The Counterinsurgency Campaign of the Nigerian Army:
The Fight against the Boko-Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria, 1999-2017

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to God,
To my Parents, Late ASC and Mrs Leo L. Yalmi
To my family,
And to my students at Plateau State University, Bokkos, Nigeria.
### Abbreviations

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<td>ADS</td>
<td>Aeronaut Defence System</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Maghrib</td>
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<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory Training Team</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civilian Affairs</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<td>CIV-POL</td>
<td>Civilian Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAS</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provision Authority</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Compound War</td>
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<td>CZ</td>
<td>Contested Zones</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency (US, DIA)</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (USA)</td>
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<td>EDAO</td>
<td>Explosive Devices Analysis Office</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Effects Operation Centre</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FGN</td>
<td>Federal Government of Nigeria</td>
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<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front Deliberation Quebec</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GCMA</td>
<td>Groupement De Commando Mixte D’Aeroportes</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
<td>Guerrilla of the Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<td>GMI</td>
<td>Groupement Mixte D’ Intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>HW</td>
<td>Hybrid War</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosives Devices</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Image Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPROM</td>
<td>International Network to Promote Rule of Law</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Syria</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JTTF</td>
<td>Joint Terrorist Task Force</td>
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<td>LCBC</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist party</td>
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<td>MDAs</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Information</td>
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<td>MMDINT</td>
<td>Measurement Intelligence</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<td>MPABA</td>
<td>Malayan People’s Anti-British Army</td>
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<td>NAVMC</td>
<td>Nigerian Army Vehicle Company</td>
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<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>NFA</td>
<td>Nigerian Air Force</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>NYSC</td>
<td>National Youth Service Corp</td>
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<td>ONSA</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Adviser</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCNE</td>
<td>Presidential Committee on the North-East</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation organisation</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSCs</td>
<td>Private Security Companies</td>
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<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>RCOs</td>
<td>Reconstruction Contractors</td>
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<td>RIAB</td>
<td>Radio in a Box</td>
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<td>RIFU</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Search, Locate, and Destroy</td>
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<td>SMJTF</td>
<td>Special Military Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>STTEP</td>
<td>Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Target Audience</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>US special operations command</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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Abstract

The emergence of civilian democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999, which came after three decades of armed forces rule, has been a watershed in the nation’s five decade history. This period is associated with recurrent crises, including militancy and ethnoreligious violent conflict in most parts of the country: one of the deadliest insurrections has been the Boko-Haram insurgency. The militant group has been identified as one of the deadliest insurgent groups globally; it started as a fringe group of enthusiastic youths in North-East Nigeria, growing to become a sophisticated international force, threatening the existence of Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Their radical activities claimed many lives and displaced considerable numbers of people. The then government under President Goodluck Jonathan adopted an armed counterinsurgency approach to counter Boko-Haram in the North-East regional states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, the epicentre of the violence. This thesis examines the determined counterinsurgency efforts of the Nigerian armed forces in fighting the activities of the Boko-Haram group to ascertain the level of success in the operations. This study adopts the contextual assessment approach of the study of counterinsurgency using the qualitative method for data collection and analysis. It also relies on the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of historical, sociological and political perspectives to analyse the impact of the insurgency in Nigeria. Using the qualitative content analysis method in the collection of data, the findings show that the civilian leadership’s limited knowledge of armed forces’ affairs hindered them in developing a proper counterinsurgency framework to guide policy. But this should not be seen as a one-sided criticism because it should be qualified by: the lack of modern equipment and training for the armed forces; inadequate levels of manpower; low morale; over-extended deployments; and corruption that likewise hindered the success of the campaign in the North-East.
INTRODUCTION

An insurgency is a ‘protracted political and military activity directed toward wholly or partially controlling the resources of a country using irregular military forces and illegal political organisations’ (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2012). From time immemorial, states around the world have experienced insurgency, causing a downturn in the wellbeing of citizens, physical assets and economic development. Global trends show that an estimated 15,300 insurgency attacks are recorded annually (Henman, 2018). These trends have shown a continuous increase over the years, and future projections suggest that more attacks are likely. An estimated 29,000 non-militant fatalities are recorded annually in the Middle East and North Africa alone. Violence from North Africa is spreading as insurgents migrate towards the Central and West African Coastline where Nigeria is situated.

Nigeria, listed among the top ten countries suffering from deadly attacks of insurgency, has battled with the activities of Boko-Haram. The Boko-Haram insurgency, which initially originated from the North-East of Nigeria in 2002 has spread to parts of neighbouring states of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. By 2015, the Global Terrorism Index earmarked Boko-Haram as one of the deadliest groups in the world. Gradually, Boko-Haram took over almost the whole of the North-East region of Nigeria, declaring the existence of an Islamic caliphate in a secular Nigerian state, and hoisting its flags against the law of the land. This action caused tremendous loss of life and property, but also high instability in education, economic activities, and the general governance of the region. More than 90 per cent of the deadly attacks carried out in Nigeria since 1999 have taken place in the North-East, an area that makes up two-thirds of the state and contains the majority of Nigeria’s population (Onuoha, 2016, Bolarinwa, 2018). This insurgency caused violence of an intensity not seen in the country since the civil war of Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. The North-East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe were under siege from the activities of these insurgents leaving the scourges of death, destruction of property, displacement, ravaging of farmlands and environment despoil (Abubakar, 2017). No region of Nigeria has experienced as much insurgent violence as the North-East, where attacks are characterised by hit-and-run or suicide missions, or areas taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies (BBC, 2013). These features point to an insurgency that is a planned revolt with effects not just on the targeted victims of the uprising, but a rebellion insurgency threatening the very existence of the country (Wada, 2015).
Generally, the Nigerian police have been delegated the responsibility of dealing with internal crises and battles, as well as protecting the citizenry. However, they decried their lack of capacity to execute the set mandate as they were at risk of engaging in battle with the insurgents due to archaic weapons as compared to the sophisticated weaponry of the insurgents; lack of experience in tactical combat; and absence of a strategic plan among others. Contrary to this, the might and firepower of the insurgents were so overwhelming to the police and other security apparatuses that the then government under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan on the 14 May 2011 came up with a ‘militarised’ strategy after failed attempts by the previous government to curb the situation. President Goodluck Jonathan then declared a state of emergency across an already heavily armed area of northern Nigeria. The question is whether more troops on the ground will make any difference. Analysts say on one side that the military has been losing the battle for hearts and minds due to ill performance, while on the other side allegations of abuse by the military has helped to boost activities of Boko-Haram in the North-East. As the violent struggle for control progressed, the Nigerian Government devised and implemented a counterinsurgency operation to smother the insurgent group. For over a decade after the launch of the armed counterinsurgency operation, the Boko-Haram insurgents still exist without an apparent success from the actions of the armed forces. After President Jonathan took over the leadership of Nigeria following the demise of Musa Yar Adua’a in 2010, the new government was advised to take urgent security measures to avoid a repetition of leaving the fight against insurgency to luck as was done by the previous governments. Despite this, 1999-2015 became the bloodiest period in Nigeria’s half a century history as the violent struggle for the region’s people and resources kept progressing (Wada, 2015). This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Nigerian armed forces in tackling the violence of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria, 1999-2017, and why this struggle suffered from numerous problems, challenges and set-backs.

Gaps in the Literature and Opportunities for New Research

researched on Boko-Haram and gaps were identified. None extensively addressed the issue of counterinsurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency against Boko-Haram is the significant issue that this research focuses on as well as to respond to some gaps while opening new vestiges for further investigation.

Andrew Mumford (2013) wrote that ‘the British are not good at counterinsurgency as was previously assumed’. Also adding to Mumford’s position is Douglas Lovelace (2011), who in his summary opined that ‘an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare’. Mumford’s book identifies ten myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance. It seeks to debunk them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as a competent learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force. This maxim is a departure from the British-Malayan action. The bruising experience according to Mumford ‘in Iraq has demonstrated that the British have no stomach for protracted irregular war’, this research adds that ‘counterinsurgency is more of cooperation in the 21st century, rather than unilateral action’. The study sees this as a massive lesson for Nigeria, and Chapter Five highlights this position.

In contributing to the discourse on Boko-Haram, Omeni (2017), in his book *The Counterinsurgency in Nigeria: The military and operations against Boko-Haram 2011-2017*, explains the internal workings of the armed forces and the government reaction to the threat of insurgency and how the armed forces came in to deal with the violent activities of Boko-Haram. The author first failed to look at the condition of the armed forces, also its preparedness in counterinsurgency operations. Secondly, Omeni was unable to address the daunting effect of lack of equipment, and other significant supplies of the armed forces, which – as this thesis will show – significantly affects the armed forces in its counterinsurgency operations. Thirdly, Omeni did not address the operations manual of the armed forces in their training. On the other hand, in agreement with Omeni, there is the need to draft in the armed forces to the counterinsurgency operations. Alongside the drafting, is the need to address the fundamental challenges such as the poor institutional capability of the armed forces. These ranged from its training manual to outdated equipment and a lack of
supplies, which culminated in giving the armed forces low morale which in turn affected its operations against Boko-Haram insurgency.

Other scholars on Boko-Haram and counterinsurgency, such as Abdullahi (2018), write on strategic communication. He examines counterinsurgency as a potent tool of countering non-state actors. Although his emphasis was the means of communication in counterinsurgency, Abdullahi was able to establish that both the armed forces and the insurgents used communication to their advantage and hence, a limitation to the success of armed forces operations. Further to this, Abdullahi failed to bring up significant communication constraints of the armed forces; that as a state agent, there is certain classified information which cannot be released or made public. The lack of modern communication equipment at the disposal of the armed forces became the primary source of information leakage. Communication gadget is a constraint placing the armed forces at a disadvantage, especially as the insurgents had better and more sophisticated communicating devices which they used to get across to the populace even ahead of the armed forces.

Komolafe (2013), analysing *Military Culture And Counterinsurgency In The Twenty-First Century, Defeating Boko-Haram In Nigeria*, focused on the culture of conventional war position of the military against non-conventional war. Komolafe talked about the successes of Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and Boko-Haram. In contrast, most standing armies around the world adopt the conventional method of warfare. Until recently, with the wave of these kinds of unconventional wars, those armies are beginning to take new strategies in understanding and fighting these groups. This research has shown that this is a new phenomenon for the Nigerian armed forces, and it lacked the institutional framework to engage the insurgent group, until recently, with the support of the international community.

Habibu Bappah (2016), an author on Boko-Haram, in his article ‘Nigeria’s military failure against Boko-Haram insurgency’, raised three factors that were responsible for the failure of the armed forces in North-East Nigeria to include lack of professionalism, poor handling by the top military officers, and the lack of decisiveness by the government. As glaring as these issues are, Bappah failed to address the reasons for the lack of professionalism of the armed forces as it has been politicised. First, a prolonged stay in power caused political officials and military leaders to be corrupt, while inter-agency rivalry and, as a result, institutional decay, led to the decline in training, recruitment, and provision of supplies to the military. This
greatly affected the armed forces’ morale and caused it to not give its best, most of all in the North-East.

Eyituoyo’s (2013) thesis, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency: a Case Study of Boko-Haram in Nigeria*, assessed that if counterinsurgency is not correctly organised, it could lead to a state of terrorism. In Eyitayo’s work there was an apparent misuse of key terms. Eyitayo also looks at socio-political and economic reforms as well as amnesty programmes as measures to be invested in to help curb Boko-Haram. Even though this might be true, the writer, however, looks at counterinsurgency from a purely non-kinetic approach, forgetting that the insurgents are heavily armed, and his approach seems inadequate. Understanding the simplest definition of counterinsurgency would have helped the writer. For a successful counterinsurgency operation, there is a need for better synergy between the kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.

There is also a body of literature (Kukah, 2012, and Mac-Antoine Montelos, 2014) alongside news reports (The Nigerian Weekly Trust Newspaper, 2013, and The Sahara Reporters, 2012) that addresses the political aspect of this counterinsurgency. Another author, Solomon Hussein (2012), specifically dwelt on the failure of the former administration under the leadership of President Jonathan to devise and implement a successful approach to counterterrorism. The first point to disagree here in this thesis is that Boko-Haram is not a terrorist group as has been addressed by most writers and scholars from Nigeria, but an insurgent group as enumerated in Chapter One of this thesis. His primary emphasis was on the failure of the political leadership, without recourse to the armed forces as an institution. Study on counterinsurgency is relevant because it is important to policymakers and military leaders. Effectiveness of any military depends on the policy framework of the counterinsurgents. Discoveries have revealed that the Nigerian government did not have a coherent counterinsurgency policy for its armed forces’ counterinsurgency operations in the North-East.

As good as international cooperation for counter-insurgency is, the peculiarity of the Nigerian state and the armed forces must be taken into account before these strategies are implemented. The research advocates for more comprehensive, productive collaboration with the local community in understanding the nature of the Boko-Haram insurgency and its activities. Geographical knowledge is vital in counterinsurgency operations. The North-East is a complex region even for Nigerians who are not familiar with the area, so this can be more difficult for a foreign force to navigate and succeed.
Idahosa (2015) underscores three of the most prominent perspectives shared on the rise of Boko-Haram, which are poor socio-economic infrastructures and poor governance. He sees poverty as a significant catalyst to the rapid increase in the membership of these groups and the rise and aiding of religious extremists by politicians for their selfish ambition. His study reveals that while it is true that socio-economic factors may drive the radicalisation and politicisation of religious sects in the country, the fear of domination and indeed the fight for political leadership is at the heart of the current insurgency in North-East Nigeria. Even though the issues raised were quite compelling and contributory to the rise of the group, Idahosa, however, failed to understand the role of the armed forces in counterinsurgency operations. This thesis agrees that bad governance has helped to heighten the situation but countering the violent activities of the group involves both military and civilian actions.

Previous scholarly studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency include those by Galula (1976), Hazelton (2012), Kilcullen (2006), Omeni (2015), Adeniyi (2016), Burstein and Levit (1980), Meron (2003), Byman and Hoffman (2002), most of which address issues based on western perspectives on terrorism and insurgency. Nevertheless, the lessons are relevant towards counterinsurgency efforts in Africa and particularly in Nigeria. Most of these discussions are captured in the thesis. These scholars all recognised the importance of the military in dealing with the violent activities of the insurgent groups. Literature is absent on the effectiveness of the military, especially as it relates to its morale of the forces in dealing with the insurgency. The issue of morale is vital in any military operation, as without that, it would be challenging to get the military to be fully functional. Some of the problems that affect the effectiveness of the army include lack of modern weaponry, shortage of supplies like boots, uniforms and medical supplies, and other issues include low pay and an extended stay in the area of deployment.

In summary, this section on the shortcomings in the literature builds a case for the need to focus on the effectiveness of the armed forces in counterinsurgency based on the central rationale that there is a gap in the literature surrounding the central concept of effectiveness in the Nigerian Army’s counterinsurgency efforts.
Statement of the Problem

Before 1999, Nigeria had been under military dictatorship for over three decades. Military coups had consistently interrupted democratically elected administrations. Each time the country started experimenting with a regime of civilian rule, there would be a coup or countercoup often characterized by increasing authoritarian and corrupt official lies and failed promises (Siollun, 2009). Reasons for these coups ranged from ethnic rivalries, intramilitary quarrels, personal jealousies and ambitions and personal fear (Onwemechili, 1998).

After 1999, right into 2002 when Boko-Haram was found, the region experienced pockets of unrest which were mostly nonviolent and since the group claimed that they aimed to ‘purify Islam in northern Nigeria’, the government took things for granted (Cook, 2003). The government had underestimated the threat of Boko-Haram, but the leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf was killed. At the same time, in police custody in 2009, the extremists took the law into their hands and launched a series of attacks. Gradually, Boko-Haram’s radicalisation progressively grew and, from 2009, incidences of violent politically motivated ethnoreligious unrest were on the rise, most of which were linked to Boko-Haram and their allies. A series of bomb blasts targeting state institutions and innocent bystanders were particularly notable in and around the Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states of the North-Eastern region of the country. Afterwards, members of Boko-Haram launched a string of coordinated attacks across states in the northern part of the country, thereby creating the most palpable tension and sense of insecurity among Nigerians, as well as opening up potent security threats that are capable of tearing into pieces the very fabric that holds Nigeria as one indivisible entity.

The impact of the activities of the Boko-Haram insurgent group began to manifest in other parts of the country. Sophisticated attacks were launched. A bomb blast occurred on the 1 October 2010 at the independence-day celebration in Abuja, about 850km away from northeast Nigeria. To avert a descent into complete insecurity, President Goodluck Jonathan in his response to the independence-day bombings and subsequent threats to Nigeria’s national security, said that the time has come for a serious review of the security policy in the country. To show his commitment, Jonathan directed the nation’s security organs to ‘rise to the occasion and arrest these new and dangerous challenges of bomb-blasts and other acts of domestic terrorism’ to our peace and stability (Onuoha, 2016). To give impetus and meaning to his words, President Jonathan immediately ordered the deployment of many security forces
to flashpoints in the North-Eastern part of the country and mandated security agencies to use minimum justifiable force where necessary. Other measures taken include the adoption of the anti-terrorism bill (National Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011) and the establishment of a Presidential committee to look into the security situation in the country and to define a comprehensive and workable framework for resolving the insecurity (Sahara Reporters, 2013).

On 16 April 2011, Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner of the general election, this was his first win after he took over the presidential seat following the death of President Umar Yar’adua on the 5 May 2010. Despite previous measures, the year 2011 experienced a large degree of violence and destruction of lives and property coupled with the palpable fear and tension associated with the state of insecurity following the declaration of the election winner. The perpetrators became more daring as the targets of the attacks were Army barracks, Police headquarters and a United Nations building, all in the federal capital Abuja as well as the other major cities of Damaturu, Gombe, Maiduguri, and Yola in the North-East. Among the new tactics of this insurgent group were suicide bombings and guerrilla warfare, which proved useful in sending their messages of terror to the state and any group of the society that supported the government (Bappah, 2016). They carried out many assassinations on religious, community leaders and destroyed public buildings. The insurgents were able to carry out terror attacks on different locations across northern Nigeria with high intensity in the North-East region. The insurgents also took hostages, mostly women and children. By 2013, the insurgents were able to hold territory, hoist their flags and declare a ‘caliphate state’ (De Agbibos, 2014). Following these, it became necessary for the government to act and President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the North-Eastern states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno by 14 May 2013 (BBC News, 2013). The military was then fully drafted to help fight the insurgency in the affected areas. Yet with all these, the end of 2014 recorded a milestone in the history of insurgency in Nigeria which witnessed the abduction of 276 female students at Government Secondary School, Chibok, in Borno State.

Since independence, several issues have been identified that put to the test the security of lives and property of Nigerians and the far-reaching ramification of the nation’s political stability and national security. Of all these occurrences, the unfathomable atrocities and destruction of lives and property that accompanied the 1967-70 Nigerian Civil War that
pitched the Igbos from the Eastern part of Nigeria against the Nigerian State, have become a point of reference on the issue of security and national development in Nigeria. Added to this, are several government counterinsurgency attempts using legislation and the military to fight and win insurgency. However, challenges such as the lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict by the government and the military, environmental factors, corruption by politicians and the military high command, and the lack of funding among others are significant hindrances to the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency. Given these challenges, what are the causes of the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency efforts in tackling the violence of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria from 1999 to 2017? This thesis explores and discusses the salient factors which other scholars tend to overlook in analysing the military campaign against the Boko-Haram insurgency.

Objective and Significance

The main aim of this thesis is to determine: How effective has the Nigerian Army been in tackling the violence of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria since 1999-2017, and what challenges has it faced?

In North-East Nigeria, Boko-Haram’s activities have caused tremendous hardship. These hardships include loss of lives, property, and even the primary means of livelihood. The activities of the insurgents have crippled the socio-political and economic activities of the region. The government’s role over the years has yielded minimal results in dealing with the activities of the insurgents, particularly in protecting the people of the area. In fact, between 2004 and 2014, the insurgents had captured territories with total control. The research has addressed why the military, despite the supposed support it got from the government and the international community, found it difficult to degrade the insurgency.

The findings in this study will help the government and policymakers put in a policy framework to deal with the present situation and curb any future occurrence in Nigeria. The policy that will eventually be put in place in Nigeria might assist her neighbouring countries since there is evidence of insurgents crossing national borders. It will help other researchers to expand on this field of research to fill in the gaps, and this research has contributed to knowledge and practice.
Research Methodology

This study adopts the contextual assessment approach of the study of counterinsurgency, as suggested by Connell (2012). In this approach, Connell indicates, rather than relying on rigid data collection and quantitative methods that do not necessarily address the challenges of insurgency, it is preferable to adopt objective strategies. Previous assessment procedures which are mostly subjective and do not yield clear or credible results fail to guide policymakers and military leaders in taking strategic decisions. Current assessment methods propose an approach which assesses counterinsurgency within the conditions of the environment. As such this study adopts the contextual approach using the qualitative method for data collection and analysis while relying on the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of historical, sociological and political perspectives for analysing the impact of insurgency in Nigeria.

The Hegelian dialectic model (refer to fig 1) focuses on three major themes of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to reflect where the problem is, what the government has done, and how to get back to a state of peace. In this model, the cycle of order is almost always short-lived since the factors leading to the conflict are not adequately addressed. Furthermore, the dialectical model is an approach that connects insurgency and the root causes that threaten lasting peace. Therefore, this research adopts the dialectical method to provide a detailed analysis of the interconnection between the history of insurgency and insecurity in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria.

Figure 1: Hegelian dialectic model
In terms of data analysis, this research utilises both primary and secondary data sources. For primary data, semi-structured interviews with key participants elicited data about Boko-Haram and military effectiveness. Secondary literature includes books, journals, newspaper articles, unpublished theses, and government documents.

According to Pritha Bhandari (2020), a qualitative research method involves collecting and analysing non-numerical data like text, videos, or audios to understand concepts, opinions, or experiences. It can be used to gather in-depth insights into a problem or generate new ideas for research. Qualitative research is commonly used in humanities and the social sciences. Each research approach involves using one or more data collection methods, for example, observation, interviews, focus group, survey, and secondary research. This thesis employed the use of interviews and secondary materials in its data collection.

According to Whittaker (2012), methodology refers to ‘the totality of how you are going to undertake your research. It includes the research approach that you will use, including your epistemological position and the specific research methods you will choose’. In view of this, the researcher aimed to ensure that all aspects of the methodology employed in this research were carefully and critically chosen to meet all the requirements for answering the research questions appropriately and accessibly. According to Denzin (2002), the purposes of a research project is to determine the type of method and design of research to be used. It is in this spirit that after careful evaluation of all the options available relative to the methodology for this research, the most appropriate approach is to follow qualitative tradition, operationalised through undertaking interviews for data collection. Interviews helped to elicit detailed information from government officials and military leaders. The choice of interview stem out of the fact that the research focuses on the knowledge, values, beliefs, and attitudes of members who are affected largely by their involvement and participation or otherwise in the activities of Boko-Haram in the North-East, Nigeria.

By interview, it means a face-to-face verbal exchange in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to acquire information from, and gain an understanding of another person, the interviewee. The interviewee may be invited to talk about their attitude, beliefs, behaviours or experiences. The interviewee may be selected as either an individual or a representative of their team, organisation or industry. This research employed interviews to collect first-hand information from the target population who were directly involved either as decision-makers,
combatants or experiencers of Boko-Haram counterinsurgency. Connell (2012) opines that ‘an effective assessment depends on the ability to deliver context and nuance, which senior-level decision-makers need to understand what a military campaign truly is’. Because of this, this study uses semi-structured interviews with military officers, combatants, policymakers, and the victims to collect data on the realities of the insurgency and the armed forces’ operations.

Adding to the above are Mellisa Dejonakheere and Lisa M. Vaughn (2019), to them, semi-structured interview are in-depth interviews which are commonly used in qualitative research. This method typically consists of dialogue between researcher and participants, guided by a flexible interview protocol and supplemented by follow-up questions, probes and comments. The method allows the researcher to collect open-ended data, to explore participants’ thoughts, feelings and beliefs about a particular topic and to delve into personal and sometimes sensitive issues. Although semi-structured interviews are often an effective way to collect open-ended data, there are some disadvantages as well. According to Dejonakheere and Vaughn (2019) ‘one of the common problems, with interviewing is that not all interviewees make great participants’. They further added that ‘some are hard to engage in conversation or maybe reluctant to share about sensitive or personal topic’. But despite its limitations, it is a great way of collecting data.

The interview design and questions were set by the researcher and approved by the university’s research ethics panel. A face to face oral approach was employed in conducting semi-structured interviews, and possible uses of the semi-structured interviews are made clear to the respondents before the commencement of each interview. This is important because it made clear what the researcher’s intentions are and what is expected from the interviewee. Furthermore, the line of enquiry of the interview was such that the researcher was not exposed to information that may breach the Official Secrets Act of Nigeria. Despite the restriction placed on the quantity of data that can be collected through this method by the contemporary and on-going nature of my study, the high-quality data produced enriched the analysis of the relationship between Normativity/Morality in the conduct of activities of the militants and military conduct. This method contributed to the answering of the questions raised for this research.

The interviews were conducted in Nigeria in 2018 and 2019. This was followed by a series of phone call-based interviews to various officers in both the Army Headquarters and the theatre
command of Operation Lafiya Dole. The Military Headquarters is a challenging place to access, as the military operates in confidentiality and secrecy. The primary contact (gatekeeper) was contacted, and appointments set for a particular date. I was introduced to a Colonel by another Colonel. At the appointed date and time, the researcher presented himself, was searched, and presented his identification card from the University of Salford to support why he was there and the reasons for the interview. The research ethics approval form, the consent forms and the invitation letter were shown and the interview questions were vetted. After being satisfied with all the necessary procedures, the researcher was admitted to the Colonel’s office. It should be put on record here that all electronic devices are prohibited in Headquarters, so all notes made whilst there were made in longhand.

Most officers interviewed were officers with experience in theatre. The interviewed officers were from all strata of the military, from Major Generals, Brigadier Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, Captains, to Sergeants. NCOS Naval Officers were also interviewed, as were Airforce Officers, all cutting across different ranks. The Desk Officer for civil-military relations was also contacted and interviewed. Interviews were conducted in Kaduna at the Army Command and Strategic Centre where a counterterrorism school is established. Interviews were conducted in individual offices; some were conducted at the researcher’s private lounge. Permission was usually given to see officers during their lunch hours. Phone calls to conduct interviews from Manchester were also very helpful. These calls again cut across all ranks, and were subject to the availability and willingness to grant interviews. There were instances where information was denied, and this is understandable given the need for information security.

The total number of officers who were interviewed is as follows: five Major Generals, six Brigadier General, eight Colonels, four Majors, two Captains and ten NCOs. These are all from the Nigerian Army. Others include one Navy Commodore and one Airforce Commander. These interviews with members of the Airforce and Navy were few because the army is at the centre of the counterinsurgency operations. There is a large presence of the Airforce and Navy in the Joint Military Task Force, but the majority are from the army.
Secondary Sources

The secondary sources used in this thesis are drawn from local and international newspapers, magazines and media houses, and reports by government and non-governmental organisations, and existing academic literature. Specific news sources include the Nigerian Guardian Newspaper, the BBC, CNN, The Nigerian Sun, the Terrorist Perspective Magazine, the Nigerian Punch Newspaper, and the Daily Trust newspaper. Most of these newspapers, magazines and media houses were in operation before the outbreak of the insurgency. A significant problem encountered in the use of news reports was that some of the stories were religiously and ethnically biased, especially newspapers and media houses from the Northern part of Nigeria. Their mode of reportage was found to be entirely different from their counterpart in the Southern part of the country. Caution was employed in the usage of such materials as not all newspaper articles were reliable. Therefore, several of both primary and secondary sources were consulted as well as educational materials to gain a balance. An advantage of this was that it enabled the researcher to observe how people viewed an event as it happened, providing multiple points of view about an issue, permitting researchers to trace the historical development of a subject over time (guides.osu.edu). Even though not all news reports can be reliable, they can be a significant source of vital information.

For instance, the Nigerian Nation was the first newspaper to report on Boko-Haram’s rise to international prominence in 2010 and 2011 when it carried out a series of deadly attacks against the Nigerian government and detonated a car bomb after crashing into a United Nations building in Abuja. Another example is the Nigerian Independent Newspaper, which provided first-hand accounts of the failure of intelligence in the armed forces’ counterinsurgency operations in connection with kidnapping by the Boko-Haram group in the North-East in 2014. It was also newspapers that first revealed that Boko-Haram had at its disposal a seemingly limitless amount of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs and ammunition that it uses to kill with unfathomable wantonness. The Islamic militants, masquerading as members of the military, raided three villages in North-Eastern Nigeria this week and killed 400 villagers ‘from house to house’ using ‘sophisticated weapons’, one local leader told Bloomberg (The Nation, 2014). Further, The Punch Newspaper in Nigeria also reported on the Presidential visit of Goodluck Jonathan to Madalla, and how when he visited Saint Theresa Catholic Church, where the militant group killed more than 44 people, Jonathan was almost moved to tears (The Punch, 2012).
The above are examples of newspaper reports that made headlines both locally and internationally, forcing the government to be more proactive in its counterinsurgency approach (Campbell, 2018). Newspapers in Nigeria and some international media outlets were the first to provide information about the activities of the Boko Haram group, and this is because it was a new phenomenon. Until recently, when scholars began writing about it in local and international academic journals, few books are written about it.

There are fewer government reports on this subject, and as most are highly classified, the researcher does not have access to them and this is a limitation of the research. Several challenges to accessing such reports include the level of armed forces operations, lack of institutional framework, and mostly the inability of the Nigerian government and the armed forces to release reports on its activities, which might equally implicate them. For instance, Amnesty International in its report ‘Stars on their shoulders. Blood on their hands: War crimes committed by the Nigerian military’ (2015) show the brutality of the military on suspected Boko Haram members, without due recourse to the rule of law and proper investigation. It was Amnesty International that helped to expose the high level of corruption within the ranks of the Nigerian armed forces. The report states that ‘the Nigerian military, including senior commanders, must be investigated for the deaths of more than 8,000 people murdered, starved, suffocated, and tortured to death’ (AI, 2018, Report). Chapter Three of this thesis focuses on the report and highlights the excesses of the armed forces.

Transparency International in its Report on ‘Corruption in the Nigerian armed forces’ (2017) has helped to expose corruption in the armed forces. The report narrates the kleptocratic activities of the officials of the Nigerian defence ministry, which has seen over $150 billion stolen, leaving the military without vital equipment, insufficiently trained, low in morale and under-resourced. This insufficiency has crippled the Nigerian military in fighting an aggressive ideological inspired enemy, such as Boko Haram (Transparency International Report, 2017). Corruption within the Nigerian armed forces as it relates to the counterinsurgency was a significant issue of concern; more of this is captured in Chapter Six of this thesis.
Research Architecture

This section focuses on the outline in which this thesis is presented. The general introduction presents a layout of the entire research process. This is followed by the first chapter which gives a discussion of works of scholarly literature on terrorism, insurgency, proto-insurgency and guerrilla warfare, to try to understand their different definitions and contexts. It will be demonstrated that Boko-Haram can more accurately be described as an insurgent group than a terrorist group. It also examines fundamental issues relating to militarisation, and above all, the nature of counterinsurgency and the theories surrounding it such as the right governance approach, hearts and minds, minimum force and the coercive approach. The study also reviews intelligence as the bedrock for successful counterinsurgency. The chapter also evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of the military in order to create a framework for analysing the effectiveness of the Nigerian army in its counterinsurgency against Boko-Haram in later chapters.

Chapter Two examines the aim and objectives of the Boko-Haram group, its leadership, and the organisation and membership of the group. It also looks at the sources of their funding, methods of operations and concludes by looking at their internationalisation and connection to global insurgency. Findings reveal here that the main quest of the Boko-Haram group was to overthrow the secular Nigeria state and impose a Sharia Islamic state. Findings also show that Boko-Haram is connected to the Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab groups, from whom it has drawn finances and training for its members. Findings in this chapter were used to fashion semi-structured interview questions on the armed forces’ knowledge on the nature of the insurgency before them. This has also helped in terms of comparing the types and sources of fighting equipment as the overall outcome of the research has established that insurgents had an advantage over the Nigerian armed forces due to the sophisticated weapons they utilised. This too is a limitation to counterinsurgency.

Chapters three to six focus on the critical themes of counterinsurgency, which are coordination, governance, intelligence, and military preparedness. Chapter Three focuses explicitly on coordination in general terms as it relates to counterinsurgency globally. The importance of civil-military relations as an element to a successful counterinsurgency, the importance of police/military information coordination, non-kinetic operations, the importance of police primacy over the military in defeating the insurgency, civil-military relations and counterinsurgency in the North-East of Nigeria are discussed. Also highlighted
is the establishment of a professional indigenous police and military force, and the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria. Findings here reveal that there was a lack of proper coordination in the counterinsurgency operations of Nigerian armed forces in North-East Nigeria.

Chapter Four focuses on the good governance approach; this highlights the influence of policy on the population, fuelling or countering insurgency, and the impact of policy on the armed forces. The chapter also looked at the good governance approach in counterinsurgency in the North-East Nigeria 1999-2017, including focusing on the use of minimum force or coercion in counterinsurgency. Findings here reveal that the population plays a crucial role in counterinsurgency as both insurgent and counterinsurgents sought the support of the people. This chapter helps to explain that bad governance was a major challenge that created an opportunity for the insurgency to thrive, as the populace lost trust in the government and some even aligned with the insurgents.

Chapter Five pays attention to intelligence as a vital tool in counterinsurgency. It mainly examines how the Nigerian armed forces were engaged in intelligence gathering from the North-East through surveillance, cordon and search operations, intelligence from daily contact with the general population, questioning, interrogation, and informants. Also, a cursory look at the cooperation amongst interagency units about sharing intelligence, intelligence gathered by one agency and shared with other agencies, and the prompt gathering and use of intelligence are discussed in this chapter. Findings here reveal that the place of intelligence in counterinsurgency cannot be overemphasised, and intelligence is the pivot on which counterinsurgency operations succeed. The thesis argues that there was a lack of proper use of intelligence by the Nigerian armed forces in its counterinsurgency operation in the North-East.

Chapter Six presents the readiness of the armed forces for the handling of counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The main issues discussed here include the level of motivation of the armed personnel in the Nigerian case, the strength of the workforce, suitability of personnel in the Nigerian armed forces, availability of equipment, extent of training, level of experience and the undeniable pandemic of corruption. The debate here is whether the Nigerian military was prepared for the counterinsurgency operations. Findings reveal that the absence of a requisite training manual for the training of armed forces affected its counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. Other findings also reveal that outdated equipment, low morale, corruption,
lack of professionalism, long deployment in the area of operations, lack of basic supplies and welfare, all contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian armed forces in its campaign against the insurgency. Further findings include that young, inexperienced combatants who just graduated from the Military Academy, when confronted with superior firepower of the insurgents, mutinied. Corruption within the political and military establishments also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian armed forces in its campaign in the North-East.

Therefore, the thesis argues that the Nigerian armed forces were not prepared for the counterinsurgency operation in North-East Nigeria from 1999. The armed forces lacked the institutional framework from its training manuals to have handled the Boko-Haram insurgency in the North-East. The armed forces were faced with outdated weaponry and modern equipment necessary to carry out its campaign against the insurgency. The armed forces lacked the necessary equipment for both ground and aerial surveillance to help in intelligence gathering; this also affected interagency cooperation among the armed forces and other security agencies to coordinate on intelligence. Of course, without proper intelligence and coordination, counterinsurgency may not succeed. Hearts and minds is a crucial element in counterinsurgency. Still, the armed forces Nigeria initiated their campaign on brute force, relying more on a kinetic approach, rather than mixing both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in its campaign. The significant findings in the thesis also suggest that the armed forces deployed young officers without experience to fight the insurgency in the North-East, and that this contributed to the lacklustre capabilities of the fighting force, faced with issues of outdated and lack of modern equipment, lack of experience and low morale against a better-equipped insurgent group. Above all, corruption became the albatross of the armed forces and the political leadership. It led to the armed forces not having the right tools to fight the insurgency, this affected the purchase of modern equipment, getting the right personnel, training, pay, better welfare package to its officers, all of which brought low morale in the military. With the above mentioned, with the overwhelming findings, it can be concluded that the armed forces have not been effective in their counterinsurgency operations in the North-East between 1999-2017.
CHAPTER ONE

Literature Review

This chapter reviews the existing literature on terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare. This literature review is carried out in three broad headings. The first deals with the broad theme of defining the concepts of terrorism and insurgency. The second examines counterinsurgency approaches which includes issues bordering on ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ counterinsurgency, the ‘hearts and minds’ approach, the military based approach to counterinsurgency and the use of intelligence in counterinsurgency. It analyses the differences and similarities between the terms to establish the scope of focus and avoid misrepresentation of the aforementioned concepts. This chapter also focuses on the military and how effective it has been in curbing the activities of Boko-Haram in Nigeria and how the military is used by the Nigerian government to control the insurgency. The third part examines military preparedness with regards to effectiveness and efficiency in its counter insurgency operations. By understanding these broad concepts, the role of the military in curbing the insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria from 1999-2017 can be analysed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

1.1. Concepts: Insurgency and Terrorism

1.1.1. Insurgency

According to the CIA, an insurgency is a ‘protracted political and military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of the country using irregular military forces and illegal political organisations’. Insurgent activity includes guerrilla warfare, terrorist-style attacks, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, covert operations and international activity designed to weaken government control and legitimacy. The common denominator of insurgents is their desire to control an area. This objective differentiates insurgents from a purely terrorist organisation, whose goals
do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country (CIA, 2012). From the preceding, insurgency can widely be viewed from different schools of thought. Just like in the case of terrorism, with its various meaning and interpretations, the concept of insurgency also varies in its use, but a cursory look can help give a better understanding to the meaning of insurgency.

Anthony James Joe, a leading scholar in asymmetric warfare, said insurgency is profoundly ‘political’. Insurgency is primarily a political skill that ultimately determines whether the government or the insurgent prevails. Such understanding implies that political acts will seriously shape the struggle and eventually the conflict outcome; he further stated that ‘sound military operations cannot compensate for bad political practice’ (Joe, 2004). This was the case in Nigeria, where the armed forces’ presence and show of strength or power did not stop the insurgency. According to Bard O’Neill (1997), insurgency, also stresses the political aspect of the insurgency. O’Neill also adds that insurgency is a struggle between the non-ruling and the ruling groups, where the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy or reformulate the basis of political legitimacy of one or more aspect of politics (O’Neil, 1997; Bard, 2004). For both Joe and O’Neill, the use of arms and violence is important for insurgencies’ success, but the political front can be decisive. However, James Fearon and David Laitin who are researchers on ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war differ from those that highlight the political skills required for insurgency success. According to Fearon and Laitin, insurgency is a ‘technology of military conflict, characterised by small, highly armed bands practising guerrilla warfare from rural base areas’ (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). On the other hand, Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jorgen Maao describe insurgency as a military strategy adopted by both the weak and the strong in seeking specific military and security objectives or the transformation of the power structure (2011). Robert Jones, a US Reserve Colonel, and an author on the model of insurgency shifts attention to the link between the conditions of insurgency and the quality of governance. He contends that insurgency is best understood if taken out of the context of warfare and viewed as both a condition within a populace as well as a form of conflict, like the case of Nigeria; eventually ascending to Jones’ insurgency because the relationship between the governed and those who govern is unbalanced, creating a vulnerability amongst the people for insurgencies to thrive in (2017).
Many of the comparative scholars based their analysis on insurgency within the broader civil war and irregular warfare framework. Within this framework insurgency is examined within roughly three different perspectives: ethnic or nationalist, economic, and state capacity. According to the first, insurgency is an expression of ethnic clashes and nationalist aspiration to build a nation-state. Scholars in this line of research argue that the security dilemma, the problem of commitment, secessionism and the homogenisation process by a nation-state is likely to lead to political armed struggle (Gutaj and Al, 2007). The second, economic terrain stresses the link between national resources and armed conflict. According to this argument, larger reserves of national resources also lead to greater incentives for the establishment of insurgency operations. When a country does not cater for the people’s basic needs where there are the resources to do so, there will be resistance from the poorest parts of the population. Similarly, there is a correlation between armed struggles and national resources (Ross, 2005). Lastly, the state capacity school of thought argues that insurgency is more likely to emerge under conditions in which the state is unable to control and administer its territory, especially the countryside. Insurgencies tend to emerge and fight primarily in rural areas and mountainous environments as such conditions create spaces for the insurgents to succeed (Burstein and Levitt, 1987). The case of Boko Haram in Northern emphasises the above position, as they take advantage of the terrain to push away the method of dealing with or confronting them.

Further building on the discussion of the political element of insurgency, one school of thought that has tried to explain insurgency success looked at the political will of insurgency. Revealing these successes Andrew Mack, an expert in world politics, in his pioneering work on insurgency success, stresses strong political as a significant factor in the ability to wage a ‘total war’ against the perceived enemy or opposition. Mack’s argument is summarised as ‘success for the insurgents arises not from a military victory on the ground but rather from the progressive attrition of their opponent’s political will to wage war’ (Mack, 1975). Other scholars look at the strategies that the insurgencies employed and have explained it from that angle. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, a leading scholar on asymmetric warfare, argues that ‘the best predictor of asymmetric conflict is strategic interaction’ (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). While the stronger side is likely to adopt a direct approach to the fight, relying on firepower and technology and searching for a quick victory, the weaker side in the struggle will adopt indirect approaches to be stealthy and be able to tolerate casualties. Arreguin-Toft, in the publication ‘How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict’, narrates that ‘when
the very strong meet the weak in asymmetric armed conflict, strategy matters more than power.’ His work contains expert scholarly analysis and a writing style that communicates complex topics. It is extremely relevant in the current geopolitical context and serves as a warning to US policymakers to get military strategy right, regardless of relative power. Accordingly, Bradford further adds that ‘Arreguin-Toft’s argument makes clear the perilous consequences of neglecting the importance of strategic interaction’.

Other scholars too, look at the regime types in trying to understand under what conditions insurgent groups are more likely to succeed in their political objectives. Scholars on insurgency success and regime include Gil Meron, also an expert on small wars, who suggests that ‘Democracies fail to enforce their will against weaker adversaries because a gap emerged between state policies and popular sentiments towards the war effort’ (2003). Others have looked at the relationship between the civilian population and insurgents, and how this relationship shapes insurgency success. In summarising the success, Claire Metelits, a political scientist and researcher on security issues, finds that ‘the type of relationship between the two groups (along the spectrum from coercive or contraction) shapes the likelihood of insurgency’ (2010). The more contractual the relationship between the population and the insurgents, the more successful the insurgency is likely to be.

Is it enough to say that political will, superior strategy and contractual relationship guarantees insurgency success? These domestic forces are important for an insurgency’s outcome, but they seem to be only secondary to external support. Few studies have, however, focused on this relationship by looking at the external flow from ‘mother’ states and diasporas into insurgency operations and not necessarily external support from major powers. The flow of external resource is often credited for keeping an insurgency alive and running, and research has shown that external states and diaspora support are correlated with insurgency (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman et al., 2012). The most potent affirmation is that there is no modern example of successful insurgency without external assistance in the form of money, supply of arms and military advice. In concluding on that, Jeffrey Record sums it up as thus, ‘the presence or the absence of external assistance might be the single most important determinant in insurgency success’ (2007). It is important to note here that there are other forms of insurgency, one of which is ‘proto-insurgency’. An explanation of this term will help to broaden the understanding of insurgency and will follow later in this chapter.
It has been established that insurgency anywhere in the world is challenging to deal with or to defeat (Bennett, 2008). Collin Clark (2016) maintains that ‘for every successfully prosecuted counterinsurgency campaign, there are significantly more that have failed. Similarly, John McCuen (1966) and John Nagl (2005) explain that many of the counterinsurgency efforts that have succeeded in recent history benefit from circumstances peculiar to their environment, making it difficult to extract and apply meaningful lessons to other scenarios. This is because insurgencies have inherent advantages which are not easily counted, and this too often has resulted in a victory for the insurgents (Fredrick, 1964). However, Clark further opines that ‘difficult to defeat’ is not the same as ‘impossible’, that insurgency campaigns, deftly waged, can yield a successful outcome (2016). This clearly shows that if counterinsurgency fails, it either, the operation is not well organised or the insurgency has an advantage.

According to Cordesman (2005), insurrections start with a motive, which can be an injustice, or perceived injustice, that has not been, cannot be, or will not be addressed by the government or occupying power. This impasse according to Cordesman leads the most radical factions within the populace – usually proto-insurgency at the onset – to a form of violence or armed resistance which is now full-blown insurgency. The core belief that their cause is righteous stiffens the resolve of the cadre and creates a powerful foundation upon which to fuel the passions of the public. If the situation were easily resolvable, one could argue that the insurgency would have never started in the first place (Cordesman, 2005). But by the existence of the insurgency movement, the government or occupiers at this point has neither prevented the crisis from escalating nor set the conditions for peacefully resolving it.

The insurgents enjoy the initial momentum as they have freedom of action; choosing the time and place to engage the government’s leaders, forces and institutions. Generally, they benefit from a geographical sanctuary (as is the case with Boko-Haram in the North-East of Nigeria). The government, as a political organisation, is characterised by decentralised command, control, and operations. Additionally, it is hampered by bureaucracy, physical bases of operation, and the rule of law and other strictures of statehood which inhibit their adversary. Insurgents also possess near-perfect intelligence as their targets are well known. In contrast, the physical manifestation of the government’s powers is ubiquitous, and thus highly vulnerable (Clark, 2006).

Given these disadvantages, a government counterinsurgency campaign must be conducted with discipline and vigour. It must incorporate all elements of national power into its strategy,
which can be economic, political and military to achieve success. Recognising the tenet that counterinsurgencies are predominantly political is the first step of the process (Small War Manual, 1940). Modern liberal democracies have never successfully turned the tide on an insurgency using military force alone, though many have tried to do so. While military operations are an essential component in counterinsurgency operations, experience has shown that political, economic, and diplomatic efforts ultimately comprise the preponderance of the nation’s overall efforts in successfully quelling an insurgency (Hammes, 2004). In the end, the government or the occupier must delegitimise the insurgency and assure the security of the population. This can be attained by looking at it from a population-centric perspective as examined in the theory of counterinsurgency and offering them hope for a better future than that proposed by the insurgents (McCuen, 1966).

1.1.2. Terrorism

While this research focuses on insurgency, there is a relationship between insurgency and terrorism even though there are distinctions to be made between the two terms. Some scholars, such as Omeni, Abdullahi and Komolafe, tend to use the terms interchangeably but the concept of terrorism has been introduced in this work to highlight the differences and similarities between them. There is a seeming ambiguity in defining the term ‘terrorism’ by scholars, with any kind of violence being described as a terrorist act. The essence of this section is to clarify the issues surrounding terrorism and place it within the proper concept of academic discourse.

The terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ emerged from the events of the French Revolution of 1789, following the overthrow of the monarchy. The group known as the Jacobins took power and conducted a ‘reign of terror’ among the citizens throughout the nineteenth century (Hayes, 1980; Combs, 2003; Wardlaw, 1989). Hayes, a research fellow and consultant on security and counterterrorism, describes terrorism as organised violence by small groups of people against the state for political purposes. This suggests that a terrorist is a person who uses unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims. There are four dimensions to his definition. First, terrorist activities are organised, and they involve conscious planning and direction; a kidnap or hijack attempt, for example, require co-operation within an organised group. Second, small secret bodies of armed men and women usually undertake terror projects. Terrorist violence is not usually by large groups
of people, but by a small group who are excluded from power (Hayes, 1980; Paine, 2014). Third, terrorism, even when its victims are ordinary citizens, is directed against the state and its representatives. Fourth, terrorism is used to further political aims. Terrorists are not just criminals; they may engage in armed robbery, but this is part of a larger political strategy and it is not purely for material gains (Erde\textsuperscript{mir} & Kaya 2008).

Some scholars, government officials and those interested in global conflicts seem to agree on one dictum: ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. This has caused political and military leaders to be dismayed and discouraged, not knowing when you are fighting terrorism or a freedom fighter (Combs, 2003). Assessing the interpretation of the concept of terrorism, Combs (2003,) opines that, ‘ideology has always placed an ambiguous relationship on terrorism, at one point justifying it and at another condemning it’. Theorists and practitioners of both the left and the right have advocated the use of what has been termed ‘terrorist violence’. Understanding the context of the ideological dissolve helps to deal with the justification offered in contemporary times for terrorist acts.

The term terrorism is difficult to define. However, there are universally accepted connotations to the phenomenon that are commonly agreed upon in contemporary times, in what Combs termed a ‘loose’ definition of modern terrorism:

Terrorism is defined as a synthetic war and theatre, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence. That which is perpetrated on innocent victims played before an audience in the hope of creating a mode of fear, for a political purpose (Combs, 2003).

From this definition, we can deduce some components of terrorism, which include violence, an audience, the creation of a mode of fear, the innocent victim, and political motive or goal. Individuals are murdered in non-political, non-terrorist acts throughout the world each year (Combs, 2003). The unfortunate thing about terrorism is for most of its victims to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Again, as Howe succinctly captures:

To qualify as an appropriate victim of a terrorist today, we need not be tyrants or their sympathizers. We need not be connected in any way with the enemy, the terrorist perceived; we need not belong into any group, we need only be in the wrong place at the wrong time (Howe, 1976.).
On his part, Wilkinson (1986) defined terrorism as ‘the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction, to terrorise individual, groups, communities or government into conceding to the terrorist political aim’. For Alexander (1976) it is ‘the use of violence against random civilian targets to intimidate or to create generalised pervasive fear to achieve political goals’. The above definitions are very important and precise and often quoted by scholars. However, they lack an essential aspect of terrorism, that is, international linkage. Terrorism cannot inflict terror without the funds and infrastructure facilities that are received from a global connection.

Terrorism is part of the modern political world. Terrorist groups consist of real people in a real conflict. The task, according to Hayes, is not to ‘condemn them, but to understand them’ (1980). His idea of terrorism is essential in this research because it encapsulates the four elements of terrorism as outlined above. He gives precise characteristics of terrorism, which are political, organized and aimed at ordinary citizens to send a message to the opponents (Crenshaw, 2004). The United Nations (UN) which has the sole responsibility of securing global peace against vices like terrorism around the world, has similarly come up with its definition of terrorism which has been accepted by member states. In 2004, the UN’s Secretary-General’s high-powered level report defined terrorism as

> Any action… that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such acts, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do abstain from doing any act (UN, 2004).

Being an international watchdog and facilitator for ensuring world peace, the involvement of the UN in matters of terrorism amplifies the importance of securing lives and property across international borders. Crenshaw, who has written many highly commendable and critical works on the study of terrorism, seems not to agree with such definitions and sees it as problematic. Crenshaw sees terrorism in a broader narrative and defines it as a ‘form of violence that is tilted towards concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy, and deception’ (2004). She further opines that terrorism is not spontaneous, nor does it involve mass participation. The act itself communicates a future threat to people which identifies with the victims. The choice of time, place and victim is to shock, frighten, excite or outrage the opponent (Crenshaw, 2004).
Actors in terrorism use five underlying but interrelated factors irrespective of political ideology, and the first is relevant to this thesis. It is to set the political agenda in conflict to try to undermine the authority of the government they are opposed to. This is to provoke an overreaction from the government or the targeted population and to mobilise popular support at home and abroad, which is aimed at coercing compliance (Crenshaw, 2004). Groups may pursue all or some of these uses of terrorism simultaneously or sequentially because they are not mutually exclusive or incompatible. Most groups will adopt a pragmatic mix of internal and external considerations.

The US State Department also corroborates the FBI’s position on defining terrorism as ‘the calculated use of violence or the threat to incite fear intended to coerce or intimidate government or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological’ (DOD, 2000). This is often a ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience’ (Terror-Research.com, retrieved, 8 May 2017). The UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 also gives its definition as the use or threat for advancing a political, religious or ideological cause of action, which involves serious violence against any person or property (Whittaker, 2007).

Scrutinising the various definitions, different authors have a difference in opinion when linking terrorism to other types of violence. Official descriptions reflect governments’ institutional positions. The FBI, for instance, stresses ‘coercion and unlawfulness, and offences against property, in furtherance of social as well political objective’. The US State Department emphasised premeditation. The UK’s position is to be found in the Terrorism Act as presented to Parliament in 2002 and amended in 2006. Although here again, the definition seems to be too broad in scope that it may seem to be government restricting or even denying the legitimate rights of a wide range of protest group (Whittaker, 2007).

In addition to the question of defining terrorism is the question of why terrorism is difficult to define in the first place. According to Whittaker (2007), few words like terrorism have insidiously worked their way into our everyday vocabulary. He went on to state that most people have a vague idea about the definition of the word. This is partly caused by the modern media for which airtime or print space have led to the promiscuous labelling of a range of violence acts as terrorism. Globally, some newspapers look at the bombing of a building, the assassination of political leaders, and the massacre of people by a military unit,
the poisoning of consumers’ products, or the deliberate contamination of over the counter medication in a pharmacy as terrorism or terrorist acts. Any perceived act of violence against society whether it involves the activities of anti-government dissidents or government themselves, organised-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in military protest, individual psychotics or extortionists are all labelled ‘terrorist’. This is where and how it has been difficult to place or define terrorism.

In looking further at the dynamism of the word, Whittaker is of the view that the Second World War and the period of nationalists’ struggle for independence that followed later ‘swing the pendulum’ of the meaning of terrorism. Most countries in Africa owed their independence to these kinds of struggle, primarily geared towards the sympathy of the international community who are more sympathetic to them. Most third world countries refused to be termed terrorists with their fight against colonial domination but prefer to regard it as conducted by ‘Freedom Fighters’. The Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) at the UN General Assembly in 1974 captured this position rightly:

The difference between revolutionary and terrorist lies in the reason for each fight. For whoever stands by a just cause and fight for their freedom and liberation of his land from invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot be called terrorist (Yasser Arafat, 1974).

The 1960s and 1970s saw terrorism within a revolutionary context. Still, there was a modification to it, and it now included nationalist and ethnic separationist groups outside a colonial or a neo-colonial framework as well as radical minorities. Some of these groups are the PLO and the Quebecois’ separatist group. All these groups adopted terrorism to draw attention to themselves and their respective causes, with the specific aim of attacking their anti-colonial predecessors or of attracting international sympathy and support (Hoffman as stated in Whittaker, 2007). Yet, by the 1980s, the term terrorism had taken on a new meaning when it came to be used against the West as part of a global conspiracy. By the middle of the decade a suicide bombing against America diplomats and military target in the Middle East came to be regarded as ‘state-sponsored terrorism’. Some Middle Eastern states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria became actively involved in sponsoring terrorism and terrorist acts. Terrorism thus became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare, whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution (Hoffman, 1998).
Most writers, including Crenshaw and Hoffman, agree that the usage of the word has changed over the years to accommodate a more political vernacular and discourse of each successive era. Terrorism has increasingly become elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition. At one time, the terrorists themselves were far more cooperative in their endeavour than they are today. The early users did not hide under any semantic or camouflage as ‘freedom fighter’ or urban guerrillas. However, the 19th-century players unabashedly proclaimed themselves terrorist or declared their tactics to be terrorism (Hoffman, 1998).

One point of agreement amongst scholars is that ‘terrorism’ is a pejorative term. It is a word with a negative connotation that is applied to one’s enemies or opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore what is called terrorism. Whittaker, in his book, *The Terrorism Reader* quotes Brian Jenkins' definition (an expert on terrorism and transportation security) that, ‘it seems to depend on one’s point of view’, as use of the term implies a moral judgement, and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Hence the decision to call someone or label some organisation as ‘terrorist’ becomes more subjective, depending on whether one sympathises with or opposes the person, group or cause concerned. If one identified with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identified with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded more sympathetically, in a positive light, and it is not terrorism (Whittaker, 2004).

Terrorism is often confused with or treated as synonymous with guerrilla warfare and insurgency. It is not surprising since guerrillas and insurgents often use the same tactics of ‘hit and run’, kidnapping, assassination, bombings of public building and gatherings, and hostage-taking; for almost the same purpose as to intimidate, coerce and affecting behaviour through raising fear and intimidation. Again, terrorists, as well as guerrillas and insurgents, wear no uniforms nor identifying insignia and thus are often indistinguishable from non-combatants. Despite the similarities amongst these groups, there are marked differences between them. Guerrillas, for example, in its most widely accepted usage, refers to a numerically large group of armed individuals who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territories, while also exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population. Insurgents share these characteristics; however, their strategy and operations transcend ‘hit and run’ attacks to
embrace what in the past has variously been called ‘revolutionary guerrilla warfare’, ‘modern revolutionary warfare’ or ‘people’s war’ but is today commonly referred to as insurgency. Thus, in addition to the irregular military tactics that characterised guerrilla operations, insurgencies typically involved coordinated informational propaganda and psychological warfare efforts. Terrorists, however, do not function in the open as armed units and generally do not attempt to seize or hold territories. Deliberately avoiding engaging enemy military forces in combat, they are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted political mobilization efforts and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national level (Horgan, 2005). More discussion will come later in this thesis.

1.2. Counterinsurgency Approaches

This section examines counterinsurgency approaches, as the focus of this research is to investigate the effectiveness of the military in tackling the violence activities of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria since 1999-2017. To achieve this, notable counterinsurgency approaches have been analysed, namely ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ counterinsurgency, coordination, the hearts and minds approach and the military based approach. This part of the chapter will help broaden the understanding of the theoretical framework of counterinsurgency on which the study was designed and conclusions are drawn.

1.2.1. ‘Cold’ and ‘Hot’ Insurgency

Galula propagates that ‘if the insurgency’s activities remain in the whole legal and non-violent, which means when it is at the preparatory stage, the insurgency should be referred to as ‘cold’. When this is the case, the essential problem for the counterinsurgency is that actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demand made by the adequate response. That is, the response necessary to eliminate the insurgency is likely to be deemed excessive by the general population. The above leaves counterinsurgents with four options as noted by Galula: they can act directly on the insurgent leader; they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency; they can infiltrate the insurgents’ movement; or, they can reinforce their own ‘political machine’ (Galula, 1976).
For this, Galula further narrates that acting directly on insurgent leaders by arresting them or limiting their action is difficult in democracies and often backfires. Such direct actions should only be attempted when the insurgents’ cause is not popular. The counterinsurgent has the legal authority to act, and significant publicity of such action can be prevented. Indirect action consists of co-opting the insurgents’ cause or addressing the weakness of the state.

A successful insurgency requires a viable cause to rally support. If the demands of an insurgent can be met through state action, without undermining its authority, the insurgent is deprived of his or her cause, for example, providing land reform when this is the insurgents’ goal. Unfortunately, an insurgent cause is often impossible for a state to adopt, without relinquishing its power. In this case, indirect action can be taken to ensure that the judicial, police, and military institutions are strong, as this discourages insurgent action. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, these institutions are very weak. Insurgency seeks to destroy it from within by turning it against itself. However, although potentially quite effective, such action can backfire and anger the general population. The final option strengthens or builds up the ‘population machine’ of the state, which consists of convincing the people to buy into the state’s legitimacy and moral authority. While essential in ‘cold’ insurgencies, this is the primary activity in ‘hot’ insurgencies.

Reeder opined that ‘when the activities of the insurgents are openly illegal and violent, it becomes, ‘Hot’ insurgency’ (Reeder, 2018). In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgent, because the moral ‘fog’ surrounding the insurgents dissipates and the counterinsurgency is free to act more decisively. Nevertheless, decisive action, according to Galula (1976), does not necessarily mean military action. Indeed, as emphasised by Galula, ‘it is the military action which is secondary to the political one’, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population. Keeping the above emphasis on political action and the laws of counterinsurgency in mind, Galula develops a comprehensive strategy for dealing effectively with ‘hot’ insurgencies. He divides the strategy into eight steps: isolate the area, which is manpower intensive; strategically place troops in hamlets, villages and towns; monitor the population and control their movement to cut off their links with the insurgents; destroy the local insurgents’ political organisation; use elections to set up new provisional local authorities that are not sympathetic to the insurgents; test these authorities to ensure they provide good governance to the population; replace the soft and incompetent political and military leaders, give full support to the committed leaders,
organise self-defence units and groups, and educate the leaders of the national political movement; win over or suppress the insurgents’ last remnants. Accordingly, each of these steps is to be undertaken in a specific area which is consistent with the fourth law, which is ‘intensity of efforts and vastness of means’, and then repeated in other areas, as necessary.

Though Galula presents these eight steps as a guide to ‘hot’ counterinsurgency operations, he is quick to point out that like every similar concept, this one may be sound in theory, but dangerous when applied rigidly to a specific case. In most counterinsurgency operations, one size does not fit all. This research posits that the theory is that counterinsurgency might be generalised, but its practicality must be indigenous, because of certain peculiarities, especially the terrain, as exemplified by the Boko-Haram situation in North-East Nigeria.

1.2.2. Coordination in Counterinsurgency

The US Field Manual 3-24-2 (2009) states that ‘counterinsurgency involves coordinating all political, social, military, paramilitary, and civil authority.’ It is the ability of the counterinsurgent to bring all these together in an organised way which can cause the defeat of the insurgency. Coordination is, therefore, an essential part of counterinsurgency. This section of the thesis shows how vital coordination is to our understanding of why counterinsurgency succeeds or fails.

One of the crucial aspects of successful counterinsurgency programmes is coordination. According to Galula, ‘this coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies.’ In furtherance to that, Ladwig (2007) believes that ‘combating an insurgency tests a government to its fullest limit’. However, to succeed, the government must bring to bear all elements of its national power into focus, the political, military and social, in its coordinated campaign. The absence of such can result in a lack of apparent authority, inadequate intelligence analysis, poorly integrated efforts by civilian agencies and military operations that will fail to achieve the desired results. Sir Robert Thompson, a well-respected practitioner-turned author on counterinsurgency, lends his voice to the above, by writing that ‘without a reasonable efficient government machine, no programme or project in the context of counterinsurgency will produce the desired results’ (Thompson, 1969). He further advised that it is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government should not allow itself to be diverted
either by countermoves on the part of the insurgents or by critics on its side who will be seeking a more straightforward and quick solution. He asserts that ‘there are no shortcuts or gimmicks’, in counterinsurgency coordination. A more detailed analysis of coordination in the campaign against Boko-Haram can be found in Chapter Three.

1.2.3. The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Approach

In this section, good governance is seen as a process whereby the government provides the necessary basic needs of the people, which include provision of housing, healthcare and employment opportunities. Where these social amenities are in place, the people’s suffering is reduced. In counterinsurgency operations, the provision of these basic human needs is referred to pursuit of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. The hearts and minds concept can also be referred to as good governance (Gathii, 1999).

In the hearts and minds and good governance approach, counterinsurgency success is based on the conviction that the government must provide political, economic, and social reforms that meet the needs of the population. According to the US National Security Strategy of 2002, to practice good governance, governments must fight corruption, respect fundamental human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship. Considering the above, good governance is necessary to defeat insurgencies because it is the corrupt government that creates them in the first place. This is clear in the case of Nigeria, where there was bad governance, leading to massive corruption. However, much more importantly, representative government and more public goodwill build broader popular support for the state, attract civilian cooperation against the insurgent, and marginalise the insurgents (Walker, 1967). In a list of requirements to defeat an insurgency, leading counterinsurgents had as their first priority to ‘identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fuelling the insurgents’ (Hosmer; Crane, 1962; Beckett, 2005). Counterinsurgency success requires government reforms to address popular grievances.

In its analysis of counterinsurgency, the US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 (2014) gives and exemplifies the good governance approach, drawing on sixty years of Western practitioner accounts of successful counterinsurgency campaigns (US Department of the Army Manual). Soldiers and Marines shall be expected to be nation builders as well as
warriors. General David Petraeus and General James Amos wrote ‘they must be ready to help establish institutions and essential service. They must be able to facilitate’ the good governance approach including by direct military targeting of insurgents. Still, governments must prevent harm to civilians because harm will only increase support for the insurgents (US Department of Army Manual 3-07). This emphasis according to Hazelton, on discriminatory force, is more prominent in the contemporary world than in the post-world war literature; but as Galula wrote ‘Every Military move has to be balanced concerning its political effects, and vice-versa’. ‘Only attack insurgents when they get in the way’, so adduces the Field Manual. General Petraeus said to his troops serving in Afghanistan ‘if we kill civilians or damage their property, we create more enemies than our operations eliminate’. The argument that good governance causes counterinsurgency success also rests on the assumption that success requires popular support, and that ‘the populace is the centre of gravity’, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends (Clausewitz, 1976).

Moreover, much of the research that supports the good governance approach makes potentially unwarranted assumptions about the campaigns themselves. An example, according to Karl Hack (2009), is the widespread assumption that counterinsurgent government deliver on what they promised, thereby having positive effects on the populace and adverse impact on the insurgency. A similar premise relates to the role of the reforms, including that the government has the capacity and the will to institute them, that the populace desires them, and that the majority has no political preferences and will side with the stronger side (Galula, 1976). Another problematic assumption is that foreign interveners can decisively shape events (Macdonald, 1992). None of these assumptions remains warranted by empirical research.

In more recent times, Robert Egnell (2010) has opined that this approach is rooted in the theory of modernisation where attempts have been made to reduce the number and kinds of grievances which can fuel the insurgency. Paul Dixon (2009) has asserted that interaction with the people to obtain information about the insurgency from civilians alongside effective information campaigns could be a vital component of this approach. Similarly, but more firmly, Jacqueline L. Hazelton, an expert on counterinsurgency, analysed how government can defeat insurgencies through the good governance approach. Hazelton (2017), advances explanations for why governments succeed and retain power against insurgency, assuming that both political and military efforts are required. She observed that the US runs into
problems in its attempt to support counterinsurgent governments as the US approaches the issue of an armed, organised, internal non-state political challenge to a government as a ‘zero-sum game’. In this competition, the state and non-state actors compete for popular support and cooperation (Hazelton, 2017). Hazelton contends that the US prescription for success is twofold. First, it is to provide support for liberalising, democratising reform designed to reduce popular grievances and given broad support, while undermining the insurgency and target insurgents with military force without hurting the civilian population. Second is the ‘good governance’ approach, for it remains geared towards building a liberal, reformist central government to trouncing the insurgency.

According to Hazelton (2017), the internal logic of the good governance approach is solid, but the supporting research suffers from two main problems. First, it lacks theoretical rigour. Second, it is based on unexamined assumptions. The lack of rigour hinders consideration of which types of government behaviour are more likely to contribute to success in which types of cases. Unexamined assumptions distort analysis by drawing attention away from potentially important elements. Those who question counterinsurgency success disagree, however, over how much political change is required and whether a government’s use of force against civilians hurts or helps its efforts to defeat armed non-state actors, fighting to change the distribution of power or wealth within the state; or overturn the status quo; or divide the state into two or more states. There are two opposing views in the counterinsurgency literature on the role of the populace (Hazelton, 2017). One view is that government and insurgency compete for the allegiance of the populace by providing it with political, economic, and social benefits; this is what Hazelton earlier referred to as ‘good governance approach’. The other view holds that the government succeeds simply or primarily by using military force against the insurgency.

In her summary of the good governance approach, Hazelton narrates that these problems appear in the leading alternative approach to counterinsurgency success, which advocates targeting the insurgency directly with military force and downplays question about political efforts that may be necessary for success. Therefore, in relation to the Nigerian situation as opined by Hazelton’s good governance approach and its efforts in copunterimmsurgency, scholars like Aiyede (2015), looks at the development of the Nigerian military since the colonial era, and also at the series of ‘post-independence efforts’ to develop the military into a ‘reliable institution’ for the defence and security of the Nigerian state. He further
emphasised the transition reforms from 1999, when democracy was re-introduced into the Nigerian space. The paper then examines the counter programme of transformation instituted by the military, its level of implementation and the key factors behind the current state of the military reform (if any). The author concludes by arguing that ‘Nigeria lost several opportunities to transform its military into an effective and efficient force capable of deterring external aggression and maintaining internal security within the framework of democratic civilian control’. He further adds that ‘the trajectory of democratic politics as shown by President Obasanjo to alter the constitution in order to provide for a third term for Presidents and state governors, slowed down the commitment to military reforms by the government’. He added that it provided the space for the military to take control of the reform of the defence sector from civilian authorities, derailing the implementation of a systematic transformation of the military.

Okechukwu (2017), deals with the cyclical nature of counterinsurgency operations by the Nigerian military and its preparedness to tackle the security challenges in country and content that ‘the time has come to rethink the concept of victory in counterrinsurgency operations in Nigeria’, and adds that ‘the change advocated is not just targeted at Boko-Haram, but also against ethno-religious and anti state forces that have mushroomed and will continue to evolve in Nigeria, if the current trajectory of ill-fitting strategy and obsolete notion of victory remains unchanged’.

1.2.4. The Military-Based Approach to Counterinsurgency

In the post-World War Two era literature on counterinsurgency, two schools of thought have evolved that emphasise the use of military force against the good governance approach. These are the guerrilla-centric or enemy-centric and the cost-benefit approach. Some scholars argued that ‘brutality’ is the primary means of defeating insurgents, such as Douglas Porch (2013) and David French (2012) although, according to Hazelton (2017), ‘a lack of rigour and unquestioned assumptions about the role of force and politics in counterinsurgent success limits the usefulness of both approaches’.

The guerrilla-centric or enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency success prescribes defeating an insurgent militarily. Roger Trinquier, a French army officer, argues that ‘Force is the foundation of counterinsurgency success’ (Trinquier, 1964). Supporting this assertion is
Edward Luttwak, an historian. He notes ‘the successful application of terrible force, including collective punishment and reprisal killings, in past successful counterinsurgencies’ (Luttwak, 2007). Ralph Peters, a retired US Army officer, further opines that ‘insurgencies overwhelmingly have been put down thoroughly by killing insurgents’. Charles Wolf and Nathan Leite (1960) developed the cost-benefit approach to counterinsurgency; in place of trying to gain the allegiance of the populace through a time consuming, expensive process of offering reforms, they prescribed punishing civilians who do not cooperate and providing benefits to those who do. This carrot and stick approach should prevent insurgents from obtaining resources such as food, shelter, and civilian recruits, while military force should prevent insurgent violence. Daniel Ellsberg and Richard Shultz (1970) are of the view that neither approach discussed above present testable theories, identify the conditions under which its prescription is likely to succeed or provide a systematic analysis of relevant cases. Each assumes that the government’s use of violence will repress all the insurgents’ political goals and the use of force will reduce rather than increase the level of popular protests.

There are two intervening variables on this theory, one military and the other political. Hazelton (2017) operationalised the first variable as a military campaign to destroy an insurgency’s capacity and will to continue to fight. The campaign has two facets, direct and indirect. The immediate military effort is an attrition campaign against the insurgency, and this is also assumed to take place in good governance theory (Pape, 1996). The indirect military effort uses brute force to block the flow of resources from civilians to insurgents (Lanhan, Rowman and Littlefield, 2010). Hazelton further operationalised the second variable as accommodation, that is the use of threat and rewards to gain the cooperation of political and military leaders outside the government in exchange for intelligence on the insurgency and the provision of military capabilities to the government (Tilly, 2003). The process involves the use of coercion to break the insurgency as a fighting force and organisation based on the use of threat, display, or application of force to coerce changes (Brass, 2003). According to Charles Tilly (1992) counterinsurgency is primarily a domestic political process of violent state-building; historically, the process has been incontrollable. Political order arises from elite efforts to reduce violent political rivalry. Ruling elites seek to retain power and protect their interests at any costs and regardless of any detriment to the population (Tilly, 1992; North and Wallis, 2009).
In the literature, coercion theory recognises that counterinsurgency is about political interest, in the same way that warfighting is (Clausewitz, 1976). Coercion theory contrasts with the good governance approach to counterinsurgency in three essential ways. First, it identifies the significance of conferring accommodations on elites, rather than proposing and implementing reforms to gain popular support. Secondly, it identifies the critical role of military control over civilians, rather than protection from harm. Thirdly, the coercion theory is explanatory, whereas the good governance approach is prescriptive or programmatic (Tilly, 2001). Van Evera (2001), opines that two predictions flow from the coercion theory. First, if the government accommodates rival elites, then its intelligence and military capabilities should increase. Second, if it uses its increased capabilities to more effectively target insurgents and their resource flow, including controlling the populace, then the insurgent should be significantly weakened. Bennett (2015) rationalised that the coercion theory cannot explain success if any of the following three conditions apply: first, the government does not control the populace; second, the government implements reforms benefiting all, gaining support among the population, while reducing support for the insurgency, before using its strengthened capabilities to defeat insurgent force; third, the government systematically avoids harm to civilians, even at military cost (Bennett, 2015).

Hazelton concludes that her theory of coercion theory offers a more robust explanation for success in counterinsurgencies than does good governance theory. According to the coercion theory, counterinsurgents must use force to control civilians, and thus cut the flow of resources to insurgents, as well as provide accommodations to rival elites to obtain information and enhance their military power. The coercion theory better explains counterinsurgent success in cases that proponents of the good governance approach present as model campaigns – cases that should present substantial evidence of the effectiveness of good governance in defeating insurgencies. Furthermore, if the predictions of the good governance approach are accurate, the government should limit its use of force in countering the insurgents. It should propose and implement reforms to reduce popular grievances, and popular support for the government should rise. The empirical evidence demonstrates that none of these factors is present in these three cases considered by supporters of the good governance theory as a model of counterinsurgency success. Further elaboration on the military in counterinsurgency shows that with good governance, counterinsurgency can succeed.
1.2.5. Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

In his opening introduction to his article ‘Vital role in counterinsurgency operations’ Colonel David Clark (2006) notes that intelligence in counterinsurgency operations reveals one noteworthy constant, ‘None has been effectively carried out without a methodology for gathering and disseminating time and accurate intelligence data’, or in today’s parlance ‘actionable intelligence’. He further narrates that ‘effective counterinsurgency warfare; by its nature, attains greater success through human intelligence and vice intelligence. These can be gained through national technical means such as signal, imagery and measurement intelligence’ (SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT).

Although it is traditionally accepted that human intelligence (HUMINT) is much more useful than SIGINT, with the advent of computers, mobiles, and the internet, SIGINT is becoming more useful and can be used to expose insurgent cells for attack (Clark, 2006). The insurgents enjoy the initial momentum. They have freedom of action; choosing the time and place to engage the government’s leaders, forces, and institutions. Generally, they benefit from the geographic sanctuary, like the case of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria, where they have the advantage of the terrain, understanding it, making it difficult for the armed forces and government, and in most cases, political decentralised command and control operations. Furthermore, they are unfettered by bureaucracy and physical bases of operation, working without obeying laws that might inhibit their operations. Their targets are well known, and they are the physical manifestation of the government’s power which are ubiquitous and thus highly vulnerable. Looking at the stated difficulties for the government or the military, counterinsurgency campaigns must rely on good intelligence to enable them to conduct their activities with vigour and discipline, and this was lacking at the initial stage of the government and military fight against Boko-Haram insurgency. The factors leading to counterinsurgency campaigns are mostly political in nature. The political dynamics of intelligence relate to the mechanisms of governance, power play and negotiations between various interest groups or stakeholders in the counterinsurgency campaign.

Nando (2002) asserts that while military operations are an essential part of counterinsurgency operations, experience has shown that political, economic and information or diplomatic efforts ultimately comprise the preponderance of the nation’s overall effort in successfully
defeating an insurgency. In the end, as concluded by Paget (2006) the government or the occupier must delegitimise the insurgency, assume the security of the population, and offer hope for a better future than that proposed by the insurgency.

According to Hosmer (1962) one undisputable component of counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the entire spectrum of operations, is the requirement of ‘actionable intelligence’. Accurate, timely intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the insurgency is a prerequisite to success in all facets of counterinsurgency warfare. Due to the inherent precariousness of their situation, even counterinsurgent forces in its possession of good intelligence may be defeated; but alternatively, they have no hope whatsoever without. Intelligence, and the means to get a centrally-managed experience, and well-organised intelligence architecture is fundamental to successful counterinsurgency operations. Putting it succinctly Beckett (1962) believes that intelligence is the paramount component of counterinsurgency that is essential to gain. As mentioned above according to Beckett conventional warfare, is where the balance of intelligence data is obtained from technical means. In counterinsurgency warfare, intelligence is gained primarily through a human interface.

Conclusively, in failed or collapsed states as in Nigeria, where an indigenous police infrastructure is often weak, or non-existent, military intelligence and police units by themselves will be charged with obtaining the intelligence needed to drive operations. It is by no means an easy task under optimal conditions, let alone in an undeveloped, anarchic environment as in the North-East Nigeria situation. Ideally, these units can anticipate a shortage of native linguists with expertise in the local Hausa language, and are likely to be unfamiliar with the regional culture, to have a lack of credible information, and in most cases, a glaring lack of human resources to accomplish their mission.

In another dimension to the approach to counterinsurgency, Oyewole (2016) in his article ‘Making the sky relevant to battle strategy: Counterinsurgency and the prospect of Airpower in Nigeria’, opined that ‘the most important role in counterinsurgency is to maintain adequate security presence to protect lives and properties of the affected population and restore law and order in the society’. He further asserts that ‘the situation in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency theatre has been affected by the quantity and quality of security presence, most especially the ability of the operatives to gather timely and relevant information and mobilize for prompt response’. He adds that ‘the roles of the ground operatives have dominated public attention’.
The local air force and the complementary air powers have affected security situations with the level of their presence or absence in the sky for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; firepower; and transportation in-theatre. Adding credence to Oyewole’s position, the thesis adds that the Nigerian Airforce can learn from the experiences of other counterinsurgencies in airpower surveillance. The Nigerian Airforce as part of the joint military action have used the advantage of its airpower in dealing with the insurgents but their capacity has been minimal due to a lack of modern equipment and trained personnel.

Oyewole (2016) postulated that Airpower offers one of the most effective means to perform these COIN roles with its advantages in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), firepower, and transportation. Although their impacts are more seen than heard, the local air force and the complementary air powers have recorded significant headway despite numerous challenges in the counterinsurgency theatre. This thesis agrees with the above position, because with the kind of strategies the insurgents are using, and their knowledge of the environment, one of the best ways to deal with it is through airpower, if adequately harnessed. Also agreeing with that position are Gompert and Gordon (2006), who suggest that by permitting operatives to respond rapidly to warnings, to surprise insurgents, and to cover spans of territory without requiring stationary positioning, tactical air mobility provides an operational alternative, or at least a complement, to the large-scale, widespread presence of slow-moving forces in counterinsurgency. Consequently, the US Field Manual 3-24 further adds that using all means at their disposal to gather, analyse and disseminate intelligence for current operations, it is imperative that they simultaneously work to reconstruct, recognise and train indigenous personnel to do the same. In the final analysis, the success of the intelligence effort and the counterinsurgency effort in general, depends on the degree to which the latter mission is fulfilled (US Field Manual, 2007). As intelligence plays a vital role in counterinsurgency, Chapter Five of this thesis is dedicated to it.

1.3. Military Preparedness, Effectiveness and Efficiency

In wars or other crises that require military deployment, the military must constantly be prepared when called upon to act. Military preparedness is pivot to its effectiveness. This section is fundamental in helping us understand the prerequisites and requirements of when a military is prepared or not. The thesis shows that the Nigeria military as an institution, lacked
or did not meet some of these requirements to be fully prepared for its campaign on counterinsurgency in the North-East.

Effectiveness has been defined as ‘the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power’ (Millet, Murray, and Watson, 1988). The primary issue facing most military forces globally, either big or small, democratic or undemocratic, developed or developing states, is the quest for efficiency while attaining effectiveness. Efficiency, which is an essential key to military effectiveness, lays the foundation for the basis of a capable military. As defined from a thermodynamic angle, efficiency is the percentage of useful work extracted from the heat of a system generated by the burning of a fuel source, divided by the combustion process (www.sciencedirect.com, cited 2018). In any system, there is an amount of waste heat consumed in a process that may not necessarily provide any useful work. One hundred per cent efficiency would have all the valuable work output from a system applied to a specific requirement or task and thereby lead to an effective method. Additionally, efficiency is doing things right and timely, whereas effectiveness is very much concerned with the result. In achieving effectiveness, there is a need for the system to be prepared.

A cursory look at John Collins’ benchmarks or ‘principles’ of preparedness describes what constitutes a favourable assessment of a joint force, which could inform the development of specific measures against missions and tasks. Collins’ principles have been adopted by the US Army and other services. As Joint Principles, they help ‘U.S. planners, programmers, and budgeters’ fashion ready, sustainable armed forces at reasonable cost’ (Collins, 2004). Hence, Collins identified nine principles of preparedness. These principles are now discussed accordingly.
First is ‘purview’. Collins noted that armed forces perform best when organised, equipped, and trained to fulfil their political responsibilities. He acknowledged that each service had roles that ‘fundamentally shape readiness and sustainability requirements’, unique functions and specific missions. In current times, with the advent of advanced technologies and cyber and space operations, these roles, duties, and missions should not be construed as static. Roles and missions are also important in terms of military interference with other national government agencies, such as in the realm of military support to what the US referred to as ‘Homeland Security’ and the boundaries between defence and law enforcement.

Second is a regional peculiarity. Armed forces perform best when organised, equipped and trained to accomplish missions in a geographic region. Acknowledging the geographic and cultural differences, Collins believes that ‘Armed forces expressly prepare for employment in any given environment normally function less well elsewhere until they complete time-consuming and often costly transition’. But this is arguably less the case today, given how well forces’ forward stations in Korea and Europe adapted to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regional specialisation continues to be recognised as a necessity for better cultural integration and preparedness for operations. Even for militaries whose interests and scope are mainly local, this principle applies due to the propensity for increasing numbers of nations to provide contingents for international peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts.

Third is quantitative sufficiency. Armed forces perform best when manpower and materials are numerically sufficient to fulfil assigned roles, functions, and missions in designated regions (Collins, 2004). This principle is a result of the first two and touches on the amount of structure available (does the army have enough Brigade combat team to be allocated against each region, given the threat) and the levels of readiness within the structure (number of weapons, equipment, and supplies). Sufficiency is vital because the expense of sustaining readiness in modern times dissuades most nations, including the US, from pursuing capacity that may be excessive.

Fourth is qualitative superiority. Armed forces perform best when manpower, weapons, equipment, and supplies are superior to those of the most capable prospective opponent (Collins). Qualitative assessments can be very different to quantitative ones. If the capabilities of a weapon system in Brigade combat teams are overmatched by an adversary, then the quantitative measures of readiness become less important and the sending of more Brigade combat teams into conflict is not a sure path to victory.
The fifth is complementarity. Armed forces perform best when the mix maximises the strength and minimises the weakness of Active and Reserve components. Like the above discussion of quantitative sufficiency, the cost-benefit judgment between sustaining capabilities in Active versus Reserve forces missions’ components necessitate a proper balance. Collins noted that ‘it is cost-ineffective to assign Active forces missions that Reserve component could perform well’. Capabilities suffer when Reserve components are better qualified (Collins). In the past, the US Army put the preparedness of combat arms in the Active force and combat support and combat service support in the Reserves (Collins, 2004), so that in the event of an emergency, there is an availability of personnel. When all nine principles are achieved there is an ideal force mix, though in practice they cannot all be achieved at once. Each national military faces its debate on the force mix. For some, it may be along Active-Reserve lines, while for others, it may be defence-gendarmerie or other divisions.

Sixth is infrastructure. Armed forces perform best when diversified installation facilities, essential training, and essential support are provided (Collins, 2004). Collins said that ‘Qualitative excellence depends on diversified base and facilities’. Infrastructure is costly but vital, so balancing the various needs of the force to sustain quantitative and qualitative readiness is crucial to ensure the recruiting, manning, training, equipping, sustaining, developing, mobilising and de-mobilising, deploying and redeploying, and caring for the forces and their families. Unlike in previous eras, it is hard today for the US to get land abroad to build bases on. The US military must effectively align its existing properties to the readiness needs of the force (Collins, 2004).

Seventh is compatibility. Armed forces perform best when they prepare to participate in multiservice operations, with allies whenever appropriate (Collins, 2004). Collins was a proponent of interoperability in capacity, doctrines, and plans. In modern times, ‘interoperability’ has become even more important as the ability to operate seamlessly across a Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and a multinational front is crucial for success in both combat and stability operations. Interoperability has been deeply embedded in NATO culture and serves as a pillar of readiness in other regional security apparatus, such as the African Regional Standby Brigades (Collins, 2004).

Eighth is foresight. Armed forces perform best when actions to ensure present and future preparedness proceed concurrently in proper balance. Collins’ warning about preparedness
under tight budgets ring true today, ‘there are strong tendencies to short-change tomorrow when purse strings are tight’. Efforts at modernisation have tried to strike this balance in ensuring adequate capability, to address threats as new capabilities were under development.

The ninth and final principle of preparedness is financial sufficiency. Armed forces perform best when funds are sufficient to acquire, operate, maintain, and otherwise support the military establishment that foreign policies, military strategies, roles, functions, and missions required. This is especially relevant with regards to today’s tight budgets, but it has always been the case. Society expects much of the armed forces and the US has served in a leading role as guarantor of global security, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In times of fiscal strength, the world has looked to the US to intervene, militarily or otherwise. The developmental programmes of governments must be more aggressive during a conflict or post-conflict era. When weak, democratic institutions act accordingly so support must be aggressive and persistent. In times of fiscal constraints, the expectations of the world do not necessarily diminish, nor do those of US allies and partners. Thus, decisions affecting readiness carry second- and third-order effects on national security policy.

The tension between readiness and modernisation is apparent in a number of these principles, especially foresight. As adversaries evolve in their capabilities and capacities, the US might be limited in its ability to assess its impact on the Joint force, which affects preparedness decisions. At what point does qualitative insufficiency, which may include capabilities that are in-hand but not ready, become qualitative inferiority in which the capability no longer measures up to the adversary? Infrastructure degrades over time, at what point does it cease to create or provide training and essentials to support despite any effort to sustain it, and therefore must be replaced (Galvin)?

In summary of Collins’ principles, they suggest that managing preparedness is a complicated business, whether in developed or developing societies. A force can be wholly ready, all personnel on the ground, all equipment up and running, and all units trained, and yet be unprepared for the mission due to gaps in capabilities with partners and allies. The vast array and constant dynamic of readiness and capabilities information available in the force are challenging. Therefore, making sense of it so to advise strategic decision-makers is vital. Because no matter how one calculates or assesses readiness via scales, ratios, or narratives, the fundamental question remains a binary one. Is the military ever going to be ready?
Driving the answer to the question is one of the most significant priority functions of the defence institutions.

In analysing the above question of whether the military is prepared Galvin (2015) believes this is the question at the back of the minds of many national senior military leaders. He further asserts that to US Congress, the answer to that question provides a benchmark of confidence in the military leadership’s ability to address threats to national security interests. For example, for military leaders it is a question that underpins the quality of trained and ready forces provided to combat commanders.

Galvin, in dissecting the question further adds that the question seems like a simple one at the national level. Still, in defence management practice, it is two questions rolled into one, and the questions are usually oriented towards an objective or against a threat. The first question to him is ‘are the capacities on hand prepared for X’? This is a question about preparedness. If the capabilities on hand are matched adequately against adversaries known and anticipated in national security documents to assess these capabilities and aid in remedial actions to correct deficiencies in preparedness, the second question from Galvin is ‘are all current capabilities in hand for X’? Even if all current capabilities are in hand and fully mission capable, this still may not be enough to meet a requirement. Capabilities management processes serve to identify and prioritise demand for new capabilities, then develop and field them, modernising the military with new equipment or technology.

Accordingly, Readiness and Capabilities Management Systems are direct and distinct as they involve different actors handling different information, but their ultimate convergence in the national level discourse is essential. The single overarching question drives the energy in both systems against each other for defence budgets. Therefore, it is useful to consider holistically what these systems are intended to achieve.

Preparedness is not defined in the Joint Doctrine of the US military. This thesis adopts President Barack Obama’s definition in National Preparedness (2016), which reads:

the questions taken to plan, organise, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effect of, response to, and recover from threat to national security (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011).
Preparedness must be measured against some benchmarks, whether a strategy document, campaign plan or assigned mission that identifies threats and the nation’s anticipated response to them. The Joint strategy planning system’s output—such as the National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic capabilities plan—contributes to defining the plans (Collins, 2004).

Military preparedness and efficiency can lead to military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is a dynamic output of the security processes by which a military converts its available national resources into real fighting power. These national resources can be both hard and soft resources. Hard or physical resources include personnel, weapons, equipment, and general supplies. While the soft resources reflect the effective military power, which is built around four traits: political, strategic, tactical and operational (Wright, 2007), evaluating military effectiveness requires a comparison of horizontal and vertical components holistically. Bernasconi (2007) asserted that adaptability is a critical ingredient in military effectiveness, as, ‘war involves the interaction of two or more thinking opponents, rather than one person facing an automation’.

Military effectiveness has four horizontal components as asserted by Millet, Murray and Watmann (1996). These consist of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. A cursory summary of the four horizontal levels is as thus, firstly, the political level concerns itself with all aspects of national power—the idea of the nation-state, whose security the military provides. Second, the strategic level deals primarily with policy setting for the respective nation, what Barry R. Posen captures as ‘grand strategy’, specifically, what is required to provide the nation with the security they desire. As resources are finite, and the potential threats are numerous, there is a trade-off between the political ends and the military (Posen, 1984). The operational and tactical components are the two units closest to military effectiveness, which is converting potential into actual combat power (Bernasconi, 2007). At the operational level, military effectiveness pertains to the proper synchronization and utilization of forces in time and space. At the tactical level, military effectiveness concerns itself mostly with the conversion of potential combat power into applied combat power. Each of these vertical levels affects the other three levels. However, it is necessary and vital to look at the four elements separately.

Military effectiveness can be measured using soft indicators and hard indicators. The first of the soft indicators that will be used here is political. The political level of war, and the fight
against insurgency in this thesis is also seen as a type of warfare, involves the interplay of a nation’s military leadership and the leadership of the nation’s government and its associated political operation. However, it should not be limited to a one-way exchange with the military, simply providing funding requests for the government to fulfil or not. Some questions begging for answers regarding this interaction are as follows: what is the level of integration between national (resources) and military (strategies) policies? Do the armed forces provide timely and honest advice to the political process required to ensure that the desired policy is achievable with the military resources available (Millet, Murray and Watmann, 2016)? Are the desired policies’ end-state attainable by military means and, more significantly, are the ways affordable by the nation? With such questions in mind, one must always remember that the goal of any armed forces is the security of the nation. The means-ends equation must, as in a physics problem, be solvable from either end. When describing military effectiveness at the political level, one is talking about the interface between the political and strategic levels of war. For example, individual researchers defined political effectiveness as the military’s success or failure to obtain resources from its political masters in the form of money, technology, and people. This is only one aspect of the equation; the other point is the affordability of the military force structure that is required by its political policies.

The notion of military effectiveness is premised on the understanding that a country’s military organisations receive national resources and transform them into specific warfighting capabilities. The warfighting capabilities generated are effective to the degree that they enable a country’s leader to impose their will on enemies, existing and potential. Thus, the broader logical framework developed for examining national power can be applied writ small to examining how national military establishments generate effective military force. Put simply, the question is what the military gets, what the government or political leaders’ policy towards the military establishment is, and how successfully they can be transformed into effective military power. Military effectiveness thus becomes the outcome of the resources provided to the military and its capability. A country may provide its military with a generous budget and large cadre of manpower. Still, if the military’s doctrine is misguided, the training is ineffective, the leadership unschooled, or the organisation inappropriate, military effectiveness will surely suffer, and these traits explain the case of the Nigerian armed forces in its campaign against the Boko-Haram insurgency. Military effectiveness in
this analysis refers to what Biddle termed ‘input measure’, what the political leadership put into the armed forces to make it effective (Biddle, 1988).

The strategic level is the second approach to achieving military effectiveness. The military strategy relies on ‘stick’ operations of violence, for example detention and elimination of individual insurgents, and disruption of insurgents’ organisation (US government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009). It is a kinetic component of a government response to guerrilla or irregular warfare. The military strategy may be carried out using either selective or indiscriminate violence, which has opposite effects on the dynamics of insurgency. Selective state violence punishes based on individual behaviour, targeting only rebels or individuals who were involved with rebellion. Intuitively, such violence has a suppressive effect on insurgency, as it makes participation in rebellion costlier relative to neutrality or loyalty to the state. The use of selective violence thus deters civilians from joining or avoiding the rebellion (Kalyvas, 2006). In contrast, indiscriminate state violence punishes civilians based on their affiliation with a group, for example their village or ethnic group, regardless of whether individuals took up arms or assisted rebels in any way. Indiscriminate violence makes loyalty to the state costly, sometimes even costlier than neutrality, which means it effectively encourages civilians to join the rebels (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Even when civilians do not join the rebellion, they can assist them by providing or withholding information from the government about the rebels. Conclusively, Bennett (2008) surmised that the military strategy has two features. The first is state soldiers’ ability to identify and capture the target, that is, intelligence about who the insurgents are and the ability to remove insurgents from the population (this is effectiveness); the second is the extent of collateral damage if any, in other words the civilians hurt during the operation (this is accuracy). When the right strategies are employed by the counterinsurgent and the military, it surely enables the military to act effectively (Bennett, 2008).

Another soft indicator of military effectiveness can be found at the operational level. The operational level of war shifts military effectiveness from pure science of war over to the arena of the act of war. At the preceding levels Bernasconi (2007) asks what capabilities can our forces bring to the fight as against the capabilities of the adversary. The ability to act at the operational level depends on being able to properly identify the root source of a problem and sustainably apply combat power to solve that problem (Clausewitz, 1976). The operational level of war, which is in between the strategic and tactical levels of military
effectiveness, appears to be best suited to successfully address military effectiveness in what is generally referred to as ‘fighting power’. As a concept, fighting power is better used in understanding the many aspects that make up military effectiveness in war (Jobbay, 2010). In fighting power, within the limits set by its size, an army’s worth as a military instrument equals the quantity and quality of its equipment multiplied by what will be termed its fighting power. In brief, fighting power is defined as the total of those mental qualities that make an army fight (Crevald, 1980). History cites many examples of superior fighting powers like the French during the Napoleonic era, the Romans in the era of Caesar, the Wehrmacht during Hitler’s reign, and since 1948 the Israelis, to mention just a few. That these armies remained unsurpassed for only a brief period before they disintegrated suggests that fighting power is something that can be attained rather than some inherent national quality or its people (Denton, 1983).

Martin van Crevald further asserts that while military excellence is inconceivable without a victory, victory is by no means the sole criterion of military excellence. A small army may be overwhelmed by a large army. Confronted with impossible political and economic odds, a qualitative superior force may be defeated through no fault of its own. Also, the largest army is not always the most effective. Few armies better institutionalised their leadership methodology, more effectively tailored their forces or derived greater fighting power in combat application than did the German Army in the Second World War. Their efficiency and effectiveness, though of a different era and circumstances, offer many important and valuable lessons for the future (Denton, 1988).

The effectiveness of the military involves several vertical levels. These include resources, training, doctrine, recruitment, civil-military relations, leadership, education, and socio-cultural factors. It can be asserted that vertical components exert an influence on different stages of military effectiveness and can even run counter to the overall effectiveness in the military based on their influence at the separate horizontal aspect. The true value of military effectiveness is in accomplishing the task which provides for a nation’s security through the conduct of war (Bernasconi, 2007).

Effectiveness in the military is turning potential combat power into applied combat power sustained over a period, as was discussed earlier. One must balance the requirement to optimise military effectiveness across the four levels of warfare, while still developing and maintaining the ability to sustain an increase in their level of power over time. Military
effectiveness is never fixed, even a much conservative military that is locked into its doctrine experiences fluctuation in its military effectiveness daily. As Hwang observed ‘old soldiers leave the military and new recruits replace them’, and outside forces play upon the social environment that the military inhabits. These factors can be social, political and technological. The environment that we live is constantly in conflict and the efforts of government all around the world are designed to curtail the influence of the enemy (Hwang, 2012).

Most recent academic thoughts on military effectiveness can be divided into two broad strands. One strand of thought stresses the physical aspect of warfare, and the other, morale. Restated, these two concepts are the organisational and sociological factors directly affecting military effectiveness. Two scholars, Janowitz and Shils (1948), ranked the German Army of the Second World War as highly effective, theorising the reason for this was its high level of unit cohesion (Janowitz and Shils, 1948). Their theory strongly supports the idea that sociological factors trump organisational factors in any measurement of military effectiveness. Although scholars like Madej and Vitoria (2010) question this assessment, noting that rather than being the cause of military effectiveness, strong group cohesion was an effect of the organisational superiority of the German state as a whole or the impact of the military resource requirements on the state. Nor did they address the adaptability of the German military. Both sides can be correct and incorrect at the same time, correct in the sense that both sociological and organisational factors are important, that they are the building blocks of military efficiency and effectiveness; also, both are wrong, because they are not only neglecting to look at the interplay of all factors across the level of war but neglecting the ability to adapt to the changing environmental sphere.

Further, there is a tactical level for measuring military effectiveness. In analysing tactical military effectiveness, John A. Lynn (1984) in Bayonets of the Republic provides a useful methodology for defining and evaluating tactical military effectiveness by what he refers to as ‘tactical military effectiveness’. Tactical combat effectiveness is the ability to convert potential combat power into applied combat power through fire and maneouvre. Three elements making up tactical combat effectiveness begin with the military system itself. The military organisations consist of a body of doctrines, organisation, weaponry, and training. How were the units organised? What weapon systems did they deploy with and after the first battle? What did they change? How effectively were combined arms used in both offensive
and defensive operations? How did a small unit’s doctrine change based upon experience? The second element of tactical combat effectiveness is the motivational system. This consists of unit cohesion and morale. Why do men risk their own lives? And what policies were in place that contributed to unit cohesion? The third element of tactical combat effectiveness is measured through actual combat because one cannot reliably assess the action of the enemy unless that action has already occurred. It is not a battle against a simulation or automation, but a living, breathing, thinking body, and most importantly, there is a need to adapt to the enemy tactics (Lynn, 1996).

King (2019) discusses the issue of command in counterinsurgency operations. Though his work is not on Africa generally or Nigeria specifically, important lessons are to be learned. One of the problems with the Nigerian counterinsurgency operations in the North-East, is the issue of command structure. The author starts by showing that even in Iraq and Afghanistan which has been referenced in much recent counterinsurgency literature shows that a lot of controversy followed the effectiveness of the military. King examined the changing nature of twenty-first century operations. He narrates that as a result, military scholars and media commentators have been overtly concerned with the difficulties of effective military command and have been interested in highlighting the special historical conditions in which military and political leaders now operate. Yet, their work implies a potentially more profound point about military command. He further added that ‘it is not simply a distinctive problem of military and political leaders’, but that the practice of command itself may also be transition. Strategy, operational, and tactical decision-making may itself be changing, as a result of the globalisation of international relations, conflict and the armed forces themselves.

Sergio Catignani discusses the military and its strategies. He argues that it is important given the dynamic nature of conflict, that the militaries innovate. That is how the military can adopt new strategic doctrine, routines, programmes, and organisational structure in order to improve military performance in the face of operational challenges. He asserts that military innovation has been equated by researchers interested in military changes with ‘changes in operational praxis’ which according to Catigani generates a substantial ‘increase in military effectiveness’ (2012).
In conclusion, for a nation to have an efficient and effective military, it must put all its national resources to bear to assist the military. It is these resources that can translate into better training, modern equipment, doctrine and recruitment, which help to build better civil-military relations and enable the military to act effectively any time that duty calls.

Military preparedness demands personnel, weapon, equipment, and supply(ies) of adequate quality in the proper mix and sufficient quantities to accomplish assigned missions, wherever and whenever directed. Preparedness takes the present and projected requirements into account. Perceived threats, doctrines, plans, programs, military infrastructure, the industrial base, and budgets strongly shape results. The problem develops whenever any aspect becomes deficient (Collins, 2004).

This quote from Collins highlights the areas that need to be addressed by all armed forces globally, especially in this age of conflicts involving non-state actors.

![Figure 2: Components of military effectiveness](image)

Conclusion

In summary, the need for an armed forces’ preparedness, effectiveness and efficiency is paramount in achieving success in counterinsurgency. The success of counterinsurgency is built on the various approaches to counterinsurgency as well as the soft and hard indicators of
military effectiveness. This chapter’s review of the literature will be crucial in analysing and assessing the extent to which these inferences are valid based on the findings from this research. Having discussed extensively the relevant literature, the next chapter focuses on the activities of Boko-Haram in Nigeria.
CHAPTER TWO

Boko-Haram

This chapter discusses Boko-Haram. It will throw light on and elaborate on the different aspects of what motivates it and what the group aims to achieve. This chapter is important to this research, as it is the main essence of why the research is being undertaken and is divided into the following sections: the aims and objectives of Boko-Haram; Boko-Haram and the Salafi transformation jihadist movement; leadership, organisation and membership; sources of funding; tactics; and internationalisation.

Most authors writing about Boko-Haram have referred to them as a terrorist group or examined them within the context of terrorism. These include Onuoha’s 2010 journal article ‘The Islamic challenge: Nigeria’s Boko-Haram’s reaction to President Buhari’s action’. Onuoha looks at the ‘paradox of Boko-Haram terrorism and Nigerian counter-terrorism’; this is quite reflective because he has captured the activities of the group as terrorism and the campaign as counter-terrorism. The crux here is that what the writer was referring to was insurgency, which has been captured in Chapter One of this thesis. Another example is Ishaku’s The Road to Mogadishu: How Jihadist Terrorism Tears Nigeria Apart (2012), in which he consistently refers to the violent activities of the group as terrorism. Even some of those who begin by referring to them as insurgents go on to consider them as terrorists in the body of their work. An example is Babatunde’s article ‘Counter-terrorism, Multinational Joint Task Force and the missing components’. In the abstract he refers to ‘the wave of terrorism in the Lake Chad region’, showing that he considers these acts to be terrorism (Babatunde, 2017). Boko-Haram meets the definition of an insurgent group, and the armed forces also considered it to be an insurgency and therefore mounted a counterinsurgency against them. Despite this, this literature on Boko-Haram provides valuable information about Boko-Haram, government policy and the armed forces’ activities. For example, Onuoha has written extensively on Boko-Haram, his insight to the activities of the military and government policies provided understanding to this thesis with regards to the policy of government and operations of the armed forces. In his opening abstract in his journal article ‘Nigeria’s Military Failure against Boko-Haram Insurgency’ (2016), he attempts to explain the apparent failure of Nigeria’s military action against the insurgency and further adds that
intervention came jointly from Chad and Niger in January 2015. Of interest in this article is the exposing of the rot within the military, which has incapacitated the armed forces in their function. He asserts that ‘the flying of the flag by Boko-Haram in the region was a failure by both the political and military leadership’. He concludes by giving three main reasons why the fight against Boko-Haram was a failure as thus: the erosion of military professionalism under civilian administrations since 1999; the poor handling of the war by the top military officers; and a lack of decisiveness in the leadership of President Jonathan and the military to end the insurgency.

![Nigeria map showing areas of Boko-Haram attacks](image)

**Figure 3:** Nigeria map showing areas of Boko-Haram attacks

### 2.1. Synthesis

The Nigerian military’s effectiveness in the fight against Boko-Haram suffered major setbacks as the national and military policy of government were not well integrated with fighting the war against the insurgency. The insurgency started as a small group in 1999, but
became more active around 2009. Despite being among Africa’s largest militaries and having played important major roles in peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Nigeria’s armed forces have been unable to stop Boko-Haram.

The military ‘must overcome entrenched corruption and incompetence’ to be able to deal with the insurgency. Despite Nigeria’s budgetary expenditure of N4.3 trillion on its security budget from the inception of the counterinsurgency: ‘Corruption prevents supplies as basic as bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the frontlines of the struggle against Boko-Haram’, and ‘Morale was low and desertions were common among soldiers in the 7th Army Division fighting the insurgents’. Nigerian newspapers also reported lamentations by the military of ‘the negative impact of inadequate funding for military operations’ in the North East. This disclosure came from Major General Abdullah Muraina, Chief of Accounts and Budget of the Nigerian Army, at a training programme in Jaji, Kaduna (Ishaq, Vanguard Newspaper, 2014).

Dozens of military officers have faced a court-martial in the course of their activities in the North-East. This further lowered morale among the armed forces, deterring them from making their best efforts. Orders were disobeyed, and in some instances shots were fired at commanders. In extreme cases, death sentences have been handed down to officers. High ranking officers, according to Sahara reporters (2015), published a letter from an army commander in Borno state, which encompasses Baga, noting that his men were underequipped and that senior military officers were siphoning money budgeted to fight the insurgency (Sahara Reporters, 2015). All these stated factors have contributed to the ways the Nigerian military has been engaged in their fight against insurgency in the North-East between 1999-2017.

2.2. Aims and Objectives of Boko-Haram

According to Andrew Walker, a writer with the BBC (2012), in his summary of what is ‘Boko-Haram’ he emphasises that it is an Islamic group that believes that politics in Northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt false Muslims, and that it wants to wage a war against them and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a ‘pure’ Islamic state ruled by sharia law. In their opening to their journal article, ‘Perspectives on terrorism’ Pieri and Zenn (2016), opined that, in August 2014, Boko-Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau
announced the creation of an Islamic state which is the main aim of Boko-Haram, a so-called Caliphate in the areas of North-East Nigeria under the control of Boko-Haram. This was consistent with Mohammed Yusuf’s, the leader and founder of Boko-Haram and Shekau’s predecessor and founder of Boko-Haram, longstanding calls for the creation of an Islamic state in the region. According to the group, ‘we do not have any agenda other than working to establish the Islamic Kingdom like during the time of Prophet Mohammed, no matter what happens to us’ (Abu Qaga, reprinted by Sahara Reporters, July 2014). Shekau’s announcement of an Islamic state marked the achievement of a long-term goal of the movement. Boko-Haram in that vein continued to annex most towns in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states into the so-called Caliphate.

According to the former Deputy Governor of Borno State, it was just a matter of time, as if Boko-Haram continues in their violent activities before the ‘three North-East states will no longer be in existence’ (Ajai, 2014), although this prediction has not come true. A Multinational Task Force, including Chadians supporting the Nigerian troops, were able to curtail Boko-Haram’s momentum in the run-up to Nigeria’s presidential election in February 2015 and rolled back Boko-Haram’s territorial gains (Global Initiative Report, 2014). However, Shekau’s declaration of an Islamic state and his bayah (allegiance) in Syria and Iraq in May 2015, despite military offences against the group. This confidence demonstrated to the followers of Boko-Haram that it was succeeding and establishing a caliphate in North-East Nigeria. In an interview published on 2 August 2016, a Boko-Haram leadership figure, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, stated publicly that Boko-Haram is at war with the Nigerian, and other African governments, backed by fighting to reclaim territory taken by these powers. Al-Barnawi pledged to oppose Christians and Western influences deemed to undermine Islamic society, including using violent means (Australian National Security, 2017). The group started as religious fundamentalist, but gradually transformed into a violent organisation between 1999 and 2017.

Boko-Haram rebranded itself in 2015 as an Islamic State of West Africa. It is an extremist movement operating primarily in Nigeria’s North-East region, extending into the borders of neighbouring states of Cameroun and Chad, but in July 2015 also attacked Chad’s capital N’Djamena with suicide bombings as well as the interior cities of Cameroun, such as Marous, with a female suicide bombing and many kidnappings. Boko-Haram’s members are predominantly Kanuri; the target is the irredentist movement, which is associated with the
jihadist aim of building a caliphate. This Caliphate started from Borno state, North-East Nigeria, and follow a trajectory that would eventually cover the areas of former Kanuri-led Kanem-Borno Empire, which was a powerful historic Islamic entity that included tracks of land in present-day Western Chad, North-West Cameroun, and South-East Nigeria. Boko-Haram’s founder Mohammed Yusuf (1970-2009) and the current leader Abubakar Shekau made expansionary goals clear in their various sermons and speeches as early as mid-2000. This was nearly a decade before Shekau declared the ‘Jihad’ against the Nigerian government and the US in July 2010 and Boko-Haram launched its first coordinated attacks in September 2010 (Zenn, 2014), though the goal of an ‘Islamic state’ or Caliphate only gained international attention in late 2014 through the abduction of over 300 Chibok girls.

Shekau expressed the vision of an Islamic Caliphate state to Boko-Haram’s members in August 2014; he declared areas under Boko-Haram’s control in North-East Nigeria as part of an Islamic state that has nothing to do with Nigeria anymore (Zenn, 2014). The relationship would not be sealed until several months later with Shekau’s bayah and al-Baghdadi’s acceptance of their request for membership of ISIS in March of 2015.

Boko-Haram aims to establish a caliphate system based on the Islamic revivalist ideology of Usman Dan Fodio, and, like Usman Fodio, combat symptoms of corruption, poverty, nepotism and bad government and to restore moral order, including ending mixing of Islam with ‘impure’ and other forms of concepts of democracy, secularism, and westernization generally (Pieri and Zenn, 2014). In terms of its ideology, Boko-Haram seeks a return to the original fundamental tenets of Islam as it existed during the time of Prophet. Though not everyone agrees with its interpretation of the past, a large number followed through. The era of the Prophet is seen as the golden age when Islam governed all aspects of life. Boko-Haram’s agenda and ideology are firmly rooted in Salafism. In his statement before his death in the hands of police in 2009, Yusuf said

We follow the Ideology of the Salafist and any fatwa issued by a Salafist Islamic scholar, on it, we stand’. No matter who the Islamic scholar is, we need to know if he is guided by Salafist principles before we accept him as such a scholar. We will accept scholars who preached and follow the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the hadiths, every teaching of a scholar must be supported by the writings and teachings of Salafist scholars (Mujahidai, YouTube.com, Accessed 2/10/2017).
Yusuf’s concern is deeply rooted in the level of corruption and poor governance in Nigeria and set about to establish an ideal society organised according to the tenets of Sharia. By establishing Microfinance programmes, he intends to loan a small amount of money to individuals and attract a large following of youths and women. These young men would establish small ventures like shoe shining businesses, market sellers and rickshaws, and would give a certain amount of the profit back to Yusuf’s method of recruitment and financing of Boko-Haram. Women were also instrumental in the early workings of the movement, benefitting from Yusuf’s largesse, and he called for women to be educated in Islamic Knowledge (Pieri and Zenn, 2017).

In their fieldwork analysis, Pieri and Zenn gathered that some of their respondents in Nigeria agreed that Yusuf’s initial version of Islam was popular in the North-East. People in the North-East, mostly poor Almajiri, felt the neglect of government, they saw corruption and nepotism as rampant, and as such it was easy for Yusuf to sell his brand of Islam as the solution. Their respondents also commented that even after Boko-Haram turned violent, there was support for the movement. Attacking politicians and government institutions were not seen as highly problematic particularly when Boko-Haram combined such attacks with rhetoric against the Hausa-Fulani elites, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, or against the local Kanuri traditional rulers who had ‘sold out’ Islam, thus demonstrating how Kanuri identity is intertwined with Islamic ideology in this case. Idayat Hassan succinctly summarised that ‘Many followers did not have an affinity to government and sympathised with even a violent programme of change’ (Abuja, January 18, 2014). This acceptance of Boko-Haram’s methods was to change. There was a significant shift when Boko-Haram began to attack Christians and Muslims who did not believe in its version and vision of Islam.

In 2009, the Nigerian government launched an investigation into Boko-Haram’s activities, following reports that its members were arming themselves. However, the other main reason for the investigation and the subsequent crackdown was that Yusuf turned against the politicians he had supported and called for their downfall. Clashes with security forces in July 2009 in Maiduguri led to the deaths of several hundred people (Serrano & Zenn, 2014). Yusuf was arrested, and subsequently extra-judicially killed by police. The incident was filmed on mobile telephones and leaked on social media. This is the major reason for the radicalisation of his followers and therefore called for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate system via Jihad. Drawing from history, Ibraheem Sulaiman argues that through his
preaching, Dan Fodio became a symbol for the revival of Islam in Hausa land as well as a voice for the people and for justice.

For Sulaiman, what Dan-Fodio sought to do was to create an intellectual and moral leadership

that would eventually displace the present rulers to forge a new community which will embody the spirit of reinvigorating Islam, and establish an alternative society defined on definite goals and aspirations of his own (Suleiman, 2009).

For twenty years, Dan-Fodio managed to gather a large following of people both those who believed in the socio-political transformations that he wanted to make from a religious perspective as well as those who were disgruntled with the political system but were not necessarily of the same religious fervour. Dan-Fodio met with the rulers of Gobir, the area where he was living in present-day Northern Nigeria, on several occasions, seeking to instruct them in Islam to engender their compliance in the proper implementation of the sharia. With each attempt he became even more forceful in his demands, with his followers growing to the point where the rulers of Gobir felt that Fodio and his movement had become a threat (Isichie, 1997).

It is clear from Yusuf’s statement that Dan-Fodio, as well as Boko-Haram today, believe that Islamic sharia is the antidote to all the above-mentioned societal ills. The key issues here are that, first, traditional Muslim leaders are to blame for the poor situation in the Northern part of Nigeria, because they abandoned their allegiance to Allah by accepting secularism, democracy and Western education. Second, that Boko-Haram, to revive a caliphate, overtook the traditional Muslim leaders’ mantle of Islamic legitimacy with Boko-Haram actions set to usher in a new period of prosperity and justice. The leadership of the group are not truthful to its followers; the society of the 19th century is not the same as what it is today. Society is continually evolving; modernity has crept into every stratum of different communities.

One of the vital elements of the Boko-Harm Islamic agenda has been to galvanise support for the idea of a Caliphate system in North-East Nigeria. Following the imposition of Western colonialism in Africa, many tribes and ethnic groups that once had trans-regional ties like Fulani and Kanuri were tied into new national identities, which continued with the establishment of nation-states in the postcolonial period. This has caused many feelings of irredentism. It is partly this imposition of national states’ boundaries by colonial powers that
did not consider pre-existing governing structures on ethnoreligious groupings that drives Boko-Haram’s desire to recreate a Caliphate across the historic borders of the Kanem-Borno Empire. This is aptly captured by the early sermons of Boko-Haram: ‘Their (Mai of Borno) commitment to Islam penetrated Niger, Chad and other neighbouring countries’. However, Europeans divided the countries, cutting off Niger and Chad. They left Niger on their own, knowing that Niger is very poor, and poverty does not cause any threat. As of Chad, Europeans created ethnic problems, amalgamated them with other infidels and unbelievers and established a rotational system of political authority in the tribes. This led to political instability in Chad since the time of Tumbal Mai, and as a result, the country has remained inseparable from conflict. In the case of Sudan, the country was forcefully amalgamated with South Sudan (Yusuf, 2007).

As reported in the UK Daily Telegraph (2015), the Kanuri faction is important to Boko-Haram. It is the Kanuri who held the key positions of leadership within Boko-Haram, including Yusuf and Shekau, and it is from Kanuri heartland that the movement was launched in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital. A Nigerian government investigation into Boko-Haram estimated that eighty per cent of the movement members are Kanuri, a figure corroborated by international observers, including the Head of the British High Commission (www.strategy.com.). Similarly, as noted by Baca (2015), ‘The Kanuri, Borno’s most populous ethnicity, serves as the chief protagonist of this internecine war, dominating both Boko-Haram as well as the regional political establishment that largely opposed it. In her submission, Stahnke, a writer and expert on Boko-Haram, writing for the Guest Post Newspaper, (2015) said that in Diffa, a town on the border of Niger and Nigeria, Boko-Haram recruits young men mainly from the Kanuri population. Boko-Haram pays recruits 300,000 France CFA ($500), plus a motorbike and a promise of a bride. This is discussed further in Chapter 2.3 of this thesis.

According to Stahnke (2015), Boko-Haram is a complex organisation and a melting pot of a range of identities and ideologies, which the movement has become adept at drawing from, depending on its target. As an Islamist organisation with established links to an Islamic state, it now asserts its primary identity as that of ultra-orthodox Salafi Islam. He went on to posit that, with Boko-Haram at present Islam is presented as transcending ethnicity in an endeavour to appeal to Muslims outside of Kanuri, similar to how ISIS has transcended the Sunni Arab identity. Indeed, as noted by Colonel Barmou (2015)
in Northern Nigeria, there was a bit of bandit and gangs that fought for politicians in
return for money, they intimidated political opponents. Upon assuming power, these
politicians forget their fighters and the promises, so the bandit fight back to demand
their share (Barmou, 2015).

Boko-Haram has become an increasingly attractive vehicle for such a people.

On the means of communication used by Boko-haram, Zenn and Pieri expressed that, 
although Hausa may be the lingua franca in Northern Nigeria and even among the group
members, Yusuf and Shekau have long provided special post-sermon presentations in the
Kanuri language of their Hausa sermons. This is an attempt to carve out a special audience
for their Kanuri followers and prospective recruits, including from neighbouring countries of
Chad, Cameroun, and Niger, neither of whom speak Borno’s other minority languages, Hausa
or English, and also because of the value Yusuf and Shekau placed on Kanuri identity. Their
main sermon has to be in Hausa, as among many Nigerians it is widely spread and easily
understood. Kanuri usually understand Hausa, but most Hausas do not usually understand
Kanuri. In the context of Shekau’s ‘jihad’, after 2010, it has also been necessary for him to
use Hausa so that his propaganda videos and especially threat against the government and
religious elites can be widely circulated in the media and understood by Hausa listeners in
Nigeria and beyond. However, in the run-up to the bayah to al-Baghdadi, Arabic videos were
not necessary to convey Boko-Haram’s messages to the international audience as it was too
soon to embrace Boko-Haram as the Islamic States of West African province.

In their conclusions on the establishment of a Caliphate state by Boko-Haram, Pieri and Zenn
argued that Boko-Haram’s leaders articulated the goal of establishing an Islamic state in
Northern Nigeria as early as 2002, almost a decade before the current leader, Shekau,
declared Jihad in July 2010. The movement started in 2002, with Mohammad Yusuf, but was
not a jihad until Shekau declared it so in 2010. Boko-Haram’s claim or declaration is not a
new dictum in the mainstream discussion in Nigeria’s socio-political settings, especially in
the context of northern Nigeria. In 1804, Islamic scholar Usman Dan-Fodio mobilised his
Fulani ethnic group to fight the existing ‘Infidel’, mostly Hausa Muslim power structures of
the region, to implement his vision of an Islamic state. He sought to extend his Caliphate to
include the Muslim and ethnic Kanuri led Kamen-Borno Empire; that is, the territory that
Boko-Haram controls today and the ethnic group to which most of its leaders and members
belong. Dan-Fodio ultimately succeeded in toppling the Hausa Muslim state of Northern
Nigeria, not Borno itself, and its place established the Sokoto Caliphate. The Caliphate existed for one hundred years until the British imposed colonial rule over Northern Nigeria. The present Sultans and Emirs in the areas of the former Sokoto Caliphate who are descendants of Dan-Fodio have maintained their status as traditional religious rulers, but in most cases, no longer have formal political or military authority. They further assert that ‘the concept of a Caliphate with military and political has, however, continue to resonate with Nigerian Islamist in contemporary times’. The desire for a new Caliphate is most effective being harnessed and promoted by Boko-Haram, whose ideology, military successes and declaration of a Caliphate in 2014 are perhaps the closest Nigerian Muslims have come to the reviving of an Islamic state since the end of the Sokoto Caliphate (Pieri, 2014). From the foregoing, Boko-Haram leaders are inspired and motivated by Dan-Fodio ideology. The group’s sermons, statements and publications make it very clear that their aim is to recreate the Caliphate with Boko-Haram ‘approved’ leaders replacing the current ‘Infidel’ Muslim traditional leaders, who are guilty of mixing Islam with Western notions of democracy, secularism, and education.

Adesoji (2010,2011), looks at Boko-Haram from the lens of ‘Rivalism’ and the sensitive religious nature of the Nigerian society, which according to the author provides a fertile ground for the sect to strike, and concludes that if these internal factors are not properly checked, the violence will continue as it is evidenced by the Boko-Haram insurgency. He concludes that the Nigeria government has not properly given attention to the economic dislocation of the country, making Boko-Haram to strive. Adesoji provided a great insight to the factors contributing to the rise of Boko-Haram and the failure of government, but failed to discuss the counterinsurgency as a panacea for stopping the insurgency in the North-East.

Also contributing to the literature on Boko-Haram, Agbedo and Osumah (2012), analysed Boko-Haram within the context of the aftermath of the ‘execution’ of Osama bin Laden and some of his kingpins, which shows a decline in global terrorism. They asserted that in spite of the decline, there was a rise in the proliferation and radicalisation of local terrorist groups with possible links to Al-Qaeda. The authors looks at how the Nigerian government should respond to Boko-Haram uprising and also highlights the failure of government institutions and its fragility, they concluded that ‘ Nigeria should adopt a human security approach, rather than the repressive state security approach’. It is a very insightful contribution by the authors, but they kept referring to Boko-Haram as a terrorist group, which this thesis does
not agree with, but contribution to the body of literature helps to recommend some approaches the Nigerian government can utilise to fight the insurgency.

2.3. Leadership, Organisation and Membership

Before his death in July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf a Kanuri from Borno state was the spiritual leader as well Commander-in-Chief (Amirul-aam) of the group. Under his leadership, there was an executive cabinet, and a Sharia (decision-making) council were instituted to oversee the affairs of the group. Two deputies then assisted Yusuf, each state had its own Amir (Commander), and each local government area where they operated also had an Amir. The group appointed Amirs in various locations across the cities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, and the Kanuri regions of Niger and Chad, to oversee local activities. They also organised their levels according to multiple roles, such as soldiers and police (Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009). In its early stage, the group was entrenched in Borno, Yobe, Katsina, and Bauchi states. Over time, it has recruited more followers and established operating cells in almost all the nineteen Northern states, possibly Nursing the intention of spreading further south.

In the aftermath of Yusuf’s death, one of his deputies, Abubakar Shekau, became the new spiritual leader of the group. Abubakar Shekau inherited, if not modified, the organisational structure. Under Shekau, the group maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows it to operate in cells and units that are interlinked but, generally, the cells take directives from one commander (Ali, 2011). The shura council sits at Boko-Haram’s apex and is the highest decision-making organ. Cells are represented on the council (Marama 2013). Currently, Shekau heads the Shura consultative council, which has authorised more coordinated and sophisticated attacks by various cells since the 2009 killing of its leader by the police.

Boko-Haram’s members come from diverse backgrounds: disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, Almagiris and some wealthy individuals, mostly but not limited to Northern Nigeria. It also draws members from beyond Nigeria, from Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Sudan. Former Almagiris mainly form a significant part of its collection of foot soldiers. The term Almajiri here refers to youths and sometimes children who are in pursuit of higher knowledge and Islamic purity, who leave their homes and take up residence with a senior or
elderly Islamic scholar. It is an ancient and widespread Islamic practice whereby children are sent to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities in mostly Northern Nigeria, such as Kaduna, Kano, Maiduguri and Zaria (West Africa Insight, 2010). Sometimes this is voluntary, but in most cases, children are forced into becoming Almajiris by abject poverty or orphan hood. A study conducted by the ministerial committee on Almajiri education in 2010 revealed that ‘there are 9.5 million Almajiris in Nigeria’ (Ibrahim, 2010). Over 70 per cent of these Almajiris are concentrated in North Nigeria, and they live and study in appalling social and economic conditions. The presence of Almajiris has been a contentious phenomenon that has generated different interpretations of its possible connections to insecurity in Northern Nigeria. The Almajiris have been rightly or wrongly associated with Islamic radicalisation, militancy and the periodic religious riots that have blighted many Northern Nigerian cities (Onuoha, 2010).

The current Boko-Haram violence in Northern Nigeria has accentuated the concern. In contrast, some writers have questioned the unfounded stigmatisation of this religious practice of acquiring education (Hoechner, 2013); others have raised serious concerns over its vulnerability to exploitation by extremist groups. In this regard, four crucial features of the Almajiri system that made it ideal for exploitation by terrorists or extremist ideologies have been identified: first, it involves children being relocated or separated from their family and friends to the guardianship of Mallam in towns; secondly, it is restricted almost exclusively to boys; third, the curriculum of the school is primarily with teaching the six chapters of the Koran by memorising; fourth, each school serves 26 to 500 children, from the ages of 6 to 25. These schools are mostly autonomous from government oversight (Awofoso, Richie and Degeling, 2003). On Boko-Haram, Scott MacEachern (2020), in his book emphasised various factors to attribute to the emergency on Boko-Haram and why it persisted. He takes the approach differently from most scholars. MacEachern discusses the environment and initial peopling of the Lake Chad Basin. The author draws on genetics and linguistic evidence to posit the gradual expansion of the desert between 6000 to 4000 years ago, which spurred the Southward movement of those who today might be regarded as ‘climate refugees’. MacEachern summarised that the ‘archaeological evidence marks an increasing hierachicalisation, and subsequent material complexity overtime.'
2.4. Sources of Funding

According to Onuoha (2010) Boko-Haram sustains its operations through diverse sources of funding. However, four major financial streams stand out: membership dues, donations, external financing, and bank robberies. The payment of membership dues was initially the fundamental source of funding for the group before Mohammed Yusuf was killed; members had to pay a daily levy of 100 Nigerian nairas (28 pence) to their leaders. The known members were predominantly peasant farmers, traders, roadside car washers and commercial motorcycle riders known as ‘Okada’. Some of the Okada were believed to be owned by Yusuf himself, who collected daily returns from them. However, since Yusuf’s death, the activities of the group became more secretive, making it difficult for researchers and security agencies to investigate the kinds of economic activities they are engaged in to generate funds and whether members still pay dues, as well as the significance of such contributions to the group’s sustainability. Donations from businesspersons, politicians, government officials, and other individuals and organisations within Nigeria have been another source of funding for the group.

On 5 January 2011, for instance, the Nigeria police celebrated what it described as ‘landmark’ achievement when security forces arrested Alhaji Bunu wakil and 91 other persons. Alhaji Bunu Wakil, who is a contractor and an indigene of Borno state, was alleged to be a significant financier of the Islamic group (Idris, 2011). Besides, on 21 November 2011, state security operatives arrested a serving Senator representing Borno South Senatorial district, Mohammed Ali Ndume, who was subsequently arraigned before an Abuja High Court for his ties and sponsorship of Boko-Haram (Abonji, 2011). Senator Ndume is currently being tried under the provisions of Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011, and if convicted will serve a prison term of not less than 30 years. The group is also alleged to receive financial assistance from international terrorist networks. In 2007, for instance, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagin, the proprietor of the Daily Trust Newspaper group, was arraigned before the Abuja High Court on three charges, namely: belonging to the Nigerina Taliban; receiving a total of 300,000USD from Al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism; and aiding terrorism in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five charges, which include receiving monies from Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists to attack the residence of foreigners, specially, Americans, living in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012). However, the charges against Mohammed Bello Illyes Damagin were later dropped.
The issue of external financial assistance to Boko-Haram remains uncertain. US Department of Homeland Security officials contend that ‘groups like Boko-Haram are being influenced and financed by extremists’ foreign religious leaders and groups’ (Offor, Ogbonican and Okoro, 2011). Evidence in this regard emerged recently during the trial at the Federal High Court in Abuja of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko, alias ‘Kabiru Sokoto’ who masterminded the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger state. A prosecution witness informed the court ‘that Sokoto included in his statement’ details of funding received by the insurgents from an Islamic group, Musullimi Yaa’maa, based in Algeria and how the funds led to the fragmentation of Boko-Haram following disagreements over the splitting of the money (Soniyi, Bello and Akinsuyi, 2013).

Recently, Boko-Haram has relied on criminality, such as directly raiding banks or supporting robbery gangs to attack banks and other monetary institutions, to finance its operations. The police arrested a member of a robbery gang in 2011, a Sheriff Shatima, who confessed that his group arrested by the police in 2011 was responsible for most of the robberies in and around Borno State to raise funds for Boko-Haram. He claimed that his gang raided Damboa branch of First Bank Plc. on 12 October 2011, during which a policeman was killed, and 21 million Naira was stolen (Bwala, 2011). In this regard, Boko-Haram militants subscribe to the principle of Fa’, the religious argument used by extremists to justify the robbing of banks and jewellery shops to finance the jihadists’ operations. Indeed, some Boko-Haram members have been caught as armed robbers in Nigeria. According to Okereke, Omughelli (2012), as security agencies tighten the noose on its known financial income streams the group may turn to other forms of activities, such as theft, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, illicit trafficking in arms and narcotics and offering protection rackets for criminal networks to raise funds.

2.5. Methods of Operation

Boko-Haram has used the asymmetric, non-conventional method of operation. This section of the chapter looks at this method critically. According to Fukuyama (1992), with the end of Cold War in the 1990s, many theorists of International Relations, like himself, assumed ‘the world has finally emerged or entered a period of peace’. Interstate conflicts seemed to be on the wane in the post-Cold War period. Most of the few wars that were fought, like the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006 and the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 over Ossetia and Abkhazia,
were of short duration and asymmetric (Nichol, 2008 and Knickmeyer, 2006). This perception of the post-Cold War world was shattered by the 11 September 2001 attacks (Laqueur, 2003). With these attacks and the subsequent declaration of a ‘war on terror’ by the US, the issue of ‘terrorism’ was pushed to the forefront of international political discourse. The 9/11 attacks have brought the spectre of how well-organised non-state groups can challenge even a superpower to the fore. Boko-Haram has waged a most protracted insurgency against the Nigerian state since 1999 (Hassan, 2010).

Before 2010, Boko-Haram had no clear strategy on how to achieve its objectives in Northern Nigeria (Montclos, 2005). It occasionally used guerrilla tactics of ‘hit and run’ to harass and oppress Nigerians in its area of operations. Its weapons were rudimentary: clubs, knives, swords and locally made guns. Boko-Haram militants sometimes shot sporadically from ‘Okada’ (Local slangs for motorcycle, used for commercial means of transport) at their targets, both civilians and police officers, before speeding away (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This strategy, however, began to change after 2010 as the group started using bombs and improvised devices (IEDs) in strategic locations (Walker, 2012). Boko-Haram’s tactics also include suicide bombings. On 26 August 2011, a suicide car bombing in Abuja directed at the UN building killed 21 persons and injured 73 others (Murray and Nassitter, 2011).

Boko-Haram’s arsenal now includes AK-47, rifles, surface to air missiles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, vehicle-mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-53 tanks, automatic rifles, Panhard ERC-90 armoured cars, ‘sagei’ and explosives such as Semtex (Campbell, 2014). Tactics have become more sophisticated, both in response to increased security operations by the military and to stir sectarian conflict. The first attacks in 2010 were predominantly shootings, but also IEDs began to be used by December of that year and especially in the run-up to the elections of 2011 (African Report, 2014). After these elections, the movement turned to vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs). These cars were typically packed with several propane cylinders or explosives filled with oil drums. Furthermore, to disseminate its ideology and to reach a broad audience, Boko-Haram began to make effective use of the internet; YouTube has been particularly useful in displaying Boko-Haram’s exploits and confrontations with the Nigerian Army (www.youtube.com, 2017).

Apart from forging links with other Jihadi groups as mentioned earlier, Boko-Haram, through its activities in the territories of Nigeria’s neighbours, also externalised the war. The group is also active in Niger, Chad and Cameroun. For example, Boko-Haram attacked a police
station in Koussei, and a Chinese run engineering company in Cameroun in 2014 (De Montclos). It also launched a devastating attack on Ngouboua in Chad in February 2015 (Vanguard Newspaper, February 13, 2015). The reason for the extension of the war into these countries is also strategic. On the one hand, the group wanted to show to Al-Qaeda and later ISIS that its reach has covered the whole of West Africa (Montclos, 2014). Finally, extending its operations into neighbouring Cameroun, Chad and Niger ensured the continuous supply of men and materials from the Maghreb, particularly Libya. The extension offered Boko-Haram a haven beyond the reach of Nigerian troops (Look and Kindzeka, VOA, 25 March 2014). Also, in his narratives, Folade (2016) concludes that ‘to bring any armed conflict to an end, it is important to understand the nature of the war’. He further adds that the South African mercenaries were effective against Boko-Haram, because they had a better understanding of the nature of the war in Northern Nigeria, hence, their adoption of the tactics known as ‘relentless pursuit’. Nigeria has variously referred to the conflict with Boko-Haram as a terrorist campaign, a religious war and an insurgency. In line with this reasoning, the government has tried various strategies, which did not fit the kind of warfare being fought by Boko-Haram. The Army’s approach failed to defeat the activities of the group, partly because lack of fighting equipment, low motivation of the soldiers, corruption and incompetence of their superiors and, as has been argued above, because the government misread the nature of the conflict.

2.6. Internationalisation

This section of the chapter argues that Boko-Haram is already a critical international Jihadi group. Much has been written about Boko-Haram by both Nigerian and Western scholars. The work of Emilie Oftedal, a seasoned Norwegian terrorism scholar, concludes that ‘Boko-Haram focused mainly on national grievances and targets.’ She warns against, ‘exaggerating Boko-Haram’s connections with foreign militants and the likelihood of Boko-Haram becoming a major international terrorist threat.’ In her report, she also suggested and raises the possibility that Boko-Haram or one of its factions, mainly Ansaru, has conducted several attacks against Westerners and targeted soldiers going to Mali and appears more globally oriented than the ‘core Boko-Haram movement led by Abubakar Shekau’ (Oftedal, 2013).
In a different narrative, Zenn (2015), had a different take. In his submissions he argued that Ansaru was created by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and has a close operational relationship with Boko-Haram in many ways. Ansaru is the international component of Boko-Haram. However, it may not exist as a distinct entity, since the French intervention in Mali in January led to the two groups’ integration when Ansaru lost contact with a retreating AQIM (Heras and Zenn, Fair observers, 5 July 2013). Other observers note that Boko-Haram is already an important international Jihadi organisation, although most of its insurgent activity is focused, for the moment on Nigeria territory. Ofstedal (2013) analyses in an unpublished MA thesis the transnational aspect of Boko-Haram. She examined their activities and the significance for the group’s capabilities and reach, concerning the states bordering Nigeria which are threatened by the Boko-Haram’s insurgent activities, namely Niger, Chad, Cameroun and Benin (Ofstedal, 2013). As will be seen, the Boko-Haram threat represents a form of internationalisation, which if not properly checked or handled, will have dire consequences in the subsequent years of its existence.

After the death of its leader Yusuf in August 2009, the acting head of the organisation Umaru Sanni published an ideological declaration regarding its goal and methods of operation. This will be a milestone in the organisation’s move to the second phase, which is an evolution towards an international orientation;

In fact, we are spread across all 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko-Haram is just a version of Al-Qaeda, which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, and we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is completely converted to Islam, which is according to Allah (Drukhan, 2012).

Several years later, documents seized at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in Pakistan showed that top-level Boko-Haram leaders had been in touch with Al-Qaeda within the previous eight months (Burke, 29 April 2012). While these statements show various forms of international intentions, the watershed that marks Boko-Haram’s transition from a solely Nigerian phenomenon to an international Jihadist actor is its attack on the UN building and the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014. These activities raised international concerns and show the world how dangerous it could be.

According to Ofstedal, Ansaru claimed responsibility for the December 2012 kidnapping of a French engineer from his residence in Katsina state, in retaliation for France’s ban on the
Islamic veil and its role in the military intervention in Northern Mali. In January 2013, Ansaru attacked a convoy of troops in Kogi state en-route to deployment with West African forces in Mali trying to stop Nigerian troops joining Western powers. Meanwhile, she also gives examples that support the view of Boko-Haram as an international Jihadist actor. Like other researchers, she cites Malian security officials as saying Boko-Haram fighters were in the majority in the attack on the Algerian consulate in Gao in April 2011. Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou’s June 2012 statement claimed that Niger had evidence that Boko-Haram was running training camps in Gao, Mali. The Nigerian Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petirin, claimed in June 2012 that Boko-Haram had ties with to AQIM, the first time a Nigerian security official made such links in public. In June 2012, General Carter Ham, head of the US military’s African command, said there were signs that Boko-Haram, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab were increasingly coordinating their activities.

In Roggio’s analysis (2012), in a November 2012 video, Shekau, unlike his five other statements issued in 2012, made one in Arabic and this was posted on online Jihadist forums, an indication that he was seeking to appeal to both the wider Jihadist community and to Al-Qaeda’s leaders. Shekau refers to the fighters in the Jihadist theatres as his ‘brothers’ and addresses them

as the soldiers of the Islamic state in Mali...our brothers and Sheikhs in beloved Somalia...our brothers and Sheikhs in Libya...our brothers and Sheikhs in oppressed Afghanistan... our brothers and sisters in wounded Iraq...our brothers and Sheikhs in Pakistan...our brothers and Sheikhs in blessed Yemen...our brothers and Sheikhs in usurped Palestine, and other places where our brothers and Sheikhs are doing Jihad in the cause of Allah.

Shekau warns Britain, America, Israel, and Nigeria that the killing of Jihadist leaders will not defeat the groups. Shekau emphasis that Boko-Haram is with the ‘Mujahedeen brothers’ in their fight against the ‘Jews and the crusade Christians’. According to Roggio, an American commentator on military affairs, Shekau’s video is very similar to tapes issued by Somalia’s Al-Shabaab in 2008, when the group was making overtures to join Al-Qaeda (Roggio, 2012).

In December 2013, a night-time attack was launched by hundreds of Boko-Haram fighters on Nigeria Air force base in the city of Maiduguri, in which many security personnel were killed and several aircraft destroyed. This is reminiscent of attacks by Al-Qaeda’s associates on important military bases in other theatres of war, the Pakistani’s Taliban’s attack on Pakistani

Speaking in Arabic, Hausa, and Kanuri in a video disseminated on the internet, Shekau claimed ‘the whole world’ fears him - US President Obama, French President Francois Hollande, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and even late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He singled out the US ‘you are boasting that you are going to join forces with Nigeria to crush us, bloody liars’, he said adding by Allah, we will never stop. Don’t think we will stop in Maiduguri, tomorrow you will see us in America itself. Our operation is not confined to Nigeria; it is for the whole world (AFP Video, 12 December 2013).

The arrest of principal figures from the group proved that the link with AQIM opened it up to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia such as the Islamic World Society and some prominent local businesspersons. From the trial of Kabiru Umar, the suspected mastermind of the Christmas day bombing of the St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla on 25 December 2011, it appeared that funding also came from an Islamic group, Musullimi Yaa’maa based in Algeria (Doukhan, 2013).

Conclusion

In summary, John Hill from the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, rightly compared the path of Boko-Haram towards a bloody Jihadist group with the Algerian model. The extreme violence and indiscriminate character of its attacks (burning or throat-cutting of dozens of students) are re-enacting what has already happened in Algeria. The extreme forms of terrorism and cruel tactics of Guerrillas of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) leading to the factionalism of its direct forbear, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and finally the AQIM under the influence of Ayman al-Zawahiri, could tie Boko-Haram more closely to the Algerian Jihad group (John Hill, 9 October 2013). Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer and most populous state, the internal instability provoked by the expanding violence of Boko-Haram could have severe and significant regional and global implications. The majority of Boko-Haram’s members, the indiscriminate and cruel characteristics of its attack, the complexity of the Nigerian religious and ethnic context, the sheer weight of the Nigerian state within an unstable geographical region, and its proximity to the Jihadist battlefront in
the Sahel, support this assertion. From all the preceding analysis of Boko-Haram, it can be concluded that it has connections to international terrorists and insurgents groups.
CHAPTER THREE

Coordination in Counterinsurgency

In a coordinated campaign, for any government to be successful or have any meaningful means of combating insurgency, the government must ‘bring all of its elements of national power to bear’ (Ladwig, 2014). According to Ladwig, ‘Combating insurgency tests a government to its fullest’. These national elements are the political, military, and social to help in a coordinated campaign. Coordination is one of the key elements in fighting insurgency. If any government, be it local or international, does not bring all forces into proper coordination, that campaign is likely to fail. Inadequate intelligence and lack of clear authority, poorly managed integrated efforts by the civilian agencies and the military, as Robert Thompson emphasised ‘will not give the desired result’ (Thompson, 1966).

This chapter discusses the issues surrounding coordination in counterinsurgency. The chapter will focus on: coordination in general terms; the importance of civil-military relations as an element of counterinsurgency; the importance of police primacy over the military; civil-military relations and counterinsurgency in North-East Nigeria from 1999-2017; and the establishment of professional indigenous police force (Civil Joint Task Force).

Interagency integration can be achieved through a mechanism that the FM 3-24 describes as unity of effort as seen through civil operations and a rural development support organisation during the Vietnam War, yet this is just one way of integrating civil-military relations efforts in counterinsurgency. This was also achieved by the British in the Malayan Emergency, by the effective integration in a host of successful counterinsurgency campaigns through the employment of an executive-committee. The Malayan Emergency is an example of successful coordination between the civil and military elements of government, although making war by committees is not the best approach to military operations. It demonstrates one method of achieving effective management of civil and military resources (Ladwig, 2010). In the Malayan effort, the British followed a familiar pattern; at the beginning of the insurgency, authorities lacked basic and adequate command and coordinating structures. Initial attempts to coordinate government effort fell short, and only through a process of analysis and adjustments did an effective coordination structure eventually emerge in the
form of joint (civil-military) and combined (British and Malayan) Executive Committees that
directed the operational conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign (Ladwig 2000). It is in
the light of this, that the Nigeria government came up with a Comprehensive Security
Strategy document in November 2014 which is tagged ‘National Security Strategic
Document, 2014’. The strategy provides a common framework on which the whole nation
focuses its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy; this document was reviewed in
2016 (Reviewed NSS document, 2016). It is in line with best international practices and is
tailored to address the particular domestic peculiarities and recognise international human
rights standards and the rule of law. This strategy also incorporates all the elements of
national power to include all security services, ministries, departments and agencies of the
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) with the collaboration of civil society organisations
and international partners (Ikelegbe, 2013).

3.1. Response and Coordination of the Federal Government

There is little in the way of written materials on the Federal Government’s response and
coordination. This research therefore draws heavily on interviews conducted by this
researcher. One of the interviewees explained that the FGN’s response to the challenges
posed by Boko-Haram over the period 1999-2017, especially 2009-2016, involved initiatives
to include developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power, military,
diplomatic, economic and intelligence information. The initiatives are divided into kinetic
and non-kinetic action (Major General A18).

3.1.1. Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Action

Nigeria and the other members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), which includes
Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun, and Benin Republic under a multilateral collaboration,
established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF supports the Nigerian
Armed Forces, Joint Task Force, and led ‘Operation Lafia Dole’ meaning ‘Peace at all costs’,
military action designed to combat the threat in the North-East theatre. The coordinated
operations of these forces have continued to maintain pressure on Boko-Haram, especially in
the Lake Chad region, where the Abu Musa’ab faction is currently operating, and the
Sambisa forest, where Abubakar Shekau has been hiding. Though limited cases of asymmetric attacks by the group persist, especially around the border areas with Niger, Chad and Cameroun, the dynamic operations coordinated by the Nigeria Armed Forces and the MNJTF through airstrikes and ground operations have significantly degraded Boko Haram’s operational capabilities in their stronghold areas around Kangarwa, Damasak and Mallam Fatori. Suffice it to say that Boko Haram have equally mounted various successful and unsuccessful attacks to repel the military too (Musa, 2013). The military too continued to recover some lost areas, but have constantly been repelled. The air assets of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) played major roles in degrading the insurgents’ capability. Other kinetic measures include the stabilisation of the situation along the borders; bringing the incessant attacks by the insurgents to a minimal level, which has allowed for free movement of persons; and a better situational awareness of the battlespace. The deployment of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets of the TCC have also afforded better understanding by the MNJTF of the tactics, techniques, procedures and layout of the insurgent camps, helping to curb their activities in the North-East region. Also the recovering of civilian captives by the MNJTF is a major achievement; during an operation on the fringes of the Lake Chad basin, a large number of civilians were rescued and moved to the Internally Displaced Persons’ camps (IDPs) in and around Maiduguri, the Borno state capital (Musa, 2013). The Nigerian military involvement in all these operations has been significant, but how effective it has in dealing with insurgency is another issue altogether. The Nigerian armed forces is the main force spearheading most of the operations in the North-East, using at the initial stage the kinetic approach, but having to change tactics as it was at yielding the desired results, as evidenced in various of the interviews conducted for this thesis.

### 3.1.2. Safe Corridor Coordination

Safe Corridor Coordination is another initiative of the FGN, designed to encourage willing and repented Boko Haram insurgents to surrender and embrace peace. The objective of the operation is to facilitate easy access and passage for surrendering insurgents to security forces for subsequent de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and re-integration processes. The initiation is a joint and multi-agency humanitarian operation, involving the military, security and law enforcement agencies, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), and multinational and non-governmental organisations. It is being conducted under the ambit of international
humanitarian law, with strict adherence to the rule of law. Currently, many Boko-Haram combatants, both men and women, have surrendered to the military and are undergoing the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme run by the military. The Explosive Devices Analysis Office (EDAO) at the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is the centre for counter IED strategy in Nigeria. The EDAO concentrates on detailed analysis of IED threats and attacking the IED network of funding sources, training and strategy. The EDAO has been active in coordinating joint investigations of major IED incidents, the controlling of explosive devices nationwide, spelling out regulations for security agencies with regards to safety and security measures to be employed. These measures have helped in keeping sensitive materials such as explosives, fertilizers, and other IED precursor materials away from criminals, so much that the use of common ammonium nitrate fertilizer which was used in about 80% of IED incidents 2009-2012, has dropped considerably to just about 10% (Major A23, 2018).

The presidential committee on the North-East initiative was to look into the prevalent situation in the North-East, including looking into what have been the causes of underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty and lack of education. All these have been compounded by a lack of education, by the propagation of extreme religious beliefs and an all pervasive low human capital index, and all have been identified as contributing to insurgency in the North-East. The FGN therefore designed what it considered to be a robust programme to address these needs. The PCNE is a multi-sectoral and multidimensional development programme covering a wide spectrum of socio-economic development of the region. These include agriculture, commerce and industrialisation, education, infrastructure development including roads, transport and energy, humanitarian responses and various skill acquisition programmes, though sadly these promising initiatives have been mired by corruption.

There has been a concerted effort by the government of Nigeria in strengthening bilateral and multilateral engagement with friendly countries at the sub-regional, regional and global levels. Cooperation between Niger, Chad, and Cameroon led to the establishment of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), with a Headquarters in Abuja. Through this mechanism, the intelligence services of those five countries share intelligence information in a timely fashion, which is important to tactical operational needs. Also, the Joint Coordination Planning Committee comprising Nigeria, US, France and UK was established in 2014 for the purpose of intelligence gathering and sharing on Boko-Haram.
The National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P-CVE) has three core components: counter-radicalisation, de-radicalisation and strategic communication. The P-CVE is a silent war-fighting tool aimed at ensuring that the fight against insurgency and insurgents is stabilised and the variables which may cause security to breakdown further are contained. Also, it aims at stabilising the security and economic wellbeing of the people affected by the crisis in North-East Nigeria. The P-CVE strategy provides a framework with clear, articulated roles to ensure seamless interaction of MDAs with communities in which non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, civil society organisation, families and especially mothers, are critical stakeholders. Countering insurgency is a very expensive enterprise, especially in a global recession and with Nigeria’s financial situation, coupled with extensive corruption and the demand to speedily bring the conflict to an end. Despite lean resources, the Nigerian government has been able to invest in the fight against the Boko-Haram with more help from the LCDC and international donors like the US and UK. Massive corruption within the military and political leaders, as discussed in Chapter Six, contributed to the constraints faced by the campaign against the insurgency. The extensive land border between Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroun stretches over thousands of kilometres. This factor imposes difficulty in adequate policing and protection by the security forces of neighbouring states. Boko-Haram is very aware of this challenge and has used this to its advantage. However, ways to effectively guard the borders are currently being discussed at the different fora among the states.

3.2. Civil-Military Coordination in Counterinsurgency

On the discussions on civil-military relations, Hew Strachan looks at strategy as key to a successful policy implementation in war. Strachan (2006) opined that the failure of the US in the war in Iraq lacked strategy, as ‘there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside’. Accordingly, Strachan analysed that ‘strategy implies that the government has a policy and that the strategy flows from the policy; it is an attempt to make concrete a set of objectives through the application of military force to a particular case. Borrowing from the above and in relation to Nigeria and the Boko-Haram operations, the researcher agrees that the Nigerian government and the military lacked proper strategy in their operational campaign in the North-East. This is a lesson that must be learnt by both the government and the military. Strategy is important to civil-military relations, because it forms part of the
culture of organisation. The government has to plan and be strategic in its approach to civil-military affairs, and this is in relation to planning, engaging the civilian population to understanding government activities in building a better relationship with the population. The political aspect of government has to do with the policies it is reeling out to foster a better working environment and a more building a mutual trust which is necessary for a successful civil-military relations. The military is seen as using brute force in its approach to quelling civilian unrest, especially within internal crisis, this is understandable because of its training, so most time it lacked trust from the civilian population. For the military to succeed in solving internal conflicts whenever they are called too, it has to be more civil in its approach.

Strachan further asserts that strategic failure is not an exclusively American problem, and that the same case can be made about the British. In 2003, he argues, British forces were committed to Iraq before the criteria for the war as proposed by the British campaign planners were fulfilled. There was no structure put in place for the post-conflict phase of the occupation, despite that brings a vital element of any ‘three-block’ war. London tends to excuse its failure in this respect by saying that it had to follow Washington, in that the British could not have a strategy for Iraq because it was made in America. Strachan disagrees.

Strachan added that there is a need for a new model on civil-military relations and it must reflect the changing character of war. This is to mean that wars are no longer regular wars, but irregular war, so most times the military is called upon to be engaged in the operations of these internal war, therefore the need to harmonised relations between the military and the civilian population. It must consider four factors. The first is that today’s wars include ‘operations other than war’, they are not necessarily, or even normally, preceded by a declaration of war, and they are conflicts in which frequently the parties are not state actors. Second is that conflicts may be of low intensity, but are often persistent, continuous and simultaneous; they can involve national military commitments against different enemies at different theatres at the same time. Third is that those who do the fighting are cut-off from society. Finally is that society’s image of war is mediated by the press, and not just the printed word, but by television, the internet and mobile telephones. The author had in mind Nigeria when writing the above, it has captured the nature of the war on insurgency and what needs to be done.
Contributing to the above discussion on civil-military relations is Michael C. Desch (2001), who adds that the end of the Cold War was a widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. He argues that the truth is that civilian authorities have not been able to exert greater control over the military policies and decision making. In wartime, civil authorities cannot help but pay close attention to military matters. In times of peace however, civilian leaders are less interested in military affairs, and therefore often surrender power to the military. Samuel Finer (1962, 2017), however recognises a distinct class of countries in which the government have been repeatedly subjected to the interference of their armed forces (Nigeria, and most African states). Despite this pattern or regularity, Finer acknowledges that the military often works on the government from behind the scenes. Indeed, he argues that even when armed forces’ intervention is successful, the military will frequently generate some quasi-civilian façade of government behind which it will retire as quickly as possible. He further added that historically, there has existed a somewhat common assumption that it is ‘natural’ for the military to obey the civil power. Nevertheless, the very nature of civil-military relations is inevitably and seemingly self-contradictory. That is that the military, as an institution, is created to provide protection for society primarily against external threats, but secondarily for internal or domestic purposes. The potential for such conflict is unavoidable within society as multiple agencies and institutions must be relied upon to provide for diverse needs.

Finer (2017) also argues that civil control of the military is not ‘natural’. He suggests that the issue is how civilians exert control. It is the disposition of the military that provides the answer. That is, in order to intervene, the military must have occasion and disposition, that being the combination of a conscious motive and a will or desire to act. A strong point made by Finer is that ‘thus, where adherence to civilian institutions remains strong, military intervention will occur or will be weak’. Finer further averts that, rather than inquire as to why the military engages in politics, is should be asked why the ever do otherwise. He identifies three major advantages of the military: superiority in organisation, highly emotionalised symbol status, and a monopoly of arms.

Given these advantages, Finer (2017), is of the opinion that the questions to which responses are needed throughout are: why is the military intervention in politics or military government the exception rather than the rule? And, how and why does civilian rule persist? Responses to these questions are reflected in the political weakness of the armed forces; its technical
inability to administer, and lack of legitimacy to do so. Finer, notes that, in less developed economies, it is easier for the military to function as administrators, in that the provision for law, order, and communication is all that is required. However, as societies become more and more complicated, with expanded economy and increased in division of labour, the technical skill of the military lags further behind.

In his book the *Supreme Command*, Cohen (2012), coined the term ‘unequal dialogue’, which he meant the conversation between political leaders and generals that needed to be candid, and sometimes even offensively blunt, yet remained always unequal. Or forever resting on the final and ambiguous authority of the political leader. Over the past several decades the purpose, rules, limits, and even legitimacy of the unequal dialogue between soldiers and civilians have been challenged. Some critics have accused civilians of ignoring military advice, others have accused the military of not rendering candid advice of being ‘yes men’. Still others have argued that generals should have professional autonomy or a virtual veto over certain decisions that affects the military. Unequal relations and communications are an inherent fact of military life, so why have ‘unequal dialogue’ between politicians and soldiers produced so much conflict and confusion? Cohen concludes by arguing that the ‘unequal dialogue’ is not simply a peculiar characteristic of civil-military relations, but a central feature of the military’s professional ethics. Furthermore, the principles and practices, the obligations and limitations of the professional dialogue within the military apply directly to how they engage with both political leaders and the larger society.

Contributing to the civil-military relations on the development of the Nigerian military and its counterinsurgency operations, Ehwarieme (2011) opines that one of the major reasons for the instability of the democratic state in Nigeria was the frequent military intervention into the body politics. He concludes that there are two possible reasons for stability in the polity: (1) to him, there were improvements in democratic governance; and (2) this is characterised by the Nigerian armed forces. The paramount question asked by Ehwarie was why the military has not intervened since the introduction of the democratic dispensation from 1999-2011 (2020)? He argued that the explanations are rooted in the nation’s past, society, politics, and economy as well as the international environment, which helped to stabilised the quasi-democratic structure in Nigeria. But the respected author, failed to show that the military has not done well under the civilian administration, especially in the ares of improved
professionalism, equipping, and manpower, which are clearly evident in several failures of the campaign against Boko-Haram in the North-East of Nigeria.

While contributing to the body of literature Bachmann (2014), analysed that from a western perspective as well as African perspective, two of its main pillars are security sector reforms in specific countries and systematic support to the development of African peace and security architecture. Bachmann tries to address the question why such efforts met little success in Francophone Africa. Bachmann argues that the failure of Western advisers to understand the sociological dynamics of African armed forces, shaped by political culture based on personal loyalty to the leader, is at the root of the problem. Therefore, the Huntington-type distinction between the civilian and the military does not apply as military and civilians act in concept within common clientelism system. As a result of the curtailing of the state-formation experience in most African states, the military never had to demonstrate its performance as a state builder, nor did it have to bargain its legitimacy against the support the citizens. The author concludes that ‘until African militaries can credibly demonstrate commitment to state building grounded in a broad-based social contact’ this partnership will remain a misnomer.

In his analysis of African military and civil-military relations, Herbst (2004), examines the geographical, political, and economic determinants of how African militaries face the threat of rebellion and of different levels of effectiveness in combating insurgency. He emphasised that the size of the country appears to be an important determinant of the initial course of an insurrection; in small countries, there is often a battle for the capital that can end fairly quickly. But in big countries such as Nigeria, different armies can occupy important territories far from each other and avoid having to fight an immediate battle to the death. He asserts that ‘once conflict has begun, it appears that the nature of the degree of fungible resources provided by the international communities are both important determinants of how well African armies are able to mobilise to fight’. He concludes by saying that ‘the international community must consider how to help African countries' strengthen militaries as well as the police and intelligence agencies, so that it is possible for government to respond quickly to rebel threats’

Claude Welch (2007), though, discusses issues in the Philippines, and this has important lessons for Africa in general, and Nigeria specifically. He narrates that ‘while the military has remained central to the counterinsurgency campaign, the government has also instutionalised police involvement in conducting operations and requested input from local civilian
authorities in paramilitary recruitment and human rights violations by soldiers were also established’. Welch asserts that the experience of 20 frontline communities in central Philippines, reflect these changes. Local civil-military interaction has moved from confrontation to consultation and accommodation. Although tension remains as the military and civilian leaders, disagree on the gravity of the insurgency threat.

Bruneau and Matei (2013) tried to deviate from the ‘forefatherism’ of the concept of civil-military relations. The authors recognised authors like Peter L. Feaver, Douglas Blend and Rebecca Schiff, who they say suggest a certain theoretical construct regarding the changing rules from civilian control to effectiveness. For Bruneau and Matei, their position is not to ‘disregard the significance of civil control, but to complement it’, and the concepts of ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ are captured in the introduction to this thesis. Thus, their starting point is in the definition of civil-military relations on which they offer this:

the challenge in the contemporary world is not only to assent and maintain civilian control over the military but also to develop effective militaries, police forces and intelligence agencies, that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.

The above statement is trite if a successful counterinsurgency is to be operationalised. Although this might work well in well-defined democracies, it might be difficult in developing democracies like Nigeria, worst in Nigeria, because the military has usurped power for over four decades, so it has lost that relationship with the civilian population. Building it in the period of the Boko-Haram insurgency became a herculean task.

They further summarised that ‘although civilian control is an indicator, it should be one among others’ and that civilian control allows for a relevant assessment of civil-military relations. They conclude with the insight that ‘civil-military relations need to be understood not only from the point of view of civilian control but, more importantly from the point of view of effectiveness of the armed and security forces’ (Bruneau and Matei, 2013).

Morris’s (2009) understanding of civil-military relations is formulated in the context of intelligence sharing with organised groups like Private Security Companies (PSCs), the Reconstruction Contractors (RCOs), and NGOs. A graphic illustration by Morris shows the interface between the military and civilians. This research agrees that this interface is important to fostering a mutually beneficial relationship. Although the military cannot divulge a large part of its classified information, it needs to release some to work in tandem with civilians in pursuit of success.
Jordan Stern, a captain in the US military, served in multiple deployments in Afghanistan and other commands. In his article in the *Small Wars Journal* ‘Civil-military operations and military information support operation coordination’, he reiterates that a ‘counterinsurgency operation first and foremost starts with discipline’. Accordingly, this refers to the discipline to understand and execute a balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations in shaping the battlefield and a specific Target Audience (TA) (Stern, 2011). This kind of knowledge was not adopted by the Nigerian military in their operations, probably because the Boko-Haram situation was not properly analysed. Kinetic operations are actions in the battlefield that involve direct fire, specifically intended to violently exterminate the enemy. Non-kinetic on the other hand, is an operational action in the battlespace that involves shaping the battlefield environment without directly engaging the TA with violent weaponry or action. In non-kinetic operations, the TA is either the enemy or the local populace. Kinetic and non-kinetic operations are not mutually exclusive, commanders of both require discipline and a deliberate focus in order to balance and coordinate the two in shaping the battlefield in support of a successful counterinsurgency and the commander’s higher intent (Stern, 2011).

Stern further opined that these operations have been tested by the US in Afghanistan for instance, and need few modifications to suit the environment be operated in. Civil-Military
Operations (CMO) and Civil-Military Information (MISO) are capable of supporting operations’ coordination and synchronisation within counterinsurgency operations. This may benefit the commander’s intent and objectives by complementing, enhancing and amplifying one another, thereby exerting synergistic effects across lines of operation. In terms of Civilian Affairs (forces that plan and execute CMO), Stern explained that this provides the military commander with expertise on the civilian component of the operational environment. The commander uses Civilian Affairs’ (CA) capabilities to analyse and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicated resources and within the overall mission and intent. CA specifically helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of the CA is recognising the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organisation to achieve a defined effect (Stern, 2011).

The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing and transitioning CA operations (US Marine corps JP 3-57). Joint, interagency, and multinational operations support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations or other stated US objectives before, during, or after military operations. The CA’s execution of CMO provides available resources and avenues for non-kinetic targeting and subsequent exploitation of non-kinetic targets, specifically MISO. MISO is an integral part of non-kinetic activities that influence TAs and shape a better space for coordinated and synchronised military operations (Stern). MISO is planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of their government, organisation, groups and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitude and behaviour favourable to the originator’s objectives. MISO is a vital part of the broad range of US activities to influence foreign TAs directly through radio stations, print and other media outfits (US, DOD, Joint publication 3-13, Information Operation, 2006). By analysing several factors, MISO can identify TAs and behaviours that can perpetually adversely affect the commander’s intent for the battlespace. Those factors include political, military, economic and social-infrastructure, information, physical terrain and time. The MISO can also determine techniques to influence the desired change to the TA’s perception and consequent behaviour.
The loud-speaker and sometimes the Radio-in-a-box (RIAB) are the very best two types of media for message dissemination in coordinated counterinsurgency when they are used in a way that is mutually supporting and provide mixed media (audio, visual, and audio-visual message products that MISO use to influence the TA). The more important of the two is loudspeaker broadcasts, which are often used at the tactical level, and this was more pronounced in Afghanistan to influence a TA during patrols. In the Muslim world expectedly, the loudspeaker broadcast is currently culturally appropriate, this is due to its inherent link to the call to prayer and sermons that are broadcast five times a day. Here again, there is a variety of messages that include messages from local government officials, public service announcements, and warnings of controlled detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The expeditionary RIAB presents many opportunities to broadcast additional audio messages via the FM radio band. However, loudspeaker broadcasts facilitate three advantages in the tactical environment: the TA cannot turn off or change the channel on the loudspeaker broadcast; the MISO team is capable of receiving real time impact indicators of the messages’ effect due to the team’s vantage point which enables the MISO team to view the TA during the broadcast; and specific TAs in Afghanistan are for the most part hard wired to listen and give credence to the message broadcast from loudspeakers (Stern, 2011). Stern further suggests that the RIAB also has some advantages, for it provides diversity of broadcasting content and it can support consistent messaging across a very wide area of the battlespace.

Compromise in negotiation is a critical cornerstone taken for granted in democratic societies, but is not necessarily fundamental in developing countries such as Nigeria. Often, the TA assumes that it should receive goods and services for nothing or very little in return or that adjacent TAs should receive similar goods and services simultaneously as opposed to sequentially over time. If commander’s desire uniform responses from neighbouring TAs for example, mitigating measures should be implemented to avoid conflict or simply to avoid different TAs from receiving, or at least perceiving, inequitable treatment. Mitigating measures include approaching the TA as a secular entity by community or district, rather than by tribe in order to establish geographic demarcation between TAs, a concept to which the TA may not ordinary be accustomed to. It is critical that CMO and MISO identify and implement mitigating measures within the non-kinetic environment to effectively influence the target audience in support of a commander’s desired end state (Stern, 2011).
In example of the US in Afghanistan, two initiatives will be helpful in the future if properly implemented for coordination operations. The first was to continue to divide and separate the Afghan civil society from the insurgency. This should be applicable to societies going through similar situations as in Nigeria, and there is a need for the practitioners of counterinsurgency in Nigeria to adopt similar initiatives. The second is by co-option. Here again it a matter of influencing the insurgents to leave the insurgency and re-join civil society. This is done by the counterinsurgents providing incentives for alternative behaviour. These two are the basic tenets of counterinsurgency and connected to that are various techniques for influencing the desired behaviours among the two TAs. Nigeria would benefit from understanding of these initiatives.

The ‘Inkblot’ strategy was formalised by the British during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s and re-addressed by David Kilcullen and General David Petraeus while war gaming solutions to counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq (New York, 2007). Capturing and explaining the ‘Inkblot’ strategy, Paul Buchang has this to say, in his article ‘Two sides of the Afghan counterinsurgency’, that conventional forces roughly divided equally into combat and civilian assistance units are sent out into disputed territory to establish secure control of designated localities. Then they provide humanitarian and nation building assistance to local control. As each ‘Inkblot’ secures its territory, the conventional forces expand their reach outward in terms of combat and government capability, eventually overlapping and saturating the countryside with its presence amid an increasingly supportive population. That denies the insurgent the cover and support it needs to continue effective combat operations, which force it to surrender or negotiate a peaceful settlement (Buchanan, 2010). The ‘Inkblot’ strategy when implemented at the tactical level is amplified when MISO forces coordinate with CA and support CMO.

In negotiating projects, implementation at the tactical level is amplified when MISO forces coordinate with CA and support CMO. The GIROA, with the assistance of CF, will negotiate projects only if a given village is able to achieve the desired level of security. For example, if there are no IED attacks or direct fire attacks on CF, then the village will receive a fixed amount of money for projects they desire. The CA transfers money from the CF directly to the contractor for specific projects. The CA ensures that the GIROA officials are paying the negotiating contracts in order to empower local government in that particular district or village. There is the need for the issue of accountability and supervision of funds due to the
potential for corruption among contractors and government officials. The funds are encouraged to be shared with the project contractors transparently, to reinforce the government’s involvement and support to local projects. This is a basic tool to CMO and MISO, helping to foster a balanced relationship with them and reduces the population’s suspicions (Forster, Edmunds, and Cottee, 2003).

In his summary, Stern argued that once a project is established in one village, the programme should expand to the surrounding villages in order to further promote incentives for development within a specific district. The reason for the expansion is to facilitate increased security and development from village to village, but fundamentally it is to support villages that refused to offer haven to insurgents within an area. If this is done in Nigeria, it will curtail the harbouring of group members in some communities. One assumption according to Stern is that if a village does not achieve its required level of security during the specified period of time and consequently does not receive monetary support for its projects, then the village will continue to observe ongoing developments in adjacent areas. This needs to be treated carefully, as the other villages might become a safe haven for the insurgents and cause havoc, disrupting development in the other area. Essentially, this application of the ‘Inkblot’ strategy involves crafting situations of mutually beneficial exchange between the counterinsurgents and the local population and simultaneously unmasking the insurgents in return for development. Furthermore, by including GIROA in the negotiations and oversight function of development projects, local government legitimacy is enabled, and the trust of the military is enhanced (Stern, 2011).

The opportunity for reintegration of the insurgent is key during the phase of incentivizing development. CMO and MISO should exploit the project’s opportunity to do that. Therefore GIROA sponsored developments, underwritten by CF, become more attractive to be would-be insurgents because they offer a better long-term outcome rather than continuing with the status-quo. Local development and the jobs they provide, will offer an effective outlet for former and potential insurgents. Added to the above recommendation is legitimising the government through coordinated CMO and MISO. Finally, as a warning, Stern asserts that if CMO and MISO are not properly coordinated and disjointedly execute within the battlefield, then scarce resources and funds will be squandered carelessly, and precious time will be wasted. The tactical application of the ‘Inkblot’ method provides a method for commanders to successfully plan and execute counterinsurgency operations within their respective
battlespaces. CMO and MISO coordination and cooperation amplify the ‘Inkblot’ strategy and provide a rubric for a unity of purpose and unity of efforts across the chain of command. Ultimately, CMO and MISO coordination and cooperation generate tremendous synergy and provide the appropriate and relevant non-kinetic military platform for balanced, disciplined, counterinsurgency operations during the delicate period of transition. The above narrative shows the relationship between civil-military relations and the MISO, which, properly harnessed, will help the search for a successful counterinsurgency. The success of one CMO in one region should be replicated in other theatres, but with modification to suit the environment.

3.3. Police-Military Coordination

For a successful counterinsurgency, there is a need for coordinated actions between the police and the military. Therefore, this section focuses on police-military coordination in the fight against insurgency. In counterinsurgency operations there are times when police primacy can be difficult such that the police is unable to contain a violent situation and the Army will have to take the lead. These and other instances are discussed accordingly.

3.3.1. The Importance of Police Primacy

Law enforcement is not a traditional military skill. Rather, police forces are usually entrusted with domestic criminal laws, under highly prescribed legislative regimes that ensure appropriate ‘due process’. This is most functional in developed societies, whereas in most developing countries, like Nigeria, the police do not follow any strict legislative regime. In the opening remarks of a report by the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL), the expert Stephen White contributed that the concept of police primacy is considered an objective in many police reform processes, but there is little research on the term and no common understanding of what it is (White, 2014). There is no defined standard definition of the term, and most definitions are given to suit particular situations. These definitions, according to Ellison and Smyth, often relate to internal security and public safety arrangements where police have a monopoly on public order and law enforcement (Ellison and Smyth, 2006). Accordingly, most common definitions refer to broad situations where, for example, internal actors aim to enable indigenous police to be at the forefront of the rule of
law and security intervention (O’Rawe, More, 1998). The definition of the term is very important in this research to enable readers and researchers to place the term in the proper context and understand what the term stands for, and to show the importance of police primacy in quelling internal uprising as compared to the military which protects the territorial sovereignty of a nation.

The term ‘police primacy’, has more than one definition and its meaning is dependent on the context in which it is used. Researchers and practitioners often describe the term and what it means to them. For some, police primacy is an overriding principle at the centre of police reforms; for others, it is a strategy used to address a particular challenge; for some, it is a simple procedure, when police take the lead in an operation; still for others, it is a description of the type of relationship that exists between the police and the military. Two main notions can be derived from the above, one notion is that, it is a philosophy and all-embracing principle; that police should be the prime agency for law enforcement, including counterinsurgency, in an effort to establish the primacy of the rule of criminal and civil law, where Human Rights are protected. The second notion of police primacy is more about practices and procedures, particularly in international interventions, where missions are police led, and examples include overall police reforms program within a stabilization mission and strategy to deal with organised crime, public disorder (INPROL, 2014). Our interest is in the definition tied to counterinsurgency.

The term ‘police primacy’ is commonly used by military commanders, diplomats, security reform experts, and others who operate in difficult and dangerous scenarios. Policing and the relationship between police institutions and civil society are vital to peace and stability in the world. In Northern Ireland today, for example, attempted murders of police continue to blight the peace process. This and similar cases highlight the difficulties faced by those who design, lead, and implement police primacy reforms and strategies in conflicting and post conflict situations. However, as the INPROL report states, military-led responses devoid of policing expertise and lacking a central vision of policing, often lead to even greater problems in the long run (INPROL, 2014).

Since 1976, in Northern Ireland, the term has been used in common parlance in police, military, and political spheres. There has been a transformation of the term, which has evolved both in meaning and application, and it now connotes both the philosophy and practical aspect of the primacy of police. In the mid-1970s, ‘police primacy’ was the policy
that was an integral part of government strategy, the aim of which was to criminalise terror and move away from a military-led response to terrorism towards a local police-led response. Police primacy in Northern Ireland has evolved during the conflict, to mean a long-term and comprehensive process that involves establishing the rule of law, gaining public confidence through modern democratic policing, and providing a foundation for conflict resolution and political settlement (Oyewole, 2016). This link between conflict resolution and political settlement was aptly captured by the then US President Bill Clinton, in his speech in Belfast on 4 September 1998, when in the wake of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement – a key moment in the peace process – he emphasised the value of ‘adopting your police service as one of the benchmarks for the peace building process’ (Clinton, 1998). It can therefore be said that ‘police primacy’ is both a means to an end and the preferred end state. For the two meanings to fit together, it is crucial for all parties involved to understand and agree on the desired end state; in other words, all parties must share a vision of success (INPROL, 2008).

The UK’s Home Affairs Committee published a report addressing the creation of an entirely different entity or national terrorism agency that is not police-led, and accountability was the main concern (September 2010). In the report was a summary stating that ‘this has the potential to cause major problems and will not respect a major policing structure’. Instead, the primacy of the Metropolitan Police in counterterrorism operations should be enshrined in law to increase accountability and simplify the command structure (Home Office, September 2010). Furthermore, for most practitioners, lawmakers, strategists, and researchers, police primacy is a worthy ambition that implies improved effectiveness and enhanced police accountability. Yet, it is very important to note that, as argued in the INPROL Report, there is a potentially negative connotation with police primacy, in in a corrupt autocratic state police primacy can be used as an instrument of subjugation and terror. Nigeria experienced such cases of police brutality and the police have been used by the state to suppress dissenting voices. It is observed that in a failed state, the security agencies are the most organised institution of corruption and repression. It is very effective in keeping the regime in power and extracting wealth. In spite of this assertion, police primacy is assumed by practitioners to be a positive trend associated with modern policing that is legitimate and protective of freedom and civil liberties. By far the most common use of police primacy relates to improvement in police conduct and performance (White, 2014).
3.3.2. Police Primacy in the Context of Good Governance

Some of the key people who can and should emphasise international best practice of good policing are police missions, military commanders charged with policing tasks, strategic planners and policy-makers. The best practices are ethical behaviour, attention to human disputes and the protection of individual citizens. Robert Trajonowicz and Bonnie Buequeroux (1994), claim that effective modern policing should follow the principles of community policing, which include strategies that address police and community relationships, ethics, trust and acceptability, change management, and the delivery of effective policing-in-partnership strategies for crime reduction and problem solving (Trajonowicz and Buequeroux, 1994). It is worthy of note that the quality of relationship between civil society and police can be enhanced. Some researchers on good policing like O’Rawe and Moore name factors that contribute to good policing, which include the need for a vision of improved local policing, that is applied ‘wholesomely’, the potential failure of disjointed, isolated approaches and the linkage to the political environment. They gave a checklist of some elements required to build a relationship between the police and the public to include, a representative police service, the importance of training, the need to address organisational culture, legal and democratic accountability, structural arrangements that supports human rights, the need to design and implement appropriate forms and styles of policing, and the management of transitional processes. Adding to that, Chris Patten, in his report on Northern Ireland, produced a similar list of elements to help foster a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland (Byrne and Jarman, 2011).

The Patten Report shows that in Northern Ireland the military role had become a subordinate one of providing military aid to the civil power. The same report described how Army escorts no longer accompanied police patrols in Belfast and most other towns, but in a few places police officers still patrolled with Army protection. The Report recommended that in order to stabilise the situation and change policing for the better, that the Army’s role should continue to be reduced, as quickly as the security situation will allow, so that the police can patrol all parts of Northern Ireland without military support. Eventually Army support for the civil power in Northern Ireland should in principle be no more than it is in any other part of the United Kingdom, working only in situations such as search and rescue, bomb-disposal and in exceptional cases of emergency, like natural disasters (Patten, 1999). The Patten Report is a comprehensive police reform programme, offering a template for police reforms in a conflict
and post-conflict situation, where the military’s role is diminishing, and the police role is elevated. These recommendations will be very important to Nigeria, to help reform its police and position it for effective policing in both pre-, during and post-conflict situations.

### 3.3.3. The Police and the Military in Joint Efforts

In analysing a workable relationship between the police and military, the INPROL Report argued that police primacy does not imply the absence of military involvement. On several occasions, military units and police specialist are deployed, if not simultaneously, then eventually to the same location. It is critical that each understands the other’s role, mandate, and responsibility, because this will help in clear planning and coordination. For the EU member states’ police forces, it suggests that the two main scenarios are identical for planning and training purposes; a scenario where police element under military responsibility, and a scenario where a local police presence exists and maintain executive function. Police primacy is the preferred scenario, but this can only be arrived at only when a certain level of security exists, and police capacity well developed (INPROL Report, 2014).

The EU guidelines for crisis management gives a critical issue on how best to shape and manage the best relationship between components of police and the military. The Nice European Council conclusions acknowledged that, where it is necessary, military and police components must be part of an integral planning process and should be used on the ground in a closely coordinated manner. The guidelines gave some examples including that one of the components, at the request of the other, will cooperate in order to help to create the conditions under which the other will be able to fulfil its task. In joint actions in the field, related to maintenance of public security, the actions must be coordinated in order to avoid unhelpful interference or collusion. Coordination can be achieved through liaison officers, or where necessary, through ad hoc coordinating groups. As argued in the Nice European Council conclusions, in some instance, police executive functions, subject to national roles and legislation, can be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population. In such cases, the military will need to have authority over the specific police elements involved, to fulfil their duty to ensure that the specific mission is accomplished (EU, 2000). The Report, however, concludes that the police and military resources, which are key to any mission can and should work together even
when police primacy is employed for only limited aspect of a set mission, it should be noted, however, that police primacy and the sovereignty of the Rule of Law are always at the core of a missions’ objective.

David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito in their book *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime* focused on the division of labour and acknowledged the security of citizens and the police is a major consideration (2010). They differentiate between the police and military tasks. That both have tasks that are suitable for the other is important, because it is the mixing of duties that can create chaos and disharmony which is not beneficial to the citizenry. Bayley and Perito described police primacy principles within the context of conflict and counterinsurgency. They proposed that the fundamental goal of counterinsurgency is the ‘creation of self-sustaining legitimate government, [and] the primary vehicle for dealing with an insurgency should be the police’ (Bayley and Perito, 2010). They also recognised that military action may be necessary to create conditions within which civilian policing can occur. In discussing terminology, Bayley and Perito make the point that counterinsurgency can muddy the distinction between the police and the military. The INPROL Reports also agreed with this assertion, arguing that in various cases the police have acted more like soldiers and soldiers have behaved like police officers. It is on record that since 1978, an FBI delegation to Belfast used the term ‘Combat Cops’ to describe the police in Northern Ireland.

In furtherance to the above, Bayley and Perito assert that four characteristics distinguish police from military operations and make the police more suitable for dealing with local insurgencies within a community or society: that police are more lightly armed or in some cases unarmed; and police are more often deployed in small numbers—sometimes on single person patrol. Stephen White (2014) also gave further distinction from his experience in Northern Ireland. These differences, some obvious and some subtle, help explain why during a mostly local terrorist campaign, police primacy policy was more successful than military responses. The differences according to White, are as follows: indigenous police officers live within and are part of the local community, while soldiers tend to be deployed for short tours of duty of four or six months. Police officers live and work with the community twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, while soldiers are confined to the barracks and exposed to only Army culture after patrol duties. Police officers have a stake in their own society for up to thirty years as professionals and as citizens once retired, whereas soldiers tend to be
deployed in the same theatre for only three or four tours at most. Police tend to have more females in their ranks and are therefore more representative of society. Finally, police officers interact with citizens on a range of activities by local neighbourhood patrols and partnerships, on road traffic issues, children and young people’s issues, general nuisance and low-level crime issues, whereas soldiers normally interact with citizens only in security related matters, leading them to have less opportunity to build relationship, engage in rapport, and gain trust and the confidence of the people (White, 2014).

Bayley and Perito sum up the benefit of police primacy when the term is used to describe the philosophy and practice of deploying police experts rather than soldiers in conflict efforts; Foreign armies should not be responsible for directing police operations or training local police for two reasons. One, when military forces are used for policing, a mixed message is sent about the proper roles of military and police. Foreign forces must serve as role models with respect to the separation of military and police forces. Two, the military does not have the knowledge or training to develop civil policing. Civil policing requires skills and orientations unfamiliar to most military personnel, among them an emphasis on violence prevention over violence suppression, the use of minimal force to control situations and the ability to interact with civilians (Bayley and Perito, 2010). Within the context of both the philosophy and the practice of police primacy in conflict and post-conflict zones, where public trust is the great prize that is sought, the above factors must be harmonised and sensitively too.

There are also valid short-term objectives for police primacy including to demilitarise the situation, and to address specific situations using civil-police resources and expertise, such as border security, organised crimes and public order management (INPROL, 2014). However, if these objectives are planned as part of the overall rule of law strategy with modern policing principles as its core, they can play a major role in stabilization and growth. Law and order are crucial to security, social development, political stability, and economic recovery. It often needs radical and comprehensive attention, because police and the dominant style of policing represent the state, its priorities and values. Law and order, and the effectiveness of policing, which must be recognised as a priority; sadly, this is not always the case in Nigeria.

James K. Wither and Thilo Schroeter, in ‘Challenges of developing host nation police capacity’, highlights why police primacy as opposed to military primacy can be the best way forward. He suggests that military forces are often essential to creating the internal security
conditions that allow the civilian components of a stability operation to build a durable peace. However, armed forces are not intrinsically suited for police work. Soldiers are trained to apply lethal force in war, military force can have a deterrent effect on militias and criminal gangs, but the development of soldiers in a law enforcement role sometimes leads to excessive violence, which invariably alienates the local population and provoke armed resistance (Wither and Schroeter, 2012). Wither further lists the range of actions that, depending on the nature of operations, foreign-deployed police may perform. He identifies the roles best suited to the civil police during stability operations, pointing out the division of tasks between police and military forces vary according to mission-specific factors, such as the mission mandate, threat environment, condition of indigenous security institutions, and availability of foreign manpower and expertise (Wither and Schroeter, 2012). Wither’s list includes advice to host nation police services, training and mentorship to build local police capacity, executive law enforcement functions, such as public order, riot control, criminal investigations and intelligence gathering, the establishment of new host nation police services and support to military forces against terrorist and insurgents (Wither and Schroeter, 2012). One could argue that major reforms and installation of modern police practices and values are implicit within these activities. However, comparing this list to, for example, the checklist of priorities identified by O’Rawe and Moore Patten (1996), one can see that, in many stability missions, police reforms are implemented in a piecemeal fashion. Conclusively, the preferred scenario is for civil-police specialists to support international police intervention and reforms, as opposed to military forces becoming engaged in policing matters. The reality is often far engaged in policing matters; the reality is often far from the ideal.

Some critically important lessons include to avoid underestimating the central role that civil policing plays in society. In summary, it is important to identify and learn some common reoccurring problems that have beset the primacy of police. The list produced by Wither and Schroeter include inadequate planning, shortage of deployable police asserts, lack of training, and quantity rather than quality with a need for more emphasis to be placed on quality indigenous police. A plethora of different types of law enforcement agencies that may include military police, uniformed police and paramilitary units, including border, counter-narcotics, and anti-terrorist teams, have differing and sometimes competing doctrines and operating procedures. Although at the early stages of operations the military can be used to good effect, the ideal situation is to train the police and local forces so that they can achieve and maintain security instead (Wither and Schroeter, 2012). Terminologies to describe police primacy and
effective policing can range from ‘democratic policing’ to ‘professional policing’. The concept of effective policing, however, is yet more extensive, and has its core principles and objectives beyond competent law enforcement. It implies practices that ensure policing is open and transparent and must be accountable to the law and civil society.

3.4. Civil-Military Relations and the Counterinsurgency in Nigeria

Civil-military relations in Nigeria is a very topical issue, and unique in the sense that it provides more questions than answers. For scholars and policy makers to really understand civil-military relations in Nigeria, it must be placed first and foremost in the history of military intervention and regimes of about three decades of the country’s existence as an independent state. Nigerian society became militarised due to a long period of military rule, so after 1999 the issue became how to civilianise the military, to make it subject to civilian rule, the rule of law, and civil society, and to foster a harmonious civil-military relationship.

Circumstances immediately after the Cold War, prompted the process of democracy and its tenets in most developing nations. The period witnessed transformations of formerly non-capitalist states and autocratic regimes across Africa into democratic ones. It was what Huntington described as the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, which began in Portugal in 1974 (Huntington, 1998). Thomas Carothers described it a ‘global democracy’ that involves a simultaneous movement of several countries away from dictatorial rule, towards more liberal and often democratic government (Carothers, 2002). Nigeria returned to democratisation in 1999 after several years of military rule, this was not particularly easy and was hard earned because it was a combination of both external and internal pressure that led to the voluntary withdrawal of the military from politics. However, according to Ajayi (2007), the military left the corridors of power after perfecting a strong network of what he described as ‘patron-client’ relations, spanning social, economic and political terrains. Patrimonialism was the framework or network that the military opted for, to allow for a retired military General and former head of a military government, Olusegun Obasanjo, to assume office as the president in 1999. Obasanjo was chosen as he would appeal to both the military, to which he belonged, and to the Yoruba, one of the main ethnic groups in South-West Nigeria, to whom he also belonged. Therefore, researchers of Nigeria’s political history regarded the rise of Obasanjo to the presidency as more in tune with traditional authoritarian rule than genuine democracy.
(Walker, 2009; Walker, 1999; Fayemi K.J., 2003; Amake, 2007). Public discussions centred around the need to unite the divided ethnic groups during the transition in an effort to avoid a re-emergence of military rule (Victor, 2008; Aniete, 2008; Emmanuel, 2008; Obasanjo, 2006; Ojo, 2006).

It is against this backdrop of military influence in the political system (Ajayi, 2007; Agbese, 2000) that the prospect of democracy in the polity is continuously being linked to the role of the military and in the transition process (Umar, 2006; Obasanjo, 2006). In a similar vein, the need for democratisation in Nigeria reinforces the idea of liberal democracy, emphasising democratic culture and control of the military. However, apart from being a transition made difficult by ethnic divisions, what is probably most important in Nigeria’s transition was the dominant influence that the class of top brass military generals acting in concert with the dominant elites as noted by Bayo Adekanje exerted (2005). Therefore, the need to consolidate the nation’s nascent democracy on the one hand unleashed a trend for civilian government to assert greater influence over the Officer Corps and for the military to try and defend their pre-existing prerogatives. It is in this context that civil-military relations in Nigeria’s fourth republic belong. The military plays a crucial role when democratic consolidation is premised on establishing civilian control of the military, particularly within the context of the several coups in Nigeria. As submitted by Obi (2008), such a path to democracy was necessary in order to cast democracy in the image of the military. On the other hand, it encouraged the high influx of retired military generals in the process; Dr Onadipo Soloye (2015) captured it as thus: the involvement of the military in governance in Nigeria has given undue advantage to military officers both serving and retired. Having been socialised into the arena of power, they have developed high political visibility, and built vast networks of friends’ acolytes and loyalists. In some cases, most of the known and recognisable faces in government today are more often retired military officers. Soloye’s position represents a scenario of retired military officers’ dominance of the Nigeria political domain. Abubakar Mormoh described this as the imposition of new dictatorship in the form of de-democratisation. Anugwom argues that the difficulties facing democratisation in Africa, including Nigeria, emanate from the realities of African societies which include, but are not limited to their historical experience (Anugwom, 2001).

The empirical reality in Nigeria portrays an ambiguous situation classifying the nation’s political trajectory as argued by Plattner and Diamond (2002). They contend that nations like
Nigeria do not seem to deepen democratic ideals and thus do not consolidate democracy. In this sense, this limitation affects civil-military relations in a liberal democracy. Connected to those challenges of institutionalising democratic norms is the gap created in Nigeria’s civil-military relations, a deep underlying structural distortion posing a grave danger to the nation’s democratisation process. In fact, observers of Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, followed by election rigging in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2014, has not helped build a democratic ethos in the polity. Carothers had earlier contended that, ‘of few transitions to democracy that are under way, more than a few are not following the model’. Notwithstanding this, the nation’s democratic structure has the motive to transform its democratic substance through continuous reforms. Therefore, one major factor necessary for the consolidation of democracy relates to the state of relations between the military and the civilian leaders. In fact, the relevance of the military to support civil rule underscores the need to take the case of consolidating Nigeria’s democratic gains at the doorstep of the military, as stated by former President Obasanjo. In this regard, the extent to which the military and political interest in the polity can broker common ground is therefore critical to the sustenance of the nation’s democracy.

As expressed by Ngoma (2006), this relationship takes two dimensions, the first at the ‘people’s level’, while the second is a rather complex manner with governmental structures—a phenomenon that entails application of the ‘catch’ terms of civil-military control or oversight (Ngoma, 2006). In addition, the constantly changing realities and traumatic socio-political history of the African continent, together with the generally unstable economic environment, have affected civil-military relations on the continent. Therefore, the socio-political conditions of African states define the nature and character of civil-military relations (Ngoma, 2006). Moreover, the fusion of warrior and rulers in traditional African societies as present in Nigeria, questions the possibility of an effective civilian control of armed forces in the polity, not to mention prolonging military rule with its effect on civil-military relationships in Nigeria. Ebo described it as ‘the inversion of civil-military relations with the structure of the relationship standing on its head’ (Ebo, 2003). Most empirical works on civil-military relations in Nigeria follow the laws as stipulated in the Nigerian constitution and the strategies the military employ to stay in power (Adekanje, 1999; Fayemi, 2003; Ajayi, 2007; Ojo, 2007; Zabadi, 2006). These studies, therefore, do not go beyond analysing the role of the military as outlined in the constitution, the cause of military rule and its effects on the political process. The explanatory factors affected the military’s relations with civilian
society and the authorities to determine civil-military behaviour on the ongoing fourth republic. It also marked a departure from past studies by adopting Feaver and Kohn’s model of day to day strategic interaction (Feaver and Kohn, 2001), a feature of his ‘agony theory’, while simultaneously determining the level of civilian control using Samuel Fitch’s criteria (Fitch, 2004). This enhances the possibility of combining traditions and theories which have not previously been connected. Admittedly, there has been a concentration of research on civil-military relations in developed democracies. Some major works in this area focused their theories on established democracies, combining traditions and theories that seem unrelated (Feaver and Kohn, 2001; Samuel, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Bland, 1999). These will enable this research to be situated within the stream of knowledge that seeks to produce new understanding in the study of civil-military relations, particularly as it relates to transitional democracies.

Most studies on civil-military relations in Nigeria avoid the complexity of the relationship by focusing more on the constitutional role of the military in a democracy. However, this thesis attempts to investigate how the uncertain character of the military as an institution have shaped and will continue to shape the nature and character of civil-military relations in the polity against the backdrop of the importance and the need to consolidate national democracies. Henry Bienen once stated that most studies on civil-military relations in third world countries neglect ‘the institutional characteristics of the military institution and political process, which is a germane issue that needs investigation in third world civil-military relations’ (Bienen, 1981). To complement the examination of the web between the military and other components of society in Nigeria, it will be critical to look at the strategies adopted by Obasanjo and Yar’adua, two former Presidents’ administrations, to ensure civil supremacy. It provides the basis for understanding the problems of civil-military relations in Nigeria, as it relates to the suppression of democratic institutions by past military regimes. It focuses on the interconnectedness between achieving the nation’s aspiration for genuine democracy and her civil-military relations. Feaver and Kohn (2001) argue that civil-military interactions are best understood through an institutional lens of principal-agent theory. The agency theory provides a basis for determining the nature of civil-military behaviour in Nigeria, which is useful for measuring the military vis-a-vis the civilian branches, particularly using Fitch’s criteria. In addition, there is an attempt to classify Nigeria as a state in transition within the parameters of an electoral democracy, which is in transition to the fundamental of democracy.

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3.5. The Department of Civil-Military Affairs

Nigeria’s Department of Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) was established in December 2016 by the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lieutenant General O. A. Iherijika, to serve primarily as an interface between the Nigerian Army and the civil populace. It has the responsibility of underscoring the fundamentals of civil-military affairs as a strategic national institution. The department is also charged with introducing and transmitting the core element of effective civil-military relations in areas of human rights, the rule of law, and negotiating liaison and conflict management. In the researcher’s interview at the Military Headquarters in Abuja, at the Office of the Chief of Military-Civil Relations (Cmdr. D12, January 2018), it was gathered that for the first time, a Human Rights desk had been established by the Nigerian armed forces to further boost civil-military relations in the country, in line with international best practise. This initiative was supported by the speech delivered by Major General Nicholas Roger, the Chief of Civil-Military Affairs (CCMA), on behalf of the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, which emphasised that, ‘the event marked another important milestone in the History of the Nigerian Army, by establishing the Human Rights Desk’. He went on to add that the desk was ‘borne out of the increasing interest of the local and International Human Rights bodies’, on what the armed forces were doing in the North-East and other parts of the country. The nature of inquiries and commentaries from these institutions requires a response of professional and specialised nature by the Nigerian armed forces. This was also facilitated by the Nigeria Bar Association. Speaking further, the COAS, listed the function of the desk to include recovering documents and investigating complaints from individuals, organisations and institutions on alleged rights violations involving the armed forces.

They are also to make their findings available to the COAS, produce annual reports, review updates on existing training manuals, and facilitate the participation of the Nigerian military in local and international training programmes. He again listed other functions like liaising and facilitating interaction with human rights organisations; strategies and strengthened capacity of the Nigerian military in promoting human rights as well as developing a network of contacts in Human Rights Offices in Nigeria. Adding to the above, the Executive Secretary of the Nigeria Human Rights Commission, Bem Angwe, said that ‘the Nigerian Army has set a commendable precedence for other services of the Armed Forces.’ He, therefore, pleaded
that the office remain open for enquiries and with this, the Nigeria Army will remain close to
the civil populace. In the same vein, the Senior Human Rights adviser to the UN Resident in
Nigeria, Martin Ejidike, commended the initiative of the Nigerian Army as thus, ‘this is the
Nigerian army setting important precedents for Human Rights work in Nigeria’ (Premium
News, February 2016). The interviewee also contributed to research by mentioning some of
the activities of the CIMIC to include organising workshops, seminars, and press conference
to enlighten the citizens both locally and internationally about their activities in the North-
East.

3.6. The Nigerian Military’s Strategies for Counterinsurgency

The Nigerian military has re-strategized its operations in the North-East leading to the
introduction of new platforms and equipment which considerably enhanced progress against
the insurgency and has led to successes in the war theatre. When conducting the research
interview, the interviewee said that before now, the last time the Nigerian government bought
equipment for the armed forces was in 1980s, during the Presidency of Shehu Shagari (1979-
1983). The interviewee stated that in the period when the insurgency became so strong, the
armed forces were ill-equipped to fight back, and that this is one of the major setbacks for the
armed forces between 1999-2014. The situation only improved by 2014 -2016, when new and
modern equipment was purchased. He further narrates that for the military, and especially at
fighting level, the motivation on the field is ‘the weapon to fight’ (Brigadier Gen T11,
interviewed 2018). In support of the above, the COAS has addressed this in his speech,
saying that coordinated strategic communication and information operations is the integrated
employment of media and psychological operations during military operations in concert
with other lines of operations. This is done to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the
decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries, while protecting one’s own troops
and allies. In line with this, the Nigerian Army has aggressively pursued a media strategy that
focuses on timely dissemination of information and reflects operational priorities and
objectives. These strategies include periodic briefings and interviews, press releases,
publication of the military magazine ‘Soja’, journals for each of the military’s formations,
and regular updates of the Nigerian Army social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter,
as well as involving journalists in some of its activities and operations. The purpose is to
identify the target audience and develop key narratives that support mission priorities and disseminate such through the most appropriate medium.

An interviewee (Col A3, January 2018), added that the establishment of the media campaign centre called ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’ on FM radio helps provide real time and accurate information in the North-East and served as an avenue for proper coordination of the many military activities. The radio station broadcast in languages familiar to the people, like English, Hausa, and Kanuri and other minor languages in the area, with the view of informing them on the danger of Boko-Haram and extremist ideology as well as to re-orient the locals on the tenets of the two religions which they uphold, peaceful coexistence and to denounce violence of any sort. Furthermore, social media is continually used by the Nigerian military to bring down Boko-Haram propaganda. COAS concludes, ‘we have defeated Boko-Haram physically and we will follow them to the social media and defeat them as well’ (COAS, 2016).

One of the major instruments the Nigerian armed forces is using and not many people are aware of it, according to the Office of Civil-Military Affairs, is psychological operations (Psy-Ops). The robust utilisation of Psy-Ops is an essential and effectual component of armed forces’ operations, having specialised goals of influencing perceptions. Psy-Ops are organised to broadcast information targeted at influencing the sentiments, emotions, motives, objectives and reasoning of a large mass of people. It is a planned operation to convey selected truthful information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions and so on, and therefore ultimately their behaviour. The Nigerian military has used different Psy-Ops through leaflets, radio jingles, and posters. These have helped to open doors of opportunities for some Boko-Haram members to surrender, which many have done through the introduction of ‘Operation Safe Haven’. The capture of camp zero as well as the dissemination of the ranks of the group was exploited for Psy-Ops purposes through the upload of pictures and videos to social media to play down the assumed superiority of the insurgents (Major General A20, 2018).

This interviewee also discussed the utilisation of cyber operations, which is not popular among the populace. This is also important, as Boko-Haram for instance used the internet to spread their propaganda. In response to this, he adds, the government, security agencies and the general public now used the medium to provide access to critical, real time information, as well as the location of the insurgents, to proactively stop them before they unleashed terror
on unsuspecting citizens (Colonel R12, 2018). Information gathered at the Defence Office shows that the government in 2011 mandated the Nigeria Communications Commission to register all mobile telephones in the country in order to enhance the security of the nation and its citizens and to enable operators to have reliable profiles for the users in their network. With this information, intelligence gathering improved and the Nigerian armed forces and other security services were able to capture key Boko-Haram commanders like Sani Mohammed, Kabiru Sokoto, and Shuab Mohammed Bama as well as many more. Another instance was on the 23 May 2013, when the government shut down mobile communication in the three North-Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The objective of the shutdown was to limit Boko-Haram’s communication capabilities, restrict their ability to regroup and reinforce and also to limit its adverse effect on the social, economic and security situation in those areas. The success of the action led to the group being driven out from Maiduguri, the centre of the conflict theatre and its environs to the vast and treacherous Sambisa forest, where the military recently captured the insurgents’ main base and is currently carrying out methodical clearance operations to put an end to the group’s activities (Information from the Office of COAS, gathered January 2018).

Finally, it has been revealed that the use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) by the military helped them to gather publicly available information on specific targets. The military employs several modern techniques in today’s highly sophisticated operations environment to collect OSINT on certain targets, which has helped the operations in the North-East. It has also led to the arrest of many insurgents and economic saboteurs in the theatre of operations. In an interview with the Chief of Civil-Military Affairs, he talked about the kinetic and non-kinetic counterinsurgency operations in the North-East, placing more emphasises on the adoption of the non-kinetic approach to end the activities of the insurgents and to build public confidence in the activities of the military. Most of the non-kinetic approaches were highlighted in a speech by COAS and some interviews conducted in Military Headquarters. Although there are success stories from the theatre of operations, sporadic violence is still ongoing in the North-East. There is therefore a need for the military to sustain the pressure on the insurgents and put an end to it all (Major General A20, 2018).
3.7. The Establishment of a Professional Indigenous Police and Military Force (Civilian Joint Task Force)

In his opening remarks in *Training Indigenous Force in Counterinsurgency: A Tale Of Two Insurgencies* (2006) James Corum wrote that ‘counterinsurgency is manpower intensive’, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. This is an important statement, because without the indigenous or community police or military forces, it will be almost impossible to handle the issues of security or counter measures in a geographical area. The establishment of indigenous police or military forces is a major key to any successful counterinsurgency coordination (Corum, 2006). The establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria is an example of how indigenous policing helps to fight insurgency with the support of the armed forces. Before analysing the CJTF in Nigeria, it is important to look at different examples of the importance of establishing this outfit.

The importance of training indigenous police and military forces is understood in counterinsurgency doctrine and theory; relatively little research has been done concerning how the mission should be carried out. There are several major questions that the practitioners need to address to properly understand the concept of indigenous policing; how can the supporting or governing power best organise the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency? What level of training do security forces need to conduct effective counterinsurgency? What is the role of home guard or irregular security organisation? What kind of training programs produces effective police and military leaders? (Cohen, 2016). According to Cohen, these are questions that are relevant to the US military as it revises it counterinsurgency doctrine. In most countries where the US military is involved it is engaged in training and supporting the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency operations. Cohen observed that ‘as the war on terror continues, the US military will certainly see many more missions to train and support indigenous security forces. He further stated that training indigenous security forces is also one of the most complex tasks in developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Building new forces from scratch is difficult enough. It is even more difficult to take indigenous police and military with a tradition of incompetence and corruption and transform it into new and effective forces that can fight and defeat insurgents without undermining the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population (Cohen, 2016).
In Cohen’s monograph, he builds his studies around two case studies concerning the British experience in training indigenous security force in Malaya and Cyprus to fight insurgencies. Although he emphasised that this occurred almost about 50 years ago, most of the challenges have been faced more recently by the US military both in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both Cyprus and Malaya, Cohen expressed that the hostility of major ethnic groups was at the heart of the insurgent movement. He narrates that in both cases, the degree of success in counterinsurgency was largely determined by the effectiveness of the government in winning support among the disaffected part of the populace. The training competence and the leadership of the indigenous security forces in these cases played a central role in the government’s ability to win civilian support (Cohen). The two insurgencies were protracted conflicts. At the beginning of each conflict, the government’s police and security forces were undermanned, poorly trained, and poorly prepared to conduct counterinsurgency, as in the Nigerian case, at the beginning of the insurgency. Strategic success in both cases depended on the government’s ability to recruit, retrain, and reorganise the indigenous security forces. In Malaya, the British succeeded in building a highly effective Malayan police force and army. As the Malayans became more capable of handling their own security, the British were able to withdraw their forces and leave behind a stable and democratic nation, which was able to finish the insurgent movement. In Cyprus, the British dramatically increased the Cypriot police force and organised new local security units. However, they failed to adequately train the police and provide effective leadership. Indeed, the poor discipline and training standards of the Cypriot police were major factors in the British failure to defeat the Cypriot police. The two case studies focused mainly upon the role of indigenous police in counterinsurgency. Soldiers must not forget that in counterinsurgency, the line between law enforcement and military operation often is blurred. In fact, in most counterinsurgency campaigns, the primary role of the military has been to provide support and manpower for essential police operations although in Nigeria it happens the other way around, such as search and cordon operations, roadblocks, area control operations, and search and sweep missions. In many, if not most, counterinsurgency campaigns, the police have been the major force employed by the government, but not so in Nigeria. This was the case both in Malaya and Cyprus where the police usually operated jointly with the military forces. Neither the Malaya or Cyprus insurgencies were characterised by large-scale combat. In both cases, normal operations more closely resembled policing on a large-scale rather than conventional warfare. This is yet another similarity with recent US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and indeed, with most counterinsurgency operations of the last century and the present century. Some important
lessons from Cohen’s analysis of the two histories he summarised as thus, that they offered a comparison of the effectiveness of widely varying strategies as they relate to indigenous forces. Several lessons from the US doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan are relevant to countries like Nigeria.

In Cohen’s conclusions, he summarised that

the lessons deal with recruiting security forces from different ethnic groups, the training of indigenous security forces leadership, the role of home guards in Counterinsurgency, the role of civilian police trainers, and the establishment of ongoing police and military force training (Cohen, 2016).

From the foregoing therefore, we will look at the Nigerian situation and see how it helps to solve the problems of insurgency. The Nigerian experience does not follow exactly on from the British in Malaya and Cyprus, or the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, it was necessary, given the surrounding circumstances in the North-East, to establish the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF emerged in June 2013, as a voluntary force to assist the Special and Joint Task Force with the counterinsurgency campaign in North-East (Bamidele, 2013). The composition of the CJTF is retired armed forces personnel and young people, mostly unemployed with little or outdated equipment, no proper training in the act of policing. Their weapons were mostly bow and arrow, compared to the highly sophisticated weaponry of the insurgents. The CJTF also had swords, clubs and daggers, and operated under the supervision of a group commander. They started as a community security outfit and later metamorphosed into a Joint effort with the security forces to help curb the activities of the insurgency. Maiduguri (Borno state), the major city of the insurgency’s theatre, had some semblance of peace with the activities of the CJTF; because most of the groups’ member were locals and could easily be identified by the CJTF, most of the insurgents ran out of town to avoid been identified and caught, this later became a problem as there were retaliatory attacks on CJTF members (Agbiboa, 2015; Bamidele, 2013)

According to Bamidele, the CJTF was a necessary tool in combating Boko-Haram’s violent activities. They emerged as a necessary element to address some of the failures of the intelligence failure of the Special Military Task Force; this is because they had better knowledge of the terrain and the community compared to the established force. The North-East has a very difficult topography, this is very tough for military manoeuvres, and the CJTF
acted as the anti-insurgent group. Their activity built confidence amongst the people and the community began to feel comfortable and safe with them (Bamidele, 2016). The creation of the CJTF as part of the machination for combating the violent activities of Boko-Haram in North-East Nigeria represents a veritable example of a citizen-driven communal response to security challenges and an indication of how insurgency can be prevented by the help of an indigenous or community kind of policing (Bamidele, 2016). The civilian JTF used the knowledge of the communities to identify suspected Boko-Haram members and other suspicious members (Okereke, 2013). The CJTF have had many successes in stopping many attacks through swift identification of strangers in their communities and have equally helped the special task force to arrest known members of Boko-Haram (Okereke, 2013). However, these successes and activities of the CJTF are known to the members of the group, and this led also to reprisal attacks and loss of lives and property of CJTF members. The North-East government in their quest to support the activities of the CJTF, seeing their success, began to give them financial support, vehicles and other benefits to members to show appreciation and encourage them (Nigeria watch, 2014). The government also offered employment and training to about 5,000 CJTF members (Ekotts, 2013). How successful the CJTF was, is another thing altogether. According to Fessan (2015), the CJTF became a vital link in the intelligence gathering network necessary for a successful military operation, in fact, the importance of the CJTF lies not only in the immediate response to Boko-Haram’s violent activities, but also in the prospect of counterinsurgency in the North-East of Nigeria, if properly organised and sustained over time.

From the activities of the Special Task Force of the Nigerian military in the North-East most of Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts are reactive without the accompanying efforts of the CJTF in intelligence gathering and providing knowledge of the terrain (Bamidele, 2016). The focus and implementation of the Nigerian government’s Special Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the paramilitary forces of the police as well as other security services, may have failed. This can be seen in the escalation of Boko-Haram’s activities in the region, and it is the activities of the CJTF that has helped reduce some of these failures. According to the Nigerian Army Information Officer on Boko-Haram matters, Major-General Olukolade, ‘at the early stage of the battle against Boko-Haram group, the military JTF, did not feel the need to work with CJTF; but seldom considered it as part of the security efforts.’ In order words, the MJTF thought it makes little contribution to crime intelligence or to efforts to predict and forecast insurgency acts (interview, Gen
Olukolade, 2014). Baba Lawan Jafar, the leader of the CJTF, has a contrary view of the MJTF, namely that the CJTF in the North-East was the first youth organisation who fearlessly chased gunmen with only sticks in 2013. He went on to say that the CJTF has 15,541 registered members in all the states of the North-East (Lawan, 2015). In his own submission, Hassan (2015) claims that the civilian JTF structure supports the government SMJTF, and that it may eventually become an effective alternative to the SMJTF; this is because the SMJF has little or no knowledge of the area and does not even speak the language of the locals (which is Kanuri, Shuwa, and Arabic) or know the local culture and religion as compared to the CJTF. Hassan further reveals that organised activities, whether by the state government or non-state groups like CJTF who are local people that seek to ensure the maintenance of peace, communal order, and security in society through prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment are surprisingly understudied. What is evident, therefore, is that, combating insurgency in the North-East is not and cannot be a monopoly government or its special forces; it is a combination of efforts of both the CJTF and SMJTF. Nonetheless, the CJTF approach to counterinsurgency is a valuable asset for advancing safety and security among the locals.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion therefore, it is apt to assert that insurgency or terrorism as most literature will refer to it in Nigeria, remained a serious challenge to the development of any country in the world. In Nigeria, it has affected its prosperity, governance, law and order. In dealing with the issues of insurgency, the security apparatus must be at the top of its game. One of the key things for the security agencies to do, based on the analysis in this research, is to co-opt community or indigenous policing. With the notoriety of the Boko-Haram insurgency, and the establishment of the CJTF and the seemingly successful role it has played, it is important for the government to adopt these as part of the security machinery to help curb the insurgency. This is important as, as already stated, their knowledge and insights into the culture, religion and most importantly, its understanding of the environment, helps the military in identifying perpetrators of the violent acts. The government should provide the CJTF the necessary tools to function, like providing a centre just like the SMJTF, to give it a legislative backing, so that it can increase its legitimacy. The centre will help for a better coordination in areas of intelligence, surveillance and identification. In conclusion therefore,
it can be gathered that the role indigenous policing, specifically using locals with vast knowledge of the area, is an added advantage in assisting the police or the armed forces in counterinsurgency operations. The CJTF in the North-East demonstrates such success.
CHAPTER FOUR

‘Hearts and Minds’ in Counterinsurgency

This chapter examines the complex, but the very important issues of ‘hearts and minds’ in counterinsurgency operations. It is vital to understand this, because both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent crave the winning of the population’s hearts and minds. The chapter also looks at the good governance approach in counterinsurgency, with emphasis on the North-East Nigeria, and whether the government paid serious attention to the plight of the people in that region or not. The question of the use of force or coercion, and minimum force in the military’s operations in the North-East is also considered.

4.1. The Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’

Gregory Muller, in his article on ‘Arts of War: Winning hearts and minds: Key conditions for population-centric counterinsurgency’ (2018), looks at the issues of hearts and minds within two broad approaches to dealing with insurgency. One is the conventional military approach and what David Kilcullen notes as the ‘enemy-centric approach (Kilcullen, 2007). There are of course, variations within this approach, namely whether the focus should be on leadership (decapitation measures) or group members (attrition), and which methods, instruments and tools a state will use to target the insurgents, which might be law enforcement, military raids or covert action. The second approach is winning ‘hearts and minds’, which Kilcullen referred to as the population-centric approach, in which efforts focus on cutting off the insurgents’ ‘lifeblood’ and supply lines by either providing reward to the population for supporting the counterinsurgency, or by imposing costs on the population for supporting the insurgents. A population-centric approach may also focus on disengagement, attempting to convince current members to give up on violence and lure them away from the insurgent group (Muller, 2018; Kilcullen, 2007).

Scholars like Hazelton and Galula have agreed on a shift from the enemy-centric approach to a population-centric approach, because in most counterinsurgency or insurgent success, the population is key. This can be seen in the US effort in Iraq, most especially after the 2006
release of the US Army Manual 3-24, which emphasised a shift from an enemy-centric to a population-centric approach (FM 3-24, 2006). Given that effort is being put into his approach, and the amount of work put into it, and because each insurgency is different, it is critical to ask whether such an approach is better or more effective. Gentile and Porch (2013) are very critical of this style of counterinsurgency approach. But those who advocate for counterinsurgency generally favour a population-centric approach or ‘the wining hearts and minds’ approach (Bertrand and Nagl, 2013). Furthermore, according to Muller, it is logical to believe that if we can just convince the population to support counterinsurgency efforts and oppose the activities of the insurgents, then we can defeat the insurgents. If we have the support of the people, the insurgents lose a pool of potential recruits, lose sources of funding, of arms, and safe havens and will have less operational security, as the people provide valuable information to the government about the insurgents. Nigeria’s government should be aware of this position, to engage the local population into her strategy on counterinsurgency. If properly followed through, it can help deal with the insurgency in the North-East.

Muller (2018), further emphasised that the problem with the conventional wisdom that counterinsurgents should win hearts and minds is that it overlooks important variations within insurgent movements that can make this difficult or even impossible. He contends that counterinsurgency scholars and researchers are so preoccupied with how to win over the population, that they fail to ask whether attempting to do so is even appropriate. This thesis looks at some variations that exist among insurgencies to identify when the ‘hearts and minds’ approach is more likely to be effective and when such an approach may backfire, though several factors may influence the outcome of any counterinsurgency approach. This thesis observed some key traits of the insurgents themselves, because as Sun Tzu states, ‘victory requires that you know your enemy’.

Douglas Porch (1986), narrates that one of the first uses of the term hearts and minds was by a French general in Indochina, when countering rebellion along the Chinese Border, but it is associated more with the British counterinsurgency in Malaya (Dixon, 2009). The US engaged in a similar effort to sway the population, first in Vietnam, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The phrase takes on somewhat cynical connotation when used to refer to any attempt to sway public opinion (Gentile, 2013). It is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘counterinsurgency’ when using wining hearts and minds simply amounts to defeating an insurgency (Cline, 2013). Porch generally equates hearts and minds with the acquisition of
tactical intelligence. He also highlights the often-overlooked danger of the population-centric approach in that it causes the soft target population to suffer attacks and retribution when insurgents begin to view the people as conspiring with the government or counterinsurgency forces. While there was a great deal of literature in the last two decades about population-centric strategies, and counterinsurgency more generally, most of these works focused on the ways and means that states use to implement a strategy of winning hearts and minds, in order words, conditions that are largely under the control of the state (Paul, 2013).

Khan (1968) argues that the two most important political factors in winning hearts and minds are looking like a winner and assurance of safety. The British hearts and minds strategy in Malaya primarily involved what Eland (2013) described as ‘discriminate use of force, political reforms, and improved governance’. Huw Bennett suggests that the British approach to hearts and minds has been overstated, because in the Malayan Emergency it was found that the police and the army tried to operate within the law, but mistakes were made. It also shows that shortages of personnel caused frustrations and resulting actions by British forces which led to the disregarding of ‘minimum force’ rather than establishing hearts and minds. Suspects’ areas were subject to collective punishment for insurgent activities. Bennett further shows that in 1949, for example, the indiscriminate use of force continued, concluding that instances of such use of force ‘were not investigated, and the law was modified to permit use of force’. He concludes by saying that ‘indiscriminate death and destruction is, to a larger or lesser degree, inevitable in armed conflict’ (Bennett, 2009). It is more likely when policy makers think that targeting non-combatants is strategically useful; strategic studies must continue to engage with the question of common suffering not simply because of the moral imperatives inherent in democratic states that are subject to the rule of law, but because it affects the ability to win.

In their article on the ‘Hearts and Minds Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare’, David H. Ucko and Jason E. Fritz (2017) narrate that in past decades, the most dominant view of counterinsurgency in policy and academic circles has fluctuated with regards to the importance of winning the civilian population’s allegiance, which is also important to the insurgents. Accordingly, the broad consensus suggests the need to ‘win’ over the population, mostly through popular empowerment and by shielding it from violence, and, on the whole, preventing it from supporting the insurgency. Still, some saw the focus on securing the population, and the associated slogan ‘wining hearts and minds’, as
implying a dubious and misleading promise of counterinsurgency as a kinder, gentle war (Cohen, 2010). Critics are quick to pounce, yet keen to eschew the necessary context or confuse their own sometimes reductive interpretations of counterinsurgency for its conventional wisdom (Gentile, 2013; Porch, 2013 and Ucko, 2014).

This affirms that what Hazelton articulates as ‘good governance theory’ is associated with the hearts and minds concept. Challenging the good governance theory approach, Hazelton (2017) advanced the ‘Coercion theory’ as introduced in the introduction to this thesis, that sees no danger, and in fact a key benefit in violently controlling civilians as long as select elites are made to benefit from the counterinsurgents’ activities. Success, she notes, is ‘the result of a violent state-building process in which elites engaged in a contest for power’, adding that ‘popular interest matters little to the outcome, and governments benefit from the use of force against civilians’ (Hazelton, 2017). She further argues that ‘drawing from the case of Malaya, as well as Dhofar and El-Salvador’, that this coercion theory better explains success in counterinsurgency than good governance. Scholars like Ucko and Fritz, believed that while Hazelton’s position is explanatory, it nonetheless posits a false choice by proposing that either policymakers accept outright savagery or do not engage in counterinsurgency at all (Ucko and Fritz, 2017).

Overall, while Ucko and Fritz disagree with Hazelton’s approach, they provide several insights. First, they say, her approach problematizes ‘popular support’ as a winner. Hazelton is correct that counterinsurgency is not won by the most liked side, but by the side exercising the most effective control. This explains the situation in North-East Nigeria in the period under study (1999-2017) as the insurgents held control of the region and were winning because they had popular support and were very effective in their attacks. This only changed when the counterinsurgents redesigned and changed their strategy by 2014. That is when the tide turned around in favour of the armed forces, although it was still not a successful story (FM 3-24, US army manual, 2006; Ucko and Fritz, 2013).

In identifying the idealistic assumptions of the good governance approach, Hazelton identifies the linear renditions of counterinsurgency theory which overstates the government’s desire to enact reforms, its ability to target them, its capacity to carry through on this intent, and the relationship between such actions, popular support, and strategic victory. She also acknowledges common deficiencies in counterinsurgency research, including the dominance of secondary sources, the reflection of ‘insurgents’, ‘people’, and
‘government’ as monolithic actors, and the tendency to allow a comforting liberal script to cloud analysis. Hazelton’s coercion theory also has some merits argues Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov (2012) in that it ‘problematises popular support as a war-winner’. Some case studies particularly in authoritarian settings, underline the point that coercion can be effective in defeating insurgency (Ucko, 2016). Caroline Elkins (2005), opined that even in a democratic context, large-scale violence against civilians has not stood in the way of strategic success. Though she said much has already been written on the topic, there is value in acknowledging this dark side of counterinsurgency (Elkin, 2005).

Most literature by scholars and researchers is in agreement when it comes to counterinsurgency strategy or doctrine, specifically that the population is key. This then suggests that winning the hearts and minds of the population is very important to counterinsurgency success. This has been succinctly captured by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces, Afghan Commander, (2009) as thus:

> What I am really telling people is the greatest risk we can accept is to lose the support of the people here. If the people are against us, we cannot be successful. If the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we cannot be successful, and our casualties will go up dramatically.

As captured above, counterinsurgency will always involve the local people, because both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents seek their support. In light of the above they determine who wins in a battle between the governing state and an insurgency. An insurgency as has been defined previously in this thesis, lacks resources and money, which makes it impossible to fight a state power out in the open (Fine, 2010). As a result, an insurgency must rely on the population for support, making them the focus of the battle between a powerful counterinsurgent and the insurgents. The concept of winning hearts and minds was employed by practitioners of counterinsurgency as a strategy to defeating insurgency, serving as a guideline in creating division between the general population and the insurgents (Fine, 2010).

Winning hearts and minds is a broad concept and can be interpreted in a variety of different ways. For the purpose of this thesis, Galula’s theory of what success in counterinsurgency means will be a bedrock for this conceptual analysis. As has been noted in the introduction to this thesis, Galula, an experienced French military officer, served in an area where insurgency
was taking place. One of his more critical assignments in terms of contributing to counterinsurgency theory was his service as military attaché in 1945 at the French embassy located in Beijing, China. He observed one of history’s greatest insurgent movement led by Mao Tse-Tung and as a result, he became familiar with insurgency and its practices. His summary is as thus:

A victory is not just the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organisation…it is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population (Galula, 2006; Galula, 1964).

In Galula’s view there are some key pieces of hearts and minds in which his theory on counterinsurgency success requires that the population be isolated from the insurgents and secured from their attacks without help or influence of the counterinsurgents. As noted by Fine (2010), ‘if the population is not convinced of what employing power of counterinsurgency has to offer in comparison to the insurgents, the general population might succumb to the insurgency’. Building infrastructures and local amenities and meeting some of the basic needs of the people are major elements in winning the hearts and minds of the people for any counterinsurgency effort. Building relationships with the community is equally very important. Looking at the activities of Greg Mortenson, a compassionate humanitarian who helped build schools in Pakistan, what resulted was capturing the hearts and minds of the local populace, which drew the attention of high-ranking US military officers like General David Petraeus, former US commander in Afghanistan, and was therefore encouraged to be replicated in other areas (Mortensen, Relin, 2006).

The US Army War College has now made it compulsory for all officers to study Greg Morteson’s Three Cups of Tea, an expository to Morteson’s work in Pakistan’s less developed areas (Well, 2008). Winning hearts and minds does not necessarily mean the counterinsurgent must be nice, but in dealing with counterinsurgency strategy it requires emotive (hearts) and cognitive (minds) components for a counterinsurgency strategy (Malevich, 2010). The variation in its use depends on the culture of counterinsurgency which is applied towards utilising the winning of hearts and minds in one area. Still, it may mean the use of monetary negotiation in exchange for certain services, leading to what Galula highlighted in his theory of counterinsurgency success as ‘other targeted areas’ that may require some form of stability to achieve a hearts and minds approach. Providing stability
would allow some areas to develop and create their own economic gains without the disruption of insurgent activities. A more common approach is the expansion of social services, which focused on the construction of schools, hospitals, and jobs. This approach is centred on winning the hearts and minds of the local populace in counterinsurgency in order to ensure their full cooperation (Fine, 2010).

As we have generally emphasised and believed in Academic and policy cycles that ‘the strategy of winning hearts and minds’ is considered the key to successful counterinsurgency. But according to Katagari (1991), in his journal article ‘Winning hearts and minds to lose control: Exploring various consequences of popular support in counterinsurgency missions’, it often looks at the expense of the war. He further narrates that this happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgents to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy, and because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory will almost be impossible without it (Katagari).

Unlike conventional war where armed forces play major roles, the centre of gravity of counterinsurgency lies in popular support. Both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents depend on the population for support, information, sanctuary, training grounds, membership and of course legitimacy. When the insurgents are isolated from these privileges, their source of power evaporates and the counterinsurgents can obtain victory. Thus ideal counterinsurgency missions entail great efforts to win over the masses through collaboration with local leaders rather than killing the rebels or those who harbour them. This strategy has been widely applied and replicated in so many counterinsurgents’ efforts, including Britain in Malaya and Dhofar (1965-75), and the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have been touted as one of the most important components of anti-rebellion policy. The winning of hearts and minds is not a cure-all strategy. In his article, Katagari examines the set of effects that the strategy generates, challenges the notion of winning hearts and minds, and offers grounds for caution about its potentially negative consequences (Katagari, 1991).

The elite group has incentives to do so, because the only way for the counterinsurgent to win hearts and minds is to work with the group and because working with the counterinsurgents advances its ends. The tension reveals a critical dilemma inherent in the strategy of civilian collaboration; working with an elite group is a crucial part of the strategy as counterinsurgency would be impossible without this group (Fine, 2011). Fine gave the
example of the Malayan Emergency and argued that Britain’s victory against communist insurgents in Malaya, a classic successful study in winning hearts and minds, came at the expense of a series of concessions to local leaders. While the concession were not one sided, as the British government too made some compromises, reliance on Malayan leaders effectively forced them to make a constitutional handover earlier than intended and abandon certain law enforcement and defence privileges in exchange for their help. Stern concluded that the case study demonstrates that a hearts and minds campaign carries with its certain risks that must be addressed if it is to succeed, and because of the importance of the strategy in counterinsurgency missions, current and future, we must know more about the dynamics (Stern, 2011).

The above strategy according to Jones (2011), has gathered momentum in recent years, as according to him, ‘it has become the centrepiece of many counterinsurgency operations and manuals’. He gave an example, namely that in 2006, the US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, drew attention to a model referred to as ‘clear, hold and build’, which implicitly stresses the importance of civilian support (Field Manual 3-24, 2006). Adding to the above McCary examines the Anbar awakening movement in Iraq in 2006, which led to the decline of support for insurgents in other provinces, supporting the validity of local support gained through patient diplomatic efforts to bridge the gap between interested groups (McCary, 2006). The support as explained by Richard Stubbs (1989), and as spearheaded by General David Petraeus in 2007, is based on the presumption that a 30,000-man increase in combat brigades and support troops would contribute to a close network between the indigenous Iraqi security forces and the coalition (Stubbs, 1989). The people’s support is acknowledged to be so important that not just the government, but insurgents too, have courted civilians in order to combat more powerful enemies (Korski, 2009).

Nori Katagari (2011) explained that there are three competing views to connect to the above exposition. The first view to him, is the strategy to bolster counterinsurgency by boosting military, police, and intelligence operations. Mao foresaw the creation of base areas where one would secure popular support and a haven during what he referred to as a ‘strategic defence’ period. Popular support is the key enabler of insurgents, who use these base areas as a stepping stone to move onto the ‘equilibrium’ period and later the conventional war period in which guerrilla forces would become a supplement to regular armies. Specifically, the population provide intelligence for police and military operations and help the
counterinsurgents choose enemy supply and communications lines so that they must expose their positions in order to gain supplies and recruits. This Maoist proposition has been adopted by the revolutionary leaders and independence movement elsewhere, especially in Indochina (Katagari, 2011). In his second view, Katagari notes that the strategy generates a substandard outcome. Popular support may dissipate under two circumstances. First, civilians may fear insurgents’ retaliation. Revenge is a powerful deterrent; most people prefer to carry on their daily lives without threats on their lives in the North-East of Nigeria. These expectations for revenge and retaliation can easily discourage an otherwise radicalised population from turning away. Second, the strategy may not work when insurgents can offer better alternatives to supporting counterinsurgent policy. They can outbid the latter with promises of reforms, increased spending, and job creation. The fluidity of popular support is made acute by the long duration of campaigns that can cause people to be significantly displeased about the conflict. Narrating further on this, Katagari avows that the counterinsurgent is pressed to provide a reasonable account of progress so that the public will tolerate the sacrifice being made. It must also show consistent accounts of gains and losses on the cumulative basis that they are nevertheless intangible, thus, open to interpretation and disputation (Katagari, 2011). The population will become frustrated if they perceive that the government is not protecting them (Greenhill and Stamiland 2007).

Katagari added a fourth set of views, which he thought has not been exploited in scholarly literature. He posits that the strategy yields negative effects when it requires help from a group better positioned than the counterinsurgents to deal with the civilians. This group he identified as the local organisation that either has existed before the war or emerged during the conflict. It acts on its own interest, with various degrees of freedom to help counterinsurgency operations. It plays a key role in police and combat operations and nation-building efforts to close the gap between the counterinsurgent and population. It causes difficulties, however, when the counterinsurgents become aligned with it in order to gain a semblance of legitimacy that is needed to win over the populace. The counterinsurgents expect the group to play no more than a supportive role, whereas the group allows the latter to demand compromise that is too difficult to meet without relaxing its objectivity, such as territorial control and delegation of greater authority. The result is a dilemma, as without the group playing its part, the strategy will be ineffective. Yet, when the strategy is implemented through the group, the strategy compromises the policy it serves (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery and Sin, 2017).
Two ways out are identified from the above stated problems. First, by empowering the group in the short term, so it becomes a viable force, the counterinsurgent sows the seed of its own demise by aiding a force that may ultimately pursue ends contrary to its own efforts. Winning hearts and minds as captured by Katagiri and Stern, means that the counterinsurgents run the risk of creating a beast that may turn on it in the long run. In other words, the main enemy is no longer the insurgents, but the way to fight them. Second, the problem affects the balance between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. The latter’s inability to handle civilians on its own sends the insurgents a signal of weakness and boosts their political status. It encourages them to invest more in social programmes to harden their popular base, making counterinsurgency even more difficult. Civilians then see the growth of insurgent confidence as a hope for a better life to arrive soon, become more likely to support the insurgents, and as a result become harder to win over. In other words, the constraining nature of indigenous involvement gives the insurgent the momentum and greater popular support. Therefore, the strategy used through the group can undermine the counterinsurgents’ political base (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery, and Sin, 2017).

Katagari summarised that the above four positions are not mutually exclusive; they can occur at the same time and in a chain or sequence, generating a set of highly mixed outcomes, but can have a different impact.

Some past experiences point to the dilemma as a key factor that affected counterinsurgents’ performance. In the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya of 1952-1960, winning support from the ethnic majority, the Kikuyu, became an integral part of British counterinsurgency. The political party the Kenyan Africa Union (KAU), while supporting military operations closely, sought to abuse Britain’s weakness to advance its agenda of independence in 1963. By the granting of independence, the Kikuyu had received a series of concession in land reform, agriculture subsidies, raise in urban wages, direct election of the parliament, and greater political representation. Britain won the counterinsurgency through a compromise with the local representatives of those whose support it needed. In the Philippines, 1946-1954, the US fought the Huk rebels, while Ramon Magsaysay, the President of the Philippines, lent needed help, while feeding on its military and financial and increasing his political status. Both sides collaborated through compromise. On the one hand, the Philippines extended to the US various benefits including an open trade status through the Bell Trade Act. On the other hand, that they needed to defeat the Huks through civilian collaboration forced the US to accept a series of concessions in addition to providing financial aid. Working with local elites and
government officers became a central part to America’s victory, while undermining Washington’s decision-making authority (Kerkvliet, the Huk Rebellion; Baustista. The hukbalahap rebellion). Katagiri quips that the point of the two illustrations is not to show concession-making as a substitute for victory, but to show that it played a vital role in the successful execution of the strategy and the resilient relationship between the counterinsurgents and the local groups (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery and Sin, 2017).

Katagiri (2011) further employed that counterinsurgency practitioners must apply the lessons when they do as part of a progression of historical events that has taken place. He suggests that three inter-related phases – preventive, reactive, and damage-control – can help reduce the adverse impact of the strategy. In the preventive phase, the counterinsurgent can reduce the chances of getting into a dilemma in four ways. First, it can state the range of bargaining explicitly with the local group to discourage the group from abusing its privileged position. It can do so by striking a deal designed to reward cooperation on less significant issues. Second, it can build its support base independent of the group through mechanisms like reward and amnesty. Third, it can prop up another local group through mechanisms which seek popular support and use it as a potential rival to the first group, increase its leverage, and reduce both sides’ bargaining power. Finally, as an alternative, it can explicitly deny the group any room for compromise while promising a greater political role after the war. This might make the situation temporarily difficult, but might also impress on the group the counterinsurgents’ strong resolve to win the war at any cost and to work with the group once the dust of war settles. When taken carefully and in proper context, these measures can help prevent the counterinsurgents from being overly dependent (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery and Sin, 2017).

If the counterinsurgent becomes prey to the group’s abuse, it can try to reduce damage in three ways, while continuing to seek civilian support. First, it can strengthen an ongoing public relations campaign to convince the public that achieving civilian support in the war is so important that compromise is justified. Second, it can again set an upper limit of future concession by balancing the cost of past compromise made against the ones currently demanded, this time with a clearer set of conditions in case the counterinsurgent is found to renege on this pledge. He summated that the counterinsurgent could signal that it is determined to defeat the insurgents on its own to send a stronger message meant directly for
the target audience (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery and Sin, 2017).

Adding to the above, Sinno (2008) argues that concession-making would facilitate the counterinsurgents’ task within the framework of a hearts and minds strategy. Moreover, the strategy is not necessarily detrimental to counterinsurgency, to the contrary, he argues that despite its political pitfalls, the strategy remains one of the most effective strategies to date. Because the cost of this strategy can outweigh its benefits, the counterinsurgents must consider the wisdom of making a blind rush to build up domestic allies in order to gain local support in the light of the potential dangers of doing so. It must also choose its partners with care towards long-term harmonisation with its own interests rather than short-term expediency and navigate through the trade-off in ways that maximise its national interest.

Over time the US and its coalition members have learnt to embrace a strategy of using non-kinetic approaches. Outcomes of negotiations as part of the strategy are unlikely to be one sided. Western counterinsurgents will secure verbal promises from political leaders to make efforts at corruption dealings, financial restriction, and nation-building. But they are certain to take advantage of their position to elicit as much as they can from coalition members bent on seeking popular support from their own constituents. It will be the main task of the counterinsurgents to find ways to mitigate pressure not to give more than they might.

Brian Drohan (2016), writes about the assumption of British counterinsurgency cultural values, which he described as related to the notion that Britain was more successful in waging counterinsurgency than any imperial power such as France. During the 1946-1954 war in Indochina and the 1954-1956 Algerian War, French forces embraced torture to obtain intelligence on insurgent activities and terror to cow the civilian population into submission. He suggested that in both conflicts, France suffered defeat. Likewise, many supporters of the ‘British approaches’ to counterinsurgency, viewed America defeat in Vietnam as the result of the US’s reliance on overwhelming firepower and technology panaceas. These failures coincided with supposed British successes. According to this view this, British forces succeeded because they achieved a kind of moral legitimacy. They won the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilian population by obeying the ‘rule of law’ and using the minimum amount of force necessary against the insurgents, proponents of this narrative believed that unlike the French, British forces existed to protect rather than harm non-combatants.
Drohan further surmised that ‘this idealised image’ of past British victories proved particularly compelling for American policymakers because it appeared to have offered a solution that was not only effective but aligned with American liberal democratic posture and ideals and contemporary international human rights norm. In December 2006, the United States released Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, which wholeheartedly embraced the British counterinsurgency approach as both effective and moral. Security analysts, and policymakers in America, submitted that the new Field Manual offered a viable alternative approach to the intractable problem facing American policymakers in Iraq and Afghanistan (Cahill, 2020). Counterinsurgency became fasionable policy buzzword in Washington as the idea of British exceptionalism rapidly gained favour within both defense and human rights circle. But in activity, ‘British’s post 1945 counterinsurgency campaign involves brutality and coercion against the civilian population of the Mau Mau in Kenya, British forces detained almost the entire Kikuyu population in a ‘gulag’ system, depriving them of their rights and subjecting them to physical abuse. When the Committee of the Red Cross attempted to intervene, the colonial government refused to admit Red Cross delegates into the colony until 1957 when the idea of the war turned decisively in favour of the British colonial authorities. The colonial authorities also manipulated the judicial system by changing rules and expanding the range of capital punishment—ultimately, the government executed 1,090 Kenyans for Emergency-related offences during the conflict, often with little evidence of guilt. Torture, forced incarceration, collective punishment, and other forms of coercion also occurred or were alleged to have occurred during other colonial conflicts between 1945-1967, such as the Emergencies in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, Nyasaland and Aden (Drohan, 2016).

4.2. The Nigerian Armed Forces and ‘Hearts and Minds’

The input of Boko-Haram on security agencies should not be lost. The objective of attacking military and paramilitary installations at the inception of the insurgents’ campaign was to send a clear message and warning to the civil populace who expected that the military would defend them. By 2014, Boko-Haram was in control of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. It launched a media wing, which constantly assaulted the public psyche with images of executions and its other exploits. At the sub-regional level, Boko-Haram also contributed large portions of territory in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, prompting a flurry of deplorable activities across Africa and Europe. Without a doubt, 2011-14 was Boko-
Haram’s most active and successful period. During this period, there is no doubt that the public lost confidence in the ability of the military to defend Nigeria’s territorial integrity. Media editorials and commentaries in both local and international news media headlines clearly indicated this flow of public opinion. The three states in the North-East were placed under emergency rule by the Federal Government. Some observers also called for the removal of the Service Chiefs because of the failure of the armed forces activities in these geographical areas. However, this order of events was not entirely strange. Existing literature on the life cycle of insurgency suggests that insurgency is most violent at the initial stage of their campaign. In this regard, Peter Phillips argues that ‘at the centre of the life cycle sits the grassroots support for the insurgency organisation, competition for grassroots support shapes the timing and intensity of the terrorists’ (insurgents’) organisation’ (Philips, 2017). However, the extent to which Boko-Haram succeeded is debatable. In dealing with insurgency, several lines of operation are usually open to governments. These lines of operation include kinetic, and non-kinetic like diplomacy, political, information, and economic, among others. It is imperative to do so within the parameters of these lines of operations if Nigeria is to win the war against Boko-Haram. Here in this thesis, based on the foundations laid on the activities of Boko-Haram, there is the loss of confidence of the public on both the government and armed forces to secure the North-East. It has become significant for the government to win the hearts and minds of the people in the region. The armed forces’ efforts in that regards are examined as follows.

The National Defence decision making process is stratified into grand-strategy, operational strategy, and tactical levels, and this is in line with the discussion of military effectiveness section in Chapter One. As has been mentioned, misdiagnosis of a problem at the higher echelon can lead to some degree of inertia at the lower echelons. However, the Nigerian military recognises the external dimension of the Boko-Haram insurgency. The doctrine was there but it was difficult to realise due to a lack of institutional framework. The threat definitions have also considered the internal manifestations of Boko-Haram. This has in turn informed the level of force applied. For example, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued by Defence Headquarters emphasised the need for troops to distinguish between civilians and insurgents and ensure the continued protection of the civilian population, in order not to derail the overall objectives of winning hearts and minds. It is also to the credit of this awareness that a youth group, named the Civilian Joint Task Force, who worked with the military to track down known insurgents in the North-East was created (Omeri, 2011).
Similarly, classical counterinsurgency strategy broadly applies the principles such as minimum necessary force. Political awareness by troops and popular support are some of the measures for dealing with threats to national security like those posed by Boko-Haram. Consequently, the restructuring of the campaign plan directed by the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, has resulted in the creation of the theatre command and eight task force divisions as well as logistics and forward operation bases that are cognisant of their huge responsibilities to the society. Despite obstacles, these efforts have given traction to full spectrum logistics, which have supported kinetic operations across the North-East theatre (Liolo, 2013).

Interviews were conducted with members of the military on their methods of pursuing winning hearts and minds in their North-East operations in the period 1999-2017. The respondent was of the view that with regards to winning the hearts and minds of the people at the initial stage of the campaign, there was a disconnect between the civilian population and the military on their intentions and actions, because the population lost confidence in the ability of the military to protect them, judging from the activities of the activities of the insurgent in the North-East. The respondents collectively talked about ‘war of attrition’, which uses non-conventional methods in its operations, and which Boko-Haram have mastered over the period and have been using to its advantage. They emphasised that Boko-Haram resorts to using children as shields and carriers of IEDs, bobby-trapping areas under threat. There was the need for the military to change its tactics and strategy in combating the violence in the region. On the above and in order to successfully deal with the problem, the army resorted to collaborating with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (Respondents, 1, 2 and 5), and as has been discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, the setting up of the Human Rights Desk for queries and Inquiries, free phone lines for the general public to encourage them to provide information, and engaging with the media to try and publicise what the military is doing to build better civil-military relations in the region. The question to ask here is how effective all these measures have been in curbing insurgency. The military in trying to win the hearts and minds of the population came up with what was tagged ‘Quick Impact Projects’. These projects include, but are not limited to, the provision of medical outreach, seminars and workshops, countering damaging ideologies, primary health clinics, securing of farms and farmers, peace-keeping and peace-building, and understanding the evolving nature of the new war including cyber warfare (Major General A34, 2018).
As has been reiterated above, the military had to change its strategy from the kinetic to the non-kinetic model of operations to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population. The Nigerian military’s main mandate in the North-East is to counter the violent extremism faced by the fighting insurgents (Major Gen A10). However, in doing so, it has to win the hearts and minds of the people in the area to regain lost confidence, putting the population-centric approach into focus.

In the interviews conducted at Military Headquarters in January 2017, respondents also narrated the negative public feelings about the military failure and lack of trust on the government’s ability to protect them. All these, they said, contributed to fuelling support for the insurgents (Respondents 15, 17, and 19). As has been clearly stated in Chapter One, both the counterinsurgents and the insurgents seek popular support. In Nigeria, with the failure of the government and the military, the insurgents have for some time had an upper hand and the support of the population.

The winning hearts and minds strategy calls for a reorientation by constructing positive narratives and providing evidence that the military is fighting for the people. This is significant, looking at the history and background of the military and the public perception of its activities in the North-East (Ebube, 2015). As stated earlier, this is important considering that the military response has been received with mixed feelings, generating a feeling of lack of trust and confidence and a perception of failure by the public. The military has faced scrutiny for allegations of human rights abuse, and the indiscriminate use of force resulting to much more collateral damage while fighting the insurgency. Many Nigerians, therefore, lost trust in the military. On the military’s effectiveness, respondents in the military admitted that ‘at the initial stage, there was poor handling of the insurgency situation’, that it was largely as a result of poor information or intelligence, and a lack of organisation, experience, and training in the acts of irregular warfare. So, as an institution, the military was not very surprised by the negative reactions and perceptions it gets from the public. Therefore, in light of the above, the military is trying to redeem its image by winning the hearts and minds of the population through the various activities enumerated earlier in the work (Several Officers interviewed, 2018).

Other activities have also been undertaken in furtherance of winning hearts and minds (Colonel R10, 2018). The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) established a clinic in Dalori Camp 1 for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which is staffed with military Doctors and Nurses,
clinical volunteers catering for patients with mild and severe health conditions. The military can also be found guarding the gates and patrolling the compound. Overall, the military plays a huge role in camp life, including the provision of health services in and around the camp. The NAF also provide medical activities to residents and provides support in other groups such as the nutrition and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). In Banki, a town bordering Cameroon and an entry point for Nigerian refugees from Cameroon, the military is currently fighting the insurgency and providing security to nearby towns, and also assisting in the protection and safe return of Nigerian asylum seekers and refugees along the border. Although, this activity is encroaching on the work of the humanitarians, the respondents are of the view that the activities of the military can be justified as hundreds of Nigerians returned every day, and the humanitarian actors are expected to make realistic preparation and response plans for returnees through the provision of basic needs which include protection, shelter, food, clothing, water, and hygiene and in some instances education. Again, the humanitarians on the ground are being overwhelmed, and given the remoteness and insecurity in the region humanitarians cannot cope, so the space has been expanded to include the Nigerian military. Besides, the respondent narrates that there is a security aspect to the returnees, which includes monitoring and documenting the number of returnees and issues of logistics, which the military supports in partnership with the immigration services and NGOs (Brig-Gen A18).

The respondents also acknowledged that one other way the military is winning hearts and minds is through de-radicalisation; that the two operations put in place, Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Safe Corridor have focused on the rehabilitation and de-radicalisation programmes which focus on the reorientation of violent extremist ideologies. The military campaigns are calling for Boko-Haram militants to surrender and are relying on the narratives of disenfranchisement in the insurgency (where foot soldiers often suffer more, and the leadership goes free), the respondents allay that this has been effective. Many repentant insurgents took to the military gestures and surrendered. The wider implication as gathered in the interviews is that this strategy supports peacebuilding initiatives and other conflict resolution practices endorsed by other stakeholders. It has been gathered that the initiative on de-radicalisation and rehabilitation should be a national plan to ensure repentant insurgents, after going through the process, should be reintegrated and provided with a livelihood support system to avoid a reabsorption into the insurgency (Respondents, 10, 12, and 16).
Other respondents contributed that the other way the military is winning the hearts and minds of the population is the related use of technology, more specifically public relations and social media monitoring hate speeches and information. One respondent quips ‘I no longer put pictures online or use social media, because of the negative public scrutiny and pressure’. He said some of the negative posts you easily come across on social media will often read like ‘Nigeria soldiers eating snakes’ and further comments will also accuse the military of incompetence and corruption, though we know the scale in which these things happened, but some credit must be given to the military or else it can be demoralising to them. A notable intervention by the military is the reduction of individual posts by soldiers and more organised press statements released on military websites and social media pages. The monitoring of press releases on individual posts might infringe on free speech, however negative reports will reduce the image being put on the military and this will also help them in winning hearts and minds of the population. The military too should use friendlier captions on their headlines for the public.

4.2.1. The Good Governance Approach

A good governance approach anywhere in the world curbs most of these negative vices like insurgency. In Nigeria, the issue of bad governance has been a major flaw which can be attributed to many of the ills in society, culminating to rise of crime in major cities and the worst being the Boko-Haram insurgency. The good governance approach is already discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, so that it can be understood within the context of its implication on national security and the rise of Boko-Haram in the North-East Nigeria and how this can help in the counterinsurgency efforts of Nigeria. Boko-Haram’s emergence has always been connected to poverty, lack of good governance, and the deplorable educational system in Nigeria, especially the North-East. According to Edeh and Ugwueze (2014), it is equally unfortunate that the insurgents are fighting to uphold what they think they intend to displace. The real state of the Nigerian situation as regards the Boko-Haram insurgency is a product of bad governance, poverty and stack illiteracy of the underlying mission by the insurgents (Edeh and Ugwueze, 2014).

Good governance applies to the exercise of power in a variety of institutional contexts; the object of which is the direct control and regulation of activities in the interest of the people as
citizens, voters and workers. For political scientists, governance refers to the process of political management which embraces the normative basis of political authority, the style in which public affairs are conducted, and the management of public resources (Bohman, 1991). Central to the above definition of good governance are accountability and transparency, which define how the governed can determine the effectiveness with which their leaders lead them, and legitimacy, which concerns itself with the right of the state to exercise power over citizens, and the extent to which those powers are perceived to be exercised. When the above factors are strictly observed, we can admit to there being good governance; where there are violations, we can then refer to it as bad governance. Below are some elements that have been identified as being responsible for a crisis of governance in Africa in general and particularly in Nigeria: corruption, self-serving interests of the elite and lack of political legitimacy owing to weak or undemocratic leadership.

The above three factors have been attributed to the crisis of governance in Nigeria, and have permeated the leadership fabric at all level of institutionalization or near institutionalization, thereby making it very difficult for leaders to be extricated from the cycle of bad governance, an administrative nemesis. National security, which is almost lacking in Nigeria, is a cherished value associated with the physical safety of individuals, groups, or nation state, together with similar safety of their most cherished value. Therefore, security in an objective sense can be measured by the absence of threat, anxiety or danger. More importantly, security has a sense which is subjective, which can be measured by the absence of fear that threatened, anxiety or danger (Nnoli, 2006).

The Nigerian economy, especially the North-East and the fabric of the already weakened security state, has been totally paralysed by the emergence of the Boko-Haram insurgency (Sule, Sign and Othman, 2015). Like other threatening groups in Nigeria, Boko-Haram has been attributed to poverty, which also is a product of bad governance. Nigeria as one of the largest producers of oil in the world, has the capacity to deal with issues of economic deprivation and even be a striving world power, but according to Sule, Sign and Othman the contrapuntal mechanisation over the years had succeeded at rendering this dream illusory. Boko-Haram and its activities in the North-East has exposed the economic backwardness of the region and country at large, thereby impoverishing the people more and making living conditions unbearable for the people in the region who are either moving out or are in perpetual fear. Insecurity is subjective when there is a threat of attack. Nevertheless, the
Boko-Haram insurgency speaks very loud on the economic backwardness of the Nigerian state, while projecting a serious cataclysmic consequence in the future should the insurgency ever end. The situation in the North-East has become a major issue of great concern both locally and internationally, it has been characterised by mutual distrust and destruction which is prevalent in Nigeria as a result of the Boko-Haram insurgency (Crisisgroup, 2015).

The narrative is that most problems can be solved by good governance. By this derivative interpretation therefore, good governance is a panacea for insecurity, which causes other related issues like economic underdevelopment which is characteristic of Nigeria. These are the problems Nigerians continued to suffer right from the military era from the 1970s. Perhaps, with the return of Nigeria to democratic rule, one should have expected that the situation would improve, but as noted by Adele (2011), the transition to civilian rule has created its own challenges for national security and socio-political development as demonstrated by diverse conflict, upheavals and anti-government agitations in the Niger Delta, and the most dangerous of all is the Boko-Haram as expressed in this thesis (Adele, 2011). Consequently, poverty and socio-political underdevelopment are not conquered through armed struggle, but instead, through coordinated struggle of minds imbued with constructive criticism and good policy initiatives which is lacking in Nigeria. Added to the above, there is a connection between strong democratic leadership and good governance, which are exemplified in three components of good governance – accountability, legitimacy and transparency – as noted earlier. A strong democratic leadership, beyond being a legitimate and transparent one, is an accountable leadership. It is only accountability that can sustain good governance and where there is a technical manoeuvre, bad governance reigns. This explains why Nigeria has not developed despite all the rich human and natural resources it is endowed with (Adele, 2011).

As a corollary to the above, beyond the nexus between strong democratic leadership and good governance, there is an intricate linkage between and among good governance, national security and economic development. Consequently, economic development derives from national security which is also derived from good governance. Where good governance is in critical short supply, national security is compromised, and economic development is eroded, and insurgency can have a birthplace (Sule, Sign and Otherman, 2011). The more the state generates and the more it gives back to the people, the more security and economic development there will be. So, with the reduction in the resources of the state, an insurgent
group might arise to fight for the basic needs of the population. The emergence of this group is not unconnected to the grievances arising from the reduction in the number of resource-generating groups from other parts of society; yet there is no corresponding preferential treatment from the state. Due to the decline in the resource-generating groups, the political leadership finds it difficult to provide adequately for its citizens, but at least there is provision of the quantity capable of taking care of the people’s daily needs. The people in this society are likely to give support to the state fighting the insurgents from one part. Security is seen as a collective responsibility of both the state and the people; hence, the collective fight against the enemy while hopefully looking up to the state to improve the resource-generating groups of the society for onward adequate provision of a better life for them (Sule, Sign and Othman, 2011).

In Nigeria, the resource-generating group has collapsed and can no longer meet the needs of its people and the politicians can rarely give good governance. Because of the long period of corruption, the people are anxiously looking up to the state for their survival. The grievance arising from the situation has given rise to insurgency in the North-East, fighting to gain more resource allocation and attention which the state may or may not have, and because the people receive little or nothing from the state, they are less willing to help the state fight the insurgents; the state is losing popular support. The uprising continues to exacerbate, whereas the state also continues to shrink. The insurgents are seen by the people to be fighting for a just cause. Here, bad governance has corrosively gained control and the state actors scamper to accumulate the less available resources of the society for their private use in anticipation of the generation yet unborn (Sule, 2004).

Once there is good governance and it is improved upon like in most developed societies, the resource-generating groups of the state will also be increasing and so will national security and economic development. Then the insurgency is bound to decline. A decline in good governance elicits a corresponding decline in the resource-generating groups of the state and the same with national security and economic development, while insurgency will be on the increase too. However, the gradual corrosion and erosion of good governance exemplified in utter degeneration of the resource-generating groups of the society and the subsequent grievance arising therefrom suggests that the more resource-generating groups of the state, the more the resources the state has to allocate to the people, and the less aggrieved the
people are. By implication, the lesser the insurgency and the more national security and economic development there is.

From the foregoing therefore, one may ask, what is responsible for the inability of the armed forces to effectively fight the insurgency in Nigeria and the subsequent rise of insurgency in the North-East part of the country after 1999? Most of the answers have already been stated in various parts of this research, but it will be important to restate a few here: corruption; self-interest of the political elites; and loss of political legitimacy owing to weak institutions. In their conclusion, Sule, Sign and Othman, whom the thesis agrees with is, argue that both bad governance arising from the selfish interest of the leaders built on the use of state power for acquiring material gains as the case of Nigeria from the 1960s to date, and insurgencies arising from the desire of the insurgents to lure the state through violence to grant them their wishes, are all products of greed which is a precondition for corruption and other social vices that follow suit. ‘Greed and opportunity play important roles in motivating people to fight’ (Reno, 2006). There is no difference between the politician who fights and kills in order to gain state power by all means possible, and the insurgents who also fight and kill to gain power by all means possible to achieve their selfish desires and needs (Reno, 2006). The Nigerian armed forces are a reflection of bad leadership by the Nigerian politicians, so if there is lack of good governance from the government, the armed forces are limited to what they can do as an institution.

As a matter of national importance, the Nigerian state, represented by the ruling political elites, should hasten to remove all the ailing resource-generating groups of the economy, agriculture, mining, education, in addition to commerce and industry. What it means is that high budgeting for security, as was the case with the 2012 Nigerian national budget, while not bad, is not a panacea for the insurgency in which Nigeria is enmeshed today. There is a situation where pen-robbers who are worse than armed robbers are found guilty of corruption and are made to pay a paltry sum as a fine, while waiting for pardon to continue to steal from the government purse (Edeh, 2014)

4.3. The Use of Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency

This section on the use of minimum force argues that it is critical in the war against insurgency; this is because it minimises the level of casualties among the civilians. The use of
minimum force in counterinsurgency is important because it determine how hearts and minds are won. In this chapter British counterinsurgency is examined, with a view to analysing the Nigerian scenario. In his analysis on the use of force in counterinsurgency in the article ‘The other side of Counterinsurgency: Minimum and exemplary force in British Army counterinsurgency in Kenya’ Bennett (2007), expressed that during the decolonisation period, in which the UK gave up a large portion of its overseas territories, the British military faced many encounters with irregular armies. British counterinsurgency has been seen by many writers, scholars and researchers as a model for present and future success in counterinsurgency operations, although many writers, scholars and researchers have also found a platform for debate (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Egnell, 2010; Katagiri, 2011; Asal, Deloughery and Sin, 2017). This will be more discussed more broadly in the conclusion to this chapter. The basic question usually asked in British counterinsurgency and other contexts, is to what extent do counterinsurgency operations adhere to the principles of the use of force as it relates to the rules of engagement.

Titus Van de Kerke (2015) in his narratives in the paper titled ‘The Use of Minimum Force: Painful Myth or Useful Reality’ points out some important and necessary points about British counterinsurgency operations. He looked at Thomas Mockaitis and Rod Thornton, two prominent scholars on counterinsurgency and opined that British counterinsurgency revolved around a set of principles, one of which is the use of minimum force. This aspect is equally important to this thesis, as the experience of the British counterinsurgency and the US too demonstrate.

In his article ‘Low-Intensity Conflict: The British Experience’, Mockaitis (1990) opined that the British approached low-intensity conflict with the vital assumption that ‘insurgency was primarily a military problem’. He further alleged that ‘civil unrest should not be met with violence but be dealt with through a combination of reforms like winning hearts and minds’ and police measures. Mockaitis further narrates that if it was necessary to keep the peace ‘soldiers would operate to support the police from within the civil structure and would be bound, like police themselves, to use only the degree of force which is just’ and essential to restore peace and order.

Mockaitis further asserted that the principle of the use of minimum force, which initially would only have been applied if soldiers were aiding civil power in the case of a riot, was expanded to what he considers ‘to cover an ever widening variety of disturbances’, partly out
of fear that soldiers would have to be deployed in the context of labour unrest (Mockaitis, 1990). Mockaitis explains that legally, various forms of civil unrest can still warrant different degrees of force, and he believes that the use of as minimal force as possible became something soldiers adhered to as a general rule, even when martial law had been imposed. He agrees that while there could be difficulties, creating the possibility of ambiguity about the acceptability of force. He asserts that ‘soldiers avoided the legal imbroglio by applying the principle of minimum force to all cases of unrest.’ He vehemently supports the importance of restraints for the success of British counterinsurgency, which he called ‘a principal ingredient in the British formula for success in counterinsurgency’ (Mockaitis, 1990).

In departing from Mockaitis’s adoption of the minimum or limited force principle, Rod Thornton (2004), engages with the principle of minimum force. Thornton argues that the minimum use of force had been a part of the British army’s organisational culture for many years prior to the massacre of Amritsar. He believes Amritsar was by itself a departure from acceptable norms for the British soldiers who had been trained to avoid or reduce fatalities in carrying out their duties. British troops did not restrain themselves because of what Thornton referred as ‘qualms about inflicting heavy casualties in their conduct was guided by much deeper lying principles, which is the moral principle installed in them by Victorian society’ (Thornton, 2012). According to Thornton ‘an emphasis on individual acceptance’ in British society came to be accepted with a price; it ‘meant that individuals had to be extremely mindful of their own action in line with the law’ (Thornton, 2004). He again explains that the same challenge faced British soldiers when involved in the repression of civil unrest, no matter where they happen to be. Troops had to operate within the confines of British common law which he said also meant that ‘the degree of force used in any policing situation whether in Britain or overseas had to be more and no less than the minimum force necessary to restore the peace’.

In disagreeing with Thornton, Mockaitis disputes the extent to which use of minimum force was intrinsic to the mind-set of British officers, noting that they ‘often resented the restriction placed on their ability to use force’ (Mockaitis, 1990). Hughes noted that soldiers tended to be ‘condemned for using either too much force or too little’, and argues that in many situations, they would have prepared the ability to nip ‘unrest in the bud’ and save ‘more lives in the future’ (Hughes, 2009). Thornton believes that the use of a minimum force philosophy largely came from pragmatism, as the British maintained a successful
professional army of limited scope while controlling an increasingly large part of the world. Realising that maintaining order using violence would antagonise neutral or loyal civilian populations, Britain adopted a strategy of maintaining a military presence in unruly areas but only using force when there was no other means available and with as much caution as possible (Shoul, 2006). He further believes that this mind-set led the British army to develop a reluctance to adopt weapons which reduced the ability to apply force in moderation as well as a preference for mobility over protectiveness in transportation (Thornton, 2006). Mockaitis also believes that while British troops ‘generally avoided serious misdeeds’ during counterinsurgency campaigns, they were sometimes less successful in avoiding the appearance of wrongdoing (Mockaitis, 1990). He does, however, argue that when an excess occurs, the British authorities tended to establish a genuine inquiry into the incident.

Hughes (2009) in his article ‘Banality of Brutality: British Armed Revolt and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine 1936-39’, asked whether British troops tended to ‘avoid what today would have been human rights abuses’ in the course of their counterinsurgency campaign in Palestine in the late 1930s. This point challenges Thornton and Mockaitis’ views. For instance, while Mockaitis points at the principle of minimum force being spread through several military manuals for engagement in civil unrest and small wars, he remarks that those same publications provide ‘a legal framework for shooting rioters and allowed for collective punishment and retribution.’

In yet another remark, Hughes asserts that while legal actions against soldiers who had committed criminal acts against the civilian population during the Palestinian conflict were technically possible, the fact that individual soldiers (without identification of them) had to be pointed out and the separation of the civil and military legal systems, meant that such cases were unlikely to occur. He opined that Arab combatants were denied prisoner of war status, subjecting them to criminal prosecution as well as measures enabled through martial law ‘such as the death penalty for carrying ammunition or a firearm’, while not being protected by international law. He concluded that the British attempted to find a balance between what was ‘lawful, what was morally right, and what worked’ during their campaign in Palestine, leading them to implement a ‘systematic, systemic, officially sanctioned policy of destruction, punishment, reprisal and brutality; operating within their legal framework.’ He does however, remark that compared to other imperial powers that fought similar campaigns, British wrongdoings were relatively minor (Hughes, 2009).
Bennett (2007) explains that some of the secondary literature on British counterinsurgency, assumes that the replacement for international law in restraining the military was national, organisational culture, evident in the concept of minimum force. Bennett continues by mentioning that scholars are ‘beginning to question the notion that the concept of minimum force was integral to the British tradition’ and the extent to which it was responsible for British counterinsurgency success. He argues that while minimum force was ‘being clearly laid out in doctrine, professional journals and Staff College syllabi’, it clashes with draconian legislation introduced when emergencies were declared. The campaign in Kenya, whose military stages lasted from October 1952 until November 1956, resulted in over 20,000 deaths as well as 150,000 imprisonments among Kenya’s Kikuyu, Embu and Meru civilian populace.

In Bennett’s conclusion, the security forces including the army, relied upon broadly indiscriminate repression to produce results and ‘such an attitude was hardly unusual, nor did it demand a complicated manipulation of international law’ (Bennett, 2007). In his defence on the criticism on the use of force on the Kenya uprising, he had identified the need for British counterinsurgency to ‘move beyond an obsessional impulse to prove doctrine true’, because of its ‘important implications for military strategy and operational efficiency (Bennett, 2007). In Hughes’ doctoral thesis on the Arab revolt (2006) he challenges the myth surrounding British counterinsurgency and maintained that there is a general overreliance on the assumption that the British used force sparingly, and only limited endeavours to guarantee the use of force. He assesses the degree of force used by the British forces in India, Egypt and Palestine during the inter-bellum on a more rigorous, statistical level than formerly attempted. Shoul (2006) concludes that while riot suppression involved ‘every degree of forcible suppression from polo sticks to machine guns and aerial bombs; using force was the ‘universal’ first resort of both civil and military leaders.’ Accordingly, Shoul asserts that the fact ‘that British civil administration was not keen to call the army in, and the army did not like to be called, led to the development of a variety of ‘indigenous diplomatic solutions meant to avoid the use of violence. While his research produces a relatively positive look at the use of force by British troops, he does however criticise the ‘tendency in much recent research to take the official description of events and doctrine as the verbatim truth.’

Finally, another example of an author who criticises the historical research surrounding British counterinsurgency and the use of force is Andrew Mumford. He maintained that the
‘long standing assumptions’ that British counterinsurgency aimed to produce civilian goodwill ‘must be a colonial-era myth’ given the regularity with which insurgent suspects were brutally treated during the conflict in Northern Ireland, noting that the use of force ‘revealed a dark lineage to British counterinsurgency conduct’ (Mumford, 2011). The use of wall-standing, hooding, continuous white noise, food denial, and sleep deprivation was developed during colonial counterinsurgencies since the end of the Second World War (Newbery, 2015). Van de Kerke (2015) concludes that while the debate shows how different presentation and interpretations of the past create the possibility of adopting different lessons or experience for the future, the image provided by the current literature on British counterinsurgency shows the UK as relatively prone to look for solutions which involve the avoidance of force. It shows that counterinsurgency works best with minimal force.

4.3.1. The Use of Minimum Force by the Nigerian Military

The concept of minimum force is not well defined in the counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian armed forces’ campaign in the North-East. In conducting interviews as regards the use of force, most officers submit that appropriate force was used commensurate with the offensive from the insurgency. This does not agree with the Amnesty International report of 2015 on the excessive use of force by the Nigerian armed forces against suspected Boko-Haram members.

Interviews were conducted for this study, though when it came to some sensitive security issues Officers were not comfortable discussing it. This is understandable, because the fight against insurgency in the North-East is still ongoing, and certain information if released might jeopardise intelligence. However, some vital information was collected which will help in our analysis of the subject under discussion. Other documents will be relied on such as secondary literature, government reports and some legislative proceedings as to the use of minimum force in the North-East Nigeria. The purpose is to understand the level at which the military used the rules of engagement in its operations, most importantly whether the use of force was proportionate and appropriate. Some incidences of military engagement are discussed. The findings are that the military were excessive in the use of force leading to human rights abuses. With the high rate of abuse by the military, the counterinsurgency operation in the North-East lost the support of the population, because the population began to see the military as an enemy. This was also an advantage to the insurgents, who gained
more sympathy, and thus more support. As has been stated, successful counterinsurgency is to a large extent population-centric in approach. According to the Amnesty International Report (2015) written for the 29th session of the UN’s Human Rights Council, both the Nigerian military and Boko-Haram were guilty of grievous offences against international law.

The same report revealed that during their operations against Boko-Haram, the Nigerian military’s forces have committed war crimes, acts which amount to crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations. These acts are documented in Amnesty International’s Report ‘Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military’ (AIR, 44/1/1657/2015), which was released on the 3rd June 2015. Its claims include that since March 2011, more than 7,000 men and boys have died in military detention. Their deaths are often unrecorded, like most other abuses during the military’s counterinsurgency, and almost never investigated. Amnesty International gathered the data and details of individual cases through visits to mortuaries, from internal military reports, and statistics recorded by local human rights activists and interviews with eyewitnesses, detainees, hospital staff, mortuary officials and military sources. The main causes of death were starvations, thirst, severe overcrowding that led to the spread of lethal diseases, torture and lack of medical attention, and the use of fumigating chemicals in unventilated cells. The highest death rates were recorded in Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, in the months of May, June and July 2013, where up to 180 deaths were recorded. Amnesty International further documented similar patterns of deaths in custody at the military camp Alpha ‘Guantanamo’ in Damaturu, the Yobe state capital and through the Joint Task Force in Potiskum, also in Yobe state. More evidence points to further deaths in custody at the multinational JTF Headquarters at Baga, Borno state, 23 Armoured Brigade Barracks in Yola, Adamawa state, and the Presidential Lodge ‘Guardroom’ in Damaturu, Yobe state.

On extra-judicial executions Amnesty International found that at least 1,200 people, and almost certainly many more, have been extra-judicially executed by the military since February 2012, including the following cases: On 14 March 2014, Nigerian soldiers killed more than 640 recaptured detainees in Maiduguri, after they were released during a Boko-Haram attack on Giwa Barracks; On 18 April 2013, 64 detainees were taken out of their cell in Presidential Lodge ‘Guardroom’ in Damaturu, Yobe state, driven into the bush and shot at close range; and on 14 February 2012, Nigerian soldiers opened fire on civilians in Duguri,
an island in Lake Chad. According to witnesses, more than 200 people were killed. The killing appeared to have been revenge for a Boko-Haram attack two days earlier, in which at least two soldiers died (Amnesty International, 2015).

On the topic of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, Amnesty International found that the military have tortured suspects in custody and kept them in overcrowded cells, without access to adequate sanitary facilities, food, water or medical care. These conditions amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. They also estimated that, concerning arbitrary arrests, since 2009, the Nigerian military has arrested at least 20,000 persons in areas of Boko-Haram activity. On numerous occasions, particularly following Boko-Haram raids, soldiers have used unreliable hidden information to screen entire communities in Borno and Yobe states. The military has also arrested relatives of Boko-Haram suspects in lieu of the main suspect. On unlawful detention, in detention centres in the North-East, detainees have not had access to their families, lawyers or adequate medical attention. Those detainees are held because they are allegedly members or supporters of Boko-Haram, but most have never been charged or have not been brought before any court. In relation to the above, Amnesty International concluded that the government of Nigeria has failed to take prompt and effective steps to investigate and hold accountable most perpetrators of serious crime on all sides, including Boko-Haram, the Nigerian military forces and the state-sponsored militia known as the ‘civilian JTF’.

Documentary evidence which Amnesty International said was provided to them shows clearly that senior military officers were fully informed of the nature and scale of the crimes being committed and failed to take any meaningful measures to stop the violations. Their report names five high-ranking military officials who oversaw operations in North-East Nigeria from 2012 to 2015, as well as two Chiefs of Army Staff and two Chief of Defence Staff, who should be investigated for potential individual and command responsibility for crime and excesses in their various actions or inactions. The Nigerian military has vehemently denied all allegations and even accused Amnesty International of complicity and bias in their conduct and reports on their activities in the North-East. In summary, there is high level of abuse by the Nigerian military and complicity in all allegations levelled against it. It important for the military to own up to these and change its strategy and adopt a more robust application of minimum force.
Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, it is important to gain the population’s support on the side of the counterinsurgents, as the insurgents clamour for the same support. Winning hearts and minds leads to good governance; it allows the government to provide the basic needs of its citizens, which again is a quest for most developing countries, specifically for the Nigerian government, who have failed to provide good governance to its citizens, thereby providing the conditions necessary for the growth of ‘soft targets’ and a fertile environment for insurgency to flourish. Subsequent to the above is the issue of the minimum force, as proportionate force is required to be used in response to attacks, excessive force can lead to human rights abuses, thus can make counterinsurgents lose the support of the population, and risks increasing support for the insurgents.
CHAPTER FIVE

Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

It is generally recognised that without proper intelligence, it will be difficult for any counterinsurgency to succeed. As such, intelligence is widely used by the Nigerian military in coordinating the fight against Boko-Haram. Emphasis will be placed on surveillance, cordon and search operations, collecting intelligence from the public, interrogation, covert operations, all of which are methods used in collecting intelligence in the North-East Nigeria. The chapter also examines coordination in intelligence among the security agencies involved and, finally, how intelligence was used in the North-East to counter the insurgency. The chapter concludes by showing whether intelligence was properly collected and used adequately or not by the Nigerian military. It was categorically stated in interviews conducted with the military that intelligence was most likely compromised and, as found in other interviews, some military officers are sympathetic to Boko-Haram’s aims.

5.1. The Importance of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

Bruce Hoffman (2004) believes one indispensable component of counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the entire spectrum of operations, is the requirement for ‘actionable intelligence’. Accurate, timely intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the insurgency is a prerequisite to success in all facets of counterinsurgency. Due to the inherent precariousness of their situation, even counterinsurgency forces in possession of good intelligence can be defeated; but alternatively, they have little hope without it. Intelligence, and the means to get it—a centrally managed, experienced and well organised intelligence architecture—is fundamental to the success of counterinsurgency warfare.

Given this fact, it is paramount that counterinsurgents gain essential intelligence. Unlike conventional warfare, where the balance of intelligence data is derived from technical means like Signal (SIGNINT), Imagery, and Measurement and Signature Intelligence, in counterinsurgency warfare, intelligence is gathered primarily through the human interface. Hammes (2006) opines that this kind of intelligence (HUMINT), has advantages over other
forms because it is investigative and more analytical (Hammes, 2006). Analyses by Herman (1996) and Clark (2006) have highlighted the relative efficacy of the various methods of collecting intelligence in conventional conflicts and counterinsurgencies. Herman’s analysis provides a chronology of the adoption of both HUMINT and SIGINT, where credible intelligence was obtained from people and technical sources respectively. He noted that the use refugees and emigrants provided valuable HUMINT about the Soviet missile programme in the 1950s. In another scenario, informants from Iraq provided important information on Saddam Hussein’s nuclear programme. HUMINT could be problematic, however, as intelligence personnel would have to rely on informants or spies from the enemy’s camp who were willing to ‘betray or compromise their allegiance to their country or organisation or in other instances engage informants covertly to obtain the desired information’ (Lomas and Murphy, 2019). Herman underlines SIGINT from radio interceptions as instrumental to the successes of the Germans at Tannenberg in the interception of Russian orders, and to the British naval strategy of remote obstruction of the German Fleet from Scapa Flow and Cromarty. Herman notes that the adoption of SIGINT also grew alongside reliance on the use of radio during the Second World War. Clark also argues that with the advent of computers, mobiles, and the internet, SIGINT is becoming more useful and can be used to expose insurgent cells for attack (Clark, 2006).

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen in their article, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st century’ (2004), summarised that in a failed or collapsed state (like Nigeria in recent years), where an indigenous police infrastructure is often weak or non-existent, military intelligence and police units by themselves are charged with obtaining the intelligence needed to drive operations (Metz and Millen, 2004). This is a daunting task under optimal conditions, let alone in an undeveloped, archaic environment. Typically, these units can anticipate a shortage of linguists, unfamiliarity with the regional culture, a lack of credible sources from which to extract information, and in most cases, a glaring lack of manpower to accomplish their mission. Here, and in the previous chapter on the establishment of indigenous police and a community Civilian Joint Task Force, the establishment of indigenous police was raised and proffered as a solution to help fight against insurgency. Understanding the local environment and language of the people is key to successful counterinsurgency operations. In addition, using all means at their disposal to gather, analyse, and disseminate intelligence for current operations, it is imperative that they simultaneously work to reconstitute, reorganise, and train indigenous personnel to do the same (Metz and Millen, 2004). Glop (1962), said
that in the final analysis, the success of the intelligence efforts, and thus the counterinsurgency effort at large, depends on the degree to which the latter task is fulfilled. This thesis we will examine the examples of the British counterinsurgency in the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), as experiences that Nigeria and other countries can use to improve their own counterinsurgency strategies.

5.1.1. The British in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60

This insurgency began in 1948 in an outbreak of hostilities against Europeans by the Malayan-Chinese population conducted principally by the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA), although there were other smaller armed factions involved as well (Nagl, 2002). The violence was the culmination of political tension caused by a perceived lack of fairness in the treatment of the ethnic Chinese minority and the ascendance of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). At the time of the uprising, the British and indigenous military and police forces were few and were already stretched. The British responded by requesting reinforcements and by attempting to generate additional indigenous police and army units. However, in addition to the unfavourable force ratio between government and guerrilla forces, the initial British military operations conducted to quell the insurgency employed conventional tactics that were ineffective in capturing or killing enemy combatants. The Communist Terrorist (CT) forces retreated to the jungle, melted into the local population, and by operating in small bands, avoided detection by the army’s cumbersome ‘cordon and search’ operations (Clark, 2006). As with the other scenarios, the lack of reliable, actionable intelligence was hampering the government’s efforts to respond. In the beginning, the intelligence apparatus was representative of the British Administration in Malaya. It was understaffed and improperly organised particularly for the type of fight within which they were embroiled (Clark, 2006).

The British intelligence apparatus, formidable prior to the Japanese occupation, had not been reconstituted prior to the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. Two events occurred in short succession, however, to set the intelligence architecture and the entire counterinsurgency campaign in the right direction. The first of these was the implementation of the ‘Briggs plan’, with the arrival in 1950 of its namesake, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs. Briggs resettled Chinese ‘squatters’ to new locations to deny CT forces sanctuary, succour, and
intelligence from the local population. He expanded police and indigenous defence forces and established a unified command structure for the direction and control of all counterinsurgency operations (Molnar, 1966). By the end of his tenure as Director of Operations, eighteen months later, he had set the conditions for success in Malaya (Mans, 1962). The second breakthrough was the recognition of the intelligence structure and the emergence of police forces as the focal point of intelligence operations. This was accomplished by the Briggs’ successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, upon his assumption of the position of High Commissioner in early 1952 (McCuen 1966). It was decided they would organise the intelligence agencies around the police rather than the army. This capitalised the static nature of police deployment, which enabled the police to build up intelligence picture in one area over a long period. Gradually, this system provided an ever-increasing flow of information for the security forces (McCuen).

In his book *The Act of Counter-Revolutionary War*, John J. McCuen (1966) assessed that this development sounded the death knell for the CTs in Malaya as the British and the Malayan allies systematically identified, targeted, and neutralised the insurgents:

> Within a few years, the intelligence people had pictures of all the active rebels. ‘Kills’ could be photographed by troops or police and identified on their return to base as principal counter-revolutionary weapon (McCuen, 1966).

These initiatives were not without their problems; the resettlement program, although ultimately effective in cutting off the insurgents’ base, was fraught with problems. With resettlement progressing and the intelligence architecture reorganised around police work, the counterinsurgency flourished. In this environment, the British Special Branch of the police, responsible for collecting and collating intelligence, began to roll-up the insurgents. They expanded their collection areas, to include the new resettlement villages. The Special Branch developed a network of paid informants and were able to ‘turn’ some CTs into double agents resulting in the ‘foiling’ of insurgents’ operations and the disclosure and capture of entire insurgent cells. As the war progressed, the Special Branch improved further by establishing a school that taught counterinsurgents tactics and techniques learned in the field to new arrivals and indigenous recruits (Nagl, 2002).

By 1952, the British had largely pacified the Malayan peninsular and granted the country full independence by August of 1957. The insurgents persisted until 1960, but by that time the
movement was fragmented and largely ineffective, having been deprived of its base; with independence, the insurgency lost its anti-colonialist propaganda message as well (McCuen, 1966). After twelve years of frustration, adaptation and innovation, British success in Malaya was complete. The British performance during the Malayan Emergency is often cited as the paradigm for a successful counterinsurgency. Furthermore, the insurgents enjoyed little outside assistance because they ‘had no common border with any sympathetic country’ (McCuen). The counterinsurgent forces were able to isolate their adversaries from the public, an important pre-condition for its success. This differs from the Nigerian experience of counterinsurgency because the insurgents enjoy cross-border cooperation with allies in neighbouring countries (Chad, Niger, Cameroon) and external support (from Al-Qaeda, Al-Shaabab, and ISIS). This buttresses the earlier assertion that the success of counterinsurgency operations is largely dependent on the peculiarities or circumstances of the environment. However, lessons from the Malayan experience can help the Nigerian military in fighting insurgency.

5.1.2. The Police and Human Intelligence

A successful counterinsurgency campaign suggests a strategy that entails collaboration between police and intelligence organisation such as a joint police and intelligence organisation, focused on the exploitation of human intelligence. Normally, the practitioners of this enterprise are indigenous police and military HUMINT operatives under the auspices of the local or occupation authorities, which employ overt, covert, and clandestine methodologies to penetrate the insurgents. Equally noteworthy is that all the successful efforts in the British-Malayan Emergency were coordinated under a single authority to ensure unity of effort (Hoffman, 2007).

As noted by McCuen, ‘the police are the logical authorities to organise the intelligence network. They have the organisation, distribution of personnel, and wide contact with the population to accomplish the tasks. Intelligence collection, processing, and distribution must be jointly conducted with the military, administrative, and political establishment, joint collection of intelligence thus becomes the foundation of unity of effort among the various agencies responsible for counterrevolutionary operations (McCuen, 1966). At the same time, police and HUMINT efforts must be supported by an active counter-intelligence campaign to
deny and frustrate the insurgency. Successful counterinsurgencies have built momentum by thwarting hostile intelligence operations and parlaying these successes into propaganda victories (Clark, 2006). The director or commander of this intelligence organisation may be a police officer or a military intelligence officer; however, it is imperative that this individual have the requisite background and experience to manage these specialised, complex operations. When reading about the importance of police work in counterinsurgency warfare, it is important to note that the desired skills are investigative in nature. The business of the police in counterinsurgency operations is to extract, analyse, and disseminate information gathered from the public and captured hostiles for use in the apprehension or elimination of known insurgents. This is complex detective work involving surveillance, the recruitment and management of informants, informal questioning, detainee operations, and formal interrogation of suspected insurgents and their associates. Likewise, should a military intelligence officer be selected to head this organisation, the ideal candidate would be a trained HUMINT officer with strong leadership credentials and extensive field experience in overt, covert, and clandestine operations (Clark, 2006).

The appointed Director must be well-trained and well-versed in police and intelligence investigative process and able to respond to adaptive insurgent modus operandi. In Iraq after the 2003 invasion, the United Sates has faced an insurgency with external connections well beyond the state’s borders. The director of intelligence operations must know that police capability has always been vital to destroy insurgent political backgrounds, but also is becoming more so as insurgency mutates. Today, effective, preferably multinational law enforcement support is vital to limit insurgent access to resources, whether direct criminal activity or ties to global organised crime (Metz and Mullen, 2004).

The director of intelligence operations must establish a systematic approach to collecting, collating, analysing, producing, and disseminating data as the first order of business. As noted earlier, British in Malaya, for example, established centralised intelligence organisations in their respective areas of operation with superb results (Hammes, 2004). Information and reports gathered from multiple resources were funnelled in to the intelligence headquarters for all source analysis, cataloguing, and action in hierarchical fashion. Then, in cases where the acquired data was time sensitive, the finished intelligence product was disseminated to the operator for immediate action. In other cases, where the data
was less precise or incomplete, it was further developed and used to drive planning for future operations.

In contemporary times like today, the same general principles apply; but now, the information has the potential to move much more rapidly from the collector to the consumer due to advances in technology and can be merged with intelligence gathered from other technical means to create an all-source product (Hoffman). Hierarchal organisations persist, but the trends are towards flatter, network-centric structures that offer more agility. They use less time processing, analysing, and disseminating intelligence, and more closely mirror the structures, methods, and tactics of the insurgents (Hoffman, 2006). But like in the past, direct human interface remains the preferred method of gathering intelligence in a counterinsurgency campaign. IMINT, SIGINT and MASINT contributed to the effort, but without having corroborating HUMINT these have led to faulty targeting and catastrophic collateral damage which feeds insurgent propaganda (Benson, 2006). Consequently, the most reliable source of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations is derived from direct human contact.

There are many methods of gathering HUMINT to support counterinsurgency operations. Each of these methods is a potential tool in the intelligence director’s comprehensive campaign to pierce the insurgents’ network. Before receiving these methods, it should be noted that the vast majority of HUMINT report is derived from what most would consider mundane police and intelligence networks, principally patrolling the beat, questioning ordinary citizens, and investigating crimes. On the other hand, while extremely valuable, only a small percentage of overall HUMINT collection comes from covert or clandestine means. This fact does not undermine covert or clandestine operations, but underscores the great value derived from less glorious, even tedious, overt HUMINT operations (Clark, 2006).

Clark further noted that one of the most routine, yet most productive methods of collection is through daily contact with the population. Police officers, particularly indigenous officers, are ideally suited to these tasks. During their daily duties, police officers render reports on personalities, incidents, and other activity occurring in their area of responsibility. While these reports are voluminous and difficult to compile, they form the bedrock of the intelligence effort. Modern database tools allow analysts, agents, and investigators to search this electronic warehouse using criteria such as type of activity, name, and location, thereby facilitating trend analysis and corroboration of other collected intelligence. The keys to these
are twofold, first, they must be well-trained, observant, and concentrated in their reporting to ensure the integrity of the database, and second, the database must be accessible to all who have a need to know and not ‘stove-piped’ within police or HUMINT channels only (Clark, 2006).

Molner asserts that another conventional method of gathering HUMINT is cordon and search. This is a valuable valid collection technique that very often is executed poorly. In Iraq, during the early days of the insurgency in 2003 and early 2004, cordon and search operations were conducted carelessly and received criticism for alienating the public (Hoffman). This procedure is employed most often when initial intelligence on the target is not specific enough or is incompetent. A geographic area is chosen and designated to be cordoned, or surrounded, to cut off potential escape routes; police, military, or security forces are used to search systematically the area for the specific target or targets. Inhabitants of the area are questioned, and residences and buildings are thoroughly searched to capture or gain additional intelligence for future exploitation (Molner 2000).

Police and counterinsurgency personnel also receive valuable information from informants. These collaborators willingly cooperate with authorities by providing information of value about the insurgents. They may do this for a variety of reasons, which may include everything from patriotism to abject greed (Molnar). This information can be extremely valuable, particularly after the source has been evaluated formally for reliability and trustworthiness by the handling agents (Clark 2006).

Another important source of HUMINT is interrogation. Police and other HUMINT officers interrogate ‘agents, informants, suspects, and captured or surrendered members of the insurgent organisation’, to gather critical, first-hand information about the capabilities and intentions of the insurgent movement. US interrogation methodologies have received intense scrutiny in the wake the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq which has led to a complete re-examination of US interrogation doctrine. Intelligence experts hope to forge a doctrinal response to this inquiry that balances military intelligence requirements with national and international ethical values and standard of conduct. Interrogation is too vital a part of intelligence collection to be abandoned completely. The interrogation of a high-value target, when properly conducted, remains an invaluable source of intelligence information; ‘in the last four years of the Malayan Emergency, the intelligence gathered from each surrendered insurgent resulted in the death of two insurgents’ (Pustay. 1981). Because if this continued,
ultimately, interrogation techniques will be revised, and will be a vital source of HUMINT in support of counterinsurgency warfare (Clark, 2006).

5.1.3. Counterinsurgencies are Manpower Intensive

The second universal characteristic of successful counterinsurgency warfare is the massive deployment of forces through the area of operations. Counterinsurgencies are manpower intensive by nature, this has been buttressed by Corum, in Chapter One of this thesis. There is no substitute for the robust presence of police and military cadre on the ground, preferably doing something to ensure the security of the people and for proper intelligence gathering. This robust presence is necessary for a number of reasons, not the least of which to facilitate civil-military operations in support of the government’s ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. This has also been emphasised in previous chapters of the thesis, dealing with civil-military relations and winning hearts and minds. But it is also decisive from an intelligence perspective.

One of the principal failings of the French in Indochina was the lack of adequate personnel on the ground. There were not enough soldiers, police, or administrators to simultaneously pacify some areas of Indochina, while attempting to clear others; the Vietminh simply avoided each French thrust and watched the tiger chase its tail to exhaustion. Similarly, without stable outposts gathering information, the French were unable to develop a thorough understanding of general Giap’s intention and capabilities in northern Indochina. This dilemma bears some similarities to US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq from 2003, and that leads us to the next question: if physical presence is important in quelling insurgency, how many counterinsurgents does it take to extinguish a virulent insurgency, asked Clark. In order to deal with any large-scale insurgency, particularly in a vast expanse of territory, the force ratio between government forces and insurgents must favour the government, based on the experiences of the French in Indochina and the British in Malaya (Clark, 2006)

Depending upon whose estimate of insurgents’ figures is correct, the ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents in Iraq from 2003 ranges from healthy 30:1 to a frightening 15:1 (Hendrick and Tucker). Most likely the truth lies somewhere in the middle; in either case, it is incumbent upon the counterinsurgent forces to improve upon this ratio by steadily increasing the number of trained and able indigenous forces.
Once the requisite numbers of policemen and soldiers are trained and ready, the next step is to display them strategically throughout the country. This technique referred to as ‘oil spot’ or ‘inkblot’ strategy, employing pockets of civil-military teams including police, administrators, and soldiers in clusters throughout the country (McCuen). The object is to gradually expand from these locations by conducting pacification operations in the surrounding areas. In theory, the clusters will become contiguous as the insurgency melts away. The US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept in Afghanistan and Iraq is an example of these approaches (Hoffman 2007). Initial site location is the first consideration, it is prudent to deploy the first teams or outposts in the regions which are under government control or only marginally threatened by the insurgents, and then expand to other regions, as the military forces secure additional territory. As these deployments and outposts continue, more intelligence information will become available as well, further fuelling the entire process.

Implementing a systematic approach to intelligence gathering within these localities is essential to shutting down the insurgent network over the years. Different techniques have been developed to accomplish this task; Roger Trinquier’s employment of gridded, comprehensive over watch, and rigid accountability measures worked effectively in Algeria. But a finer net had to be cast to catch the insurgents in Iraq after the 2003 invasion (Hoffman, 2007). These cells, devoid of traditional structure, are small, non-hierarchical, and operate nearly autonomously. They communicate infrequently through messages or in coded messages via the internet. Thus, they expose themselves less frequently to exploitation or capture. To foil these insurgents, a combination of low-tech, traditional police techniques must be supplemented with state-of-art HUMINT computers, tool sets that afford collectors rapid access to key networks and databases. In this way, biographical sketches, photos, fingerprints, arrest records, and other important data can be passed between Headquarters, and individual operatives instantly. This may not help to find the needle in the haystack, but it does shrink the haystack. The shortage of coalition and indigenous troops, police, and civil servants has been a problem for the US in Iraq since the spring of 2003. It became clear within weeks after the declared end to major combat operations that the US troop presence was insufficient to maintain order there (O’Hanlon, 2005). This was exacerbated by the fact that the indigenous military and police forces dissolved in the wake of their defeat and were formally disbanded by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003 (Fallow, 2005).
In hindsight, most expert observers agree that a large force was needed in Iraq, even if they could not agree on whether this force would have prevented the insurgency (Mathew, 2004). At a minimum, it has been useful to curb the widespread looting and to protect the ammunition points that were left unguarded and subsequently raided by the insurgents (Hendrickson and Tucker). From an intelligence perspective, US and coalition forces were nearly blind (Hoffman). Without an indigenous network in place, military police and HUMINT collectors began to campaign without a start-up database; they had few leads or contacts and those they did receive were mostly unreliable (Hendrickson and Tucker). The lessons learned in Iraq only reinforce the lesson of Indochina, and Malaya, that counterinsurgency is manpower intensive. The host government or the occupying power must augment its organic forces to cope with a large-scale insurgency. If the necessary forces cannot be generated internally, then they must be mustered from the indigenous populace, trained and certified by a competent cadre, and prepared to assume the real mission as soon as possible (Cordesman, 2006). Failure to recognise this that counterinsurgency is manpower intensive or attempting to correct the problem too late vastly increases the likelihood of failure. Consequently, police and intelligence professionals must be deployed in sufficient strength and in constant contact with as much of the public as possible to gather information. In this fashion, counterinsurgency forces can be deprived of their base support, be isolated, and rendered ineffective.

5.1.4. Integration of Indigenous Forces

The final useful characteristic of a successful counterinsurgency campaign in respect of intelligence is the full integration of indigenous police and intelligence forces. If history is a reliable indicator, in the wake of the conflict resulting in regime change in which an insurgency erupts, the occupying force will be understaffed, lacking in cultural awareness and short of people with an understanding of the local language, as emphasised in Chapter Three. Indigenous forces offer the most logical and appropriate source of additional manpower. In Malaya for example, these forces were virtually non-existent at the onset. As a result, the British suffered grievously in their respective insurgencies. The theatre was characterised by incorrect or inadequate intelligence, the government had little or no contact with the population, and the insurgents had unbridled freedom of movement. Fortunately for the British, they learned from their mistakes and took appropriate corrective measures to address
the problems. By the end of the conflict, the indigenous forces were robust and ably assisting in the day-to-day prosecution of the war (Clark).

Indigenous forces bring skills to the campaign that are not replicated easily by the occupying forces. These include cultural sensitivity, language fluency, and familiarity with the population. In his insightful essay, ‘Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung’, E.L. Katzenbach Jr, warns that counterinsurgency ‘operations’ must cause minimum harm to the people, lest they become antagonistic to the government. The troops must be highly disciplined to respect civilian rights and property (Katzenbach, 1962). Indigenous police and intelligence operatives can avoid this error. They have personal contacts among the population and generally a better understanding of the nuances of the problems plaguing the country. This makes indigenous personnel ideal for civilian policing and all manner of covert and clandestine operations, where blending into the population is paramount (Clark). In the post-colonial world, an occupying or external force cannot afford to prosecute the counterinsurgency camp on its own (Cordesman 2006). Not only are the manpower numbers insurmountable, but so are the strong feelings of fear, distrust, and resentment engendered by the occupiers (Terrill and Crane, 2005). An occupation force rouses resistance even among the most moderate elements in a country. Therefore, it is imperative that occupying powers promote and accelerate the transfer of power to indigenous authorities as soon as feasible. If a cadre of advisors or operatives are required in the aftermath, this presence should be minimised to the greatest extent possible.

The first step in building competent indigenous forces is to establish comprehensive formal training programs to educate them in those critical disciplines. The British established training academies in-country to constitute rapidly growing indigenous police and security operatives, as well as to train their own inbound soldiers. For example, in Malaya, the British expanded the indigenous Home Guard from a force of 79,000 in 1951 to a force of 259,000 by 1953 (Nagl, 2005). In the early stages of an insurgency, the government can use newly constituted units to hold down low-skilled positions and conduct low-risk missions, thus, freeing up trained cadre to perform the more complex tasks. In time, however, expectations will rise until the indigenous units are fully capable of performing all tasks within the police and indigenous forces. Care must be taken to ensure these forces are not rushed into combat, they must be ready for increased responsibility or the results will be disastrous (Terrill and Crane, 2005). Following this milestone, indigenous forces are ready to receive a complete
transfer of authority from government to occupying forces. Indigenous forces can significantly improve intelligence in areas of operation because locals understand the environment better, and can navigate and interact better than ‘outsiders’. So, for proper intelligence, there is a need to involve indigenous forces in the proper mix, when they are properly trained. The intelligence forces are the body equipped to monitor, gather, and use intelligence in a guided manner and in the right circumstances. Most times too, indigenous forces are a help to intelligence based on experience and local knowledge.

5.2. The Collection of Intelligence in Nigeria

In order to assess the armed forces’ effectiveness in the campaign against the insurgency, this section discusses how the military collected intelligence in the North-East, Nigeria between the years 1999 and 2017. The major forms of collecting intelligence are through surveillance, cordon and search, interrogation and the use of informants. In the case of the Nigerian military, surveillance was not commonly used.

5.2.1. Poor Military Intelligence

A former US intelligence official told the Telegraph in December 2018 that Boko-Haram attacks reflect, among other things, ‘how poor Nigerian troops’ battlefield intelligence is.’ This analysis is supported by statements made by troops on the ground. One officer was quoted by World Politics Review as saying, ‘we do not know what they are planning, and we do not know what they think.’ In some cases, intelligence officers in the North-East cannot speak the most common local languages. This extends to many military personnel deployed to the North-East who are often from other regions of the country, leading to an armed force that lacks knowledge of both the local environment and language, harming their own intelligence-gathering abilities. This is a major factor for counterinsurgency operations in the region; diverse languages, and officers deployed there are not familiar with those, then getting intelligence becomes very difficult.

The Civilian Joint Task Force, a vigilante group formed in 2013 by civilians to fight back against Boko-Haram, now works as a militia alongside the military, and has helped fill this intelligence gap, although the value of the intelligence it provides is not always clear. Other
evidence suggests that problems go beyond local intelligence-gathering. STTEP, the South-African private military contractor, had warned about intelligence shortcomings within the Nigerian armed forces. They were hired in December 2014 to help combat Boko-Haram and were key to the rollback of the group’s territory. ‘Prior to, and following our departure from Nigeria, we issued numerous intelligence warnings to his (Buhari’s) government,’ STTEP’s chairman Eeben Barlow said in a November statement, adding that the warnings ‘were all rejected. ‘Nigeria’s government reportedly went as far as advising neighbouring countries ‘not to listen’ to STTEP, he said. These intelligence failings and misinformation about the nature of the Boko-Haram’s threat, such as Buhari’s insistence they are ‘technically defeated’ has occurred multiple times, often hindering the fight against Boko-Haram.

The US government has also declined to share some intelligence with Nigerian security officials because of concerns about infiltration by Boko-Haram. Those disagreements appear to have led the Nigerian government to cancel a US mission to train one of its Special Forces battalions in 2014. At least one of the soldiers sentenced to death for mutiny was trained in Pakistan. He told the court that the program involved weapons that the Nigerian soldiers wanted but never received, such as German submachine guns. It is another example, according to the soldiers, of the army’s dysfunction. This is the glory picture in which the military found itself and this affected its operation in counterinsurgency and as an institution (Sieff, 2015).

5.2.2. Surveillance

Surveillance is a vital component in counterinsurgency operations. The activities of non-state actors in contemporary times is a major concern to all watchers of security issues. This very much so, as the violent activities of these groups like Al-Qaeda, Al Shaabab, ISIS and Boko-Haram are getting very sophisticated. Therefore, national governments and security organisations must develop new and better strategies using modern technology to carry out searches involving surveillance if counterinsurgency is to be successful.

Krishnan (2015), in his article, ‘Mass Surveillance, Drones, and Unconventional Warfare’, narrates that ‘armed drones are made for unconventional warfare and have little value for conventional interstate conflict’. This is true, because there is a shift from conventional wars,
where most military are trained, but at the turn of the century, unconventional warfare has been adopted to modern ‘hybrid’ warfare. He further adds that

the rise of armed drones to prominence has to be considered as an indicator for the changed nature of contemporary armed conflicts that has now become focused on countering insurgencies and fighting ‘hybrid’ wars globally.

Krishnan (2015), maintained that

the US military is preparing for a global counterinsurgency and for civil unrest at home as they are creating global surveillance reaching from outer space, to cyber space, when everything and everyone can be continuously identified, tracked and located. Unmanned systems assist in global surveillance and provide the global reach for intervening in internal conflict without the need of deploying large armies.

Krishnan summarises by emphasising that the ‘new technological capabilities, including drones, biometrics and cyber warfare are very useful for global manhunt; that western government are also increasing concern about the spread of extremist ideologies and the possible mass civil unrest, which means that many of the lessons learned in the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq could be applied to the West’, and the research adds to all parts of the world, particularly Nigeria.

Surveillance as seen by Renade (2011) can be a ‘valuable way of collecting intelligence’, adding that ‘surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities of combating insurgency’. Since the time man conceived borders and frontiers, whether to stake out his property or secure the boundaries of people, surveillance has been used in one form or another. According to US field manual FM 34-35, surveillance is: ‘The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means’. It is primarily intended to protect and secure the individual, his property or commercial entity and the nation state. Surveillance can be defined as intended ‘to detect, identify, track and intercept hostile action’. In contemporary times, especially with the ever-present danger of use of nuclear weapons in the subcontinents, these actions, with a robust predictive component and continuing real-time inputs of an ongoing actions to allow for countermeasures. This is in addition to the forensic or post events role that surveillance plays. The above position by Renade has not really changed for insurgency, and its attendant consequences, therefore the need for surveillance to
curtail the excesses of these groups, wherever they are found, continues. In most developed countries, modern surveillance equipment is deployed to secured areas. This is a fundamental problem in Nigeria; surveillance is very minimal, with the high level of insecurity in the country, especially in the North-East, there is need to employ the use of drones in its surveillance and other modern equipment. This will go a long way in helping security personnel and the armed forces to gather quick and ‘actionable intelligence’ and to help curtail the excesses of the insurgents (FM 34-35, 1998).

Nigeria’s national security has been threatened in its contemporary history by the violent activities of Boko-Haram insurgency on a scale previously unimaginable to the government, citizens and the security forces. The Nigerian government put in place measures to contain the insurgency, mostly in a military based approach, which has yielded minimal results, and the insurgency persists. There is therefore a need to re-evaluate this military strategy to include surveillance and intelligence with modern technology to curb the excesses of the insurgents.

Ese Ujara, Oluwatosin Ifaloye and Daniel Ekong (2017) are of the view that ‘surveillance that is rooted in electronic technology can help counter insurgency’ and that ‘security would be difficult to accomplish without the influence in surveillance technology’. They conclude by opining that ‘a collaboration of technological tools; especially using electronic surveillance possess a potentially effective counterinsurgency strategy, as more and more insurgents depend on ICT tools’.

In the context of surveillance and Nigeria’s insurgency threat, the observation of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres is pertinent: ‘we can’t change their will to attack, only their ability to attack’ (Stein, 2015). Findings suggest that the military recognizes the role of surveillance and has invested resources in acquiring useful machinery. After the Abuja bomb blast (October, 2010), security and surveillance were increased across the capital territory, a meeting of security experts was convened to address the issues of a lack of functional CCTV and other surveillance equipment that are not properly placed in the city. Counterinsurgency strategy requires that the security apparatus of the nation are proactive in identifying attacks before they occur; this is where the need for efficient and effective surveillance in comes into play.
As part of efforts to address security challenges in the country, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt-Gen Azubuike Ihejirika commissioned surveillance vehicles that can monitor security flash points in Kaduna. The re-modified heavily equipped vehicles with state-of-the-art communication equipment which came into the Nigeria Army in 1979 was carried out by the division signals. (Ishaya, 2014)

However, there seems to be inadequate strategy for surveillance based on findings from interactions with participants. In interviews with some military officers conducted by this researcher, it was gathered that since the insurgency is a more recent phenomenon in the country, issues of surveillance have not been properly institutionalised within the armed forces.

There are no sufficient documented materials for training for most of our men at the tactical level, as most of their experience is on the spot assessment of the situation. There was limited institutional response to insurgency as it took the country and the military by surprise. (Col. R20)

At the initial stage, surveillance was not organised because we did not anticipate this magnitude of violence from the insurgency as we are experiencing. So, it affected our preparedness because we did not have the equipment and training. Although, the Air Force has had a better experience with the air surveillance (Brigadier General S 3).

Nigeria has been trying to counter the insurgency by confronting it with all possible means. The interviewee mentioned that the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has played a major role in the mission in the area of air surveillance in the North-East. NAF operatives have neutralised core centres of Boko-Haram’s insurgency, especially in their strongholds like Turubun Rago, its settlement near the northern fringes, a settlement bordering Lake Chad. The operation started with an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission. This was followed by air interdiction to strike the identified targets (Khera, 2018). Then came Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) missions to assess the nature and extent of damage to the targets, then follow on mop up operations by helicopter gunships at multiple locations which enhanced the degree of target neutralisation (Nigeria Airforce press release, 9 January 2018). A similar operation was carried out by the NAF in conjunction with the Nigerian Army on 3-4 January 2018 in Sambisa, a notorious hideout of Boko-Haram, and in Njima and camp zero
These operations constitute a classical example of airpower surveillance and actions.

Nigeria is one of the most affluent and powerful West African countries, with high GDP on the continent. The cumulative combat power and national power of these four neighbouring states is less than that of Nigeria by a large margin. The difference in combat air power between Nigeria and these four neighbouring countries is even more glaring (ISS, report, January 2017). Consequently, the prime focus on Nigeria’s creation and employment of air power has been to manage internal conflicts, which has been poorly managed, and insurgency, besides ensuring the protection of the coastline and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The country is around 9,100km long and 100km broad. The three military air bases are strategically located and over thirty airstrips are evenly spread across the country to allow for efficient application of air surveillance and power, but all these have not really helped in curbing the insurgency.

This justification will permit sustained and effective round the clock counterinsurgency operations by NAF. The combination of sensor and precision weapons will be difficult for the insurgents to beat. Precision strikes by the proposed low-calibre guided weapons will also reduce the probability of collateral damage. However, the mission can be effective only when it is supported by adequate ISR and suitable communication grids. NAF is presently not well equipped in this regard. With the limitations in available ISR resources, it will not be possible to be fully effective. NAF has a large area to cover for surveillance and monitor activities in specific groups on a round-the-clock basis. The time lag between the initial ISR mission and follow-on-mop-up-attacks in December 2017 and January 2018 is of the order of 24 hours. With this kind of mobility available to insurgents, this time is adequate to relocate to safety, thus, staying ahead of the ISR cycle. Operation obligation is designed to shrink the sensor-to-shooter time (NAF Press release, 2018).

To upgrade its ISR capabilities, NAF is looking intently at UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) (Nigeria Ministry of Defence Report, 2018). These provide an optimal low cost and safe solution for long duration, repetitive missions. A benign air defence environment makes a perfect backdrop for UAV operations. The issue however is of the availability of resources to fund these needs. The answer lies in a re-examination of the operational environment and reassessing the combat equipment requirement. One deal that stands out in this regard relates to the JF17: with practically no conventional threat to its borders, should NAF be equipping
itself with the high cost JF-17s at this juncture? Its existing fleet of F-7 is barely a decade old and adequate, along with ground base radar, to ensure air superiority in its neighbourhood against known threats for another decade. The financial resources earmarked for the three JF-17s could be utilised to upgrade the surveillance and communication network and reduce the sensor-to-shooter time for counterinsurgency (Ashiru, 2015). It was, however, difficult to obtain much data on surveillance as the majority of the participants for this research were unwilling to divulge information due to the sensitive nature of ongoing war.

A good intelligence collection apparatus should have indications and warnings about imminent attacks. As Ashiru equips, if 100 insurgents are congregating, planning and mobilising for an attack, active and effective intelligence analysts should be able to get wind of the activity, be it visual, through 24 hour surveillance, or via interception of insurgents’ communication or perhaps through a network of informants on the ground. It is easy to see why the COAS was displeased about the lack of activities of active intelligence gathering which could have given the troops forewarning and saved lives. When an insurgent attack occurs, intelligence agencies are usually blamed for it. Hence, for example, the 9/11 attacks on the US was considered by some to be a US intelligence failure. Intelligence operatives refuted these accusations. However, further investigations into the matter revealed that there were some shortcomings within the intelligence community. One of these weak points was lack of information sharing. For this reason, the US government and intelligence leadership put measures in place that helped increased information sharing to forestall reoccurrence of that (Ashiru, 2015).

Within the broader context of the ever-present threat of insurgency, cities, ports, airports, railways stations and marketplaces need to be brought under the umbrella of surveillance cover. For those entrusted with the task of keeping a tight grip on the country’s purse strings, they can be assured that saving human lives compensate for the expenditure on these systems. Moreover, once deployed sensibly, the surveillance camera system will simultaneously reduce the incidence of crime, facilitate identification and apprehension of the perpetrators, make the cities safer and improve traffic discipline. The imposition and recovery of fines from traffic violations alone will help recover the expenditure on the surveillance system (Ashiru, 2015).

There is emphasis today, in view of the insurgency threat, on ‘pre-emptive’ intelligence through surveillance of land, sea and air borders. To obtain this intelligence, the US and
European Union (EU) are using a variety of types of equipment and refining surveillance technology. For example, Global Positioning System (GPS) is increasingly being used on land, the sea and in the air, similarly, air, sea and land-borne cargo is scanned at the point of loading, thus bringing it into the ambit of pre-emptive surveillance intelligence. For border surveillance, in addition to basics like solar lighting, ground based radar, patrol craft and sonars, countries are increasingly expanding the area surveilled by deploying drones, UAVs, and Underwater Unmanned Vessels (UUVs). China, for example, has quietly made rapid strides in UAV and UUV manufacture and technology. Satellite platforms are routinely used. The US and EU have introduced similar systems, including biometric ID cards, visitor identification systems and a passenger database. The US is attempting now to introduce the electronic system of travel authorisation, or prior authorisation to travel. Together, these surveillance technology platforms provide an ever-expanding database facilitating facial and biometric recognition of visitors and suspects. Over time, these simplify security and immigration clearance procedures for travellers at the point of entry while appreciably enhancing security (Renade, 2011). Surveillance, particularly backed by technology, is equally effective in monitoring the country’s land, sea, and air borders. Satellite appears to currently provide the best solution for monitoring of activity in areas around the borders, including deep inside the neighbouring states. Google-Earth is good example and Nigeria needs to key into all these global technologies and enjoy the benefits they brings.

5.2.3. Cordon and Search Operations

Cordon and Search operations as stated by John Sutherland, Rich Baillergeon and Tim McKane (2010), ‘have become one of the frequently used operations in the fight against terror’ or what this thesis refers to as insurgency. This type of combat operations, according to Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, involves isolating a suspected building to capture or destroy possible insurgents or contraband. They further added that ‘Cordon and Search may be thought as a movement to contact, a raid, a deliberate attack, area reconnaissance, based on accurate intelligence.’
Cordon and search has certain requirements, in that it must be deliberate, and based on reconnaissance and intelligence. The US in Iraq from 2003 and Afghanistan from 2001 showed these in their operations and this has become a point of reference to scholars and operators of cordon and search operations. This thesis examines whether the Nigerian military used the above stated requirement in their approach to the campaign in North-East Nigeria against the Boko-Haram insurgency.

The purpose of cordon and search operations as articulated by Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, and by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the complex environment, which has proved to be the main reason for cordon and search to be effective in that area, as regards seizing key materials that an enemy may utilise or to seize personnel. Materials could include weapons caches, explosives, contraband, evidence or intelligence. They further stated that ‘personnel normally fall into categories of insurgents, sympathisers, or criminals’. The interesting part on their discussion is that cordon and search may also be for other reasons such as ‘a show of force or to demonstrate to the local populace that the government not the insurgents have control of the area’ (Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, 2010). The challenges of a complex urban environment can be difficult to understand. The skilled
tactician will disregard this pain and begin planning for success. One of the first things to plan is your task organisation, so it important to begin by understanding the task of a battalion or company’s cordon and search operation. There are many variations on task organising; the typical organisation for search and cordon operations consists of a command element, plus a Reserve element to deal with the unexpected (Bailtergeon and Sutherland). The above position on the superiority of the government’s show of force is important for the populace to know that they are secured and can be protected by their government. This thesis categorically states that ‘the people of the North-East Nigeria, did not feel this sense of protection and security from their government’. This sense of hopelessness was noted when conducting interviews for this research in IDP camps in Jos in Plateau State. (Interviewed women in the IDP Camps in Jos, 2018).

An effective command element and control is crucial for all military operations and no less important during cordon and search. The command element is the Headquarters of the organisation, executing the operation. Careful consideration should be given to the size and composition of the element (Sutherland, Bailtergeon and McKane, 2010). The command element should be large enough to effectively coordinate and synchronise the security and search operations but must be small enough not to create an overwhelming footprint and become a burden on overall security. The execution of cordon and search is no place for a commander to carry a big entourage with him. The position of the command element in relation to the search operation is another important factor. Since the focus of the operation is the actual search, the command element usually positions itself where it will be close enough to the search to carry out its duties, but without getting in the way. Normally, the command element will include host-nation representation in the form of a police or government official, adding legitimacy to the operation (Marine Corps Report, 2005).

The security element consists of two primary components, the outer and the inner cordon. Cordon is a tactical task given to a unit to prevent the enemy’s withdrawal from or reinforcement of a position. A cordon is a type of isolation, it implies seizing or controlling key terrain and or mounted and dismounted avenues of approach along the search area (Sutherland et al., 2010). The objective of the outer cordon is to prevent anyone or anything from moving into the designated targeted area (search area). This could include enemy reinforcements or even civilians who could disrupt the operation. This element may utilise any of several tactical tasks to accomplish their purpose, including isolate, block, contain,
deny and secure. To achieve these tasks, an element may set up traffic control points or blocking positions, emplace snipers, utilise observation posts and conduct patrols. The commander will determine the various methods to use based on his analysis (Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, 2010).

The main objectives of the inner cordon are to protect the main efforts of the operation (the search and assault element) from the enemy and ensure the enemy cannot enter or leave the search area. The tactical task that may be utilised include those mentioned in the outer cordon, to suppress, cover, and guard. The element executing the inner cordon may utilise, among several methods, over watch positions, supporting-by-fire positions, and emplacing snipers. One of the major differences in the outer and inner cordon is the amount of terrain involved whereas, the outer cordon may require setting up forces along many blocks (or kilometres, if in an open environment), the inner cordon may also require a block, a single building or even a portion of building. The type of terrain and nature of the threat will dictate the inner and outer location and methods. Planners must also consider the type of construction searchers will encounter among dwellings when conducting cordons in built-up areas (Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, 2010).

As earlier noted, the main purpose of the cordon and search operations is to find personnel and materials. It is the search element’s job to do just that. The search element contains an assault team, search team, security team, and support team. The assault team seizes the objective to allow the search team to conduct the search. The security team provides on-location security of the immediate objective area and holds any detainee. The support team provide an overwatch in the search area and is prepared to assist the other teams as required. In addition, the search element may use many unique special teams depending on the mission. Some of the common types of special teams include; detainee team, vehicle search team, demolition team, documentary team, military working gongs, tunnel team, interrogation team, mind detection team, combat team, civil affairs team, psychological operation team, human intelligence team, field interview team, sensitive site team, escort team, female personnel search team, Explosive Ordinance (EOD) team, possibly media team, and as many interpreters and linguists as can be assembled (Sutherland, Baillergeon and McKane, 2010).

The search may be in the form of a forced entry where shock and speed are used to rapidly gain control of the search area, or a more benign approach can be used called ‘cordon and
kick’ or ‘cordon and knock or ask’. Units use the same organisation of force as a regular cordon and search element, knock on the door and inform the occupant that a general search is to be conducted. This may seem odd given that this is still considered a combat operation, but in the battle for the population’s hearts and minds, politeness counts as emphasised in Chapter Four of this thesis. Planners choose the hard or soft approach based on the level of intelligence of the objective and the estimate of the threat involved. Female soldiers are another important consideration to include within the search team. Units must respect cultural taboos in searching and handling of female non-combatants and children (Kilcullen, 2009).

The last element is the Support Reserve element. Since cordon and search operations involve finding hostile forces hiding in the open amongst the population anything is likely to happen. It is the support or reserve element that provides the commanders’ flexibility to deal with the unknown. The exact composition of this element is directly related to its anticipated task. Possible missions may include dealing with an angry crowd that threatens the outer cordon or reinforcing the search element in handling detainees. Consequently, the support element must be prepared for just about anything. Every member of the support reserve element must be familiar with the other elements’ role and functions during a cordon and search operation and ‘proper rehearsal are the keys to ensure mission readiness’. The cordon and search operation is one of the most universal types of tactical operations conducted in the war on insurgency and terrorism. By understanding how the forces are organised for this unique, but common operations, one can appreciate the challenge whether at the company or battalion level, cordon and search requires detailed planning and creative thinking (Sutherland, Baillergeon and Mckane, 2010).

Turning to Nigeria, the theatre command in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital, is the body in charge of enforcing or maintaining the safety and security of the entire North-East. The operation of the theatre command is tagged ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’ to fight off the insurgency in the North-East. The armed forces’ operations in Lafiya Dole includes conducting cordon and search to help fish out elements of the insurgency. They predominantly act based on security intelligence reports. One of the major searches carried out was the cordon and search operation of the UN building in Maiduguri, which was widely condemned by the UN and the global community (Megaiconmagazine, 2017).
In its reaction, the military advanced the above in a press statement on 11 August 2017, in which the spokesperson Colonel Kingsley opined that

    as part of the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the North-East the theatre command operation Lafiya Dole has been conducting several clearances as well as cordon and search operations in urban areas in the North-East.

He further asserts that

    the clearance operations effort was yielding several successes, that it has forced the Boko-Haram insurgents to change tactics and resort to the employment of suicide attacks to target military locations and the populace. This has necessitated an intensification of cordon and search in Maiduguri and environs. Cordon and search operations have been carried out in areas like Jiddani-polo, Muna Garage, Jakana among several other areas in the North-East (Megaiconmagazine, 2017).

On 10 August 2017, theatre command received information from one of its credible sources that some high value Boko-Haram insurgents had infiltrated into a building in Poupomori in Maiduguri. It therefore became expedient to take pre-emptive action by combing the general area through cordon and search operations. He further stated that the operation was successfully conducted and over thirty houses were searched. One such included a property which was said to be occupied by UN staff, although, the property did not carry a UN designation. Overall, the operation in the affected area was successfully conducted, but no arrest was made because the suspects were not found. He concludes by saying that the command wishes to assure the general public that these operations are being conducted to safeguard lives and property, and are not targeted at any individual (Nigerian Premium News, 2017).

In April 2018, troops of Operation Lafiya Dole deployed to a forward operation base in Beni Sheikh uncovered Boko-Haram’s training camp where instructional training was provided to its foot soldiers. The troops uncovered the camp located in a hideout in the Afa general area, following a tip-off that insurgents were trained in that camp. Colonel Onyema Nwachukwu, Deputy Director, Public Relations of the Nigerian military said, ‘Armed with information, troops immediately mobilised to the area where they conducted a cordon and search operation’. He further stated that during the operations, troops encountered elements of Boko-Haram insurgents who were withdrawing hastily from the camp in the shootout that ensued,
troops killed one of the insurgents and recovered one Dane gun. Troops also arrested one Mallam Abba, who was held hostage in the camp by the insurgents. The entire training in the camp was destroyed by the troops (Megaiconmagazine, 2017).

In another statement by the military spokesperson, Sani Usman, a Colonel, the troops of the 25 Task Force Brigade, Nigerian Army, claimed it has achieved an unprecedented feat in the fight against the Boko-Haram insurgents in its area of operations at Sandia, Kokakowa and Nyaleri villages. A suspected insurgents’ enclave was discovered and destroyed, as was an Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs) making factory at Miyati and Nyaleri villages, along Maiduguri-Bulabulin-Danboa road, in Damboa local government area of Borno state. Additionally, some insurgents were arrested, including a high-profile suspect known as ‘Ameen’. Items recovered apart from the IED making equipment, were a Peugeot pick up van, foodstuff, 10 KVA lister generator, a gas cylinder, boreholes, pumping machines, three bags of maize, one bag of millet and empty jerry cans. The joint operations between the Brigade and Nigeria Airforce provided air cover, and was part of the determined effort by the military to rout out insurgents in the general area and open roads hitherto held by the insurgents for public use. After Boko-Haram seized significant territory in North-East Nigeria, the government was no longer able to ignore the problem. Offensives through 2015 and 2016 drove Boko-Haram from much of its territory and significantly weakened the group (Usman, 2018).

Nigeria gained significant foreign military assistance in the form of a rejuvenated MNJTF, and it secured the services of South African private military contractor STTEP, which trained and supported Nigeria’s 72 Mobile Strike Group. They employed a tactic of relentless pursuit, carrying out constant assaults on Boko-Haram and cutting off withdrawing militant. The 72 Mobile Strike Group also benefited from organic air support STTEP. Nigeria’s contract with STTEP was not renewed after Buhari assumed office in May 2015 (Posting, 2019). However, compared to that period of offensive operations, Nigeria’s strategy has since transitioned into a primarily defensive one. Garrison towns scattered across Nigeria’s North-East are intended to protect local communities and contain militants. This has shifted the Nigerian army to a more static stance, giving Boko-Haram the initiative, and allowing Boko-Haram to dictate the pace of conflict. Exposed military bases have presented good hard targets for Boko-Haram, often providing militants the opportunity to further supply and equip
themselves. This strategy has been further weakened by the issues within the Nigerian armed forces.

According to most interviewees ‘Bases are not always suitably defended, a problem made worse by poor equipment and low morale’. Reinforcements and air support can also be slow to materialize if they come at all. Boko-Haram’s use of roadside bombs and ambushes on supply lines further expose the military, and sometimes prevent follow-up operations after attacks. Bases that are supposed to contain Boko-Haram and protect local communities can even be given up without a fight, such as when soldiers at Arege ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The Nigerian military has curtailed economic activity in the North-East to starve the militants of resources and supplies. This has, however, been advantageous to Boko-Haram, complementing its strategy of reaching out to civilians and raising funds via taxation and levies on economic activity (Interview, Colonel R20, 2019)

When they are on the offensive, armed forces operations are still often reactive and can have limited effect. Operation Last Hold, announced in April 2018, was meant to ‘totally destroy Boko-Haram’ according to General Buratai, but by the end of the year Boko-Haram appeared increasingly deadly. As the frequency and scale of insurgents’ attacks in North-East Nigeria increased, a struggling armed force appears to be finding it hard to fight back. Underlying issues have not been addressed, leading to an ineffective strategy further hampered by self-inflicted wounds (Buratai, 2018).

While many of these issues existed in 2015, foreign support and a different, more offensive, strategy helped the military push back Boko-Haram. Any lasting victory in this new phase of the conflict seems unlikely without the military addressing the multitude of underlying problems. The situation will only worsen as Boko-Haram attacks increase in frequency, with increased risk of more bases being overrun and even significant towns being captured and held by Boko-Haram militants. The current path in this conflict seems unsustainable for the Nigerian armed forces, and changes to its strategy and tactics must be made. But as in 2015, this alone will not be enough to deal a lasting blow to the insurgents (Brechenmacher, 2019). This is the reality on the ground, because the military’s activities have not really changed.

The regular offensives of Boko-Haram through suicide, use of explosive devices and wholesale assaults and conscriptions have forced the armed forces to rely on the establishment of checkpoints along major roads and armed military patrol operations in the
North-East. Permanent checkpoints are placed at locations that are intended to maximise the chances to identify, arrest and intercept Boko-Haram members who are in possession of explosives or seeking to reach large population centres or bombing targets. In addition, the military uses raid operations to destroy specific Boko-Haram hideouts, rescue conscripted persons, reclaim locations and kill designated insurgent members. Omenma and Hendricks (2018) noted that the combined armed forces and Civilian-JTF effort increases the efficacy of raid operations at Boko-Haram hideouts, cells, camps and networks, as well as impacting devastating effects on the group, as more insurgents were either arrested, killed or dispersed in the process. Here the departure from Hendricks, Omenma (2018), is that as laudable as the cordon and search is in curbing activities of the insurgents, there is problem with the Nigerian armed force mounting these check point in the North-East area. Just recently the Governor of Borno state, was paying an unscheduled visit to an area attacked by the insurgents. Upon reaching the Maiduguri entrance checkpoint, located near the Borno State University, the governor met hundreds of vehicles queued up on both sides of the lanes. ‘This is unacceptable,’ Mr Zulum said speaking on top of his voice.

How can you subject people to this kind of torture all in the name of National ID card? And you are all here collecting N500 and N1000 from poor travellers who do not have national ID card (Premium Times, Haruna, 2020).

The governor was angry at the armed forces mounting roadblocks and collecting money from car owners and travellers so close to an area that has just been attacked by Boko-Haram. This attitude of the armed forces negates the intention of thee roadblocks. This position further buttressed the high-level negligence of the armed forces in their professional conduct in safeguarding the victims of the attacks, further stressing the level of corruption within the different strata of the armed forces hierarchy. Again, Omenma and Hendricks (2018), also referred to the insurgents as terrorist, and this thesis disagrees on that. But in spite of that, the authors have contributed to the limited body of literature on the Boko-Haram insurgency. If Nigeria wishes to secure a lasting victory against Boko-Haram, the underlying issues within the armed forces must be addressed, but with no apparent will among the military and political leadership to make the required changes, for the time being the conflict seems likely only to worsen. The cordon and search operations by the Nigerian armed forces have yielded very minimal results. A lack of ammunition and low morale are the reason for this tactical ineffectiveness.
5.2.4. Interrogation

Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of time, and to satisfy intelligence requirements by any echelon of command (US field manual FM 34-54, 1992). Sources of interrogation may be civilian internees, insurgents, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents or suspected agents.

A good interrogation produces needed information which is truly complete, clear, and accurate. An interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities—the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two may differ because of individual characteristics and capabilities of the participants. Furthermore, the circumstances of each contact and physical environment vary (FM 34-52). Other forms of intelligence interrogation include interview, debriefing, and elicitation. There are principles which generally apply to all types of interrogation; namely, the objective, the prohibition against the use of force, and security. Findings in the thesis reveal that the armed forces used this above stated procedure, but most times, the ‘surprise was lost’ (Colonel R20, interview, 2019).

Each interrogation must be conducted for a definite purpose. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he or she proceeds to obtain usable information to satisfy the assigned requirement, and thus contribute to the success of the unit’s mission. The objective may be specific—establishing the exact location of an ammunition storage facility, or it may be general—search to obtain information about a specific echelon of enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator must use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should attempt to prevent the source from becoming aware of the true objective of the interrogation. The interrogation should not concentrate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to recognise and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, during an interrogation, the interrogator learns of the presence of a highly destructive weapon outside the objective in his duty and the information is not in line with the specific objective, the interrogator must develop this important lead to obtain all possible information concerning the weapon. It becomes obvious an interrogator’s objective can be changed as necessary or desired. Having established what interrogation means, it will
be important to look at an example of the British experience and see how Nigeria has carried out interrogation in the process of gathering intelligence, and what lessons to learn for future use.

One of the methods used in conjunction with interrogation by interrogators is torture; whether this is permissible or not will be seen during this research. According to Mumford in his article, ‘Minimum Force Meets Brutality: Detention, Interrogation and Torture in British Counterinsurgency Campaigns’ (2012), interrogation as a process is a long standing and vital element to counterinsurgency intelligence gathering technique. However, as he noted, the actions of individual members of the British security forces, and importantly, the permissive structural environment in which acts of torture took place, has necessitated a critical assessment of how the interrogation of suspects as a perfectly legal process on occasion degenerated into legal acts of brutality. In analysing the British experience Mumford sums up that ‘torture’ has occurred in British counterinsurgency campaigns.

The British counterinsurgency experience has demonstrated that at the heart of every eventual campaign ‘success’ lay an efficient, decentralised well integrated intelligence network (Mumford, 2011; Hack, 1999; Bamford, 2005). Mumford asserts that not only did intelligence provide the basis for the launch of pin-point military operations, offering information on insurgents’ location, likely strength and movement, it also aided the political side of the campaign, revealing schisms within enemy political leadership, as well as establishing the political acceptability or likely civilian acquaintance towards an operation or policy. According to Kennedy-Pipe and Mumford (2007), that intelligence proved itself to be integrally inter-connected with the military and political dimensions of the counterinsurgency campaign. Yet, intelligence must be a by-product of other counterinsurgency tactics (in particular, the interrogation of suspected insurgents) as well as a catalyst for direct military, or indirect political action. Yet, the frequent use of seemingly indiscriminate detention policies and the implementation of ‘in-depth’ interrogation methods became one of the primary retardants to building an effective ‘hears and minds’ strategy across numerous British counterinsurgency campaigns as the indigenous population reacted against tales of torture in detention facilities (Kennedy-Pipe and Mumford, 2007).

Often the recourse to ‘in-depth’ interrogation of suspects in detention facilities was the result of stymied intelligence collection efforts in the theatre of operation (Blakeley, 2007). Intelligence inroads into gaining agents or informants among often closed cluster of a society
from which the insurgency sprung, frustrated the intelligence machinery of MI5, MI6, but more usually military intelligence officers and police Special Branch. However, a paucity of intelligence should not be a licence to adapt brutal interrogation techniques. The essential peace keeping role of the police and the military’s desire for ‘contact’ intelligence from detainees need not be militarily exclusive, especially given the evident link between the legitimate conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign as a mode of winning civilians’ ‘hearts and minds’ as described in Chapter Four, and the recourse to torture as a result of an intelligence vacuum (Mumford, 2012).

If properly conducted, interrogation undertaken within acknowledged legal boundaries can fill intelligence gaps that other methods of collection cannot plug (Teamey and Sweet, 2006). The implementation of torture, which according to Samantha Newbery in her book *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security: Controversial British Techniques* (2015), that torture is not easy to define, but according to the UN Convention against Torture, are usually employed in interrogation narratives. Newbery further adds that definitions are important because ‘torture is almost universally considered not only unethical, but illegal’ and sums up by saying that ‘illegal practices are simply not justifiable’ (Newbery, 2015).

Mumford went further to state that the implementation of torture during interrogation can indeed create more intelligence problems. First, the social backlash incurred when tales of torture spread into the public realm can directly impact upon the ethical and political dimension of the conflict, often irreparably damaging political counter-narratives that attempt to build a construct of legitimacy and other designs to undermine the insurgency case. Second, this backlash can have a tangible impact upon the levels of violence as retribution and anger within indigenous populations become manifest at the treatment of fellow citizens. Third, the actual quantity of intelligence gleaned during torture must be questioned. Confessions should not be conflated with actionable intelligence (Bellamy, 2006), while any such information surrendered by detainees should not be conflated with ‘untruth’ given the understandable human desire when faced with the infliction of pain to say anything to ensure the avoidance of harm (Blakeley, 2007). Mumford believes holistically, information extracted from detainees under torture is unreliable, and potentially detrimental to wider counterinsurgency strategies of reducing civilian violence, not to mention morally dubious (Mumford, 2005).
The haunting postures of prisoners abused at Abu Ghraib prison will remain one of the defining images of the entire Iraq War and run the risk of capturing the zeitgeist of the twenty-first century Western liberal democratic attitude towards human rights. The American-led ‘war on terror’ has given rise to phrases now popularly used in the public parlance as ‘extraordinary rendition’, while the notion of a ‘preventive strike’ has equally turned the international laws of war on their head. Yet, it has been the treatment of terrorist suspects during the push for ‘ending freedom’ as the invasion of Afghanistan was operationally labelled, that provided intense controversy, claims of moral hypocrisy and accusations of illegal activity. Richard Jackson talked about a ‘torture culture’ surrounding the war on terror (2007), while Alex Bellamy (2006) has noted what he believes to be a coordinated strategy. Nicholas Onuf (2009) has gone on to opine that torture is an ‘institutionalised practice’ in today’s world, despite the moral opprobrium and legal codes designed as a bulwark against its implementation. Torture in whatever guise should not be encouraged as has been stated earlier. The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights as stated in article 5 that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture’, while the Geneva Convention of 1949 made a similar statement. In 1948, the UN adopted the Convention against Torture, which became binding on states in 1987.

Earlier in the thesis the need for the establishment of local police units to help in the fight against Boko-Haram was established and the CJTF was discussed in Chapter Three. Reports state that they have violated International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Sahara reporters have claimed and shown videos of so-called CJTF members torturing two suspected Boko-Haram insurgents in Maiduguri, Borno State. Interviewing an officer with Nigerian Navy (Navy Captain VC), this interviewee said the military follow the normal international standard on interrogation techniques, specifically the ‘silence’ technique used on Boko-Haram suspects in their custody, although when prompted for more information on more details, the interviewee declined, stating that these are issues not to be divulged to the public. Collaborating this point, another officer (Commodore RS) added that an army colonel said each detainee is interrogated based on their peculiarities and the kind of information required. It is very difficult to get most officers to give information on interrogation within the military, this can be understood as it relates to issue of secrecy with military establishments.
However, information from secondary sources proved that there were gross human rights abuses by the Nigerian military as regards interrogation of detainees. Nigeria has been criticised by local and international human rights groups for allowing systemic human rights abuses by the military. President Buhari told Al-Jazeera’s Mehdi Hassan on 16 October 2015 that he had not received any Amnesty International documents and that his aides people have never given him copies of the report which revealed human rights abuses by the Nigerian military during the fight against Boko-Haram. He promised to prosecute individuals for war crimes and human rights abuses, but so far there have been no prosecutions. In one of the videos, a Boko-Haram suspect is seen being hung from a tree, his arms tied behind his back. As the suspect dangles, someone stands behind his back and the vigilante members stack heavy items on him as they interrogate him. The torture of the suspect goes on for an undetermined length of time. The second video shows a Boko-Haram suspect tortured by being pushed to the ground as a mob of people surround him. As the torture session continues, the CJTF members beat the insurgent, whose legs are covered in blood, the same vigilante begins to waterboard the suspect first with a water bottle, then later with a large pail filled with water. The suspect is tied up and threatened with a knife by one of the vigilantes (Sahara Reporters, 2015). When contacted by Sahara Reporters, the military acting Director of Army Public Relations, Colonel Sani Usman, reacted by saying that the military ‘does not speak for the CJTF’ and adds that the vigilantes ‘have their own structures who should speak for them’.

Figure 6: A Boko-Haram insurgent tortured by Nigerian Armed Forces

Source: Nairaland, 2019

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5.2.5. Informants

An informant is a person who provides privileged information about a person or organisation to an agency. The term can often refer pejoratively to the supply of information without the consent of the other parties with the intent of malicious, personal or financial gain (Levin, 2003). There are two principal considerations when dealing with informants. First, they must be evaluated continually by their handlers to ensure that they have not been ‘turned’ by the enemy. If so, they could be providing disinformation to the agents, or worse yet, collecting intelligence for the insurgents. Second, their identities and their cooperation with the government must be kept confidential, in order to afford them a continued access to intelligence and to keep them and their families safe from reprisal (Clark, 2001). Interviewing sources within the military, it was generally agreed that in their operations against Boko Haram, a lot of informants were used, although they refused to give details of how the informants are recruited, how they get intelligence from them, and how reliable were the informants.

The thesis agrees that using reliable informant in counterinsurgency operation in the North-east Nigeria is vital. Reliability is key to the operations as the complex nature of the environment, makes it difficult to operate without local intelligence. To what extent informants are used cannot be ascertained without proper information. Interviewing an Army Colonel, this respondent said ‘informants were used in their counterinsurgency operation in the North-East. That they used locals like village heads (Mai angwa), indigenous vigilante groups, and paid informants that the military recruits’ (Colonel NR, interview, 3 August 2020).

5.2.6. Intelligence Liaison

According to Jennifer Sims (2006), intelligence liaison arrangements can be categorised according to the type of ideas or mode of cooperation involved. In what she termed ‘simple intelligence liaison’, which involves only intelligence collection capabilities among the concerned parties. For example, she gives the insight that two states may agree to exchange
intelligence on a common target derived from their respective human sources. If their cooperation is restricted to this sole target, which is of equal importance to both parties, the liaison arrangement may be considered both limited and systemic. Sims further adds that in ‘modern intelligence systems’ simple intelligence liaison can nonetheless involve highly complicated or unusual arrangements because intelligence collection involves human or technical sources, providing access to the targets, such as airplanes, ships, buildings, and satellites. A liaison arrangement might involve one party’s offer to share control of a collection platform, such as a building or a shop, in return for another party’s communications system transporting that data. Sims gave the example that during the Cold War, Turkey was reputed to have provided the US with access to territory near its border with the Soviet Union in exchange for the ‘take’ from the listening posts the US subsequently established there.

In contrast ‘complex intelligence’ liaison involves the bartering of intelligence collected for a mix of political, intelligence, economic, military, or operational goods provided through intelligence channels. Such liaison is complex because assessing the ‘symmetry’ and breadth of the relationship involves multiple factors not strictly related to intelligence collection. Sims gave an example in that complex foreign liaison relations might involve the provision of armoured cars or bodyguards to foreign political leaders (i.e. covert political support) in exchange for access to that government’s intelligence on an adversary. In such arrangements, intelligence may flow only one way, with the second party receiving political, economic, or political ‘goods’ in return for the first party’s access to its sensitive sources (Sims, 2006).

What is intriguing about Sims’ assertion on intelligence liaison is that states can benefit from each other, in terms of intelligence sharing and gathering. The fight against insurgency requires a global alliance to deal with it. Intelligence is a key factor in the fight against these ills. It is therefore, important for counties to be engaged in intelligence liaison arrangements as analysed by Sims. Nigeria, as a global partner should and must link with other counties like the United States and Britain to share intelligence.

5.3. Coordination of Intelligence in Nigeria

Coordination of intelligence is a considerable problem in Nigeria as this thesis has gathered, largely due to rivalry among the different security outfits. This has not allowed for proper
coordination efforts, especially in intelligence, which has hindered the proper execution of the counterinsurgency campaign in the North-East. For a successful counterinsurgency, coordination in intelligence is very important. There is minimal coordination among the armed forces and other security agencies like the State Security Services, Department of State Security, and the police, and in most cases, the armed forces are the dominant actor in most conflict situations, and this might largely be due to the long military regime the country has experienced. Until the bomb blast at Eagle Square on 1 October 2010 and the intensification of Boko-Haram depredation, concern about security capability in Nigeria was defined in terms of training and equipping of personnel of police, the State Security Service (SSS) and the military. The 50th independence anniversary bomb blast, however, changed the paradigm. Since the challenge was novel, it created new awareness and triggered some dimensions of response that required the cooperation and collaboration of all the security agencies, the armed forces and paramilitary institutions (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

However, while the urgency for inter-agency synergy came to the fore, such imperative only helped to expose years of rivalry between and among those agencies. It also brought to the fore the abysmal lack of capacity to deal with the new threat. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the aftermath of the tragedy, the police and the State Security Service appeared to have worked at cross purposes in the immediate investigations and arrest of the suspects. Unfortunately, the situation has remained the way it is, in fact even worse between the same armed forces. Police and other paramilitaries such as the Civil Defence, Immigration, Customs and the correctional services are involved in the fight against the insurgency in the North-East. Lack of cooperation and coordination of intelligence has hampered the success of the counterinsurgency operations in the region right from when it started, from 1999 and became worse from 2011. While the police considered the 1 October bombing as an infringement on public order and therefore, its prime responsibility, the SSS on the other hand, saw it as a national security issue involving a celebration presided over by the President and attended by very senior Government and visiting Heads of States and Governments (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012). This jurisdictional fog has engendered a lack of cooperation and limited information, intelligence sharing incentives between these important National Security agencies, such that almost every criminal investigation is now bugged down by petty squabbles as was the case of the radio station bomb blast, for which the police and the SSS have different theories as to the motive of the suspect.
Rivalry between security agencies is not peculiar to Nigeria. To understand further, as noted by Thomas A. Schweich in his essay ‘America’s broken interagency’ (2009), interagency fallings were experienced first-hand by European powers and the US in Afghanistan. What is however peculiar to Nigeria, is a situation where senior officials of the critical agencies with legal responsibility for protecting the nation would not only trade blame openly, but revealed damaging accusations, and indeed seek to discredit one another in the media in a bid to score cheap advantage, and because of the danger this portends for Nigerian national security, there is an urgent need by the political leadership to intervene (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012). The authors further add that whether we want it or not, it is the failure of security and crime detection that should be uppermost, and they need to channel their resources and energy towards protecting national territorial integrity—in the current security situation in the country, the military is already overstretched, it has been deployed in thirty-four of the thirty-six states in the country (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

This is the basic situation in the North-East, especially in Maiduguri, Borno state capital, Yobe, and Adamawa. The larger implication of this exposure is that it makes the military troops deployed for these duties rather vulnerable, especially on the roads. It is therefore very expedient to strengthen the police who have the constitutional power assigned to them to enable them deal with such issues or situations as they arise (Civiliansinconflict.Org, 2015).

In his paper titled ‘Enhancing inter-agency cooperation in conflict management: The Nigerian perspective’, Olesegun Adeniyi (2012) observed that given the situation that appeared at the Saint Andrews military protestant Church, Jaji, where Boko-Haram attacked the armed forces’ premises, that there could not have been a more appropriate time than that that period to engage the issues that impact on the peace and prosperity of Nigeria as a nation and the institutional capacity of the armed forces. This is a period when the nation is facing a new form of security threat that involves the planting of IEDs, the use of rocket launchers and other high grade weapons by armed gangs to attack police stations, military posts, financial institution, schools and markets (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

He further adds that we are in a period when vehicles, rigged with deadly explosives, are rammed into media houses, television viewing centres, places of worship, military formations, killing innocent people, with scores of others maimed for life, physically and psychologically. It is a period when indoctrinated young men strap explosives on their bodies to blow themselves up in gatherings of people, just to pursue the destructive objectives of an
extremist group. He went on to assert that the nation is faced with a situation almost akin to war, where dusk to dawn curfew had been in place in some northern states for a long period of time, and where the task of maintaining internal security, peace and order, is now being carried out by the military with troops and armoured vehicles patrolling the streets of major cities across the country (Adeniyi, 2012).

Interestingly, while inter-agency collaborations may be a recent development globally, it is an area where Nigeria has had some rudimentary experience in the last two decades. Even when restoration of law and order may be the core mandate of the police, because they have proved to be lacking in the requisite capacity to perform this function effectively in the country, the Federal Government has had to resort to a loose arrangement called Joint Task Force (JTF), which unfortunately is fast becoming a permanent feature of national life with all the attendant implications. Related literature is rife with examples of agencies competing for or asserting their independence, while cooperation is relatively rare. In this research, most of the respondents were of the view that the lack of cooperation is because most of the security agencies want to have control of their funds, and this a major challenge to the strategy of an organised counterinsurgency campaign (Adeniyi, 2012).

5.4. Weaknesses in the Way Intelligence Was Used in Counterinsurgency

This section is not about intelligence gathering but looking at weaknesses in the way intelligence was utilised. It is general knowledge that a lack of intelligence is a limitation to most counterinsurgencies. The basic question is, was there an intelligence lapse in the armed forces’ campaign in the fight against insurgency in Nigeria? One of the key findings of this research identified was that there was a lack of proper application of intelligence by the Nigerian military. Findings from interviews indicate that the military had intelligence insights before most attacks occurred, however, there was negligence concerning acting on the information received. Most interviewees identified that ‘intelligence was compromised’. An interviewee explained that ‘it is believed that there are intelligence leakages within the military’ (IT 02). This kind of weakness led to the negative outcome of the Chibok girls kidnapping, and this will show more in their handling of other occurrences in the counterinsurgency operations.
These perspectives exposed that as the Boko-Haram insurgents kept persisting in their attacks, there was intelligence failure, and intelligence collected was not properly utilised. Boko-Haram continued its campaign against security forces in the North-East of Nigeria, and Chad, a neighbouring country that experienced two attacks. The first was an incident where three IEDs were detonated, one was at the fish market and the other two at the refugee camp, resulting in the deaths of many people. The second Boko-Haram attack was a launch at the Chadian soldiers; Boko-Haram fighters were killed too. The nation lost soldiers and others were wounded (Ashiru, 2019). Ashiru further stated that, in Niger, another neighbouring state, three suicide bombers died when these IEDs prematurely detonated en-route to their intended targets.

These regional attacks echo the importance of activities that tackle the issues of porous borders to curb the ease of movement and prevent transfer of weapons and intelligence knowledge within the region. Several intelligence collection techniques or technologies which can track border movement exist presently. Therefore, there is a need for collaborative effort to employ them. These tools can help in surveillance by the security operatives to identify obscure border transfer or crossing routes the insurgents used (Ashiru, 2019). In Yobe state, Nigeria, three IEDs detonated, killing civilians, one at a settlement behind a housing estate. The second detonated at a mosque in a government housing estate called Bulari housing estate and the third at a shopping centre within the state estate. Also, in Yobe, a military base was attacked overnight by a large group of insurgents, the army retaliated, and many insurgents were reportedly killed. According to Ashiru, two lessons arise from this. The first is that security appears to be reactive, evident in their being caught off guard. The second, is these attacks could also be indicative of major intelligence collection paucity. This is where the thesis will focus its attention.

In responding to these various attacks, while in Yobe state, as reported by Ashiru (The Nigeria Guardian, 2019), the Army Chief of Staff (COAS), who visited the military camp, referred to all the advanced military weapons and equipment available. In interviews conducted for this research, officers said there was nothing like ‘advanced military weapons and equipment’. The COAS said his men were not proactive in warding off the insurgents in the interview conducted, a Brigadier General narrates that the soldiers that are deployed to the theatre of conflict are totally inexperienced, with no real combat experience (Brigadier-Gen S10). The military lacked the proper equipment, manpower and motivation to
counterattack the insurgents or protect themselves, or the surrounding communities. In other words, the troop did not undertake offensive strategy, which is the central point of counterinsurgency operations. The insurgents must be found out to stop further attacks. COAS sums up ‘once an attack occurs, it is seen as a failure of counterinsurgency’ (COAS, 2015).

A major setback in the counterinsurgency was how intelligence was not used promptly in the North-East (1999-2017). Available evidence suggests that intelligence was not used effectively in the scenarios which occurred in the efforts against insurgency. In analysing the failure of intelligence in the North-East, a case study of the kidnapping and abduction of the over 300 Chibok schoolgirls will be highlighted here to demonstrate how intelligence was not properly managed by the military. This analysis is important here because it shows that intelligence was not utilised. Interviews conducted show that ‘intelligence was compromised’ (Multiple officers interviewed, across different ranks of the armed forces, 2018).

The Chibok girls’ debacle of 14 April 2014 took place in the town of Chibok, 20 miles from Maiduguri, Borno state, where over 300 schoolgirls were abducted by Boko-Haram. The Chibok kidnapping, as it came to be known, aroused global outrage and condemnation, with the now popular ‘Bringbackourgirls’ movement gaining wide and local media attention, including prominently within the BBC (BBC, 2016). This global outrage did not, translate to substantive impact in the theatre of operations. Moreover, the kidnapping was neither the first nor the last incident where groups of people were taken by Boko-Haram (the most recent is the Dapchi school kidnapping, in which over two hundred girls were abducted). Kidnapping is but one tactic the group has come to employ in its violent campaign. As John Hill wrote of the incident, ‘Boko-Haram has been in a state of perpetual evolution’. It has actively embraced innovations and adoption by consistently changing what it does, where and with whom. Kidnapping and abductions were added to its repertoire only a few years ago (Hill, 2014). This suggests that Boko-Haram appears to be advanced in gathering and utilizing intelligence more than the military. It can be categorically stated here that either intelligence was not properly utilised or it was compromised. Chibok, however, was perhaps the single most talked about point of Boko-Haram’s threat throughout operation Zaman Lafiya, the phase of the Nigerian military’s counterinsurgency against the insurgency between 2013 and 2015. Not only has the military’s failure to locate the girls been politicised, the insecurity at Chibok, that facilitated the kidnapping had sparked a debate around the failure of Nigeria’s
counterinsurgency response to intelligence. The military failed to penetrate the intelligence network of the Boko-Haram to foil their plans and strategies. Many of the interviewees were of the view that Boko-Haram has informants within the military hierarchy thereby compromising intelligence and breaching information confidentiality.

Regarding actual details of the attack, there have been allegations that the military had prior intelligence, up to four hours before Boko-Haram’s arrival at the school in Chibok, but failed to act (Mark, 2014). Additionally, Hill wrote that ‘the inexplicable withdrawal of the soldiers guarding the school from which the girls were taken is questionable’ (Hill, 2014), though this seems to somewhat conflicting with a report from the Nigerian Guardian Newspaper, which notes that ‘soldiers held off the militants for almost an hour but fled when no reinforcement arrived’. However, countering the above narratives, Major General Chris Olukoya, the army’s spokesperson, commented that those accusing the military of having prior intelligence and failing to act ‘just want to give a dog a bad name, to hang it’. He argues that the allegations are unverifiable, as is often the case (Mark; Monica, and Amnesty, May 2014). This is typical of failures within the counterinsurgency campaign, critics of the military’s approach make allegations, the military denies it and such failings are left poorly examined.

On the other hand, it may be the case that the Nigerian military received information about the impending attack on Chibok. It may be the case that the military knew this intelligence was credible and actionable. It may be the case that the military could have responded post-haste to prevent the kidnapping; yet failed to act, seemingly out of cowardice or what is regarded as ‘ineffectiveness’ as reports suggest. Assumptions of this nature constitute a worst-case scenario; however, other possible explanations exist for the military’s inaction. The intelligence may have been received, but summarily dismissed as is very usual with the military and other security outfits in Nigeria. But sources could not be verified. Likewise, the intelligence may have been received, verified as accurate, but no action could be taken, because there simply were not enough resources to mobilise a response in the timeframe. Major General Olukoya, may also be right, there is little substantive evidence that proves without doubt that the Nigerian military did receive information as regards the Chibok attack, but ignored it. Still, none of this absolves the military of its failing in the kidnapping. Operational failures leading to the incident are indicative, at the very least, of: (1) poor communication between in situ, and the nearest possible reinforcements outside Chibok; (2) poor tactical assessment of troops’ deployment in forward areas; (3) poor threat assessment,
the local presence of Boko-Haram was misjudged, and not for the first time; and (4) a reluctance of ground forces to engage the enemy at the time—this point is less about cowardice in the face of the enemy per se, and more about the failure of echelons above Brigade to adequately equip and support outfields battalion (Omeni, 2015; Bappah, 2016). Another factor which affected the use of intelligence was inadequate communication due to the geographical distance between the battle theatre and the military bases. The military operations were largely coordinated from Abuja while the troops were faraway in the North-East. Looking at the military’s preventative options related to the Chibok incident, there should have been a forward presence close enough to the town, from which mobilisation could have been a realistic option. The Chibok incident remains a low point of the Nigerian military’s North-East counterinsurgency campaign. But there are some positives to emerge from it. One of such was the formation of several new ‘roving’ Task Force (TF) battalions to secure forward areas. As a result of these new battleground areas, when the military previously had little or no forward presence, now have field units with stronger reinforcement options. The aim is not just a defensive role however, the newly formed TF battalion introduced an amplified deterrence factor (Omeni, 2015).

Omeni (2015) also identified the lack of inter-agency cooperation between the three main arms of the Nigerian military as well as the police and other paramilitary/security agencies which hampered its ability to apply intelligence in its counterinsurgency operations. The designated roles of these agencies support the military in counterinsurgency. The Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), monitors issues of national security from outside the shores of Nigeria. The State Security Services (SSS) is tasked with gathering intelligence internally, the military is tasked with protecting the territorial integrity of the state and assisting in maintaining internal peace when needed. The Nigerian Police Force is tasked with the responsibility of detection and prevention of crimes. The Nigerian Customs is charged with preventing the flow of contraband, illegal arms and ammunition across the border posts. The Immigration Service is responsible for ensuring that suspected insurgents or illegal persons do not cross into the country. The Nigerian Prisons Service is mandated to ensure that suspects do not escape and convicted insurgents serve their terms. The Federal Road Safety Corp (FRSC) identifies unmarked vehicles which may have been rigged with explosives. The Nigerian Civil Defence Corps’ role is to quickly pass information to the appropriate agencies when unusual things are noticed around the country. Therefore, ‘the importance of enhancing
interagency cooperation cannot be overemphasised’ (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

Akali Omeni (2015) in his article’ The Chibok Kidnappings in North-East Nigeria: A Military Analysis of Before and After’ narrates that the background to the counterinsurgency efforts against Boko-Haram in 2012-2014 and notes that at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) it is very important to understand that at the beginning of the counterinsurgency, it was the Army that was deployed (not the military as a whole) to curb the violence. The military came together to form inter-agency cooperation. As earlier stated, Omeni observed that the AHQ assumed operational oversight from Defence Headquarters (DHQ). Later in 2013, the Nigerian military’s counterinsurgency underwent a period of great reorganisation. Certainly, counterinsurgency operations in this phase of the conflict saw a larger role by the NAF and the local police played a supporting role at the Battalion level. By and large, however, the military effort against Boko-Haram remain centred around the infantry of the Army, with the creation of an infantry division, the first in the army’s history, and only its sixth manoeuvre division in over a decade (Omeni, 2015; Bappah, 2016).

Chilaka and Ikechukwu (2011) and Adeniyi (2012) are also of the view that the pace at which the campaign of violence and deaths has spread across Nigeria, especially in the North-East, has exposed the gap in the relationship among the various agencies. Events have shown that there is an urgent need to fix that gap. The absence of effective interagency cooperation has not only led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians at the hands of armed bandits, and especially with the Boko-Haram insurgents, it has also claimed the lives of military, intelligence, immigration, custom, police and prison personnel. This shows that it is not only in the interest of the nation that an enhanced interagency cooperation is established, but also in the interest of each these agencies and their operatives.

Omeni further states that with the 7th infantry (7 Inf Div.) formed in Maiduguri, Borno state, in August 2013, contested areas of the North-East would be militarised as thousands of additional troops were deployed to the theatre of operations. This was the largest mobilisation of the Nigerian Army since the civil war of the 1960s and 7 Division’s creation, it was thought, would change the calculation of war and swing the pendulum of engagement firmly in the favour of the Army. Again, he also emphasised that between 2013 and 2014, the Nigerian Army was not the only actor undergoing change at the time. This also was a period characterised by a series of shifts by Boko-Haram, away from the guerrilla-style tactics it has
emphasised throughout 2012, when it fought 7 Division’s predecessor, Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order (JFT, ORO) to a stalemate. The difference, however, between changes by the Nigerian military and changes by Boko-Haram, was that the latter’s change was mostly tactical. Until 2013, Boko-Haram’s covert operations included pre-dawn raids, hit and run gun attacks in the daytime and at night, and IEDs as standalone assets or as part of fast-moving Istishhad (Omeni, 2015). The first shift by Boko-Haram away from the doctrine according to Omeni, coming later in 2013, was towards mobile warfare tactics. Here, Boko-Haram made use of its overt front—a standing army of irregulars that employed motorised infantry, protected mobility, artillery, and newly acquired heavy guns in the aftermath of the civil-war in Libya to launch a different military campaign.

On the second shift, Omeni noted that shortly after, the insurgents’ mobile warfare, by mid-2014, gave way to positional warfare and a territory-seeking strategy that was initiated rather than shying away from engagement within the military fighting phase that followed. Boko-Haram demonstrated surprising resilience and fielded modified and refitted Nigerian Army towed guns and heavy armour, in addition to non-Nigerian vehicle mounted anti-aircraft assets. In three years, therefore Boko-Haram had demonstrated no less than two unique shifts in military doctrine. Thus, whereas the military struggled to adapt its counterinsurgency doctrine, the insurgent demonstrated no such weakness over the same period (Omeni, 2015).

Omeni narrates that Boko-Haram had more resources than the military at the initial phase of the fighting. Unable to build tactical momentum, considerably more resources were given which, over time, brought about a raft of changes and some innovations over the period between 2013 and 2014. Indeed, the Nigerian military’s campaign by the end of 2014 was considered different, unrecognisable in many respects as a more active operation ‘Zaman Lafiya’ was introduced to replace the much smaller operations being conducted when the military first began its task (Omeni, 2015). In surmising overall, Omeni (2015) observed that just because the campaign was expanding, and the military was aggressively adapting for war between 2013 and 2014, does not mean that the tactical momentum being built at the time was rapidly being translated to theatre level results. This translation would take time, over 18 months in some cases, and well into 2015. Boko-Haram would greatly exploit this period of reorganisation. It is however, comforting to note that the men and officers are also encouraging interagency cooperation. In September 2014, as observed by Chilaka and Ikechukwu (2011) and Adeniyi (2012), that the former General Officer Commanding 82
Division of the Nigerian Army, Major General Sunday Idoko, stressed in Port Harcourt, the River State capital ‘the need for interagency cooperation among the military and para military groups’. Furthermore, Idoko adds that ‘interagency cooperation was very essential, because of threat to the nation’s environment demands such on all the agencies. Chilaka and Ikechukwu (2011) and Adeniyi (2012) support this, and this thesis also agrees that ‘the General could not have been more apt’.

One thing must be clear though, interagency cooperation is a matter of mutual trust and respect—having a hunch that if I give you my word, you will have my back (this is where it is very problematic with the security and intelligence agencies in Nigeria). In Nigeria today, examples are given of this failed relationship. When the Nigerian military carried out an operation that led to the arrest of the late Boko Haram leader, Mr Mohammed Yusuf, he was handed over to the police in Maiduguri, apparently for further investigation and prosecution. But shortly after, it was reported that Yusuf was executed in police custody. His killing became a focus both locally and internationally, giving rise to concerns about the actions of the military as he was arrested, handed to police and extrajudicially killed, although the military came out strongly in denial of having had anything to do with his death. Such a development erodes the kind of mutual trust that is needed to ensure and enhance that they all play their roles accordingly (Oarhe, 2013).

While this is uncharted territory with regards to dealing with home grown insurgency, that also makes it compelling that there be more collaboration and coordination among the different armed forces. To this end therefore, there is a need to rethink the old ways of fighting insecurity as it has not been effective. But even when collaborations should be given, the pertinent question remains: Collaboration on what? What is level of experience and awareness of insurgency, what is the capacity to fight an enemy that is not afraid to die and bring others down? And how will the military fight without abusing or alienating the communities (which has happened in their various campaigns). The last point might seem a small issue, but it affects the capacity for effectiveness in this kind of war, where you need the support of the people.

This is because fighting insurgency requires intervention across multiple agencies. Effective interagency coordination is not only desirable, it is essential to meeting timelines as well as reducing wasteful overlap and unnecessary duplication. But such efforts could only be enhanced by acknowledging the role played by the various units in achieving a common goal.
Giving credit to all the agencies involved in the execution of a given task, no matter how small the contribution could be, it could go a long way in enhancing cooperation among them. The main challenge today is that the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) which sits atop the security infrastructure is somehow facing challenges in performing this critical role (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012). One of the challenges faced by the Office of the NSA, according to the researcher’s interview with a Colonel in the army, is the misuse of power, and the likelihood of not providing sound advice to the president. The Office also used to conduct corrupt practices as captured elsewhere in this thesis, in the era of Colonel Sambo Dasuki. There is also the the chance of the Office been politicised, and controlled by the political leadership (Colonel R23, 18 February 2021). Chilaka and Ikechukwu (2011) and Adeniyi (2012) further adds that interagency coordination can only be effective in an environment where each agency’s responsibilities are clarified, modalities from the sharing of information are provided, and the operational guidelines that would ensure the realisation of the stated objectives are clearly defined. Because differences in institutional perspectives and individual assumptions can muddle a clear understanding of the challenges, a common sense of ownership and commitment is needed and that can only be a product of an institutional arrangement which is solely lacking in Nigeria (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

In the US for example, in the aftermath of 9/11, what did they do? One, they identified that there was a problem. Two, they agreed that the worst attack on their homeland since the Second World War was a result of the absence of interagency collaboration on issues of national security. Three, they took positive and concrete steps to address the problem by setting up the 9/11 Commission to investigate the remote and immediate possible causes of the lapses that made the attack possible. Four, they are presently implementing the findings and recommendations of the panel, which include but are not limited to sharing information in real time. Five, they established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate all the agencies. Today, while the system may still not be perfect, the US and Americans are safer than they were years ago. Can Nigeria and Nigerians say the same thing in the aftermath of Boko-Haram and its effects? Only time can tell (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

In this era of an invisible enemy, it is important that all stakeholders improve their knowledge of who the targets are and that they come to terms with the reality that this is more
intellectual, rather than physical, work. It is a war in which we need the academics, the clerics, the communities, and the media. The point here is that fighting and defeating security threats like Boko-Haram entails more than an application of force (enemy-centric). Stabilising the crisis environment, assisting traumatised population (non-kinetic approach), and building societies and institutions are essential to achieving this task.

The scenario then suggests that it is also critical that there be some form of integration or interfacing with one another among these government agencies outside the intervention of the armed forces’ outfit. The collaboration is even beyond the level of security agencies; it is the societies or communities. Against the background that the civil authorities will remain engaged long after the military has departed the operational environment, it is therefore imperative that there be collaboration with the civilian actors in critical theatres of the current operations, especially, in North-East Nigeria. It is also important not only to share information, but also to be able to analyse such information and to ensure that no one drops the ball.

Increasing training for personnel in the various agencies on issues of insurgency cooperation will also go a long way in enhancing their effectiveness. Such training should focus on the dangers of not sharing valuable interagency collaboration, which may not only be detrimental to national security, but also puts everybody at risk. But, beyond collaborations, there is the need to address the critical issue of coordination. Who takes the lead in time of crisis? Who has a global picture of things to ensure that everyone is on the same page? How can we effectively deploy new technology in the fight against insurgency? It has been reported that there is an office of coordination on terrorism (insurgency), in the Office of the NSA, but is it very effective at all? Is there a database to ensure the relevant agencies get the requisite information in real time and act on them? These are some of the few questions that the relevant authorities must find answers too asked Chilaka and Ikechukwu (2011) and Adeniyi (2012), which this thesis is setting out to ask the relevant authorities too.

It can be said that there is a semblance of an interagency cooperation and collaboration, especially between and among the three services that make up the armed forces, such that each agency is very much aware of its constitutional duties and responsibilities in times of crisis and there is a clear command and control systems in place. While that is commendable, for as long as there is no such synergy between the police, SSS and other security institutions, the collective security as a nation will still be endangered (Adeniyi, 2012)
Perhaps, there is something in the institutional foundation of the military from which lessons can learned since the law clearly defines the role of each of the services. For instance, the Army knows it is its responsibility to protect the land, the Navy the territorial waters and the Air Force the airspace. Either jointly or separate, they could also be called upon by the Commander-in-Chief in aid of the civil authorities which is ordinarily just an ancillary responsibility. But they cannot be effective for as long as the laws governing other institutions with which they collaborated remains unclear. By the laws establishing the SSS, it was designed as a policing organisation rather than an intelligence gathering institution. It is the little wonder that there is perpetual conflict between the agency and the police (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

What compounds the problem in Nigeria is the fight over turf, that is even evident at the political level of leadership and this also comprised the nation’s security. For example, it is only in Nigeria (it is assumed) that you can have a Ministry of Police Affairs, when the institution should ordinarily be, as it is in other developed countries, under the Ministry of Interior. This has led to all manner of frictions. The Customs Service, as an arms-bearing institution, is rather curiously under the Ministry of Finance that has, not surprising, turned the men and officers to no more than mere revenue collectors. That explains why their pre-occupation is to meet financial targets for which they would do anything, even if such compromises the nation’s internal security which ordinarily its number one priority should be (Chilaka and Ikechukwu, 2011; Adeniyi, 2012).

5.5. Defence and Intelligence Establishments

The Nigerian police are statutorily charged with ensuring internal security and public order. In addition to the police, Nigeria’s intelligence community, such as the State Security Service (SSS), which is responsible for domestic intelligence, National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which is responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), which is responsible for military intelligence, has reacted to the violent activities of Boko-Haram.

Since 2009, when the federal government deployed the JTF, it has continued to maintain a substantial presence in strategic cities in the Boko-Haram heartland, in places such as Bauchi, Yobe, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Adamawa, Niger, Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states. The JTF,
in a bid to combat the Boko-Haram security challenge, has undertaken various operations such as house-to-house searches, stop and search operations, and raids of suspected hide-outs of Boko-Haram militias (Osumah, 2013).

The violent or repressive mode of response is often reinforced by substantial armed forces expenditure in operational gadgets. For instance, the Borno State government donated ten armoured vehicles to the police, apparently to enable the force to effectively combat the group. In the 2012 budget, the government allocated a staggering $5.947 billion to defence and national security, translating to ₦921.91billion. This figure represents 20 per cent of the total budget and the highest allocation ever for defence and security in the history of the country. This also makes Nigeria the biggest spender on defence and security in Africa. The 2012 allocation is also a marked difference from the ₦233 billion in 2009, ₦264billion in 2010, and ₦348 billion in 2011 (Daniel, 2012). The government has also ensured that Nigerian security agents receive up to date training in counterinsurgency, and every other capacity building initiative available in the world today for combating the insurgency. This training has been continuous, taking place both in and outside the country. There has been speculation that some 300 Nigerian soldiers were sent to the US to receive counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and bomb-disposal training specifically aimed at fighting Boko-Haram. However, Nigerian Army sources were reported as denying this. US officials would not comment on whether such activities were linked to Boko-Haram (Daniel, 2012).

The operations of the defence and intelligence community to contain the violence and associated costs have resulted in destructive and devastating consequences. The JTF has been accused of gross human rights violations, mass murder, extra-judicial killings, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning houses, and stealing money during raids (Nigeria Vanguard Newspaper, 2012). Despite allegations of widespread security force abuses, the Nigerian authorities have rarely held anyone accountable, which further reinforces the culture of impunity for violence (Vanguard, 2012). In fact, the security community seems to rationalize their operations to retaliate for the deaths of some security operatives from the Boko-Haram violence. As the JTF, through its spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Sagir Musa, noted ‘we should not forget that several security operatives have been killed or maimed by the terrorists, a lot of police stations and military installations have been destroyed’ (Timothy, 2012) Though there is no exactitude in the number of Boko-Haram militia fighters that may
have been maimed and killed by the security operatives, the casualties may be reasonably substantial.

Despite the military offensives of the JTF, Boko-Haram has grown more sophisticated. The group has executed reprisal attacks for the offensive operations of the security agencies against its members. Since the death of Yusuf Mohammad in police custody, the group has executed several attacks on security formations. On 24 December 2003, when Boko-Haram militias launched an attack on a police station and public buildings in the towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Yobe, a joint operation of soldiers and police were deployed to crack down on them. On 21 September 2004, the militants again launched attacks on the Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State (Agbedo and Osumah, 2012). In 2012, high profile armed forces and police commands were targets of Boko-Haram attacks. The Church facility at the Command and Staff College, Jaji in Kaduna State, was attacked on 25 November. Also, on 26 November, the Special Ant-Robbery Squad (SARS), headquartered in Abuja, was attacked. These attacks, perhaps, underscore the impotence of the Nigerian state. Indeed, in the first nine months of 2012, no fewer than 815 people were killed in 275 attacks, according to Human Rights Watch. This number is more than half of the not less than 1,500 casualty figures for three years, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Olakunle, 2013). A total of 185 policemen and residents were killed in the 20 January 2012 bomb blasts, which targeted mainly security formations in Kano – the deadliest single operation so far (Agbedo and Osumah, 2012).

5.6. Dilemmas of the Defence and Intelligence Establishments in Response to the Security Challenge

The main dilemma of the Defence and Intelligence establishments in responding effectively to the Boko-Haram security challenge is the absence of mutual confidence amongst armed forces. There is undue rivalry and suspicion among the sister organizations, and a quest for personal glory at the topmost levels of the agencies. For instance, it was reported that a lack of teamwork was responsible for the failure of the security agencies to prevent the UN building attack. Though information about the plan was reportedly received about nine days before it was executed, it was denied by the then National Security Adviser. Also, a central challenge to the Defence and Intelligence establishments in effectively responding to the
current security challenge of the Boko-Haram insurgency is the porosity of Nigerian borders. Nigeria shares borders with the Niger Republic, Chad, the Benin Republic, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. The Nigerian Immigration Service disclosed it has discovered along the borders about 1,487 illegal routes into Nigeria and 84 regular routes (Vanguard Editorial, 2013) The sheer number of these entry points can challenge even the best security plans. Thus, the porous borders are perhaps exploited by Boko-Haram for their violent activities, bringing arms and illegal immigrants into the country and escaping from the security agencies in the wake of attacks.

Former National Security Adviser General Aziza Owoye cited the exclusionary politics of the ruling PDP as the cause for the resurgent and widespread Boko-Haram attacks (Eghosa, 2012). Some senators such as Mohammad Aliyu Ndume, representing the Borno South Senatorial District, Ahmed Khalifa Zannah, representing the Borno Central Senatorial District, and the former Governor of Borno State, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff, have been variously accused of having ties with the Islamic group (Yemi, 2017). Also, some retired military generals and ex-heads of states before the General Sani Abacha administration, a former vice president in the first eight years of the current democratic dispensation, northern state governors (Isa Yaguda of Bauchi), and Muslim traditional rulers have been identified as sponsors and allies of Boko-Haram (The Street Journal, 2013). More poignantly, President Goodluck Jonathan held that the activities of Boko-Haram have become difficult to combat because the group has infiltrated sensitive government institutions such as the legislature, presidency, executive, judiciary and even security apparatuses such as the police and armed forces (Adetayo, 2013). In his words:

Some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government while some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies. Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won’t even know the person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house (Adetayo, 2013)

In addition, the seeming intractability of the Boko-Haram security threat has also been linked with cover provided by some communities. The authorities of the Defence and Intelligence establishments have accused residents of some communities of accommodating, shielding and allowing members of Boko-Haram to use their houses as escape routes after attacks
This may be for fear of retribution from the group or the inability of the security agencies to provide them security. Corruption is another factor which undermines the ability of the defence and intelligence establishments to combat the Boko-Haram security challenge. For example, Boko-Haram militias claimed that they offered bribes to navigate their way through the numerous checkpoints mounted by different security agencies to execute the attack on the UN office in Abuja (Ayorinde, 2013). Also, the defence and security establishment have little impact on the organization and campaigns of Boko-Haram. This stems from its inability to keep pace to stem the indoctrination, recruitment and training of members to carry out suicide bombing at different locations. Also, Boko-Haram operates asymmetrically. When it is losing to security agencies it declares a cease-fire and readiness for dialogue while soliciting for unconditional amnesty and the release of its detained members in various locations. The situation is further complicated by the fact that intermediaries of the group refuse to disclose the identities of the members of the group (Soriwei, 2013). This asymmetric mode of operation contributes to the difficulty of the Defence and Intelligence establishments in effectively responding to the Boko-Haram security challenge. The responses to the Boko-Haram security challenge have been inadequate. The ineffectiveness of the Defence and Intelligence establishments is attributable to a number of complex and interlocking dilemmas such as the disconcertion of the various security apparatuses, corruption, the prevailing poor economic condition, the crowded nature of the cities in the north, porosity of Nigerian borders, and the complicity and support of some of the political elite with the Boko-Haram.

Thus, for the Defence and Intelligence establishments to have a greater impact in their responses to the Boko-Haram security challenge, several steps must be taken. There is the need for the various apparatuses to share intelligence among one another and coordinate their responses to such intelligence. There is the need for effective management of borders, which are routes for illegal arms, illegal immigrants, criminals and contraband. The security establishment should deploy officers to patrol the illegal and regular routes to Nigeria. This cannot be done by one arm of the Defence and Intelligence establishments. The Nigerian Air Force should be tasked with air patrol, the Navy should handle the maritime sides of the border, and the Nigerian Immigration Service should work with customs, the police and other security agencies in policing the borders. These establishments should be provided with the necessary surveillance, logistical and operational facilities to effectively patrol and manage
the borders. Also, there should be inter-service training among the Defence and Intelligence establishments aimed at coordinated patrol of the borders (Adetula, 2015).

Adetula further adds that to respond effectively to the Boko-Haram security challenge, the defence and intelligence establishments need to seek the cooperation of the security outfits of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. They also need to elicit the cooperation of local communities in the affected areas of their operations. To be able to elicit the cooperation of the local communities, the defence and intelligence establishments need to respect the fundamental rights of the residents. The defence and intelligence establishments need to muster the courage to confront the political elites allegedly behind the group. The elites such as the politicians are mostly in support of Boko-Haram. It has been alleged that the group gets sponsorship from political elites to help fight their opponents. Boko-Haram capitalizes on widespread poverty and limited economic opportunities in the north. The poor economic condition and inequality, which conflate to create a climate of desperation, must be dealt with by the Nigerian government if the defence and intelligence establishments are to ensure sustainable counter-terrorism operations (Mbah, Nwangwu, and Edeh, 2017).

In view of the crowded nature of the houses in the Boko-Haram areas of operation, there is the need for urban renewal. Tall fences should be lowered. Intelligence gathering and analysis, community policing, an operational and strategic approach to policing, vigilance and awareness by the public, renewed public campaigns and a joint integrated approach of all the security agencies are measures that should be employed against the Boko-Haram security threats. There is also a need for international assistance especially in the areas of intelligence sharing, the detection of improvised explosive devices, forensic analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, and the mounting of a de-radicalization programme (Oarhe, 2013).

Experience from countries that have encountered so-called home-grown terrorism and counterinsurgency and have successfully dealt with it with boots on the ground, through soldiers and elite forces patrolling in groups in the terrorists’ main areas of activities. Essentially, the combined operations of the army and police in the areas where Boko-Haram operates will significantly limit and minimize their attacks and help restore normalcy in the lives of citizens living in the areas (Oarhe, 2013).
Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, it is imperative for Nigeria to begin to pay attention to some foregoing issues as it seeks to find a way round factors militarising Nigeria at this crucial period of the nation’s life. How Nigeria deals with this will determine how secure all its citizens will be now and in the future. The Nigerian government, through its intelligence agencies, must recognise that in the face of new dimensions of human conflict, new models of crisis engagement and management of intelligence must come into play. Different geographical and sociological peculiarities shape response plans. But most importantly, interagency cooperation supports containment strategies. Nigeria cannot and should not be an exception in this digital and knowledge age in the contemporary world today; novel thinking must be done to drive new tactics of resolving conflict, while a comprehensive review of the nation’s interagency cooperation template needs to be embarked open. This is an important pre-condition for the survival of the Nigerian entity.
CHAPTER SIX

Military Preparedness for Counterinsurgency

This chapter discusses findings on the factors responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian military in its readiness for counterinsurgency operations, including how motivated the military is as an institution. Within this focus will also be the manpower requirements, specifically whether the Nigerian military has the manpower it requires given that counterinsurgency is manpower intensive. Particular attention will be given to recruitment, and the suitability of personnel. It also presents the views of participants on their assessment of the quality of Nigeria’s military equipment in relation to global standards in counterinsurgency. On equipment, there is the question of whether what the Nigerian military has in its arsenal meets the standard to fight the insurgency; with the rise of new technology and the insurgents using modern fighting equipment, it is important that Nigeria has more superior ones to counter such threats. The issue of training, experience and corruption will all be discussed in this chapter. Findings reveal that the Nigerian military has not been strategically prepared in its operational capacity in dealing with the insurgency. In line with Collins’ assertion that as earlier identified, military preparedness demands personnel, weapons, equipment, and supplies of adequate quality in the proper mix and in enough quantities to accomplish assigned missions, wherever and whenever directed. Key research findings have shown that the Nigerian military failed in most aspects of Collins’ nine principles of military preparedness.
6.1. Motivation of the Military as an Institution

The catalyst that helps people and institution to function beyond and above expectation is motivation. There are different forms of motivation, it could be provided by monetary incentives, gifts or promotion for instance. Conducting interview at the military Headquarter in Abuja, Nigeria, an Army Brigadier General (Brig-Gen S, 2018), surmised that ‘for the military, motivation is having the necessary equipment, supplies and the right morale.’

Motivation for institutions is different from individuals, from officers to fighting soldiers.

Motivation is a physiological response and feeling of willingness. As for military motivation, it is a willingness, it is what makes the military keep trying when the challenges seem overwhelming. It is what keeps the military engaged if it is needed. Military motivation is special. The military is expected to do the job in harsh, unfamiliar environment and extremely stressful and urgent situations (Smykowski, 2019). Facing the unknown is a commonplace event in the military, but there are some known challenges to prepare the military for throughout the officers’ time in the army. Findings in this research reveal that the Nigerian
military was ill-motivated and lacked basic training in its counterinsurgency efforts in the North-East.

The issue of combat motivation is key to combat operations, especially as it concerns counterinsurgency. With low morale, defeat is considerably more likely. Various scholars have tried to define morale, but the one definition, which captures the picture is that by John Baynes. He defines morale as ‘the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of the group’ (Baynes, 1986). In military parlance, ‘morale’ and ‘motivation’ are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights the condition of a group, while motivation describes principally the attribute of an institution.

Many military strategists x-ray strategies to tackle the scourge of terror which has damaged the image of the Nigerian military and national image globally. It is highly commendable that President Muhammadu Buhari as stated in the past, ‘has absolute confidence in the ability of the Nigerian military to end the insurgency spearheaded by members of the Boko-Haram group’ (Abah, The Nigerian Guardian Newspaper, 2018). He continued, ‘I have always believed that the military alone cannot end the war on insurgency without the support of the political benefactors of terror in the first place’ (Abah, 2018). In 2018, a young army officer who was interviewed on whether the military can stamp out Boko-Haram, commented that ‘not with this commander-in-chief of the armed forces,’ he said. Whatever that meant is difficult to understand (NCO, Interview, 2018).

But according to Abah (2014), fighting troops must respect their Commander-in-Chief and must have the backing of same to succeed in wars prosecuted. Again, Abah (2014) asserts that a nation’s armed forces are as strong-willed as the commander-in-chief and the military high command of that country. The US president Barack Obama almost threw his presidency on the line when he overrode his security chiefs on their recommendations to him on how to get Osama Bin Laden. Abah narrates how he gets the chance to teach staff members of corporate organizations in management training schools. And how he still remembered vividly, when one such attendee -told a story of how a young military officer friend of his deserted the army because of a war-posting to Maiduguri. He had a hunch that he would be killed in battle—the fear was borne out of the fact that most of his graduate course mates from the Nigerian Defence Academy had been killed by the ‘Haramist’, due to ineffective armoury deployed to prosecute the war coupled with low motivation of fighting troops (Abah, 2014).
Many more are deserting the military. In an occasion when an interviewee went to have his eyes checked his doctor friend who consults for many military personnel told him about a soldier who came to ask him to draft a resignation letter for him. ‘He plans to leave the army. And as with recycled stories elsewhere, most of his mates had been killed due to poor armament and low motivation of troops was the chief reason why he planned to resign’ (Interview with an officer, 2018). A deserter who said that he was drafted to the war front from the parade ground without warning and orientation without a chance to say goodbye to his family. He was an unattached male and would have loved to say farewell to his mother. They were given only minutes to put their things together and all he did was that he went to his room, undressed into civilian dress and deserted the army (interview, January 2018). This is most of the situation most military personnel go through in the life of their careers, preparedness is important for both the institution and the individual officers.

This research concluded that desertion for the Nigerian soldiers is not cowardly, but the lack of training, equipment and motivation are what is largely responsible for their behaviours. Military analysts have said that the armed forces, is the last unit that is now holding the unity of this country together at the moment—for it is starkly clear that the political leadership have failed in one its primary duties of proving the necessary needs of the military, and even the little provided has been corrupted.

One major problem with Nigeria is that there is no government agency set up to actively engage and counter falsehood, to inform, educate, analyse, encourage learning and provide solutions to challenges of nationhood. Instead of spending billions to send people on religious pilgrimages why not set up such agency to feed people with knowledge? Has the military changed its recruitment strategy for war efforts? A successful applicant into the army having passed through the hoops in his path, the thorns and tares of military interview, is assigned a department based on his or her skills, competence, capability and his choice of department. In the barracks soldiers are quartered according to their units: Army Corp of Engineers, Signal Corp, Military Police, Supply and Transport, Workshop, Military Intelligence, Medical, Education, Ordinance, Garrison, Mechanized Infantry Battalion, Artillery and more. Groups of soldiers on assignments are in platoons (36), companies (100-120), battalions (1000), brigades (4000) and all are under a division (12000) (Abah, The Nations Newspaper, 2018).

One interviewed soldier retorted that the military ‘do not work with borders’ and further adds that ‘all units are a microcosm of the country.’ Soldiers have an unwritten rule: regardless of
tribe, a soldier thinks of unit and country first, not ethnicity. They work through a sort of clairvoyance and watch each other’s back instinctively regardless of ethnicity. After all, only ‘soldiers speak soldiers’ language’ (interview, Maj As7, January 2018). The military is a hierarchical and authoritarian profession which is not centred on ethnicity to cause military dysfunctions. This impression is in the minds of people and it would not be a good strategy to put it in mind. The Chief of the Army needs to correct the impression by putting out a statement. This research admits to having a vague idea of how soldiers are mobilized for war but having watched soldiers in the barracks, and by interacting with some military officers, it can be deduced that the military does not deploy based on ethnicity, although complaints have occurred in that direction without proof yet.

Available findings show that Nigeria has not given its military the preparedness outlined in Collins’ nine principles above. It therefore suggests that the military will be ineffective. Beyond military equipment, everyday necessities are often lacking. Proper accommodation for soldiers, who are often deployed for years, can be non-existent in most cases, but specifically for the deployed military in counterinsurgency operations. Findings from interviews with serving military personnel reveal that ‘Soldiers have reportedly resorted to buying blankets from refugees and begging aid workers for mattresses’ (Interview, 2018). This can affect the motivation of the military as an institution, and specifically in the counterinsurgency operations in the North-East.

They are often not paid in full for the work they are doing. In September, a corporal in a Special Forces regiment said, ‘For months now, we not been paid our allowance,’ according to an investigation by The Cable. This is a recurring complaint, and soldiers often say they are not paid on time (The Cable, 2018). There have been a multitude of complaints by soldiers over the quality and quantity of their rations. Before an attack at Jilli in July 2018, one of the most deadly carried out by Boko-Haram, soldiers were complaining about a lack of food and even water (Interviews, 2018). The situation was similar before the attack at Metele in November 2017, with a soldier later stating: ‘We are not properly fed.’ A senior humanitarian official said, ‘soldiers ask us for food’ (Col R5, 2018). All of this, not surprisingly, reduces morale and makes soldiers less willing to fight. This has all, unsurprisingly, contributed to what one former general described as ‘a crisis of morale.’ Constant Boko-Haram attacks, poor and outdated weapons, limited equipment, shortages of basic supplies, multi-year deployments, widespread corruption, and withheld pay have all
sapped soldiers’ will to fight. President Buhari recently accepted that low morale is an issue, saying in a TV interview that the ‘question of morale is correct,’ and ‘There is really what I would call battle fatigue.’ This admission is an important step and contrasts with statements made by top military officials. However, it remains to be seen if it is just rhetoric or will translate into actions: Buhari campaigned on defeating Boko-Haram, and recent Boko-Haram success has undermined that promise in the run-up to elections in February.

Most tactical officers interviewed said that ‘this low morale undeniably contributes to poor military performance against Boko-Haram. Soldiers increasingly break and retreat when their bases are attacked, and some are reportedly afraid to leave their bases’ (Interviews, 2018). It has also led to many soldiers deserting the army and has extended to other security forces. When a group of soldiers was told in August that they were going to be redeployed to the front lines with Boko-Haram, after having already spent four years fighting the group, they mutinied, protesting in Maiduguri airport, firing into the air and refusing to board planes that would have taken them to the front lines. Around 70 soldiers were arrested for their involvement in the incident (BBC, 2014). The Nigerian military despite being one of the largest in Africa, have had to grapple with a lot of its own internal problems. The organisation of the military lacks basic training, cohesiveness, equipment, and above all the basic key element of necessities that motivates the hierarchical strata of the officers of the Nigerian military. What really motivates the Nigerian military or what has been put in place to motivate the military?

In most of the interviews conducted, officers gave different view as to the issues concerning motivation. The high-ranking officers from the rank of Colonels to Major General, who are at the strategic level, shows that ‘the military is well motivated’ (Brig Gen O, 2017). On the other hand, middle ranking officers and the foot soldiers felt differently about that. They are strongly unhappy with the system and how they are being handled. Some of the areas they complained about are: lack of proper training; lack of equipment; lack of manpower, which leads to being overworked and not redeployed for a long period; low staff morale, which affects their psychology and their performance; long stays away from their families; and lack of promotion to the next rank, even after qualifying. In other interactions, the research gathered that officers who just came back from the North-East were very disappointed and disenchanted with the way they were handled on the battlefield. One Sergeant lamented that ‘even uniform, boot is not provided to them, some added that allowances were not enough
and sometimes not paid at all. To some feeding was a major problem’ (anonymous, Nigerian soldiers). Senior officers’ ignorance, or apathy, to the plight of the average Nigerian soldier worsens this morale problem and will prevent steps being taken to fix the issues rife within the military.

Their attitudes are perhaps best represented by a quote from the former Chief of Air Staff and Chief of Defence Staff Alex Badeh, who said in January 2015: ‘how can a soldier come up and say ‘I’m not well equipped’ yet you have a rifle; what do you want? You want APC, you want tanks? The basic weapon of an infantry man is rifle, so why should there be mutiny?’ Badeh’s comment still seems representative of senior officers who continue to ignore the issues faced by the average soldier, even as problems have worsened. When these issues are raised, the military is quick to deny problems while maligning those who speak out. In a memo circulated to commanders fighting Boko-Haram following a spate of attacks in July, Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai lamented ‘worrisome’ cases ‘where units abandon their positions.’ Rather than discussing steps to address the issues, Buratai threatened commanders, reminding them ‘any officer or soldier found guilty of cowardly behaviour shall on conviction by a court martial be liable to suffer death.’

A few months later, Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Culture Lai Mohammed refuted that there was a lack of food for soldiers, that allowances had gone unpaid, or that they were using poor equipment. He said that such accusations were ‘fake news,’ adding that reporting on these issues amounted to collaborating with ‘enemies of the nation’ and that the reports themselves were ‘a clear and present danger to the nation’s security.’ From the above statement of the Minister, this clearly shows how the government’s positions are defended, but the reality of the situation is not being addressed to enhance proper motivation of the soldiers. This attitude, as well as the other problems facing the Nigerian military, persisted through several changes of military leadership. Findings revealed that there have been several reshuffles of top commanders, while five different commanders have led operations in the North-East in less than two years. The theatre commander at the time was Major General Benson Akinroluyo for operation Lafiya Dole (Premium Times, 2018).

Despite these changes, the internal problems facing the Nigerian military, now seemingly systemic, have remained even as the conflict with Boko-Haram has worsened. Senior officers have reportedly become unreceptive to new ideas. Worse, an analyst told World Politics Review that the conflict does not receive enough attention as service chiefs are ‘only
concerned about who becomes the next chief of defence staff.’ Here it shows that individual concern is more important than the interest of the nation. It is this attitude that has further jeopardised the effectiveness of the military, especially at the strategic level. As was opined by an interviewee ‘one bad policy decision affects all the other decision of the command’ (Major Gen S20).

‘Soldiers have become terrified of the insurgents, afraid to leave their bases, said a security source and a diplomat’ (Carsten, 2018). While hundreds have died recently, hundreds more have deserted. One retired general, speaking on condition of anonymity, described ‘a crisis of morale,’ linking the frequent allegations of human rights abuses rape, torture, shakedowns and extra-judicial killing—to broken spirits. ‘The Nigerian military denies such accusations, though it set up a panel last year to probe allegations’ (Carsten, 2018). Its findings have not been made public. Regardless of the denials, in the early part of 2015, Nigerian Special Forces mutinied at an airport, refused to be deployed after learning that after years in the North-East they were to be redeployed to another dangerous part of the region (GOV.UK, 2019). With low morale of the military, their best cannot be given, thus, it affects the performance of the troops.

6.2. Equipment

Equipment and logistic deficits have been identified as major challenges of the Nigerian military over time. Evidence from previous studies and input from interviewees suggests that the lack of equipment and logistical support has hampered the capacity of the Nigerian military to curtail the insurgency in the North-East over time. This is obviously one of the low-morale attributes of the military and its motivation among personnel of the organisation. In conducting interviews, one of the officers reliably informed the researcher that ‘since the early 1980s, there has been no major purchase of modern equipment for the military force’, that what they have in their arsenal has become obsolete and non-functional, although he adds that ‘since the coming into power, the government of Muhammadu Buhari, has made some purchases of modern and functional equipment, that is why some successes have been recorded in the North-East’ (Colonel B20). According to the International Crisis Group (2016) report ‘Nigeria: The challenge of Military Reforms’, for many years, the military made no major acquisition, at best taking delivery of refurbished platforms (Muslim
Obanikoro, 2014). The limited equipment available is often poorly maintained (Ex-Minister of Defence, T.Y Danjuma, the Guardian, 1999). For instance, the army’s 35mm anti-aircraft guns are not useful for counterinsurgency but are illustrative of the general situation with the army’s equipment. Imported from Switzerland in 1979, they became unserviceable in 2002 and were left in that condition until 2013 (Thisday, Newspaper, 2013). In 2014, the services had nearly 95 aircraft and 75 maritime vessels, but less than one third had flown or sailed in several years (Former army logistic, Lagos, 2015). Two months after he took office, President Buhari lamented ‘the air force is virtually non-existent’. The fixed wing aircraft are not very serviceable. The helicopters are not serviceable, and they are too few’ (Nigerian Vanguard, 2015)

Poor maintenance has crippled operations. For instance, three aero-star UAVs, procured from the Israeli-based Aeronauts Defence System (ADS) in 2006 to track militants then attacking crude oil pipelines and kidnapping expatriates in the Niger-Delta, were grounded in 2009 (Nigerian Vanguard, 2014). Military analysts say the UAVs, equipped with thermal imaging cameras suitable for night operations, may have been the best tools to deploy in the search for the Chibok schoolgirls. Without them and other ISR assets the military was unable to rescue the girls, as discussed in earlier chapters of the thesis. The service has also had to contend with obsolete, substandard equipment. Military sources said the exclusion of logistics branches from the arms procurement process under past administrations sometimes resulted in acquisition of substandard or unserviceable equipment (Military Interview, Abuja, 2019). In February 2008, an anonymous army officer petitioned the president, warning that the military has become ‘functionally paralysed’ and in the event of war ‘cannot defend itself’ (The Nigerian News, 2008). In 2012, sources involved in the African-led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA), reported that the 900 men Nigerian contingent, which ECOWAS had heavily relied upon, arrived ‘in a shocking state’. As observed, they were poorly trained and even more poorly kitted-out, had to buy pick-up trucks as their armour kept breaking down, and eventually spent a lot of time on basic manning check points, as they did not have the capacity to carry out even the most basic manoeuvres necessary for forward operations.

Many soldiers deployed to fight Boko-Haram in 2013-14 reported that their equipment broke down frequently, and they had severe shortages or lack of body armour, radio equipment and night vision goggles. This was a major factor for the many mutinies in those years (Interview,
Major B21, Abuja, 2019). An ex-soldier said ‘sometimes, we had as little as 30 bullets each, facing Boko-Haram fighters whose ammunition seemed inexhaustible’. At the peak of their frustration in May 2014, troops mutinied, firing on the car of the 7th Division commander, Major-General Ahmadu Mohammed, whom they blamed for the death of fellow soldiers. ‘The situation in the North-East is deteriorating’, said a major in the army, who wanted anonymity, ‘they [the military] are running out of weapons, ammo and basic equipment, the military is highly exhausted.’

On the flip side, new equipment has been bought by the Nigerian government to help fortify the military arsenal. According to defenceWeb (2019), in its article ‘New Nigerian Military equipment revealed’, the NAF and army have revealed new acquisitions and plans to acquire more equipment including domestically built armoured vehicles. During a firepower demonstration at Army Camp Kabala in Jaji, Kaduna state on 27 April 2019, the Nigerian Army unveiled new surveillance equipment including Thales Ground Observer 12 lightweight surveillance radar, which was delivered early in the year, and Thales Sophie-LR handled thermal images, delivered in 2018. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that a Hensoldt Spexer 2000 ground surveillance radar was also displayed.

The Nigerian Army Vehicle Company (NAVMC), which was formally commissioned in January 2019, displayed a prototype 4x4 armoured personnel carrier and mine roller gear. The company is also developing three vehicles, including an off-road buggy and two armoured vehicles called the NAC-V and NA-IPV2. Both are 4x4 and feature 360-degree enclosed turrets. The Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai said the NAVMC needs at least N1billion ($2.7million) of investment, which the army is sourcing to build vehicles to combat insurgency, although with the issue of corruption in the procurement of this equipment, it is hoped that this will not go the same way as it affects the efficiency of the military. The COAS further added that the Nigerian Army light armoured vehicles and mine sweepers produced by NAVMC shows that the military will soon be better equipped to stem the challenges of insurgency (Buratai, 2018).

The NAF, also, on 29 April 2019, displayed the first two new A109 power helicopters during its 55th anniversary celebration. The helicopters, which arrived in March 2019, were fitted with rocket and gun pods. Nigeria has two more on order from Italy’s Leonardo Helicopters. The Chief of the Airforce (CAS), Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, said that the NAF had improved the weapons it needs to fulfil its obligation of protecting and defending the
territorial integrity of Nigerian airspace. Continuing, he said ‘we have continued acquired and bringing various platforms into service and to build upon the foundations laid by our noble predecessors by reactivating several aircraft that were hitherto grounded; acquired and brought various platforms into service and increased the strength of service personnel by 7,500 airmen, women and 400 officers. Additionally, two new commands and two staff branches were established to meet the evolving security challenges we are faced with. He said, ‘Furthermore, the gap between force projection and force protection capability has been substantially bridged with the training of more than 1,000 special forces. These personnel have been deployed as part of the Base Defence force to deal with the threat to our bases and to support internal security, especially in the North-East’. Paramount Marauder vehicles were recently delivered from South Africa to further boost the equipment capability, and increase effectiveness of the military (DefenceWeb, 2019).

In a clear case of lack of equipment, findings show how the military were attacked and lack of equipment was a major obstacle to countering such an attack. Boko-Haram jihadists have raided a military base in North-East Nigeria near the border with Niger, killing several troops and stealing weapons, military sources said ‘Fighters from the Islamic group in eight-gun trucks launched a pre-dawn attack on the base in Kareto village, 335 kilometres (210 miles) north of the Borno state capital Maiduguri’ (Officers interviewed, January 2019). ‘The insurgents attacked the 153 Troops Battalion in Kareto around 4:00 am (0300 GMT) and subdued the soldiers who were forced to withdraw after a hard fight,’ an army officer who did not want to be named told the researcher. ‘We lost several men, but we are still working to establish their number one thing we are sure about is that the base commander, a lieutenant colonel, was among those killed.’ He further narrates that the insurgents ransacked the base and carted away weapons and vehicles. The Islamist group ‘took troops by surprise’ while they were working to fix communications equipment that had been destroyed in a rainstorm, said another officer, who also sought anonymity. The troops could not seek support from two nearby bases because of the faulty equipment’ (Interviews, December 2018).

Findings reveal that search and rescue teams were combing the area for missing soldiers and dead bodies. They also show that Kareto, a town in Borno state, had been repeatedly attacked by insurgents who have since July 2018 targeted dozens of military bases in attacks that have left scores of soldiers dead in this volatile region. Research also finds that recently, in March 2019, the jihadists carried out multiple attacks on military bases in Borno state, overrunning
three of them and stealing weapons after killing soldiers (Interviews, January 2019). One security source told the researcher that soldiers ‘are running out of weapons, ammo and basic equipment.’ A corporal in a military special task force’s unit narrates ‘they had not received basic equipment such as uniforms, boots or body armour’ (Corporal D5). Another soldier told the researcher that they have ‘no helmet, no flak jacket, not enough ammunition’ (Lance Corp B2). In the above scenario, it reveals that the military cannot be effective in its operations, because of the lack the above basic requirements are the tactical force. This goes to infer that the military cannot perform their responsibility fully when it has all these challenges.

There are also problems with more sophisticated equipment. In February 2019, an officer told the researcher that armoured vehicles and tanks purchased by the previous administration had already ‘broken down’ and were in ‘a state of disrepair’ (Major S8). Most of the soldiers interviewed have complained of tanks only firing twice, armoured personnel carriers running for 10 to 15 minutes before overheating, machine guns jamming, and mortar shells failing to detonate. What good equipment soldiers have is often captured by the insurgents as they overrun bases. Recent propaganda videos and pictures released by Boko-Haram commanders appear to show tanks and armoured vehicles being seized on several occasions. The generally poor state of weapons and equipment and the capture of good equipment by Boko-Haram has led to a situation where Nigerian soldiers complain that militant opponents are better equipped than them (This was a general comment collected from various officers, amongst interviews conducted from 2017 to 2020).

Faulty and missing equipment and weapons can severely hamper the defence of bases, let alone offensive operations. When attacked at the end of November 2018, in Baga, soldiers successfully fended off Boko-Haram militants, but they ran low on ammunition during the battle and were not resupplied, forcing them to abandon the base. A military officer later said, ‘They had no ammunition to fight in case of renewed attack and had to abandon the base,’ while another added, ‘They did not receive supplies and decided to leave the base and move to Mallam Fatori.’ From the above interviews and analyses, this goes to show all the challenges that Nigerian military has had to deal with since the inception of the insurgency and at the initial take-off of the war against it. The myriads of problems be it strategic, operational and tactical has not be properly managed to bring in the desired results from the Nigerian military Counterinsurgency operations in the North-East.
In 2014, the Nigerian government tried to equip its military with Cobra attack helicopters, but the deal was halted by the US. The Nigerian ambassador to Washington said in November after the sale was stopped that the equipment ‘would have brought down the insurgents within a short time’ (Adefuye, 2014). State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki asserted that the sale was ‘cancelled due to concerns about Nigeria’s ability to use and maintain this type of helicopter, and ongoing concerns about the Nigerian military’s protection of civilians when conducting military operations’ (Sieff, The Washington post, 2015). The lack of equipment and supplies of the military to its fighting force is highly detrimental to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in the North-East. It further confirmed the earlier position that, with all these deficits, the ‘morale’ of the officers became low, therefore affecting their motivation to be effective in the campaign against the insurgency, who are well prepared and highly motivated. Lack of policy framework limited the capacity of the military as an institution too. It can be summarised that the lack of the necessary modern equipment of the Nigeria armed forces is a major setback for its operations in the North-East.

### 6.3. Personnel and Training

In the 1990s, the Nigerian military was hailed for its role in peace-keeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. But after military rule in this country ended in 1999, experts say, the armed forces were kept weak to prevent them from attempting coups. The military is under-staffed and under-trained. Nigeria’s 1:1,000 ratio of military and paramilitary personnel to overall population is lower than those of its neighbours (Chad 3.4: 1,000; Cameroon 1.2:1,000; Benin 1.1:1,000), except Niger (0.7:1,000) (the Military Balance, 2014). For a country of its size and with multiple security challenges – an insurgency over a wide area of the North-East, a communal crisis across the North-Central zone (Middlebelt), oil theft and related maritime crime in the Niger-Delta and committed to several peacekeeping missions abroad, personnel strength is widely considered inadequate. The military reported that its strength is less than half that of 18,966 officers and 190,139 soldiers which the Defence Headquarters in 2014 projected as necessary to meet its challenges soon (Crisis Group Interviews retired military officers, 2015).

The recruitment process guided by the Nigerian Army Administrative policy and procedure Number 1 of 2005 stipulates that the minimum education requirement for a recruit is the
West Africa School Certificate (WASC). It further states that recruitment is subject to the Federal Character provision of the 1999 constitution and prescribes standard physical and medical requirements, as well as vetting procedures. In practice, these provisions are poorly observed, resulting in a deeply flawed process. In trying to meet the Federal character requirement, the recruitment process often takes many applicants from states with poor schools, who do not meet the minimum educational requirement. According to an officer who served on the recruitment board, some are barely literate, so difficult to train (Interview by Crisis Group, 2015). Recruitment is also deeply influenced by the priority given to applicants on the President’s list, First Lady’s list, Honourable Ministers, the Emirs and so on, with little regard for martial potential or merit (interview, 2019). Many applicants seek to enlist not for patriotic duty, but for a salaried job with privileged status over civilians, finding genuine service-oriented recruits is increasingly difficult. In July 2014, then Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minimah, commented that ‘our soldiers are recruited from the Nigerian society, and today most people are not called to be soldiers; they are desperate for jobs’ (Daily Post, 2013). The process is further compromised by fraud. The 2010 report for screening of the 65th Regular Recruit Intake (RRI) from the southern zone of Nigeria noted that many candidates presented forged certificates, altered their exams grades or presented documents procured or stolen from others (Crisis Group interview, 2015). Even so, some recruits found to have enlisted with forged certificates or false identities were protected by their ‘godfathers’ (those in high political or military offices), and allowed to continue training (interview, retired army officer, 2015).

The military has elaborate training institutions, and the Service Headquarters issue training directives to units and formations annually; but training has declined over the years. The depot, Nigerian Army Training Branch and recruits centre, which gives recruits initial foundation training, lacks qualified instructors. In 2010, it was estimated that it should have 272 officers and 350 soldiers, but there were only about 164 officers and 125 soldiers in March 2015, too low an instructor-to-recruits ratio to achieve satisfactory results. Several recruits and serving officers lament that tactical training has declined, and its overall quality increasingly leaves much to be desired (interview, former trainer, 2015).

Unit training is also deficient. A retired officer told Crisis Group

battle inoculation, which are conducted with live shooting, are not held regularly, so the training provided does not prepare soldiers sufficiently for real life battle

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situations. Some troops complete their training with no near-combat field experience (Leadership Newspaper, 2015).

Until recently, doctrines and modules were geared towards conventional warfare operations, with little attention to counterinsurgency. A cursory look at the US and British experiences might throw light on this and show that the Nigerian military is not well trained for counterinsurgency. Though it can be argued that their expertise and experience might not really be best for the Nigerian situation, a lesson or two can be learned. ‘The centre of gravity of our enemy then was mechanized forces—his artillery,’ says Lieutenant Colonel Steve Smith, an artillery officer — the branch of the Army known as ‘The King of Battle.’ ‘It was pure force on force.’ He further asserts that ‘It was purely our Army and our Air Force is going to destroy your army and your air force and your equipment,’ Smith says. ‘And when we do that, we win, and we go home.’ Britain has sent dozens of military trainers to Nigeria after a request from the troubled African state for help to battle Boko-Haram Islamist extremists. Defence sources said plans were being drawn up to bolster a small existing UK training mission in the Nigerian capital as the extremists continued to seize territory and wage a bloody campaign of attacks. The Nigerian government has called for more help as its demoralised military has failed to push back recent offensives, a senior Whitehall source said. Defence planners are looking at boosting the UK training force to two or three dozen soldiers, though any final decision will have to be made by the National Security Council. One source said: ‘We are scoping it now. There’s some internal debate about what we could do and what we would want to do.’ (Farmer, 2014).

The RAF sent three Tornado GR4s to the country to help efforts to track down the Chibok schoolgirls. Some of the captives had escaped, but the majority remain missing and the group claims they have been married off to its fighters. Matthew Henman, manager of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, said the Nigerian military was badly led, demoralised and riddled with accusations of corruption (BBC, 2016). The Boko-Haram militants, who number several thousand fighters in several loosely aligned factions, are by contrast highly motivated, experienced and well equipped. The militants have begun to push out of their strongholds in three states in the country’s North-East and make gains further afield. Despite some recent successes, the government has largely been unable to resist their advance (Henman, 2016).

He further said: ‘The past years has been pretty terrible for the Nigerian military, with concerted military operations only exacerbating insurgent violence in the North-East.’ ‘What
we have seen in the past four or five months is they have been expanding their campaign to seize control of territory, while the Nigerian military has been unable to resist or push back.’ He said the Nigerian armed forces desperately needed building up. He said: ‘What they really need is capacity building, because currently the Nigerian military is almost thoroughly outclassed by the militants in terms of arms, morale, and training. ‘There’s a fundamental lack of capacity and leadership in the officer class to wage effective operations, although the claimed recent recapture of Mubi, capital of Adamawa State, from Boko-Haram seemingly represents a much-needed success.’ William Hague, then the Foreign Secretary, said in June 2014 that Britain would deliver more military aid, intelligence support and aid. A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said: ‘The Defence contribution includes training and advice to the Nigerian armed forces.’ This capacity building effort is being delivered through short-term training teams of various sizes, augmenting the work of our permanent British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT).’ ‘All UK assistance is rigorously assessed against strict human rights compliance procedures.’

US Special Forces were in Nigeria on a seven-week tour training local soldiers in advanced infantry tactics that will most likely be used to fight Islamist insurgency. A group of Green Berets and other infantrymen trained 200 Nigerian soldiers stationed at an army school. ‘They face a significant threat from both Boko-Haram and ISIS,’ said Captain Stephen Gouthro, the group’s officer-in-charge, speaking to Army Times. ‘It really puts a spin of realism on what we are doing,” he added. “It’s very possible that this training event will be some of the last training they get before they go into combat for their country.’ In June 2014, former Army Chief and present minister of interior, General Abdulrahman Danbazzau (Rtd) observed, ‘the armed forces are the ones doing the duties of the police’ (Leadership Newspaper, 2014). As of June 2014, military units were deployed in joint operations areas like the North-East and this distract troops from preparing for real combat (Sun Newspaper, 2013).

Faced with this crisis in the North-East, the military has had to conduct emergency recruitment and inadequate training. Some soldiers who served with counterinsurgency units in Borno state told the researcher that in many encounters with Boko-Haram through 2013-14, the units had not been trained for the terrain and operations, and they were often vastly outnumbered. The results were a disaster and defeat was inevitable (Interview officer, January 2019). One interviewee asserted that ‘The quality of the Nigerians’ tactical training
has declined’ (2nd Lt A5). Even Boko-Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, has poked fun at the Nigerian military. ‘You send 7,000 troops?’ Shekau said in one video recording made in 2015 and posted online in 2016. ‘This is small. Only 7,000? By Allah, it is small. We can seize them one by one.’ (Shekau, 2015. The above statement clearly shows that personnel of the military is quite inadequate to deal with the situation in the country, most especially the North-East, where the military has been overwhelmed.

6.4. Experience

This portion of the thesis addresses the Nigerian military’s experience in its counterinsurgency actions in the North-East. How did the military fare in the face of daunting challenges, ranging from lack of equipment, lack of well-trained personnel, low morale, and environmental constraints? Systemic issues within the Nigerian military have contributed to preventing it from effectively combating Boko-Haram militants. Several lessons can be learned from the experience of violent conflict in North-East Nigeria since 1999. The recurring nature of the conflict suggests that it is imperative to develop early warning and response mechanisms at different levels of governance from the Local Government Authorities (LGA), at the state levels, and the Federal level. Efforts in this direction will limit heavy losses of lives and property that characterise many North-East states since 1999. It should be noted, however, that an early warning system is not necessary a panacea. Given the entrenched conflict, conflict mitigation must become an important element in the process of constitutional and institutional reforms in the country.

When violent conflict does erupt, they can better be managed. The deployment of force might become an urgent necessity. What type of force is deployed and with what level of logistical support needs to be better thought through. The collaboration and coordination between such forces and local and state bodies cannot be taken for granted and must be given the attention it deserves, since such collaborations have shown to be vital to the success of the forces. The constitutional and institutional factors fuelling the cooperation between federal and state authorities over the control of the security forces needs to be re-examined.

The human rights culture of the military needs to be clearly improved upon, and their rules of engagement in internal security duties need to be clearly articulated. Further training in this regard will be necessary within the military. In the context of the current security challenges,
the payment of compensation to victims of violence, no matter how small, will go a long way in assuaging their sense of victimisation. Commission of inquiry and eminent persons’ panel have often been used as fact finding mechanism (Interview).

Building peace in North-East Nigeria must be something to be achieved with a partnership between the various government and their agencies. Military-civil relations are equally important especially in adopting the non-kinetic approach. The role of international agencies and actors is very important in this regard. The frequent over-politicised the management of the conflict situation needs to be addressed. Instead, civil society organisations, the media, academics and development partners are in a search for peace. Overall, some 15 million people have been adversely affected by the insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. Boko-Haram fighters have slaughtered civilians in villages and towns and abducted thousands of people, forcibly marrying off women and girls to their fighters, and conducted mass-casualty insurgent attacks against mosques, churches, schools, markets, and camps for IDPs. Yet the response of the Nigerian state until 2015 oscillated between neglect of the problem and counterproductive heavy-handed counterinsurgency measures that exhibit little distinction between Boko-Haram fighters and the population who have had to endure its rule between 2015 and 2017. The effectiveness of the military campaign improved, and the Nigerian state managed to retake territories from Boko-Haram, pushing the group to more marginal areas. Yet the military has struggled to effectively hold retaken territories. Lower-scale Boko-Haram attacks persist, and steadily expose the questionable claims of the counterinsurgents that Boko-Haram has been degraded (Felban-Brown, 2018).

The Nigerian government has attempted many times to negotiate a peace deal with Boko-Haram that includes various unspecified forms of amnesty, both to incentivise a top-level deal and to encourage defections amongst rank-and-file fighters. Nonetheless, these political negotiations have collapsed every time; in each attempt they lacked a credible level of efforts with premature declarations of success by the Nigerian government causing significant embarrassment. Moreover, these failures have left the Nigerian government with political egg on its face and discredited such processes.

Finally, as Boko-Haram has been pushed out of their occupied territory recently, the Nigerian government and military have a chance to finally start overcoming the deep-seated legacy of an abusive and neglectful state. To do so, however, they will need to radically change counterinsurgency practices, bringing them in line with human rights and best practice in its
counterinsurgency operations. They will also need to improve and expand leniency measures, and effectively rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals formerly associated with Boko-Haram. Nigeria has a chance to become a model of disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration processes even before the conflict has fully ended. The international community should support and encourage Nigeria in such efforts, including by demanding accountability for egregious human rights abuses by Nigerian military, and Boko-Haram (Robert, 2018).

6.5. Corruption

As Nigeria fights Boko-Haram, its army is hampered by an equally dangerous enemy: corruption. Corruption in the Nigerian military has been a major factor influencing the failing of the military’s fight against insecurity, especially the insurgency in the North-East. In 1999, with the introduction of democracy as already enumerated in the introduction to this thesis, it is alleged that the military had been involved with corruption, high level embezzlement of budgetary allocations, and poor performance of the leadership. The presence of corruption in the Nigerian military is a steep slippery slope into the abyss of insecurity and instability (Duke, Agbaji and Bassey, 2017).

The issue of corruption in the Nigerian military has caused it to be ill-equipped with sophisticated modern high-tech weapons, promotes the purchase of substandard military hardware, facilitates the non-payment of soldiers, disrupts the processes through which food, medical supplies, and transport vehicles reach the battleground, and spurs the desertion of officers on the frontline causing others to stay longer than the scheduled time for their tours of duty. In fact, the corrupt nature of the Nigerian defence group has seen over US$15bn stolen, leaving the military without the necessary equipment and insufficient trained manpower which affects the operationality of the military in its counterinsurgency campaigns (Transparency International (TI) Report, 2017). As Duke and Etim (2016) observed, with a lack of sophisticated arms, low morale, mutiny, and low welfare packages, some of the reasons for the military’s ineffectiveness in combating insurgency are apparent. In the corruption index of the Transparency International Report Nigeria is placed in group B and E – the group of countries with very high corruption, which is a risk level in their national defence institutions (Duke, Agbaji, and Bassey, 2017). According to findings from the interviews it is believed that ‘it is ultimately the frontline troops who suffer from this kind of
corruption’. Under-equipped soldiers have been killed in ambushes or have simply fled the battlefield when faced with the superior firepower and equipment of the Boko-Haram militants (Interview, January 2019).

Corruption has been a major hindrance to the military’s fight against the insurgency. This is because in spite of the high budgetary allocation to the military, it has not had better modern equipment to fight the war on insurgency. The welfare of the soldiers has been severely compromised, leading to low morale of the military. Most of the interviewees revealed that their allowances are not always paid on time and that they have no modern equipment to fight the insurgents. All this has helped to undermine the effectiveness of the military in its counterinsurgency operations. The perception of corruption in Nigeria worsened between 2016 and 2017, a new report by Transparency International revealed. Nigeria ranked 148 out of 180 countries assessed in 2017 on the perception of corruption. Another report by TI (2017) said military corruption has weakened Nigeria’s efforts to battle the Islamist insurgency of Boko-Haram. It underlined the difficulties of achieving two key promises of President Buhari’s campaign promises in 2015; tackling endemic corruption and defeating an insurgency that has claimed many lives and displaced a lot of people. It states that ‘corrupt military officials have been able to benefit from the conflict through the creation of fake defence contracts, then proceeds of which are often laundered abroad in the UK, U.S and elsewhere’ (TI Report, 2015).

Vice President Professor Osinbajo has said that about $15 billion has been stolen from the public purse under the previous government of Jonathan, through fraudulent arms procurement deals. TI adds that it has left the military ‘without vital equipment, [and] insufficiently trained, low in morale and under-resourced’. It further narrates that ‘this has crippled the Nigerian military in the fight against an aggressive ideological inspired enemy, Boko-Haram’. It said, pointing to cases of soldiers taking on the militants without ammunition or fuel in the fight against insurgency, the avenue has become a conduit pipe to siphoned money by both the politicians and the military officers. To save the country, it became sacrosanct to purchase armaments and military hardware to help fight the insurgency in the North-East. Trillions of Nigerian naira was budgeted for, which finds its way into private pockets of people in government and their friends. Corruption and fake arms deals aided the ineffectiveness of the military’s campaign against insurgency in Nigeria. Here a
military with few weapons fight a well organised group with high-tech weaponry (Onuah, Reuters, 2016).

A few months after the President was sworn in, he ordered the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to investigate the individual and two non-recommended, not air worthy helicopters for a huge sum of $136 million instead of $30 million each (Vanguard News, 2016). Top military officers, because of greed, and the quest for illegal acquisition of wealth, siphoned monies meant for these purchases, sacrificing the lives of Nigerian masses and the military as an institution. It was overwhelming to discover that one of the top officers who had a mansion in Lagos gave a strict directive that there should be two sewage channels. One was wired for the storage of waste, one was dug and fitted with expensive tiles. When the EFCC finally raided the house for investigation $1m was found stored in plastic containers submerged in the soak away (Premium, 2014).

To the above end, vibrant and young officers of the Nigerian armed forces lost their lives. Soon after the EFCC began to probe deeper and make arrests, other revelations began to surface, and monies meant for procurement of arms, military kits and for the welfare of the men and officers were diverted, this money was budgeted to the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Colonel Sambo Dasuki. ‘Corruption is worsening the conflict, and it is a big driver of insecurity in Nigeria,’ said Katherine Dixon, Transparency International's program director. ‘So, over the last 10 years, corrupt elites have profited from the conflict in the northeast and driven Nigeria to a crisis point.’ (Dixon, 2018). On more corruption charges, the EFCC have questioned the former Chief of Army Staff, General Azubuike Ikejirika, over his role in the $2.1 billion arms procurement deals under the administration of President Jonathan (Sahara Reporters, 2018). He was one of the 18 retired army officials investigated for defence equipment procurement fraud by a committee set up by President Buhari when he became President in 2015. The committee, headed by AVM John Ode (RTD), found out that ‘three contracts with a total value of N5, 940,000,000.00 were awarded to DYI global Service LTD and Doiyatee Comms Nig. Ltd (owned by the same individuals) for the procurement of military hardware, including 20 units of Km-38 twin hull boats and 6 units of 4x4 ambulances fitted with radios (Sahara reporters, 2018). The committee further found that two companies collected N5, 103,500,000.00 representing 86% of the total value of the 3 contracts worth N5, 940,000,000.00, but only performed to the tune of N2, 992,183,705.31. The report adds that ‘in this regard, a review of the procurement carried out
by Chose Ventures Ltd and Integrated Equipment Service Ltd established that between March 2011 and December 2013, the two companies exclusively procured various types of Toyota and Mitsubishi vehicles worth over N3, 000,000.00 for the Nigerian Army without any competitive bidding.

The COAS was also indicted for sums transferred in various currencies to the tune of N115 million, $132,000, £16,000 and £44,000 to his relatives who did no work at all. The report also asked General Ikejirika to explain the suspicious transfer of N845,600 and $3,450, and $619,000 made from Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) domiciliary and naira accounts. Also asked about the latter was the former DG of DICON, Major-General E.R. Chioba among others. According to most officers interviewed, ‘Much of this money is said to have disappeared through kickbacks, payments to ‘ghost soldiers’ who don’t exist, or via no-bid contracts resulting in inflated spending that benefits politically-connected contractors’ (Interview, January 2019). A drop-in oil prices have left corrupt officials in Nigeria scrambling for other ways to enrich themselves, according to findings. Since defence makes up 20 percent of Nigeria’s budget, it is an attractive target.

Nigerian democracy has been plagued and under perpetual threat of insecurity and misgovernance since 1999. Although the history of that goes a long way back, the interest of this thesis is from 1999 when the country returned to democratic governance after decades of military rule or misrule. As noted by Ogundaya (2010), ‘the Nigerian political climate has been hostile to democracy’. The general apathy and cynicism are most justifiable when one considers all the variables that facilitated the collapse of the first and second republics which were characterised by widespread vices like violence, electoral fraud, ethno-religious crisis, disregard for the rule of law (which holds the fabric of democracy together), human rights abuses and above all the current Boko-Haram insurgency. Tied to all these is the high level of corruption in all facets of Nigerian public life, in both the political and military leadership. This factor alone has challenged the legitimacy and authority of the state and that of the military in its fight against the insurgency (Ogundaya, 2010).

In fighting counterinsurgency, the military needs to be properly funded, to help in procurement of modern and standard equipment. Most countries are in partnership with each other, this partnership helps each other in the area of experience, equipment and training. Nigeria can collaborate with the US, UK and Israel who have experience both locally and internationally and have transformed over the years to tackle the rise in international
terrorism and insurgency. Nigeria will need to learn from these experiences. Since Nigeria does not develop her own weapons, it is important to collaborate with the countries that do. Corruption as we have emphasised has been one of the major setbacks of the Nigerian state and specifically the military as an institution. This is a major contributor to the military’s decline and loss of face with the public. In all facets of the defence department, this manifests itself in diverse forms. At the National Assembly, legislators are known to have padded the defence budget, manipulating the appropriation process to serve private purposes. Legislative committees on the military have regularly used oversight functions at military facilities and projects to extort funds from Service Chiefs and other commanders in exchange for favourable reports. When appropriated funds are available for release to the Service Chiefs, some finance and defence ministry officials are said to hold them up until they get their share. To deal with the above, since coming into power the government have established mechanisms such as the Treasury Single Account (TSA), which has forced all monies going or leaving through the TSA. How successful this is, is still shrouded in mystery, as the impact is not felt, and going by the Global Index on Corruption, remains to be seen. Although more has to be done about the procurement of arms, the level of corruption that remains will make this challenging.

It is worth mentioning again that corruption anywhere in the world is dangerous to growth and development. Nowhere is this statement more pertinent than in the case of Nigeria. In the Nigerian military this has caused its ineffectiveness in her duties and services. The internal dynamics of the Nigerian military has been seriously hampered by the corrupt practices of the officers. This phenomenon has caused the military to experience decline which has created instability in the military hierarchy and exacerbated the national insecurity. The high level of corruption in the Nigerian military has been severely criticised from local and international watchers. Akume and Godswill (2016) assert that there are a number of factors that have contributed to undermine the government’s ability to fight the insurgency, the most being military corruption. For them corruption is not a very strange thing in Nigeria, and in the fight against insurgency its manifestation has been expressed through malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance.

Malfeasance is more than stealing; it is the performance by public officers of deed that they are forbidden to perform by constitutional or statutory law or by commonly accepted moral standards... Misfeasance is the improper performance of lawful
duties, ‘it involves administrative activity that is within the lawful mission of an agency but violates constitutional standards or public interests. Nonfeasance is the failure of public officers to perform required duties (Akume, Godswill, 2016).

As reported by Entrepre News (2014), the US under the Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Sarah Sewall, said that ‘corruption is hindering Nigeria’s effort at ending insurgency in the North-East’. How? The first case is the theft of funds appropriated to the defence group or for combating insurgency in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, Africa Report, 2014). In a bid to address the rising insurgency, there was an increased in defence budget from 100 billion naira ($625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion naira ($6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion naira ($6.2 billion) in 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Despite the huge budgetary allocation to the Nigerian military and the defence group, there is no measurable corresponding outcome due to the inability of the military to justifiably explain the appropriations in tackling national security, specifically the insurgency in the North-East. According to Mallam El-Rufai, the present Governor of Kaduna state in Nigeria, stated that ‘it can be argued that there is no correlation between the amounts of funds budgeted for defence group and outcome of transformation in the group’ (El-Rufai, 2012).

Akume and Godswill (2016) narrated that a thorough investigation about how the monies budgeted for combating insurgency are spent will reveal that a large sum of the funds is misappropriated by top government, military and other security agency officials in collaboration with politicians and contractors supplying military hardware. As Agbaji wrote, a case in point is the $2.1 million arms scandal popularly called the Dasukigate involving the former National Security Adviser (NSA), Colonel Sambo Dasuki (Rtd) and other top military officers and politicians. The case revealed the large-scale fraud in the armed forces where funds meant for the military had been distributed for private and partisan purposes. The kleptocratic capture of the Nigerian defence group has seen over $150 billion stolen, leaving the military without vital equipment, insufficiently trained, low in morale and under resourced. This has crippled the Nigerian military in fighting an aggressive ideological inspired enemy, such as Boko-Haram (Transparency International Report, 2017).

Another way corruption challenges the military’s war against Boko-Haram is the limitedness or unavailability of logistical support for the military. The components of logistics in its most comprehensive sense are those aspect of the military that deal with: the acquisition and distribution of military equipment (arms and ammunition, fuel, weapons system); transport of
personnel and equipment; construction and maintenance of facilities (training camps, command centres, military bases, garrisons); acquisition and furnishing of services like uniforms, jungle boots, belts, and entertainment; and medical services (food, water, and medicine) (Ogun and Osokogu, 2011). Regardless of the huge defence budgets, there are reports that the Nigerian military as noted earlier are still ill equipped, and soldiers are usually sent into combat with limited weaponry, which heavily affects their effectiveness on the battlefield. In a study, Fulani (2014) explained that some soldiers in Mubi and Izighe (Boko-Haram’s enclaves), military bases, in Adamawa state, stated that they used the limited and very poor weaponry against well-armed insurgents. The soldiers said that while they were equipped with just AK-47 rifles and only dozens of bullets, the insurgents used sophisticated arms and ammunition like Browning machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, night vision goggles, Ak-49 rifles, armoured personnel carriers, and suchlike. Added to this is the fact that soldiers are poorly fed, medical services are limited or unavailable, and families of fallen soldiers are only granted minimal stipends. These alone can completely demoralise the soldiers and hamper the fight against insurgency (Fulani, 2014).

Added to the above narratives, is the level of secrecy inherent in the defence procurement pattern which easily paved the way for corrupt practices. The public are not given the opportunity to scrutinise the procedures. Thus, the absence of disclosure effectively makes the security group the most prone to contract inflation and ineffective service delivery as well as the creation and financing of fake defence contracts (Jimoh, Olaniyi and Muss, 2017). Citing Transparency International’s report, ‘Weaponizing transparency’, it notes that ‘corrupt military officials have been able to benefit from the conflict through the creation of fake defence contracts, the proceeds of which are often laundered abroad (in the US and UK) and elsewhere’ (TI, 2015). Similarly, too is what Akume and Godswill (2016) saw as good arena for corruption–military hardware contracts. For them, this is facilitated through the ‘offset’ principle operated in defence procurement that is built into contractual conditionalities. Defence offset dictates that the buyer of military hardware obliges to reinvest a percentage of the contract in the supplying company’s home country. Since defence contracts involve great expenditure, the offset arrangement is similarly large in value, since in many countries there is almost no due diligence of potential improper check on beneficiaries from the offsets, and no monitoring of performance on offset contracts, thus, it is highly susceptible to corruption (Akume and Godswill, 2016). The suspicious way the Nigerian government smuggled an alleged sum of $9.3 million to South Africa for military hardware purchases to confront the
insurgency, and failed attempts to probe this in the House of Representatives only explains the role corruption by government and the military chiefs have played in challenging the effort to combat insurgency. Clearly the assertion above has affected all the strata of strategic, tactical and operational levels of the counterinsurgency.

In the case of the purchase of standard equipment for the fight against insurgency, corruption has caused the Nigerian state to be handicapped and has also caused military ineffectiveness by the purchase of substandard military material. In a statement issued in 2016 by the Senior Assistant to the Minister of Information and Culture in Nigeria, Segun Adeyemi, Alhaji Lai Mohammed insisted that the weapons, munitions and equipment which the former administration said was bought were refurbished and lacked the basic components and spare parts. Additionally, he said that the ammunition bought for both high calibre and small weapons were mostly expired, incompatible with weapons, and grossly inadequate (Lai Mohammed, 2016). This kind of situation only leads to the injury and death of the soldiers who use the substandard equipment. It is worth noting again, as reported by Sahara Reporters (2016) following the fatal crash of Group Captain Ubong Akpan and Master Warrant Officer Zabesan Hosea, who boarded a Russian-made Mi-24V helicopter with the intent to carry-out assault on Boko-Haram insurgents in Adamawa State in December 2014, the arm procurement audit, which began in August 2015, revealed that Air Vice Marshal Amosu and retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki purchased two unserviceable Mi-24V helicopters which were missing the necessary parts to fly, including being without rotors. Also, the audit showed that Colonel Dasuki and other Defence Chiefs purchased unserviceable and cheaper military equipment when they had budgeted for newer military hardware. They then diverted the leftover funds to their personal accounts (Agbaji and Etim, 2016). Most of the interviewees felt very bitter about the above report as officers felt that this is major drawback for them, as ‘the military does not have equipment to fight the insurgency’ (Interview, December 2019).

Above all military reforms in Nigeria have become overdue. The current Chief of Defence Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin, has taken steps in 2015 by setting up a military committee with the mandate to formulate a plan for reforming the military (Statement issued by Defence Headquarters, 2015). The initiative was excellent, but highly insufficient, as it focuses only on the military, instead of the wider defence group; was largely concerned with improving operational effectiveness as against holistic reforms of the services; and, being a self-driven
process, lacked the buy-in of the non-military stakeholders crucial to sustaining reforms. What is needed is more fundamental, comprehensive and inclusive approach.

The starting point must be a serious reassessment of security challenges, articulation of defence and security policies to address them, and a roadmap that repositions the military and security services to implement the policies effectively. Earlier defence policies focused largely on responding to external threats, but more recent developments of militancy and the rise of insurgency in the North-East and other threats in the whole country have highlighted more pressing internal threats. These have deep political, social and economic roots, meaning that strategies and policies require more input from non-military stakeholders. There is a need for both the President’s Office and the National Assembly to initiate public and expert discussions on defence and security priorities and the kind of military and other security forces necessary. However, regardless of what this dialogue produces, and even before it starts, several immediate actions are required. Transparency International (2018) recommends that the Nigerian military develops an anti-corruption strategy, provides public access to security information, regulate security votes and protects whistle-blowers. Dixon says that monitoring confidential procurement is also essential: ‘Some secretive spending will inevitably have to happen that should be overseen by a particular committee, so that you have proper monitoring that is confidential procurement,’ she asserts. She continues, ‘So, any spending that is important enough to remain secret is important enough to be monitor effectively’ (Dixon, 2018). Recently, it has been revealed by the Budget Monitoring Office that 4.3 trillion Nigerian Naira which is equivalent of about 2 billion pounds has been expended on the armed forces’ campaign since the inception of the Boko-Haram in the North-East, yet the scale of attacks have remained steady, armed forces are not well equipped, and morale is still very low (Senator Adamawa State, 2020).

Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, it can be seen that monies meant for the procurement of arms and ammunition have been siphoned into private pockets. This is a setback to the nation faced with such heinous violent insurgency, and worst of all for the military at its operational level. The tragedy of this corrupt phenomenon is that the military officers at strategic, operational and tactical levels are all involved in this corruption saga. Therefore, the lack of preparedness
of the military in the areas of motivating the military, proving modern equipment, training of personnel and above all corruption which hinders all the above from functioning, affects the effectiveness of the military. Findings reveal that if you have got an ill-disciplined security group that is abusing its own power, whether it is because its soldiers are not being paid or because there is just a sort of a culture of impunity, then, of course, you are driving people to join groups like Boko-Haram, who offer a very simplistic alternative to what is considered to be a corrupt establishment.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the effectiveness of the armed forces in tackling the Boko-Haram insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria between 1999 and 2017. It has argued that that the armed forces have been encumbered by a myriad of problems in coordination, winning hearts and minds, intelligence and their preparedness. The thesis concludes that the armed forces have failed in its counterinsurgency operations. The flagrant neglect of the armed forces from their training, recruitment, personnel, lack of professionalism, lack of basic supplies, to long stays at the place of deployment, all affected the morale of the armed forces which overwhelmingly reduced their motivation to succeed in their counterinsurgency campaign. Armed forces’ preparedness, coordination, winning hearts and minds and intelligence capability are key to armed forces’ effectiveness when effectiveness is defined as the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. But it was argued in this thesis that the Nigerian armed forces lacked effectiveness, because it was not prepared in its efforts towards countering the insurgency at the strategic, tactical and operational levels.

This thesis examined the issues of terrorism and insurgency. The research argues that there is a significant difference in the style, definitions and conceptualisation of these terms. Of importance is the difference between terrorism and insurgency. The words have been used interchangeably and sometimes can be confusing, and sometimes lack of correct usage, can lead to military and political leaders not interpreting the situation correctly. This thesis therefore draws the conclusion on their differences, that insurgency tends to hold territories and try to change government, while terrorism uses the tactics of ‘hit and run’ to make a statement to the political leader or the system being targeted. Be that as it may, both insurgency and terrorism engage in violence in order to attain certain political or increasingly politico-religious objectives, national liberation and independence, a particular system of government, or restoration of a caliphate. On Boko-Haram, this research concludes that the aim of the group is to establish an Islamic caliphate starting with the North-East of Nigeria, although the group transformed into a more political arrangement given that this research also found that some of their sponsors are politicians who have used them for their own political gain. Evidence shows that a large percentage of Boko-Haram members are illiterate, thereby
creating a soft ground for politicians to manipulate them for either political or religious causes.

It has been argued in this thesis that in counterinsurgency, non-armed forces measures are often the ‘most effective element’, with armed forces playing an enabling role of defense. The thesis focused on the armed forces because they were to deploy to carry out the campaign against the Boko-Haram insurgency. The thesis further asserts that counterinsurgency is best practiced when is integrates and synchronises with political, security, economic and informational components that reinforces government legitimacy and effectiveness, while reducing insurgents’ influence over the population from insurgent violence. Counterinsurgency strengthens the legitimacy of government and the capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly, and manage insurgents politically, socially, and economically. The emphasis here was on the broader concept of counterinsurgency drawing experiences from more developed counterinsurgency operations of the British in Malaya and what lessons Nigeria could gain from it. The thesis concludes that the Nigerian counterinsurgency was replete with a myriad of problems, which this research also found needs external support to enhance its operational capabilities and capacity, as Chapter Six emphasised.

Coordination is a fundamental issue in counterinsurgency; without proper coordination, most counterinsurgency strategies will most likely not succeed. The research examines coordination in general term and concludes that there was a general lack of coordination amongst the three arms of the forces, Namely, the army, the air force and the navy, all of them wanted to play their role independently, largely due to inter-agency rivalry. This negatively affected a coordinated effort in Nigerian armed forces counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. Both the insurgent and the counterinsurgents seek the support of the population; for a successful counterinsurgency operation, there is the need to gain the support of the population. It was gathered that, at the initial stage of the armed forces’ counterinsurgency operations, there was a mutual suspicion by the public in the North-East as to the armed forces’ activities in the region. This was largely due to the brute force the armed forces used in their campaign, although the research showed that the armed forces, realising that brute was not helping its fight against Boko-Haram, later introduced non-kinetic approaches to win the population over to its side. Though somewhat successful, it was received with mixed feelings.
The importance of civil-military relations as an element of counterinsurgency cannot be overemphasised. The importance of police primacy over the armed forces in defeating insurgency is cardinal in counterinsurgency operations. This is because the police are close to the people and understand the environment better than the armed forces. One of the major setbacks of the armed forces in Nigeria’s North-East was that the armed forces, of which most of them are not natives of the area, affected the ability to navigate the area properly. This gave the insurgent group a real advantage, leading to killing and unsuccessful operations by the armed forces, and the establishment of professional indigenous local vigilante group (Civil Joint Task Force), which was a major boost to the armed force. Although this came with its challenges, of importance was the lack of trust, as the research found out that some of the members of the CJTF were insiders for Boko-Haram, therefore compromising the armed forces’ intelligence.

This thesis concludes that the mitigating and continuing problems of North-East Nigeria, which contributed in breeding soft ground for the development and recruitment of Boko-Haram elements has not been properly managed by the government. It is agreed that ‘bad governance is the main cause of this’, so it is good governance that fixes this lingering phenomenon. Unfortunately, the Nigerian government, bedevilled by a long period of poor governance, have neglected the plight of its citizens for decades, thus being unable to properly deal with the issues surrounding the growth of Boko-Haram or the problem of security in the North-East. This research proffers that the Nigerian Police Force should be equipped to handle policing the community, since that is their constitutional role. The primacy of the police over the armed forces should be key as it is practiced in the US and the UK. Recently, in Nigeria, the government has directed the police to move in and replace the armed forces in areas where the violence has been subsided by the armed forces, then gradually takeover the entire counterinsurgency operations. The major problem faced by the police is that the scale of attacks has increased tremendously since this pronouncement, and the police has not had any major logistics upgrades, in terms of training, modern equipment like surveillance cameras or the necessary wherewithal to combat sophisticated Boko-Haram fighters.

The research concludes that the armed forces were not prepared by their training, or their institutional framework. Like most armed forces around the world, the majority of the armed forces were trained in conventional warfare; the surprise of the twenty-first century brought a
lot of awareness of the reality of modern warfare, which is characterised by terrorism and insurgency. Developing counties like Nigeria, are encumbered by such phenomenon. From data collected within the armed forces, it caught the Nigerian armed forces off guard. Added to the problems of preparedness were the internal problems of lack of modern equipment, dearth of professionalism, and lack of training, because the armed forces became political due to spending over thirty years in power. It is argued in this thesis that all these problems affected the morale of the armed forces. Further, corruption became the monster of the armed forces. Most of the senior officers were involved in high level corrupt practices, and these are captured in Chapter Six of the thesis. Suffice to conclude that without proper logistics, there is no way a country’s armed forces can succeed in any form of war. Operational capabilities of the armed forces were comprised, long overstays of the soldiers in the area of deployment, lack of payment of allowances and the welfare of the dead officers’ family further added to deepen the situation of the soldiers, thus affecting the outcome of the counterinsurgency operations.

The armed forces is a subsection of society. Consequently, the values and culture of society also affect that of the armed forces. Nigeria, which has little experience in unconventional warfare, has little of the modern war equipment to effectively cope with it. So, Boko-Haram, was a watershed that brought to the fore the ill-preparedness of the Nigerian armed forces for counterinsurgency operation. The other reason for the aversion to unconventional wars is the challenge it presents: as the FM 3-20 espouses, unconventional wars are different and difficult wars owing to the nature of the enemy. They tend to be unpredictable and usually require a whole-of-government approach that most militaries are not trained and equipped to undertake. Unlike conventional wars in which the objective is to destroy enemy forces of captured territory, the objectives of counterinsurgency including winning the hearts and minds of the population as discussed in Chapter Four. This cannot be accomplished by brute force, but by isolating the insurgents from the population. The insurgents’ greatest weapon is its cause. Consequently, counterinsurgents must focus on defeating the insurgents’ cause.

To be successful, a counterinsurgent must understand the physical as well as human environment in the region. This would enable the counterinsurgent to understand the underlying cause of the insurgency. Boko-Haram in Nigeria employs religious ideological rhetoric in its cause in the North-East; however, its real strength is its ability to rally a disgruntled population to its cause. Contextually and historically, from the Usman dan-Fodio
jihad of 1804 to the contemporary war of Boko-Haram in the North-East region from 1999 to the present day, socio-economic challenges played a central role in the whole saga.

A basic prerequisite for the socio-economic development by the Nigerian government is security in the region. It has been argued in this thesis that the Nigerian armed forces must be adequately trained and equipped to fight counterinsurgency operations at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. Furthermore, if the recent trends in warfare are anything to go by, unconventional wars will remain a dominant form of warfare, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, a reorientation of the Nigerian armed forces is essential. The international community, including the US and the UK, could help facilitate the reorientation and training of the Nigerian armed forces based on their experience, but this must be adapted to meet local and national needs because counterinsurgency cannot be ‘one size fits all’; it must meet environmental peculiarities. The successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations must begin with a mental shift from conventional warfare strategy to counterinsurgency strategy.

The Nigerian armed forces’ failure to reinterpret its internal functions left it as a ‘coercive institution’ of the state. It was even left more internally involved than was the case during the colonial administration, with indiscipline already an issue within the institution. This has been made worse by corruption and political meddling, a coup culture, and a neglect of professionalism further undermined the armed forces’ legitimacy and damaged their interface with society. The Nigerian armed forces’ doctrine drew too heavily from Western interpretations to accommodate its own experiential learning and the local operational environment. Moreover, their doctrine has been demonstrably difficult to change in situ during its campaign. This is a stark contrast to Boko-Haram’s insurgency doctrine, and its adaptability. The perceived lie to the nation was supposed to be effective in its operational contribution to counterinsurgency, if anything they lent explanatory power to why it seems too much, in too little a time, is now expected by an armed force that cultural, institutionally, and doctrinally has failed to purposively prepare for this de guerre. Still, at the operational level, there has been some progress by the different Joint Task Forces, although they have been overwhelmed with challenges and most times struggled, but certain lessons have been learned from their operations in North-East’s counterinsurgency activities.

The Nigerian armed forces have been repeatedly criticised by human rights groups for running brutal campaigns that making little effort to win the hearts and minds of the
population. The 181,000 strong armed forces are structured on a very traditional line, but sends troops to highly hostile areas, like the North-East for sometimes up to four years operating on a small budget. Soldiers are often underpaid, and morale is usually low. All this has affected the effectiveness of the armed forces in their counterinsurgency operations. The qualitative analyses carried out in this thesis showed that data collected from the Nigerian armed forces, indicates that the armed forces have been neglected for a very long time. The findings show that the last time there was a major purchase of war equipment was in the 1980s. However, non-state actors possess the most recent war equipment. It has shown that the Nigerian armed forces are ill-prepared for any eventuality, especially for the Boko-Haram insurgency. It shows an armed force that is not motivated and is ill-prepared. According to an interviewee, a Major General in the Nigerian armed forces, ‘logistics is what motivates the armed forces, not just money’.

The other findings reveal the quality of the personnel. According to the same general:

young officers that are been deployed to the battle front, had no experience in war, not less unconventional war, these officers when confronted with superior fighting power of the Boko-Haram, deserted.

Finally, the armed forces of Nigeria, had no capacity to effectively deal with the highly sophisticated Boko-Haram insurgency in the North-East from 1999-2017, from what findings have provided in this thesis. There is, therefore, a need for institutional reforms of the entire armed forces to meet local needs and international standards. One of the ways of doing this is by retraining, reequipping, better welfare, and corrupt officers must be investigated and dealt with, to pave the way for the armed forces to be brought back to professionalism. It can be said, too, that community policing is the modern way of dealing with unconventional groups, as community policing will be closer to the people, understanding the geographical locale, so manoeuvring and interacting with the people can help. In Nigeria now most regions are coming up with such initiatives. The South-West has just introduced the group known as ‘Amotekun’ which is a local group intended to safeguard the region; the ‘Hisbah’ in the North-West; and of course the CJTF in the North-East. These groups are coming with challenges which is usual with the Nigerian narratives of ethnicity and religion. But the message is clear: people are more comfortable with their own security and this is an issue the Nigerian government will have to face since the central security under the armed forces and police has failed.
Contextually, the issue of conceptualisation is highly problematic, because most literature from academics, policy-makers, and the armed forces’ leadership all fail to place the insurgency within its proper meaning and narratives. It was given a different name, so the approach was not the right one in the formulation of the policies for the counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. Most of the documents, as captured in the thesis’ introduction, called the violent activities of the group terrorism, so it was given a counterterrorism approach, which differs from a counterinsurgency approach.

From the foregoing therefore, the thesis argues that using different approaches gave the kind of results we have in North-East Nigeria. Furthermore, it has shown that the failure of approach, intelligence, coordination, motivation and the lack of armed forces’ preparedness, all contributed to the ineffectiveness of the military in the North-East. Above all, the high level of corruption within and without the armed forces led to the lack of basic modern equipment, training, ineffective manpower, lack of institutional preparedness, over stretched stays in the place of deployment, lack of proper hearts and minds initiatives inadvertently affecting the morale of the armed forces in their operational abilities at the strategic, tactical and operational levels.

The gap identified in this thesis is that scholars have all recognised the importance of the armed forces in dealing with the violent activities of the insurgency. However, literature is absent on the effectiveness of the military, especially as it relates to the morale of the armed forces. This thesis is based on research and interviews aims to contribute to understanding by providing material and open windows for further research into the missing links in the body of literature. Most of the academic and media publications say Boko-Haram emerged in 2002, with it gaining prominence both locally and internationally around 2011 with the inauguration of President Goodluck Jonathan. This thesis argues that although it did not emerge as a formal group until 2002 its activities began in 1999, when the governor of Zamfara state introduced the Sharia law in the state, which the President then Olusegun Obasanjo referred to as ‘political sharia’. It did of course set up the premise for agitations towards that direction in most Northern states. 1999 is equally important because it was right after the military rule of more than three decades. A lot of discernment was in the air, and most people took advantage of the freedom of expression that came with democracy to express their different agitations and grievances. Boko-Haram was one such expression.
In his analysis of intelligence in the article ‘Military and Intelligence: Difficulties Fighting The Insurgency’ Guitta (2014) narrates that the US, UK and France’s experience in various counterinsurgencies shows the insurgents can merge into the civilian population, making them difficult to identify and collateral damage even harder to avoid. As part of a successful Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy, gaining the support of the civilians with whom Boko-Haram is trying to embed itself will be necessary. While this will not be attainable overnight, it is ultimately what is needed to build up a better HUMINT network, something made more difficult due to human rights abuses. As further asserted by Guitta, and as recognised in this thesis, there is a further reason why HUMINT is not forthcoming: fear of reprisals against civilians by Boko-Haram. There is a further dilemma for the Nigerian government: unfortunately, even with the best intelligence possible, Boko-Haram would still thrive due to its supporters’ seeming penetration of the Nigerian political and security apparatus. In January 2012, President Jonathan acknowledged that Boko-Haram sympathisers were

in the executive arm of the government; some of them are in the legislative arm of the government, while some are even in the judicial arm. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies.

With this goal in mind, Boko-Haram acquired military training from within and outside Nigeria and obtained such weapons as General-Purpose Machine Guns, rocket propelled grenades, rocket launchers, AK-47 rifles, SAM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, and bombs. It also acquired the rudimentary technology of IEDs. Armed with these weapons, Boko-Haram unleashed a most ferocious and savage war against the Nigerian state. This thesis has asserted that Boko-Haram has better weaponry that the Nigerian armed forces. As Guitta suggested they are trained from within and without showing further that the insurgents are better prepared for acts of war than the Nigerian armed forces.

Ewa (2018) is of the view that counterinsurgency operations should cover the entire landscape of activities, with a special focus on continuous disruption of the insurgents’ logistics, cutting the insurgents off from supply routes, and disputing their local and foreign links. This is important too, because as captured in Chapter One of this thesis no insurgency can survive without its external links. One of the major setbacks of the counterinsurgency campaign in the Nigerian North-East is that external support has not been checked. This is very glaring from the huge and very sophisticated armoury the insurgent group has, and it is also seen from the armoured personnel vehicles it uses. These show how much support the
insurgent group is getting. This thesis’ views align with Ewa’s (2018) that the external as well as the internal link must be checked or totally disrupted. The disruption of logistics would be achieved with a good intelligence network, continuous pursuit of the insurgents, strategic bombing in the Sambisa Forest, and cooperation from neighbouring countries. Efforts for cutting the insurgents off from supplies should be targeted against their real and potential sources of recruits who are used as suicide bombers and combatants. As much as possible, communities and settlements should be insulated from contact with insurgents and their radical ideas through appropriate enlightenment programmes. He further adds that cutting them off from supplies and stopping their concealment in the communities were what the British used in defeating Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya in the mid-1950s. Insurgents usually conceal and obfuscate their linkages through counterintelligence. Ewa (2018) further argues that headlines such as ‘Boko-Haram releases new video, targets Cameroon’ were designed to confuse the military about the whereabouts of the insurgents. This means that perspicacious intelligence operations are required to help fight the insurgents. The lack of intelligence coordination among the different arms of the military has contributed to the ineffectiveness of the armed forces in the North-East of Nigeria.

On his part, Oyewole (2016) asserts that the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Jonathan, mounted a counterinsurgency operation known as Operation Zaman Lafiya, but it was not strong enough to check the advance of Boko-Haram. Unlike the Niger Delta operations, in which non-military efforts have, crucially, been used along with protective military and security operations to achieve some measure of compromise, the insurgents in the North-East had always remained adamant against any overtures for negotiation. They have been most unidentifiable, elusive, and intransigent, making any moves for dialogue difficult. As a result of this, operations in the North-East have been driven mainly by armed forces and security operations. The control of about 21,545 square kilometres of Nigerian territory in 2014 by Boko-Haram from no ground in 2009 meant that Operation Zaman Lafiya was a failure. In response to the groundswell of public criticism of the performance of the operation, Muhammadu Buhari, on assumption of office as Nigeria’s elected president in May 2015, quickly made modifications within the armed forces, dismantled Operation Zaman Lafiya, and put in motion the present counterinsurgency operation codenamed Lafiya Dole under the command of Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai. Within three months – October to December 2015 – the operation, marked by a consolidation of efforts from the military, the Department of State Services, the police, other security agencies, and military
cooperation from neighbouring countries through the Multinational Joint Task Force, had given a good account of itself. In what will be a major assault in the history of Nigerian warfare, Boko-Haram was forcefully pushed out of all its bases within Nigerian territory. At 1:30 p.m., Thursday 22 December 2016, Operation Lafiya Dole reached its peak with the capture of Camp Zero in Sambisa Forest, the last fortress and hideout of the insurgents. However, the fall of Camp Zero is not the end of insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria. While the Nigerian Air Force is continuing with its Search, Locate, and Destroy (SLD) Operations against the insurgents, other armed forces and security operatives are working hard to contain sporadic suicide bombing and violence sponsored by Boko-Haram.

The infiltration of the counterinsurgency operatives by the insurgents was a common unprofessional activity among front line officers. There are several reports of support for the insurgents by counterinsurgency forces in terms of intelligence, training, and weapons. Many officers were reported to have abandoned, sold, or surrendered their weapons to the insurgents. This contributed to the capacity and resilience of the insurgents against counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. Hundreds of officers and vigilantes were arrested for spying for Boko-Haram. Leaked security details were responsible for many records of ambush and death of several officers as well as failure of many counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. This development eroded confidence among the officers in the front line, who reduced the quality of their performance accordingly. In response, the Nigerian armed forces have court-martialled several officers and dismissed more than 5,000 soldiers for mutiny, cowardice, and support for insurgents as of the middle of 2015. The new administration has, however, reviewed the court-martials, pardoned many officers and recalled 3,032 officers into active service (Vanguard Newspaper, 2018).

The failure of the counterinsurgency operations since 2013 was marked by temporal success, as virtually all the lost territory was recovered within the short time that the 2014 election was postponed for. This was made possible with the improvement in the quantity and quality of the operatives in the counterinsurgency. In conducting interviews to ascertain the improvement of the military, different phases of the operations were identified. An Army Colonel stated in an interview that the operations took place in this order: Operation Restore Order 1, 2 and 3, Operation Boyona, Operation Zaman Lafiya and Operation Lafiya Dole (Interview, 2020). The officer further added that ‘the different operations are mission
specific; every operation achieved a particular purpose.’ It is important to note that the name for the operation in the North-East is ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’.

The morale of the troops was raised with the payment of arrears and improved welfare and supply of ammunitions at the operational level. A series of court-martials also restored discipline, which was fast degenerating in the counterinsurgency formation. Neighbouring countries, China, and Russia increased their support for Nigeria. However, Oyewole (2016) saw the essence of boosting the morale of the armed forces as a way of becoming more active in their participation and effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. This thesis has argued that it is the main pivot that makes for a successful and effective counterinsurgency operation. The decline in support adversely affected the armed forces.

It is unfortunate that this research has come to the conclusion that in the area of conceptualisation, the ideology of the Boko-Haram insurgency, coordination in counterinsurgency, winning hearts and minds, intelligence and corruption within Nigerian politics and armed forces, there has been great negligence and failure of those given the responsible to cater for people. There is a total lack of political will towards resolution. Appropriate and modern equipment for the armed forces, and a lack of clear armed forces doctrine, all affected the armed forces who were ineffective in dealing with the Boko-Haram insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria from 1999 to the present. It is imperative therefore to suggest that where this research has stopped, other researcher will take up from there to fill in the gaps that this research could not address.

In summary, the following recommendations could be made to the Nigerian government. First, there is a very urgent and immediate need to revive the regional coalition. The Nigerian Government must come up with a clear roadmap with her neighbours like Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroun to revive what has been under the Multinational Joint Task Force, which was successful at the initial stage, but was weakened by internal strife. Second, Boko-Haram’s ideology must be fought. The Nigerian Government must fight this holistically, and to do this not just by mere religious literacy. The scheme should aim to instil religious tolerance by teaching the right sermons in schools and mosques. Third, it should boost support to the armed forces. The Government should work to help the troops fighting Boko-Haram, not only by providing equipment to address reported complaints of inadequate ammunition, but importantly by also addressing fatigue and low morale of the troops, and also the massive issue of political and armed forces corruption. Fourth, the government must target grievances
and socio-economic circumstances that made young people vulnerable to Boko-Haram. This can be done by taking serious steps to combat poverty, unemployment and the impact of environmental degradation, alongside providing basic services. Rehabilitation and reintegration is also key.

The activities of Boko-Haram put the military under severe pressure, and eventually signs of low morale began to appear amongst the rank and file. The military complained about inadequate weapons and equipment for their operations (Daily Trust, 2015). As the fighting zeal and morale of the military was plummeting, the insurgents were becoming stronger, overrunning military formations and taking over more towns and villages. This means that their areas of influence were increasing. The major problem the military faced was the issue of corruption, where allowances were not paid, and severance packages for their deceased colleagues were unpaid, and their families neglected. Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Index revealed that 43% of its respondents felt that the military was or is highly corrupt (www.transparency.org/geb.2013, accessed Feb 2016). Given the nature of the secrecy around military spending, evidence of corruption cannot be easily obtained to confirm the allegation. What is clear, however, is that many Nigerians felt that the performance of the military against the insurgents did not satisfy the huge budgetary allocation for defence. More specifically, the budget allocation had not translated effectively into arms acquisition and better provision for the soldiers on the battlefront. Consequently, questions were raised about the credibility of the military leadership. Some soldiers, unhappy with the way the operation was unfolding, mutinied (The Washington Times, 2015). The manner of information dissemination on the activities of the military was discouraging, which further damaged its image. Several communications were found to be inaccurate and a series of denials marred the military operations against the insurgency. For example, the military claimed at a point that they had killed Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko-Haram. It was a ruse as it turned out to be untrue (McCay, 2014). This made Shekau appear to be invincible. Meanwhile, the insurgents were using social media such as YouTube and Twitter to communicate their activities, aims and motives clearly to the public.

The abduction of the 276 Chibok girls on 14 April 2014 was a disaster for the military; while it claimed that only 150 girls had been abducted and rescued, it again immediately retracted the press release, because it was not true. Other related issues were the deserting of Nigerian soldiers into Cameroon. This the military denied, but again, the insurgents showed videos of
the soldiers fleeing into Cameroon and even footage of the wreckage of the bombed Nigerian fighter jet and the execution of the pilot. This put a final nail to the credibility of the military and its operations against the insurgents. Ways forward include having better intelligence sharing among different security agencies at the local, sub-regional, regional and global levels. Bilateral and multilateral collaboration is very important to this course. There should be improved border patrols and policing which are very important. The collaboration between Nigeria, Chad and Niger should be sustained, as without a secured border, insurgency in the West Africa region will take a long time to be ended. Thus, there is a need for the international community to continue to provide support. Destroying the terrorist safe haven should also be a matter of importance, and the large ungoverned space exists along Nigeria’s border with neighbouring countries. The Nigerian northern desert area, the Chad desert area, the Northern Malian desert and the Cameroonian mountains are ungoverned spaces, which have provided safe havens and sanctuary to Boko-Haram and their collaborators, so there is a need for a greater policing of these areas. There is a need to urgently put a stop to proliferation of light and small arms, which are coming from war-torn countries in the Sahel region. These weapons include heavy machine guns that have swelled Boko-Haram’s lethal capacity. The FGN has established a presidential committee on the control of small arms and light weapons to stop this challenge, although, at present this challenge persists. There is need for a greater synergy to put an end to it. Tracing the insurgents’ finances and sponsors, this will require high level technology, and this is not usually readily available in Nigeria or other African states, leading to a need for collaboration with the international community in this regard.

Finally, countering ideology, radicalisation, and negative narratives are difficult. The military is not well equipped or trained to fight non-conventional warfare, and this is the significant fallout of its operations in the North-East of Nigeria. The Nigerian police must be trained for its internal role in securing the society, with only a supporting role from the military. Above all, corruption at all levels of government and the military affected the armed forces’ operations in the North-East. Also, it affected the military in procuring modern, standard equipment and supplies. The welfare of the soldiers was also affected; therefore, their ‘morale’ in the fight against the insurgency was low, contributing to the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian armed force’s campaign against the insurgency in the North-East since 1999.
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