Vulnerability assessment of vehicle to infrastructure communication : a case study of Unmanned Ground Vehicle

Abdullahi, AD, Dargahi, T ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0908-6483 and Babaie, M 2020, Vulnerability assessment of vehicle to infrastructure communication : a case study of Unmanned Ground Vehicle , in: IEEE Global Communications Conference 2020 (IEEE GLOBECOM 2020), 7th-11th December 2020, Taipei, Taiwan/Online. (In Press)

[img] PDF - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (2MB) | Request a copy
Access Information: © 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Abstract

In recent years, increase in the development of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) has sparked cyber security concerns. In particular, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, which is essential for CAV and the transportation system, has introduced a new threat landscape and created several attack surfaces for malicious agents. The available literature on cyber-attacks mostly concentrate on sophisticated tools and equipment in performing malicious activities. However, ignorance of simple attack and defense methods, sometimes as simple as defining proper access policies, is among top reasons for cyber-attacks. This paper aims to emphasize on the need for practicing security-bydesign and increase awareness of manufacturers and developers to adopt minimum security measures. A generic network communication vulnerability assessment method is adopted to perform navigational attack through GPS falsification on connected vehicles, using an Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) as a case study. This paper underlines the Wi-Fi security threats if used for V2X communication without proper access control measures in place. The experimental analysis demonstrates exploitation of a vulnerability which allows full control and backend navigation manipulation with respect to the UGV movement.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Schools: Schools > School of Computing, Science and Engineering
Journal or Publication Title: IEEE Global Communications Conference 2020 (IEEE GLOBECOM 2020)
Publisher: IEEE
Depositing User: T Dargahi
Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2020 08:12
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2020 08:12
URI: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/58506

Actions (login required)

Edit record (repository staff only) Edit record (repository staff only)

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year