CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods

Shah, SZA, Akbar, S, Liu, JL ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2978-6022, Liu, Z and Cao, S 2017, 'CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods' , Research in International Business and Finance, 42 , pp. 1489-1503.

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Abstract

This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and post-financial crisis periods. Our results suggest a negative relationship between CEO bonuses and banks’ risk in the pre-financial crisis period. Similarly, restricted shares and options granted to CEOs in the post-financial crisis period also appear to decrease banks’ risk. In contrast, we observe a positive influence of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on banks’ risk. Our results also show that the length of time to maturity of options influences banks’ risk-taking behavior. Our findings have useful implications for formulating and regulating CEO compensation structure.

Item Type:	Article
Schools:	Schools > Salford Business School > Salford Business School Research Centre
Journal or Publication Title:	Research in International Business and Finance
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0275-5319
Related URLs:	Publication
Depositing User:	JL Liu
Date Deposited:	14 Aug 2017 11:58
Last Modified:	15 Feb 2022 22:20
URI:	https://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/43526

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