive potentiality of the nation [could be] thrown out in the required direction’. As British defence arrangements were in a ‘disorganised state’ it was ‘only a matter of time’ before war caused ‘terrible internal trouble’ in the country, as ‘our marine insurance practices would automatically force up the price of bread… at least fourfold, and in forty-eight hours… workpeople would feel the pinch’ and call for ‘peace at any price’. When the Manchester Guardian reproduced a summary of the speech, which it labelled ‘anti-English’ and ‘pernicious in its political tendencies’, it received letters from readers, including from Graham and the Vicar of Eccles, which condemned the university for Maude’s appointment. While the newspaper insisted that it did not quarrel with the inclusion of ‘lectures on Military History’ at Manchester, it felt that the subject would ‘suffer through its being identified in the public mind with [Maude’s] cranky and ill-digested theories’.

Still more embarrassing for the university was what Tout referred to as the ‘Maude failure’. Despite Maude’s lectures, as well as Wilkinson’s donation of military books to the university library, Manchester did not have any successful candidates in the War Office exams and was, therefore, unable to nominate any students for a commission. In the academic year of 1907-08 Maude ceased to work at Manchester and resumed a position at the University of London lecturing on Military Law. Following Maude’s departure, Wilkinson

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207 Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, The Times, 14 Oct. 1905, p. 10. It is possible that Maude’s understanding of Clausewitz was based on a misreading of the concept of ‘absolute war’ found in Book I of On War. If so, this is similar to the misreading of Basil Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War, pp. 16-18.


211 UMA, Vice-Chancellor A. Hopkinson Papers, VCA 6/830/3, Tout to Hopkinson, 14 March 1908.


was appointed Lecturer in Military History to replace him in March 1908. Wilkinson delivered his course of lectures on ‘the rise of strategy illustrated mainly from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’; and, from 4 November 1908, he also taught the Third Year Honour Class taking the course on the ‘Napoleonic Period’ which consisted of eight students.

The University of London also encountered difficulties in organising its course of Military History lectures intended for those students seeking a commission. The University Senate appointed Col. H.A. Sawyer to lecture on Military History alongside F.N. Maude on 27 October 1904. Under this agreement the instructors were paid salaries amounting to £250 per year. The Military History course began on 17 January 1905, and the Secretary of State for War, Arnold-Forster, chaired the first lecture on the Franco-Prussian War. However, it soon became apparent that there was little interest in the subject amongst the students, and by January 1908, the advertisements for Sawyer’s course began to include a notice that it would not run ‘unless at least ten students present themselves’. Since only one person from the University of London successfully passed the War Office Military History exam prior to 1909, the Senate took the decision in March 1909 to ‘dispense with the services’ of Sawyer and Maude.

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At Oxford, as the funds which had sustained the Lecturership in Military History were about to expire, the Statutory Purposes Committee of All Souls College recommended on 24 February 1909 that an offer to the University should be made to endow a ‘Reader in Military History’ at £300 a year for five years. Following consideration of the matter, however, the College recommended instead the establishment of a Professorship in Military History to replace the Lecturership. On 26 February Anson wrote to the University’s Vice Chancellor to make the formal proposal. The statute of July 1909 which created ‘the Chichele Professor of Military History’ outlined that the position was to ‘give instruction in Military History with special reference to the conditions of modern warfare’. In return, the incumbent would be elected for five years and would be paid by All Souls a stipend of £500 per year, of which £200 came from a Fellowship which he was automatically awarded. The board of electors selected to choose the best candidate consisted of Oman, Firth, H.B. George, Cunliffe, and a representative of the Secretary of State for War. Firth contacted Wilkinson in the early summer of 1909 to tell him he ‘was the sort of person the University would like to elect’ and that he would support him ‘against any possible rival’. Once assured that he would not be competing against Cunliffe, Wilkinson sent testimonials regarding his suitability for the position from Tout, Lord Nicholson and Lord Roberts to the board of electors. Cunliffe, despite Wilkinson’s earlier refusal to recommend him for the Lecturership, also supported his

222 OUA, HC 1.1.82-3 Hebdomadal Council Proceedings, Hilary Term, No. 82, 1909, ‘All Souls Library and Professorship of Military History’, 26 February 1909.
225 Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, p. 313. William Nicholson was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 22 November 1909.
application. And, even though Charles Callwell was the candidate favoured by the War Office, Wilkinson was elected to the Professorship on 6 October 1909.\textsuperscript{226}

Wilkinson had considerably more freedom than Cunliffe to teach Military History in the way he saw fit, as in June 1909 the Modern History Board finally resolved that the ‘military special subject’ would no longer be subordinated to the War Office exam syllabus.\textsuperscript{227} Wilkinson’s view of the role his Professorship could perform was based on both his understanding of the University’s function and his Clausewitzian perception of the nature of war. He believed that the study of Modern History at Oxford rendered a ‘twofold service’ to the nation: first, it created, maintained, and communicated the standard way of understanding the ‘life and growth of states’; and, second, it trained the minds of the country’s future governing elite.\textsuperscript{228} Wilkinson felt his Chair was a ‘chance to communicate’ to these men ‘the two truths that war is a chapter of policy and that policy cannot be right without strategy’.\textsuperscript{229} Thus, to create ‘statesmen’ Wilkinson thought that he must demonstrate to his students that the ‘control and direction of a war… is the function primarily of the statesman rather than the soldier’. Moreover, he believed he needed to make his students ‘acquainted with war’, so that even though they ‘need not… be able to handle fleets or armies… [they would] have a true knowledge of what can and what cannot be done by those instruments’.\textsuperscript{230}

To this end, Wilkinson reformed the ‘Military Special Subject’ so that it focused on the developing nature of war, particularly the notion that war in ‘any age is the reflection of

\textsuperscript{227} OUA, FA 4.11.1.2, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, ‘Modern History Board Meeting: the special subject, Military History and Strategy’, 11 June 1909.
\textsuperscript{228} Spenser Wilkinson, \textit{University and the Study of War}, p. 4; and, BL, Spenser Wilkinson Papers, 96850, MFR453, Reel 3, OTP 13/51, Lecture at Royal Engineer Institute, ‘Universities and the Army’, [n.d, 1911-1912?], p. 17.
\textsuperscript{229} BL, Spenser Wilkinson Papers, 96850, MFR453, Reel 3, OTP 13/51, Lecture at Royal Engineer Institute, ‘Universities and the Army’, [n.d, 1911-1912?], p. 17.
\textsuperscript{230} Wilkinson, \textit{University and the Study of War}, p. 10.
the political and social condition of the communities engaged in it’. He focused on warfare during and after the French Revolution, as ‘a new type of conflict between nationalised states’ had been created which ‘it was the achievement of Clausewitz [to have] first recognised’. Thus, to Wilkinson ‘the military history of the nineteenth century [was] the history of a persistent endeavour [to] more perfectly to realize’ the conception of the ‘nation in arms’.  

To study this phenomenon and how the national armies which it created could be utilised, Wilkinson made his students study a Napoleonic campaign as it contained the ‘germ’ of the changes under way, and a campaign which illustrated an example of the ‘nation in arms’, a phenomenon which he judged to have begun with the American Civil War.  

Thus, in 1912 Wilkinson’s students studied the Waterloo Campaign and the Seven Weeks War, while in 1914 they examined Napoleon’s Italian Campaign and the Franco-Prussian War.  

Following the creation of the Chichele Professorship, the University of London began to consider the formation of a course of military instruction which would count towards a student’s degree. In June 1910 the University’s ‘Military Education Committee’ drew up a draft syllabus for a new subject entitled ‘Military Science’ which consisted of optional topics to be taken during a student’s penultimate and final year of study. Under this scheme, members of the OTC taking a Bachelor’s degree in Arts or Science could undergo courses on Tactics and Military Topography, Military Law, and Military Engineering in their Intermediate year, followed by a study of ‘Military History and Strategy’ in their final year. Since it ‘seem[ed] desirable that the syllabus should be correlated to those in the Regulations for University Commissions in the Regular Army’, arrangements were made so that the

231 Ibid., p. 16; BL, Spenser Wilkinson Papers, 96850, MFR453, Reel 3, OTP 13/52, Lecture on the Balkan War delivered to the Historical Association at Oxford University, n.d. [1913], p. 6.
233 OUA, FA 4.11.2.1, Modern History Board Reports, 1899-1912, ‘Military History Subject Schedule: 1912-1915’.
special campaign selected by the War Office was that which was studied.\(^{234}\) It was hoped that the study of Military History, besides allowing a greater opportunity to pass the War Office exams, would also ‘enable [the] student to form broad and well-informed opinions on questions of national policy’ as well as ‘promoting general interest in the subject, which is fundamental to the Art of War’.\(^{235}\) The University accepted these draft proposals, and the ‘Military Science’ course began in 1913, with the first students taking it during their intermediate year.\(^{236}\) Although Captain G.P.A. Phillips was appointed ‘Lecturer in Military Science’ for the period 1913-1914, his programme of Military History commenced after the outbreak of the Great War.

Despite the appointment of specialist lecturers to teach Military History at Oxford, London and Manchester, Cambridge had not followed suit, so its students who sought a nomination for a commission relied on lectures put on by the University’s OTC.\(^{237}\) Ironically, just as Oxford abandoned the study of Military History subordinated to the War Office exam, on 5 November 1909 Cambridge University’s Board of Military Studies recommended that an optional special subject, consisting of military topics, including Military History, should be created, as ‘for some years… [at] Oxford’ such a course had ‘undoubtedly proved beneficial to the preparation of University Candidates for the Army’. It proposed that two papers on Military History, which directly reflected the War Office syllabus, be created, and Fortescue’s *History of the British Army*, along with James’ *Modern Strategy*, be appointed as the textbooks for the course. Once the University Senate confirmed the proposal on 14

\(^{234}\) ULA, ME 1.1, Military Education Committee Papers, ff. 38a, ‘Military Education Committee Minutes, 1909-1911’, ‘Report on meeting held, 28 June 1910’.


\(^{236}\) Anon., ‘Syllabuses in Military Science for Examinations in Arts and Science for Internal Students’, *University of London Gazette*, 11, No. 140 (25 May 1912), p. 158.

December 1909, the course began with the study of the Waterloo campaign, as the War Office had selected this as the ‘special campaign’ for 1910.238 With Cambridge now also involved in the teaching of Military History, the discipline had achieved a new level of acceptance within the ivory towers of academia.

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In summary, it can be seen that the development of ‘high-brow’ Military History was dependent on the emergence of Modern History as a discipline located in leading universities which emphasised the use of primary source material. While much of the intellectually rigorous Military History produced prior to 1899 had continued to focus on the historical agency of ‘great men’, after 1885 a new generation of historians began to place a greater emphasis on the use of primary sources to solve historical problems beyond those posed by the development of the British constitution.239 This new development was driven by the professionalisation of the study of History at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Manchester.240 The new emphasis on primary sources meant that Military History could now be legitimised whenever historians employed it in their research and writing.241 Just as this new generation of historians did not copy or adopt the complex methodologies employed by their counterparts in Germany, those who wrote Military History also lacked a scholarly

239 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea; Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India; Malleson, History of the Indian Mutiny; and, Alison, The Life of John Duke of Marlborough.
240 Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, p. 215; and, Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, p. 129.
241 Oman, History of the Peninsular War; Firth, Cromwell’s Army; Firth, Last Years of the Protectorate; and, Ward et al., Cambridge Modern History, Vols. 8-9.
apparatus beyond the archive and pencil. Nonetheless, Charles Oman became the first university scholar to engage in specific and detailed criticism of the judgements made by military figures. Previous scholars, such as E.A. Freeman, John Kaye, Samuel Gardiner, and C.H. Firth had deferred to the judgement of professional soldiers. This increasing rigour also influenced those working outside universities, with John Fortescue’s *History of the British Army* not only drawing on a wide range of primary sources but also engaging in an analysis of the past which was not simply centred on ‘great men’.

There were, in essence, three factors which contributed to an approach to Military History which took source material more seriously, establishing it as a serious research discipline, and which made it a university subject. First, around the turn of the century military historical subjects began to make inroads into the curricula at several universities: for instance, in 1899 Military History was included in the Modern History syllabus at Oxford to supplement the study of political history. Second, following the army’s poor showing during the Second Boer War, the university candidate scheme was reorganised, so that between 1904 and 1914 the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester and London came to teach the military historical knowledge required for a nomination for a commission. In fact, the way in which the subject was taught at these universities closely mirrored the War Office syllabus, which was based in part on Jomini’s ‘principles of war’.

Third, there was a growing conviction that civilians, too, required knowledge of military

affairs which could only be gained through knowledge of Military History. When Spenser Wilkinson was appointed in 1909 to the first Chichele Professorship in Military History, the ‘special subject’ was reorganised to provide instruction in ‘the nature of war’ for future politicians. In fact, Wilkinson largely dismissed the notion of ‘principles of war’ in his teaching, contemptuously writing that he would only give them passing mention ‘for what they were worth’.

This move away from the War Office syllabus meant that for the first time Military History was on the road to becoming a university subject in its own right, overseen by professional historians. The increasing acceptance of the subject was reflected in chapters on Military History published in the Cambridge Modern History, 1902-12. The trend was confirmed in the years between 1909 and 1914 when several postgraduate students at Oxford undertook a B.Litt. in aspects of the subject, supervised by Wilkinson and Oman. This growing acceptance of Military History as a scholarly discipline was symbolised by the inclusion of a ‘Naval and Military Section’ at the International Congress of Historical Studies held in London in 1913. At this event, although Wilkinson was notable by his absence, civilian scholars, including Oman and J. Holland Rose, a Reader in Modern History at Cambridge, gave papers on Military History alongside officers, such as F.B. Maurice and A. Lonsdale Hale.

The final confirmation of the acceptance of Military History at leading British universities could be seen in the establishment by Trinity College, Cambridge, of the ‘Lees

248 Wilkinson, University and the Study of War, p. 10.
251 OUA, FA 4.11.1.3, Modern History Board Minutes, 1910-1923, ‘Captain H.F.P. Percival, Christ Church, application for B.Litt., Professor Spenser Wilkinson was appointed to supervise his work’, 8 March 1912.
252 Anon., ‘International Congress of Historical Studies’, American Historical Review, 18 (July 1913), p. 679. This was the third International Congress of Historical Studies; the first had been held at The Hague in 1898, the second in Paris in 1900.
Knowles Lectureship in Military Science’, with Fortescue appointed as the first holder of this honour.\textsuperscript{254} Despite the title, Fortescue did not discuss in any depth ‘military science’ during the lectures he gave during the Michaelmas Term of 1913.\textsuperscript{255} Instead, he examined the scope of the field of Military History, providing a broad overview of British military activity, particularly in India and the colonies, based on the research he had conducted for his \textit{History of the British Army}. Like Wilkinson, his thinking was based on the understanding that warfare was primarily ‘the strife of communities’ and so required statesmen to study it as well as soldiers. He argued that through the study of Military History it was possible ‘to learn the nature of the supreme test to which a nation may be subjected, so that [the nation] may equip [itself] morally and physically to pass through the ordeal with success’. Of secondary consideration was the study of strategy because he felt that the subject was of importance to ‘citizens at large’, since it gave them as voters an insight into ‘how far strategical considerations enter into political arrangements’ and so was ‘essential to the right understanding… of domestic and foreign politics’.\textsuperscript{256}

The transformation of attitudes towards Military History at universities was now complete. The subject had been for much of nineteenth century the domain of conservative ‘men of letters’, who had emphasised the role of ‘great men’ in deciding the outcome of historical events, and who had lacked scholarly credibility in the eyes of the mostly liberal, professional historians whose work focused on the political history on Britain.\textsuperscript{257} In fact, for the most part, prior to the appearance of Oman’s \textit{History of the Peninsular War} (1902), most high-brow Military History was largely uncritical of the British Army and often consisted of

\textsuperscript{254} Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, \textit{The Times}, 11 Mar. 1913, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{256} Fortescue, \textit{Military History}, pp. 4, 14, 29, 32, 19, 42.
biographical work which sought to protect the reputation of its subject. It was, however, a tribute to Britain’s liberal atmosphere that when civilians began to examine military historical subjects in detail, they did not attract the same level of opposition as was, for instance, the case in Germany. When Maurice criticised Oman’s analysis of Moore’s retreat to Corunna it was to suggest how civilian scholars could improve their approach to the subject; Lord Roberts and Lord Nicholson even agreed to write references to support Wilkinson’s application for the Chichele Chair of Military History.

Of course, it may have been that the lack of resistance was due to the unpopularity of reading among army officers. But the problem of anti-intellectualism was only to be seriously argued over between the World Wars, a debate which was conditioned by a very different set of parameters. But in early 1914, these controversies lay far over the horizon.

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260 Anon., ‘Notes by the Editor, Military Education’, p. 491.
Conclusion

Military History has, to a great extent, been viewed by researchers through the lens of twentieth century debates. As a result, the type of Military History which emerged during the period between 1854 and 1914 has been dismissed as mostly simplistic, unreliable or reactionary, especially the form known as official history.\(^1\) However, this negative perception was formed as a result of controversies in the twentieth century, not least those instigated by the writing of Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller.\(^2\) As there has been hitherto no attempt to examine the emergence of Military History on its own terms, largely because the existing secondary literature does not identify this as a subject worthy of study in its own right, the development of the discipline has been fundamentally misunderstood.

In essence, historians have approached pre-1914 Military History with a series of preconceived notions, often assuming that one genre of the discipline somehow represents the entire subject matter. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, however, British Military History experienced a dramatic expansion and diversification between 1854 and 1914. There were, in fact, five main factors which drove the development of the subject: the requirements of military education; the need to compile recent or historical information for intelligence and planning purposes; commercial opportunism; the desire to alter the public perception of

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military affairs; and, the transformation of Modern History into a university discipline based on the use of primary sources. While the emergence of Military History in the second half of the nineteenth century has been largely ignored by historians in favour of themes such as military reform, tactical development and technological innovation, the changes in the way in which it was both written and studied between 1854 and 1914 had a profound effect on its future development.

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The central aim of this study has been to ascertain how and why British Military History emerged, expanded and diversified between 1854 and 1914. In order to provide a response to the central research question, it is first necessary to address the five sub-questions outlined in the introduction.

In regard to the first sub-question – what caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam syllabuses – the increase in the use of Military History in the army’s exam syllabuses in 1856 and 1904 occurred for the same reason on both occasions, namely, in an attempt to improve the education of the officer corps out of military necessity following infamous and well-publicised battlefield disasters. However, the way in which it was thought that the subject could contribute to this end underwent significant change. After the Crimean War, Military History was added to the syllabuses of Sandhurst, Woolwich, Chatham and the Staff College to provide officers with a theoretical framework through which they could gain a greater understanding of the factors which were thought to influence the conduct of a campaign. Despite the use of Clausewitz’s writing at the Staff College between 1868 and 1872, a factor not explored in the scholarly literature on the influence of
the Prussian’s writing in Britain, this framework was derived largely from the ‘principles of war’ articulated by Jomini.³

This approach to studying Military History had several serious flaws, however. On the one hand, it created an odd paradox. Although the army deemed that Military History was important enough to insist that officer cadets at Sandhurst, Woolwich and Chatham undergo a course in the subject, no effort was made at this time to institutionalise the study of the subject by obliging the majority of the officer corps to read it. On the other hand, the exclusive reliance on continental theorists, which reflected the poverty of British military thought at this time, prevented the study of an approach to warfare which was tailored to Britain’s unique situation. Thus, although between 1854 and 1914 the British Army was involved in numerous colonial conflicts as well as operations which required close cooperation with the navy, as Jomini and Clausewitz’s writing did not focus on these types of military operations, they were essentially ignored in the army’s Military History syllabuses prior to the 1890s.⁴

As the teaching of Maurice and Henderson at the Staff College (1885-99) had a major influence on the perceived military utility of the study of Military History, when the subject was given more emphasis in the army’s exam syllabuses after the Second Boer War it was assigned three functions not present prior to the 1890s. It was intended to increase the military capacity of officers by developing their decision-making ability, as advocated by the Clausewitzian approach to the subject.⁵ In fact, despite the view of the existing historiography, the study of Military History immediately prior to the outbreak of the Great War did not simply consist of compiling factual information, but was considerably more

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³ Bassford does not specifically examine the use of Clausewitz’s writing in British military education, and instead relies on published works which referenced the theorist. The closest he came to examining the use of On War at the Staff College in the 1870s was to speculate that Chesney had read the work. Bassford, Clausewitz in English, p. 48; and, Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 104, 287.
⁴ Jomini, The Summary of the Art of War, p. 62; and, Bassford, Clausewitz in English, p. 18.
⁵ Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, p. 156.
complex.\textsuperscript{6} It was thought that the study of the subject could play a role in the professionalisation of the officer corps by creating an interest in military literature.\textsuperscript{7} To this end, there was an effort to institutionalise the study of Military History by increasing the number of officers required to take exams in the subject and by limiting the use of textbooks to encourage wider reading.\textsuperscript{8} Given the increasing emphasis in British military thought on maritime considerations, naval elements now played a role in the study of the subject.\textsuperscript{9}

In response to the \textit{second sub-question} – why was there an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers? – the increase in the writing of Military History intended for military educational purposes was caused primarily by two factors. Commercial opportunism led to an expansion in the publication of material intended to assist those taking army exams between 1856, and the early 1870s as well as after 1904. At the same time, a small number of officers wrote work intended to improve the education of their fellows as they felt that army education was not preparing them sufficiently for future conflicts. In 1856, when Military History was added to the syllabus designed for those seeking a staff appointment, an audience, and so a commercial opportunity, was created for material to assist officers taking this exam.\textsuperscript{10} However, the initial expansion in the publication of Military History for this purpose was short lived because in the 1870s and early 1880s \textit{Operations of War} was made the sole basis of the Military History syllabus at the

\textsuperscript{7} Fuller, \textit{Foundations of the Science of War}, pp. 29, 328; Liddell Hart, \textit{Ghost of Napoleon}, p. 146; and, idem., \textit{Remaking Modern Armies}, pp. 170, 173.
\textsuperscript{8} Askers-Douglas Committee, Report, pp. 20, 28, 30, 38.
\textsuperscript{10} Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. cxliv.
Staff College and Woolwich.\textsuperscript{11} As a result, the financial incentive for publishers and authors to produce such educational material was reduced, so the publication of such work declined during this period.\textsuperscript{12}

In the late 1880s and 1890s a handful of officers took it upon themselves to improve army education by either translating into English material related to the study of Military History, or by writing works which used the subject but were unrelated to the army’s exam syllabus.\textsuperscript{13} Although few in number, these works had a disproportionate influence on how Military History was subsequently approached when it was intended to serve an educational purpose for officers as several had the effect of establishing new ideas in British military thought. A focus on German tactical writing introduced the Clausewitzian approach to Military History to Britain and this had a profound effect on Henderson’s writing.\textsuperscript{14} Likewise, Callwell drew on Military History to provide examples for \textit{Small Wars} as well as his work on maritime operations.\textsuperscript{15}

As the ideas regarding the study of Military History which came from German writers had altered the perceived function of Military History in the 1890s, this influenced the way in which it was written for the instruction of officers after the Second Boer War. The expansion of the army’s use of the subject, combined with the decision to avoid prescribing textbooks, created once again a financial incentive for publishers and authors to produce work which officers could use to study in preparation for an exam. As a result, a large amount of this type

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] Henderson, \textit{Battle of Spicheren}, pp. 27, 260-1.
\end{footnotes}
of material appeared between 1904 and 1914.\textsuperscript{16} While this material naturally reflected the Military History syllabuses used by the army, they have been misrepresented in the existing historiography. As Luvaas was convinced that the way in which the army studied Military History was based on the recollection of ‘facts’, he saw these works as merely intended to furnish officers with basic information which they would be expected to reproduce verbatim in the exam. As a result, he thought that this type of work, particularly those on the American Civil War, represented a step back in British military thought as they ignored Henderson’s contention that military history should be studied to induce men to think critically about warfare.\textsuperscript{17} However, these works were intended to provide the raw material with which candidates could analyse the historical military situations presented to them in the exam, and so reflected the adoption of Henderson’s contention rather than its rejection.\textsuperscript{18}

In terms of the \textit{third sub-question} – what caused the emergence and diversification of official history? – it is clear that this genre of Military History emerged and diversified due to a combination of factors. Initially, official history emerged from the need for precise military information, as it was used to compile reports and technical information regarding the siege of Sebastopol in order so that officers in the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery could learn from this chastening experience. Moreover, military educational requirements contributed to the writing of the army’s official account of the Russo-Japanese War as it was intended to provide information for those taking the new Military History exams introduced after the Second Boer War.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, the compilation of a ‘Combined History’ of the Russo-Japanese War by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence reflected the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item An Infantry Subaltern”, ‘Promotion of Regimental Officers’, p. 288; and, Anon, \textit{Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904}, p. 8.
\item Luvaas, \textit{Military Legacy of the Civil War}, p. 188.
\item TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
increasing emphasis on the role played by maritime considerations in British military thought. Consequently, the work presented the view for those studying the campaign to see the actions of the two branches of service as interdependent.

The need to compile information for intelligence and planning purposes, and to provide technical information for staff officers, led to the diversification of British official history as accounts were produced which largely ignored the fighting and focused almost exclusively on logistical considerations and the intricacies of the politics of regions. Although these works were dismissed as ‘non-descript’ and largely overlooked by Luvaas, they were in fact highly specialised works. They not only reflected what were seen as the biggest challenges faced by British forces in various regions around the world, but also the proposed solutions. For example, while the authorised accounts which dealt with expeditions conducted in Africa consisted largely of logistical information, those regarding campaigns fought in India focused on imparting an understanding of the customs and characteristics of the native peoples.

From 1879, following a series of military defeats and the growing press coverage of colonial campaigns, the production of authorised accounts became increasingly influenced by the desire to alter the way in which the public understood the conflict. When John Frederick Maurice was appointed the official historian of the British invasion of Egypt of 1882, for example, he decided to produce an account which was principally aimed at the reading public and was intended not only to respond to press criticism of the campaign, but also to influence the way the public understood future operations. Similarly, the desire to alter the public perception of the Second Boer War led Henderson to begin to write an account of this

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21 Ibid., pp. xi, xiv-xvii, 1-43, 199-231, 284-6.
22 Paget and Mason, *Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason*; and, Reade, *Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6*.
24 Maurice, *Campaign of 1882 in Egypt*, p. i.
conflict which was intended to defend Britain’s justification for going to war by demonising the Boers; and, it attempted to place as much blame as possible for the army’s poor performance on the neglect by the government.\textsuperscript{25} The suppression of Henderson’s account demonstrated that the debate surrounding the bias of official history pre-dated Liddell Hart’s accusations about the Official History of the Great War.\textsuperscript{26} However, it is noteworthy that in Henderson’s case the government acted to limit the partisan nature of the work in order to reduce its potential to create controversy and to ensure that official history was, at least in their view, once again of use to officers studying the campaign.\textsuperscript{27}

Turning to the fourth sub-question – what factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military History? – the primary driving force behind its expansion was commercial opportunism. Financial considerations drove the publication of the majority of this type of material and, ultimately, caused it to emerge as an established form of writing by the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the desire to alter the reading public’s perception of military events also played an important role in the diversification of this type of Military History. The initial expansion of popular Military History occurred during the late 1850s as publishers were keen to capitalise on public interest in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. To this end they produced a large number of ‘instant’ and serialised histories which drew on British eyewitness testimony to describe events soon after they occurred.\textsuperscript{28}

Popular Military History underwent a second period of dramatic expansion and diversification between 1884 and 1914. This was caused by the growth in the potential market for such work as the literacy rate in Britain increased significantly, falling production

\textsuperscript{25} CLW, Henderson Papers, A320f.B1, Draft of Chapter 2, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{26} Liddell Hart, \textit{Why Don’t We Learn From History?}, p. 32; LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/84, Liddell Hart to Edmonds, 25 June 1934, LH 1/259/93, Liddell Hart to Edmonds, 6 November 1934; and, David French, ‘Official but Not History?’, pp. 58-63.

\textsuperscript{27} TNA, WO32/4758, Maurice to Edward Ward, 28 September 1903; and, TNA, WO32/4756, Major Gretton to Sir Guy, 21 April 1903.

\textsuperscript{28} Figes, \textit{Crimea}, p. 305; and, Bullard, \textit{Famous War Correspondents}, p. 5.
costs enabled works to be sold for less, a colonial book market emerged and the development of the cheap jingoistic popular press stimulated a greater public interest in colonial campaigns, which reached new heights during the Second Boer War.29 Even though ‘instant histories’, which made up the majority of such work, only experienced a short life-cycle, the large volume of books which were produced during this period caused popular Military History to become an established form of writing by the end of the nineteenth century.30

This emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing caused the subject to diversify as it was now seen as a medium through which it was possible to influence the perception of military affairs held by a sizeable portion of the reading public.31 Initially, popular Military History was used in this way by senior officers in an effort to control the public perception of the campaigns which they had conducted and so enhance their reputations.32 However, amid growing concerns about British ‘military inefficiency’, particularly acute after the embarrassing setbacks encountered by the army during the Second Boer War, several popular military histories, most notably the Times History of the War in South Africa, argued for military reform.33 Similarly, the growing nationalism and militarism of the period was not only reflected in the Military History which appeared after 1884, it also caused a diversification of the way in which the subject appeared. Following the large number of works produced that eulogised General Gordon, more biographical volumes were

29 Weedon, Victorian Publishing, pp. 33, 114; and, Altick, English Common Reader, p. 171.
30 RPL, Longman Papers, MS1393.2.72, ff. 398, Churchill to Longman, 10 March 1900.
31 Steevens’ With Kitchener to Khartum had sold 54,902 copies by the end of 1899. The Times History of the War in South Africa sold 29,500 individual volumes. Arthur Conan Doyle’s Great Boer War sold 50,000 copies in less than a year following its publication.
32 Brackenbury, Ashanti War: A Narrative; [Maurice], Ashantee War; Hensman, Afghan War of 1879-1880; and, Roberts, Forty-One Years in India.
published which underscored and championed positive personality traits thought to be stereotypically British.34

In response to the fifth sub-question – what factors contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and research discipline? – the emergence of Military History as a research discipline was dependent on the development of Modern History into a university discipline based on the use of primary sources as it led military historians to increase the scholarly rigor of their work and legitimised the study of the subject in the eyes of professional historians. However, although Military History initially became a university subject due to the influence of Oman and Firth at Oxford, it was military educational requirements which underpinned how the subject was taught from 1904. The increasing emphasis on primary sources in the writing of Military History by university historians influenced those writing outside the academy. As a result, from the late 1890s high-brow Military History, authored by ‘men of letters’, such as Fortescue and Trevelyan, was written using a range of primary source material. The increasing use of primary sources created scope for more sophisticated work to be written; so high-brow Military History broke away from its earlier emphasis on biography.35

While financial considerations played a role in the publication of some high-brow Military History, most notably Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, they cannot be seen as contributing to the emergence of the subject as a serious research discipline. To be able to compose high-brow Military History which engaged in serious research, as opposed to work which, for example, either lionised a ‘great man’ or which was intended to appeal to popular sentiments in order to increase circulation, required access to a large amount of primary

34 Fletcher, Baden-Powell of Mafeking, p. 9; Stevens, Complete History of the South African War, p. 148; and, Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 34-53.
35 For example see: Firth, Cromwell’s Army; Oman, History of the Art of War: Middle Ages From the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century; and, Oman, History of the Peninsular War.
source material. This often meant that only a select few people could write this type of work, and so limited the scope for commercial factors to drive the composition of the subject. Equally, one of the most intellectually rigorous works to appear, Fortescue’s *History of the British Army*, was not financially successful. Indeed, even though both author and publisher lost money on the work they continued to produce it.  

After the Second Boer War, concerns regarding the standard of officer education and the extent to which politicians understood military matters influenced the way in which Military History was taught at British universities. Following a change in the War Office scheme by which a university candidate could be awarded a commission, between 1904 and 1913 Military History came to be taught at the Universities of Manchester, London and Cambridge as well as fundamentally altered at Oxford. Therefore, despite the aspirations of the newly appointed Lecturer in Military History at All Souls College, the way in which he was expected to teach the subject was dominated by the army’s exam syllabus and so the earlier developments in the way in which intellectually rigorous Military History was written could have little impact. Moreover, even when Wilkinson was appointed to the Chichele Chair of Military History in 1909, he adopted an approach to the study of the subject which was based on the writing of Clausewitz and was intended to educate future politicians. Thus, his understanding of Military History bore little relation to earlier ‘high-brow’ writing which could loosely be described as ‘academic’.

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36 Fortescue, *Author and Curator*, p. 94.
38 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History Special Subject’ by Foster Cunliffe, 11 June [1908], p. 1.
The answers to these five individual sub-questions, which closely relate to the five main genres of Military History, allow for a more considered response to the main research question as to how and why Military History emerged, expanded and diversified in Britain between 1854 and 1914. In essence, there were five general factors which can be identified in the establishment of Military History as a discipline: first, the desire to improve military education; second, the requirements of military intelligence and staff planning; third, commercial opportunism; fourth, the desire to influence the public perception of military affairs; and, fifth, the professionalisation of the study of History at several universities. Each genre was influenced by its own particular dynamics, so that popular Military History, for example, was driven by the commercial opportunities which such work offered publishers and authors. At the same time, these different factors exerted together a collective influence on the overall advance of the discipline over a sixty-year period.

There were other contextual factors which played a part in the expanding productivity among military historians. One of these was the overlapping nature of the three categories of military historian identified in the study – army officers, historians and journalists. For example, General John Frederick Maurice, who taught Military History to officers at the Staff College, not only acted as a correspondent for the Daily News during the Ashanti campaign and used his reports to compile an ‘instant history’, but later also worked as a high-brow historian when he composed Diary of Sir John Moore in 1904. Equally, Spenser Wilkinson, who began his literary career as a journalist became the first Chichele Professor in Military History at Oxford. But it was not simply the boundary-crossing of the historians which played a role. Events such as the Indian Mutiny and the Second Boer War generated an
appetite for popular histories. This, in turn, created a process whereby the army leadership developed an interest in using official history to influence public opinion.

Another factor which cannot be underestimated is the role played by foreign military authors. Since in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no real indigenous British Military History to speak of, the need to consult foreign authors was almost absolute. For this reason, German approaches to the study of Tactics and Military History played a key part in the emergence of Military History in Britain. Foreign military theorists cannot be ignored either, Jomini and Clausewitz in particular, as they offered an intellectual justification for the study of historical case studies and examples. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the expansion of Military History in Britain without reference to Clausewitz and Jomini.

Although it is true that Jomini’s work was promoted heavily through Edward Hamley’s *Operations of War*, the influence of Clausewitz has been somewhat underestimated. In this regard, an examination of material used to teach Military History at the Staff College reveals that the transition from away from the exclusive use of Jomini’s ideas first began in the late 1860s when students were encouraged to use an eclectic range of theorists, especially Clausewitz.\(^{40}\) Graham’s translation of *On War* (1873) may have been a by-product of the teaching at the College. After all, he had written *Progress of the Art of War* in 1858 to assist the officers studying for a staff appointment. The initial failure of Graham’s translation to sell is probably explained by the dominance of Hamley’s *Operations of War*.\(^{41}\) It is likely that *Operations of War* hindered the emergence of a professional reading public as it served to reduce the number of works published for military educational purposes; and, as

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\(^{41}\) Bassford, *Clausewitz in English*, p. 57.
Hamley artificially inflated the price of the work, it may have dissuaded or even prevented officers from buying it and developing an interest in military literature.\textsuperscript{42}

Soon after Clausewitz’s ideas returned to the Staff College in the mid-1880s, they influenced Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’.\textsuperscript{43} Although they have been overlooked by historians, Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ had a major impact on how Military History was studied by the army in the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Great War and so also on British military thought during this time. As Military History was used by the army to communicate a standard way of understanding the nature of war, when the teaching of the subject was expanded after the Second Boer War the approach then in use at the Staff Colleges, which was dependent on Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’, dictated how warfare was presented on the new exam syllabus. Thus, although there was no direct reference to Henderson’s ‘principles’, from 1904 the Military History syllabuses of Sandhurst, Woolwich and the promotional and competitive exams presented warfare using the same combination of Clausewitzian and Jominian ideas which they embodied. For example, both Henderson’s ‘principles’ and the new syllabus placed a great emphasis on the influence of psychological factors in war, as Clausewitz had done, while at the same time they presented the necessity for concentrating a ‘superior force at the decisive point at the decisive time’, as per Jomini’s writing.\textsuperscript{44} Equally, both underscored the influence of maritime considerations on land campaigns.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42} NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood 22 February 1865, and MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865.
\textsuperscript{43} LHCM, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, Mar. 1912.
\textsuperscript{44} JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division 1912, ff. 34-36. ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles, 6th edn., March 1912.
\textsuperscript{45} LHCM, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, March 1912; ‘An Infantry Subaltern’, ‘Promotion of Regimental Officers’, p. 288; and, Anon, Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904, p. 8.
Despite Fuller’s assertion that the study of Military History by the army prior to the First World War was based on the compilation of factual information for its own sake, a sentiment repeated by Liddell Hart in his often quoted allusion to the ‘enumera[tion] of the blades of grass in the Shenandoah Valley’, this thesis has sought to challenge this view. From the late 1880s, the way in which the army studied the subject became increasingly influenced by the approach devised by Clausewitz and articulated by subsequent German writers. By 1904 the Military History syllabus of the Staff Colleges, Sandhurst, Woolwich and the promotional exams were centred on the development of an officer’s military judgement and his ability to identify the ‘lessons’ demonstrated by a campaign. Strangely, Fuller must have been aware of this, as to gain entry to the Staff College in the summer of 1913 he achieved high marks in a Military History exam that, for example, not only asked him to ‘explain how railways have influenced strategical operations’, but as the examiner explained, was designed to ascertain an officer’s ability to make ‘clear and concise deductions’ from the past.

This finding has several wider ramifications regarding both the understanding of officer training and military thought in Britain prior to the First World War. As the existing historical literature which has commented on the role played by Military History in officer education has accepted Fuller and Liddell Hart’s contention, it has misrepresented both the

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47 For example, Gizycki, *Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: [taken from Strategischtaktische Aufgaben nebst Lösungen]*, trans. Rocca.
intended function of Military History and how it was studied. More recent historical research which has touched on this part of officer education, such as De Groot’s biography of Douglas Haig, has incorrectly interpreted material related to the study of Military History at the Staff College. De Groot claimed that as Henderson had deducted marks from Haig’s answer to a question on the Shenandoah valley due to points of ‘mere trivia’ regarding the location of a bridge and the time which night fell in the region it had demonstrated that Liddell Hart’s explanation of how the topic was taught was essentially correct. However, when it is understood that Henderson used Military History to develop the subjective judgement of his pupils, by placing them in a historical situation and expecting them to explain and justify the course of action that they would have adopted, knowledge of the location of a strategically important bridge, and the time from which darkness would have made the movement of troops considerably more difficult, was of great importance.

Besides concealing the real development of British military thought in the decades before the First World War, the emphasis placed by the scholarly literature on Fuller and Liddell Hart’s interpretation of the way in which the army studied Military History prior to 1914 has obscured the larger point which these writers were attempting to articulate regarding the role the subject should play in officer education. In fact, both Fuller and Liddell Hart condemned the way in which Military History had been studied in order to argue that the subject was of greatest utility to the military when it was used to ascertain how warfare had changed previously and so could be used to provide an indication as to how it would subsequently develop. As the role played by ‘economic factors’, the organisation of manpower as well as technical innovation, particularly in terms of weaponry, were seen by

50 Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 157; Holden Reid, ‘War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930’, p. 4; and, Luvaas, Education of an Army, pp. 243, 369.
53 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 328; Liddell Hart, Ghost of Napoleon, p. 146; and, idem, Remaking Modern Armies, p. 173.
both men to be central causes of change in warfare, they criticised the British Army for failing to place an emphasis on these factors before 1914.\(^{54}\) For example, Fuller alluded to the ‘Brown Bess mind’ which caused the army to see fighting as ‘the sum and not the product of the weapons used’ and which he felt had caused technological changes in weaponry to have been largely ignored.\(^{55}\) Similarly, Liddell Hart saw the American Civil War as ‘the signpost that was missed’ since he thought that the army had overlooked the influence which ‘rifles’ and ‘indirect’ approaches, such as those allowed by northern sea-power, had the potential to have in the future.\(^{56}\)

However, Fuller and Liddell Hart were not entirely correct, as some of these factors had influenced the study of Military History in Britain before 1914. The revisions which Hamley made to *Operations of War* were related to how technical innovations, principally the development of the telegraph, railways and rifled weapons, had influenced strategy and tactics, and in the 1878 edition of the work he concluded that the telegraph had modified Jomini’s conclusion regarding the strength of the central strategic position.\(^{57}\) Likewise, it was the realisation of the potential which the introduction of modern rifled weapons had to transform tactics which caused historical present to be seen as no longer a good basis for their study.\(^{58}\) This caused the Manchester Tactical Society, and others in Britain who studied tactics, to look toward German works on the topic and it led to the removal of Military


\(^{55}\) Fuller, *Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars*, p. 20.

\(^{56}\) Liddell Hart, *Sherman*, pp. vii-viii, 381, 427-8, 429-30, 431; and, Liddell Hart, *British Way in Warfare*, p. 123. It is interesting to note that Fuller and Liddell Hart both incorrectly stated that during the American Civil War both sides were used ‘rifles’ when in fact they were using rifled muskets. Henderson also made the same error in his writing and so perhaps hints at the extent to which these later writers relied on his work. See also Henderson, *Science of War*, p. 323.


\(^{58}\) Anon., *Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904*, pp. 7, 35.
History from the syllabuses of Woolwich and Sandhurst so that the study of Tactics could take place using fictional case studies rather than historical precedent.59

Besides changes caused by purely technical matters, prior to 1914 there was also some realisation that changes to the organisation of manpower and economic considerations had caused warfare to undergo a period of development during the nineteenth century. Although these factors featured only to a limited extent in the study of Military History at the Staff College, they were the premise of Wilkinson’s teaching as Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford in the years immediately before the outbreak of the Great War.60 Wilkinson’s course of study was dictated by the selection of campaigns which he thought demonstrated the development of the ‘nation in arms’, as he felt that this knowledge would cause his students, who he expected to form the country’s governing elite, to be more effective ‘statesmen’.61

Furthermore, the fact that the army had been studying maritime operations on its Military History syllabuses from the 1890s reflected the realisation that Britain’s armed forces were particularly well suited to conduct this type of warfare long before the appearance of Liddell Hart’s British Way in Warfare in 1932 or even Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911.62 Thus, despite Liddell Hart’s contention that the importance of maritime considerations during the American Civil War were overlooked before 1914, the campaign on the Richmond Peninsula – which underscored the potential of

the Federal armed forces to conduct amphibious operations – was regularly used by the army to examine this very factor for at least a decade before the outbreak of the Great War. While Holden Reid was correct in pointing out that Liddell Hart was wrong in his assumption that the use of maritime operations during the American Civil War had gone unnoticed in Britain, it cannot be said that this conflict was principally responsible for causing the importance of ‘command of the sea’ to be recognised. After all, it was not until the 1890s that this factor entered into the army’s Military History exam syllabuses, and the Peninsular War was just as regularly used to pose questions on this topic.

Nevertheless, while it may be doubted whether Fuller’s view of the role Military History should play in military education was sound, he was correct that the army did not use the study of the subject to provide insights into future warfare. Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, British military thought was based on the work of Jomini, Clausewitz and Mahan, who did not look to the past to understand future warfare. To a large extent, the Military History syllabuses used by the army between 1856 and 1914 emphasised continuity in strategy, rather than change, through the use of the same ‘principles of war’ to study both contemporary campaigns and those fought in the Napoleonic era.

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Looking beyond the focus of this thesis, it is perhaps appropriate to suggest some fruitful areas for future research. One such subject would be the other literary activity undertaken by

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63 LHCMA, A. Wavell Papers, 1.1, Notes taken on McClellan’s operations in the Richmond Peninsular, Junior Division, 1909.
64 Holden Reid, “‘A Signpost that was Missed?’”, p. 407.
65 For example, see: Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1898, p. 30; and, Anon., Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in June 1905, p. 115.
British officers in addition to the writing of Military History. Besides *Operations of War*, Hamley wrote poetry, fiction and regularly contributed articles to *Blackwood’s Magazine* which reviewed literature and philosophical works. Although Hamley was particularly prolific in this regard, he was by no means the only officer to produce this type of material. For example, Sir Garnet Wolseley, John Kaye, Lionel James and Sir Ian Hamilton also all wrote novels and poetry. The apparent volume of such work raises several interesting questions regarding the composition, publication and reception of literary work written by officers in the Victorian and Edwardian period. A future project could investigate not only why officers chose to write such material, particularly during a period of supposed ‘anti-intellectualism’ in the army, but also how it was received in the civilian literary ‘scene’, especially by reviewers writing in the periodical press.

As this thesis has taken the outbreak of the First World War as the end point of its analysis, this provides scope for an examination of the Military History produced in the interwar period. The study of Military History by the army between 1918 and 1939 has remained almost as unstudied as the period before the Great War. An examination of how the army approached the subject, especially in light of this conflict, which posed serious questions as to the accuracy of the army’s pre-war understanding of strategy and tactics, would be a useful avenue of enquiry. More specifically, it would be important to explore the

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69 The only exception is a brief reference in Travers, ‘The Development of British Military Historical Writing and Thought from the Eighteenth Century to the Present’, pp. 33-4.
influence of the later editions of *Field Service Regulations* on how the subject was taught by the army, especially following the inclusion of ‘Principles of War’ in the 1920 edition.\(^{70}\)

Equally, it would be worthwhile to consider how Military History was written for a military audience, as the interwar period appears to have been very different to the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. Fuller, Liddell Hart and other authors produced work which not only placed a much greater emphasis on the changing nature of war but also suggested a radically new use for Military History which was based on using the subject to predict the conditions and nature of future warfare.\(^{71}\) Yet, for all the radical new ideas, textbooks written before 1914 were still in use for part of the period: *Operations of War*, albeit a revised edition from 1923, along with Bird’s *Strategy in a Nutshell*, were recommended reading in official army publications, such as Major H.G. Eady’s *Historical Illustrations to Field Service Regulations, 1929* (1930).\(^{72}\) This raises the question as to how significant the previous era was in providing intellectual foundations, and specific attitudes towards Military History, which historians may well have underestimated.

Beyond the military uses of Military History at this time, another vital area for such a project to examine would be the continued development of Military History as a university discipline after the Great War. It would be important to determine, firstly, whether the study of the subject spread to other universities, and secondly, how it was approached at Oxford, Cambridge, London and Manchester, where it was already established. In relation to this latter consideration, as Spenser Wilkinson retained the Chichele Chair of Military History until 1923, when he was superseded by Ernest Swinton, this not only raises the question of

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\(^{71}\) For example, see: Fuller, *Foundations of the Science of War*, p. 328; and, Liddell Hart, *Ghost of Napoleon*, p. 146.

the extent to which his teaching methods remained the same after the Great War, but also whether his successor made any alterations.\textsuperscript{73}

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Any examination of the Military History written during the interwar period would need to reflect that the foundations of both the growth in the publication of military literature and the increasing professionalism of the army had their foundations laid down in the two decades prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Despite the findings of a recent study of the Edwardian Army, which concluded it was hard to detect a growth in professionalism or an improvement in officer training over that of the Victorian Army, the way in which Military History was studied and the appearance of increasingly sophisticated works for the education of officers before the Great War calls this conclusion into doubt.\textsuperscript{74} Not only did a professional reading public emerge for work unrelated to the army’s exam syllabuses, but most tellingly of all, several writers, such as J.F.C. Fuller, Frederick Barton Maurice, Henry Rowan-Robinson and George Aston, who went on to publish significant military historical and theoretical works during the interwar period, began their writing careers in the years before 1914.\textsuperscript{75}

As the intellectual origins of the writings of this group of military writers has gone largely overlooked, it has led to inadequate explanations as to why Britain was able to produce so many original military writers in the twentieth century. As continental contributions to military thought have exerted a major influence over how military thought has been assessed historically, particularly through the influence of Clausewitz’s writing, this

\textsuperscript{74} Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 39, 217.
has led to a further underestimation of British military thought before 1914. In other European countries, a more comprehensive approach to military education has obscured the very different way in which the British approach to military thought emerged. In effect, the occurrence of two major wars in the first half of the twentieth century, in which Britain fielded large armies and committed them in Europe as well as other theatres, has served to overshadow these areas of innovation.
Appendix 1: Biographies

Army Officers

Sir Charles Edward Callwell (1859-1928) was educated at both Haileybury College (1871-6) and at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (1876-7). In January 1878 he gained a commission as a Second-Lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery. His first posting took him to India, where he joined his battery at Dinapore. After seeing action in the Second Anglo-Afghan War, as well as in the First Boer War, Callwell returned to Britain in December 1881. Here he attended the Staff College (1884-5). In his final year at the institution he was under the instruction of John Frederick Maurice, the Professor of Military History. In 1886 he won a prize at the RUSI for an essay on ‘The Lessons Learned from British Colonial Campaigns since 1865’. This article ultimately proved to be the foundation on his most famous work, *Small Wars*, which was published by HMSO in 1896. The work, which became a Staff College textbook in 1899, was re-printed and revised several times before 1914.

In October 1887 he was transferred to the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. His section was responsible for collecting and collating intelligence material on Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt and the independent African states. At the end of 1896 he was posted to Malta to take charge of a company of the Royal Garrison Artillery which was assigned to the coastal defence of the island. The following year he acted as a military observer during the Graeco-Turkish War, operating with the Greeks. It is possible that his experiences during this war, in which maritime operations played an important role, combined with his service in charge of coastal anti-invasion defences, as well as his reading of the work of the American naval theorist, A.T. Mahan, had an impact on his military thought. Consequently, these influences may have led him to write *The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns* (1897) as well as *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance* (1902).

During the Second Boer War, Callwell’s unit was sent to support the operations of General Redvers Buller against Ladysmith. He wrote a regular series of anonymous articles
for Blackwood’s Magazine in which he described the conduct of the campaign. Later in the conflict Callwell was put in charge of a British mobile column formed to chase Boer commandos. However, he was unable to prevent a commando under Van Deventer from escaping encirclement by British forces at Brand Kraal. This had a negative effect on Callwell’s military career as it caused him to fall out of favour with his commander, Sir John French, who later became CIGS in 1912. Following his return to England, Callwell was overlooked for promotion and so retired from the army in 1909. In 1911 he became the editor of the ‘Campaigns and the Lessons’ series, published by Constable and Co., to which he contributed a history of the Tirah expedition.

After the outbreak of the First World War Callwell was recalled to active service and was appointed Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office. In this capacity Callwell was heavily involved in the planning of the disastrous landings at Gallipoli, although from the beginning he was sceptical of their potential for success. He later drafted the memorandum which formed the basis of the order to evacuate British and ANZAC forces from the Dardanelles. Subsequently, in 1916, Callwell was sent on several special missions to Russia in order to organise the supply of munitions and other material connected with Britain’s support for Russia.

After the war Callwell continued to write books and work as a journalist. His post-war publications include: The Dardanelles (1919) and The Life of Sir Stanley Maude (1920). These works contributed to the award of the Chesney Gold Medal by the RUSI in March 1921 for his services to Military Literature. He died on 16 May 1928 at Queen Alexandria Military Hospital in London.


Charles Cornwallis Chesney (1826-1876) was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and was gazetted as a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on 18 June 1845. After his promotion to Lieutenant in 1846, he served in Ireland, Bermuda, the West Indies
and New Zealand. An interest in Military History led to his appointment to teach this subject at Sandhurst in 1858. He later went on to succeed Edward Hamley as Professor of Military History at the Staff College in 1866, a position which he held until 1868. During his time at the Staff College Chesney wrote his most famous work, *Waterloo Lectures* (1868) which was, in part, based on the teaching material he used. Chesney also contributed several articles on military topics to the periodicals owned by Longmans, several of which were later collected together in *Essays in Military Biography* (1874). However, his literary work never achieved him the fame afforded to his brother, Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, author of ‘Battle of Dorking’, a work of invasion fiction which appeared originally in *Blackwood’s Magazine* in 1871. Upon leaving the Staff College, Chesney served on the Royal Commission for Military Education which sat under the presidency of Lord Dufferin and then later Lord Northbrooke between 1868 and 1870. His next major appointment was to command the Home District of the Royal Engineers. However, while serving in this capacity at Aldershot he caught a chill and died of pneumonia on 19 March 1876.


**Sir Edward Bruce Hamley (1824-1893)**, the son of Vice-Admiral William Hamley (1786-1866), obtained a cadetship at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, on 19 November 1840. On 11 January 1843 he was commissioned as a Second-Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery. In order to pay off debts Hamley produced material for *Fraser’s Magazine* between 1849 and 1850, before beginning to write for *Blackwood’s Magazine* in 1851. He also wrote a novel, *Lady Lee’s Widowhood* which was published by Blackwood in 1853.

During the Crimean War, Hamley served as adjutant to Colonel Richard Dacres, who commanded the British artillery. As a result, he saw a good deal of action during the conflict: at the Battle of Alma, Hamley’s horse was struck by a cannon ball; another horse was killed under him at the Battle of Inkerman, and this incident almost resulted in his capture by the Russians. For his bravery, he was mentioned in despatches and was promoted to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel on 2 November 1855. Throughout the war Hamley defended the army’s
performance in the letters which he submitted each month to *Blackwood’s Magazine*, claiming that it had been improperly funded by the government.

After the Crimean War, Hamley spent four years stationed in Scotland at Leith. During this time he became friends with his publisher John Blackwood and continued to contribute regular articles to *Blackwood’s Magazine*. In 1859 Hamley was appointed Professor of Military History at the Staff College. During his six-year tenure in this capacity, Hamley wrote *Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained* which, after its publication in 1866, became his most famous work. On 1 April 1866, he was made a member of the Council of Military Education until it was dissolved on 31 March 1870. During this time he was to secure agreement that *Operations of War* should be selected as the textbook used to teach Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, against the wishes of the rest of the council. When Hamley became Commandant of the Staff College (1870-7) he was able to ensure his work was the textbook used to study Military History at this institution.

Promoted to Lieutenant-General on 10 May 1882, Hamley was offered the command of the Second Division by Sir Garnet Wolseley as he planned the invasion of Egypt. Hamley submitted an unsolicited plan for an amphibious landing at Abu Qir Bay, which Wolseley, in an effort to confuse the enemy, deliberately led him to believe he was going to use. When Hamley found out that his plan was not to be employed, he took this as a personal slight, and was further dismayed to learn that he was to leave a section of the Second Division at Isma’liyyah in order to further mislead the enemy as to Wolseley’s intended line of advance. The final straw came following the battle of Tel-El-Kabir. Hamley felt that his troops had played the decisive role in the battle, causing the Egyptian forces to flee before the rest of the British force arrived. However, in the despatches he sent after the battle Wolseley largely ignored the role played by the Second Division. Again, Hamley took this as a personal insult and wrote an article in the *Nineteenth Century* which presented his version of events in an effort to redress the balance. In the storm of controversy which broke, Hamley fell out with the group of officers loyal to Wolseley, known as the ‘Wolseley Ring’. Despite this, he was retained on the active list until 30 July 1890 as a result of a public outcry when news of his early retirement appeared in the press.

Between 1885 and 1892 Hamley served as Conservative MP for Birkenhead. In this capacity he campaigned for both better training for the volunteers and for the construction of defensive works around London. Hamley died at Bayswater, London, on 12 August 1893. He
never married, but virtually adopted his brother’s daughter, Barbara, following her father’s death in 1863.


George Francis Robert Henderson (1854-1903) was born on 2 June 1854, the eldest son of William George Henderson, the Dean of Carlisle University between 1884 and 1905. In 1873 Henderson won a History scholarship at St John’s College, Oxford. However, he did not graduate and instead entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1876. He was commissioned on 1 May 1878 in the York and Lancaster Regiment and initially served in India. He took part in the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and fought at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.

In 1883, after a period of service in Bermuda, Henderson was stationed at Halifax in Nova Scotia. He used this opportunity to visit several American Civil War battlefields, including Fredericksburg. In 1886, following his promotion to Major, Henderson published a historical account of this battle. As the Adjutant-General of the Army, Garnet Wolseley, was keen to foster professionalism in the officer corps and he was eager to reward the writing of military literature, so Henderson was appointed as the instructor of Tactics, Administration and Law at Sandhurst in January 1890. While occupying this position between 1890 and 1892, Henderson became good friends with John Frederick Maurice, then Professor of Military History at the Staff College. The pair would spend long evenings at Maurice’s house at Camberley discussing military history into the small hours.

Henderson succeeded Maurice as Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff College on 17 December 1892. While serving in this position, Henderson wrote his most enduring work, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (1898). Henderson left the Staff College in 1899 and, following the outbreak of the Second Boer War, was appointed Director of Military Intelligence on Lord Roberts’ Staff in January 1900. Immediately before the surrender of the Boer commander, General P.A. Cronje, in late February, malaria and exhaustion caused Henderson’s health to break down and he was invalided back to England. After an improvement in his health, Henderson was appointed as the official historian of the
Second Boer War by Lord Roberts in August 1900. In the autumn of 1901 he returned to South Africa to order to collect material for the Official History. But his health failed again and he returned to England in February 1902. On doctor’s orders to avoid the cold of an English winter, Henderson travelled to Egypt, but died at Aswan on 5 March 1903.


Patrick MacDougall (1819-1894) gained his commission in February 1836, and in 1840, he entered the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, to train as a staff officer. He graduated in 1842. In 1854 he was appointed as Superintendent of Studies at Sandhurst, but temporarily vacated this position to serve in the Crimean War. He reassumed the post in 1855 and held it until the following year. In February 1858 MacDougall became the first commandant of the newly created Staff College, Camberley, a position he held until September 1861. During his time at Sandhurst and Camberley, MacDougall wrote both The Theory of War and The Campaigns of Hannibal in order to help men studying the Military History then covered in the army’s exam syllabuses.

After leaving Camberley, MacDougall was appointed Adjutant-General of the Canadian Militia (1865-1869). On his return to England in 1873 he was made head of the Topographical and Strategical Department of the War Office. However, he was soon to return to Canada; in 1878 he was appointed to the North America Command, a position which he held until his retirement in 1885. He died in Surrey in 1894.


Sir John Frederick Maurice (1841-1912) was the eldest son of the prominent Victorian theologian Frederick Denison Maurice. He was educated at Addiscombe Military College and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. He received his commission in 1861 and attended
the Staff College in 1870. In 1869 he married Anne Frances and the couple had eleven children, the eldest of which was Frederick Barton Maurice who emerged as a prominent military historian after the First World War.

Maurice’s career received an impetus in 1872 when he won a prize for an essay on how the British Army could be best organised and prepared to fight a continental army. This competition was marked by E.B. Hamley, who awarded second prize to Garnet Wolseley, then Adjutant-General of the Army. As a result, Maurice came to the attention of two prominent figures within the army. Through Hamley he became part of John Blackwood’s ‘Military Staff’, publishing several articles on military topics in *Blackwood’s Magazine*. Maurice’s connection with Wolseley was to have a profound influence on the rest of his life. Not only did it lead to him being appointed by Wolseley as Instructor of Tactics at Sandhurst in 1872, it also caused him to be appointed as Wolseley’s private secretary during the Ashanti campaign of 1873-4. Consequently, Maurice became an established member of the ‘Wolseley Ring’, and subsequently accompanied Wolseley during his campaign in Zululand (1879-80) as well as during the invasion of Egypt (1882) and in the attempt to relieve General Charles Gordon at Khartoum (1884-5).

On his return to England, he was appointed Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff College, a position which retained until 1892, when he was succeeded by G.F.R. Henderson. In 1890 Maurice purchased the *United Service Magazine* and transformed the periodical into a vehicle which championed officer education. Maurice also acted as an official historian on two occasions: first, during the late 1880s, when he wrote an account of the British invasion of Egypt; and 1903-7 when he took over the compilation of the authorised account of the Second Boer War from Henderson, following his premature death.

Following his retirement from the army at the end of 1902, Maurice’s last major literary project, besides that of the Official History of the Second Boer War, was his two volume *Diary of John Moore*, which was published in 1904. Although the work utilised primary source material hitherto unused by historians, it encountered criticism for its extravagant and excessive praise of its subject. Maurice died at Camberley on 11 January 1912 following the break-down of his health while he was working on the Official History of the Second Boer War in 1907.

Frederick Sleigh Roberts (1832-1914) was born in Cawnpore, India, and was educated at Eton College before attending the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, beginning in January 1847. On his father's insistence he joined the East India Company's service, leaving Sandhurst for Addiscombe College, which trained men for appointments with this force, in February 1850. He was commissioned in the Bengal Artillery on 12 December 1851. He fought in the Indian Mutiny, winning the Victoria Cross for capturing a rebel standard and saving the life of a loyal sepoy. As a result of the absorption of the Bengal Artillery into the British Army in 1861, Roberts became a British officer.

During the Second Afghan War, Roberts was appointed as the commander of a column of troops dispatched to occupy the Kurram valley. In the first phase of the conflict he defeated the Afghan forces defending the northern exit to the valley after conducting a daring night march. Following the massacre of the British political mission in Kabul under Sir Louis Cavagnari, Roberts led a force which captured the city. In November 1881 he assumed the Madras Command; in July 1885 he became the Commander-in-Chief of India. He left the sub-continent in April 1893 and succeeded Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Irish Command in October 1895. While in Britain he compiled his memoirs, Forty-One Years In India (1897), which enjoyed a high degree of popular success.

After the disastrous setbacks encountered by the British Army during ‘Black Week’ early in the Second Boer War, Roberts was sent by the government to replace General Redvers Buller in overall command of British forces in South Africa. Although he encountered a personal tragedy, as his only son was killed at the Battle of Colenso on 15 December 1899, he was able to trap the Boer forces under General P.A. Cronje at Paardeburg which caused them to surrender on 27 February 1900. However, Roberts misjudged the nature of Boer opposition, which was to drag on in the form of guerrilla fighting until May 1902; he had handed over command of British forces in South Africa to Lord Kitchener, his Chief of Staff, on 29 November 1900, returning to England.

He was made the Commander-in-Chief of the Army upon his return from South Africa, succeeding Garnet Wolseley. When this position was abolished in February 1904, he accepted a seat on the Committee of Imperial Defence. At the outbreak of First World War he was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Empire (Overseas) Troops in France. While visiting
Indian troops he caught pneumonia and died on the 14 November 1914. He was buried in St Paul’s Cathedral.


**Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley (1833-1913)** was born in Dublin on 4 June 1833. Wolseley was nominated for a commission by the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington, due to his father’s service; he gained an ensigncy in the 12th Regiment of Foot in 1852. He saw a great deal of service during the 1850s: first, he fought in the Second Burmese War, in which he was wounded in March 1853; he also served during the Crimean War and took part in the relief of Lucknow in the Indian Mutiny. As a result, Wolseley rose, without the need to purchase a commission, from Ensign to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel by the age of twenty-five.

Following a posting to Canada in early 1860s, Wolseley visited the United States during the American Civil War and was able to travel in the Confederacy. During this trip, he met both General Robert E. Lee and Colonel ‘Stonewall’ Jackson after the Battle of Antietam in 1862. In 1870 Wolseley led the Red River Expedition in Canada and overthrew a provisional government established by the rebellious Metis at Fort Garry. In 1873 he was chosen by the Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell, to lead a punitive expedition to Ashanti in response to Ashante attacks on the Gold Coast. This he achieved by capturing and burning the Ashante capital, Kumasi, in early February 1874. Many of the officers who had accompanied Wolseley to the Ashanti were subsequently selected by him for his future campaigns, and this group of men became known as the ‘Wolseley Ring’.

Wolseley’s active career continued during the 1870s and 1880s: he was dispatched to Zululand following the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879; he commanded the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and led the unsuccessful attempt to rescue General Charles Gordon at Khartoum (1884-5). He was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and made a Field-Marshal on 26 March 1894. However, soon after he assumed this role its powers were significantly reduced and Wolseley came to feel that he was the ‘fifth wheel of a coach’. Wolseley retired from the army in 1903 and died in March 1913.
Historians

Sir John W. Fortescue (1859-1933), the fifth son of the Third Earl of Fortescue, was educated at Harrow public school (1873-8) and studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1878. Although he wished to follow his elder brothers in the army, Fortescue’s father prevented this on grounds of expense. As a result, on leaving Cambridge in 1880, Fortescue became private secretary to Sir William Robinson, Governor of the Windward Isles, and subsequently to Sir William Jervois, Governor of New Zealand.

Following his return from the colonies, Fortescue turned to writing popular Military History in order to make money. After writing a history of the 17th Lancers, he was engaged by the publisher Macmillan in 1896 to compose a biography for their ‘Men of Action’ series. Next, Fortescue turned to writing more complex Military History, and at his proposal Macmillan agreed to publish a four volume history of the British Army. Fortescue’s zeal for research using primary sources caused this work to grow exponentially and eventually resulted in thirteen volumes published over a thirty-one year period. Throughout his time writing this work, Fortescue was hindered by his financial limitations, which were exacerbated by his history’s poor sales. As a result, he was forced to find other sources of income and in 1905 he was appointed as librarian at Windsor Castle. Later his wife’s dress-making and house decorating business was to prove essential in the completion of the history.

Despite his financial difficulties, Fortescue’s History of the British Army was well regarded as a scholarly work. On its strength he was chosen to deliver the Ford Lectures at Oxford University in 1911, for which he selected as his topic ‘British Statesmen of the Great War, 1793-1814’. Fortescue was also appointed to give the Lees Knowles Lectures at the University of Cambridge in 1914, choosing to lecture broadly on British military history. Furthermore, in 1920, he not only attained an honorary fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, but was also awarded the Chesney Gold Medal by the RUSI.

In 1916 he reluctantly agreed to become the British Official Historian of the First World War. However, it would appear that his heart was not in the work and he was removed...
from the project after critically reviewing Sir John French’s 1914. He died after an operation in October 1933 in France.


Sir John Kaye (1814-1876) was born in London and was educated at both Salisbury public school and Eton College. After leaving Eton he studied at the East India Company’s training facility at Addiscombe College (1831-2). Upon graduation he served in the Bengal Artillery as a cadet; he was commissioned on 14 December 1833. He resigned from the army on 1 April 1841 so he could devote himself to his literary work. He founded the Calcutta Review in 1844 and submitted articles on political and military topics. In 1852 he completed a two-volume study of the First Afghan War.

In 1856 Kaye entered the Home Civil Service of the East India Company and, after the transfer of the governance of India to the Crown in 1858, he succeeded John Stuart Mill as the Secretary of the Foreign Department of the India Office. This position allowed him access to a vast quantity of material related to the Indian Mutiny and he began a history of this conflict, entitled History of the Sepoy War in India in 1864. He completed three volumes of this work before he died in 1876. The work was completed by George Bruce Malleson,


Alexander William Kinglake (1809-1891) was born in Somerset and was educated at Eton College (1823-28). He attended Trinity College, Cambridge, securing a BA (1832) and an MA (1836). He also studied Law at Lincoln’s Inn (1828-36). In August 1834 Kinglake set out on an eighteen-month tour of Europe and the Ottoman Empire; he became a member of the Traveller’s Club in 1845. In the following year, he competed for the affections of Miss Harriet Howard with the exiled Louis Napoleon, the future Napoleon III of France. However,
he was ultimately unsuccessful, and Howard accompanied Napoleon back to France in 1848 and lived openly with him as his mistress.

In 1854 Kinglake travelled to the Crimea to witness the fighting around Sebastopol. He was present during the Battle of Alma and dined afterwards with Lord Raglan, commander of the British forces. At the Battle of Balaclava he saw the charges of the Heavy and Light Cavalry Brigades; but soon after he fell ill and was forced to return to England. Between 1863 and 1887 Kinglake wrote an eight-volume history of this conflict, entitled *The Invasion of the Crimea*, which was published by Blackwood’s. When the first volume of the work appeared it encountered a storm of controversy regarding the extreme criticisms it directed at Napoleon III, which unbeknown to the reviewers was likely to have been caused by Kinglake’s earlier conflict with him. The later volumes of this publication further excited debate as Kinglake went out of his way to defend Lord Raglan, particularly in relation to the ill-fated charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava and the sufferings encountered by the British forces during the winter of 1854-5.

Beside his literary work, Kinglake served as a Liberal MP (1857-69). He lost his seat following a bribery scandal involving his literary agent. He died at his home in London on 1 January 1891 following his contraction of throat cancer several years previously.


**George Bruce Malleson (1825-1898)** was educated at Winchester public school and received a direct commission as an ensign on 11 June 1842 in the East India Company. He was attached to the 65th Bengal Native Infantry on 26 September 1843. On 28 March 1856, he was appointed an Assistant Auditor-General of the East India Company and was engaged in administration duties in Calcutta during the Indian Mutiny. During this conflict he wrote *Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical Narrative*, which was published anonymously in 1857, and which became generally known as the ‘Red Pamphlet’. This work was highly critical of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, and blamed his decision to annex the Oudh as principally responsible for causing the revolt. Malleson later became Sanitary Commissioner for Bengal in 1866 and Controller of the Military Finance Department in 1868. He retired from the army in 1877. In 1876 he took over John Kaye’s *History of the
*Sepoy War* at the publisher’s request, following the historian’s death. Malleson also produced some popular Military History, such as *Decisive Battles of India* (1883). He died at his home in London in March 1898.


**Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman (1860-1946)** was born in Mozaffarpur in India, but soon returned with his family to England. From an early age Oman encountered Military History, initially through his father’s memories of life during the Indian Mutiny, subsequently through his reading of Napier’s *History of the War in the Peninsula*. Oman attended Winchester public school and won a scholarship to New College, Oxford, in 1878. He excelled in his studies and received a First in both *literae humaniores* and Modern History. During his time at Oxford he joined the Kriegspiel Club which had been set up by Spenser Wilkinson. Although he failed to secure a fellowship at New College, he secured a more prestigious fellowship at All Souls. In 1884 he won the Lothian Prize with an essay on the ‘History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages’. After being made deputy to the Chichele Professor of Modern History in 1900, Oman attained this Chair in 1905.

Oman authored many historical works, a large proportion of which was high-brow Military History. Oman is best known for his four-volume study, *History of the Art of War*, which was based on his prize-winning essay, and for his *History of the Peninsular War*, which was published in seven volumes (1902-30). This latter work drew on a wide range of primary source material previously unused by historians, including material from archives in Spain.

During the First World War, Oman worked for the press bureau and the Foreign Office, for which he was knighted in 1920. In 1927 he conducted a comprehensive study on the losses sustained by German forces during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Here he was able to demonstrate that Sir James Edmonds, the British official historian of the conflict, had overestimated German casualties, whereas Winston Churchill in *The World Crisis* had set them too low. Oman died on 23 June 1946.
George Otto Trevelyan (1838-1928) was born in Leicestershire on 20 July 1838. His mother, Hannah More, was the sister of Thomas Babington Macaulay, the famous historian. As Macaulay spent a great deal of time with Trevelyan’s family, he proved to be a huge influence on him. In 1851, Trevelyan went to Harrow, followed by Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1857. As he failed to win a fellowship, he subsequently went to India to act as private secretary for his father, the Governor of Madras. In 1865 he wrote a history of the siege and massacre at Cawnpore, which had taken place during the Indian Mutiny. This work was critical of British attitudes toward the natives and suggested that their poor treatment had played an important role in causing the mutiny.

In 1865 he entered parliament as a Liberal; in 1868 as a civil lord of the Admiralty, he became part of William Gladstone’s government. However, in 1870, he resigned over the increase of the grant paid to denominational schools in the Forster Education Act. In 1882 he became the Chief Secretary of Ireland following the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish in Phoenix Park, Dublin. He retired from politics in 1897 and between 1899 and 1914 he compiled a six-volume history of the American War of Independence. As this work portrayed the colonists in a positive light, and was highly critical of the King George III, it was well received in the United States. Trevelyan died on 17 August 1928 at the age of 90.


Journalists

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery (1873-1955) was born in India in 1873, the eldest son of an official in the Indian Forestry Commission. From 1887 he was educated in England, attending Harrow, where he met a young Winston Churchill, before going up to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1892. He took Classical Moderations in 1894 and studied literae humaniores in 1896. In 1897 he was elected to a seven-year fellowship in History at All Souls College, a position which he retained until 1912. As a result of this fellowship, Amery
was instrumental in the creation of the Lecturership in Military History at All Souls in 1905; it is possible that his influence enabled his close friend Foster Cunliffe to assume this post.

Soon after joining the staff of *The Times* in 1899, Amery travelled to South Africa to cover the beginning of the Second Boer War; for a period he was the only British correspondent with Boer War forces. Later in the war he was placed in charge of coordinating the paper’s correspondents as they covered the conflict. As Amery expected the hostilities to end following the capture of Pretoria in 1900, he proposed that a collection of articles from *The Times* should be published in order to form an ‘instant history’ of the conflict. However, after securing the agreement of the newspaper’s Managing Director, Moberly Bell, Amery changed his mind and decided that he would produce a major multi-volume study of the war which argued for the reform of the army. This new vision for the project led to conflict between Amery and Moberly Bell as the work grew in length and complexity as the war continued. Eventually, after nine years, the *Times History of the War in South Africa* was completed, totalling seven volumes.

During the First World War, Amery initially served as an Intelligence Officer in Flanders. Due to his ability with languages, he also spent time in the Balkans, Gallipoli and Salonika. After the war he became Alfred Milner’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office. Following Milner’s resignation in 1921, Amery moved to become the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary at the Admiralty. Later in October 1922 Amery was made First Lord of the Admiralty; between 1924 and 1929 he acted as Colonial Secretary. After a period as a back-bench MP during the 1930s, he was offered the India Office during the Second World War by Churchill. However, in the 1945 general election Amery lost his seat in Parliament. He died in London on 16 September 1955.


George Warrington Steevens (1869-1900) was born in Kent, attended private school and in 1882 was awarded a scholarship to the City of London School. He was successful in his studies and won a Classical Scholarship to Balliol College, Oxford (1888-92). He achieved a First Class in both Classical Moderations and *literae humaniores*. Although earlier in his life he identified with the Radical Party, as he aged his political views moved to the right and he
became an imperialist. In 1896 he joined Alfred Harmsworth’s *Daily Mail* and the following year he acted as a war correspondent for the first time, covering the Turkish-Greek war. Steevens accompanied the Anglo-Egyptian army during the re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898; as a result he wrote *With Kitchener to Khartum* (1898) which quickly sold a large number of copies. In 1899 he accompanied Sir George White’s army in South Africa during the Second Boer War. He reported on the Battle of Elandslaagte and Nicholson’s Nek and was subsequently besieged in the town of Ladysmith. He died of typhoid in Ladysmith on 15 January 1900, aged 30.


*(Henry) Spenser Wilkinson (1853-1937)* was born in Hulme and his early education was at Owen’s College, Manchester. He studied at Merton College, Oxford (1873-8); following a period at Lincoln’s Inn, was called to the bar in 1880. During his time as a student at Oxford, Wilkinson read an article on European armies; noticing that the British Army was far smaller than its continental counter-parts, he set out to discover the reason for this. In so doing, he began to develop an interest in military affairs. This interest led Wilkinson to join the Oxford Volunteers; he accepted a commission in 1880. In order to improve the training of the Volunteers Wilkinson became one of the founding members of the Manchester Tactical Society in 1881. This group set out to translate foreign works on tactical matters and set up more realistic tactical exercises for the Volunteers.

In 1881 Wilkinson’s growing interest in military matters led him to begin a career as a journalist writing on this topic. He initially wrote occasional articles for the *Manchester Guardian*, but this arrangement ended in 1892 when the editor, C.P. Scott, refused to print his work as he did not think that it reflected the liberal viewpoint of the paper. As a result, Wilkinson was employed by the high-tory *Morning Post* (1895-1914). During this time he was also a regular contributor to *The National Review* and several service journals, including John Frederick Maurice’s *United Service Magazine*.

During the 1890s, Wilkinson, at the insistence of his friend, Lord Roberts, became increasingly interested in national defence and army organisation. Although prior to 1891 he had not passed much comment on naval matters, from this time he began to write more extensively on the topic. Ultimately, he saw the navy as the key to Britain’s national defence.
and, besides writing a series of books which argued this point, he became the co-founder of the ‘Navy League’ in 1894. Wilkinson also pressed for the reformation of the War Office. In order to inform the public about the German General Staff, he wrote *Brain of an Army* in 1890.

In 1909 Wilkinson was appointed as the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University; he was able to transform the teaching of this subject; he intended Military History to act as a training tool for future political elites, rather than, as formerly, to teach students the required military history needed to pass a War Office exam in the subject. Wilkinson retained this Chair until he retired in 1923.

By the outbreak of the First World War, however, Wilkinson’s influence on the War Office and the armed services had dramatically declined. He was no longer the nation’s foremost military authority in the press on the war. Wilkinson repeatedly volunteered his services to the army and navy during this conflict, only to be frustrated as he was turned down. The war brought personal tragedy as one of his sons was killed in action with the Royal Flying Corps. Together, these factors caused Wilkinson to lose interest in writing on military topics; and, in 1932 he told Basil Liddell Hart in a letter that he was ‘getting rather tired of war’. As a result, he turned to writing his memoirs and to translating ancient Greek writers. He died in 1937.


Herbert Wrigley Wilson (1866-1940) was educated at Trinity College, Oxford, where he was awarded a first class in Classical Moderations (1887) and a Second Class in *literae humaniores* (1889). He held a particular interest in naval matters; this led him to write a number of books on the topic, such as *Ironclads in Action* (1896), as well as to contribute several chapters to the *Cambridge Modern History*. Wilson’s main career, however, was as a journalist. His contribution of articles on military topics to *The Times* and *The Standard* in the 1880s and early 1890s brought him to the attention to Alfred Harmsworth. When Harmsworth launched the *Daily Mail* in 1896 he appointed Wilson as chief lead writer and assistant editor, positions which he retained for the rest of his life.
After the outbreak of the Second Boer War, Wilson wrote a serialised ‘instant history’ of this conflict for the Harmsworth Press, entitled *With the Flag to Pretoria*. When the war did not end after the capture of Pretoria 1900, the work changed its title to *After Pretoria: The Guerrilla War*. Prior to the First World War, Wilson vocally supported the growth of the Royal Navy and repeatedly warned the reading public of the threat posed by Germany. He died at his home on 12 July 1940.

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