Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information

Miglo, A ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9237-5293 2010, 'Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information' , Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER), 8 (8) , pp. 27-42.

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Abstract

In recent years, financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firms’ insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same means of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.

Item Type: Article
Schools: Schools > Salford Business School
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER)
Publisher: Clute Institute
ISSN: 1542-4448
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Dr Anton Miglo
Date Deposited: 26 May 2021 08:15
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2021 10:43
URI: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/60386

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