Missed signals? A reply to Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons

Hall, BH

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ABSTRACT
This response to Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons’ recent debate article on British wireless communication in the First World War makes use of new and under-utilised archival sources in order to counter their claim that the British high command failed to modernise its communications system when it could have done so. Taking issue with their argument and methodology, which oversimplifies the nature of the communication difficulties experienced by the armies of the era and distorts our understanding of the complexities of the British army’s communications system, the article contributes to the ongoing academic re-evaluation of the British army’s ability to adapt and innovate during the war.

Introduction
Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons’ recent debate article regarding the British army’s use of wireless communication during the First World War follows on from a previous exchange between the authors and myself.1 Apparently unhappy with comments I made in two articles and an earlier review of their 2010 book Missed Signals on the Western Front, Bullock and Lyons felt it necessary to publish, in effect, an article-length version of their book’s main arguments.2 Given the significance of this subject to our

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understanding of the British army and, in particular, the ongoing academic debate regarding its willingness to learn and ability to adapt and innovate, the inherent flaws in their argument and methodology cannot be left unchallenged.\(^3\) Therefore, the first part of this riposte will provide counterarguments to the judgements made in their article. Since the core line of argument advanced in their article and the methodology they employed are symptomatic of their work as a whole, the second part of this retort will offer a more detailed assessment of their book than was possible in a standard review.

**Debate Article**

In their recent debate article, Bullock and Lyons attempt to show how the British army during the First World War ‘failed to modernise its communication system when it could have’. They point to the demonstration in February 1916 of a prototype wireless-telephone set by a group of Royal Flying Corps (RFC) engineers, under the leadership of Major Charles Prince, as an opportunity squandered. Reiterating one of their book’s chief contentions, they maintain that it was the ‘significant institutional bias’, or ‘lack of vision and will’, of the high command that prevented British forces from being equipped with the most modern continuous wave (CW) wireless-telegraph and wireless-telephone sets. To support this, they make four additional claims which I shall examine each in turn: first, that in my earlier work, I failed to explain adequately the importance of the innovation of CW wireless; second, that in contrast to the British army, both the pre-war Royal Navy and the US navy adopted wireless early and exploited its full potential; third, that the design, production and employment of the tank proves that the British army could also have developed a practical and reliable wireless-telephone set within a similar timeframe in 1916; and, fourth, unlike the British, upon entering the war the US army immediately equipped its troops with modern CW wireless technology.\(^4\)

The first of these claims, that my previous work has failed to recognise the significance of the shift from spark to CW wireless technology that took place during this period,\(^5\) can quickly be dismissed because it is simply not true. Both my articles they refer to make explicit references to the development of such technology, how it was employed

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\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 233, 249.

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by the British army during the First World War and how it influenced military operations.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, as my previous work has argued, and this article will further highlight, the ability of the British to exploit CW wireless in 1918 was an extraordinary achievement, certainly when compared to the German army. However, given the nature of the fighting on the Western Front, the finite resources available and the technical shortcomings of the CW wireless sets at the time, there were limits as to how effective this technology could be. Yes, the shift from spark to CW is a breakthrough development in the history of radio. But as this article will demonstrate, the nascent CW technology at the time did not, and in the case of wireless-telephony could not as yet, provide a panacea to the army’s communication problems.

With regards to the second component of Bullock and Lyons’ argument, that the pre-war navies of Britain and the US displayed a greater willingness to embrace wireless than the British army must be regarded as axiomatic. Unlike the British army, which already possessed the electric telegraph and was beginning to make use of the telephone, neither the Royal Navy nor the US navy possessed electronic, long-distance ‘real-time’ means of communication at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is therefore unsurprising that they both produced early innovations in the field of naval wireless,\textsuperscript{7} with the Admiralty becoming one of the Marconi Company’s best customers.\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, the principal characteristics of the wireless technology at the time meant that its use was far more conducive to military operations at sea than on land. The disappointing results of the British army’s experiments with wireless during the Second South African, or Boer, War (1899-1902), for instance, was predominantly due to the temperamental nature of the primitive, cumbersome technology used and the unfavourable geographical and meteorological conditions experienced.\textsuperscript{9} Even by


\textsuperscript{7} However, the US Navy did not begin using wireless on its ships until 1912. See Daniel R. Headrick, \textit{The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-1945} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 126.


1914, no army possessed wireless equipment that was simple in operation, secure and ‘rapid in movement, erection and dismantling’. No portable man-carried set for army purposes would exist until well into the First World War and even these were handicapped by the constraints imposed by the unique battlefield environment which existed on the Western Front; an unfavourable force-to-space ratio, lack of open flanks for manoeuvre, and the overwhelming concentration of enemy artillery fire.

By contrast, the wireless tests conducted by the Royal Navy during the same period were more successful, due in no small measure to the fact that seawater ‘has a higher specific conductivity than the land’ which significantly enhanced the performance of wireless signals when sent over sea. Furthermore, unlike the army, size and power was not an issue for the navy. Ships not only had the space to accommodate the bulky sets, their engines could also generate the large supply of electricity needed to power the equipment. In addition, as Captain Henry Jackson observed in 1897, ‘though the necessity of raising insulated wires in the air has increased the difficulty of adapting it to military purposes on shore, it has rendered the system easily adaptable for ship work, as the masts of the ship readily lend themselves to the temporary or permanent fitting of these wires’. Finally, the loss of ‘directionality’ in the early Marconi apparatus, in which signals were radiated in all directions at once, thus decreasing security, gave it an ‘all round’ facility that, while off-putting to the army, was particularly advantageous for naval use.

12 ‘Report by the Engineer-in-Chief of the General Post Office on Recent Experiments with the So-called Wireless Telegraphy’, 29 October 1897, ADM116/523, TNA.
13 ‘Report of 25th July 1899 (N.S. 4301), from Captain H.B. Jackson, H.M.S. “Juno”, to Vice-Admiral Sir Compton E. Domvile, Commanding B Fleet (Naval Manoeuvres)’, ADM116/523, TNA.
14 ‘Report of 31st March 1897 (G. 1935), from Captain Jackson, H.M.S. “Defiance”, to the Commander-in-Chief, Devonport’, ADM116/523, TNA.
15 ‘Remarks on Captain Jackson’s Wireless Telegraphy Report, 30th December 1900’, 15 January 1901, ADM116/595, TNA. For additional context, see A.J.L. Blond, 24
Therefore, contrary to Bullock and Lyons’ assessment, the feelings of doubt, suspicion and scepticism that many British officers harboured towards wireless were, in many respects, quite rational and pragmatic responses to the dangers of pursuing new and temperamental technology which, prior to the First World War, offered the army few practical advantages over existing means of communication. Crucially, this military cultural mind-set towards emerging technology should not be viewed as a uniquely British phenomenon. Markus Pöhlmann, for example, argues persuasively that the ‘non-invention’ of the tank in Germany owed less to a conservative military organisation ‘motivated by ignorance, romantic technophobia or domestic concerns’, than by ‘a rather pragmatic estimation of the technical possibilities for mechanization’. Pöhlmann’s conclusion, that prior to 1914 ‘the dominant future war image – offensive, mobile warfare – provided no place for the slow and technically unreliable tank’, can equally be applied in the case of the British army’s attitude vis-à-vis the bulky, fragile and vulnerable nature of the wireless sets then available.16 Indeed, it was also partly for reasons concerning its unsuitability for the envisaged future campaigns of mobility and manoeuvre that the British army gave a rather lukewarm reception to the telephone.17 Thus, genuine concerns regarding compatibility, technical reliability and security governed the British army’s outlook towards wireless during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The third component of Bullock and Lyons’ argument – that the design and production process of the tank in 1916 offers a model that Prince’s wireless-telephone set could so easily have replicated had the high command not been so backward-looking – is undermined by their reluctance to engage with the available archival sources and modern scholarship. They cite just two sources, one of which is very dated.18 The emerging consensus amongst historians is that the genesis of the tank was not quite so simple a process as they imply, nor did it owe its existence to the ‘championing’ of any one, or even two, prominent individuals.19 More importantly for this debate,

19 J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 4-78; David J. Childs, 

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however, is the timescale given by Bullock and Lyons for the tank to move from ‘proof of concept’, the demonstration in June 1915, to its first employment in combat in September 1916, a total of 15 months. And yet for CW wireless-telephony, we are told, the demonstration in February 1916, when Prince and his fellow engineers accomplished ‘proof of concept’, should have begun a series of steps in which the engineers ‘could have’ and ‘would have’ overcome all sorts of technical difficulties, leading to battalion-level usage within just four months (1 July 1916). In light of the tank comparison, I would have to disagree with their claim that ‘this is not a far-fetched sequence of events or time frame’.20

Fundamentally, the claims made by Bullock and Lyons that ‘no one in a position of authority [in the Royal Engineers or the British army] understood the promise of CW and directed that resources be applied to develop it’, and that consequently the development of CW wireless ‘did not proceed on [a] fast track, or indeed on a slow track’, are questionable in light of the available archival evidence.21 An account by Prince and his associate Major Robert Orme reveals that shortly after their demonstration in 1916 ‘an urgent demand for wireless telephony’ for air-to-air use arose from within the army which led the War Office to set up the Signals Experimental Establishment in September, under the command of a Royal Engineers officer Colonel Arthur Bagnold.22 At the same time, the British Expeditionary Force’s (BEF’s) Central Wireless School, under the leadership of another Royal Engineers officer Lieutenant-Colonel Lyster Blandy,23 stepped up research, design and testing of


21 Ibid., p. 237.
23 In June 1917 Blandy was appointed Chief Experimental Officer of the Signals Experimental Establishment, a post he held until April 1918 when he was given command of the Wireless Experimental Establishment of the newly-formed Royal Air Force (RAF). See ‘Personalities in the Wireless World’, The Wireless World Vol. 7 (1919), p. 180; ‘Colonel/Air Commodore L.F. Blandy, CB, DSO’, The Royal Engineers Journal Vol. 78 (1964), p. 340.
new CW wireless technology, including the latest French and Marconi/Round valves. Demonstrations of prototype CW wireless sets were carried out, including that which occurred at the RFC aerodrome at Fienvillers on 10 November with the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Sir Douglas Haig, looking on. In his diary entry that day, Haig noted: ‘The progress in wireless is… quite wonderful. We can now telephone between two machines in the air’. Thus, the primary sources indicate quite clearly that British experiments with CW technology, and wireless-telephony in particular, were not shelved in the aftermath of the aforementioned demonstration in early 1916, but were channelled specifically into developing and perfecting sets for the purpose of inter-aeroplane communication. Given that the RFC was an integral part of the British army, it is difficult to uphold the accusation that the high command suffered from institutional bias or inertia towards CW wireless.

Bullock and Lyons also apportion too much blame on the high command for the time it took to deploy the CW wireless equipment. Firstly, the manufacturing resources required for mass-producing CW wireless sets in Britain were extremely constrained due to the pressures of wartime demands. Bullock and Lyons do make reference to this point when explaining the disparity between the numbers of US and British CW wireless sets produced, but they underestimate how significant the problem was. The manufacture of valves was particularly problematic for the British. According to Captain Henry Round, a Marconi engineer who worked alongside Prince, during the early years of the war the production of valves ‘required special men. Even then it was a terrible process. Again and again we lost the knack of making good tubes, owing to some slight change in the materials used in their manufacture. A thorough investigation was impossible, as all hands were out on the stations. On several occasions we were down to our last dozen tubes’. Although valve production did improve later in the war, there were still manufacturing difficulties that continued to limit valve, and thus CW wireless set, production. Evidence of one such problem comes courtesy of a secret MI5 report, written shortly after the war, detailing the agency’s wartime monitoring of ‘aliens’ who had been employed on war-related work. According to


25 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig Diary, 10 November 1916, WO256/14, TNA.


the report, one of the few places where the employment of ‘aliens’ was considered ‘of national importance’ was glass-blowing. It cited the case of four Dutch glass-blowers who in 1918 were prevented from boarding a ship at Liverpool bound for South Africa. Working with the Ministry of Munitions, MI5 refused the Dutch workers permission to leave on account of ‘the scarcity of glass-blowers of every sort in the United Kingdom’.

Given that the wireless valves of the era were encased in spherical or tubular glass bulbs, it can be deduced that the shortage of skilled glass-blowers would have had a detrimental impact upon the production and deployment of CW wireless sets. In fact, the inability of supply to meet demand forced the British in the spring of 1918 to begin making arrangements to use the much larger wireless manufacturing resources of the US.

The second key explanation for why it took until 1917 for CW sets to reach frontline units was because the ongoing limitations associated with the technology, such as mutual interference, jamming, power supply, range and transportability, militated against the sets’ use as reliable, safe and efficient means of communication on the Western Front. Not only do reports acknowledge the difficulties these issues caused when attempting to utilise CW wireless-telephony for aeroplanes and tanks, but some of Prince’s fellow engineers cast doubt after the war as to the suitability of the technology for use within the infantry and artillery. Although recognising the importance of wireless-telephony between aircraft, for example, Major Tom Vincent Smith stated that ‘there was obviously a lot of spade work to be done before we could apply wireless telephony to anything like practical use in the line’. He further noted:

It was most inadvisable to show an article like a wireless telephone to the Higher Command, who imagined that one had only to have a

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28 ‘Report on the A. Branch of M.I.5. Aliens Employed on War Service’, 1921, pp. 47, 55, KV1/13, TNA. I am grateful to James Bruce for drawing my attention to this source. For additional context, see Chris Northcott, MI5 at War 1909-1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War (Ticehurst: Tattered Flag Press, 2015), pp. 208-11.


30 ‘Manufacture of W/T Apparatus, its Inspection at Manufacturers Works and Fitting into Aircraft, by Major W.J. Polyblank’, 1919, AIR1/2217/209/33/6, TNA.


28 https://www.bjmh.org.uk
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telephone without wires in order to solve all communication
difficulties; whereas, of course, it was our duty to modify their
enthusiasm considerably, otherwise they were inclined to ask us to do
all sorts of impossible things.32

Smith’s comments are revealing, for they suggest that not only were the engineers well
aware of the limitations of the early CW wireless-telephones for battlefield use but,
more importantly, that rather than being resistant to new communications technology,
the high command was perhaps too eager to exploit it; an argument that chimes well
with current academic wisdom on the BEF. Studies of Haig’s attitude towards poison
gas and tanks, for example, criticise the BEF’s Commander-in-Chief for being too
enthusiastic, rather than unreceptive, towards these new and untried technologies.33

The fourth, and final, strand of Bullock and Lyons’ argument – that, unlike the British,
‘as soon as it became a belligerent the US Army equipped its forces with modern
wireless communications’ – is rather misleading and requires qualification.34 That the
US produced more CW wireless sets during the war than the British is not in doubt.
However, this in itself is not proof that the US army was better at recognising the
potential of CW wireless than the British high command; rather, as this article has
already shown, it was to a large extent indicative of the greater CW wireless
manufacturing resources of the US. Moreover, as was outlined earlier, the British and
French had already recognised the potential of CW wireless before the US had entered
the war. At the same time Bullock and Lyons argue the US army was equipping its
forces with modern CW wireless technology, so too were the British and French, but
they were simply unable to produce CW sets in the same quantity as the Americans.35

32 Major C.E. Prince, ‘Wireless Telephony on Aeroplanes: Discussion’, Journal of the
Institution of Electrical Engineers Vol. 58 (1920), pp. 387-8. Smith was RFC wireless
technical advisor, GHQ (March-December 1916). ‘Services of Major T.V. Smith, M.C.,
Vol. 68 (1927), pp. 1022-23.
33 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), pp. 197-8; Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army
35 On the greater CW wireless manufacturing resources of the US, see Peter J. Hugill,
Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: The John

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That the US army upon entering the war equipped its forces with modern CW wireless communications, particularly the most modern wireless-telephony sets, requires clarification. Historians would be hard-pressed to find any evidence that shows that the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was employing a sophisticated, modern CW wireless-based command and control system in 1918. Behind the authors’ statistics on CW wireless-telephone sets produced, the fact remains that none of this equipment actually reached frontline American units in time for it to be employed in combat. In fact, Bullock and Lyons’ defeat their own argument by citing the judgement of the US Army Signal Corps official historian. But their use of quotation is extremely selective, bordering on a sleight of hand. The relevant quote is reproduced in full, emphasising the sections omitted by Bullock and Lyons:

> Despite the conscientious efforts by government and industry, the limited duration of America’s involvement in the war left little time for the development and application of new technology, and the United States relied chiefly on Allied radio equipment. Nevertheless, the Signal Corps made some breakthroughs, especially in airborne radiotelephony, an achievement on which General Squier placed great emphasis. Not only would radio allow the pilot and his observer to communicate more easily between themselves (instead of using hand signals) as well as with the ground, it would also make voice commanded squadrons possible. An aero squadron based at Camp Vail made nearly one hundred flights per week to test new equipment. In a public demonstration held in early 1918, President and Mrs. Wilson talked with a pilot flying over the White House. While some aerial radiotelephone apparatus arrived in France by the fall of 1918, it did not see use in combat. The Signal Corps also experimented with land-based radiotelephone equipment, but it did not attain notable success prior to the Armistice.

Both the US Chief Signal Officer’s official 1919 report and the official history of the US Army Signal Corps during the Second World War also testify to the fact that the First World War came to an end before the army could establish a modern CW wireless-based communications system.

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These conclusions mirror the judgements made by current historians on the AEF’s role and performance during the war. For instance, in his most recent examination, David Woodward makes no mention of a superior CW wireless-based communications system being employed by the AEF for the simple fact that such a system never materialised. Indeed, Woodward describes the AEF as ‘a beggar army’, dependent upon its British and French allies for much of its transportation and weaponry, a view shared by another recent historian of the AEF Mark Grotelueschen.40 In much the same way, the communication system developed by the AEF also owed a great deal to the assistance afforded by its allies – a fact overlooked by Bullock and Lyons. According to the Director of the AEF’s Signal School:

Few of the [American] Officers, even the Signal Corps Officers themselves, were sufficiently familiar with the conditions [of modern war]. It was therefore recognised that in the scheme of military education Signal Schools should be organised where the functions of Signal troops would be taught utilising the services, not only of the few of our own officers who had been able to familiarise themselves with conditions by serving with the British or French, but also utilising the services of especially well-informed British and French instructors, who were cheerfully supplied us by our Allies.41

Since American signal training relied upon British and French instructors, it should come as no surprise that US Signal Corps doctrine also mirrored its allies’, with British and French communication manuals reproduced almost verbatim and disseminated

41 ‘Final Report by Director of the Army Signal Schools American Expeditionary Forces Conducted at Langres (Haute Marne) France from December 1st, 1917 to January 31st, 1919’, Box 1, NM-91, Entry 402, RG120, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Maryland.
widely.\textsuperscript{42} This also meant that, for much of its involvement as a belligerent, the AEF relied principally upon British and French equipment, including signalling lamps, telephones and wireless.\textsuperscript{43}

All of this leads to two inescapable conclusions. First, that although Bullock and Lyons are correct to assert that George Squier was instrumental in championing the Signal Corps’ agenda, particularly with regards to wireless development, without the technical assistance, training, doctrine and equipment acquired from the British and French, no AEF signal unit would have reached the high state of maturity and efficiency that British and French units attained by the end of the war.\textsuperscript{44} On the whole, however, it was the judgement of the official historian that ‘the United States began and completed its role in the 1917-1918 war without reaching a development in... combat communications... comparable to that of France or Great Britain’.\textsuperscript{45}

Secondly, if the Americans, with all the technical, doctrinal and material support of their allies, could not furnish their forces with modern CW wireless-telephones within the 17-month period between ‘proof of concept’ (June 1917) and the armistice (November 1918), why should the British be denigrated for failing to do so within the four month period between the February 1916 test and the opening day of the Battle of the Somme? Although the US did undoubtedly out-produce the British when it came to CW wireless sets, the US army did not immediately equip its troops with the most modern wireless-telephone communications, as Bullock and Lyons would have us believe, and the inclusion of any developments after 11 November 1918 is both inadmissable and irrelevant to a debate concerning the wartime application of wireless.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{42}Both Forward Intercommunication in Battle (Washington, D.C., May 1917) and Intercommunication in the Field (Washington, D.C., May 1918) were literal translations of the British army’s manuals of the same name, SS. 148 (March 1917) and SS. 191 (November 1917), with even the sections on communications in the Royal Artillery and RFC included.

\textsuperscript{43}Report of the Chief Signal Officer, pp. 303-11. In May 1918, the British also gave the AEF 600 carrier pigeons and nine mobile lofts. See ‘Letter from Officer in Charge, AEF Homing Pigeon Service to Chief Signal Officer, AEF Headquarters Services of Supply’, 1 June 1918, Box 1795, NM-91, Entry 406, RG120, NARA.

\textsuperscript{44}For a similar judgement with regards to the AEF’s use of artillery, see Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (Wesport, C.T.: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 143.

\textsuperscript{45}Terrett, The Signal Corps, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{46}Bullock and Lyons, ‘Response’, pp. 243-44.
Book
Having provided much-needed correction and clarification to the judgements in their debate article, it is now necessary to turn attention to Bullock and Lyons' book, Missed Signals on the Western Front, and provide further justification for my original contention that it offers little in the way of fresh information or new interpretation. Three issues in particular will be highlighted: first, the authors’ dependence upon secondary sources instead of solid archival research; second, the authors’ tendency to focus upon technology to the detriment of other, more important, factors; and, third, the book’s reliance upon dubious counterfactuals. Before these points can be explored, however, some additional context is needed.

Given that tenuous communications lay at the heart of the British army’s difficulties in conducting successful operations on the Western Front, it is surprising that Missed Signals on the Western Front represents the only book-length study on the subject since Raymond Priestley’s 1921 work The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France). One of the main reasons for this is that Priestley’s dry and rather complex work has acted as a deterrent to historians. As the late Paddy Griffith opined, although ‘revealing and informative’, it is ‘positively the most impenetrable book ever written on the war’. Thus, as Bullock and Lyons state in the preface, the first purpose of their book is to explore ‘all of the aspects of British signals in the war, which Priestley attempted to do’, but ‘in a clearer and more understandable narrative’. The second, and main, objective of the book, however, is to demonstrate that not only did the high command fail to exploit the full potential of wireless technology but that had it done so, ‘from the summer of 1916 onwards, the military objectives of the British army on the Western Front could have been reached more quickly and at a far less cost in lives’, and thus ‘the whole complexion of the war would have changed’. That the authors succeed in writing a much easier and understandable account than Priestley’s is not in doubt, nor have I ever called into question their scientific knowledge. It is their ability to provide a well-researched, balanced and credible assessment of the influence of communications on British military operations that I take issue with.

Firstly, an historian is only as good as his or her sources. The most important recent studies of the British army and the First World War have been underpinned by the kind of meticulous and painstaking archival detective work that the academic

49 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals, pp. 1-2, 194.

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community has come to expect of its military historians. Although it makes some use of unpublished official records, Missed Signals on the Western Front relies often upon Priestley for its source material. For example, 17 of the 25 footnotes in chapter 9, which examines communications in 1918, cite Priestley as the principal source. Bullock and Lyons defend this methodology, arguing ‘its appearance with great frequency as a source in the footnotes is not only unavoidable but absolutely essential’, claiming ‘it is the only significant and contemporary source available’. This is questionable in light of the wealth of primary material, such as unit war diaries, private and official military and government correspondence, files and memoranda, contained within public and private archives across the English-speaking world. Indeed, due to the erratic preservation of documents in UK archives relating to the BEF’s communications system, there are notable gaps in the records which can nonetheless be filled by making use of copies held in the Australian and Canadian archives. The files of the AEF held at the National Archives and Records Administration also contain detailed reports and correspondence relating to the inner-workings of the BEF’s communications system which, as I have already shown, the Americans studied and copied to good effect in 1917-18. Bullock and Lyons do not make use of these non-UK archives, depending instead upon a limited selection of British archival material, dated regimental histories and secondary sources.

This is not to say that Priestley cannot be a useful source. He is particularly valuable, for instance, in terms of mapping the compositional and organisational changes that occurred within army, corps and divisional signal companies as the war progressed. Nevertheless, despite being the standard starting point for historians wishing to learn more about British military communications during the First World War, Priestley’s account contains neither references nor a bibliography. Consequently, details

50 See, for example, Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jim Beach, Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Fox, Learning to Fight.
51 Some use is made of unpublished official records held at the UK National Archives and private papers from the Imperial War Museum, London, the Royal Corps of Signals Library and Museum, Blandford, and the Royal Engineers Museum, Chatham.
52 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals, p. 5.
54 Records of the American Expeditionary Force, RG120, National Archives and Records Administration, Maryland.
55 See, for example, Priestley, Work of the Royal Engineers, appendices I-IV.
pertaining to individual units, signal companies, key commanders and signal officers are more often than not conspicuously absent. Given that it was published only three years after the war ended, the desire to maintain a degree of anonymity can be forgiven. However, military historical writing based upon this aged regimental history approach will no longer suffice. Wide-ranging and detailed archival research is required in order to provide serious analysis. Bullock and Lyons do manage to provide some answers but because the archival sources have not been properly examined, their reliance upon Priestley leads to an all-too-familiar narrative.

For example, during the examination of the fighting on the Somme in 1916, the reader is informed that casualties to battalion signallers ‘were often as high as 50 percent in a single action’, but the reference to Priestley sheds no further light on exactly which battalions or which actions. Likewise, during the March 1918 retreat we are told ‘one division established 5 HQs within 5 miles over 6 days while another had 14 HQs within 16 miles over 3 days!’ Again, the reference to Priestley does not help clarify exactly which divisions are being referred to. Finally, when archival sources are deployed, they are used rather sparingly. The authors inform the reader that the role played by communications during the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 is ‘comprehensively covered in the war diaries and reports of some of the major participants’. Yet the only account of communications during the fighting that the authors draw upon comes from the war diary of the 51st Division Signal Company. This hardly seems comprehensive given that 14 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, not to mention the Tank Corps, were engaged in the Cambrai fighting between 20 November and 7 December.

Two further examples illustrate how the authors’ lack of engagement with archival sources undermines their methodology. First, when discussing the pre-war evolution of British army signals, Bullock and Lyons make reference to two important War Office committees that met in 1906 and 1911. Citing Priestley as their only source, the footnote declares that ‘there is no other record of this committee or that of the 1911 committee’. A search at the National Archives in Kew, however, reveals the relevant files pertaining to these committees. The second example, and one that they repeat

56 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals, p. 70; Priestley, Work of the Royal Engineers, pp. 145-6.
57 Ibid., p. 118; ibid., p. 266.
58 Ibid., p. 100.
60 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals, p. 26, fn. 4.
61 ‘Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Organisation of the Corps of Royal Engineers together with Evidence and Appendices, 1906’, WO32/6805;
in their debate article, is the accusation that in 1915 ‘poor communications had not been identified [by the British army] as a key cause of battlefield failure and high casualties’. Bullock and Lyons reinforce their argument with the observation that remedying the communication difficulties ‘was not a high priority in 1915’. An examination of the archival record, however, casts doubt upon these judgements. The role played by tenuous communications in contributing to the failure of the BEF’s first major offensive of 1915, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, for example, was not lost on the high command, especially not Haig, then GOC First Army, nor his IV Corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson. Furthermore, if establishing a secure and efficient communications system was not a major priority for the army in 1915, how do Bullock and Lyons explain the establishment of the Carrier Pigeon Service in June, the initial experiments with portable wireless sets for the infantry during the summer, and the increase of the standardised depth of frontline buried cable routes from 2 feet 6 inches to 5 feet by the end of the year?

Bullock and Lyons are also inclined to view the BEF’s communications system largely via the prism of technology. Indeed, one could argue that the focus upon technology has been the dominant tendency amongst what little has been written on the subject. In the context of more recent academic debates, however, there has been growing

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‘Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Postal and Telegraph Services, 1911’, WO32/11396, TNA.


64 Haig Diary, 11 March 1915, WO256/3, TNA; Rawlinson Diary, 10 March 1915, General Lord Rawlinson Papers, RWLN1/1, Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Cambridge.

65 ‘Organisation of a Carrier Pigeon Service for the Armies in France’, 28 August 1915, RE Carrier Pigeon Service War Diary, WO95/123, TNA.


https://www.bjmh.org.uk
scepticism surrounding arguments of technological determinism in war and of methodological approaches that privilege technological factors over cultural, doctrinal and organisational issues.\(^69\) This is not to deny the importance of technology when examining British military communications during the First World War, rather that Bullock and Lyons’ fixation with technology, CW wireless in particular, makes for a rather distorted and unbalanced assessment of the BEF’s communications system, at the expense of other, arguably more important, issues.

Crucially, it is the way in which new technology is harnessed and what effect it has upon warfare that matters most, rather than the technology itself. Military history is replete with examples of new, supposedly ‘game-changing’, technologies which did not on their own prove decisive.\(^70\) What matters is the manner in which new technology is integrated within existing military structures and, crucially, to what extent military thinking and organisation adapts in order to exploit the full potential of new hardware.\(^71\) Had the BEF employed wireless-telephones from 1916 onwards, Bullock and Lyons maintain, ‘instead of basing plans on the stationary and highly vulnerable telephone system, as happened on the Somme, the staff planners would have been freed to implement what made sense militarily. Operations would have been based on achieving mission objectives instead of being designed around the layout of the fixed communication system’.\(^72\) But this would also have entailed an overhaul of the British army’s command philosophy – a crucial issue that Bullock and Lyons do not explore in any significant detail.\(^73\) In short, finding a solution to the intractable problems caused by tenuous communications required more than simply adding new technology to the equation.

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Another important factor that has a profound influence on how successful technology performs in war is the way in which an adversary responds to counter new developments. In war, the introduction of a new, supposedly decisive, technology by one side invariably forces an opponent to develop effective countermeasures. With both sides entering into a cycle of copying, countering and checking new technologies, any advantages tend to be fleeting. Part of the reason why tanks were not war-winners for the British during the First World War, for example, was because the Germans countered them by developing better anti-tank weapons and defences. With regards to wireless telephones, in light of what the Germans had been doing throughout the war, it seems reasonable to assume that they would have responded by implementing countermeasures such as jamming British wireless signals. Bullock and Lyons acknowledge this potential scenario but argue that German attempts to jam CW signals would have amounted to little because ‘talented engineers on the British side would have found a way to get around it’. Such wishful thinking not only ignores the difficulties that enemy and friendly jamming did actually have upon British CW wireless signals in 1918 but, more significantly, underestimates the impact that this countermeasure would have had upon wireless telephones. Indeed, Henry Round acknowledged after the war that had Prince’s wireless telephone sets been employed within the RFC, ‘the immediate answer of the enemy… would have been to fit their fighting flights with… jamming outfits. Our own flights… would have been at once at a disadvantage and I could see no immediate technical answer to their jamming.’

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78 Although CW signals were less susceptible to jamming than spark wireless signals, they were not totally immune. See ‘Signals Fourth Australian Divisional Artillery. Lessons Learned from Communications during Operations Commencing 8/8/18’, 21 August 1918, AWM4/22/14/30, AWM; 1 Australian Division Signal Company War Diary, 29 September 1918, WO95/3198, ‘Resume of W/T Work in Progress in R.A.F. B.E.F. France as at November 11th, 1918, by Lt. Col. Childs, R.A.F.’, AIR1/2217/209/33/6, TNA.
Ultimately, as one prominent historian of strategy has so eloquently put it, ‘better golf clubs help the game only of good golfers’. The success of technology in war depends upon the critical human factor: who these people are, how well led, well-motivated and well trained they are, and how effectively they are organised. With the exception of snippets of biographical information on some of the top engineers associated with CW wireless developments, Missed Signals on the Western Front tells us very little about the officers and men who were ultimately placed in charge of the technology on the battlefield. This includes not only the personnel of the Signal Service, whose task it was to provide and maintain the BEF’s communications system, but also the commanders and staff officers who acted as the system’s main consumers. Thus, as important as technology was, it was but one element within the confines of a much larger and intricate communications system which also involved the key elements of personnel, doctrine and organisation, and the integral processes of staff work and command. A more holistic approach, examining the interaction of all these factors, is required in order to understand fully the BEF’s communications system and its influence upon operations.

The third, and final, key theme in Bullock and Lyons’ work is their use of counterfactual history. This is a subject that divides scholarly opinion, with those at one end of the spectrum, such as Richard Evans, arguing that counterfactual approaches lack academic rigor, are ‘crudely simplistic and desperately unsophisticated’, and those at the opposite end, such as Niall Ferguson, who have endeavoured to lend historical respectability to the counterfactual genre. The important point made by those who support the latter view is that counterfactuals can only be a useful tool for understanding the past if historians adhere to a number of prerequisites, including: demonstrating a clear understanding of the historical context in which the counterfactual takes place; displaying a firm grasp of the relevant primary sources and historiography; an ability to deploy good supporting evidence from these sources in order to lend credibility to their counterfactual assertions; a due modesty on the part

of the historian as to what is and what is not plausible; and, consistency in the form of a ‘minimum rewrite rule’.  

Although Missed Signals on the Western Front contains three counterfactual chapters which attempt to show how much more successful and less costly the battles of the Somme (1916), Third Ypres and Cambrai (1917), and the German spring offensive and Allied Hundred Days’ campaign (1918) would have been had the BEF employed proficient, man-portable wireless-telephone sets, the authors devote just one chapter to an examination of how wireless was actually employed. The Somme counterfactual contains no less than 24 consecutive ‘Ibid.’ references to a single secondary source, while Leon Wolff’s very dated In Flanders Fields [1959] is the principal source of inspiration for the Third Ypres/Cambrai counterfactual.  

These weaknesses are compounded by a number of factual errors. Further undermining the integrity of these chapters is the fact that each concludes with a very similar set of sweeping statements about how wireless-telephones ‘could have’ and ‘would have’ restored command and control to the battlefield ‘with nothing but positive results’. Such judgements fail to take into account a whole range of other factors that had an equal, if not more important, bearing upon the conduct of the BEF’s operations. For example, the authors confidently assert that during the summer and autumn of 1918 the use of wireless telephones would have enabled the Allies to turn the German retreat into a rout because ‘Allied units would have had in hand the means to communicate under mobile conditions and to ensure that their advance stayed close on the heels of the retreating German Army. The faster they moved the more rapidly the Germans would have had to move, losing any semblance of cohesion and control’. This ignores, though, the immense and growing logistic challenges that British and allied forces faced as their advance continued, a factor that recent studies have been at pains to stress.

86 The Somme counterfactual, for instance, states that it was the British XII Corps, consisting of the 18th and 39th Divisions, which attacked along the far south of the British line on 1 July, whereas it was in fact XIII Corps, comprising the 18th and 30th Divisions. See Ibid., p. 79.
87 Ibid., p. 86, p. 111.
88 Ibid., p. 149.
89 Ian M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1998), pp. 200-40; David Stevenson, With our Backs to the Wall: Victory and 40
The other key factor that Bullock and Lyons underestimate is wireless security. The interception of enemy wireless signals, as well as the protection of one’s own, became an important preoccupation of both sides during the war. Bullock and Lyons argue that concerns regarding the interception of wireless signals were ‘a convenient excuse for the Army’s lack of interest’. Again, the historical evidence does not fully support their assertion. As one signal officer noted after the war, ‘the Germans possessed a very complete system of intercepting stations, with a staff of expert deciphers’. German direction finding methods could also pinpoint the location of transmitting British wireless sets and supply the artillery with the necessary coordinates. During the closing stages of the Third Ypres campaign, for instance, the Canadian Corps’ wireless directing station was repeatedly destroyed; it being ‘very evident that the enemy was ranging the station by means of a compass set. Whenever the station began sending, the enemy started to shell’. Rather than ‘a convenient excuse’, the concerns some British officers had towards wireless insecurity were genuine and, in many respects, understandable, hence one of the main reasons why security procedures, such as encryption, were often vigorously enforced.

But at least wireless-telegraphy messages could be encrypted. The technology for ‘scrambling’ wireless-telephony would not be available until the 1930s, and even by the end of the Second World War it was still too cumbersome to be employed on the battlefield. Theoretically, a paper-based encryption method, such as the Anglo-American SLIDEX system of 1944-45, could have been employed. But not only would

90 John Ferris (ed.), The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1992); Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, pp. 155-67.
91 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals, p. 172.
94 This point is further reinforced by the SIGINT successes of the BEF which provided ‘very reliable but low-level information [on the German army] that was a significant augmentation of the other frontline [intelligence] sources’. Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p. 167.

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the time taken to encrypt and decrypt the messages have undermined the speed advantage of the voice link, such methods were also very insecure.\textsuperscript{96} Thus, not only would the BEF’s wireless-telephone sets have been prone to enemy jamming, the conversations that took place via this medium would also have been highly vulnerable to enemy interception. Bullock and Lyons dismiss the significance of this issue, stating that ‘if the enemy gathered such information but was unable to react to it in a timely way, the negative consequences [would have been] minimal’.\textsuperscript{97} The experiences of the British army in the Second World War, however, do not support this judgement. According to the most authoritative study yet, wireless-telephone insecurity remained a considerable problem throughout the war and undoubtedly contributed to some of the army’s most notable setbacks in the Western Desert, the Italian campaign and in Northwest Europe.\textsuperscript{98}

Overall, although their work has some merits, it would seem that Bullock and Lyons push their line of argument too far, beyond the available evidence and contrary to the findings of recent academic studies. Simon Godfrey has shown that it took until the 1944 campaign in Northwest Europe before the British army finally possessed wireless-telephones of reliable effective capability. But even then, he argues, armour-infantry communication remained problematic, while infantry wireless communication below battalion level continued to be unreliable until the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{99} To argue that the nascent CW wireless technology of the First World War ‘could have’ and ‘would have’ enabled the British army to do what its counterpart over 25 years later could only just about manage is difficult to sustain. Whatever the potential of CW wireless-telephony, its capability in 1914-18 was limited.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The work of Bullock and Lyons appears to paint the history of British army wireless during the era of the First World War as a struggle between innovative, forward-thinking engineers on the one hand and an ignorant, reactionary military organisation...


\textsuperscript{97} Bullock and Lyons, \textit{Missed Signals}, p. 178.


\url{https://www.bjmh.org.uk}
on the other. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although there were undoubtedly individuals who did not take to wireless, the British high command was, for the most part, remarkably open to innovation. Haig’s attitude towards wireless, for instance, was as encouraging as could reasonably have been expected given the technology’s limitations in the early twentieth century. That the BEF decided to channel its efforts into the development of CW wireless-telephony mainly for inter-aeroplane communication does not make the high command ‘institutionally biased’.

The notion of a lost opportunity for the BEF to have conducted its operations in a more successful and less costly manner is also dangerously misleading and simplistic. Wireless, even CW wireless, suffered from a number of inherent problems that made its use within the unique battlefield environment on the Western Front highly problematic. Its vulnerability to jamming, interception and damage from enemy fire was clearly demonstrated during the final months of the war. And yet the ability of the British to exploit CW wireless during the last year of the war, especially with regards to counter-battery, RAF and tank communications, was a remarkable achievement, certainly in comparison to the German army who did not employ such technology. Indeed, a Canadian Corps intelligence report in August 1918 put the state of the BEF’s wireless technology a year ahead of the German army’s. Evidence to support this judgement comes in the form of a captured German document, dated 1 June 1918, in which the high command admitted to having ‘not so far been successful in constructing a continuous wave wireless apparatus’, and therefore ordering German troops to ‘salve further enemy wireless apparatus’ from the wreckage of aircraft. Although the BEF’s ability to develop and employ wireless might not have been perfect, it was, in the end, better than that of its opponent and just as successful as its American ally.

Thus, it is not necessarily that Bullock and Lyons’ conclusion, that ‘the British army did not modernize its communication system when it could have’, is ‘a harsh judgement’. Rather, it is that their conclusion is at fundamental odds with the available evidence. In light of the constraints imposed by the unique characteristics of the Western Front, the limitations of the technology at the time and the finite resources available, it is difficult to see how much more ‘modern’ the BEF’s communications system could have been. In this respect, therefore, the case of British army wireless during the First World War provides further evidence to support the argument that, although far from perfect, the BEF did successfully learn and adapt to the challenges of modern war.

100 ‘Wireless Intelligence Summary, German Field Stations, August 10th to August 16th (inclusive)’, August 1918, RG9-III-D-3, Vol. 5004, Folder 687, LAC.
101 ‘Translation of a German Document’, 1 June 1918, AIR1/2217/209/33/6, TNA.
Wasp or Mosquito? The Arab Revolt in Turkish Military History

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ABSTRACT
This article presents the idea that the official Turkish military histories of the First World War are underutilized by western historians in assessing the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918. In popular culture much of what many people believe to be true about the Arab Revolt comes from the work of Colonel T.E. Lawrence (famously known as Lawrence of Arabia). However, for historians, a larger issue arises from the fact the English language historiography of the Arab Revolt is derived almost entirely from non-Turkish and non-Arabic sources. Wasp or Mosquito? The Arab Revolt in Turkish Military History corrects that by examining the modern Turkish official histories. This article notes that the Ottoman and Turkish narrative asserts the Arab Revolt had a very limited effect on the war in the Middle East and that the Ottoman centre of gravity lay in the retention of Medina rather than in defeating the northern Arab armies associated with Lawrence. This article also identifies and compares the extant published Turkish official military histories with their British counterparts and informs the reader about some of the kinds of valuable and hitherto unknown information which may be found in the Turkish works.

T.E. Lawrence and Arab forces used guerrilla tactics to overcome the Ottoman Turks during the Arab Revolt.¹

Counterinsurgency, US Army Field Manual 3-24

Introduction
The irregular operations of T.E. Lawrence and others, during the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916-1918, have achieved almost mythic status in the literature of

both the First World War and in the study of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{2} In many quarters, the success and effectiveness of Arab operations in attriting Ottoman strength and diverting resources from the main theatres of war are accepted almost without dispute.\textsuperscript{3} This theme in the historiography and received wisdom has gone unchallenged for almost a century without inquiry into the Ottoman record. In fact, the Ottomans waged a very successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Arabs, Lawrence and others. This article examines the Turkish military histories of the Palestine and Hejaz campaigns to establish the affect the Arab Revolt had on Ottoman army operations in those theatres.\textsuperscript{4}

The term Arab Revolt in the context of the war in the Middle East in the First World War has come to mean the rebellion of the Hashemite leader, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali and his struggle against Ottoman rule in the Hejaz. In the military sense, the term has come to mean the military operations of the Arab armies of Hussein’s sons Abdullah ibn Hussein, Ali ibn Hussein and Feisal ibn Hussein. The Arab Revolt broke out on 10 June 1916 when Ali fired a single rifle shot from his window in Mecca and it ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in late October 1918. In terms of the western context of the First World War, the term Arab Revolt became nearly synonymous with the guerrilla operations waged by Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence (well-known as Lawrence of Arabia). These overlapping narratives obscure the larger theme and scope of the Ottoman struggle for control of the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.

The English language historiography of the Arab Revolt presents the idea that Arab armies, composed small regular components and large bodies of irregular tribal

\textsuperscript{2} This is a vast and growing field of popular history. For recent examples see N. Faulkner, Lawrence of Arabia’s War, S Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia (2013); J. Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire (2009); M. Korda, Hero: The Life and legend of Lawrence of Arabia (2012); J. Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, T.E Lawrence and the Arab Revolt (2011). Earlier examples include M. Asher, Lawrence, The Uncrowned King of Arabia (1999); B. Liddell Hart, T.E. Lawrence in Arabia and After (1934); L. James, The Golden Warrior: The Life and legend of Lawrence of Arabia (1995), J. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised Biography of T.E. Lawrence (1989). This is a partial listing of the extant literature.

\textsuperscript{3} As noted in the epigraph. The United States military has seized on the idea of Lawrence’s operations as being excellent examples of creative and innovative problem solving. See also, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3, Tactics, (GPO: 1997), p. 111.

\textsuperscript{4} This article presents the official Turkish view of these military operations. It is not an assessment of the academic validity of this history, nor is it an assessment of Ottoman operations and strategy. Finally, it is not assessment of the periodization of the Arab Revolt nor is it an explanation of why the official Turkish military histories focus on military operations at the expense of cultural, social, and demographic factors.

\url{https://www.bjmh.org.uk}
warriors, reinforced and coached by a tiny number of British and French advisors, achieved dramatic successes wildly out of proportion to the resources expended. This narrative suggests that, at the strategic level, low levels of allied military assistance to the Arabs forced the Ottomans to expend a larger share of defensive resources, an equation that favoured the resource-rich allies. The narrative suggests, at the operational level, that the Arab armies tied up large numbers of Ottoman soldiers and forced the Ottomans to divert forces from the front lines in Palestine to militarily insignificant locations such as Medina. At the tactical level, the English language narrative suggests that T.E. Lawrence invented a new form of irregular or guerrilla warfare, which itself became a template for such operations in the twentieth century. Conspicuously absent from all of these themes is a counter-balancing narrative from the Ottoman side as well as information from Arab primary sources as well. The modern Turkish narrative presents a much reduced portrait of the Arab Revolt, which deflates its importance relative to the Ottoman effort in the First World War. In metaphorical terms, the English language narrative presents the Arab Revolt as a dangerous wasp, while the Turkish histories present the Arab Revolt as more of an annoying mosquito.

In fact, the Ottoman historical narrative comprises a much wider and larger view of the events known as the Arab Revolt and is inclusive of the military operations in Asir, operations against the British in Yemen and the irregular war waged by Senussi tribesmen against the allies in Libya. This article will limit itself to expanding the English language narrative of the Ottoman war against the forces of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali and the armies commanded by his sons.

The military characteristics of the Arab Revolt in the English language

An understanding of the principal elements of English-language narrative of the military aspects of Arab Revolt, the Arab armies, and their military campaigns is necessary to proceed with this analysis. There were three Arab armies operational in the Arab Revolt, only two of which (Feisal and Abdullah’s) figure prominently in the English-

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6 Elizer Tauber’s The Arab Movements in World War I, (London: Frank Cass, 1993) is a very useful exception to this trend.

7 The best single book on the military aspects of the Arab Revolt is David Murphy’s The Arab Revolt, 1916-18, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2008), which contains a valuable order of battle, good maps and a readable narrative in a chronological order. Murphy’s book is a popular history uncluttered by citations, which lessens its value for the specialist; however, it is the place to start for readers newly interested in the broad sweep of the Arab Revolt.

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language historiography. This is largely due to the structure of the British official histories, the writings of T.E. Lawrence and the near 100 percent reliance on western archives and records by subsequent historians over the last century. The major elements of the English-language military historiography of the Arab Revolt may be broadly arranged in three parts. These are: first, the securing of the Red Sea coast and attempts to isolate and capture Medina; second, the railway campaigns and the seizure of Aqaba; and third, the formation of the Arab regular army and operations on the flank of the British Egyptian Expeditionary force (EEF).

Arab forces under Emir Abdullah seized the towns of Mecca and Taif between 10 June and 22 September 1916. Reinforced by Emir Feisal, Abdullah’s force became known as the Arab Eastern Army later in the year. Arab armies captured the coastal towns of Jiddah, Rabegh and Yanbu between September 1916 and January 1917. Abdullah’s tribesmen then moved northward in December 1916 and captured Wejh on 25 January 1917. These battles secured the central Red Sea coast west of Medina and Mecca.

The most well-known of the Arab operations is called as the Railway Campaign, which began on 6 March 1917 and lasted until 17 August 1918. This campaign was largely conducted by Feisal and his Arab Northern Army. The object of this campaign was to isolate the Ottoman forces in Medina and prevent them from moving north to oppose, or flank, the impending offensive of the British General Sir Archibald Murray’s EEF advance on Gaza. This set up one of the most famous incidents in the Arab revolt involving Lawrence and Feisal’s seizure of Aqaba on 6 July 1917. The most well-known aspect today of the Aqaba narrative is Lawrence’s circuitous and dangerous two-month trek deep in to the Arabian Peninsula’s interior from Wejh to Aqaba. This battle secured not only the Red Sea coastline but the operational right flank of the EEF as well.

These Arab successes led to the creation of a small Arab regular army supported by Britain and France. This regular force became a component of Feisal’s Northern Army, which then had a small regular army of about 2,000 men and an irregular tribal element of around 6,000 men. Feisal’s Arab regular army seized the town of Tafila on 25 Jan 1918. This encouraged Feisal but his next attack over-extended his army and they were defeated at Maan, 13-17 April 1918. The absence British offensive activity in the mid-spring and summer of 1918 led to inactivity on the Arab’s part. However, as General Sir Edmund Allenby began his final campaigns in Palestine, Feisal and Lawrence operated on the flanks of the British advance on Damascus & Aleppo from 16 September-28 October 1918.

The English language historiography of the Arab Revolt

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THE ARAB REVOLT IN TURKISH MILITARY HISTORY

It is from the British official histories and from the study of T.E. Lawrence that almost all of our contemporary English language understandings of what is known as the Arab Revolt emerge. Seven Pillars of Wisdom, published privately in 1922, was Lawrence’s autobiographical account of his adventures fighting with the Arabs against the Turks in the First World War. Lawrence published a cleaned-up abridgement called Revolt in the Desert in 1927, which became the entry point for British understandings about what had happened with the Arabs in Arabia and Palestine. Lawrence’s accounts were personalized and did not contain a wide-angle view of either the Arab Revolt or the Ottoman response. The official two-volume British military histories of the Egyptian and Palestine campaigns followed in 1928 and 1930. These histories included previously unavailable material about the Arab Revolt as it affected the British conduct of the First World War in the Middle East, thus supplementing the writings of Lawrence.

His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) published the first volume of the Middle East official histories, written by George MacMunn and Cyril Falls, in 1928 as the History of the Great War, based on Official Documents: Military Operations Egypt and Palestine, From the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917.\(^8\) The volume contained two chapters about the Arabs, ‘The Arab Revolt against Turkey’ and ‘The Arab Campaign against Turkey’ (36 pages). The book also contains two chapters on the Senussi in Libya, ‘The Continuation of the Operations against the Senussi’ and ‘The Western Oases and the Sudan’ (34 pages). George MacMunn was an artillery officer who served from 1888-1925, made general, and who had fought against the Turks at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia. MacMunn was, therefore, well qualified and, moreover, was already a prolific author. Cyril Fall was a captain in the First World War who had yet to become a well-known historian.

In 1930, the HMSO published the second volume of the official history, written by Cyril Falls and A. F. Becke, as the History of the Great War, based on Official Documents: Military Operations Egypt and Palestine, From June 1917 to the End of the War.\(^9\) Major A.F. Becke was a serving officer working in the historical section of the Imperial General Staff, who wrote the monumental four-volume official Order of Battle series as well as number of narrative battle histories. When MacMunn left the project, Major Becke picked up the effort to see it through to completion with Falls. There is little about

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the Arabs in this volume, a chapter titled ‘The Arab Campaign’ (16 pages) and a portion of Chapter XXVI titled ‘The Arab Northern Army’ (4 pages).

Altogether the official British military histories use a total 56 pages to describe the Arab Revolt. However, a plethora of books about T.E. Lawrence by well-qualified historians supplement these resources, but as a group, this body of work relies almost entirely on British archival materials. In addition to this body of work, there are a number of excellent studies of the Arab movements in the First World War, the activities of the British Arab Bureau in Cairo, and the complicated diplomacy and machinations of the British and the French in their quest to create post-war spheres of influence in the Middle East. Little of this material sheds much light on the Ottoman side of the war in the Middle East and how the Ottomans organized and fought its counterinsurgency campaigns against the Arabs.

**The official Turkish military histories**

The Turkish official histories of the Ottoman wars are produced by the Chief of Military History and Strategic Studies (Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt or ATASE) Directorate of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara, Turkey. The principal volume this article examines is Şükrü Erkal’s *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Vincı, Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâtı 1914-1918. [The Turkish War in the Hicaz, Asir and Yemen Front and Libyan Operations 1914-1918 in the First World War]* published in 1978. This is a large 835-page volume and it is extensively documented with 27 archival documents, 87 maps, 14 organizational charts and 12 photos. The first 145 pages contain an overview of the geography, demographics and Ottoman mobilization in 1914. The revolt in the Hejaz comprises 267 pages; the revolt in Asir (including British cooperation) comprises 19 pages; Yemen (including operations against the British and the Imam ibn Idris rebellion) comprise 213 pages; Libyan operations comprise 109 pages; and logistics comprise 99 pages.

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11 For a complete review of these works refer to Erickson, Edward J. “The Turkish Official Military Histories of the First World War, A Bibliographic Essay” in Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 39, Number 3, July 2003.

Other volumes also address various aspects of the Arab Revolt. ATASE republished *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi IV'nü Cilt, Inci Kısm, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Başlangıçdan İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar* [The Turkish War on the Sinai-Palestine Front, From the Beginning of the War to the Second Gaza Battles, in the First World War], written by Yahya Okçu and Hilmi Üstünsoy in 1979. This is a 711 page book with six documents and five charts, 49 maps, 10 organizational diagrams, and 24 photographs. Portions of the book relevant to the Arab Revolt appear chronologically as follows: Hejaz and the situation with the Sherif (10 pages), Yemen-Asir Front (2 pages), Arab Revolt in Syria (3 pages), and the Hejaz question (10 pages).

In 1986, ATASE republished *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi IV'nü Cilt, 2nci Kısm, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, İkinci Gazze Muharebesi Sonundan Mütarekesi'ne Kadar Yapılan Harekât (21 Nisan 1917-30 Ekim 1918)* [The Turkish War on the Sinai-Palestine Front, Operations from the Second Gaza Battle to the Mondros Armistice, 21 April 1917-30 October 1918, in the First World War], written by Merhum Kâmil Onalp, Hilmi Üstünsoy, Kâmuran Dengiz and Şükrü Erkal. This is a 772-page book with 4 documents, 66 maps, 4 organizational diagrams, and 23 photographs. Portions of the book relevant to the Arab Revolt appear chronologically as follows: Syria and west Arabia (2 pages) and after the Battle of Megiddo (19 September 1918) Arab armies are mentioned briefly in portions of various pages (20 pages).

While not strictly an official history ATASE published in 1965-1967 a five-volume series written by a retired Turkish general named Fahri Belen, who had served as an Ottoman staff officer during the First World War. These books sequentially cover each year of the war. Belen’s books supplement the official histories and were based on official records. Unfortunately, Belen only covered the major campaigns and battles leaving them somewhat incomplete. Each of these volumes comprises about 210 pages and the text is richly complemented with about 45 maps and a dozen organizational charts. An example of these five books is Belen, Fahri, *Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi 1917* 13

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Expanding the narrative of the Revolt of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali

The author acknowledges that the modern Turkish official military histories produced by ATASE are the subject of criticism from some contemporary Turkish historians. Similarly to their British counterparts the official Turkish military histories of the First World War were designed to assist in educating officers at staff colleges and, indeed, they are not inclusive of cultural, economic, and ethnic factors in a comprehensive way. With that in mind, I would like to point out the obvious... like their British counterparts, they contain huge amounts of information and significant historical analysis which are unavailable anywhere else. This information makes them an indispensable and critical resource for any historian seeking to discover a balanced perspective of the wars fought by the Ottoman Empire. Importantly, the Turkish official military histories are based on archival sources and military records. The narrative contained in the Turkish official military histories concerning the revolt of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali and his sons is simply too large to be compressed into an article of this length. Therefore, this article focuses on a few parts of the Turkish narrative that are additive and complementary to the English language historiography of these events. In effect, this article is something of a ‘teaser’ and it is written to arouse an interest in the Turkish side of the story and to encourage other historians to use the Turkish official military histories.

The overwhelming weight of the Turkish military narrative of the Arab revolt deals with Fahreddin Pasha’s campaign to control the Hejaz and Asir. From the Ottoman perspective, the centre of gravity of the campaign to control the Hejaz was the town of Medina, which also had significance as a religious and cultural objective as well. However, in the larger strategic sense, Medina (and the Hejaz itself) had almost no military value except that its retention directly affected the prestige of the Ottoman sultanate. Although today one might think that the possession of Mecca might serve

15 For a recent example see Beşikçi, Mehmet, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War, Between Volunteerism and Resistance, (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), who is very critical of the lack of emphasis in the official histories on social, cultural and economic factors.

16 Fahreddin is sometimes referred to in the Turkish histories as Fahri Paşa or Fahrettin Paş, and in the British histories always as Fakhri Pasha. Readers may also want to refer to Bilgin, İsmail, Medine Müdafaasi, Çol Kaplan Fahrettin Paşa [The Defense of Medina, Fahrettin Pasha, Desert Tiger], (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009) for a Turkish viewpoint.
Ottoman interests more that Medina, it was always the retention of Medina that occupied the Ottoman military in the First World War. In my previous work, I have argued that the retention of the Hejaz, Asir and Yemen were strategic liabilities for the Ottoman Empire in the First World war because stationing forces there diverted resources which would have been better employed elsewhere.\(^\text{17}\)

**The Siege of Taif**

The siege of Taif is an example of the substantial information contained in the Turkish narrative, which adds significantly to our understanding of these events. The town of Taif, south-east of Mecca, was the summer home of the governor-general of the Hejaz and was besieged by Abdullah on 10 June and falling on 22 September 1916, with the loss of 5,000 prisoners. This much is known from the British official history.\(^\text{18}\) A little more information may be gleaned from Murphy and Barr such as the fact that the governor-general, Galip Pasha himself, was in the town.\(^\text{19}\) However, Şükrü Erkal devoted 23 pages to the siege of Taif.\(^\text{20}\)

By reading the Turkish narrative, we learn that Taif was the headquarters of the Hejaz General Force, commanded by Galip, a major-general later known as Galip Paşınler.\(^\text{21}\) The principal component of the force was the 22\(^{nd}\) Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel Ahmet. At the time the town was isolated, its garrison composed the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129\(^{th}\) Infantry Regiment and the 22nd Artillery Battalion, as well as gendarmes, signals troops and engineers. According to Erkal, Ahmet had 54 officers, 39 NCOs, 932 trained men with rifles and 918 unarmed men, for a total of less than 3,000 Ottoman soldiers.\(^\text{22}\) Moreover, they were short artillery shells and rifle ammunition. Galip was initially confident that he could successfully hold the town. The defines of the town was partitioned into three sectors with the 3/129 Infantry, commanded by Captain İsmail Hakkı, holding the northern perimeter and two companies from the 1/129 Infantry holding the southeast and southwest sectors respectively, with the remaining two companies of the 1/29 held in reserve near the town’s central citadel. The garrison made a number of offensive sortie, on 18/19,

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\(^{19}\) Murphy, *The Arab Revolt, 1916-18*, 34 and also Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire*, pp. 39-40.


\(^{21}\) Ibid. p. 231.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
19/20, and 27 June to disrupt the occupation of hills overlooking the town by Abdullah’s encircling forces.

By mid-July it was evident to Galip that he was in serious trouble and he sent messages to Mecca for a relief column to launch toward Taif. The Mecca garrison was itself weak and composed of the 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry Regiments, with an irregular cavalry detachment and a few howitzers. It was itself under siege and lacked the strength of assist Galip. Other potential Ottoman reinforcements were penned in Jiddah and unavailable as well. By mid-July Galip’s men were running low on artillery shells and the Sherif brought in howitzers, supplied by the British, to shell the town. The situation for the Ottoman defenders grew increasingly desperate in August when extremely hot weather set in. Colonel Ahmet’s divisional orders on 25 August 1916, notified his men that the defence of the town now rested on his riflemen due to the shortage of artillery shells.23 Unable to break out, starving and ridden with sickness, Galip surrendered the Hejaz General Force on 22 September.24 Ottoman records recorded 138 officers and men killed, 238 wounded, 62 deserted and 16 missing and state that the Arab losses were known to be significantly greater.25 When combined with surrenders at Mecca and Jiddah, the Ottoman army lost over six battalions of infantry in this period.

Erkal pointed out that Galip’s forces held out for three and a half months before being forced to surrender. He also identified that the splitting up of Ottoman forces in easily isolated garrisons led to the loss of Jiddah, Mecca and Taif. He attributed Arab success to their use of siege craft involving sessize saldiri (or quiet or meek attacks, which I interpret as attacks that were small and not deigned to be decisive but which kept the defenders alerted and depleted their ammunition).26 Finally, Erkal noted that British military assistance in the way of artillery pieces, machine guns, shells and ammunition, combined with reciprocally low Ottoman on-hand supplies of shells and ammunition, were the critical factors in the success of Abdullah’s irregular army. This brief

26 Ibid., pp. 252-253.
exposition showcases the kind of detailed information provided by Şükrü Erkal and there is much more to the story than I have conveyed here.27

**Ottoman reinforcements for the Hejaz**

As to the question of how much of the Ottoman force structure was drawn to and involved in the campaigns against the Arab Revolt, Erkal’s *Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâti* contains detailed information about reinforcements. For example, as a result of the revolt, Minister of War Enver Pasha and Fourth Army Commander Jemal Pasha decided to reinforce Fahreddin Pasha’s Hejaz Force. On 30 June 1916, Enver ordered the 55th Infantry Regiment from the 14th Division to the Hejaz.28 This regiment then formed part of the new 58th Infantry Division organizing in Medina 25-28 June 1916 to replace the lost 22nd Division.29 The now-orphaned 42nd and 130th Infantry regiments were also assigned to the new division along with machinegun companies and artillery batteries.

The Ottoman high command dispatched additional reinforcements from Anatolia, including the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 79th Infantry Regiment and two artillery batteries from the 6th Artillery Regiment to the Arabian theatre.30 Later that summer, Jemal Pasha dispatched the 161st and the 162nd Infantry Regiments from Aleppo to Medina. The Ottoman high command selected Lieutenant Colonel Necip to command the new 58th Infantry Division, who began to organize the slowly arriving units on 14 November 1916. Necip and some units of the division saw action against Abdullah’s army in mid-December but the 58th Infantry Division was not fully combat capable until 13 February 1917.31 This illustrates the perennial strategic problem with time and space the Ottoman military had to overcome when deploying forces to distant theatres of operation such as Arabia, Mesopotamia and the eastern Caucasus.

**The Anglo-Arab Railway Campaign**

One of the most stunning parts of the Turkish official history of is the large amount of information about the railway campaign contained in Erkal’s *Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâti*. There are four multi-page fold-outs titled Ek 6-9 (Ek is a Turkish word meaning to summarize bits and pieces of information) consolidated from the ATASE archives, which outline the Arab attacks on the Medina railway in great detail.

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 185.
31 Ibid., pp. 203-211.
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[https://www.bjmh.org.uk](https://www.bjmh.org.uk)
Ek 6 presents 46 attacks from 6 March-5/6 July 1917, Ek 7 presents 23 attacks from 6 July-4 August 1917, Ek 8 presents 46 attacks from 5 August-18 November 1917, and Ek 9 presents 50 attacks from 10 January-17 August 1918. These summarize the Ottoman force attacked, the time of day, the pinpointed location of the attack (i.e.: kilometre 541), the attacking force, how the attack was conducted, damage to the railway and Ottoman casualties, and an analysis of the attack.

For example, Attack number 2 as described in Ek 9 contains the following information about one particularly hard fought battle.\(^{32}\) The 1\(^{st}\) Provisional Force was attacked on the night of 3/4 January 1918 by a force of 700 men, 800 horses, artillery, machineguns, and 9 automobiles at Curuf Station (north of Amman). The station was destroyed as was the nearby bridge and 68 rails were torn up. The Ottomans lost 25 dead and 15 wounded while the Arabs lost 60 killed and many wounded. The Ottomans retook the station when reinforcements came up from Maan. There are four associated maps, which give the reader a sense of the spatial characteristics of these attacks as well.

Securing the Medina railway
The Ottoman response to the Arab Railway Campaign is, likewise, an unknown part of the English language historiography of the Arab Revolt. We might begin the story when the Ottoman high command reorganized its forces in the Hejaz by activating the Hejaz Expeditionary Force under the command of Fahreddin Pasha on 30 June 1916.\(^{33}\) With Galip surrounded in Taif, Fahreddin took command of the defence of Medina and, after Galip’s surrender and the loss of Mecca and Jiddah, became the single overall Ottoman commander in the Hejaz in the fall of 1916. Fahreddin Pasha was an extremely able and aggressive officer and decided to secure Medina by conducting punishing attacks on Ali’s Southern Arab Army, which threatened the town from the south. With the arrival of Necip’s 58th Infantry Division, Fahreddin had an offensive instrument at his disposal. At the Battle of Bir i Derviş, 17-19 March 1917, Fahreddin’s men defeated the Arabs and he then sent the 42nd Infantry Regiment south to Bir i Maşi to inflict another defeat on them in a battle 1-4 April.\(^{34}\) By conducting these limited tactical offensive operations Fahreddin solidified Media’s vulnerable southern flank on 18 April. These small but important victories enabled Fahreddin to redeploy forces northward in reaction to the growing problem of railway interdiction caused by the Arab’s increasing attacks. The fall of Aqaba compounded this problem by creating a direct threat to Maan, which was the northern terminus of the Medina railway.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., Ek 9.
\(^{33}\) Ibid., p.179.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., Maps 32-34.
There were additional problems with supporting the Hejaz Expeditionary Force dealing with logistics. Fahreddin’s force composed about 20,000 men, of which about 8,500 were infantrymen capable of bring the war to the enemy. 35 There was only enough food to sustain this number of men for one year and Enver Pasha had already directed that some of them be pushed to locations north of Medina where they could be more easily supplied. Fahreddin’s staff began working on this and accidentally, as the situation changed, Enver’s decision proved fortuitous.

Because of the difficulty of command and control over the long length of the railway, Fahreddin activated a new headquarters south of Maan called the 1st Provisional Force, which took control of the forces north of Tebuk. 36 Supporting this force, Fahreddin deployed the 1st and 3rd Battalions of Necip’s 55th Infantry Regiment north along the railway. However, the headquarters of the 58th Infantry Division remained in Medina and focused on its defence against the increasingly powerful Arab armies of Abdullah and Ali. On 15 March 1917, the 1st Provisional Force commanded the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry Regiment, the Maan Field Jandarma Battalion and a number of independent artillery and cavalry detachments. 37 The loss of Aqaba to Lawrence and the Arabs on 6 July 1917 seriously damaged the Ottoman operational posture in the Arabian Peninsula by creating a direct threat to Maan. Combined with the increasing number of Arab attacks on the Medina railway (50 separate attacks between August and December 1917 in which the Ottomans lost several hundred men killed, wounded and prisoner and had 15 bridges, 3,254 rail ties, and 152 telegraph poles destroyed), 38 Jemal Pasha and Fahreddin Pasha decided to revise the Ottoman command architecture in lower Palestine.

Between 28 August and the end of September 1917, Jemal’s VIII Army Corps took up positions in Maan with 5,000 soldiers. This enabled Fahreddin to shift forces south from Maan and north from Medina to increase his strength along the railway. 39 As a result, Fahreddin moved the 1st Provisional Force south to El Alâ and activated the 2nd Provisional Force at Tebuk. On 31 October 1917, Allenby drove Jemal’s Fourth Army out of the Gaza-Beersheba line, causing the withdrawal of the VII Corps forces at Maan. This imposed yet another restructuring of his army on Fahreddin. By November 1917, Fahreddin resumed responsibility for Maan and sent a greatly reinforced 1st Provisional Force to the Maan area.

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36 Erkal, Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekâtı, p. 342.
37 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
38 Ibid., p. 354.
39 Ibid., Map 37.
56 https://www.bjmh.org.uk
Force there (composed of the 146th Infantry Regiment, a cavalry regiment and numbers of independent detachments) to hold the town and to block an allied advance from Aqaba. He then expanded the 58th Division’s area of responsibility north to cover the area formerly occupied by the 1st Provisional Force.\(^{40}\) By the spring of 1918, Fahreddin deployed a reinforced regiment in Maan (the 1st Provisional Force), a reinforced regiment in the centre of the Medina railway (the 2nd Provisional force), and the 58th Division now composed only of a reinforced regiment and a cavalry regiment north of Medina. Forming these provisional forces, which were brigade-sized units, depleted Fahreddin’s combat strength. He accomplished it through economy of force measures by leaving a small holding force facing Ali and Abdullah in the south.

The final campaign in Syria
Arab attacks on the Medina railway drew to an end in August 1918 as Feisal’s Northern Army positioned itself to assist Allenby’s EEF in the final breaking of the Ottoman army in Palestine. In *Sina-Filistin Cephesi, İkinci Gazze Muharebesi Sonundan Mütarekesi’ne Kadar Yapılan Harekât* (21 Nisan 1917-30 Ekim 1918) Onalp, Üstünsoy, Dengiz and Erkal open the story after the Battle of Megiddo noting that, on 25 September 1918, Arab forces were conducting raiding, acts of revenge and sabotage.\(^{41}\) Arab irregulars were again in action on 27 September near Dera and on 29 September south of Damascus. The Turkish official history does not give many details about specific actions by Feisal’s men but notes that they were helpful to the British in the capture of Damascus on 30 September 1918. On the same day near Rayak, the Ottoman 43rd Infantry Division encountered difficulty in keeping its Arab soldiers from deserting their posts and joining the Arab army.\(^{42}\) This forced Mustafa Kemal’s Seventh Army to send reinforcements there to hold the position. The next day, Feisal’s men took the bridge near Tell es Şerif, cutting off the Ottoman force in Rayak.

As the retreating Ottomans withdrew to Aleppo, two groups of irregular cavalry harassed their flanks. On 10 October 1918, Feisal declared his authority over the city, although it had not yet been taken. On 17 October, the ‘always industrious Feisal’ approached Hama with 1,200 infantry and 300 cavalry.\(^{43}\) This action again forced Mustafa Kemal to reinforce his flanks to avoid encirclement. By 23 October, Feisal delayed his attack on Aleppo until the British 5th Cavalry Division pushed to a position north of the city. Feisal’s Arabs took Aleppo on 25 October as the Ottoman Seventh

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 705.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 715.
Army withdrew its forces. The campaign came to an end on 27 October when the British and Feisal’s Arab Northern Army closed the pincers and encircling the few remaining Ottoman forces withdrawing from Aleppo.\textsuperscript{44}

**Conclusion**

What does this new information tell us about the Ottoman campaigns in the Hejaz and how might we integrate it into the extant historiography?\textsuperscript{45} First, according to the Turkish narrative, the Ottoman army was tactically unready in its dispersed positions to meet the demands of the Arab Revolt in June 1916. Its widely scattered forces were isolated and leading to the capture of the governor-general and the destruction of an infantry division. Moreover, Mecca and Jiddah were lost, which opened up a vulnerable front south of Medina. Second, the campaign drew in additional Ottoman forces equivalent to two infantry divisions in 1917, which amounted to about 5 percent of the Ottoman force pool in 1917.\textsuperscript{46} Third, in a remarkable display of defensive-offensive tactics, Fahreddin Pasha was able to shift from the defence of Medina in order to mass forces sufficient to defend the Medina railway. Fourth, a major element in the English language historiography is the idea that the Arab Revolt forced the Ottomans to defend the Hejaz at the strategic expense of defending Palestine.\textsuperscript{47} We might speculate about this but the Turkish narrative suggests that this was never true and that more men in Palestine would not have improved the Ottoman operational or tactical posture in that theatre.\textsuperscript{48}

The modern official Turkish official histories relate the theme that the Arab Revolt had small effect on the Ottoman operational posture in Palestine and the Arabian Peninsula. Ottoman forces in the Hejaz, Asir and Yemen were largely self-sufficient logistically and it a fact that Fahreddin did not surrender Medina until 9 January 1918 (72 days

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 726.
\textsuperscript{45} For a recent comprehensive overview of the Ottoman campaigns in the Palestine Theatre see Edward J. Erickson, *Palestine, The Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918*, (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2016).
\textsuperscript{47} For the most comprehensive listing of Ottoman infantry divisions and their locations in the First World War, see Belen, Fahri, *Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi 1918 Yılı Hareketleri, Vnci Cilt* [The Turkish Front in the First World War, 1918], (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1967), EK following page 250 (Türk Tümenlerini).
\textsuperscript{48} For the Ottomans the problem in Palestine was never the amount of men, rather it was inadequate logistics that failed to supply them with weapons, ammunition, food and fodder. See Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I*, pp. 127-154.
after the Mudros Armistice that ended the Ottoman war). While the Ottoman forces in these regions did not tie up significant allied forces their presence was a distraction for the British staff in Cairo. Moreover, the calculus of adding perhaps 20,000 Ottoman soldiers to another front would not have significantly affected the Ottoman Empire’s strategic or operational posture. Although this article has not focused on the operations of Feisal’s Northern Army (and, by association, T.E Lawrence) in Allenby’s Palestine Campaign, it is sufficient to remark that the Turkish histories assert that these too had a minor effect on the war.

So what of the Arab Revolt relative to the Ottoman Empire’s military struggle in the First World War - wasp or mosquito? Although the Arab Revolt is covered in far greater detail in the Turkish official histories of the war than in the British official histories, it is clear that the Turkish official historians thought the Arabs had little influence on the decision makers who exercised strategic direction for the Ottoman war effort. The Arab armies were able to seize the coastal strips but were never able to take the key city of Medina, which remained an Ottoman stronghold until well after the armistice. Neither were the Arab armies able to take cities and towns in the interior. It may be said that the Railway Campaign did force the redeployment of most of Fahreddin’s field forces, which might have retaken Mecca. Finally, the Turkish clearly advances the idea that Feisal’s Northern Arab Army failed to exercise its full potential in support of Allenby’s final offensive. In the end, much like a man swatting a mosquito, the Arab Revolt was a localized problem that the Ottoman army dealt with using the forces at hand.